TURKEY AS AN ALLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A007500030001-7
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• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 21, 1956
• Content Type: NIE

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7 Niflh 1956
NIE 3 3 ? 5 6
21 February 1956
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 33-56
TURKEY AS AN ALLY
DoctimE--_-!-7 NO.
NO CHANal IN t
CLAS3.
(3 TO TS SO
NEXT RE-ViiivV DATE:
Submitted by theTE KR 70-2
REVIEWER:
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 21 February 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of
Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and
the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
246
COPY NO.
ASS ISTANT DIRECTOR ,ONE
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CalIFIDSSTETAL
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TURKEY AS AN ALLY
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the present situation and probable developments in Turkey over the
next few years, with particular reference to Turkey's strengths and weaknesses as a
member of the Western alliance.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Since 1947, Turkey has been a stable
and dependable member of the Western
alliance and has made considerable prog-
ress in developing its economy and
strengthening its military establishment.
Nevertheless, its ambitious pursuit of
both economic development and military
preparedness simultaneously has pro-
duced serious economic and political
strains which will probably last for some
time to come. (Paras. 8-11)
2. The government has announced a sta-
bilization program and in this connection
will probably take steps to check inflation
and improve its international payments
position, which will require a reduction in
the rate of recent investment. It will
probably need additional US assistance
incident to its stabilization program and
particularly in meeting its most pressing
financial obligations. Over the longer
run, if approximately the recent rate of
investment is to be resumed and carried
out with some degree of economic stabili-
ty, continuation of substantial amounts
of foreign aid will be required as well as
currency devaluation and the introduc-
tion internally of austerity measures.
(Paras. 34-38)
3. We consider it highly unlikely that
any major threat to the stability of
the Turkish governmental structure will
arise, at least within the next few years.
The Democrat Party will probably retain
control of the government at least up to
the 1958 elections, but will probably
suffer some loss of strength and may even
feel compelled to drop Prime Minister
Menderes. Over the longer run, economic
development will increasingly change
traditional patterns of Turkish rural life
and create new political and social as well
as economic strains. (Paras. 20-27)
4. These political and economic difficul-
ties will not weaken Turkey's basic anti-
Soviet orientation. The Turks will con-
tinue to regard the US as a necessary ally
and will almost certainly continue to co-
operate with the US on major inter-
national issues. However, irritations and
tensions in the US-Turkish relationship
will be recurrent. Turkey will be dis-
satisfied with levels of US aid and will
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seek increased US support for the Bagh-
dad Pact. Moreover, strains are likely to
arise in connection with the implementa-
tion of any program for the stabilization
of the Turkish economy. (Paras. 57, 62-
64)
5. Trade with the Bloc has increased sig-
nificantly since 1950, and now accounts
for 20 to 25 percent of Turkey's foreign
trade, as compared to seven to eight per-
cent in 1950. If the stabilization pro-
gram is successful, Turkish goods may
again become competitive in Western
markets and the Turks may attempt to
reverse the trend of growing trade with
the Bloc. However, unless the Free World
is prepared to purchase Turkey's agricul-
tural surpluses, there will be little chance
of such a policy being successful. More-
over, the Turkish government's preoccu-
pation with rapid economic development
might even induce the Turks to accept
some Soviet aid, though they would al-
most certainly not do so at the risk of
losing US financial support. (Para. 39)
2
6. During the past year relations with
Greece have been marred by continuing
sharp differences over Cyprus. In time
the Turks may reconcile themselves to
Cypriot self-determination, provided the
rights of the Turkish minority are fully
guaranteed, and UK or NATO control of
military bases ? on the island is main-
tained. (Paras. 50, 58, 61)
7. Despite Turkey's military progress
over the past few years, its forces are
still only partially equipped and trained.
Turkish ability to undertake sustained
combat operations would be completely
dependent on outside logistic support.
Turkey would probably attempt to main-
tain its present military establishment
despite a cutback in US military aid. In
view of the great emphasis which both
the Turkish government and the Turkish
people have placed on the military estab-
lishment, a major reduction in US mili-
tary aid would have a profoundly dis-
illusioning effect. (Paras. 40-46, 49)
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
8. Since 1947, Turkey has been a stable and
dependable member of the Western alliance.
It has been an uncompromising opponent of
Soviet expansionism, an enthusiastic sup-
porter of NATO preparedness goals, and has
worked closely with the US. It has allocated
a substantial proportion of its resources to
the support of its defense establishment, and
with US assistance has made considerable
progress in building up and modernizing its
armed forces. It has placed primary emphasis
on its ties with NATO and the US, but it also
took the lead in the establishment of the
Balkan Alliance and has worked energetically
to set up a Middle East regional defense
grouping.
9. Turkey has made notable progress toward
political and economic development since
World War II. In 1950 the virtual dictator-
ship of the Ataturk-Inonu era ended without
noticeable loss of stability. Free elections
were held for the first time since the founding
of the republic and when the opposition Dem-
ocrat Party won an overwhelming victory, an
orderly transfer of power took place. With
US technical and economic aid, the process
of economic development has reached a point
where dynamic economic growth finally is
beginning to take place. Since 1950 national
income has been growing at a rate which for
the first time is beginning to provide signifi-
cant funds for investment. Peasant educa-
tion and construction of roads to the more
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remote villages are also beginning to have pro-
found social effects.
10. Nevertheless, Turkey is still a poor and
underdeveloped agricultural country. Al-
though political awareness in the villages is
slowly increasing, political activities are still
dominated by a small, educated elite; and
the majority of the population generally looks
to the government for instruction and guid-
ance. Despite free elections, the government
is still authoritarian in tone, with the Demo-
crats using much the same sort of legal de-
vices to curb the opposition as did their pred-
ecessors. The extent of the September 1955
anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir re-
flected the economic dissatisfaction of certain
elements of the urban population, as well as
their prejudices against minority groups.'
11. Although the Turkish government's in-
creasingly active diplomacy has scored suc-
cesses in helping to win Pakistani, Iraqi, and
Iranian adherence to the "northern tier" con-
cept, it has not tended to smooth relations
with Yugoslavia and Greece, and has resulted
in difficulties with many of the Arab states.
More importantly, the government's insist-
ence on forcing the pace of economic develop-
ment has caused serious economic strains
within the country and has resulted in serious
disagreements with the US, the IBRD, and the
OEEC which have advocated a more prudent
course. It has also contributed to strains
within the ruling Democrat Party.
Christian minorities, historically a great prob-
lem in Turkey, are no longer of major import-
ance. There are some 300,000 Christians, of
whom 130,000 are Greeks and 60,000 Armenians.
There are about 76,000 Jews. The majority of
the Christian and Jewish minorities live in the
Istanbul area. There is no legal discrimination
against members of the non-Moslem minority
group. The Kurds, who number about two mil-
lion in Turkey, constitute an ethnic and lin-
guistic, though not a religious minority. Living
in isolated areas of eastern and southeastern
Turkey, the Kurds have not been effectively in-
tegrated into the Turkish body politic. There is
also a large element ? perhaps over four million
? of tribal and seminomadic groups who are
suspect of having secret Shia Moslem sympathies
and whose peculiar customs lead the majority of
uneducated Sunni Moslem villagers to regard
them with suspicion.
II. POLITICAL SITUATION AND PROSPECTS
12. Turkey is politically dominated by the
Democrat Party, an offshoot of the once all-
powerful Republican People's Party (RPP) .
The Democrats swept Turkey's first free
parliamentary elections in 1950 and increased
their majority in 1954. They hold 471 of the
541 seats in parliament and thus can pass
legislation or even amend the constitution
(which requires a two-thirds vote) without
effective opposition.
13. Actual political power has been concen-
trated in the hands of Prime Minister Adnan
Menderes and a small group of close advisors.
Menderes is a forceful leader who sometimes
uses ruthless methods. He heads the Demo-
crat Party organization and has been person-
ally responsible for the formulation of most
governmental policy and supporting legisla-
tion. He has made full use of his control
over the highly centralized administrative
apparatus of the state, with its capabilities for
reward and punishment, to keep his followers
in line and the opposition off balance. The
President of the Republic, Celal Bayar, has
left active control of the party and govern-
mental affairs to Menderes. Bayar was one
of the founders of the Democrat Party; he
participates actively in Turkish diplomatic
maneuvers, maintains close contact with
Menderes and other party leaders, and exer-
cises considerable influence on the govern-
ment. Nevertheless, he has been content as
head of state to play the part of? an elder
statesman.
14. Thus far the Democrat Party has retained
a high degree of popular support. While
Menderes' program of headlong economic de-
velopment has begun to cause difficulties for
most of the urban population, it has been of
direct benefit to many others and has been
especially welcome in the predominant rural
sector of the economy, which has flourished
under a system of high guaranteed prices for
agricultural products and freedom from taxes
on agricultural income. Turkey's increased
prestige in world affairs has probably also
enhanced the popularity of the Democrat
Party.
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15. Under these circumstances the opposition
RPP has had little success in making a come-
back. Although it polled 35 percent of the
vote in 1954 and has two widely respected
leaders in ex-President of the Republic Ismet
Inonu and Kasim Gulek, the energetic secre-
tary-general of the RPP, the party has failed
to develop a positive program with which to
challenge Menderes. It still suffers from the
legacy of popular mistrust built up over 27
years of arbitrary rule. It has also been
handicapped by its small representation in
parliament (30 seats) and by the govern-
ment's use of a severe press control law 2 and
other legal devices to curb criticism.
16. Lesser opposition parties have also fared
poorly. The Republican National Party, a
basically conservative group long suspected as
the vehicle of orthodox Moslem sentiment for
a modification of the government's anti-
religious attitude, holds only five parliamen-
tary seats. The Peasant Party, whose plat-
form tends to ape that of the Democrat Party,
has none. Communism has never made sig-
nificant headway in Turkey in the face of the
basic popular suspicion of all things Russian
and the government's strong security controls.
Although the Turkish Communist Party has
been outlawed, some limited Communist ac-
tivity presumably goes on. The government's
claim that the recent Istanbul and Izmir riots
were instigated by the Communists is prob-
ably greatly exaggerated.
17. Although the opposition has not improved
its position in recent months, that of the
Democrat Party and of Menderes in particular
has suffered a decline. The government's
harsh methods of silencing its critics have
evoked protests from the more liberal and
politically sophisticated, and the criticism
which these methods have aroused in the US
and other Western countries has created
doubts about Menderes' prestige abroad. The
government has been charged with financial
2 The press law, which authorizes legal action
against anyone who directly or indirectly crit-
icizes the government or its ministers, is notable
for its provision that the truth of the statements
involved does not constitute an admissable de-
fense.
irresponsibility and poor tactics in dealing
with the US. In mid-1955 it succeeded in
obtaining only $30 million of additional US
aid instead of the $300 million US loan it had
been counting on to check the accelerating
inflation and overcome Turkey's worsening
international payments position. Its inept
handling of the September 1955 riots on the
Cyprus issue was another blow to the govern-
ment's prestige. It failed to order prompt
intervention by the armed forces while dem-
onstrations, probably initially authorized by
the government, developed into widespread
violence and looting. Moreover, Menderes'
economic policies have produced inflationary
strains which have created growing dissatis-
faction, particularly among the urban popula-
tion. Within the Democrat Party itself re-
sentment has begun to appear over Menderes'
arbitrary methods and over alleged financial
profiteering by the then Deputy Prime Min-
ister Zorlu and other favored officials.
18. The strains within the Democrat Party
first came into the open at the party's October
1955 National Congress, when some of the
more liberal elements raised demands for a
revision of the harsh press law and indicated
a general dissatisfaction with Menderes' high-
handed methods. The immediate crisis was
promptly resolved when Menderes expelled
nine dissident deputies from the party, in-
cluding the widely respected Fevzi Lutfi
Karaosmanoglu and two other former cabinet
ministers. Although an additional 10 depu-
ties resigned in protest, Menderes was re-
elected party president by an overwhelming
majority.
19. A new and more serious crisis arose in late
November. A caucus of Democrat deputies
subjected the government to a barrage of
criticism for financial mismanagement and
irregularities. Menderes squeaked through
with a narrow vote of "personal" confidence,
but was forced to drop Zorlu and other key
targets of criticism from the cabinet and to
promise a more effective attack on the rising
cost of living and other problems of economic
management. On this basis, a reconstituted
cabinet, pledged to undertake a tightening
up of economic and financial policies, was
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overwhelmingly approved by parliament in
December 1955. Shortly thereafter, however,
the deputies who had withdrawn from the
Democrat Party ? now totalling 29 ? united
to organize the Freedom Party. This group,
which charges the government with forsaking
pledges of constitutional and political reform,
includes some fairly prominent Democrat
Party figures, though to date it has not
attracted a following of a size and nature to
represent a real threat to the Democrats.
Probable Developments
20. The immediate outlook is for a period of
considerable political uncertainty because of
the deterioration in Menderes' personal posi-
tion, the incipient challenge to his party, and
the politically unpalatable measures which will
be necessary to check the current inflation.
Despite the press law which will continue to
dampen opposition criticism, at least through
its present expiration date in March 1956,
attacks on the government will be heightened.
The economic crisis with its attendant politi-
cal repercussions has been a severe blow to
Prime Minister Menderes' prestige even with-
in his own party. Moreover, many party
members having publicly rebuked a leader so
conspicuously intolerant of criticism, may feel
they must continue to oppose Menderes for
the sake of their own political survival.
21. Menderes remains a forceful political
leader who still towers over his potential rivals
and who will probably make energetic efforts
to re-establish a firm political position.
Should he succeed in extricating the govern-
ment from its acute economic and financial
difficulties, it is unlikely that his leadership
?
would be seriously threatened, at least during
the next year or two. On the other hand, the
temerity of the Democrat deputies in directly
challenging his position indicates a depth of
feeling which will not easily be assuaged and
probably marks a turning point in intraparty
affairs. Under these circumstances, Men-
deres' survival will depend on his ability to
convince his party and the elite in the country
that he is still in effective control of the situa-
tion and that he will take the steps necessary
to stave off economic crisis, assure continuing
US support, and re-establish party harmony.
If he does not take these steps, the Democrats
would probably feel compelled to drop him
lest they incur large-scale defections from
their parliamentary strength. In such an
event, President Bayar would probably assume
a more active role in the government, though
he appears unlikely to take over direct control
himself.
22. The outlook for the Democrat Party over
the next year or two is somewhat more favor-
able. Despite its current difficulties, it still
has a commanding parliamentary position
and its popular acceptance and support in the
countryside has only begun to decline. Its
effectiveness as a going political organization
will probably tend to discourage further sig-
nificant defections from its parliamentary
delegation. Moreover, it will probably con-
tinue to have the prestige and influence of the
president behind it. Although it is possible
that the Democrats might split over the
question of Menderes' future or the manage-
ment of economic affairs, we believe it more
likely that the party will remain united and
retain control of the government at least up
to the national elections of 1958.
23. Nevertheless, the basic trend appears to
be toward a loosening of the Democrat Party's
present grip on the country. Economic dis-
content, in particular, will probably continue
to provide the opposition with opportunities
for exploitation no matter what course the
government follows. The present dislocation
cannot be overcome quickly and any compre-
hensive corrective measures will antagonize
some elements of the population. While the
government may try to keep the opposition in
check through further resort to authoritarian
curbs, there will probably be increasing public
and parliamentary resistance to the use of
repressive measures. For example, Gulek and
other RPP spokesmen are said to have de-
liberately courted legal action against them-
selves in order to dramatize the free speech
issue.
24. A potential threat to the Democrat Party's
? position is posed by the newly formed Freedom
Party. Should the Democrat Party's present
leadership fail to satisfy rank-and-file de-
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mands, sizable defections to the Freedom
Party may take place. There are unconfirmed
and probably much exaggerated reports that
the Freedom Party can already count on the
support of 170 deputies.. To date, however,
there is little firm information showing a
marked swing to its side.
25. Underlying social strains may also have
an adverse effect on the government in power.
The violence of the September 1955 riots in
Istanbul demonstrated the depth of social,
economic, and religious antagonism towards
the large and relatively well-to-do minorities
in that city. Throughout the country there
appears to be deep seated resentment of the
inferior status accorded Islam under the
Turkish Republic, even though both major
parties remain firmly opposed to the injection
of religion into politics. The Democrats
have sought to ease the situation by removing
previous curbs on the public practice of Islam.
Since 1950, for example, the government has
allowed the call to prayer to be given in
Arabic, permitted a number of the devout to
make the pilgrimage to Mecca, and even sub-
sidized a number of small preacher schools.
Nevertheless, some further revival of conser-
vative or even fanatical religious sentiment
appears possible.
26. Over the longer run additional stresses
are likely to arise, since increasing industrial-
ization, urbanization, and the spread of a
money economy to the further reaches of the
countryside are increasingly changing tradi-
tional patterns of Turkish life. Within the
cities, the labor movement, which is growing
in size but so far has lacked experienced and
determined leaders, is likely to make strong
efforts to throw off the mantle of govern-
mental supervision and establish the right to
use strikes and other western collective bar-
gaining techniques. In time, the Commu-
nists may have some success in exploiting
unrest among various elements of the urban
population.
27. We consider it highly unlikely, however,
that any major threat to the stability of the
Turkish governmental structure will arise, at
least within the next few years. Despite the
presence of some concentrated minority
6
groups, Turkey has a generally homogeneous
population with a marked sense of national
unity. Semiauthoritarian patterns of gov-
ernment are accepted as normal both by the
bureaucracy and the masses of the people and
would probably continue to be followed even
in the event of greater political activity. The
army, which represents the ultimate guardian
of internal stability, has not been involved in
politics and will probably continue to be a re-
liable and effective instrument of control.
The armed forces did not intervene promptly
in the September 1955 riots, probably because
of the absence of adequate orders. This was
a source of embarrassment and concern to
the government. It has been followed by a
shake-up in army, gendarmerie, and police
commands, together with the imposition of
martial law for six months. Such a failure
is unlikely to recur.
III. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
AND PROSPECTS
28. Turkey is beginning to emerge from the
economic stagnation which developed under
the Ottomans. Despite Turkey's prewar
efforts to build up state industries and the in-
tensive programs for economic development
which have been undertaken in recent years,
the standard of living ? while substantially
higher than that of most other Middle East-
ern countries ? is still one of the lowest of
any of the Western European countries. (The
per capita gross national product in 1954 was
$200, compared with $395 for Italy and $200
for Greece.) Lack of an adequate system of
secondary roads to supplement the overbur-
dened rail network isolates much of the coun-
tryside from the urban money economy and
tends to perpetuate the dependence of much
of the population on primitive agriculture or
herding. Until the postwar period, the econo-
my was largely self-contained. However,
while over the past decade the relation be-
tween exports and GNP has remained fairly
constant at about seven percent, the increas-
ing dependence of the economy on imports
is evidenced by a rise from 3.5 percent of GNP
in 1946 to nine percent in 1953. Tobacco,
minerals, dried fruits and, more recently,
grains and cotton have been sizable exports.
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29. Turkey has been engaged in a program
of economic development since the 1930's.
In the period before World War II it took the
form largely of industrialization undertaken
by the government. Since 1950, the govern-
ment, while proceeding with industrial de-
velopment, shifted emphasis to the rural sec-
tor. Gross capital investment in four years
rose from an estimated 1,100 million of Turk-
ish lira 3 ($392 million) in 1950 to 2,600 mil-
lion Turkish lira ($920 million) in 1953. In
1950 and subsequent years the private sector
accounted for perhaps as much as one-half
of the total investment. The rate of gross
investment to the estimated gross national
product in the four years was respectively 11
percent, 12 percent, 14 percent, and 15 per-
cent. From the very outset the investment
drive was made possible by the adoption of
a liberal credit and financial policy that had
potentially inflationary consequences. This
was particularly true in the case of the agri-
cultural development. Credit on liberal terms
was made available to farmers for the pur-
chase of tractors, seeds, etc. A price support
program assuring markets at profitable prices
for the expanding agricultural production
meant increasing amounts of deficit financ-
ing in order to cover the losses of TOPRAK,
the government purchasing agency. Such
losses increased as world market prices for
grain fell in the post-Korean period without
a corresponding fail in support prices.
30. Taking advantage of the approximately
$600 million in various forms of US technical
and economic aid made available through FY
1955, the Turkish government has initiated
extensive rural and industrial development
activities. A large-scale road building pro-
gram has the dual purpose of opening up the
hinterland and improving military communi-
3 Throughout this estimate conversions have been
made at the official rate of exchange, which
is 2.8 Turkish lira to the dollar. The free market
rate in the past year has fluctuated between
seven and ten lira per dollar. While the latter
rates cannot be regarded as adequately reflecting
purchasing power within the country, it should
be noted that dollar amounts derived from con-
version of lira are necessarily substantially over-
stated.
cations. New lands have been opened up to
large-scale cultivation, notably in cotton.
Mechanization of agriculture has been con-
siderably accelerated during this period, as
illustrated by the fact that by 1955 there were
42,000 tractors in the country, as against only
1,000 in 1948. Turkey has also, however,
made important gains industrially, namely
in improved coal and other mining operations,
added electric power facilities, and expanded
and improved railway, airport and port facili-
ties, as well as modernized communications
services. Iron and steel, metal working,
cement, building materials, and chemical in-
dustries have been established or expanded.
Light industries, however, still predominate,
among which food processing and textile
manufacturing are the most important.
While industrial activity has been increased
and diversified in recent years, manufactur-
ing still plays a comparatively small role in
Turkey.
31. These activities have resulted in substan-
tial productive gains. As Table I indicates,
GNP rose in the four year period 1950 through
1953 by approximately 40 percent. GNP de-
clined in 1954 due to that year's severe crop
failure, but still represented a rise of 30 per-
cent over the 1948 level. While firm esti-
mates of 1955 GNP are not yet available, in-
dications are that production has resumed its
upward trend. The most notable gains have
been in agriculture. In particular, grain pro-
duction, which totalled 7.7 million tons in
1950 (or slightly higher than the prewar
average) rose to 14.8 million tons ? or nearly
double that amount ? in the bumper year
1953, thus making Turkey for the first time
TABLE I
ESTIMATED GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
Constant (1948) Prices
Per Capita
Turkish Lira Dollars* Turkish Lira Dollars*
(millions
of)
(millions
of)
1950
10,400
3,714
496
177
1951
11,988
4,279
556
202
1952
13,023
4,651
588
210
1953
14,467
5,167
635
227
1954
13,100
4,679
559
200
* See footnote to paragraph 29.
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a substantial grain exporter. Although the
poor 1954 wheat crop failed to meet even
domestic needs, the 1955 crop ? while some-
what better ? did not provide a surplus for
export.
32. Despite and in some considerable measure
because of these achievements, some major
problems have arisen:
a. The government faces serious balance
of payments difficulties. Even a relatively
modest development program would have gen-
erated requirements for capital equipment,
petroleum products, and other items from
abroad which could not have been met out of
current annual foreign exchange earnings.
However, the Turks have embarked on a very
ambitious and poorly planned program and,
even though much of the imports required for
their investment program have been met
through US grant aid, they have allowed their
foreign obligations to pile up at a far higher
rate than their repayment capabilities would
justify. This has been particularly true be-
cause a considerable portion of investment
has been financed through short-term foreign
borrowing. A large part of these debts will
be falling due this year and the next. In 1956
existing obligations including arrears call for
repayments of about $172 million and in 1957
of about $144 million. With its gold reserves
already almost entirely pledged and its un-
committed foreign exchange holdings negli-
gible, the resources for meeting these obliga-
tions are not in sight.
b. Serious inflationary strains have arisen.
Heavy development expenditures, coupled
with the maintenance of a large defense es-
tablishment, have created inflationary pres-
sures on the economy which the government
has not only been reluctant to deal with but
has actually stimulated through its farm
price support and easy credit policies. The
situation was aggravated in 1954, when the
rate of investment was maintained despite a
major crop shortfall, thus contributing to a
forced reduction in the importation of needed
industrial raw materials, spare parts, and
petroleum. Since 1953, the urban cost of
living has risen by about 25 percent without
substantial increases in wages and salaries
8
TABLE II
Turkish Balance of Payments
(In millions of TL)*
July 1,
1952
June 30,
1953
July 1,
1953
June 30,
1954
July 1,
1954
June 30,
1955
Operations on Current
Account
Imports
1,495
1,483
1,333
Exports
1,083
990
906
?412
?493
?427
Invisibles, net
?10
?28.4
?42
Other
+8.8
+72
Current balance
?422
?512.6
?396
Operations on Capital
Account
Capital movements
(private)
?26.6
+24.9
+155
Public debt repayment
?18.8
?83.3
?93
IBRD
+17.5
+38.2
+38
ICA (FOA)
+209.4
+126.8
+163
Export-import
+2.1
+2.2
Supplier credits
+26.0
+80.8
IMF credit
+56
Arrears
+104.9
+384.1
Other
+110
?52.0
+179**
Net errors & omissions
?2.5
?55.1
?46
+422
+512.6
+396
* See footnote to paragraph 29.
** Principally credits under trade agreements.
except for certain categories of skilled labor,
and even the relatively better situated rural
population has begun to grumble over short-
ages and high prices for such necessities as
sugar, nails, and spare parts for farm equip-
ment. The government's refusal to devalue
the lira and its maintenance of high agricul-
tural price supports have also tended to price
Turkish products out of the world market,
thus adding to Turkey's balance of pay-
ments difficulties. Turkey's growing resort
to bilateral trade with the Bloc, which now
accounts for about 20 to 25 percent of
Turkey's total foreign trade, as compared to
seven to eight percent in 1950, represents an
effort to get around this problem. It is prov-
ing costly in terms of quality of goods received
and possibly also with respect to price.
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TABLE III
Turkish Foreign Debt ? February 1956
Total
Government long term debt
Government short term debt
Supplier credit
Millions of dollars*
Millions of Turkish lira***
509
141**
1,424
394
(a) public sector
205
574
(b) private sector
53
147
Commercial credit
Debts to oil companies
49
137
Arrears
130
365
TOTAL
1,087
3,041
Schedule of Payments Required Under Terms of Existing Foreign Indebtedness
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
Mil $
Mil TL
Mil $
Mil TL
Mil $
Mil TL
Mil $
Mil TL
Mil $
Mil TL
Government long term debt
41
116
38
106
35
97
36
101
34
94
Government short term debt
Supplier credit
(a) private
23
65
16
44
9
26
3
7
1
4
(b) public
41
115
49
137
40
113
35
97
24
68
Commercial credit
Debts to oil companies
14
40
Arrears
53
149
41
116
18
50
18
50
_
TOTAL
172
485
144
403
102
286
92
255
59
166
* These foreign debts, while stated in dollars, represent sterling, franc and other foreign obligations as
well as dollar indebtedness.
** There is no present scheduling of repayment to foreign banks of these debts, most of which ($114 mil-
lion) is secured by gold, leaving only about $30 million of Turkish gold holdings uncommitted.
*** The lira value of this debt is understated, since it is arrived at on the basis of the official exchange rate
of 2.8 TL=$1.00. See footnote to paragraph 29.
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c. Finally, there has been considerable
waste and poor coordination in the program.
Projects have been scheduled, sometimes for
political reasons, without due regard for their
place in the over-all development of the econo-
my and without proper anticipation of bottle-
necks. There has been much diversion of
capital to inventory speculation and to rela-
tively unproductive building construction.
In some instances the Turks have made
heavier initial investments than were im-
mediately necessary, apparently in order to
obtain additional leverage in aid negotiations
with the US.
33. Until recently Turkey paid little attention
to the increasing concern voiced by the US,
the IBRD, the OEEC, and various other in-
terested parties and advisers. Menderes,
partially under the influence of former Depu-
ty Prime Minister Zorlu, seems to have be-
lieved that his economic troubles were tem-
porary ones which would disappear if the
country obtained, as he anticipated, large
additional amounts of assistance from the US
and held on long enough for the various in-
vestment schemes to pay off. He was almost
certainly convinced that in the last analysis
the US would feel compelled to provide what-
ever emergency financial support its ally
Turkey needed.
34. The events of recent months, however,
have forced Menderes to shift to a more real-
istic approach to his economic problems.
During the fall of 1955 the government tight-
ened import controls, raised the bank rate on
loans, and paid off some commercial debts.
Moreover, following the shake-up in the gov-
ernment's, economic high command which
took place as the result of the December 1955
cabinet crisis, the new Minister of Finance has
come forward with a program,4 which if car-
ried out would provide a substantial measure
4 The proposed measures include: (a) confining
new investment activity largely to completion
of projects presently under way; (b) limiting
further financing of state enterprises through
the Central Bank; (c) limiting agricultural
credit to present levels and controlling other
bank credit; (d) instituting a priority schedule
on imports; and (e) balancing the government
budget.
of stabilization for some months. Menderes
has now publicly endorsed this program, and
has reassured the Randall mission, which
visited Turkey in February 1956 under joint
Turkish-US sponsorship, that he is determined
to follow through with it.
The Economic Outlook
35. We believe that Turkey's long-range eco-
nomic prospects are fundamentally good. The
country possesses sufficient undeveloped land,
fuel, and mineral resources to support a sub-
stantially greater population than its present
24 million. Its leadership is energetic. Pro-
duction has already begun to increase at a
rate which not only exceeds that of popula-
tion growth, but is yielding a moderate sur-
plus available for investment.
36. Nevertheless, continuing economic de-
velopment will be a long-drawn-out process
requiring a higher sustained rate of imports,
over a period of years, than Turkey will be
able to pay for from its current foreign ex-
change earnings. Although Turkey may be
able to finance some portion of its future im-
port requirements through long-term loans
from non-US sources, the rate of development
will be greatly slowed without continued sub-
stantial US grant or loan aid. Both the sta-
bility of the Turkish economy and its credit
worthiness will be adversely affected by its
vulnerability to crop failure and its depend-
ence on a very small number of products for
the bulk of its export earnings.
37. Incident to such development there will
be internal problems to be faced as well. In-
creasing population, and demand for improve-
ment in the standard of living on the part of
the populace, as well as the defense burden,
will be competing with the development pro-
gram for the limited available domestic re-
sources. The success of the development pro-
gram over the longer run will require some
limitation on the rate of increase in the stand-
ard of living of the people.
38. Turkey's immediate economic and finan-
cial difficulties are likely to present a continu-
ing threat of instability over the months to
come. Turkish leaders now appear sufficient-
ly concerned to move toward putting their
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TABLE IV
TURKISH GOVERNMENT BUDGET*
Revenues
1953-1954
1954-1955
1955-1956 (Est.)
Millions
of TL
Millions of
dollars**
Millions
of TL
Millions of
dollars**
Millions
of TL
Millions of
dollars**
Taxes
2,005
716
2,274
812
2,912
1,040
Self-financing government economic
enterprises
116
41
109
38
268
96
?
2,121
2,383
3,180
1,136
Total revenues
757
850
Expenditures.
Capital outlay (including
state enterprises)
852
305
1,009 ,
360
1,660
592
Current expenditures
1,018
364
1,283
458
1,424
509
Defense, including counterpart funds
718
256
827
295
931
333
?
--
2,588
3,119
4,015
1,434
Total expenditures
925
1,113
Total Deficit
467
168
736
263
835
298
Less counterpart funds
131
47
206
74
200
71
?
?
336
530
635
227
Deficit after counterpart
121
189
Defense expenditures as percentage
of total budget expenditures
28%
27%
23%
Defense expenditures as percentage
of GNP
4.3%
4.4%
4.5%
50X1
** See footnote to paragraph 29.
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economic and financial affairs in order. If
the US is prepared to assist in meeting Tur-
key's most pressing foreign exchange obliga-
tions, the Turks can probably make progress
toward establishing their economy on a
sounder basis. However, even the present
stabilization program is likely to engender re-
sistances which may make the government
reluctant to follow through with the requisite
firmness. Sooner or later, the government
will also have to face up to the need to devalue
its currency if the stabilization process is to
be effectively carried out. Moreover, increas-
ing taxation will be needed so as to check in-
flationary trends and mobilize funds for the
internal component of the government's in-
vestment program.
39. Turkey will continue to be susceptible to
Soviet economic offers, particularly if a re-
duction in US aid appears to be in prospect.
With its credit exhausted and most of its
products priced too high to compete in West-
ern markets, Turkey has already turned in-
creasingly to barter deals with the Bloc. Im-
ports from the Bloc have risen from eight
percent of the total in 1950 to 19.6 percent
in the first half of 1955, and export percent-
ages have similarly risen from seven percent
to 26.5 percent in the same period. If the
stabilization program is successful and Turk-
ish goods again become competitive in West-
ern markets, the Turks, who are probably
skeptical of extensive dealings with the Bloc,
may attempt to reverse the current trend.
On the other hand, the increasing availability
within the Bloc of manufactured goods for
export, and the fact that Turkish wheat and
cotton may be difficult to dispose of in West-
ern markets, might make trade between
Turkey and the Bloc mutually advantageous
and attractive. The Turkish government's
preoccupation with rapid economic develop-
ment and its need for imported materials to
carry the program out might even induce the
Turks to accept some Soviet aid, though they
would almost certainly not do so at the risk
of losing US financial support.
IV. MILITARY AFFAIRS
40. Turkey continues to lay great stress on
the development and maintenance of strong
military defenses. Virtually all of its mili-
tary establishment of approximately half a
million men is committed to NATO. Much
of the cost for the training and equipment, as
well as some of the cost of supporting these
forces, has been borne by the US. US eco-
nomic aid has also indirectly contributed to
the maintenance of Turkey's armed forces.
However, the Turks have themselves assumed
an extremely heavy defense burden. Over
the last five years defense expenditures have
accounted for roughly 43 percent of the gov-
ernment budget ? approximately 28 percent
in direct appropriations to the defense estab-
lishment and another 15 percent in various
forms of indirect support, such as construc-
tion of roads and facilities. Current defense
expenditures represent about 4.5 percent of
estimated GNP.
41. The composition of the Turkish armed
forces is as follows:
a. The Turkish Army, with a personnel
strength of about 430,000, consists of three
field armies and eight corps. Major units in-
clude 13 infantry divisions, 3 mountain divi-
sions, 3 cavalry divisions, 1 armored division,
and 4 armored brigades. Under the Turkish
system, all men undergo military training
and are members of the reserve up to age 46,
thus giving Turkey a mobilization capability
of an additional 800,000 men. However,
equipment for reserves is largely lacking.
The 40,000-man Gendarmerie and the 10,000
Customs Guards are also given basic army
training.
b. The Turkish Air Force consists of ap-
proximately 30,000 officers and men equipped
with about 400 mission aircraft, including 260
jet fighter bombers and 70 jet fighter inter-
ceptors. Most of the aircraft are committed
to NATO and are organized into 14 fighter
bomber squadrons, 1 fighter interceptor
squadron, and 1 reconnaissance squadron.
Four additional squadrons of about 40 trans-
port mission aircraft are not assigned to
NATO.
c. The Turkish Navy, whose personnel
strength is expected to be raised from 24,000
to 33,000, possesses 1 old battleship, 10 de-
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stroyers, 12 submarines, 8 subchasers, 39
minelayers and minesweepers, plus auxiliary
vessels and service craft.
42. The Turkish soldier is deeply patriotic,
well-disciplined, and physically tough. More-
over, the extensive re-equipment and training
programs undertaken under US supervision
have resulted in transforming the poorly
equipped and poorly organized military estab-
lishment of 1947, with its ignorance of modern
tactics and techniques, into a considerably
more up-to-date fighting force.
43. Much, however, still remains to be done.
Even NATO-assigned tactical units in the
army are on the average only slightly over 50
percent equipped, and Turkey remains de-
pendent on outside aid for most logistical
support. Though the ground forces are in-
creasingly effective, they continue to be
hindered by such factors as a rigidly central-
ized and bureaucratic higher staff control,
some lack of individual initiative on the part
of junior officers and noncoms, and inade-
quate unit and combined arms training.
Another fundamental difficulty, which is be-
ing faced, is that of developing and retaining
sufficient numbers of competent junior offi-
cers, NCO's, and technicians.
44. The air force has shown a very slow in-
crease in combat readiness and effectiveness
over the past two years and is still only par-
tially trained. Under present aid programs
the 16 NATO committed squadrons will, by
1958, be sufficiently equipped and trained to
constitute a combat ready force. Ten major
airfields including three international civil
fields now exist, six of which are to be brought
up to SHAPE standards by the end of 1956.
About eight additional NATO airfields are
planned. As yet, Turkish air defense capa-
bilities are very inadequate because of an ex-
tremely weak air control and warning radar
net; additionally Turkey lacks an adequately
trained jet interceptor fighter force.
45. The Turkish Navy is the least effective
among those of the Mediterranean NATO
powers. Though it is a regular participant
in NATO exercises, none of its units has been
definitely assigned to NATO forces. It is in-
capable of denying access to the Straits to
Soviet naval forces in time of war, and could
probably carry out no more than minor
harassing action against Soviet amphibious
landings on the Black Sea coast. However,
its seven ex-US submarines, given adequate
logistical support, could harass Soviet supply
lines in the Black Sea.
46. At present, Turkey could probably hold its
position in Thrace and the Straits indefinitely
-against an attack by Bulgaria alone. However,
unless promptly reinforced it would soon lose
this area to a determined Soviet-Satellite at-
tack. Without allied reinforcements, Turkey
could do no more than delay a major Soviet
land offensive from the east. Turkey's ability
to shift defensive forces from one front to
another or to engage in or support offensive
moves is limited by lack of transport equip-
ment in the field army and by the limited
size and the high vulnerability of its internal
rail and road network. Turkey is almost
entirely incapable of providing its own ammu-
? nition, fuel, and materiel replacement require-
ments. In all cases, the ability of the Turks
to undertake effective and sustained combat
operations would be contingent on substantial
outside logistic support.
Future Developments
47. The future of the Turkish armed forces
will depend primarily on the extent of US
support. Turkish leaders, with general pop-
ular approval, are anxious to complete the
modernization of the present Turkish military
establishment, and would probably be willing
to undertake a further expansion if the addi-
tional equipment and direct forces support
could be made available. However, the Turks
are already overextended militarily in terms
of their economic capabilities and, despite
Turkey's potential for economic development,
they will probably continue to be so for an
indefinite period. Turkey will be unable to
defray the cost of acquiring additional equip-
ment, and probably would not be able to meet
even replacement and maintenance costs by
itself.
48. A continuation of substantial US military
aid would result in a slow but steady increase
in Turkish military capabilities. However,
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maintenance of these capabilities after exist-
ing equipment deficiencies were overcome
would still require substantial continuing sup-
port, in view of Turkey's probable inability
to foot the bill. Turkey has indicated its will-
ingness to contribute forces to the defense
of the Zagros Mountain line in Iran. Since
virtually all of Turkey's forces are committed
to the defense of its own territory under
NATO plans, however, it is highly unlikely
that forces could be made available for em-
ployment outside Turkish territory without
an expansion of Turkey's present troop
strength.
49. Turkey would probably attempt to main-
tain its present inadequately equipped mili-
tary establishment despite a cutback in US
military aid. However, the Turks would prob-
ably be unable to do so unless direct forces
support were continued. A cutback in eco-
nomic assistance would be likely to induce the
Turkish government to make some military
reductions rather than cut back on the eco-
nomic development program. In view of the
great emphasis which both the Turkish gov-
ernment and the Turkish people have placed
on the military establishment, a major reduc-
tion in US military aid would have a pro-
foundly disillusioning effect.
V. FOREIGN AFFAIRS
50. Turkish foreign policy is marked by a
fierce determination to preserve Turkey's ter-
ritorial integrity and independence, a strong
belief in the efficacy of firmness backed by
strength in international affairs, and a grow-
ing sense of self-confidence and pride in Tur-
key's achievements. The Turks consider
themselves Europeans rather than Middle
Easterners and remain basically contemp-
tuous of their weak and relatively backward
neighbors in Iran and the Arab states. Al-
though Turkey has sought to remain on good
terms with Greece, some vestiges of past
Greek-Turkish animosity existed even before
the recent flare-up of Greek-Turkish feelings
over Cyprus.
51. During the earlier years of the republic,
Turkey sought to avoid involvement in inter-
national power politics, while attempting to
14
build up economic self-sufficiency. It formed
early ties with the then equally new and gen-
erally ostracized Soviet government in Russia,
and maintained close economic relations with
the USSR up through the 1930's. Turkey
remained neutral for most of World War II,
and only entered the war in 1945 so as to
become eligible for UN membership.
52. Following World War II, however, the
basic direction of Turkish foreign policy
shifted drastically to strong support of collec-
tive security, both in and out of the UN.
Confronted once again with the threat of Rus-
sian expansionism, which for more than 300
years has posed a recurrent danger to Tur-
key's position in the Straits and Anatolia, the
Turks have since concentrated on building
up alliances in the West. Their initial pre-
occupation was with solidifying their rela-
tionship with the US, and with being accepted
as a NATO partner. Although Turkey went
along with the ill-fated Middle East Command
proposals, it initially showed little real inter-
est in Middle East defense problems. Having
achieved the basic goal of NATO membership
in 1952, Turkey has since felt free to take an
increasingly active role in regional affairs. It
made strenuous efforts to draw Yugoslavia
into a firm defensive alliance with itself and
Greece under the Balkan Pact of 1953 and
the subsequent Bled Agreement of 1954. More
recently, Turkey has conducted an energetic
diplomatic offensive on behalf of the plan for
a Middle East defense grouping.
53. These moves, together with such steps as
Turkey's decision to contribute forces to the
Korean campaign, probably reflected a desire
to demonstrate Turkey's solidarity with the
US and its other Western allies, and thereby
to strengthen Turkey's claims to continued
US military and economic aid. The Turkish-
Pakistani Pact of 1954, under which the
"northern tier" scheme first began to take
form, was undertaken in direct response to
US suggestions.
54. However, Turkey has followed through
with these policies with an energy which also
appears to reflect an increasing sense of its
importance and responsibility as a world
power and its growing concern for Turkey's
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regional interests and prestige. The vigorous
and skillful diplomacy of Premier Menderes
and President Bayar played an important role
in Iraq's decision to sign the Baghdad Pact
in 1955 and in Iran's subsequent decision to
adhere. Similar tactics have been applied,
thus far unsuccessfully, to Jordan, Lebanon,
and Syria. Although Turkey is one of the
few Middle East states to recognize Israel, it
has recently acted more coolly in its relations
with that country in order to improve its
standing in the Arab world. Turkish diplo-
macy and propaganda have attacked Egypt
and Saudi Arabia for their opposition to the
Baghdad Pact. In its efforts to influence the
situation in Syria, Turkey has backed up its
strong diplomatic pressures with a certain
amount of saber-rattling. Although the Turks
do not appear to have seriously considered
armed intervention in Syria, they have dis-
played continuing interest in the possibility
of a coup by antileftist and anti-Egyptian
elements.
55. These echoes of the Ottoman tradition in
Turkey's recent Middle East diplomacy have
roused some fears, which thus far appear to
be unfounded, among the Arabs that Turkey
has irridentist ambitions. While Turkey's
new involvement in Middle Eastern affairs
may in time generate an interest in reassert-
ing Turkish political leadership over the Arab
states, there is no indication of a desire to
expand Turkish territory to include non-
Turkish peoples.
56. Turkey, during the past year, has opposed
Cypriot and Greek demands for the union of
Cyprus with Greece, sometimes with such
vigor as to obstruct British offers to com-
promise the issues. Turkey's opposition is
based on a desire to protect the Turkish
minority (constituting about 18 percent of the
island's population and supported by a vocif-
erous pressure group on the mainland) , as
well as on the conviction that Cyprus' stra-
tegic location requires that it be kept in safer
hands than those of the Greeks. While de-
mands for the return of Cyprus to Turkey
have appeared frequently in the Turkish
press, Turkey has demonstrated no real desire
to annex the island and would be content with
a continuation of UK control there.
15
Future Developments
57. The main lines of Turkish foreign policy
will probably remain substantially unchanged
for the foreseeable future, regardless of inter-
nal political developments. Conciliatory ges-
tures by the USSR, of which the most notable
was the withdrawal in 1953 of claims to the
Straits and to Turkey's eastern provinces of
Kars and Ardahan, have not dissipated Tur-
key's underlying conviction that Russian
expansionism is a primary, and enduring
threat to its territorial integrity and security.
Recent Soviet overtures aimed at improving
relations with Turkey have been politely but
firmly rebuffed. The Bloc will probably con-
tinue its efforts to develop closer relations with
Turkey. However, even if there should be a
prolonged drift toward a de-emphasis of mili-
tary alliances and of sharp divisions between
the Soviet Bloc and the West, Turkey will
probably continue to be a strong advocate of
military preparedness against the Bloc and
will continue to look to NATO ? and in the
last anaylsis to the US ? as a source of sup-
port. The Turks would almost certainly
react firmly to any renewal of Soviet pressures
against them.
58. Although the Turks have presumably
given up hope, at least for the present, of
obtaining effective military cooperation from
Yugoslavia, they will probably go along with
Greek efforts to keep the framework of the
Balkan Alliance intact. In any event, Turkey
will make sincere, if not always adroit, efforts
to heal the breach with Greece which was
brought about by the Istanbul and Izmir riots.
Turkey was deeply disturbed by the recent
refusal of the Greeks to participate in NATO-
scheduled joint military exercises and has
taken a number of steps to placate Greece.
Although the pattern of Greek-Turkish rela-
tions so carefully built up over the last 30
years has been severely shaken as a result of
the riots, both governments now appear de-
sirous of restoring a greater measure of
cooperation.
59. Turkey will almost certainly continue its
efforts to combat anti-Western, pro-Commu-
nist influences in the Middle East, most
specifically through support of the Baghdad
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Pact. The Turks are concerned about the
possibility of Soviet political, economic, and
eventual military penetration of the area.
In any event, Turkey is too deeply committed
to the "northern tier" concept to withdraw
gracefully without loss of prestige. The Turks
are likely to remain particularly concerned
about Syria and may make further efforts,
alone or in cooperation with Iraq, to promote
the fall of the present government.
60. The ultimate extent of Turkish efforts in
the Middle East, however, will depend largely
on the attitude of the US, whose diplomatic
and military support Turkey recognizes as
vital. Turkey will probably put strong pres-
sure on the US to give greater support to the
Baghdad Pact. It may deliberately under-
take a more forward policy of its own in the
hope of forcing the US's hand. Should sub-
stantially greater US support not be forth-
coming, however, it is likely that Turkey
would eventually give up active efforts to pro-
mote the pact organization.
61. Turkey's relations with its European allies
are likely to be subject to various political and
economic strains over the next few years.
Turkish inflexibility will probably continue to
contribute to the inherent difficulties in the
Cyprus problem, though the Turks may even-
tually be persuaded to accept Cypriot self-
determination on the basis of special provi-
sion for the rights of the Turkish ethnic
minority and continued UK or NATO control
of military bases on the island.
Turkish Relations With the US
62. The main incentives to Turkish coopera-
tion with the US will probably remain for the
foreseeable future. Turkey will continue to
16
regard the US as a necessary ally against the
threat of Soviet-Communist expansionism and
will wish to support the US in its efforts to
maintain a strong free world position. Bar-
ring a drastic shift in US attitudes and poli-
cies toward Turkey, the Turks will also value
the friendship of the US because of their de-
pendence on the US for further military and
economic aid.
63. Nevertheless, relations between the US
and Turkey are likely to be somewhat less
close and harmonious than in the past. Tur-
key entered into its postwar partnership with
the US with a considerable degree of enthu-
siasm and, in fact, still works closely and
cordially with the US on most foreign and de-
fense policy matters. However, with the pas-
sage of time and the progressive growth of
Turkey's pride in its accomplishments and '
confidence in its own judgments, various ten-
sions have begun to arise.
64. Although US-Turkish friction will prob-
ably abate as a result of Turkey's recent moves
to stabilize its economy, Turkish captiousness
and irritability toward the US are not likely
to be reduced for an extended period. The
Turks, who have exerted themselves to ex-
pand the Baghdad Pact, will feel let down
unless the US gives more support to the Pact,
and further differences may arise over the
Cyprus issue. Although the Turks may prove
willing to accept a program of more orderly
and rational development, disagreement re-
garding the level of aid will continue. Never-
theless, the mutual interests linking Turkey
and the US are sufficiently important virtu-
ally to insure continued cooperation on major
international issues.
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ADRIATIC
SEA
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NOTE: Only selected railroads
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Scale 1:10,000,000
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CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
SECRET
CONFIDENT/AL
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