THE OUTLOOK FOR FRANCE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 10, 1956
• Content Type: NIE

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NIE 22-56
10 July 1956
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 22-56
(Supersedes NIE 22-55)
THE OUTLOOK FOR FRANCE
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 10 July 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant, In-
telligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic
Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assist-
ant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside their jurisdiction.
WAN'
r-143
258
COPY NO.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,ONE
DOCtiMENT NO.
NO OHANC7E IN CLASS. L ? _,..40.040:::.!
ASDECLASS9
CLASS. CHAN,: TO: TS S C
NEXT REVEW DATE: - -
6)
AUTH: HR 70-2
UATE:i REVIEWER:
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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The title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should be classified:
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WARNING
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within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
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CHART
Distribution of seats in the
French national assembly
1956
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COMMUNISTS
AND ALLIES
DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
IN THE
FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
1956
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST
RESISTANCE UNION (UDSR)?
SOCIALISTS (SF10)
RADICAL
SOCIALISTS
25545 7-56
12.0%
LEFT REPUBLICAN
RALLY (RGR)
OVERSEAS INDEPENDENTS
10
1.6%.
POPULAR REPUBLICANS (MRP)
INDEPENDENTS
AND PEASANTS
FOR SOCIAL ACTION
SOCIAL
REPUBLICANS
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
627 SEATS*
* The remaining thirty seats (4.8%) not depicted on
the chart represent the unfilled Algerian seats.
POUJADISTS
(UFF)
MISCELLANEOUS
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jr
THE OUTLOOK FOR FRANCE
THE PROBLEM
? To assess the situation in France with particular reference to prospects for short
and long term internal political stability; and to estimate the effect of probable devel-
opments upon France's policy on major international issues.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Successive setbacks in the French in-
ternational position, the Algerian prob-
lem, and the 1956 elections have produced
a situation containing new elements of
danger to the Fourth Republic. Never-
theless, ?we believe 'that such develop-
ments as an authoritarian rightist regime
or a popular front are improbable during
the life of this parliament, which will
probably run to 1960. Instead, the out-
look is for continued minority govern-
ments drawn for the most part from the
center and moderate left. These govern-
ments will probably depend from time to
time upon Communist votes (presently
25 percent of the Assembly) , but they are
unlikely to drift into continuing depend-
ence upon the Communists.
2. Operations against the Algerian rebels
may meet with considerable success, and
the French may maintain their position
for some time. In the long run, however,
we believe that a more basic solution in-
volving the grant of substantial inde-
pendence to Algeria will be virtually in-
evitable. Such a grant, or any settlement
which aroused substantial rightist oppo-
sition, might endanger parliamentary
government. We believe, however, that a
crisis over Algeria ? short of a military
disaster, which we now believe unlikely ?
or over any other foreseeable issue would
not terminate the Fourth Republic, but
would be resolved within the parliamen-
tary context.
3. The economy is currently prosperous,
but serious inflationary pressures are de-
veloping. A general, though limited,
price rise is probable in the next several
years but ? barring economically-un-
sound political decisions such as an in-
discriminate granting of price and wage
increases ? rapid price inflation and gen-
eral financial instability are unlikely.
4. Any likely French government will re-
gard the Atlantic alliance as fundamental
to French security, but will probably ex-
hibit a more independent line in foreign
policy and press for East-West agree-
ments on outstanding issues.
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ASEMIllp
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraphs
I. THE FRENCH PROBLEM 5-8
II. THE FRENCH ECONOMY 9-18
The Danger of Inflation 11-13
Economic Implications of North African Developments 14-18
III. THE FRENCH POLITICAL SCENE 19-31
The New Parliament 19-20
The Major Political Parties 21-31
Communists .21-23
Socialists 24-25
Radical Socialists 26
Popular Republican Movement 27
Social Republicans 28
Independents and Peasants for
Social Action (Moderes) 29
Poujadists 30-31
IV. GOVERNMENTAL PROSPECTS 32-46
Governmental Alternatives in the Present Assembly 32-38
Effect of the Algerian Problem 39-42
De Gaulle and the Extreme Right 43-46
V. PROBABLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES 47-68
Domestic 47-49
International 50-61
Disarmament 55
East-West Trade 56
Germany 57
European Integration 58
Near East 59
? Far East 60
Effect on French Foreign Policy of Increased
Communist Influence ? 61
Overseas Possessions and Dependencies 62-65
Morocco and Tunisia 63
US Bases in Morocco 64
Other Overseas Terrritories 65
Effect on French Policy of Popular Front or
66-68
Rightist Regimes
VI. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS 69-73
APPENDIX ? VALID VOTES IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS
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DISCUSSION
I. THE FRENCH PROBLEM
5. For decades France has been characterized
by political factionalism, parliamentary con-
fusion, and short-lived, often impotent gov-
ernments. Parliament reflects the cleavages
and class conflicts in French society. There
are strong forces for and against a fundamen-
tal change in social and political institutions,
strong clerical and anticlerical factions, in-
tense provincialism together with devotion to
supranational institutions. This very multi-
plicity of conflicting interests, with their per-
mutations and interactions, is an obstacle to
quick or radical change. Any group which
threatens to get disproportionate strength
tends to unite other groups against it. How-
ever, because governments in these circum-
stances are weak, it is always difficult and
of ten impossible to make critical policy deci-
sions. Governmental crises frequently occur
when decisions are needed or strong action
required to deal with changing conditions at
home or abroad, and such frequent crises have
lost France much of its international prestige.
6. Dissatisfaction and disillusionment with
the government and its institutions are wide-
spread among the French people. They exist
among those who support the moderate as
well as the extremist parties. Many vote in
protest instead of from positive conviction.
Many vote as far to the left as possible with-
out appreciating the consequences for state
and society which would ensue if a majority
of their fellow citizens did likewise. Substan-
tial numbers of Frenchmen are occasionally
caught up in an enthusiasm for a political
movement or a political leader, but befOre long
enthusiasm wanes as obstacles mount and
results are few. If there is any political atti-
tude common to a majority of Frenchmen, it
is cynicism.
7. This mood, together with the weariness and
frightful experiences of the last two major
wars, the series of postwar setbacks, and the
decline of France as a world power, has con-
tributed to make neutralism stronger in
France than elsewhere in Western Europe.
While very small numbers of Frenchmen (less
than five percent) sympathize with the USSR
in the East-West struggle, about half have
expressed a preference to stay aloof from that
contest, according to public opinion polls. Ig-
norance of NATO is greater in France than
elsewhere in Western Europe, and support for
it less. Belief in Western European unity is
still strong, but France's neighbors appar-
ently believe in it more strongly.
8. An atmosphere of major political crisis
periodically recurs in France. Whenever gov-
ernmental instability becomes particularly
acute, or when external problems ? such as
the current struggle in Algeria ? bear down
upon the public consciousness, there is talk of
a "crise de regime," of constitutional reform,
of a strong leader to relieve France of its politi-
cal indecision. Since the birth of the Third
Republic, these crises ? except for that
brought on by the German victory of June
1940 ? have always dissipated. Despite the
vicissitudes of politics, the bureaucracy has
gone on conducting the business of the state,
and the economy has shown a remarkable
resiliency. Nevertheless, the persistence of
this underlying malaise and its present re-
emergence, together with the cumulative ef-
fects of the recent setbacks in the French in-
ternational position, have produced a situation
containing elements of danger to the Fourth
Republic.
II. THE FRENCH ECONOMY
9. France has a balanced economy rich in re-
sources and manpower skills, but realization
of its potential is retarded by the persistence
of structural weaknesses, such as poor labor
mobility and a lack of competitive spirit.
Strong protectionist attitudes continue .to pre-
vail in France, although a more enterprising
state of mind seems to be emerging among
some entrepreneurs. The French economy as
a whole has shown steady growth since 1953.
In 1955, Gross National Product increased by
6.3 percent, about the same as the Western
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MEM* 3
European average, with industrial production
increasing by 10 percent. The increase in
GNP resulted both in higher gross investment
and in higher personal consumption levels,
while public consumption and the import sur-
plus declined slightly. Prices, although cur-
rently under inflationary pressure, have re-
mained relatively stable over the past four
years, real wages have moved steadily up, and
there is little unemploymeht. French saving
habits are returning, the capital market is
reviving, and treasury operations are easier,
for the time being at least.
10. Internal expansion has been accompanied
since 1954 by substantial improvement in
France's balance of trade and payments.
However, late in 1955 imports began to rise
faster than exports, and France once again
began to run monthly deficits in the EPU
(European Payments Union) . Receipts from
US dollar expenditures and military assist-
ance have not only helped to balance current
accounts but during 1955 served to raise gold
and dollar reserves from about $1 billion to
$2 billion. However; reserves are likely to de-
cline in 1956 and 1957. Despite some talk
of devaluation when the Mollet government
was inaugurated, France's stronger reserve po-
sition and the obvious political and economic
risks involved make any official devaluation
of the franc unlikely in the near future.
11. The Danger of Inflation. Despite these
favorable developments in the economy and
the relative stability of prices over the past
four years, serious inflationary pressures are
developing. Although this is partly a conse-
quence of the increased costs of Algeria, other
factors play a more important part. Increased
consumer demand is anticipated. The total
wage bill in 1956 will probably rise by about
8.5 percent over 1955. It is unlikely that in-
dustrial production can maintain the 10 per-
cent rate of growth in 1956 that it achieved
in 1955; key industries, particularly steel, are
already operating near capacity levels, an
energy shortage is developing, and labor short-
ages have been aggravated by the recall of
reservists and the increased unreliability of
Algerian labor in France. The severe winter
of 1955-1956 will reduce agricultural produc-
tion, particularly wheat, and this will have
adverse effects on the balance of payments and
will tend to raise the price of farm products.
12. Budgetary problems in France usually
present political dangers even when the econ-
omy itself is relatively sound. It now appears
that there will be a cash deficit of about 1,000
billion francs this year. This would represent
a 35 percent increase over 1955, and a larger
deficit could develop if warfare in Algeria con-
tinues. It will be difficult if not impossible to
cover the increase in the deficit through ad-
ministrative economies or new taxes, and re-
course to the Bank of France, which also is
politically difficult, may be necessary. While
the French Treasury position is easy at pres-
ent, borrowing 35 percent more this year than
last will inevitably create strains on the
money market.
13. Considering: (a) the basic structural
strength and weaknesses of the French econ-
omy; (b) its present prosperous condition;
and (c). developing storm warnings, we con-
clude, on balance, that a fairly general, but
limited, price rise is likely in the next several
years. This situation will be exploited by the
parliamentary opposition, but the present gov-
ernment at least, appears determined to limit
inflationary pressures by increasing taxes and
slowly reducing import restrictions. Indeed,
unless economically-unsound political deci-
sions are. taken, such as an indiscriminate
granting of price and wage increases, renewal
of rapid price inflation and a relapse into gen-
eral financial instability are unlikely. In and
by themselves economic prospects need not
significantly increase political instability;
however, the danger of renewed inflation is
sufficiently great that political ineptness could
set off a cumulative process of adverse political
and financial interactions.
14. Economic Implications of North African
Developments. The lasting economic impact
on France of developments in North Africa
will be determined largely by the political so-
lution that finally evolves. Although the total
French private and public investment in Al-
geria cannot be estimated with any accuracy,
it probably runs to several billions of dol-
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04416WILINT 4
lars and is greater than in Morocco, Tunisia,
or Indochina. In 1955 France exported about
$570 million worth of goods to Algeria. This
represented 11.8 percent of total French ex-
ports, -compared to 4.7 percent sent to Mo-
rocco and 2.8 percent sent to Tunisia. In 1955
France imported about $339 million worth of
goods from Algeria. This constituted only 7.2
percent of total French imports, but was 74
percent of Algeria's exports. By way of com-
parison, 3 percent of French imports were
from Morocco (45.3 percent of Morocco's ex-
ports) while 1.2 percent of French imports
were from Tunisia (55.2 percent of Tunisia's
exports) .
15. To protect this substantial investment
and trade, as well as French prestige and the
lives of Frenchmen in Algeria, the French are
involved in a costly effort. According to re-
cent French budget documents, extraordinary
military appropriations for Algeria will be at
least $613 million in 1956 as compared with
$176 million in 1955. In addition, regular
appropriations for national defense, with the
exception of monies for Indochina, show slight
increases, and an unknown but considerable
and growing proportion of these funds is for
Algerian expenditures. Finally, the call-up of
the 200,000 reservists to cope with Algeria, and
the increased costs involved in more active
operations may well increase present esti-
mates. In addition, the French government
has increased its contribution to civil expendi-
tures in Algeria from about $135 million in
1955 to about $185 million in 1956. Thus, the
gross public cost of Algeria to France in 1956
may be over $1 billion, of which the extraordi-
nary cost, due to the particular circumstances
of the emergency, is about $650 million. This
sum is of considerable magnitude, and exerts
an inflationary influence on the French econ-
omy. It is not yet great enough, however, to
be by itself a major influence on French policy
decisions in Algeria.
16. The costs of military operations and of
reform in Algeria, even under the best of cir-
cumstances, would remain high for at least
several years under present French policy. If
the current policy of pacification of Algeria is
maintained, and even if it is successful, the
need for substantial garrisons will continue.
Moreover, the French government will almost
certainly feel obliged to increase its invest-
ment and reform program further, without
any assurance that this will significantly alle-
viate the area's basic economic problems or
eliminate economic grievances and unrest.
17. If the French should retreat from their
present Algerian policy to something resem-
bling the Moroccan and Tunisian arrange-
ments, the public cost to France might be
substantially reduced, since garrisons could
be reduced as order was restored and the
native government took over. On the other
hand, new charges on the treasury would
arise ? for example, to finance the inderrmifi-
cation of French property owners and the re-
establishment outside of Algeria of those large
numbers of Europeans who would wish to emi-
grate to France or elsewhere. A moderate
native regime would seek to retain a French
public investment program in some form, but
would probably also seek aid elsewhere. There
would be, moreover, a strong interest on both
sides in continuing their substantial trade and
reciprocal preferences.
18. If such trade is continued to mutual ad-
vantage, independence for Algeria as well as
Morocco and Tunisia need not have a major
adverse impact on the over-all French econo-
my, although it would hurt individuals. In-
deed, France could benefit from the reduction
of French military and investment expendi-
tures there. In the short run, however, if in-
dependence for Algeria were followed by rash
anti-French economic policies on the part of
the native regime, the consequences could be
very serious for: (a) the million-plus French
colonists; (b) other holders of large invest-
ments; (c) certain French industries and their
workers dependent upon Algerian labor and
Algerian markets; and (d) the nationalist
leaders and natives themselves, as a conse-
quence of the chaotic conditions that would
ensue. To the extent that similar policies
might develop in Morocco and Tunisia if the
present moderate regimes are replaced, these
difficulties would be compounded.
.100111111a.
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11?21g0T
III. THE FRENCH POLITICAL SCENE
The New Parliament
19. French parliamentary democracy has
demonstrated remarkable staying power, de-
spite chronic governmental instability and
antiparliamentarianism on both left and
right. Moreover, while the composition of
parliaments and cabinets has shifted, the basic
political attitudes of the electorate have
shown considerable stability. Since the end
of World War II, about 25 percent of the
electorate has consistently voted for the Com-
munist party and about 15 percent for the
Socialist party. Votes for the various center
and rightist parties have been far less con-
stant during the postwar period, partly owing
to a search by the antiparliamentary right
for a political home. This extreme rightist
element appears to have voted for the Catholic
MRP in 1946, De Gaulle in 1951, and Poujade
in 1956. In addition, however, many voters
of the center and moderate right as well as of
the left, shaken by the general social and eco-
nomic instability of 1947 and 1948, appear to
have rallied to the Gaullist banner in 1951,
but to have gone to traditional parties in 1956.
The gain in votes registered by the Socialists
and Radical Socialists in 1956 suggests that
political opinion has moved slightly to the left
as compared with 1951, and restored the mod-
erate left to virtually the same strength it
demonstrated in 1946.1
20. While popular political opinion in France
thus has remained fairly stable, the size of the
party representations in the new parliament
has substantially changed. The Communists,
with virtually the same popular vote as in
1951, have 50 percent more seats and control
about 25 percent of the Assembly. This result-
ed largely from the split of the moderate par-
ties into center-left and center-right lists in
1956, whereas in 1951 they had all joined to-
gether in affiliated lists to fight the Commu-
nists and Gaullists.2 The Poujadist right is
smaller than the initial Gaullist right of the
1951 Assembly, but as a party the Poujadists
' For a detailed statement of the political strengths
of the various parties in the national elections of
1946, 1951, and 1956, see the Appendix.
appear more violent and irresponsible. The
increased number of seats for the Communists
and the proportionately smaller number for
the parties to the right of the Radical Social-
ists make the parliamentary center of gravity
in the new Assembly somewhat to the left of
that in the previous Assembly. The distribu-
tion of seats in the two Assemblies is shown in
tabular form below:
Distribution of Seats in the Assembly
Previous
Assembly
1955
1956 '
Communists and Allies 98 150
Socialists (SFIO) 104 101
Democratic Socialist Resistance
Union (UDSR) 24 19
Left Republican Rally (RGR) {75 61
14
Radical Socialists
10
75
Overseas Independents
16
Popular Republicans (MRP)
88
Independents and Peasants
(Moderes)
103
Gaullists (ARS)
32
Gaullist Social Republicans
69
Poujadists (UFF)
? ?
Miscellaneous
15
Vacancies
3
Total
627
195
22
42
8
30"
627
'For a graphic presentation of the distribution of
seats in the present Assembly, see Chart.
"These vacancies are the seats allocated to Al-
geria, where elections have not been held be-
cause of the absence of public order.
The Major Political Parties
21. Communists. The French Communist
Party (PCF) is still the largest and strongest
political organization in France, despite a de-
crease in membership and a notable weaken-
ing of the position of the party press since
1948. The strength of the Communist-domi-
nated trade unions (CGT) has also declined
considerably, but the Communists remain the
strongest force in organized labor. The hard
core of the party has remained virtually un-
changed, and party membership over the past
two years has remained between 350,000-400,-
000 ? about half that of 1948. The number of
2)3y the election law of 1951 and 1956, any affiliated
list receiving over 50 percent of the vote in most
election areas received all seats; obviously the
more parties joined in such lists, the greater the
chance of gaining over 50 percent of the vote and
all the seats.
T
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SECRET 6
Communists (and allies) in the Assembly has
increased from 98 to 150 after the 1956 elec-
tions, because of the working of the electoral
law. Nevertheless, the party's over-all elec-
toral support has remained almost constant at
about one-fourth of the total vote since the
end of World War II. This attests to the
strength and flexibility of the Communist
organization and its ability to exploit vary-
ing national issues and local grievances. It
also suggests that Communist strength in
France to a large degree reflects fundamen-
tal class hostilities and traditional leftist
allegiances which the PCF has systemati-
cally exploited. In the postwar period nei-
ther general economic conditions nor East-
West development's appear to have had much
effect upon the number of votes cast for the
Communist party. We are presently unable
to estimate what effect the changes within.the
USSR and particularly the denigration of
Stalin is likely to have either upon the nature
of the PCF or upon the popular support af-
forded the Communists.
22. For several years the PCF has been at-
tempting with some success to escape from the
political isolation imposed on it in 1947. Aid-
ed by its 1956 gain in seats and by the more
peaceful posture of Moscow, it has been sedu-
lously cultivating a popular front atmosphere.
Thus, though bluntly repulsed by the Socialist
leadership in its efforts to form common elec-
toral lists for the parliamentary elections, the
PCF nevertheless voted to invest the Mollet
government. It supported the Mollet govern-
ment on subsequent parliamentary votes, in-
cluding the grant of "special powers" on Al-
geria. However, the PCF found itself in a
dilemma. While its campaign for a popular
front dictated that it cooperate with the So-
cialists, its support of Mollet's repressive poli-
cies in Algeria conflicted with the strong Com-
munist line of anticolonialism, and caused
dissidence among Communist rank-and-file.
Hence the PCF commenced to attack the gov-
ernment on the call-up of reservists for Al-
geria, and abstained on the general confidence
vote in early June. The Communists also
stimulated riots against the sending of reserv-
ists to Algeria.
23. In the near future, relations of Commu-
nists and Socialists will probably depend to
a large degree upon how the Mollet policy on
Algeria develops. If it moves toward negotia-
tion and early independence, the Communists
would almost certainly support the govern-
ment, and would hope that the Socialists
would be deserted by the right, forced to rely
on Communist support, and thereby move to-
wards a genuine popular front. If the Monet
policy moves toward continued and costly re-
pression, the Communists may conclude that
they have more to gain by openly opposing the
government and stepping up their efforts to
win over some of the Socialist rank-and-file.
24. Socialists. The Socialists (SFIO) were rel-
atively successful in the January elections,
but are in a difficult position as governmental
leaders forced to deal with the Algerian prob-
lem. The Socialists realize that they cannot
enact reformist legislation without Commu-
nist support in parliament, and that they can-
not continue their present Algerian policy
without rightist parliamentary backing. Mol-
let has adopted a more conciliatory attitude
toward both the Soviet Union and the PCF,
while pressing forward with a left-oriented
social program within France. This has cov-
ered his left flank and has made it more diffi-
cult for the Communists to attack him. He
has covered his right flank, in effect, by pur-
suing a repressive policy in Algeria which the
rightist parties favor but to which the Social-
ists, by virtue of their traditional anticolonial-
ism, would normally be opposed. The contra-
dictory aspects of such policies have accentu-
ated conflicts within the SFIO.
25. The Communists will seek to exploit such
contradictions on Algerian and other issues to
turn the Socialist rank-and-file against their
leaders. This political duel between the Com-
munist and the Socialist leaders will probably
be a continuing feature of the present Assem-
bly. In large measure, the gains of the one
party are the loss of the other. The PCF has
the advantages of having almost twice the
electoral support of the Socialists and a much
larger and more effective political organiza-
tion. It has the power of the USSR behind it,
and it enjoys a position of political irresponsi-
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bility. The Socialists have the power of gov-
ernment influence, but will be walking a tight-
rope as long as they are in the government:
to incline too far to the right will cause them
to lose rank-and-file to the Communists; to
incline too far to the left will enhance the
possibility of a popular front.
26. Radical Socialists. The Radicals, long
characterized by strong factionalism, are di-
vided between the followers of Mendes-France
and of former Premier Edgar Faure. The ma-
jority faction led by Mendes was relatively
successful in the January elections and en-
tered the Socialist-led government. However,
trapped by his inability to influence govern-
ment policy and by the impossibility of a rap-
prochement with the right, Mendes left the
Mollet government in protest over its Algerian
policy. He apparently believes that the pres-
ent Algerian policy will fail and that France
may turn to him for a solution. In any event,
whether under Mendes or another Radical
leader, the party has a strong parliamentary
position despite its divisions, and will be the
pivot between leftist-oriented and rightist-
oriented governments drawn from the present
Assembly.
27. Popular Republican Movement (MRP).
In steady decline since the elections of 1951
and moving increasingly to the right, the
MRP is apparently unable to decide whether
in the long run it is to be a party of the left
or of the right. On the one hand, it is drawn
towards European integration, Catholic social
and economic reforms, and collaboration with
the Socialists and Mendesian Radicals; and it
desires to be clearly differentiated from the
conservative Independent and Peasants party.
On the other hand, it is repelled by the anti-
clerical position of the Socialists and of many
Radicals, by the attitude of some Socialist
leaders toward the Soviet Union, and by the
memory of Mendes' opposition to EDC. Never-
theless, because the MRP is particularly anx-
ious to regain its position in the government
and to prevent the Socialists from allying with
the Communists, it is likely to cooperate in-
creasingly with the Socialists unless the issue
of government support to church schools be-
comes acute.
28. Social Republicans. The Social Republi-
cans are the only ex-RPF group which has
retained its parliamentary identity. It is a
reformist party, which permits it to partici-
pate in the present government, but its na-
tionalist and pro-French Union character also
encompasses rightist interests. It is in the
van of those seeking constitutional changes
and a stronger executive. However, its organ-
ization is undeveloped; it is in fact a group of
loosely disciplined political personalities with
no future as a mass party unless De Gaulle
returns to power.
29. Independents and Peasants for Social Ac-
tion (Moderes). This party, though now pos-
sessed of a somewhat stronger national organ-
ization, remains a pot-pourri of conservative
agricultural and business interests, mainly
narrow and local in scope, and generally cleri-
cal in outlook. Because of their personal or
economic ties and conservative outlook, most
party members favor a strong colonial policy
and repression where necessary. The Moder&
were joined in the 1956 elections by a former
Gaullist group which had been cooperating
with them since 1952. This combined group
lost considerably in votes as well as seats in
the 1956 elections. Many of these Moderes,
especially those from Southern France, repre-
sent local interests similar to those support-
ing Poujade. Although as a party the Moder&
are Republican, some of them tend to the Pou-
jadist outlook, and would probably be quick to
cast their lot with Poujadism if it appeared to
be an effective way of heading off a popular
front. It is more likely, however, that the
Moder& will seek to render Poujadism innocu-
ous by absorbing it.
30. Poujadists (UFF). The emergence of the
Poujadists as a distinct extreme right with 52
seats 3 was the most startling result of the
1956 elections. Much of the narrow-interest,
antitax, antiadministration, antiparlimen-
tarian, antisemitic, and antiforeign support
they received was probably present but ob-
scured in the heterogeneous vote the Gaul-
lists received in 1951. They probably
captured much of the traditional antiparlia-
3 Since reduced to 42 as a result of parliamentary
disqualification votes.
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mentary right which has existed in France for
many years. Nonetheless, they now represent
a direct actionist group with some capacity
for disturbing the public order.
31. The Poujadist leaders have never clarified
their political objectives. They have been
clearly antiparliamentarian, and are talking
of convoking an "Estates-General." Should
they succeed in maintaining unity and unvar-
nished antiparliamentarianism, they might
attract additional support, particularly if pub-
lic order degenerated over the Algerian issue,
or if the parliamentary system broke down for
any other reason. We believe it more likely,
however, that they will follow the path of
similar groups which have appeared on the
French political scene in, the past, and which
have been bought off, subverted, or otherwise
deprived of appreciable power.
IV. GOVERNMENTAL PROSPECTS
Governmental Alternatives in the
Present Assembly
32. A constitutional change of 1955 permit-
ting investiture of minority governments 4 has
facilitated the task of forming governing
coalitions. Two factors, moreover, presently
militate against extreme parliamentary insta-
bility: (a) the overriding importance of the
Algerian issue, and (b) the narrow base from
which moderate governments can be drawn.
Both considerations currently inhibit the mod-
erate parties from overthrowing a government
capriciously. Nevertheless, if the govern-
ment's Algerian policy fails, or If the parties
become deadlocked over a controversial domes-
tic issue, the parliamentary situation might
change rapidly for the worse.
33. The distribution of seats in the present
Assembly makes possible five alternative gov-
erning coalitions:
a. A popular front majority led by Social-
ists and Radicals, consistently opposed by the
center and right but kept in office by Commu-
nist votes.
Investiture now requires only a majority of the
deputies voting, rather than an absolute majority
of the Assembly.
b. A "national union" majority supported
by all parties except the Communists and Pou-
j adists.
c. A right-center majority supported by all
parties to the right of the Socialists and Com-
munists.
d. A minority coalition of the center and
the democratic left, like the present Mollet
government, under a succession of leaders
drawn from the Radical Socialist and Social-
ist parties.
e. A minority coalition of the center and
moderate right, excluding the Poujadists and
depending on Socialist benevolence in the
form of voting support or abstention.
34. Clearly the Socialists hold a key position.
Their acquiescence, support, or participation
is necessary to four out of the five possible
coalitions. The fifth possibility ? the right-
center majority ? is highly unlikely because
the Poujadists will probably continue to reject
all parliamentary alliances on principle, and
because many Radicals, Popular Republicans,
and even some Independents would probably
refuse to enter any government dependent on
Poujadist support.
35. A popular front government 5 is becoming
slightly more feasible as the Communists
gradually emerge from political isolation.
Under some extreme provocation, such as a
threatened rightist coup, Socialist and Radi-
cal leaders might accept an alliance with the?
Communist party. However, we believe it
unlikely that a popular front government will
be formed during the life of the present As-
sembly. Despite the changes which have al-
ready occurred in Communist tactics and the
probability of still further changes, we believe
that the gulf between the Communists on the
one hand, and the Radical Socialists and So-
cialists on the other, will remain too great to
be bridged, except on an ad hoc basis, during
the next several years. Moreover, center and
rightist groups have a strong interest in pre-
venting a popular front and will probably
5A "popular front" government as used herein is
defined as one led by Socialists and Radicals ?
Communists would not necessarily hold any eabi-
net posts ? consistently opposed by the center
and right, but kept in office by Communist votes.
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make great efforts to do so by concessions to
the Socialists and Radical Socialists should
this prove necessary.
3.6. A national union? majority, comprising all
parties save Communists and Poujadists, is
rendered improbable by serious divisions
among the moderate parties. Such a govern-
ment would be most likely to be formed only
in a serious emergency ? possibly one arising
from the Algerian issue ? and would have
limited and well-defined objectives. It is also
possible that moderate rightists and Socialists
might sink their differences in such a coali-
tion in order to prevent the seizure of power
by a "strong man," or to deal with system-
atic opposition by both Communists and Pou-
jadists, especially if public disorder became
widespread. In the circumstances most likely
to arise during the life of the present Assem-
bly, however, a national union government is
a virtual impossibility.
37. Of the various alternatives, we believe that
minority coalitions made up like the Mollet
government from the center and democratic
left are most likely during the life of the pres-
ent parliament. Occasional reversion to a
minority coalition of the center and moderate
right is also probable, but such a government
would require benevolent support by the So-
cialists, who would probably not extend it for
long. The center-moderate left coalitions will
probably from time to time depend on Com-
munist votes to carry through some measures;
circumstances may be such that the influence
of the Communists on governmental policy
increases considerably during the present As-
sembly. We do not believe, however, that the
democratic left will allow itself to drift into
continuing and systematic dependence on
Communist support. It will probably stop
short of a genuine popular front and seek to
offset Communist influence by frequently
leaning towards the moderate right, as Mollet
has done.
38. Except for extremists on the right, and
possibly on the left, the deputies will almost
certainly seek to avoid dissolution. Accord-
ingly, the present Assembly will probably last
for virtually its full term of five years.
9
Effect of the Algerian Problem'
39. At the moment French politics are domi-
nated by the Algerian problem. The govern-
ment's announced policy is that it will nego-
tiate with representatives of the Algerian peo-
ple freely chosen in a reformed electoral sys-
tem. This policy presupposes the establish-
ment of sufficient order to carry out elections.
Having received special powers from the As-
sembly ? by an overwhelming majority, in-
cluding the Communists ? Monet has applied
increasing increments of force in an effort to
restore order. But despite the large number
of forces despatched to Algeria, and signs that
these forces are meeting with some success,
order is far from being restored.
40. We believe a majority of the French people
will continue to support military operations
against the Algerian rebels, though probably
without enthusiasm, through the summer of
1956, and perhaps longer. However, among
Mollet's own followers, there is increasing res-
tiveness over the policy of repression and a
tendency to regard the eventual independence
of Algeria as inexitable. Mollet himself appar-
ently does not intend to press for pacification
by military means alone. He has already in-
troduced substantial reforms, his representa-
tives have held preliminary and unofficial con-
versations with rebel leaders, and he has an-
nounced his intention to seek local agreements
wherever possible. If public impatience for
an early solution grows, he will probably make
more serious efforts to negotiate with the reb-
els from the position of strength created by
a force of 400,000 troops, rather than to push
forward with a costly campaign of complete
pacification. Thus he might hope to find a
compromise solution which, though falling
short of Algerian demands, might be accepted
by Algerians as an alternative to further attri-
tion and, though short of French wishes,
might be accepted in France because of lack
of faith in ultimate victory.
41. We believe such a compromise is unlikely
in the near future. The rebels will almost
certainly not withdraw their demand for na-
"NIE 71.1-56: Outlook in Algeria is being prepared
for publication in August 1956.
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tional independence as a prerequisite to nego-
tiations, nor will the French grant this de-
mand. However, there is no reason why the
French military effort of pacification cannot
go on for some time without serious losses,
and it might achieve considerable successes.
Mollet may therefore be able to report prog-
ress when parliament reconvenes in the fall,
and such a report would probably be sufficient
to prevent his fall over the Algerian question.
We do not believe that a major political crisis
over this question is necessarily imminent.
42. Although the French have the military
strength to maintain themselves in Algeria
indefinitely, at some time during the next sev-
eral years the present French government or a
successor will be faced with the necessity of a
reassessment of policy, involving a decision
either to grant independence or indefinitely
to commit French resources to a policy of
limited autonomy maintained by force.
Which course the government then in office
would take would depend in large measure
upon the situation in Algeria and France then
existing. We believe that an increasing pro-
portion of the French population will eventu-
ally come to oppose the economic and military
costs of maintaining the repressive effort, and
become gradually less concerned over the fate
of the colons in Algeria. Eventually, there-
fore, a government pledged to close out the
Algerian affair will probably take office. If
this occurs, the political temperature in
France will rise. If a settlement is attempted
that is made possible only by Communist sup-
port, or if certain elements of the right should
be unreconciled to it, there might be a danger
to the maintenance of the French parliamen-
tary regime.
De Gaulle and the Extreme Right
43. The Algerfan question has generated
strong feelings in France; the prospect of the
loss of Algeria is viewed with a sense of out-
rage, especially by powerful minority groups.
These emotions are superimposed upon a situ-
ation in which an atmosphere of political
crisis is unusually prevalent, and fears for the
future of France are freely expressed. This
situation has been produced by other factors
10
as well as by Algeria; by the continued strife
among moderate parties, the unexpected suc-
cess of the Poujadists, the increase of Com-
munist representation in parliament, the prev-
alence of talk about a popular front govern-
ment, and the series of setbacks to the inter-
national position of France. There is wide-
spread desire for constitutional reform, with-
out any clear perception of how reform can
practically be achieved. In these circum-
stances supporters of the parliamentary re-
gime are inclined towards pessimism. They
are concerned over the capacity of the Re-
public to withstand any future catastrophe
such as a serious defeat in Algeria.
44. Two main possibilities involving interven-
tion by the extreme right present themselves:
a. If it should appear that Algeria were
about to be lost as a consequence of military
setbacks or of a cabinet decision to grant
substantial independence (especially if the
decision could be put through parliament only
with Communist votes) , colonial interests,
Poujadists, and possibly elements of the army
might coalesce to force a reversal of policy,
and in the process seize control of the state;
b. If the Socialists and Radicals ? came to
terms with the Communists and a popular
front government appeared imminent, forces
of the moderate right might repudiate repub-
lican institutions and rally behind a strong
authoritarian leader.
A third possibility, less extreme in its impli-
cations, is that a prolonged cabinet crisis
might persuade a majority in the National
Assembly to invest as premier an elder states-
man with broad powers to revise the consti-
tution. In that event the Fourth Republic
might be ended legally, but whether it would
be replaced by another form of democratic
government or by an authoritarian regime
would depend on circumstances at the time.
45. General De Gaulle is an obvious choice to
lead rightist forces or to preside over a legal
liquidation of the present regime. He has in-
dicated that he is willing to assume leadership
of the government, provided he is given broad
powers to carry through a basic constitutional
revision. We think it improbable, however,
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that De Gaulle would lend himself to any
rightist adventure unless it had almost a cer-
tainty of success. In the past he has shown
much regard for legality, and would probably
accept political leadership on no other basis.
His record of arrogance and rigidity in dealing
with politicians, however, makes it unlikely
that parliament would accept him on these
terms. The Assembly would be reluctant to
invest any elder statesman with extraordinary
powers to effect a constitutional revision; if
it did so, it would probably select a more
amenable leader, such as former President of
the Republic Vincent Auriol.
46. We believe that none of the three alter-
natives discussed is likely during the next
several years, although there has been more
speculation recently on the possible return of
De Gaulle than at any time since 1947-1948.
There are serious obstacles to the assumption
of leadership by De Gaulle, and no other po-
tential leader appears to command the degree'
of political and military support which would
be required. A severe political crisis over Al-
geria is by no means certain; if it should occur
it might prove the catalyst to set off a rightist
move. We think it more likely, however, that
a crisis over Algeria or over some divisive do-
mestic issue would simply resemble many of
the crises which have occurred in the past.
It might be serious and prolonged, it might be
accompanied by disorders and riots, but the
French parliamentary system has demonstrat-
ed a remarkable ability to live through crises.
Most Frenchmen, however much they com-
plain about the regime's institutions or toy
with the idea of fundamentally altering it,
find the Third and Fourth Republics consist-
ent with their way of life.
V. PROBABLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES
Domestic
47. Assuming that minority center-moderate
left governments will continue, picking up
parliamentary support wherever they can
throughout the parliamentary spectrum, the
outlook for domestic affairs is fairly encour-
aging. The perennial problems of inflationary
controls, the budget, and wage rates will con-
11
tinue to strain weak governments. However,
because of the relatively sound condition of
the economy, there will be few other serious
economic issues. Although the Socialists have
given priority to social legislation, they have
so far behaved in a restrained manner. They
have given no sign of trying to nationalize
additional industries. Regarding the social
measures in the present government's pro-
gram which have not already been enacted,
the present government shows no disposition
to make speed.
48. Over the next few years, it is probable that
the so-called "modernization" program for the
French economy will be continued, modest
wage increases granted, improved working
conditions established, low-cost housing de-
velopments accelerated, and social security
improved and expanded. The Socialists are,
by and large, prepared to levy new taxes to
finance new expenditures, but obviously would
prefer to reduce defense commitments wher-
ever possible. The problem of tax reform in
general will create difficulties for any govern-
ment, but modest changes and alterations are
probable.
49. One thorny domestic issue likely to trou-
ble moderate left-center governments is that
of state aid to church schools. It is probable
that, if the issue were brought to the Assem-
bly floor, a majority would vote for withdrawal
of existing subsidies, and the Communists will
almost certainly attempt to force such a meas-
ure through. We do not believe that the Rad-
icals and Socialists are anxious to make an
issue of it. If they were to do so, it would
further widen the gap between the moderate
left and moderate right.
International
50. Premier Mollet and Foreign Minister Pi-
neau have made a strong effort to exhibit an
independent line in the conduct of French
foreign policy. They have been insistent on
full French participation with the US and
UK in the political leadership of the Western
alliance, and they have laid great emphasis
on efforts to reduce international tension by
such means as East-West contacts and dis-
armament. In part, this effort at independ-
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ence has been politically responsive to French
national feelings. Since the loss of Indochina,
the French have become acutely aware of the
decline of their world position. Persisting
overseas and internal problems have made
them extremely sensitive to what many of
them consider the neglect and disregard of
France by its allies. Assertions and manifes-
tations of France's independence are therefore
very popular with the French people. Both
the Mollet government and its successors, fol-
lowing the example of the Mendes-France gov-
ernment of 1954-1955, will almost certainly
give this continuing factor serious weight in
their policy-making, and even more in their
public declarations.
51. The relaxation of tensions in Europe and
the increasing belief, after the Summit Con-
ference of 1955, that the danger of war had
receded, has convinced the Mollet government,
as well as much of the French public, that the
opportunity has arrived for new courses of
action. They regard the present period as one
of competitive coexistence between the Sino-
Soviet Bloc and the Western Powers. In par-
ticular, they consider that the Western Pow-
ers have overemphasized the military aspect
of their security policies and thus have per-
mitted the USSR to win popular support by
posing as the sole defender of peace. The
West must therefore strengthen its posture as
a champion of peace by promoting disarma-
ment, economic and cultural contacts be-
tween East and West, and economic assistance
to underdeveloped countries (which, accord-
ing to the so-called Pineau plan, should be ex-
tended through international agencies rather
than by individual states) . These ideas are
widely held in France, but are particularly
emphasized by the Socialist party, and are
based on its belief that it is necessary to com-
pete with Communism both within France
and in the world on its own ground by sup-
porting economic and social reform and, above
all, by conspicuously promoting peace.
52. Nevertheless, the present French govern-
ment, like its predecessors, is committed to
the alliance of the Western democracies as the
basis of French foreign policy. Despite its
varied overseas interests and periodic colonial
12
preoccupations, France has long been faced
with the problem of guaranteeing its security
as a European power. As such, it has required
allies, and it still requires them. Most French-
men would probably prefer to do without
allies if they could dispense with them, but
they recognize that their security will be
threatened, if at all, from the East, namely
from Germany or the USSR. Thus the At-
lantic alliance, based essentially upon British
and American pledges, is regarded as funda-
mental to national security.
53. The meaning of the Atlantic alliance is
not the same, however, for France as for the
US. The French accepted the North Atlantic
pact because it clearly placed Western Europe
under the protection of American power, and
they welcomed the presence of American and
British troops on the continent as a restraint
on Germany as well as on the USSR. At the
same time they wished to keep at a minimum
their dependence on US policy. In addition,
they expected to gain support from their At-
lantic allies for their own overseas policies.
With respect to the broader purposes of the
alliance, they wish to emphasize its nonmili-
tary aspects and to provide for increased po-
litical and economic consultation and coopera-
tion among the members.
54. The Mollet government is apparently sin-
cere in its stated willingness to talk with the
USSR about any issue and at any time, and
despite the absence of any positive results
from their recent visit to Moscow, French lead-
ers have not been deflected from this attitude.
They see no inconsistency between such an
effort and their firm adherence to the North
Atlantic alliance; in their eyes, NATO forms
a protective shield and a position of strength
from which it is possible to explore possibili-
ties for solution of outstanding East-West
issues. Any likely French government will
probably have similar convictions, and will
continue to be concerned with its purely Euro-
pean power position, which involves a check
upon German as well as Soviet power.
55. Disarmament. It is principally in the dis-
armament field that the French leaders have
been attempting to work towards agreement
with the USSR. For domestic political and
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economic reasons as well as to reduce the
external dangers to France, disarmament has
been treated as a subject of great importance.
Although differences with the US still exist,
the French strongly adhere to the principle of
adequate inspection and control, and they
have agreed that the advanced stages of a
disarmament plan should be implemented
only in conjunction with a European security
agreement and German reunification. While
some weakening of the French position may
occur, we do not believe that the present gov-
ernment or any likely successor would depart
substantially from an agreed US?UK position
on disarmament.
56. East-West trade. The French probably
also feel that, apart from the political advan-
tage to be gained by making concessions to
domestic economic groups, they can make
some contribution toward the further relaxa-
tion of tensions in Europe by pushing for a
relaxation of trade controls against the Sino-
Soviet Bloc. While we do not believe they
would withdraw from either the COCOM or
CHINCOM machinery, we believe they are
likely to exert continuous pressure to elim-
inate the COCOM?CHINCOM differentials
and to reduce the number of controlled items.
They will almost certainly use every, legal
loophole to escape the obligations of the
systems.
57. Germany. French fears of Germany have
not been eliminated by the events of the past
10 years. Relations with West Germany have
improved to the point of cordiality, but there
is a residual concern that Germany may again
disturb the peace. Distrust of Germany will
grow if the nationalist tendencies recently
emerging in Germany increase in strength
and influence. The French are apprehensive
of a rearmed West Germany, not so much
because of the direct threat it could pose to
France, but more importantly because of the
threat it could pose to the peace of Europe
so long as Germany is divided. They believe
reunification could more easily be obtained
within the framework of a broad disarmament
agreement, and there is a good chance that
France will support a neutralized and re-
united Germany, provided that France is pro-
tected by a security arrangement which would
prevent new German military adventures.
The Saar issue has now been settled between
the two governments in principle, and once
technical questions are disposed of, this issue
will probably be eliminated as a major source
of Franco-German friction.
58. European Integration. Some revival of
French interest in European integration
schemes began under the conservative Faure
government and has continued under Mollet.
In part this is owing to a genuine devotion to
the European idea. More particularly, the
government is interested in EURATOM (the
European Atomic Energy Community) as a
device both to place atomic energy in public
hands and to devote it to peaceful purposes.
We believe that the Assembly will ratify a
EURATOM agreement, provided the question
of atomic weapons can be worked out. Mollet
also supports the principle of the Common
Market among the members of the Coal-Steel
Community, but at the present time does not
believe he has any chance of getting the nec-
essary parliamentary support for an interna-
tional agreement.
59. Near East. Despite the sharp decline in
French power and influence in the Near East
following French ejection from the Levant
states at the end of World War II, the French
still have fairly extensive commercial and cul-
tural interests in the area and have a strong
desire to retain their historic status as a Near
East power. This desire, recently reinforced
by concern over Arab support for the North
African nationalists and over the global im-
plications of increasing Sino-Soviet Bloc ac-
tivity in the Near East, has been manifested
by continuing efforts to insure that France
participates in US?UK planning regarding
the Near East. The French opposed establish-
ment of the Baghdad Pact, in part because of
fear of extension of British or US influence,
and in part because of concern that the exist-
ence of the pact would stimulate Arab xeno-
phobia and stand in the way of a general
accommodation between the Soviet Bloc and
the West. However, the French today official-
ly accept the pact as an established fact and
urge that emphasis be shifted to its nonmili-
SECRET
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tary possibilities. Their more immediate con-
cern is to prevent the spread of pan-Arabism
across North Africa. They have therefore an
interest in curbing Egypt and are extending
support to Israel. Over the longer period their
policy will probably evolve toward the support
of Western-oriented nationalism.
60. Far East. French interest in maintaining
a position in the Far East has diminished
since the Geneva Conference on Indochina.
While making an effort to retain a foothold in
the Indochinese states through military and
technical assistance, their more persistent ef-
forts have turned to economic and cultural
influence in Asia as a whole. The French gov-
ernment is supporting a heavier economic, as
opposed to military, emphasis in SEATO. Re-
sentment against the US role in Indochina
and against Vietnam President Diem persists
in France, but the French are unlikely to re-
new efforts to remove him. On the other
hand, accelerated movement toward recogni-
tion of North Vietnam and Communist China
is probable, although outright formal recog-
nition is unlikely in the near future.
61. Effect on French Foreign Policy of In-
creased Communist Influence. We have esti-
mated above that governments made up from
the center and moderate left would probably,
from time to time, depend on Communist votes
for the passage of certain measures, and that
Communist influence might thus increase con-
siderably in the course of this parliament.
The effects of such an increase would be to
strengthen tendencies toward negotiation and
accommodation with the USSR and Commu-
nist China, toward cutting defense expendi-
tures and increasing expenditures on social
and economic reform, and toward a generally
more neutralist line of policy. However, we
do not believe that Communist influence will
increase to the point of disturbing the basic
elements of French foreign policy, that ties
with the West would be broken, NATO dis-
rupted, COCOM abandoned, or defense grave-
ly curtailed. Governments would continue to
be dominated by Socialist and Radical minis-
ters, not by Communists, and these ministers
would almost certainly not abandon or basical-
ly modify their pro-Western orientation.
14
Overseas Possessions and Dependencies
62. The loss of Indochina, Morocco, and Tu-
nisia has struck a near fatal blow to France's
traditional policy of linking overseas terri-
tories and dependencies with the metropole
either by direct integration or indirectly
through the concept of a French Union. Al-
geria may also go, and French policy toward
its remaining overseas territories is in a state
of transition.
63. Morocco and Tunisia. Independence has
been granted to Morocco and Tunisia, subject
to formal approval by the French parliament,
and negotiations are in progress to define their
"interdependence" with France. The most
difficult remaining problems are those of for-
eign policy and defense. Under recently con-
cluded agreements, both countries have re-
ceived virtually complete freedom in foreign
affairs. However, the French are trying to
retain a special place in Moroccan and Tu-
nisian foreign relations, and in particular hope
to prevent the two new states from gravitat-
ing toward either the Arab-Asian or Sin&
Soviet Blocs. On military questions, the
French are vitally concerned with preventing
assistance to Algerian rebel forces emanating
from Morocco and Tunisia. To this end, and
in the hope of keeping North Africa within a
French zone of military defense, they are try-
ing to retain control over, or at a minimum,
influence in and access to, the military estab-
lishments in the two new states. Economical-
ly, the French desire to keep the two countries
in the franc zone and to maintain -a favored
position in trade and investments. These
negotiations are proving difficult, and it is
probable that the French will be obliged to
make further concessions in order to obtain
agreement on essentials. However, serious
dangers exist. One is that the comparatively
moderate policies of the existing governments
will be increasingly undermined by French
delay in making concessions and that extrem-
ist elements will either triumph in the gov-
ernment councils or seize control. Another
danger is that Moroccans and Tunisians, with
or without the support of their governments,
will create a series of incidents involving
French forces or French residents, or will in-
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tervene directly in Algeria. In such an event,
order might rapidly deteriorate and the
French might feel compelled to undertake
large-scale military action outside of Algeria.
64. US Bases in Morocco. The French and
Moroccan governments have not yet deter-
mined the US base question in their conven-
tions defining interdependence. While the
Moroccan government, for obvious reasons of
advantage, will seek to exercise its sovereign-
ty and to treat the base question bilaterally
with the US, the French will almost certainly
continue to demand that such negotiations
be carried out trilaterally in an effort: (a) to
utilize France's present responsibility for the
security of the US bases as a means to main-
tain French military influence and forces in
Morocco, and (b) to minimize the direct in-
fluence of the US in Moroccan affairs.
65. Other Overseas Territories. The present
government, prompted by its difficulties in
North Africa, has taken steps toward reforms
in its other overseas territories. Under new
legislation now in process the government
would be permitted to introduce reforms by
decree, and it apparently plans to eliminate
separate electoral colleges, to grant universal
suffrage, to increase the legislative and execu-
tive powers granted to territorial govern-
ments, and to encourage responsible self-gov-
ernment generally. At present, pressure for
independence in France's other territories is
not great, though it is increasing. Moderate
left-center governments, if they continue in
France, will probably continue to recognize
that the flexible policy now initiated must be
rapidly, implemented if presently dependent
peoples are to be kept in some form of asso-
ciation with France.
Effect on French Policy of Popular Front
or Rightist Regimes
66. If a popular front government should
come to power, involving a firm alliance be-
tween Communists, Socialists, and Radical
Socialists against the opposition of all par-
ties to the right, the effects on French policy
would be great and adverse to US interests.
Such a front would not necessarily carry into
effect the full Communist line ? there is no
15
reason to suppose that the Socialists and Rad-
icals would totally surrender their principles.
Its foreign policy, however, would be at least
neutralist, and almost certainly neutralist
with a sharp leaning toward the USSR. It
might abandon NATO. If France remained
technically in NATO, a popular front govern-
ment would assuredly be hostile to it and
NATO security arrangements would become
virtually worthless. Defense expenditures
would be sharply cut; Algeria abandoned. We
believe it probable that popular front policies
would provoke such rightist reaction as to lead
to violence; perhaps to civil war. On the other
hand, if a popular front government comes
into being at all (and we have estimated that
it is unlikely to do so) it will be only because
the Communists have managed to establish
for themselves a considerable degree of re-
spectability and of identification with national
interests; and because the anti-Communist
and pro-Western convictions of moderate men
have profoundly weakened. In these circum-
stances, the nature of the French state would
have greatly changed, and its policies would
have changed with it.
67. The coming to power of an authoritarian
rightist regime ? which we also estimate to
be unlikely ? would almost certainly be at-
tended with domestic violence which would,
at least for a time, further weaken France.
The foreign policies of such a government
would be strongly anti-Communist, but might
also involve expensive commitments in Algeria
which would prevent the return of French
forces for NATO assignments. The strongly
nationalist attitude which such a government
would take in and out of NATO councils would
also prove difficult to deal with.
68. If the Assembly should entrust to some
elder statesman extraordinary powers to alter
the constitution, the domestic effects would
not necessarily be violent. If the statesman
were De Gaulle, however, his highly national-
ist outlook would almost certainly result in
considerable difficulties for France's allies.
He would probably attempt to reduce US pre-
ponderance in the NATO alliance, and to
make whatever bilateral deals he could to
strengthen France's position. While Commu-
-41011E2effir
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40114341e1941'
nist influence on French policy would prob-
ably diminish, De Gaulle's parochial patriot-
ism might indirectly serve Communist ends by
a destructive attack upon the security ar-
rangements so laboriously built up since 1948.
At the same time, a Gaullist government
would be more outspokenly critical of US atti-
tudes on France's colonial problems.
VI. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
69. The military position of France, and par-
ticularly its contribution to the military pos-
ture of NATO, are strongly influenced by
France's domestic political situation and its
North African problem. By the time French
plans for the reinforcement of Algeria are com-
plete, the French ground force commitment
to NATO in Europe will be virtually nullified.
French forces in West Germany have been
reduced to one armored and one infantry divi-
sion, each at two-thirds strength. In metro-
politan France there will remain three infan-
try and one armored divisions, of which only
the last would be effective within M+ 30 days.
Thus, six of a total of 17 French divisions re-
main in Europe but all six have important
subordinate units in North Africa. The situa-
tion in Algeria has not yet seriously affected
French air or naval commitments to NATO.
70. Since it appears likely that the substan-
tial numbers of regular and reserve units will
have to remain in Algeria for some time to
come, the immediate ground force capabili-
ties of NATO will remain at a reduced level.
This troubles the French, but they consider
pacification of Algeria to be an overriding
national interest and they have obtained
acknowledgment from NATO of the impor-
tance to NATO of security in this area.
71. It is not only the North African problem
which has provided difficulties for the French
military organization. The longer range prob-
lem, still unresolved, is that of reorganizing
and re-equipping French forces in line with
the current NATO strategic concept. This
concept, based upon the use of tactical atomic
weapons and designed to prevent the quick
conquest of Western Europe by Soviet forces,
was accepted by France and plans to imple-
16
ment it have been drawn up. Nevertheless,
the additional broad military and budgetary
decisions required for implementation have
not been made, and, so long as the Algerian
problem is not resolved, prospects for imple-
mentation of the NATO concept in France
are nil.
72. In any circumstances, French govern-
ments are likely to be anxious both to reduce
tensions and to advance disarmament. In
part, this results from a desire to reduce mili-
tary expenditures, and to utilize the savings
in social and economic programs. In part it
reflects a. conviction that general war is un-
likely and that implementation of a military
program based upon a nuclear strategy would
not advance the cause of peace. There will
continue to be, on the part of almost any
likely French government, concern that the
goal envisioned by the new strategy may be
unattainable as a practical proposition, that
the new strategy continues to expose France
to nuclear attack without guaranteeing ade-
quate protection from it, that the cost of an
adequate defense system is prohibitive, and
that the real deterrent to nuclear warfare
rests with the nuclear balance between the
US and USSR. They also believe that ? as
demonstrated by the North African problem ?
an effective conventional force is required to
maintain France's position in its overseas
possessions.
73. Nevertheless, once the Algerian situation
is settled, we believe French military policy
will represent a compromise between the
views just described and the more positive and
forward-looking desires of French military
authorities. There will probably be gradual
reductions in military personnel, but military
expenditures will probably remain slightly
above the pre-Algeria level as units are re-
cast in the light of new weapons developments.
Some limited progress has been made during
the past year. In the air force replacement of
obsolescent types is underway, and 11 new
squadrons have been activated. Three major
and 11 minor combatant vessels have been
added to the fleet, and the naval air arm has
been strengthened by the acquisition of 50 jet
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E M ib.T 17
fighters. While we believe some modest prog- tial progress must wait some relaxation of the
ress will continue, at least through cornple- demands now imposed by the North African
tion of programs already begun, any substan- operations.
11MEIRM
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-RN1JOIULT 18
APPENDIX
VALID VOTES IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS
(Metropole Only)
1946
Per-
cent
1951
Per-
cent
1956
Per-
cent
Communists and Allies
5,489,288
28.6
4,910,547
25.9
5,492,326
25.8
Minor Left Wing Groups ?
184,451
1.
356,916
1.7
Socialists (SFIO)
3,431,954
17.9
2,744,842
14.5
3,187,890
15.1
Radical Socialists, UDSR
and RGR
2,381,384
12.4
1,887,583
9.9
2,952,567
13.9
MRP
5,058,307
26.4
2,369;778
12.5
2,355,873
11.1
Moderes
2,465,526
12.8
2,656,995
14.
3,084,576
14.5
Gaullists b
312,635
1.6
4,125,492
21.7
911,450
4.2
National Rally
337,486
1.5
,
Poujadists (UFF)
2,445,588
11.5
Miscellaneous
63,976
.3
87,346
.5
161,893
.7
Total
19,203,070
18,967,034
21,286,565
'Left wing groups included in Miscellaneous in 1946 figures.
b Gaullist Union (1946), RPF (1951), Social Republicans (1956).
The official total valid vote for 1951 and 1956 is 19,129,064 and 21,478,142, slightly greater in each case
than the totals given in the table. The apparent discrepancy arises from the fact that voters were per-
mitted to strike names from the ballots. Incomplete ballots were counted as whole votes in terms of elec-
toral participation but as fractions of a vote for a particular party, list.
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5NNE;
MEW
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