PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES THROUGH 1960

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• Publication Date: January 10, 1956
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P.;
v o ri
? N 1E 1 2 ? 5 6
10 January 1956
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 12-56
(Supersedes N1E 12-54)
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
EUROPEAN SATELLITES
THROUGH 1960
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 10 January 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director
of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and
the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
THROUGH 1960
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the current situation and probable developments in the European
Satellites' through 1960.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The military, political, and economic
significance of the Satellites to the USSR
is so great that Moscow almost certainly
regards the maintenance of control over
the area as an essential element of its
power position. The Satellites provide
the Soviet Union with a defense in depth
and an advanced position for launching
attacks on western and southern Europe.
The Satellite regimes themselves are val-
uable to the USSR as instruments in the
conduct of Soviet foreign policy, propa-
ganda, and economic and subversive op-
erations. The Satellites represent an im-
portant element of over-all Bloc economic
strength. The total gross national prod-
uct (GNP) of the Satellites is rough-
ly two-fifths that of the USSR and in-
cludes significant production of certain
key materials and heavy manufactures.
(Paras. 12-16, 48-51)
2. The USSR now has, for all practical
purposes, complete control over the Sat-
ellite regimes and will almost certainly be
able to maintain it during the period of
this estimate. Within the limitations
suggested below with respect to East Ger-
As used in this paper the term "European Satel-
lites" includes East Germany, Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Al-
bania.
many and Albania, we believe that it will
remain firm Soviet policy to retain such
control. This control rests fundamental-
ly on the USSR's military capability of
maintaining its domination over the area.
Control is exercised primarily through
the Satellite Communist parties, assisted
and guided by a complex of Soviet diplo-
matic and military establishments, eco-
nomic advisors, and police agencies.
Moscow has made clear that the status
of the Satellites is not a matter for in-
ternational negotiation. In the case pf
Germany, the USSR has held open the
possibility of reunification on the basis of
negotiations between the East and West
German regimes. We believe, however,
that the USSR will not voluntarily re-
linquish East Germany except in ex-
change for a solution of the German prob-
lem favorable to Soviet interests. It is
also possible that the USSR might be will-
ing to reconsider its position with regard
to Albania. For example, there is a slight
chance that the physical isolation of Al-
bania from the Soviet Bloc and its minor
strategic value to the Bloc would induce
Moscow to use Albania as a pawn in Bal-
kan intrigue. (Paras. 14, 17, 22)
3. The maintenance of effective Soviet
control over the Satellites does not pre-
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/elude policy modifications calculated to
take greater account of local conditions,
to promote smoother economic develop-
ment, and to diminish the impact of So-
viet rule on Satellite national sensibilities.
In addition, Moscow might expect that
such measures would document the claim
of Satellite independence, and would
thereby impress opinion in neutral and
underdeveloped countries and improve
the propaganda position of Free World
Communist parties.
4. Despite Moscow's firm control of the
Satellites, there are a number of local
factors which hamper the execution of
Soviet policy. In some of the Satellites
factionalism has become evident in the
party leadership and has caused confu-
sion in the program. Some elements
privately resent dictation by Moscow and
favor a reduction of political terror and
an increase in consumer goods. There
are many party members with a national-
ist tinge who constitute a potential for
"deviation." All the governments are
still confronted with problems arising
from their unpopularity with the masses
and from the difficulties inherent in de-
veloping an efficient administration in a
totalitarian state under an alien ideology.
We believe, however, that none of these
difficulties will jeopardize ,either the con-
trol by Moscow-oriented Communists or
the implementation of Soviet policy.'
(Paras. 27-28)
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army and the Deputy Director
for Intelligence, The Joint Staff while conceding
the existence of certain ideological and admin-
istrative problems in the Satellites, nevertheless,
believe these problems are currently of no great
magnitude and are likely to diminish during the
period of this estimate. They would therefore
omit this conclusion.
5. Dissidence' is widely prevalent in the
Satellites. It is unlikely that an addi-
tional five years of Communist rule will
appreciably reduce this dissidence, or
greatly diminish the traditional national
aspirations of the East European peoples.
On the other hand, dissidence is offset by
a tendency of the Satellite population to
become resigned to Communist rule and
by the gradual increase in the number of
Communist-indoctrinated youth. We be-
lieve that, except possibly in East Ger-
many, no development short of a drastic
impairment of Communist controls or the
approach of friendly forces in time of
war would be sufficient to stimulate im-
portant outbreaks of open resistance.
(Paras. 31-35)
6. The Satellite regimes have as funda-
mental goals the expansion of industry,
the collectivization of agriculture, and the
Sovietization of the countries generally.
In 1953, however, faced with mounting
difficulties, they reduced the pressure for
rapid achievement of these goals. Indus-
trialization and collectivization of agri-
culture were slowed and police controls
became somewhat less obtrusive. In
early 1955, however, pressures for increas-
ing output were revived, the priority of
heavy industrial development was re-
affirmed, and collectivization efforts were
renewed. These modifications do not ap-
pear to represent a full return to the pre-
1953 program. , (Paras. 36-40)
7. We estimate that the Satellite econo-
mies, taken together, will increase their
GNP through 1960 at the rate of slightly
On this subject, see NIE 10-55, "Anti-Communist
Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc,"
dated 12 April 1955. "Dissidence" is defined as a
state of mind involving discontent or disaffection
with the regime. "Resistance" is defined as
dissidence translated into action.
ea cm. Trornefr-r-Tfl
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less than four percent per annum, a sub-
stantial decline from the extraordinary
average annual rate of over seven percent
achieved in 1949-1954. Satellite agricul-
tural output in 1960 will probably be
about 11 percent greater than in 1954,
while nonagricultural production will in-
crease by about 28 percent. Meanwhile,
total population is expected to increase
about seven percent by 1960. Manufac-
tured consumer goods will account for the
major part of the small prospective rise
in living standards. (Paras. 43-47)
8. During the period of the estimate Sat-
ellite trade with the Free World may con-
tinue to rise somewhat faster, in percent-
age terms, than total Satellite trade. For
economic as well as political reasons, the
Satellites apparently desire to increase
their trade with the Free World. In the
absence of substantial medium- or long-
term credits from Tree World countries,
however, an early expansion of Satellite
exports will be necessary to balance any
increase in imports from the Free World.
This confronts the Satellites with the
problem of adjusting the character and
prices of their exports and their way of
doing business, in order to improve their
position in Free World markets. It will
probably be easier for the Satellites to in-
crease trade with the underdeveloped
areas than with the industrial countries
of the West. (Paras. 52-54)
9. We believe that the scope of Bloc-wide'
regional planning will substantially in-
crease as compared with the period 1949-
1953. During the period of this estimate,
The terms "Soviet Bloc," "Bloc-wide," or "intra-
Bloc" refer to the USSR and the European Satel-
lites. Where Communist China is also referred
to, the term "Sino-Soviet Bloc" will be used.
this policy will probably not contribute
greatly to the growth of the economy or
to the resolution of basic economic prob-
lems, although some benefits can be ex-
pected. Over a longer period, integra-
tion may make significant contributions
to the economic strength of this area.
(Paras. 55-58)
10. The Satellite armed forces constitute
a substantial element in the balance of
military power in Europe. Ground forces
now number 77 divisions, which, given
extensive Soviet logistical support, could
be expanded to 188 divisions by M+180
days. There are currently about 3,000
Satellite operational military aircraft of
all types. We believe that the capabili-
ties of these forces will be substantially
augmented by continued conversions to
newer weapons and equipment and by an
increase in numbers of aircraft. (Paras.
70-71, 77, 80)
11. The combat effectiveness of the Sat-
ellites armies varies considerably from
country to country. However, we esti-
mate that up to 50 percent of present Sat-
ellite divisions could be employed initially
in combat alongside Soviet forces. Sev-
eral of the armies, with Soviet logistical
support, would be capable of sustained
independent operations against tradi-
tional enemies. The reliability of these
armies is such that they would be unlike-
ly to defect on a substantial scale until
victorious Western forces approached the
Satellite area. Indoctrination and im-
proved personnel selection have increased
the political reliability of the Satellite air
forces. We believe that the combat effec-
tiveness of these air forces is such that
they could be employed in a defensive
role in the event of general war and would
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have some offensive capability, particu-
larly against traditional enemies. The
Satellite navies are small in size and poor-
ly equipped and constitute only a minor
contribution to Bloc naval strength.
(Paras. 73-74, 77, 82)
DISCUSSION
I. SOVIET POLICY IN THE SATELLITES
Basic Soviet Interests in the Area
12. The military, political, and economic sig-
nificance of the Satellites to the USSR is so
great that Moscow probably regards the main-
tenance of control over the area as an essential
element of its power position.
13. The Satellites provide the Soviet Union
with defense in depth, a consideration which
may become of increasing importance to the
USSR in view of the prospective rearmament
of West Germany. The fact that the Satel-
lites are being given current Soviet aircraft
and that their air defenses are being inte-
grated with those of the USSR, indicates the
importance which Moscow assigns to the area
as an advanced line of Air defense. Similarly,
Satellite ground forces constitute increasingly
effective obstacles along the land approaches
to the Western USSR. For offensive purposes,
control of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East
Germany provides the USSR with an ad-
vanced position for an assault on Western
Europe;,. Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania
provide a base from which to operate against
the States on the northern shore of the Medi-
terranean and against the Dardanelles.
14. The Soviet leaders probably regard con-
tinued control over the Satellites as essential
to prevent the recreation of a German state
of prewar size and power, which in their view
might once again exert dominant influence in
Eastern Europe and threaten the security of
the USSR. Directly, or through the Satel-
lites, the USSR controls not only East Ger-
many, but also the formerly German areas of
Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia, from
which most of the German population was ex-
pelled in 1945. In 1938 the eastern provinces
of Gerniany now held by Poland and the USSR
had a population of nine million, and the terri-
tory of present-day East Germany 17 million.
In other words, Moscow now controls terri-
tories which constituted one-fourth the area
of 1938 Germany, and sustained more than a
third of its population. We believe that the
USSR will not voluntarily relinquish any of
these territories except in exchange for a
solution of the German problem favorable to
Soviet interests.
15. The Satellites represent for the USSR an
important economic component of power in
the over-all East-West struggle. Satellite
gross national product and Satellite popula-
tion are approximately two-fifths as large as
those of the USSR, and the area provides the
USSR with important strategic raw materials
and manufactured goods. Economically, the
three most important Satellites are Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, which to-
gether contain 61 percent of the Satellite pop-
ulation and account for 85 percent of Satellite
GNP.
16. Finally, control of the Satellites has great
political value for the Soviet Union and the
international Communist movement. The
Satellite regimes are used by the USSR in the
conduct of foreign policy, propaganda, and
subversive operations. In addition, the mere
existence of the "People's Democracies," with
their population of almost 100 million, pro-
claims to the outside world that Communism
is on the march. Communist domestic and
foreign propaganda has made capital of the
fact that these varied and populous states are
members of the "progressive camp."
17. The USSR has made clear that it regards
incorporation of these areas into the Soviet
Bloc as an accomplished fact, and that the
status of the Satellites is not a matter for in-
ternational negotiation. In the case of Ger-
many, the USSR has held open the possibility
of reunification on the basis of negotiations
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EUROPEAN SATELLITES
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF
GROSS PRODUCT, 1960
Y
EAST GERM
31.3%
POLAND.
34.2%
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25067 11-55
HUNGARY
6.0%
RUMANIA
6.6%
Figure 1
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ALBANIA,'
0.5%
\ I
BULGARIA 4
2.6%
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between the East and West German regimes.
We believe, however, that the USSR will not
voluntarily relinquish East Germany except
in exchange for a solution of the German
problem favorable to Soviet interests. It is
also possible that the USSR might be willing
to reconsider its position with regard to Al-
bania. For example, there is a slight chance
that the physical isolation of Albania from the
Soviet Bloc and its minor strategic value to
the Bloc would induce Moscow to use Albania
as a pawn in Balkan intrigue.
Tactical Shifts in Soviet Policy in the
Satellites
18. Soviet policy in the Satellites has followed
a changing but generally consistent course
since Soviet troops occupied the area in the
wake of the German retreat. From 1944 to
1947 the Soviet tactic was to direct and assist
the local Communist parties in gaining con-
trol of the East European governments under
a facade of legality. The Communists cham-
pioned causes which could give them some
initial popular support, such as land reform,
the expulsion of some 12 million Germans
from East European territories, and the trans-
fer of the property of these Germans to Poles,
Czechs, and Slovaks. Coalition cabinets were
the order of the day, and prime ministers
sometimes came from non-Communist par-
ties, but key ministries were held by the Com-
munists. The Communists most in View were
frequently those who had acquired local stat-
ure as underground resistance leaders, rather
than those who had spent the war years in
the USSR. On the economic front, the USSR
exploited the Satellites, particularly those
identified as ex-enemies, for its own benefit,
and simultaneously introduced Soviet-type in-
stitutions into the nonagricultural sectors of
their economies. The USSR as yet showed
little interest in the long-range economic de-
velopment of the area.
19. In 1947 the next phase of Soviet policy be-
gan to develop. The Communists, well estab-
lished in key positions, proceeded to consoli-
date their power and to sovietize the Satellites.
In some countries coalition governments were
eliminated ?by means of intimidation and
rigged elections. In September 1947 the
Cominform was founded, in part to provide
Moscow with closer control over the Satellite
parties. Early in 1948 the vestiges of freedom
in Czechoslovakia were wiped out by a coup
d'etat. In June 1948 the Yugoslav party was
expelled from the Cominform for "nationalist
deviation." In September, Wladislaw Gomul-
ka was dismissed as secretary general of the
Polish party on the same charge. There fol-
lowed a series of purges, the object of which
was to decapitate nationalist Communist fac-
tions throughout the Satellites. Communist
leaders especially loyal to Moscow, men who
had spent long years in the Soviet Union and
who in many cases were Soviet citizens, openly
took over the direction of the local parties.
A beginning was made at screening undepend-
able elements from the large Communist par-
ties which had been built up in the period
1945-1948. After 1948 direct exploitation of
East Germany, Hungary, and Rumania was
gradually eased, and every effort was devoted
to the rapid development of heavy industry
throughout the Satellites. This development
was patterned after Soviet practice, which in-
volved a high rate of forced savings through
depressed consumption levels, and concurrent
neglect of agricultural development. A policy
aimed at full agricultural collectivization was
inaugurated. Security measures were tight-
ened. Western correspondents were expelled,
or arrested as spies, and Western embassies
were cut off from contact with the local pop-
ulations. Pressure on the churches was in-
tensified, and religious leaders were impris-
oned on charges of treason. This pattern con-
tinued until the death of Stalin, in March
1953.
20. Beginning in mid-1953, a shift in Soviet
tactics in the Satellites became evident. This
shift emerged primarily in the economic field
with announcements of a "new course" which
held out the promise of a higher standard of
living for the Satellite populations. Planned
rates of economic growth were cut back to
more realistic levels, and the emphasis on the
development of heavy industry was toned
down. In general, collectivization of agricul-
ture was greatly slowed, and in some countries
it actually lost considerable ground. Invest-
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ment in agriculture was increased substan-
tially. Most of the joint Soviet-Satellite com-
panies, which had become symbols of Soviet
exploitation, were dissolved, and other overt
signs of Soviet economic control were reduced.
In early 1955, however, there was some modifi-
cation of the "new course" economic ap-
proaches, concurrent with the consolidation
of the present regime in the USSR. Pressures
for increasing output were revived; heavy in-
dustrial development was re-emphasized, and
collectivization efforts were renewed. At the
same time, Soviet and Satellite planners be-
gan to place more emphasis on Bloc-wide co-
ordination of economic planning and on re-
gional specialization in economic activity.
21. In the political field, security and police
pressures became somewhat less obtrusive.
Mass deportation of urban middle class ele-
ments in Hungary came to a halt. In a few
countries, some representatives of former op-
position parties were released. A special ef-
fort was made to persuade political refugees
to return home. The isolation of the Western
diplomatic corps was somewhat reduced, and
a few Western correspondents were permitted
entry.
II. THE FUTURE OF SOVIET POLICY
IN THE SATELLITES
22. The USSR now has, for all practical pur-
poses, complete control over the Satellite re-
gimes and will almost certainly be able to
maintain it during the period of this estimate.
Within the limitations suggested in paragraph
6 with respect to East Germany and Albania,
we believe that it will remain firm Soviet policy
to retain such control. Control rests funda-
mentally on the USSR's military capability of
maintaining its domination over the area for
an indefinite period. Soviet control is exer-
cised primarily through the Satellite Commu-
nist parties, assisted and guided by a complex
of Soviet diplomatic and military establish-
ments, economic advisors, and police agencies.
Under the aegis of the Soviet security appa-
ratus, the various Satellite security services
have become in effect a part of the Soviet
police mechanism. These controls are so de-
signed as to bind the Satellites to the USSR
individually, rather than as a group.
23. The Soviet leaders will continue the policy
of controlling the Satellite area in such a way
as to produce the greatest possible internal
and foreign policy advantages for the USSR.
This aim, does not preclude Soviet policy modi-
fications calculated to take greater account of
local conditions and to produce smoother eco-
nomic development. Such flexibility may al-
so diminish the impact of Soviet rule on Sat-
ellite national sensibilities and support So-
viet claims that these states are independent.
Bloc statements on the importance of "local
conditions for the development of socialism"
may portend increasing flexibility in planning
and in socialization, aimed at a more realistic
program of economic development for the area
as a whole. Moreover, Communist control be-
ing well established, the regimes can now
afford to grant minor relaxations of political
pressure and police control. In addition,
Moscow might expect that such measures
would document the claim of Satellite inde-
pendence, and would thereby impress opinion
in neutral and underdeveloped countries and
improve the propaganda? position of Free
World Communist parties,
24. The USSR may somewhat reduce or refine '
its more visible means of control. Soviet
troops might be withdrawn from Rumania
and Hungary, where the USSR probably esti-
mates their presence is not essential. Aboli-
tion of the Cominform would be an even more
inexpensive gesture, since this agency has be-
come largely a Soviet Bloc information and
propaganda link with the West European
Communist parties, rather than an instru-
ment of control. In matters essential to So-
viet control, such as the building up of a re-
liable and subservient Satellite Communist
leadership and the staffing of key positions
with Soviet or Moscow-oriented personnel, the
Soviet rulers will almost certainly continue to
maintain the policies of the Stalin era.
25. Soviet leaders are almost certainly aware,
however, that some of the actions they have
already taken involve certain risks for their
position in the Satellites. The visit to Bel-
grade, for example, had the effect of building
up the prestige and influence of Tito, and the
public acknowledgment of Yugoslavia's right
to pursue its own "way to socialism" aroused
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Percentage
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Dec.
1944
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EUROPEAN SATELLITES
TRENDS IN COLLECTIVIZATION, 1944-55
Percentage of Arable Land in Collective Farms
Figure 2
......."'""
CZEctio,
"LOy
1
\/
CNPI 'A
-4.
.,
A
t.4
,,.K
.
ut.GDPA"
.......? ??..?. ..
.- -
AL BA
. ... ?Ov....?1l, ..l?0?
....---.........."
,
........
25098 11-55
Dec.
1945
Dec.
1946
Dec.
1947
Dec.
1948
Dec.
1949
Dec.
1950
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Dec.
1951
Dec.
1 952
Dec.
1 953
Dec.
1954
Dec.
1 955
*Includes only the more advanced types of collective forms (Types III and IV).
"Percentcrge of agricultural land, which includes permanent meadows and
postures as well as arable land.
***Includes agricultural tillage associations, which ore lower forms of collectives.
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hopes in the Satellites for a substantial lessen-
ing of Soviet control. The case of the Imre
Nagy regime in Hungary indicates the exist-
ence of latent conflicts within the Satellite
party leadership which may have to be re-
solved by Moscow from time to time.
26. We believe that Soviet authorities will
avoid any actions which, in their judgment,
would jeopardize their control of the Satellite
regimes or the regimes' control over the local
populations. There are, therefore, narrow
limits to the freedom of action which Moscow
can afford to permit the Satellite regimes to
develop.
III. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
SATELLITES: POLITICAL
27. The Communist regimes, backed by the
ultimate sanction of Soviet power, almost cer-
tainly have firm control of the Satellite popu-
lations. Nevertheless, there are indications of
factionalism within some of the party leader-
ships, and all governments are still confronted
with problems arising from their unpopularity
with the masses and from the difficulties in-
herent in developing an efficient administra-
tion in a totalitarian state. We believe, how-
ever, that during the period of this estimate,
Soviet dominated regimes will be able to main-
tain their control over the populations and
gradually to increase their administrative
effectiveness.
28. Since the Communist parties are the basic
instrument of the regimes' control over the
populations, any weakness or inefficiency
within these parties acts as a conditioning
factor on the execution of policy. Approxi-
mately seven percent of the total Satellite
population, or 6.5 million persons, are Commu-
nist party members. This means that one of
every 10 adults in the Satellites is a party
member. Obviously, the development of such
large parties from very small beginnings
(there were probably less than a thousand
Communists in Rumania in 1944) could not
have been accomplished without taking in
large numbers of people who were not dedi-
cated to Communism. In staffing positions
at the lower echelons of the bureaucracy, the
party has often had to sacrifice technical
qualification in savor of political loyalty. At
7
higher levels an element of the party member-
ship with technical qualifications is oppor-
tunistic. Some elements privately resent dic-
tation by Moscow and favor a reduction of
political terror and an increase in consumer
goods. There are many party members with
a nationalist tinge who constitute a potential
for "deviation." We believe, however, that
these "unreliable" elements will not attain
sufficient influence within the parties to jeop-
ardize either the control by the Moscow-
oriented Communists or the implementation
of Soviet policy.5
29. In the field of education, Communist
attempts to indoctrinate the adult generation
have apparently had little success. Within
the youth, however, intensive indoctrination,
coupled with the bait of advanced schooling,
career opportunities, and other material bene-
fits, has begun to produce a greater degree
of cooperation with the regime. Educational
opportunities, especially for favored classes,
have in fact been greatly increased, particular-
ly in technical fields.
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS
per thousand population 1
Country
1937-1939
1953-1954
Bulgaria
1.7
4.1
Czechoslovakia
1.9
3.7
Hungary
1.3
5.7
Poland
1.4
5.3
Rumania
1.4
3.8
The comparable figure (1954) for the US is 15.2,
for the USSR 5.4, for West Germany 2.7, and for
the UK 1.4.
'The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Army, while concurring in the esti-
mative conclusion contained in the last sentence
of this paragraph, considers that the paragraph
as a whole conveys an impression of weakness in
the Satellite Communist parties that is not sup-
ported by intelligence and recommends the sub-
stitution of the following for paragraph 28:
"Satellite Communist parties are large in
comparison to immediate postwar size, and
membership now consists of seven percent of
the total Satellite population or 6.5 million
persons. Although the parties probably con-
tain some unreliable elements, we believe
that these elements either will remain sub-
merged or will be eliminated and will not ex-
ercise significant influence on control by the
hard core Communists or implementation of
Soviet policy."
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As a result, the regimes will probably become
increasingly able to find adequate personnel
for positions in the state apparatus and the
nationalized economic enterprises. Some of
these younger people are likely to constitute
an element with a vested interest in the Com-
munist regimes, even though the majority of
youth will probably not become convinced
Communists during the period of the esti-
mate.
30. In relations between church and state,
the Satellite regimes have avoided a head-on
collision with popular devotion to traditional
religious observances, which appears to have
been increasing. Instead, they have directed
their policy primarily toward strangulation
of the independent organizational and insti-
tutional features of the churches, in the hope
of making these churches subservient to the
regime. This aim has to a large extent been
realized in the case of the Orthodox, Protes-
tant, and Moslem churches of the area. Even
the Catholic Church has been forced to adopt
a policy of avoiding open controversy with the
regime, in order to conserve the position of its
clergy and as much as possible of its tradi-
tional functions.
31. All available evidence indicates that
throughout the Satellite area the regimes
have made no appreciable progress in induc-
ing the people to give active support to the
Communist system and its program. For a
number of reasons, of which economic hard-
ship and regimentation, hatred of Soviet dom-
ination, and fear of the police state appear
uppermost, a substantial majority of the
people continue to be antipathetic toward
the regimes. Dissidence is widely prevalent
among the peasantry, which stubbornly re-
sists collectivization, and is a significant fac-
tor even within groups which are ostensibly
favored by the regimes, such as youth and
industrial workers.
32. The effectiveness of the Satellite govern-
ments in combatting dissidence and promot-
ing Communist indoctrination will be limited
by a number of factors. A shortage of capa-
ble and ideologically grounded teachers and
writers will probably continue. The tradi-
tional affinity of the Satellite intelligentsia for
Western culture will probably remain strong
in the older generations. Western broadcasts
will probably continue to reach the Satellite
populations, and there may be greater ex-
change of cultural, technical, and sport dele-
gations with Western countries.
33. The failure of the Satellite governments
to win mass support will be partly offset by a
tendency of the population to become resigned
to Communist rule. Next to general positive
support, the Communist regimes probably re-
gard a growth of popular acquiescence and
resignation as the second best development
for their purposes. If the Soviet policy of
"relaxation of international tensions" con-
tinues, attitudes of resignation among many
elements of the population will be reinforced.
The Satellite populations have placed their
main hope for eventual liberation on Western
Europe and the US, and they have tended to
believe that this could be accomplished only
through war. This hope of liberation appar-
ently remained fairly strong up to 1953, but
since then has been diminishing. The Sum-
mit meeting at Geneva intensified the belief
that the Western Powers were determined to
avoid war and, if necessary, to accept a modus
vivendi with the USSR involving the mainte-
nance of the status quo in Eastern Europe.
34. So far as is known, no active resistance
organizations survive in the Satellite area at
present. There are today, and probably will
be for many years to come, a few elements of
potential resistance scattered throughout Sat-
ellite society which may be able to survive
by remaining inactive and deeply concealed.
Only in the event of war, however, would they
be likely to attempt conspiratorial activity.
Except possibly in the case of East Germany,
we believe that no development short of a
drastic impairment of Communist controls or
the approach of friendly forces in time of war
would be sufficient to stimulate important
outbreaks of open resistance.
35. While the number of Communist sup-
porters will probably increase over the period
of the estimate, it is unlikely that anything
like a majority within the Satellite popula-
tions will accept Communism, or that the
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national aspirations of the East European
peoples will be extinguished. These peoples
have a long history of suffering under oppres-
sive masters. While submitting to the ex-
ploitation of the Turk, or the Tsarist Russian,
or the German over many centuries, they yet
managed to maintain their national identity.
They will probably continue to do so. Never-
theless, there will probably be some increase
in support of the government by more favored
elements in the population and, among the
people generally, an increasing resignation to
life under Communist rule.
IV. ECONOMIC
Trends in Economic Policy
36. While Satellite economic policy in the
period 1948-1953 resulted in a considerable
growth of heavy industry, this was accom-
plished at the expense of consumer goods and
agricultural production. Moreover, a con-
siderable imbalance developed in heavy indus-
try, resulting from overrapid build-up of man-
ufacturing facilities without corresponding ex-
pansion of the raw material, fuel, and power
base. By the end of 1952 rates of industrial
growth began to fall at a pace which made it
apparent that many of the augmented plan
goals set in 1951 would not be met. The
growth rates of previous years had been real-
ized primarily as a result of substantial addi-
tions to the industrial labor forces and of
fuller utilization of capacities. By 1953, addi-
tions to the total labor forces and transfers
of workers from agriculture to industry had
greatly diminished, so that further economic
growth depended increasingly on improved la-
bor productivity. Disaffection of both workers
and peasants, however, seriously hampered
efforts to achieve such an improvement.
37. Beginning in mid-1953 all the Satellites
adopted, under Moscow's guidance, an eco-
nomic "new course." This new policy involved
an acceptance by the Satellite regimes of
much lower planned rates of industrial growth
than they had foreseen in 1951 for the period
1953-1955. It entailed some shift in emphasis
within industry from heavy machinery to
basic raw materials, power, and consumer
goods. In agriculture, the "new course" called
for increased investment and for the enhance-
ment of incentives through such concessions
as the lowering of delivery quotas and, in some
countries, permission to withdraw from the
collectivized sector. By means of such a pro-
gram, the regimes also hoped to improve the
economic response of workers and peasants
and thereby to alleviate the major economic
difficulties of the previous period.
38. During 1954 some progress was made in
altering the structure of industry. However,
the "new course" ran into serious economic
difficulties and even created a certain political
threat. Slowness in implementing unrealistic
promises of improved living 'standards led to
widespread disillusionment and skepticism.
Noncooperation was encountered from almost
all elements of the population. The doctri-
naire elements in the Communist parties ob-
jected to what they considered a "deviation-
ist" economic course. The workers and peas-
ants were inclined to hold out for greater and
more effective concessions. Changes in pro-
duction and allocation patterns adversely af-
fected industrial schedules and unfavorable
weather reduced crop yields. As a result, per-
formance in both- industry and agriculture
was extremely disappointing during 1954.
Even the reduced industrial goals were not ful-
filled, and rising wage levels without cor-
responding increases in productivity began to
cause fiscal problems for the regimes.
39. Early in 1955 modifications of the "new
course" were undertaken, coinciding with the
ouster of Malenkov and Soviet reaffirmation
of the primacy of heavy industry. These
modifications called for restoration of some
degree of emphasis to heavy industry, re-
affirmed the eventual goal of full collectiviza-
tion, and reintroduced some of the earlier dis-
cipline into economic activities. During 1955,
the stress was placed on the restoration of
discipline in such matters as workers' norms,
wage payments, and peasant delivery obliga-
tions. In some countries, collectivization ac-
tivity was resumed. The implementation of
the renewed emphasis on heavy industry, how-
ever, was put off, at least in part, until 1956.
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40. The early 1955 modification does not ap-
pear to represent a full return to pre-"new
course" programs. Emphasis on heavy indus-
try is coupled with a determination to keep
development plans more in line with capabili-
ties and with a recognition of the danger of
neglecting agricultural development. In some
respects discipline has been restored, but
many of the "new course" incentives remain
intact.
41. The present industrial program empha-
sizes for the immediate future the full utiliza-
tion of existing industrial capacities. Such
an effort will continue the "new course" stress
on the production of raw materials, fuel, and
power. Only limited major new investments
in the field of heavy manufactures are sched-
uled. Industrial investments are to be con-
centrated to a greater degree on replacement
and modernization of outmoded equipment
and on technological improvements, rather
than on wholesale expansion of industrial
capacity. The program also seeks to reduce
the disparity which had existed prior to 1953
between the rate of expansion in the output
of producer goods and that of consumer goods.
It envisages, Moreover, greater use of heavy
industrial plant for the production of agricul-
tural equipment and durable consumer goods.
42. The Satellite regimes are faced with
thorny policy problems in the field of agricul-
ture. As a matter of doctrine, they continue
to insist that full collectivization of agricul-
ture is a prerequisite for the "building of so-
cialism," yet they have an acute awareness
that rapid and forced collectivization de-
presses agricultural production. Consequent-
ly, they can increase agricultural output sig-
nificantly over the next five years only if col-
lectivization is carried out at a slow pace, and
private agriculture is given at least limited
encouragement. They will be faced with a
delicate problem of maintaining a judicious
balance between the incentives given the col-
lectives and those provided the free sector.
In any case, as long as a substantial private
sector remains, the regimes will have difficulty
in getting maximum results from the col-
lectivized sector. On balance, in view of the
serious concern of the Satellite leaders to in-
10
crease agricultural output, we believe there
will be only moderate increases in collectiviza-
tion during the period of this estimate.
Rate of Growth
43. The application of the "new course" was
accompanied by a reduction in the rate of
growth of Satellite GNP. In 1954 estimated
GNP was only five percent greater than in
1953, a modest rate as compared with preced-
ing years. Only Poland was able to fulfill its
initial industrial production goal for that
year. In all seven Satellites, the announced
percentage gains in industrial output over the
previous year were smaller than in 1953. The
average gain in the productivity of labor was
also significantly less than in previous years;
in the case of Hungary, output per industrial
worker actually declined. Total Satellite pro-
duction of agricultural commodities showed
no increase in 1954 over the preceding year.
44. We estimate that even with the modifica-
tions of the "new course" undertaken in 1955,
the rate of increase in the total GNP of the
Satellites for the years 1955-1960 will average
somewhat less than four percent per annum.
This is lower than the projected Soviet rate of
about five to six percent, and represents a
substantial decline from the extraordinary
Satellite average of over seven percent for
the years 1949-1954.
ESTIMATED GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCTS OF
THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
(excluding Albania)
Billion
1951 US dollars
Percent
increase
1960
over
1938
1948
1954
1960
1954
European Satellites
44.5
32.4
49.4
61.4
24
Poland
14.5
11.0
17.1
21.1
23
East Germany
16.1
9.0
15.8
19.3
22
Czechoslovakia
7.3
6.8
9.2
11.6
26
Rumania
3.1
2.6
3.0
4.1
36
Hungary
2.5
2.0
3.0
3.7
24
Bulgaria
1.0
1.0
1.3
1.6
29
45. Assuming only moderate increases in the
collectivized sector, we estimate that Satellite
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agricultural output in 1960 will be about 11
percent greater than in 1954. Relatively large
increases are projected for Hungary and Ru-
mania, where agricultural output is still far
below the prewar level, but the anticipated
increase for the Satellites as a whole is much
smaller than during the period 1949-1954.
Realization of the projected 11 percent in-
crease would still leave Satellite agricultural
production about 10 percent below the prewar
level. The agricultural labor force is ex-
pected to increase slightly rather than decline
as in the past, even though mechanization is
to be accelerated. The increased use of labor
in agriculture, where productivity is low,
rather than in industry where productivity is
higher, will tend to have an adverse effect on
the rate of economic growth.
46. We estimate that nonagricultural produc-
tion will increase by approximately 28 percent
in the period 1954-1960. This will be made
possible by an estimated increase of 11 per-
cent in the nonagricultural labor force and
by an expected growth in output per worker
on the order of two to three percent per year.
The productivity of labor in the Satellite area
in 1960 will still be considerably less than that
of the industrialized countries of the West.
47. We estimate that there will be a small in-
crease in Satellite living standards by 1960.
The total population of the European Satel-
lites is expected to increase about seven per-
cent from 1954 to 1960, approximately from
93 to 100 million persons. Since the projected
increase in total agricultural production
amounts to 11 percent, only a very small per
capita increase in agricultural output is prob-
able. Even with some increases in imports of
agricultural products, comparatively little im-
provement in the per capita consumption of
foodstuffs will result. The diet will remain
low in proteins and high in starchy substi-
tutes, and the caloric intake will not be sub-
stantially increased Manufactured consumer
goods will account for the major part of the
small prospective rise in living standards.
Producer goods output will increase at a more
rapid rate than consumer goods, and invest-
ment will rise more rapidly than consumption.
Satellite Contributions to Bloc Strength
48. The European Satellites represent an im-
portant element of over-all Bloc economic
strength. Satellite GNP in 1954 is estimated
at roughly two-fifths that of the USSR. The
ratio probably will be somewhat smaller in
1960, since the estimated rate of growth of
GNP is significantly lower for the Satellites
than for the USSR.
49. Satellite production of basic materials
such as uranium, coal, petroleum, bauxite,
calcium carbide, and caustic soda represents
a particularly significant contribution to Bloc
strength. The largest Satellite reserves of
bituminous coal are in Poland, which ships
important quantities to the USSR and East
Germany, and lesser amounts to Czechoslo-
vakia and Hungary. Hungary has the largest
bauxite reserves in Europe and accounts for
approximately 60 percent of Soviet Bloc pro-
duction. Although Satellite oil reserves are
estimated to constitute only seven percent of
the reserves of the Soviet Bloc, the Satellites
currently provide 16 percent of Bloc produc-
tion.
50. It is estimated that, in 1954, the Satellites
provided approximately two-thirds of Bloc
uranium ore production. East Germany alone
provided almost 50 percent of the Soviet Bloc
total. The uranium production of East Ger-
many can be expected to remain about the.
same during the period of this estimate, and
the other Satellites may show a slight in-
crease. The USSR, however, is not dependent
upon Satellite sources. If necessary the So-
viet atomic energy program could probably
be supported at its present level of operation
from internal Soviet sources alone. Never-
theless, the USSR will almost certainly wish
to continue its rapid and large-scale exploita-
tion of Satellite ores in order to accumulate
maximum reserves.
51. The Satellites also produce some types of
machinery and equipment which the USSR
continues to import in large quantities. Most
of the production of rolling stock has been ex-
ported to the Soviet Union, leaving Satellite
railway systems in a deplorable condition by
Western standards. Satellite shipbuilding
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OTHER
40% 40%
SECRET
EUROPEAN SATELLITES*
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS NATIONAL
PRODUCT AMONG INDUSTRY, AND OTHER SECTORS**
1938, 1948, 1954, AND 1960
--TAGRICUtEURE
-5AGRICUliEUREr.
OTHER
36%
.1??????=1??????111A
-,01?11111111.1
,01.110104111...,
-3M!
"PIC
INDUSTRY
45%
1938 1948 1954
25069 11-55
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Figure 3
'JONVO?C KIXWM01.1C
,?????WIMIMWM.
'NM a,MM
ft.%!
,M?V`
INDUSTRY AND OTHER
83%
1960
*Excludes Albania
**Trade, services, transportation and
communications, and construction.
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capacity has been expanded, and the bulk of
the output, consisting chiefly of merchant
ships, has been exported to the USSR, thus
freeing Soviet shipyards for construction of
naval vessels.
Foreign Trade and Bloc Economic
Integration
52. After having steadily increased since 1948,
the trade of the Satellite countries within the
Sino-Soviet Bloc remained constant in 1954,
while their trade with the Free World in-
creased. During the period of this estimate,
trade with the Free World may continue to
rise somewhat faster, in percentage terms,
than total trade. However, the intra-Bloc
trade will probably again begin to show an-
nual increases and, in any case, will remain
the predominant part of the trade of each Sat-
tellite.
53. For political as well as economic reasons,
the Satellites apparently desire to increase
their trade with the Free World. Politically,
the development of trade ties with the Free
World coincides with the current Soviet drive
to extend Communist influence, particularly
in underdeveloped areas. Economically, the
achievement of the planned rates of growth
and the improvement of living standards will
be significantly facilitated if the Satellites can
import from the Free World certain key com-
modities, such as agricultural products, iron
ore, nonferrous metals, and machinery. Some
items in these categories are at present em-
bargoed by the COCOM countries.
54. In the absence of medium- or long-term
credits from Free World countries, which are
unlikely to be offered on any substantial scale
during the period of this estimate, an early
expansion of Satellite exports will be neces-
sary to balance an increase in imports from
the Free World. Thus, the Satellites are now
facing the problem of adjusting the character
and prices of their exports and their way of
doing business in order to improve their po-
sition in Free World markets. Except in East
Germany and to some extent in Czechoslo-
vakia, products of the newly-created Satellite
manufacturing industries have been high in
cost and indifferent in quality. The large
agricultural surpluses formerly used by some
Satellites in their foreign trade have dwindled
rapidly. Moreover, Satellite regimes have
gained a bad reputation in the Free World
for abruptly terminating the exchange of par-
ticular commodities and for unsatisfactory
performance on commitments and deliveries.
Under these circumstances, it will probably be
easier for the Satellites to increase trade with
the underdeveloped areas, particularly in
South Asia, the Middle East, and Latin Ameri-
ca, than with the industrial countries of the
West.
55. Despite this interest in East-West trade,
Soviet planners are also placing greater stress
on the economic integration of the Soviet Bloc.
The particular aspects of integration to which
they are giving attention are regional co-
ordination of production planning and a more
rational adjustment of the industrial struc-
ture of the Satellite area. Beginning in 1956,
the Five-Year Plans of all the Satellites except
Bulgaria will cover the same time period as
the Soviet plan, and it has been officially an-
nounced that these plans will be coordinated
with one another and with the Soviet plan to
a greater extent than heretofore. As in the
past, the plans will reflect broad economic
policies and goals laid down by the USSR.
The Council for Economic Mutual Assistance
(CEMA) , will probably play the major co-
ordinating role. The planners apparently
hope that, as a result of closer coordination of
production plans for particular commodities,
together with a continued high volume of
intra-Bloc trade and increasing exchange of
technical information, critical deficiencies in
materials, plant or labor can be avoided dur-
ing the next five years. They further hope
that the concept of better balanced economic
development applied to the area as a whole,
with individual countries concentrating on
their most efficient economic activities, will
increase the benefits of intra-Bloc trade and
help avoid imbalances, strains, and bottle-
necks. Such an adjustment would presum-
ably require the maintenance or elevation of
the already high priorities established for ex-
panding the output of coal in Poland, petro-
leum in Rumania and Hungary, machines and
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100%
80
60
. 40
? 20
0
1936-38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 '53
ALL SATELLITES*
,
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EUROPEAN SATELLITES*
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF TRADE TURNOVER
1936-38 Average and 1948-53
(In percent)
100%
80
60
40
20
1936-38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 '53
EAST GERMANY
13957 9-55
100%
80
60
40
20
0
1936 38 '48
100%
80
60
40
20
'49 '50 '51
BULGARIA
100%
80
60
40
20
'52 '53 1936 38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 '53
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
80
60
40
20
100%
80
60
40
20
0 0 0
1936 38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 '53 1936-38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 3 1936-38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 '53
HUNGARY
USSR and China
Rest of .Sino-Soviet Bloc
Non-Bloc
Figure 4
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POLAND
RUMANIA
*Excludes Albania
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equipment in Czechosolvakia and East Ger-
many, and chemicals in East Germany and
Poland. In agriculture the highest priorities
would logically be assigned to Hungary and
the Balkans.
56. We believe that during the period of this
estimate the scope and effectiveness of Bloc
wide regional planning will substantially in-
crease as compared to the period 1949-1953.
Economic interdependence of the Soviet-Sat-
ellite area has already grown significantly
through the forced shift of the Satellites dur-
ing the past seven years to intra-Bloc trade at
the expense of trade with the Free World. The
benefits from such trade could be increased
by further developing the complementary
character of the Satellite economies.
57. The success of these efforts will, however,
be limited by a number of factors. The task
of coordination is intrinsically difficult, and
its extension will almost certainly encounter
practical and doctrinal obstacles. Central-
ized planning and organization of supply
channels on an international scale are much
more complex than on a national scale.
Greater interdependence will multiply the
area-wide repercussions of plan failures in in-
dividual countries. While it would be ration-
al for each country to intensify concentration
on its most efficient production lines, it will
apparently be necessary, at least during the
period of this estimate, for individual Satel-
lites to maintain or even increase their efforts
along certain uneconomical lines, pending an-
ticipated production increases by their Bloc
trading partners. Finally the nationalistic
and doctrinaire position that each Communist
country should concentrate on the develop-
ment of heavy industry will probably militate
against the full acceptance of the concept of
interdependent economies.
58. On balance, we view the current stress
on economic integration as indicative of a
long-term policy which will increasingly in-
fluence Satellite development plans. During
the period 1956-1960 this policy will probably
not contribute greatly to the growth of the
economy or to the resolution of basic economic
problems, although some benefits can be ex-
pected. Over a longer period, integration
may make significant contributions to the
economic strength of this area.
V. SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS
59. During the period 1956-1960 Satellite
capabilities in many fields of science will con-
tinue to grow. At the same time, however,
the USSR will probably cease to be dependent
upon the Satellites for its basic research and
development needs in such fields as scientific
instruments, precision tools, optical goods,
photographic equipment, and electronics.
This trend will probably result in a general
redirection of effort toward the development
of items for the domestic economy and foreign
trade.
60. Since World War II, East Germany and,
to a lesser extent, Czechoslovakia have made
significant contributions to the scientific and
technological development of the USSR by
supplying instruments for scientific research
and development and for industrial process
measurement and control. During 1955, the
USSR cancelled large' contracts for instru-
ments, probably reflecting an increased supply
from domestic sources. The loss of these con-
tracts may at least temporarily reduce funds
allocated for East German instrumentation
research and development. Unless Soviet sup-
port is revived, East German research and pro-
duction in this field will depend upon the de-
velopment of other trade outlets, including
the West. Progress, in any case, will prob-
ably be slower than prior to 1953.
61. Competent scientific manpower is still in
short supply, but there are many young and
well-trained research workers in East Ger-
many, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary
whose capabilities are increasing with experi-
ence. The current trend toward the decen-
tralization of scientific research, which has
been noted particularly in East Germany, may
release a number of scientists from admin-
istrative duties and make them available for
more productive work. While the scientific-
technical manpower shortage will not be over-
come during the period of this estimate, it will
probably be considerably alleviated.
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62. Satellite restrictions on the dissemination
of scientific-technical information have been
eased, and the controlled interchange of such
information has been encouraged. Greatly
increased attendance at international scien-
tific meetings, together with an easing of se-
curity policy, have permitted contacts with
scientific colleagues on a world-wide basis.
Such exchanges of ideas and experience, if
they continue, will be of considerable benefit
to the Satellites.
63. There has been a sharp increase in nuclear
physics research. In East Germany, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia new institutes of nuclear
physics have been established, and capabili-
ties in this field are expected to increase. The
Soviet Union has announced a broad program
of assistance to the Satellites, including the
supply of nuclear reactors and fissionable
materials. Such a program, if carried out,
would considerably broaden the base and en-
hance the capabilities of the Soviet Bloc in
the nonmilitary aspects of nuclear research.
In any case, the full impact of this program
would not be felt before 1960.
64. The direct contribution of the Satellites
to the Soviet Bloc air, ground, and naval
weapons research and development program
is of little significance. There is a small
amount of work being done in Czechoslovakia
and in East Germany which gives support to
Soviet weapons programs. Soviet policy, how-
ever, has been to limit Satellite research and
development work on weapons. The Satel-
lites have been encouraged to apply their
scientific and technical effort to the develop-
ment of test and research equipment, of an-
cillary military items, and of industrial tech-
niques related to military production. We
believe that, during the next five years, there
will be no significant change in this policy.
VI. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
65. Soviet control of the Satellites has moved
the Soviet military frontier into Central Eu-
rope. In view of the strategic importance of
this region, the USSR has given great em-
phasis to its development for military opera-
tions. It has maintained and modernized
14
large forces of its own in the area, and has
intensively developed airfields and communi-
cations. It has sought to build reliable Sat-
ellite forces and has increasingly supplied
them with modern weapons and equipment.
Soviet Forces Stationed in the Satellites
66. Of an estimated 494,000 Soviet Army
ground forces (plus 24,000 security troops)
stationed in the Satellites, approximately 400,-
000 (22 line divisions) are located in East
Germany, while the remaining 94,000 (6 line
divisions) are located in Hungary, Poland,
and Rumania. It is possible that the Soviet
troops in Hungary and Rumania will be with-
drawn during the period of the estimate, since
their presence is probably not considered nec-
essary to the maintenance of Soviet control.
The Soviet leaders might make such a move
in support of their diplomatic and propaganda
campaign against NATO. At present, how-
ever, the indications are that these troops will
remain. Provided there is no basic change
in the German situation, the number of divi-
sions in East Germany and Poland will prob-
ably not change substantially during the
period of the estimate, although their combat
effectiveness will be increased through the re-
equipment and reorganization program which
has been in progress since late 1954.
67. The most significant change in Soviet air
strength in the Satellites over the past year
has been a sizeable increase in jet light bomber
strength. This substantially enhances Soviet
capabilities for direct and indirect support of
ground force operations. Of the 14 light
bomber regiments currently in the area, 9 are
based in East Germany, 2 in Poland, and 3 in
Hungary.
68. About 25 percent of the Soviet FAGOTS
(MIG 15) based in the Satellites on 1 July
1954 have been replaced by FRESCOS (imp
17). This represents a significant increase in
combat effectiveness. All indications point
to the probability that this re-equipment pro-
gram will continue until all FAGOTS are re-
placed by improved fighter types by, mid-1957.
At present there are a limited number of jet
all-weather fighters which are probably being
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used for training purposes. While these
planes do not materially increase the over-all
combat effectiveness of the Soviet air force in
the Satellites, their presence portends a build-
up in all-weather fighter strength and defen-
sive capabilities. It is also expected that all
BEAST (IL-10) attack aircraft will be phased
out by mid-1959 and replaced in the attack
role by jet fighters and light bombers. In
short, present Soviet authorized air strength
of some 2,500 military aircraft of all types
stationed in the Satellites will probably not
change substantially over the period of the
estimate. Actual strength is presently esti-
mated at about 85 percent of TO&E. The
capabilities of this force will be increased by
the continued phasing in of new types; actual
strength could be brought up to the TO&E
figure in a relatively short time.
69. The USSR bases a small number of patrol
vessels and minesweepers in several Satellite
ports on the Baltic and Black Seas. The pri-
mary purpose of these forces is to direct the
training of the Satellite navies in the use of
Soviet equipment and operating procedures.
In the size, composition, disposition, or capa-
bilities of the Soviet naval forces based in
the Satellites there have been no significant
changes and none are anticipated over the
period of the estimate.
Satellite Forces?
70. Ground. The Satellite ground forces
have become a substantial element in the
balance of military power in Europe. We esti-
mate that currently the ground forces of the
Satellites comprise 1,085,000 men organized
in 77 divisions, of which six are tank and 15
mechanized. Recently cuts have been an-
nounced for the major Satellite forces ranging
from nine to 18 percent., Even if these cuts
are actually carried out, the over-all effective-
ness of the ground forces will not be signifi-
cantly impaired. These ground forces are
See the tables in the Appendix for detailed fig-
ures on the strengths of Satellite military forces.
In the case of Albania the figure is 29 percent.
In East Germany no cut has been announced in
the strength of the military forces.
supplemented by Satellite security troops
which total 321,000 men. By M+180 days the
Satellites could mobilize 4,700,000 men in 188
divisions, provided there was extensive Soviet
logistical support.
71. We do not believe that there will be signifi-
cant increases in the Satellite standing armies
over the period of the estimate, with the pos-
sible exception of the East German army. If
conscription is adopted the latter could be
doubled in size (from 100,000 to 215,000 men) ,
but quality and political reliability would
sharply decline. Such a development will
probably depend in large part upon the ex-
tent of West German rearmament.
72. There appears to have been little joint
planning or training among Satellite armies.
The recent formation of a unified Soviet-Sat-
ellite armed forces command has changed
only the forms under which the established
Soviet control over military affairs is effected.
There is as yet no conclusive evidence of inter-
Satellite or Soviet-Satellite training under
direction of the unified command. There is
no evidence of plans for tactical integration
of Bloc forces in wartime. It is probable, how-
ever, that integrated planning is under way
and that combined maneuvers will be held
within a few years. In the meantime, in the
event of general war, the Satellite forces
would probably be used separately under the
direction of the Soviet high command and
might be placed directly under Soviet officers.
73. The morale and reliability of Satellite
ground forces has increased over the past year
and will probably continue to improve during
the period of the estimate. This trend will
be largely the result of continued indoctrina-
tion and training. We believe that the re-
liability of these armies is such that they
would be unlikely to defect on a substantial
scale until victorious Western forces ap-
proached the Satellite area.
74. The combat effectiveness of the Satellite
armies varies considerably so that no over-all
generalization is possible respecting their
probable performance in the event of general
war. The amount of transport and mecha-
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nized equipment allocated to major Satellite
forces has increased significantly in the last
year, and mobility approaches that of Soviet
forces. We believe that up to 50 percent of
existing Satellite divisions could be employed
initially in combat alongside Soviet forces.
With Soviet logistical support, several of the
armies would be capable of sustained inde-
pendent action against traditional enemies.
In general, the Bulgarian army is probably the
most reliable, best trained, and effective of all
the Satellite forces; division-level maneuvers
have been held each year for the past five or
six years. Bulgarian reserve training is ex-
tensive and thorough. Against such tradi-
tional enemies as the Turks or the Greeks, the
Bulgars would fight with their maximum
effectiveness. If the enemy forces included
sizeable German contingents, the Czechoslo-
vak and Polish armies would probably give a
good account of themselves, for the Poles
Would fear the loss of the "recovered" lands
and the Czechs the reoccupation by Germans
of the Sudeten areas. The Hungarians and
Rumanians, on the other hand, would prob-
ably regard a revival of German influence in
Eastern Europe as favoring their chances of
liberation from the USSR, and consequently
their troops would suffer from poor morale if
pitted against German units. The Satellite
army with the lowest combat potential except
for the small Albanian force, is that of East
Germany. The Garrisoned People's Police
(KVP) , as this army is still called, could prob-
ably not be used for operations against NATO
forces in West Germany, especially if the
latter included components of German Fed-
eral Republic troops. KVP units would, in
this case, have to be used for guarding lines of
communication and in other secondary roles.
75. The Satellite militarized security forces
have not changed significantly in strength
over the past several years, although they
have probably become more efficient. It is
believed that they will retain approximately
their present status through the period of this
estimate, and that they will remain capable
of protecting the local regimes against any
threat of internal subversion. The one ex-
ception to this general capability is provided
by East Germany where, until recent years,
most security functions were performed by
Soviet security forces. During the past year,
however, there has been a strengthening and
reorganization of East German security forces,
probably in anticipation of their assuming
greater responsibility for security operations.
76. The total Satellite output of arms and
ammunition will remain a small share of total
Soviet Bloc production. Although these coun-
tries will manufacture small arms, artillery,
tanks, ammunition, personal and optical
equipment, no significant increase in produc-
tion of army equipment is expected.
77. Air. The Satellite air forces now have an
estimated TO&E strength of 4,400, and an
estimated actual strength of 3,000 operational
aircraft of all types. We estimate that by
1960 TO&E strength will probably be 5,000,
and that actual strength by that date will be
nearly 4,000. Personnel strength is at pres-
ent estimated to be 102,600. The capabilities
of the Satellite air forces will probably be aug-
mented as a result of an over-all increase in
available aircraft and in the proportion of jet
aircraft. We believe that, even if the recently
announced manpower cuts are actually car-
ried out, the over-all air capabilities will not be
affected. No heavy bombers are expected to
be introduced but piston medium bombers
could be made available to the Satellite air
forces as they are phased out of the Soviet
air force. The greatest stress will continue
to be placed on air defense, with secondary
emphasis on air support of ground operations.
Throughout the period of this estimate, the
Satellite air forces will continue to constitute
a significant increment to Soviet air strength
in Europe.
78. The USSR provides intensive training for
carefully selected Satellite pilots in the doc-
trines, techniques, and tactics of the Soviet
air force. Soviet policy appears to be directed
toward the attainment of a high degree of co-
ordination between the air force of each Sat-
ellite and the Soviet air force, and the integra-
tion of the Satellite air forces into the Soviet
air defense system. There has been little co-
ordination among the individual Satellite air
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forces. While the Eastern European Defense.
Pact (EEDP) suggests that such coordination
is contemplated, probably no significant prog-
ress in this direction will be made. We esti-
mate that the policy of close Soviet control
of the Satellite air forces will continue
through 1960.
79. After the Polish defections of 1953, the
USSR strengthened its control over flying ac-
tivities in all Satellite air forces. Concomi-
tantly, there were increased efforts to improve
personnel selection and political indoctrina-
tion. Emphasis was also placed upon the role
of each Satellite air force in the defense of its
own territory, thus stressing the national in-
terest. These measures have increased the po-
litical reliability of the Satellite air forces.
We believe that the combat effectiveness of
these air forces is such that they could be em-
ployed in a defensive role in the event of
general war and would have some offensive
capability, particularly against traditional
enemies.
80. Combat aircraft production in the Satel-
lites now accounts for 11 percent by number
and five percent by airframe weight of Bloc
production. This share will probably increase
to 14 percent by number and seven percent
by weight by 1960. We believe that aircraft
models now being produced in the Soviet
Union will gradually replace obsolescent mod-
els on Satellite production lines, after the So-
viets have converted to newer models. For
example, we estimate that the FAGOT (MIG
15), the only jet fighter now being produced
in the Satellites, will be phased out and will
probably be replaced by the FRESCO (MIG
17) jet fighter in Czechoslovakia and in Po-
land by mid-1956. The FRESCO will prob-
ably be phased out after about three years
and be replaced by either the FARMER jet
fighter or the FLASHLIGHT all-weather
fighter, or by both. The BEAST (IL-10) , a
ground attack aircraft, was phased out in
Czechoslovakia in December 1954, and it is
expected that the production of a light jet
bomber, probably the BEAGLE (IL-28) , will
begin in 1956. The BEAGLE will probably be
phased out by about 1960 and be replaced by
a new light jet bomber. A new plant under
construction in Rumania will probably begin
production of FRESCO jet fighters in 1956:
No production of guided missiles in the Satel-
lites is expected during the period of the esti-
mate.
81. An extensive program of airfield improve-
ment and construction is being continued in
all the Satellites. Principal emphasis has
shifted from East Germany to Poland, but
other Satellites continue to pursue a vigorous
airfield construction effort. Runways now
being built are at least 7,000 feet long and
many are 8,000 or more. There are more
than 400 airfields available to Soviet forces in
the Satellites. Currently the number of ma-
jor airfields (permanent runways of 6,000 feet
or more) in the Satellites is 117, of which
more than one-half are located in Poland and
East Germany. If recent trends in construc-
tion continue, this figure would be almost
doubled by 1960. Airfields in the Satellites
are numerous enough to support elements of
the Soviet air force, as well as the Satellite
air forces, in a general war occurring during
the period of this estimate. Many Satellite
fields are being equipped with night lighting,
radio navigation aids, radar, increased POL
facilities, and improved structures. This grow-
ing network of modern well-equipped air facil-
ities, as it progresses toward completion, will
add materially to Soviet Bloc air capabilities.
Satellite Naval Forces'
82. The Satellite navies are small in size and
poorly equipped and constitute only? a minor
contribution to Bloc naval strength. At pres-
ent their primary function is the development
of trained and politically reliable cadres for
coastal patrol operations. They are gradual-
ly attaining some degree of defensive capa-
bility. Offensively they could give limited
seaward support to ground forces. The Polish
and East German navies have the capability
of providing appreciable assistance to the So-
viet Navy in such fields as minesweeping,
minelaying, escort and coastal defense. In
addition Poland has a limited potential for
For detailed figures on Satellite naval strength,
see Table 6.
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Figure 5
EUROPEAN SATELLITES
Percentage Distribution
of Output of
Selected Military
End Items
954
190 200
Miles
100 200
Kilometers
SECRET
CZECH
HUNGARY
YUGOSL A
? Small arms
?
Mortars
Artillery
Tank guns
Tanks
Military aircraft
The sloe of each circle is proportional to the percentage of total
Satellite output of the given commodity. The circles are located
approximately where production takes place.
AEGE
S E
20.
40
T R Y
floondothrt ore not neressorily those
resoomeed.by the U.S. Government.
_
25070 11-55
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defensive submarine operations within ap-
proaches to Polish waters. The Rumanian
and Bulgarian navies, however, will be capable
of rendering only token assistance. Satellite
ports and bases provide the USSR with a con-
siderable extension of naval logistic and opera-
tional facilities. While in the past, Satellite
navies have not been considered entirely re-
liable, the recent acquisition of several sub-
marines by Poland and a steadily increasing
number of mine warfare and patrol vessels in
the East German Sea Police attest to increas-
ing Soviet confidence in their reliability.
However, it is not expected that any long-
range program to build up the strength of the
navies will be undertaken until the USSR is
certain of their reliability.
83. The Polish Naval Air Arm, the only naval
air arm in the Satellites, has progressed slow-
ly to its present strength of one regiment of
jet fighters and a possible regiment of piston
attack type aircraft. It is considered to have
limited capabilities for fighter defense and
air strikes on surf ace vessels in the South
Baltic area. The effectiveness of this air arm
will probably, remain limited. A small East
German naval air arm may also be formed
during the period of this estimate.
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TABLE 1
SOVIET FORCES ESTIMATED TO BE 'STATIONED IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES, OCTOBER 1955
COUNTRY
ARMY 1
SECURITY
TROOPS 2
SOVIET-MANNED AIRCRAFT (TO&E 3)
NUMBER
OF TROOPS
LINE
DIVISIONS
FIGHTERS
LIGHT BOMBERS
ATTACK
TRANSPORT
RECONNAISSANCE
TOTAL
JET
PISTON
JET
PISTON
JET
PISTON
JET
PISTON
E. Germany
400,000
22
15,000
738
224
126
126
96
96
1,406
Poland
35,000
2
2,000
111
32
210
10
64
427
Czechoslovakia
?
.
Hungary
24,000
2
1,500
333
96
10
32
471
Rumania
35,000
2
2,000
111
10
121
Bulgaria
_
1,000
Albania
Total
494,000
28
21,500
1,293
352
126
336
126
192
2,425 8
'Plus 31,000 troops withdrawn from Austria, location of which is not known.
2 Plus 2,500 security troops withdrawn from Austria, location of which is not known.
3 Actual strength is estimated to be roughly 80-85 percent of TO&E. Full TO&E could be achieved in a short period of time.
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TABLE 2
SOVIET AIR STRENGTH IN THE SATELLITES BY AIRCRAFT TYPE, 1956, 1958, and 1960
(AUTHORIZED TO&E STRENGTH)1
20
AIRCRAFT TYPE
MID-1956
MID-1958
MID-1960
Fighter Day
1,160
750
650
A/W
140
550
650
1,300
1,300
1,300
Attack Jet
200
450
590
Piston
340
140
540
590
590 ?
Light Bomber Jet
. 320
270
270
Piston
Medium Bomber Jet
Piston
Heavy Bomber Jet
Prop
Transport Medium
Light
130
130
130
Helicopters
20
20
20
Reconnaissance Jet Fighter
110
120
120
Jet Light Bomber
90
90
90
Prop
S.
200
210
210
Total
2,510
2,520
2,520
Actual strength is estimated to be 80-85 percent of TO&E.
Full TO&E could be achieved in a short period of time.
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TABLE 3 '
SATELLITE GROUND FORCES, OCTOBER 1955
. COUNTRY
TOTAL
ARMY
TOTAL
SECURITY
% OF TOTAL
POPULATION
IN ARMY
& SECTY.
DIVISIONS
MOBILIZABLE IN
M+180 DAYS
ARM.
MECH.
RIFLE
TOTAL
PERSONNEL
DIVS.
East Germany
100,000
40,000
0.77
3
4
7
250,000
12
Poland
250,000
65,000
1.11
5
12
17
1,100,000
42
Czechoslovakia
170,000
45,000
1.66
2
4
8
14
1,000,000
40
Hungary
150,000
38,000
1.95
1
2
8
11
650,000
25
Rumania
215,000
78,000
1.70
1
1
121
14
900,000
35
Bulgaria
170,000
45,000
2.88
2
12
14
700,000
28
Albania
30,000
10,000
3.10
100,000
6
Total
1,085,000
321,000
1.88
6
15
56
77
4,700,000
188
1 Includes two mountain divisions.
TABLE 4
SATELLITE GROUND FORCES, 1958-1960
COUNTRY
TOTAL
ARMY
TOTAL
SECURITY
DIVISIONS
MOBILIZABLE IN
M+180 DAYS
ARM.
MECH.
RIFLE
TOTAL
PERSONNEL
DIN'S.
East Germany
215,000 '
' 45,000
2
4
8
14
400,000
18
Poland
250,000
65,000
2
4
12
18
1,100,000
42
Czechoslovakia
170,000
45,000
2
4
8
14
1,000,000
40
Hungary
150,000
38,000
2
2
8
12
650,000
25
Rumania
215,000
78,000
1
2
11
14
900,000
35
Bulgaria
170,000
45,000
2
3
10
15
700,000
28
Albania
30,000
10,000
100,000
6
Total
1,200,000
326,000
_ 11
19
57
87
4,850,000
194
See Paragraph 71.
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TABLE 5
ESTIMATED AIRCRAFT STRENGTH OF EUROPEAN SATELLITE AIR FORCES (TO&E)
OCTOBER 1955
AIRCRAFT
E. GERMANY
POLAND
POLISH
NAVY
CZECHO?
SLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
RUMANIA
BULGARIA
ALBANIA
TOTAL
%
AC'TUAL
Fighters
Jet Day
666
37
555
222
333
333
37
2,183
69
Jet A/W
Piston
450
50
500
24
Total
450
666
37
555
222
333
383
37
2,683
Attack
Jet
Piston
378
336
126
126
126
1,092
77
Total
378
336
126
126
126
1,092
Light Bomber
Jet
96
32
32
32
192
68
Piston
42
126
168
53
Total
96
32
74
32
126
360 ?
Transport
Piston
20
32
32
32
32
148
67
Helicopters
Reconnaissance
Jet Ftr.
Jet L/B
Piston
20
42
62
100
Total
20
42
62
Total
450
1,160
37
955
454
543
709
37
4,345
66
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ts:
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TABLE 5
(continued from previous page)
JULY 1958
AIRCRAFT
E. GERMANY
POLAND
POLISH
NAVY
CZECHO-
SLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
RUMANIA
BULGARIA
ALBANIA
TOTALS
%
ACTUAL
Fighters Jet Day
250
560
50
450
250
280
400
30
2,270
80
Jet A/W
50
100
20
100
50
50
30
400
100
Piston
..
. . .
. . .
.. .
. . .
Total
300
660
70
550
300
330
430
30
2,670
Attack Jet
40
80
80
80
40
40360
80
Piston
170
170
40
80
80
540
90
Total
40
250
250
120
120
120
900
Light Bomber Jet
150
30
90
90
90
60
510
60
Piston
120
120
90
Total
150
30
90
90
90
180
630
Transport Piston
20
30
30
30
30
30
10
180
90
Helicopters
10
20
10
20
10
20
10
100
100
Reconnaissance Jet Ftr.
10
10
10
10
10
10
60
Jet LIE
10
10
10
10
40
60
Piston10
..
10
20
10
50
90
Total
10
2030
20
30
30
10
150
Total
380
1,130
110
970
570
620
800
50
4,630
81
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TABLE 5
(continued from previous page)
JULY 1960
AIRCRAFT
E. GERMANY
POLAND
POLISH
NAVY
CZECHO-
SLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
RUMANIA
BULGARIA
ALBANIA
TOTAL
%
ACTUAL
Fighters Jet Day
200
460
50
350
200
230
350
30
1,870
80
Jet A/W
100
200
20
200
100
100
100
820
80
Total
300
660
70
550
300
330
450
30
2,690
Attack Jet
120
120
120
120
120
120
720
80
Piston
.
Total
120
120
120
120
120
120
720
--,
Light Bomber Jet
90
180
30
180
180
180
180
1,020
70
Piston
.
Total
90
180
30
180
180
180
180
1,020
Transport Piston
30
30
30
30
30
30
10
190
90
,
Helicopters
10
20
10
20
20
20
20
120
100
Reconnaissance Jet Ftr.
20
20
20
20
10
10
10
110
60
Jet L/B
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
70
Piston
10
10
10
30
90
Total
30
30
10
30
30
30
30
20
210
Total
580
1,040
120
930
680
710
830
60
4,950
78
_
L?D
4=.
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SECRET
TABLE 6
25
ESTIMATED SATELLITE NAVAL FORCES, OCTOBER 1955 '
COUNTRY
DESTROYER
SUBMARINE
PATROL
MINE
AMPHIBIOUS
LUC-
AUXILIARY
PERSONNEL
ACTIVE RESERVE
GDR
(1)2
30(17)
1
11,000
2,000
Poland
2
9
17
12
15
6
10,700
5,500
Albania
14
3
800
Rumania
4
3
23
4
2
9,200
15,000
Bulgaria
1 ?
9
31
21
8
5,100
3,000
Total
7
12
85
70
15
17
36,800
25,500
1 The figures on the strength of the East German Navy (Sea Police) and on the Polish Navy are con-
sidered reliable. The figures on the Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Albanian navies are of a lesser order
of reliability, but are believed to be generally accurate. No projection has been attempted since
there is no reliable information as to future additions to the Satellite naval forces and any signifi-
cant augmentation of usual strength would have to come from the USSR. The figures given include
ocean-going and coastal type vessels. River and harbor craft are excluded.
I Numbers in parentheses are ships under construction.
s Additional vessels (1 ODD and 1-3 SS) may have been transferred from the USSR.
SECRET
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Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A006900050001-2
26
TABLE 7
ESTIMATED SATELLITE PRODUCTION OF AIRCRAFT BY TYPE AND COUNTRY
1953
1954
1955
NUMBER OF
AIRCRAFT
AIRFRAME WGT.
CON POUNDS)
NUMBER OF
AIRCRAFT
AIRFRAME WGT.
( '000 POUNDS)
NUMBER OF
AIRCRAFT
AIRFRAME WGT.
('000 POUNDS)
Grand Total '
1,258
5,509
1,657
7,119
1,674
6,217
Bombers
395
2,718
300
2,176
0
?
0
_
Piston attack
Czechoslovakia
395
2,718
300
2,176
0
0
Fighters
474
_
2,432
697
3,575
574
2,946
Jet
_
..
...
...
Czechoslovakia
432
2,216
484
2,483
286
1,470
Poland
42
216
213
1,092
288
1,476
Trainers
217
201
486
1,209
932
3,099
Jet
Czechoslovakia
0
0
118
606
420
2,156
Piston
Bulgaria
86
82
60
56
60
56
Czechoslovakia
107
100
224
488
368
827
Poland
0
0
60
40
60
40
Rumania
24
19
24
19
24
20
Communications
.
Utility
172
158
174
159
168
172
Piston
Czechoslovakia
148
127
150
127
144
140
Hungary
12
7
12
8
12
8
Rumania
12
24
12
24
12
24
?S-E-G-R-E-r?
finNFIDENTIAL
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'SECRET-
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