SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US AND KEY OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS AND FORCES THROUGH MID-1959

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A006500040001-7
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• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 6, 1956
• Content Type: NIE

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1)P--EfECI
IstlE 11-56
6 March 1956
033018
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-56
(Supersedes NIE 11-7-55)
SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK
ON THE US AND KEY OVERSEAS
INSTALLATIONS AND FORCES
THROUGH MID -1959
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff,
the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on, 6 March 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director
of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF;
the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC; and
the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
Dri-C`
TO: TS S C
L.
Jjr.EVI7--I'VER- 37 I
'
COPY NO. ?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ONE
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or
Agency
2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-
cable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange-
ment with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.
3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should
either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be
requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D--69/2, 22
June 1953.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION:
White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Operations Coordinating Board
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM
1
SCOPE
1
FOREWORD
1
CONCLUSIONS
2
DISCUSSION
5
MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET CAPABILITIES .
5
I. AVAILABILITY OF MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS
5
Nuclear Weapons
5
Radiological Warfare
5
Biological Warfare
5
Chemical Warfare
6
II. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS ? AIRCRAFT
6
Soviet Long-Range Aviation
6
Inflight Refueling
7
Light Bomber Forces
7
Base Areas
7
Other Factors Affecting Soviet Air Operations
9
Navigation
9
Bombing Accuracy
9
Reconnaissance
10
Weather Forecasting
10
Electronic Countermeasures
10
Evasion of US Radar
10
III. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS ? GUIDED MISSILES
10
Submarine-Launched
11
Ground-Launched
11
Air-Launched
11
IV. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS ? CONVENTIONAL
FORCES
12
Ground and Tactical Air Forces
12
Airborne and Amphibious Forces
12
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
Naval Forces
12
PROBABLE SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES
13
V. SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND METHODS OF ATTACK. .
13
Implications of Soviet Efforts to Achieve Surprise . . .
13
Methods of Attack
14
VI. CAPABILITIES TO ATTACK THE US
14
Attacks by Aircraft
14
Base Areas
15
Staging
15
Weather
15
Scale of Prestrike Preparations
16
Assumptions Underlying Estimated Intercontinental
Striking Forces
16
Estimated Strike Forces in 1956
17
Estimated Strike Forces in Mid-1959
17
Allocation to ECM and Diversionary Tasks
17
Naval Attack Capabilities Against the US
17
Clandestine Methods of Attack Against the US
18
Clandestine Delivery of Nuclear Weapons
18
Clandestine Use of BW and CW Weapons .
18
Subversion, Espionage, Sabotage
19
VII. CAPABILITIES TO ATTACK US OVERSEAS INSTALLA-
TIONS AND FORCES
19
Attacks by Aircraft
19
Attacks by Guided Missiles
20
Ground-Launched Missiles
20
Submarine-Launched Missiles
20
Attacks by Conventional Forces
20
Ground Attack
20
Airborne Attack
20
Amphibious Attack
20
Naval Forces
21
Clandestine Attack Capabilities
21
Subversion, Espionage, Sabotage
21
Clandestine Delivery of Mass Destruction Weapons .
21
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
Annex A: Base Areas Suitable For Long-Range Bomber Operations 22
B: Maps 25
C: Estimated Performance Characteristics of Soviet Aircraft 26
D: Soviet Nuclear Capabilities (Special Distribution under
Separate Cover)
E: Estimated Base Capacity for Staging Long-Range Bomber
Operations (Special Distribution under Separate Cover)
F: Soviet Bloc Electronic Countermeasures (Special Distri-
bution under Separate Cover)
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SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US
AND KEY OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS AND FORCES
THROUGH MID-1959
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet gross capabilities to attack the continental United States and
certain US installations and forces overseas, as of January 1956 and mid-1959.'
SCOPE
This estimate is made as a contribution to the study of Soviet net capabilities to
attack the continental United States and is not intended to consider all the aspects of
a general war. Overseas installations and forces are considered only insofar as they
contribute directly to the defense of the continental United States (e.g., as bases for
interception of the attack or for counterattacks calculated to reduce Soviet capabil-
ities against the continental United States) . The estimate does not take into account
competing demands for the allocation of Soviet efforts against the strengths of any
nation but the US or against all the strengths of the US that might be involved in the
initial stages of a general war. Consequently it does not estimate the degree to which
Soviet effort will be allocated to the attack of the continental US or to the attack of US
installations and forces overseas or to the attack of any non-US installations and
forces overseas.
FOREWORD
The problem of estimating Soviet capabilities three years or more in the future
cannot be treated exclusively in terms of present indications of how these capabilities
are developing. Current evidence is incomplete and sometimes even fragmentary.
Moreover, this estimate is more than usually difficult in that its terminal date ap-
proximates the estimated date of emergence of a major Soviet threat in the guided
missile field. For these reasons, we are obliged to make our estimate of future capa-
bilities not only on the evidence at hand but also on the basis of judgments of how
Soviet leaders may assess their future requirements.
1By gross capabilities is meant the probable maximum scale of attack by existing forces, or by the forces
estimated to be likely to exist at a future date, taking into account operational factors, but not consider-
ing combat attrition.
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2
The judgments which underlie our estimate of Soviet gross capabilities in 1959
are: (a) that throughout the period of this estimate the Soviet rulers will regard it
mandatory to strengthen their capabilities to attack US nuclear retaliatory power
wherever located, both in the US and overseas; (b) that the Soviet rulers will con-
sider that, although they will acquire increasing guided missile capabilities through-
out the period, they must rely primarily on aircraft carrying nuclear weapons for long
range attacks which will have to penetrate an ever-improving defense; and, conse-
quently, (c) that the Soviet rulers will devote a substantial effort to the production
of long-range bombers.
These judgments are supported by much current evidence. We believe them
the soundest which can be made at this time. There are, however, considerations
which require us to regard the Soviet gross capabilities estimated in this paper as
subject to revision as the period advances: (a) the USSR may revise the size of its
Long-Range Aviation, its bomber production goals, or the future balance between the
types and categories of its bomber aircraft; (b) the USSR may judge it advanta-
geous to concentrate its efforts on the rapid development of guided missile weapons
systems; and (c) the greatly increasing yield of nuclear weapons, and Soviet esti-
mate of possible changes in the quality of the defenses to be penetrated, will each af-
fect Soviet judgment of its requirements as to the number and types of delivery vehi-
cles.
On these grounds we feel it necessary to emphasize that the gross capabilities
described in this paper are those which the USSR could acquire, and which we believe
it is likely to acquire by 1959, but we cannot say with confidence that these are the
capabilities which it will have at that date.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Objectives. In conducting initial at-
tacks against the US and key overseas in-
stallations and forces, the USSR would
probably through 1959 have the following
major military objectives:
a. To destroy or neutralize US capabil-
ities for nuclear warfare;
b. To deliver attacks on US and over-
seas military installations, forces, and
land and sea lines of communication in
order to prevent effective operational em-
ployment of US military forces; and
c. To deliver attacks on urban, indus-
trial, political, and psychological targets
in the US in order to reduce to the maxi-
mum extent practicable the mobilization
of US military and industrial strengths.
(Para. 49)
2. The Surprise Factor. In order to pre-
vent or reduce nuclear retaliation, the
USSR would almost certainly attempt to
attack with a minimum of warning and
yet at the same time to deliver an attack
of sufficient weight to destroy or neutral-
ize US nuclear capabilities. The USSR
could _ not count upon being able to
achieve surprise against both the conti-
nental US and US overseas bases, but it
would almost certainly attempt to do so.
(Paras. 50-53)
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Methods and Scale of Attack Against
the US
3. We believe that in attacks on the US
through 1959 the USSR would place chief
reliance upon aircraft carrying nuclear
weapons. Missiles launched from sub-
marines might be an important supple-
ment to nuclear attacks by aircraft, but
the risk of disclosure of intent would prob-
ably deter their large-scale use. Clan-
destine delivery of weapons of mass de-
struction, as well as BW and CW weapons,
would probably be employed only on a
highly selective basis in an initial attack.
(Para. 54)
4. In 1956. Present Soviet capabilities
for air attack on the continental US are
restricted by the small numbers of opera-
tional heavy bombers, the limited avail-
ability of megaton yield weapons, the
limited capacity of forward bases, and the
probable lack of an operational inflight
refueling capability. We estimate that
the USSR could at present launch an ini-
tial strike of about 600 bombers against
the US, of which as many as 500 could
reach target areas. A small number of
these could be carrying nuclear weapons
with yields up to a few megatons. (For
estimated coverage of the US by these air-
craft under various conditions, see maps
in Annex B.) (Paras. 12-13, 56, 69)
5. In 1959. We estimate that by mid-
1959 the USSR will have some 400 BISON 2
and 300 BEAR aircraft in operational use.
Also, by mid-1959 the capacity of the for-
ward staging areas and Leningrad could
have been increased to permit the entire
Soviet long-range bomber force to be
launched simultaneously. Moreover, in
1959, the USSR could have developed a
substantial inflight refueling capability,
3
permitting it to launch a number of heavy
bombers from interior bases on two-way
missions. The Leningrad base area could
be used for some of the heavy bombers
making initial unrefueled attacks on the
US. Under these circumstances, the
USSR in mid-1959 could launch about 815
mission aircraft in an initial attack, of
which as many as 640 could arrive in tar-
get areas. Of these aircraft 415 would be
BISON and BEAR heavy bombers on two-
way missions and 225 BADGER medium
bombers on one-way missions. By this
time a substantial number of these bomb-
ers could be carrying weapons with yields
up to 10 megatons or more. (See maps
in Annex B.) (Paras. 12, 60, 71)
6. Should the USSR elect to use only
heavy bombers in an initial strike against
the US in 1959, about 630 could be
launched if only home bases were used.
About 500 could arrive in target areas. If
bombers were staged through forward
bases, the number launched and the
2 Description of Soviet aircraft types:
US Soviet Nearest
designa- designa- US
tion Description tion equivalent
BISON 4 engine
jet ,
heavy bomber B52
BEAR 4 engine
turbo-prop
heavy bomber
BULL 4 engine
piston'
medium bomber TU-4 B29
BADGER twin-engine
jet
medium bomber B47
BEAGLE twin-engine
jet
light bomber IL-28
BOSUN twin-engine
jet
light bomber TU-14
CAMEL twin-engine
jet
transport
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number arriving in target areas would be
about 530 and 420, respectively. (Para.
72)
7. Submarine-launched guided missiles
might be an important supplement to nu-
clear attacks by aircraft in any Soviet at-
tack plan. These missiles could reach
many important targets up to a distance
of 500 n.m. from the launching sub-
marines, though with a decreasing ac-
curacy at ranges in excess of 200 to 250
n.m. The scale of attack would depend
upon considerations which suggest the
employment of only a small portion of the
submarines and missiles which could be
available in 1959. (Paras. 43, 54, 74-75)
Methods and Scale of Attack Against
Overseas Targets
8. The USSR would have a wide range of
capabilities for attack on key US installa-
tions and forces overseas. At present,
principal reliance for initial attacks would
probably be placed on Soviet medium,
light, and fighter bombers, many of which
could be carrying nuclear weapons. By
1959 guided missiles, including those
launched from submarines, may be the
preferred weapon against many of these
targets. The increasing mobility and nu-
clear capability of the large Soviet ground
and supporting air forces make them a
threat to many US overseas installations
and forces in operations immediately fol-
lowing initial attacks. In all overseas
areas, attacks by clandestine means and
sabotage would also be employed. (Paras.
12, 55)
9. Having launched the attack against
the continental US indicated in para-
graph 4, the USSR would have available
for use in 1956 against overseas targets
about 300 mediums (mostly BULLS) and
2,900 jet light bombers. By 1959, assum-
ing the attack against the continental
US indicated in paragraph 5, the number
of aircraft available for attacking targets
overseas would be about 330 jet medium
and about 3,100 jet light bombers. Large
numbers of these could be carrying nu-
clear weapons. (Paras. 12, 83, 85)
10. At present, a Soviet attack against
overseas targets probably could also em-
ploy 350 n.m. ballistic missiles. In 1956,
missiles with a range of 850-900 n.m.
could begin to be available as well. How-
ever, the small number of missiles prob-
ably available, the low yield of their nu-
clear warheads, and their performance
limitations would seriously limit Soviet
operational capabilities in this field dur-
ing the early part of the period. Some
submarine-launched missiles might also
be used against selected overseas targets
to supplement aircraft and ground-
launched missile attacks. By 1959, So-
viet missile capabilities will probably have
increased markedly as a result of greater
numbers of these weapons available, the
higher yield of the nuclear warheads, and
their improved accuracy and reliability.
The USSR could by then also have ready
for series production a 1,600 n. m. inter-
mediate-range ballistic missile. Large-
yield nuclear warheads for ballistic mis-
siles would probably become available in
1959-1960. (For target coverage, see map
22, Annex B.) (Paras. 12, 86-88)
11. The USSR could employ ground, air-
borne, and amphibious forces against
Alaska and certain key US overseas
installations and forces simultaneously
with, or shortly after, initial bomber and
missile strikes. However, the Soviet deci-
sion as to how and when to use these
capabilities, as well as its clandestine and
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sabotage capabilities, would probably be
strongly influenced by the Soviet desire to
obtain strategic surprise, a consideration
which weighs heavily against their em-
ployment prior to the time initial air at-
tacks were detected. (Paras. 89-91)
DISCUSSION
MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET CAPABILITIES
I. AVAILABILITY OF MASS DESTRUCTION
WEAPONS
12. Nuclear Weapons. The Soviet atomic en-
ergy program, directed primarily toward the
production of nuclear weapons, will continue
to receive special emphasis during the period
of this estimate. By the end of 1955 the
USSR had tested small, medium, and large-
yield weapons. 3 We estimate that the USSR
could now have nuclear weapons deliverable
by aircraft with yields ranging from five KT
to a few megatons. It will probably continue
to work on large-yield weapons as well as on
smaller-yield and small-dimension weapons.
By straightforward research and development
techniques, substantial progress can be made
in increasing the yield and also in reducing
the size and weight of the 1.6 megaton weap-
on tested in 1955. By mid-1959 the USSR
could have nuclear weapons deliverable by air-
craft with yields ranging from 0.5 KT to 10
megatons or more. By then it might also
have high-yield warheads for intermediate
range (1,600 n.m.) surface-to-surface ballistic
missiles.
13. Within the indicated technological limits,
Soviet military requirements will govern the
allocation of available fissionable material to
various types of weapons. The present num-
ber of weapons of greater yield than one MT
is considered limited, since it is probable that
their production was not begun before late
1955. By mid-1959 the only limitation would
be the available supply of U-235. Annex D
The 1955 test series included airbursts with yields
of about 200 KT and 1.6 MT, an underwater burst
of about 20 KT, and two other tests of about
5 KT and 25 KT.
(Restricted Data) provides the basic informa-
tion required and the method by which pos-
sible variations in the Soviet nuclear weapons
stockpile can be calculated. The annex also
includes an illustrative stockpile within the
estimated availability of fissionable material.
It must be emphasized that this illustration
is not an estimate of the most probable com-
position of the Soviet nuclear stockpile ? the
available evidence is not adequate to justify
any specific estimate ? but is an example
only, based on the assumptions prefacing the
stockpile tabulation.
14. Radiological Warfare. During the period
of this estimate, it is most unlikely that the
USSR will be able to stockpile militarily sig-
nificant quantities of radioactive materials for
use in radiological warfare weapons. How-
ever, the USSR will possess nuclear weapons
capable of producing widespread radioactive
fall-out, and these weapons could be used
primarily for that purpose.
15. Biological Warfare. The USSR possesses
all the necessary basic knowledge for the pro-
duction of most BW agents and devices for
their effective dissemination. There is evi-
dence that the USSR is engaged in a BW re-
search and development program with pri-
mary emphasis on anthrax, tularemia, plague,
and brucellosis as antipersonnel bacterial
agents. We believe that foot and mouth dis-
ease and rinderpest would be considered as the
primary antilivestock agents, although con-
clusive evidence of such Soviet BW research
is lacking. No information is available con-
cerning possible anticrop agents. Since it is
not feasible to stockpile large quantities of
most BW agents in prolonged storage, most
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operational requirements would have to be
supplied from production facilities.
16. Chemical Warfare. The USSR accumu-
lated large stocks of standard CW agents and
munitions during World War II. We believe
that it is maintaining stockpiles of these toxic
agents adequate for large-scale employment in
military operations.
17. In regard to other CW agents, the USSR
moved a GA nerve gas producing plant and
the GB pilot plant from Germany to the So-
viet Union in 1947. In addition to possessing
the physical facilities, the USSR has the tech-
nical knowledge to produce both GB and GA.
We believe that the USSR could have been
producing GA since 1949, although we have
no firm evidence it has done so. The problems
involved in stockpiling GB are greater, but
we estimate that the USSR has the ability to
produce and stock it, at least in limited quan-
tity. The USSR has also had access to openly
published information on psychogenic drugs
and other potential CW agents, including the
method of synthesis. Minute quantities of
psychogenic drugs are capable of making in-
dividuals indifferent to their surroundings and
of inducing apprehension and confusion. We
estimate that the Soviet Union has the tech-
nical ability to produce such drugs for use as
chemical warfare agents.
18. The USSR had chemical disseminating
devices and munitions prior to World War II,
some of which were suitable for aerial delivery
at speeds up to 300 mph. We estimate the
USSR could produce devices and munitions
for high speed delivery of many of its toxic
agents.
II. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS ?
AIRCRAFT
Soviet Long-Range Aviation
19. Soviet Long-Range Aviation is estimated
to have had, as of 1 January 1956, an over-all
actual strength in operational units of 1,145
bomber aircraft, including 760 BULL piston
medium bombers, 310 BADGER jet medium
bombers, about 40 BISON jet heavy bombers,
and about 35 BEAR turbo-prop heavy bomb-
6
ers. 4 There is evidence that BISON have been
assigned to operational units, but the evidence
concerning assignment of BEAR aircraft is
tenuous. All Long-Range Aviation units are
based in the European USSR except the 3rd
Long-Range Air Army, which is in the Soviet
Far East and has an estimated actual strength
of about 220 BULLS.
20. We lack sufficient intelligence to estimate
with a confidence that satisfies us the planned
future size of Soviet Long-Range Aviation, or
the planned future balance between the types
and categories of bomber aircraft. In the
absence of any evidence indicating reduction
in the number of long-range units, we estimate
that the current strength will be carried for-
ward throughout the period, with new types
being phased in as they become available.
It also seems probable that by 1959 actual
will be closer to authorized strengths. We
estimate, moreover, that during this period
the USSR is unlikely to introduce into opera-
tional units any medium or heavy bomber
types which have not already appeared. We
believe that the USSR will devote a substantial
effort to the production of medium and heavy
bombers. Based on available intelligence
and on our estimate of Soviet capabilities
to produce and requirements for a long-
range bomber force, we believe that the
USSR will produce about 700 BISON and 460
BEARS through mid-1959. Accordingly, ac-
tual strengths in mid-1959, as compared with
current actual strengths, would be as shown
below:
Estimated Operational Strength of Long-Range
Aviation
-31
Type 1 January 1956 Mid-1959
"loc,
T6
too
co
BULL
BADGER
BISON
BEAR
760
310
40
35
0
700
400
300
The serviceable BULLS phased out of Long-
Range Aviation would be available for a vari-
ety of uses, including reconnaissance (partic-
ularly naval reconnaissance) , augmentation
of Satellite and Chinese Communist air forces,
Radii-ranges and other performance data esti-
mated for Soviet bomber types are given in An-
nex C.
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conversion for tanker use or other special pur-
poses, or reserve. The USSR will have no ap-
preciable reserves of other medium or heavy
bomber types.
21. Inf light Refueling. The USSR would
probably require an inflight refueling capa-
bility if it intended to employ all of its present
or a considerable portion of its prospective
bomber force against the continental US with-
out resorting to one-way missions. Evidence
does not indicate that in the USSR inflight
refueling has gone beyond the experimental
stage. Development of a fleet of tanker air-
craft, modification of mission aircraft fuel
systems, and considerable operational training
would be necessary before a significant in-
flight refueling capability would be achieved.
The numerous BULL aircraft being phased out
could be converted to tankers, but because of
their limited speed, altitude, and fuel capacity
their use would probably be restricted to re-
fueling medium bombers. Converted BISON,
BEAR, or possibly CAMEL types would be more
suitable as tankers. The USSR could also
develop a new type specifically for use as a
tanker, but we have no evidence thus far that
it is doing so. The USSR could have, in 1959,
an inflight refueling capability adequate to
meet the requirements of Soviet Long-Range
Aviation for attacks on the US.
Light Bomber -Forces
22. For attacks on targets up to 700 miles
from Bloc bases, the USSR has available a
substantial jet light bomber force consisting
of the types designated as BEAGLE and
BOSUN. The BEAGLE is the standard light
bomber of both Soviet Tactical Aviation and
Naval Aviation. We estimate that all Soviet
jet light bombers have the capability of de-
livering nuclear weapons. Jet light bombers
assigned to Soviet Naval Aviation are also
Estimated Jet Light Bomber Strength in
Operational Units*
January 1956
Mid-1959
Tactical Aviation
2,230
2,250
Naval Aviation
653
850
Total
2,883
3,100
* See Annex C for estimated performance charac-
teristics of these aircraft.
7
capable of carrying out specialized naval mis-
sions such as torpedo attacks and minelaying.
23. During 1956 the USSR may also begin to
have operational an improved jet light bomber,
perhaps a twin-jet swept-wing type. In ad-
dition, the speed and altitude performance of
some BEAGLES has been increased by the in-
stallation of higher thrust engines. This,
however, has not resulted in a significant
change in radius/range. We estimate that by
1958 BOSUN will have been phased out of
operational service and replaced by either the
BEAGLE or the new light bomber.
Base Areas
24. We estimate that in all there are some 400
operational airfields in the Sino-Soviet Bloc
with permanent surfaced runways of 5,000 feet
or longer:
Minimum Runway Lengths (feet)
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
Total
USSR
4
28
3
93
41
169
European
Satellites
2
49
37
35
1
124
Asiatic
Communist
Countries
0
2
17
63
25
107
6
79
57
191
67
400
25. Given standard conditions (normal take-
off technique and take-off engine power, no
wind, sea level elevation, temperature 59 de-
grees F., permanent surfaced runway) we
estimate take-off distances for Soviet long-
range bombers as follows:
Take-off
Weight
Ground Run
Ground Run
to Clear
50-ft.
Obstacle
Type
(lbs.)
(ft.)
(ft.)
BULL
140,000
5,230
7,825
BULL
(modified)
135,750
4,800
7,125
BADGER
150,000
4,200
6,300
BADGER
(improved)
170,000
4,800
7,100
BISON
365,000
6,400
9,100
BISON
(improved)
365,000
5,300
8,200
BEAR
300,000
6,000
9,000
(For the effect of lower
graph 63.)
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26. There are approximately 25 airfields in the
USSR believed to be home bases for opera-
tional Long-Range Aviation bomber units,
three in the Far East and the remainder in
the European USSR. In addition, a number
of airfields associated with command and/or
training units, factory production and deliv-
ery, and testing and development are in effect
an integral part of the base structure of Soviet
Long-Range Aviation. Moreover, many other
airfields in the Sino-Soviet Bloc have run-
ways suitable for medium bomber operations
and some have runways suitable for heavy
bombers.
27. In areas where airfield development can
be easily observed, such as the European Sat-
ellites, the Soviet air forces have provided
runway lengths in excess of estimated require-
ments for the assigned aircraft. There is
some evidence of runway development at air-
fields identified as home bases for Long-Range
Aviation units. Assuming similar construc-
tion practices throughout the USSR, we esti-
mate that concrete runways at BULL home
bases have been standardized at lengths be-
tween 7,800 and 8,200 feet. Little additional
modification of these existing bases would be
required for operation of BISON or BEARS.
However, if the number of new heavy bombers
estimated for 1959 actually appears in opera-
tional units, the Soviet long-range home base
system will probably require expansion and
development in terms of number of fields, run-
way lengths, and other factors.
28. World War II practices suggest that the
USSR probably would depend upon auxiliary
airfields to insure maximum aircraft dispersal
away from home bases in event of hostilities.
The actual existence of such auxiliary fields
within the Soviet Long-Range Aviation base
structure cannot be verified from available
intelligence. In fact, the base structure at
present is such that, were Soviet Long-Range
Aviation to require airfields for dispersal in
European USSR, it would have to utilize air-
fields outside the current home base opera-
tional areas. This would mean moving into
either the more vulnerable perimeter areas of
the USSR or withdrawing farther into the
interior. Physical limitations on dispersal,
8
and probable requirements for limiting ground
stay to a minimum, would make dispersal and
revetment practices unlikely for long-range
bombers at forward staging bases in the Arctic
areas.
29. Because of the range limitations of avail-
able bombers, the launching of strikes against
North America in 1956 probably would be lim-
ited to operations staged through one or more
of six base areas within Soviet-controlled ter-
ritory ? the Chukotski Peninsula, the Kam-
chatka Peninsula, the Central Arctic area,
the Kola Peninsula, the Leningrad area, and
the Baltic-East German area. Even the
BEAR turbo-prop heavy bomber would have
to be launched from these areas in order to
hit any but the most northern US targets, un-
less refueled in flight or employed on one-way
missions. Airfields suitable for long-range
bombers exist in each of these six areas,
although Long-Range Aviation units are sta-
tioned only in the Leningrad area. 5
30. Airbase development over the past few
years in the potential forward staging areas
has improved the capability of these bases for
supporting long-range bomber staging opera-
tions. In the Baltic-East German area, only
minor additional construction and develop-
ment of air facilities at existing bases would be
required. In the Kamchatka, Kola, Chukot-
ski, Central Arctic, and Leningrad areas, there
are 20 bases believed suitable for staging long-
range bombers. Four or five of these may be
capable of supporting sustained operations.
Runway lengths and surfaces at many of these
bases are known, but information is meager
concerning load-bearing capacity, aircraft
servicing, maintenance, storage, and personnel
facilities at almost all of these airfields.
31. There are, however, indications that air-
field development in the forward base areas is
continuing, and we estimate that it is within
Soviet capabilities to develop adequate facili-
ties for sustained long-range bomber opera-
tions in any of these areas by 1959. For ex-
ample, we estimate that by 1959, with the con-
5 Annex A and Annex E (limited distribution)
cover air facilities, weather conditions, and base
capacities in these base areas.
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struction facilities and personnel now in the
area concerned, three new airfields suitable for
long-range bomber staging-operations could
be developed in the Kola and Leningrad areas,
and two each in Chukotski, Central Arctic,
and Kamchatka. Improvement of support
facilities at already existing potential staging
bases in these areas could be carried out con-
currently without major interference with the
construction effort.
32. In each of the forward areas there are
bases, in addition to those considered suitable
for staging long-range bombers, which could
be utilized for fighters, light bombers, and
transports for which the USSR would also
have a requirement in any operation con-
ducted from the forward areas. In certain
areas, however, there are only a few of these
additional bases.
Other Factors Affecting Soviet
Air Operations
33. Navigation. The USSR has available
through open sources virtually complete tar-
get and navigation data on North America
and its approach routes. It is even probable
that in the event of a surprise attack certain
Western electronic navigational aids would be
available during at least part of the flight.
Similarly, meteorological reports, including
profile data at all altitudes, are regularly
broadcast in the United States and Canada in
simple cipher. It is also possible that clan-
destinely placed navigational beacons may be
used for aircraft homing. We estimate that
Soviet blind-bombing and navigational radar
equipment is capable of equal or better per-
formance than the US World War II equip-
ment which the USSR acquired. The current
Soviet training program points to continuing
improvement in air crew proficiency.
34. Soviet Long-Range Aviation is probably
receiving training in the use of advanced nav-
igation systems and techniques. Some Soviet
crews are almost certainly capable of naviga-
tion to the most difficult assigned targets in
the US. Most crews are probably capable of
navigating with sufficient accuracy to reach
major US cities and industrial centers. We
9
estimate that by 1959 Soviet Long-Range Avia-
tion will have considerably increased its over-
all proficiency in lpng-range navigation.
35. Bombing Accuracy
a. Visual Bombing. We estimate that many
BULL crews, and crews which have been fully
trained in the newer turbo-jet and turbo-prop
bombers, are capable of attaining the following
visual bombing accuracies (in the case of the
BULL, figures are applicable up to 30,000 feet
only) :
Altitude (ft.)
CEP (ft.)
50,000
2,900
40,000
2,100
30,000
1,400
20,000
900
10,000
400
Most long-range bomber crews will probably
achieve the above level of proficiency by mid-
1959.
b. Radar Bombing. BULL units generally
are estimated to be capable of the following
accuracies in radar bombing:
Altitude (ft.) CEP (ft.)
Well-defined
targets
Poorly-defined
targets
30,000
4,000
5,500
20,000
2,000
3,500
10,000
1,000
1,750
Because of the limitations of the radar in-
stalled in the BULL, no significant improve-
ment in the above accuracies is likely. How-
ever, we estimate that the newer aircraft, as
well as affording more stable bombing plat-
forms, probably have improved radar. This
could result in the radar bombing accuracies
listed below. By mid-1959, most crews in
newer type bombers will probably be able to
achieve these accuracies.
Altitude (ft.) CEP (ft.)
Well-defined"
targets
Poorly-defined
targets
50,000
3,100
5,600
40,000
2,300
4,300
30,000
1,500
3,000
20,000
1,000
2,000
10,000
500
1,000
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36. We estimate that jet light bomber CEPs
are the? same as those for Long-Range Avia-
tion. If the Soviet SHORAN type navigation
system were employed as a bomb control sys-
tem, bombing accuracies of about plus or
minus 100 feet could be achieved at a range of
100 n.m. from the transmitter. Soviet ground
fire control radar could be used with appropri-
ate modifications to develop a precise short-
range bombing system. This system could
have a range of 15-20 nautical miles.
37. Reconnaissance. It is possible that dur-
ing the interval between now and mid-1959
the USSR might build up a pattern of recon-
naissance of US and allied early warning lines,
not only to determine their location, capabili-
ties, and vulnerabilities, but also to delay
recognition of the approach of an actual at-
tack. It is unlikely that the USSR would
jeopardize surprise by unusual reconnaissance
activity before an actual attack. However,
there would be a requirement for the surveil-
lance of sea areas from which US and allied
carrier task forces could attack the USSR.
Such reconnaissance would probably be the
primary responsibility of Naval Aviation, to
which BULL or other long-range aircraft
could be assigned or made available as re-
quired. Even if long-range bomber types were
not committed in attacks against carrier task
forces, their reconnaissance data would be val-
uable for the direction of submarine and sur-
face forces and for the planning of attacks by
Soviet jet light bomber and torpedo aircraft.
Post-strike reconnaissance of US targets
would probably be done by mission aircraft.
38. Weather Forecasting. The USSR has for
years devoted considerable emphasis to both
short-period and long-period meteorological
forecasting and has achieved a high degree of
success. We believe that it has the forecast-
ing capability to support long-range air opera-
tions. This capability plus extensive experi-
ence in meteorological research in the extreme
northern latitudes, weather reporting facilities
in Siberia and on ice floes in the Central Arctic
basin, and constant access to current North
American weather reports and forecasts
should enable the USSR to predict both route
and target weather with reasonable accuracy.
10
39. Electronic Countermeasures (ECM). The
USSR has had access to several types of World
War II US defensive radar and to some US
jamming equipment. Since 1950, a number
of instances of Soviet use of Chaff have been
observed, and recently the use of active air-
borne jammers has been noted. We estimate
that the USSR now has at least limited quan-
tities of both ground and airborne equipment
for jamming radar up through the X-Band
(10,000 mc/s) and possibly higher. Such
equipment would include active, passive, and
confusion devices. We have no evidence of
Soviet use of decoys, but consider it to be with-
in their capabilities. We also estimate that
the USSR has a ground-based jamming capa-
bility to interfere seriously with radio com-
munication between the US and its overseas
bases and forces. During the period 1956-
1959 the USSR will probably continue to im-
prove its jamming capability by the develop-
ment of equipment covering a wider range of
frequencies and by increased effectiveness of
jamming operations. 6
40. Evasion of US Radar. The USSR almost
certainly knows at least the general capabili-
ties of US early warning radar equipment,
coverage provided by the network, and weak
and strong points of the system. With such
knowledge it might expect that properly
planned attacks could reduce the chance of
detection by US radar, particularly if the at-
tacking aircraft made penetrations where
radar coverage was limited or nonexistent, or
if the physical limitations of the radar equip-
ment were exploited. However, the use of
some evasion techniques, particularly low alti-
tude penetration, would require acceptance of
reduced range or bomb load.
III. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS ?
GUIDED MISSILES 7
41. We have no evidence that the USSR now
has any offensive guided missile available for
operational use. During the period of this
?For a detailed discussion, see Annex F (limited
distribution).
7 For a detailed study see NIE 11-12-55, "Soviet
Guided Missile Capabilities and Probable Pro-
grams," 20 December 1955.
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estimate, it will probably rely primarily upon
aircraft for the delivery of nuclear weapons,
because of the probable lower relative relia-
bility and accuracy of missile systems and the
lower nuclear yield obtainable from missile
warheads. Based on US experience, we esti-
mate that at present only 40-60 percent of
Soviet missiles would reach target areas, but
by 1959 their reliabilities will almost certainly
be improved. Howevet, we believe that during
this period the USSR will devote a high pri-
ority to the development of offensive missiles,
and that it will begin to stockpile various types
as acceptable reliabilities are achieved and as
the improvement of warhead yields tends to
compensate for relative missile inaccuracies.
By 1959 the USSR will probably have in opera-
tional use several types of missiles with nu-
clear warheads suitable for attacks on overseas
installations and forces and for submarine,
shipborne, or airborne attack on the conti-
nental United States. However, an intercon-
tinental ballistic missile (ICBM) will prob-
ably not become available before 1960-1961.
Submarine-Launched Guided Missiles
42. Although there is no firm evidence that
the USSR has dev6loped a submarine-launched
guided missile capability, we estimate that it
could now have submarines equipped for this
purpose. Any of the long-range submarine
types could be equipped to carry one or two
guided missiles in topside stowage. We esti-
mate that a submarine the size of the Soviet
Z class could be constructed to accommodate
6 V-1 type or 4 turbo-jet Regulus I type mis-
siles internally. A submarine the size of the
"W" class could possibly accommodate 3 V?i
types or 2 of the larger missiles.
43. We estimate that both of the above types
of nonballistic missiles could currently be
available for launching from submarines.
The V-1 could be an improved version of the
German V-1, having a range up to 200 nauti-
cal miles with a 3,000-pound warhead. At this
range this missile could have a CEP of roughly
3 n.m., with inertial guidance. Radar track-
radio command guidance could be provided
to a distance of 100 miles from the launching
submarine, or an advanced guidance sub-
11
marine could be used. Using radar track-
radio command guidance, a CEP of about one
to two nautical miles could be achieved, de-
pending on how accurately the submarine's
position were fixed. With a 3,000-pound war-
head, the turbo-jet missile could have a range
of 500 n.m. Radar track-radio command
guidance could be provided for about 200-250
n.m. from the guidance submarine, with a
CEP of about one to two n.m., depending on
the accuracy of navigation. Inertial guidance
could be used, but at maximum range would
result in a CEP of about 10 miles. All mis-
siles which could be launched from subma-
rines could also be launched from surface ves-
sels, including merchant ships.
Ground-Launched Surface-to-Surface
Missiles
44. Several additional missile types could now
be, or could become, available for launching
from land bases. Current information indi-
cates that surface-to-surface ballistic missiles
are being given a high priority in the Soviet
research and development program. We esti-
mate that, in addition to shorter range bal-
listic missiles, the USSR could have had since
1954 an operational ballistic missile with a
range of 350 n.m. and a CEP of 2 n.m. We
believe that in 1956 it could have ready for
series production a single-stage ballistic mis-
sile with a range of 850-900 n.m. and a CEP of
3-4 n.m. In 1958-1959 the USSR could have
ready for series production an intermediate-
range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a range of
about 1,600 n.m. and a CEP of 3-4 miles. Only
a few of these latter could be available for
operational use by trained units in mid-1959,
but, if the USSR were willing to accept a
reduced range of 1,400 n.m., this missile could
be ready for series production as early as 1957.
Only low-yield nuclear warheads would be
available for these medium and intermediate-
range missiles until about mid-1959, when
large-yield nuclear warheads could begin to
become available.
Air-Launched Missiles
45. The USSR is now technically capable of
attacking targets with rocket-propelled glide
bombs launched from long-range aircraft.
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These bombs could now have low-yield nuclear
warheads. However, their use would be limited
to well-defined targets, good visibility condi-
tions, and a maximum range of 20 n.m. Dur-
ing 1956-1957, an improved version with a 50
n.m. range could become available. This mis-
sile could be equipped with a semiactive hom-
ing guidance system for use against ships or
other well-defined targets. By 1958, high-
yield nuclear warheads could also be available.
IV. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS ?
CONVENTIONAL FORCES
Ground and Tactical Air Forces
46. Any key US installations and forces over-
seas within range would be subject to attack
by Soviet Bloc tactical air forces. These tar-
gets would also be threatened by the advance
of Bloc ground forces with tactical air support.
It is estimated that, at the present time, Bloc
ground forces are composed of 175 Soviet and
about 230 other Bloc line divisions. We be-
lieve that, in general, Soviet line divisions are
maintained at 70 percent or less of authorized
strengths. It is estimated that, for air sup-
port of its ground and naval operations, the
USSR currently has an actual strength of
approximately 12,000 aircraft in Tactical
(Frontal) Aviation and Naval Aviation. Of
this total, approximately 9,600 are jet aircraft.
For mid-1959, actual aircraft in these opera-
tional units is estimated at about 14,600, of
which 13,000 will be jets. In addition there
are about 3,000 military aircraft in the Euro-
pean Satellites (4,000 by 1959) and about
2,600 in China and North Korea (3,400 in
1959).
Airborne and Amphibious Forces
47. The USSR also has considerable airborne
and amphibious forces which could be used to
attack certain US overseas installations and
Alaska. There are an estimated 10 Soviet air-
borne divisions, and some ground troops have
received training in air transport operations.
Although the USSR still has only twin-engine
transports, it is estimated that Soviet Aviation
or Airborne troops could lift 9,000 troops in
an initial parachute attack. The USSR lacks
specialized assault landing craft and support
12
ships for other than short-range amphibious
operations. It is estimated that the USSR
could at present lift up to three divisions for
an initial amphibious assault on Japan or
Korea.
Naval Forces
48. The intense and rapid naval construction
program carried out by the USSR during the
last six years has provided it with an increas-
ingly significant offensive capability. The
program for construction of major combatant
units has been limited to light cruisers, de-
stroyers, and submarines. At present major
surface vessels in the Soviet Navy are esti-
mated to number 225, including 6 heavy
cruisers, 22 light cruisers, and almost 200 de-
stroyers. By 1959, we estimate that the USSR
will have about 300 major surface vessels, in-
cluding some 35 cruisers, 265 destroyers, and
possibly one or two capital ships. We esti-
mate that, in view of the known submarine
building facilities, the Soviet submarine force,
currently consisting of about 420 submarines
of all types, could be strengthened by the ad-
dition of about 520 new long and medium
range boats by mid-1959. However, we have
no intelligence to indicate that the USSR will
in fact produce this number of submarines or
to indicate the planned future strength of the
Soviet submarine force. Considering such
factors as the probable phasing out of older
types and the possible introduction of new
types, including nuclear-powered submarines,
we believe that by mid-1959 the Soviet subma-
rine force will consist of about 780 boats of all
types, including about 600 postwar design long
and medium range submarines. The capabili-
ties of this force will probably be improved by
a limited modernization of older classes (in-
cluding the installation of snorkel) . In ad-
dition, some submarines may be adapted for
missile launching. Intelligence is lacking on
a number of factors essential to the develop-
ment of such a fleet. We lack adequate in-
formation on mobile and permanent logistical
support. Little is known of the operating
efficiency of the submarine force, which is
probably still inferior to that of US and Ger-
man forces of World War II, but performance
standards will probably rise during this period.
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PROBABLE SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES
V. SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND METHODS
OF ATTACK
49. In conducting initial attacks against the
US and key overseas installations and forces,
the USSR would probably have the following
major military objectives:
a. To destroy or neutralize US capabilities
for nuclear warfare;
b. To deliver attacks on US and overseas
military installations, forces, and land and sea
lines of communication in order to prevent
effective operational employment of US mili-
tary forces; and
c. To deliver attacks on urban, industrial,
political, and psychological targets in. the US
in order to reduce to the maximum extent
practicable the mobilization of US military
and industrial strengths.
We believe that these Soviet objectives will
remain the same throughout the period of this
estimate.
Implications of Soviet Efforts to
Achieve Surprise
50. In order to prevent or reduce nuclear re-
taliation the USSR would almost certainly
attempt to attack with a minimum of warn-
ing. A maximum Soviet attack on the conti-
nental US and key overseas installations and
forces, involving utilization of all or most
of the capabilities discussed below, Would re-
quire such substantial preparations as to al-
most certainly result in the loss of surprise.
If, however, the USSR attempted to attack
without warning it would probably be forced
to accept the following major restrictions:
(a) no large-scale mobilization of additional
units; (b) no large-scale redeployment of
Soviet air, naval, or ground forces to rein-
force peripheral dispositions; and (c) no un-
usual movement of Soviet air, naval, or ground
forces which would be likely to indicate the
imminence of attack. The effect of these re-
strictions would be reduced, however, if rede-
13
ployment and high readiness were achieved
gradually.8
51. Thus, the USSR would have to balance
the advantages of surprise against the re-
quired weight of attack. In planning initial
attacks on US and overseas targets, priority
of Soviet effort would be largely determined
by Soviet recognition of the need for neutral-
izing the most immediate threat to Soviet
security ? a nuclear attack by US forces.
These Soviet attacks, therefore, would prob-
ably be directed primarily toward those areas
and against those forces which comprise the
US nuclear strike capability. The Soviet
timetable would probably call for almost si-
multaneous assaults on other target systems,
subject to the overriding requirement that
these assaults not give warning of the initial
attacks against US nuclear strike capabilities.
52. Even in planning attacks directed mainly
against US nuclear strengths, the USSR will
probably continue to be faced with a difficult
choice as to the relative priorities to be given
to attacks on key targets in the US itself as
opposed to key targets overseas. This di-
lemma stems from the fact that Soviet plan-
ning will not only be concerned with the
relative nuclear threats presented by conti-
nental US forces as compared with US over-
seas forces, but also with estimating the
relative success which could be achieved
against continental US as contrasted with
overseas targets. The USSR could not count
upon being able to achieve surprise against
both the continental US and US overseas
bases, but it would almost certainly attempt
to do so.
53. The continental US will almost certainly
be a high priority Soviet target. However,
Soviet operational planning for the initial
strikes will probably also be strongly influ-
'For extended discussion of the problem of achiev-
ing surprise, see NIE 11-6-55, "Probable Intelli-
gence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US
Through Mid-1958," 1 July 1955.
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enced by the threat to Soviet security from
US nuclear capabilities overseas, and by the
fact that the Soviet attack capability against
such targets is relatively high. We have no
basis for estimating what the distribution of
Soviet effort between US continental and over-
seas bases would be. We believe that Soviet
planning would probably be calculated to
achieve an optimum effect, i. e., the maximum
over-all reduction of US nuclear retaliatory
capabilities, wherever located.
Methods of Attack
54. We believe that through 1959 the USSR
would place chief reliance in attacks on the
continental US upon aircraft carrying nuclear
weapons, since this form of delivery would
offer the best chance of combining a mini-
mum warning with a significant weight of
attack. Missiles launched from submarines
might be an important supplement to nuclear
attacks by aircraft, but limitations on target
coverage and the risk of premature disclosure
of intent would probably deter their large-
scale use in an initial attack. The clandes-
tine delivery of nuclear and other weapons
of mass destruction might also be attempted,
but, because of the risk of premature disclo-
sure of intent, these forms of attack would
probably be employed only on a highly selec-
tive basis in an initial attack. Sabotage of
certain key installations might occur concur-
rent with or immediately following the initial
attack.
55. The USSR would have a much wider range
of capabilities for attack on key US overseas
installations and forces than on the US itself.
At present, principal reliance for initial at-
tacks would probably be placed on Soviet
medium, light, and fighter bombers. By 1959
guided missiles, including those launched
from submarines, may be the preferred
weapon against many of these targets. The
USSR's possession of very large numbers of
submarines would permit their concentration
against US naval striking forces. The in-
creasing mobility and the probable growing
nuclear capability of the large Soviet ground
and supporting air forces make them a threat
to many US overseas installations and forces
in operations immediately following initial
14
attack. In all overseas areas, clandestine at-
tacks and sabotage would also be an incidental
form of Soviet attack, and might in some loca-
tions be highly effective.
VI. CAPABILITIES TO ATTACK THE US 9
Attacks by Aircraft
56. Present Soviet capabilities for air attack
on the continental US are restricted by the
small numbers of operational heavy bombers,
by the limited capacity of base facilities in
forward areas, and probably by the lack of
an operational inflight refueling capability.
Forward base capacities will continue to limit
the total number of aircraft which could be
launched against the US at one time, but as
the number of BISON and BEARS increases,
less reliance will have to be placed on forward
bases for launching intercontinental attacks.
Improved crew proficiency, development of an
operational inflight refueling capability, and
extensive improvement of the forward stag-
ing areas would result in a substantial in-
crease in Soviet capabilities for attack on the
US by mid-1959, even though the increase in
the number of BISON -and BEAR heavy
bombers were less than estimated herein.
57. During the early part of the period of this
estimate, the BULL and the BADGER would
be the principal aircraft available for inter-
continental attacks. We estimate that, how-
ever, as increasing numbers of newer types
become available, the BULL will be phased
out of long-range bomber units. In the latter
part of the period the USSR would almost
certainly place chief reliance on the BISON
and the BEAR for intercontinental attacks on
the US, with an improved BADGER playing
a significant role primarily in shorter-range
missions.
58. Without inflight refueling the BULL (see
maps 1-4) would be unable to reach targets
in the US on two-way missions even from
forward bases unless it were modified,n in
which case it could reach the Seattle area.
For range coverage, see maps, Annex B.
" E. g., stripped and altered for longer range in a
manner similar to the US B 29B.
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The modified BULL could, without inflight
refueling, reach all of the US on a one-
way mission from Chukotski. The current
BADGER would require inflight refueling in
order to cover most of the important target
areas in the US, even on one-way missions
from forward bases, but an improved BADGER
(see maps 5-8) , which we estimate will be
available in 1957, will probably have adequate
range to carry out these one-way missions
without inflight refueling. In order to reach
all targets in the US with the BISON (see
maps 9-12, 17-18) , the USSR would have to
employ one-way missions. On two-way mis-
sions from forward bases and without inflight
refueling, the BISON could reach only the
northwestern quarter of the US. However,
the BEAR (see maps 13-16, 19-20) , if launched
from the Chukotski Peninsula, could reach
almost all of the US on two-way unrefueled
missions; from the Kola area it could reach
only the northern half of the US. Other sig-
nificant range capabilities under varying con-
ditions are as noted on the maps.
59. Base Areas. At the beginning of the
period the entire Soviet long-range bomber
force could be launched against the US only
if bases in the Baltic-East German area were
used in addition to those within the USSR.
This area is not a likely choice for initial
strike operations against the US, because
direct routes to the US would involve over-
flight of Western territory with consequent
loss of surprise, and because of the greater
likelihood that preattack preparations would
be detected. Except for heavy bombers, and
possibly modified BULLS on one-way missions,
bases in the Leningrad area are unlikely to be
used for initial strikes because of the problems
involved in either overflying or by-passing
Scandinavia. If overflight of the Scandina-
vian area were to be avoided on an attempted
strike against the US, a dog-leg over the Kola
Peninsula of about 600-750 n.m. would be
necessary. Therefore, the bases believed to be
likely Soviet choices for mounting initial at-
tacks on the United States at the beginning
of the period are those in Kola, Chukotski, and
Kamchatka. However, after an initial sur-
prise intercontinental strike, all base areas
could be used for reattack. Bases in the Cen-
15
tral Arctic area might also be used for initial
attacks despite unfavorable weather condi-
tions and difficult logistical problems.
60. By mid-1959, the capacity of the bases in
the Kola, Chukotski, Kamchatka, Central Arc-
tic, and Leningrad areas could have been
increased so that these bases could be used to
launch simultaneously the entire long-range
bomber force.
61. Staging. About a 10-hour flight would be
required to move BULL aircraft from Far East
home bases to Chukotski area bases, and about
three to five hours from Western USSR bases
to the Kola Peninsula. Flying times for
BADGER and BISON aircraft would be about
half as long. We have almost no evidence on
the current status of servicing and fuel stor-
age and transfer facilities at the forward
bases. However, the USSR is fully capable of
developing these facilities, if they are not al-
ready available. For example, we believe the
USSR has a fuel truck with a capacity of
6,000 gallons and a pumping rate of 240
gallons per minute. We estimate that, when
BISON and BEAR bombers appear in service
in large numbers, the USSR will have avail-
able refueling equipment more compatible
with the requirements of these aircraft. In
order to service large numbers of long-range
bomber aircraft at staging bases in forward
areas, it would probably be necessary to in-
crease present stocks of POL and servicing
equipment and to establish or increase weap-
ons stockpiles at these bases.
62. Weather. Weather and climatic condi-
tions in the far northern staging areas would
have a considerable impact on the timing and
magnitude of attacks on the US. During cold
weather, requirements for high-speed refuel-
ing and heated hangar space are among the
critical problems which would be magnified as
numbers and size of aircraft increased. More-
over, the coordinated launching of a large-
scale attack composed of elements from widely
separated base areas would probably be fur-
ther complicated by varying weather condi-
tions at the different bases. Cold weather
problems would, however, be less critical with
jet than with piston aircraft.
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63. The USSR has demonstrated that it can
effectively operate aircraft under extreme cold
weather conditions. In addition, aircraft per-
formance is improved by low ground tempera-
tures in Arctic areas where the higher density
of cold air increases engine thrust and in-
creases airfoil lift so that take-off distance
may be reduced or maximum gross take-off
weights increased. For example, at 0? F. the
ground run requirement for take-off of jet
bombers would be about 25 percent less than
under standard conditions (see paragraph 25) .
Ground run requirements for the BULL would
also be reduced but the difference would not
be as great as for jet bombers.
64. The low temperatures of the Arctic region
also pose some special problems in the han-
dling of nuclear weapons. However, virtually
all of the components of nuclear weapons are
better able to resist the effects of cold weather
than are the delivery aircraft, and provision
of adequate shelters and equipment to over-
come the undesirable effects of cold weather
on the bombs is a much simpler problem. We
estimate that the USSR can successfully store
and assemble nuclear weapons for use at Arc-
tic bases under any weather conditions which
will permit the operation of bombers. The
problem of storage could also be largely elimi-
nated by storing the bombs in rear areas and
moving them to the advanced bases as needed,
although such an operation would introduce
additional timing problems.
65. Scale of Prestrike Preparations. At pres-
ent the preparations necessary for launch-
ing a maximum-scale attack from likely stag-
ing areas would probably require several
months after their initiation. By mid-1959,
however, only minimum preparation would be
required, provided that during the interim a
major effort had been made to improve base
facilities and training, logistics, and equip-
ment of the Long-Range Air Force.
66. Assumptions Underlying Estimated Inter-
continental Striking Forces. Within the lim-
its of base capacity, aircraft performance, and
operating conditions, the size of the strike
force which the USSR could launch would
vary with the employment of different types
of aircraft. The variety in methods of em-
16
ployment and attack patterns open to the
USSR makes it difficult to estimate which air-
fields the Soviet Union might employ in an
initial surprise attack. Moreover, on many
forward airfields, we lack sufficient intelli-
gence to make firm estimates of their capaci-
ties to stage bomber aircraft.
67. In order to determine the general order
of magnitude of Soviet capabilities for an
initial attack against the US, we have consid-
ered the available intelligence on runway
lengths, POL, maintenance, other base facili-
ties and accessibility for supply purposes, and
have arrived at an estimate of a probable max-
imum capacity of each of the forward bases
for staging bomber aircraft. All bases that we
have selected for the staging of heavy bombers
have runway lengths of at least 7,500 feet and
are considered to have an average maximum
staging capacity of 30 heavy or 60 medium
bombers. Those selected for staging medium
bombers only have generally fewer base facili-
ties, but have runways estimated to be at least
5,200 feet in length. Their maximum staging
capacities are considered as varying from 20
to 60 medium bombers, depending on the facil-
ities at each base. Although usable on the
basis of estimated aircraft performance fig-
ures, existing runways at many of these air-
fields are considerably below the standards
normally associated with Soviet long-range
bomber bases, and their use in 1956 would
require the acceptance of reduced safety
margins.
68. The following planning factors, based
largely on US experience, have been assumed:
a. 90 percent of aircraft at home base in
commission after stand-down;
b. 85 percent of those aircraft departing
home bases can be launched from staging
bases (includes attrition enroute to and while
at staging bases) ;
c. 80 percent of these bomber aircraft
launched on unrefueled missions will arrive
in target area (excluding combat attrition) ;
d. 75 percent of those bomber aircraft
launched on missions utilizing inflight refuel-
ing will arrive in target areas (excluding com-
bat attrition) ; and
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e. An allowance of 1.2 tanker aircraft pro-
vided for each bomber refueled in flight (com-
patible 11 tanker assumed).
69. Estimated Strike Forces in 1956. We esti-
mate the USSR could, from its present for-
ward bases, augmented by the three home
bases in the Leningrad area, mount an initial
strike of approximately the following size:
700 bombers on base, 600 could be launched,
and as many as 500 could arrive in the target
area. If tankers were available and used from
these bases, the bomber force would have to
be reduced accordingly. (See Annexes A and
E for an estimate of staging capacities of
individual bases in each area.)
70. If the USSR elected to utilize all available
bases, including some in the Baltic-East Ger-
man and Leningrad areas, and thus lessen its
chances of achieving surprise, it could initially
launch the maximum number of aircraft
which would be serviceable (approximately
900) against the US in 1956. Not considering
combat losses, approximately 720 might reach
target areas.
71. Estimated Strike Forces in Mid-1959. By
mid-1959, the capacity of the forward stag-
ing areas and Leningrad could be increased
to permit the entire Soviet long-range bomber
force to be launched from these areas in an
initial attack. We have also estimated that
by mid-1959 the USSR would have some 400
BISON and 300 BEAR aircraft in operational
use. Moreover, the USSR could have a sub-
stantial inflight refueling capability and a
number of heavy bombers could thus be
launched from interior bases in initial at-
tacks on two-way missions. In this case
the Leningrad base area could be used for
some of the heavy bombers making initial
unrefueled attacks on the US. Under these
circumstances, the mid-1959 Soviet strike
capability could be as follows:
" As used in this estimate, "compatible" means
having characteristics of speed and altitude suit-
able to the bomber employed, and a transfer
capability sufficient to add 35 percent to the
range of the bomber.
. 17
On Base
Launched
Arriving in
Target Area
BADGER
330
280
225
BISON
360
310
235
BEAR
270
225
180
Tanker
360
300
Totals
1,320
1,115
640
We have assumed the following method of
employment:
2-way 2-way 1-way
Unrefueled Refueled Unrefueled Totals
BADGER
280
280
BISON
50
?
260
310
BEAR
225
225
275
260
280
815
72. Should the USSR elect to use only heavy
bombers in an initial strike against the US,
about 630 could be launched if home bases
were utilized as launching bases. About 500
could arrive in the target area, not consider-
ing combat losses. If bombers staged through
forward bases, the number launched and the
number arriving in the target area would be
about 530 and 420, respectively.
73. Allocation to ECM and Diversionary Tasks.
It is important to note that a significant pro-
portion of the above strike aircraft would
probably be used solely for ECM and diver-
sionary tasks.
Naval Attack Capabilities
Against the US
74. Although there is no firm evidence that
the USSR has developed a submarine-launched
guided missile capability, such a capability
would constitute a significant threat against
US targets and could be used to supplement
aircraft strikes. By this means the USSR
could attack important US military, economic,
and population centers along both seaboards
and inland within range.
75. In view of current indications of an ex-
tremely active Soviet long-range submarine
building program, and the considerable capa-
bilities that submarine-launched missiles
would provide for hitting vital US targets,
submarine-launched guided missiles might be
an important supplement to nuclear attacks
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by aircraft in any Soviet attack plan. This
would be more likely by 1959, when such mis-
siles could have not only nuclear warhead
yields consonant with their CEP's but also
increased range and reliability. However, no
firm estimate as to the probable magnitude
of such submarine-launched guided missile
attacks can be made at this time. The actual
scale of such attack would depend not only
upon the availability of missiles and of spe-
cially configured submarines, but also upon
the Soviet requirement for submarines in their
conventional role. Soviet judgment as to the
risk of forfeiting the element of surprise would
also be involved. The chances for such for-
feiture would mount as the numbers of sub-
marines to be deployed prior to initial attacks
was increased. Such considerations suggest
that the actual force involved would be only
a small portion of the total submarines avail-
able now and in 1959.
76. The capabilities of Soviet surface naval
forces for attacks on the US are very low.
Sporadic raider operations are possible, but
the surface fleet in general, lacking aircraft
carriers, is unsuitable for transoceanic naval
operations on any significant scale.
Clandestine Methods of Attack
Against the US
77. Clandestine Delivery of Nuclear Weapons.
We have no evidence as to any Soviet plans or
preparations for clandestine delivery of nu-
clear weapons against the US. However, dur-
ing the period of this estimate the USSR will
be capable of producing nuclear weapons
which could be smuggled into the US either
as complete assemblies or as component parts
of subassemblies. These could range from
small-yield weapons (five kilotons or less) ,
weighing a few hundred pounds and small
enough to fit into the luggage compartment
of an automobile, up to the highest-yield de-
vice the USSR was capable of producing (10
megatons or more) . All of these weapons or
devices could be designed to break down into
a number of relatively simple and readily
transportable components. Those designed
to give a relatively low yield would not require
much labor or technical training for assembly.
Somewhat more labor and training would be
18
required to assemble weapons designed to give
high yields, and, once assembled, they would
be more difficult to transport. The size and
weight of any multimegaton device would be
such that it could probably be used only as a
fixed installation in the hold of a merchant
vessel or in secure premises, such as the Soviet
embassy.
78. Considering the known limitations of the
means of physical detection, the USSR could
probably introduce into the US and detonate
in place a considerable number of nuclear
weapons by clandestine means. A variety of
methods of clandestine delivery suggest them-
selves. Assembled weapons could be dropped
by apparently friendly aircraft, detonated in
the hold of a merchant ship, or sown as under-
water mines by submarines and possibly by
merchant ships. Either components or as-
sembled weapons could be brought in under
diplomatic immunity, smuggled across land
or sea frontiers, introduced through normal
import channels, or brought in as bonded
merchandise awaiting transshipment.
79. In introducing nuclear weapons clandes-
tinely into the US, the USSR would have to
take into account not only the estimated
chances of detection, but also the conse-
quences of detection, including the loss of
surprise in any intended overt attack and the
possible provocation of US military action.
As the number of weapons clandestinely intro-
duced was increased, the risk of compromise
would grow. This increased risk would be less
a function of the physical means of detection
(the effectiveness of which is extremely lim-
ited) than of the possibility of US penetration
of the Communist apparatus, or of the defec-
tion of even a trusted agent, or of sheer
accident. The USSR could not be confident
that none of these mischances would occur.
We conclude that, although clandestine attack
with nuclear weapons might be made against
specially selected targets, as a supplement to
overt delivery by air, the use of large numbers
of such weapons would probably be precluded
by security considerations.
80. Clandestine Use of BW and CW Weapons.
Most biological warfare (BW) agents are pe-
culiarly adaptable to clandestine utilization,
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since detection of their intended use would
be difficult. Even small-scale employment of
BW agents against livestock could be highly
effective. BW attacks against personnel con-
centrated in selected buildings could also be
effective. Anticrop BW operations could be
carried out clandestinely, with possible dam-
aging effects under proper environmental
conditions.
81. CW agents are not as suitable to clandes-
tine operations as BW agents. The effects
are more readily identifiable and except on a
limited scale, a much greater effort would be
necessary to deliiier quantities required for
lethal concentrations. Although it probably
would not be feasible to accumulate CW
agents or dissemination devices for more than
limited attacks against population centers in
the US, CW attacks against personnel in
buildings could be effective.
82. Subversion, Espionage, Sabotage. The
USSR is capable of subversion, espionage, and
widespread sabotage in the US through the use
of existing subversive elements and the place-
ment of foreign agents. Sabotage probably
would not be initiated on a large scale prior to
an all-out attack on the US since these efforts
would nullify the advantage of surprise, if
identifiable with the USSR. Attempts to sab-
otage US transportation, industrial and com-
munications facilities, and military installa-
tions could be expected with and immediately
following surprise attack by the USSR. Com-
munist party members and adherents are
capable of organizing saboteur units of vary-
ing sizes equipped with small arms and other
suitable material which could strike at espe-
cially selected and widely separated targets
simultaneously and without warning. Wheth-
er these attacks would be timed with a surprise
military attack or carried out after attack
would be dependent upon the Soviet appraisal
of the relative advantages of such action.
VII. CAPABILITIES TO ATTACK US OVERSEAS
INSTALLATIONS AND FORCES
Attacks by Aircraft
83. Assuming the USSR launched attacks
against the US on the scales indicated in para-
19
graphs 69 and 71, there would remain in its
operational establishment about the following
numbers of long-range bombers:
At Present
Mid-1959
BULL
250
0
BADGER
50
330
BISON
0
0
BEAR
0
0
300
330
These aircraft would be subject to the attri-
tion factors set forth in paragraph 68. In
addition, an indeterminate number of repa-
rable planes and salvaged aborts from the
aircraft committed to the intercontinental
attack would also be available for later em-
ployment.
84. From bases in the USSR, the BULL, if
modified, and the improved BADGER, on two-
way missions carrying a 3,500 lb. bomb load,
could reach key US installations in the UK,
Western Europe, Iceland, Greenland, the
Azores, French North Africa, Libya, the Middle
East, Japan, Okinawa, Alaska, Guam, and the
Philippines. To reach key installations be-
yond these areas, they would have to resort to
inflight refueling or one-way missions. Jet
heavy bombers on two-way missions from
bases in the USSR could reach all the above
areas and, in addition, Hawaii, Labrador, and
Newfoundland. The BEAR, from interior
bases, and the BISON, from forward bases,
would be able to reach the Panama Canal but
only on one-way missions. (See map 21.)
85. The USSR's estimated 2,900 jet light
bombers (3,100 in 1959) could also be used
for attacks against the many key US instal-
lations and forces overseas within their opera-
tional radius. There is an adequate number
of Bloc fields suitable for jet light bombers
within range of key US overseas installations
and forces. From bases in East Germany, jet
light bombers on two-way missions could
reach the entire North Sea area, the UK and
its northern and western approaches (includ-
ing the Faroes) , France and its western ap-
proaches, and northeastern Spain. From bases
in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania these
aircraft could reach most of the Mediter-
ranean Sea. From the southern USSR, they
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could reach the area north of an arc Crete-
Israel-Kuwait. Jet light bombers based in the
Vladivostok and Dairen areas could reach all
of Japan. To reach Okinawa and Luzon on
two-way missions, they would have to stage
from bases in Communist China. (See map
21.) However, for maximum effectiveness of
attacks by light bombers against the more
distant targets, considerable redeployment
from present base areas to forward bases
would be required.
Attacks by Guided Missiles
86. Ground-Launched Missiles. The 350 n.m.
ballistic missile which we estimate the USSR
could now have, and the 850-900 n.m. missile
which could begin to be available in 1955-1956,
could be used against US overseas installations
and forces. From forward Bloc areas such
missiles could reach most US overseas instal-
lations, including bases in the UK, Spain,
Japan, and Alaska. However, the small num-
ber probably available and their performance
limitations would seriously limit Soviet opera-
tional capabilities in this field during the
early part of the period.
87. However, Soviet ground-launched missile
capabilities probably will increase markedly
as a result both of the greater numbers of
these weapons available and their improved
performance and reliability. In 1958-1959,
the USSR could also have ready for series pro-
duction an IRBM with a range of about 1,600
n.m. Large-yield nuclear warheads for bal-
listic missiles would probably be available in
1959-1960. With the IRBM the USSR could
attack most of the more distant US overseas
targets, while simultaneously using short- and
medium-range missiles against less distant
targets. (See map 22.) These missiles could
therefore constitute in 1959 a significant
threat to US overseas installations and forces,
largely because of the probable invulnerability
of ballistic missiles to countermeasures.
88. Submarine-Launched Missiles. Subma-
rine-launched guided missiles might be used
against selected targets to supplement air-
craft and ground-launched missile attacks.
The range estimated for Soviet submarine-
launched missiles (see paragraph 43) would
20
permit them to reach many key overseas in-
stallations. These missiles could also be used
against carrier and other naval forces in port
or as weapons of opportunity at sea.
Attacks by Conventional Forces
89. Ground Attack. The decision as to how
and when to use Bloc ground capabilities
would probably be strongly influenced by the
desire to obtain strategic surprise, a consid-
eration which weighs heavily against their
employment prior to the time initial air at-
tacks were detected. Ground attacks sup-
ported by tactical air and naval forces would
almost certainly be an integral part of the
over-all Soviet campaigns on the Eurasian
land mass, and would present a threat to over-
seas installations and forces in operations im-
mediately following initial attacks.
90. Airborne Attack. Soviet airborne and
amphibious operations might be conducted in
several areas in order to achieve early destruc-
tion of US overseas forces and installations.
The capability of these forces to seize and de-
stroy key installations and to assist in the de-
struction of US forces would be substantial
in certain areas including Alaska. Soviet air-
borne capability is limited by the availability
of transport aircraft. It is estimated that
Soviet Aviation of Airborne Troops can lift
9,000 troops with one drop on D?day, or 14,000
with two drops, to a maximum distance of 500
n.m. For a five-day operation approximately
23,000 to 25,000 troops could be lifted. By
1959, it is estimated the USSR will be able to
lift 11,000 troops on D?day and 29,000 over a
five-day period. The lift capability in both
periods could be increased by about 1,800
troops for every 100 aircraft made available
from the 3,000 transport aircraft of the civil
air fleet and other components of military
aviation. If the USSR converted BULL air-
craft for transport purposes, the Soviet capa-
bility to transport troops by air could be in-
creased by about 5,000-6,000 troops per 100
aircraft converted.
91. Amphibious Attack. Because of the lack
of aircraft carriers and vessel types suitable
for amphibious warfare, large-scale Soviet am-
phibious attacks would be limited to short-
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range operations in areas where air cover
could be provided from Communist-controlled
territory. However, amphibious raids by sub-
marine-borne forces to attempt destruction or
neutralization of key US overseas installations
are possible. Amphibious assault against the
continental US (except Alaska) is beyond So-
viet capabilities. In assaults against Alaska,
certain restrictions would be imposed by:
(a) the limited number of landing beaches;
(b) climatic conditions; (c) problems of es-
tablishing and maintaining lines of communi-
cations; (d) the difficulties of maintaining
adequate logistic support; (e) the limited am-
phibious capability of the Far Eastern Fleet;
and (f) the difficulties of maintaining ade-
quate air cover. Amphibious attacks against
other key US overseas installations, except in
the Far East, would probably be limited to am-
phibious raids by submarine-borne forces.
Amphibious operations with an initial assault
force of up to three divisions, and a follow-up
force of five to six divisions, could be launched
against Japan. This lift capability could be
employed in other areas of the Far East
within range of Soviet land-based support
aircraft.
92. Naval Forces. We estimate that, in a
maximum initial effort, as many as 220 of the
long and medium range submarines located
in the Baltic-Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet
areas ? 160 and 60 respectively --- could be
made available for attacks against US naval
' forces and sea communications, and key in-
stallations overseas. By mid-1959, these num-
bers could be increased to about 420 and 100
respectively. A portion of these submarines
would almost certainly be employed against
US naval forces, and especially to prevent at-
tacks by carrier striking forces with a nuclear
delivery capability. In addition, Soviet sub-
21
marines would almost certainly be employed
against US sea communications by attacks on
shipping and by mining the approaches to
harbors and ports. Many of these could be
concentrated, as opportune, against US naval
task forces.
93. Soviet surface naval forces have a low
capability for contesting control of the high
seas. The Soviet surface fleet lacks advanced
bases and does not possess a shipborne air
arm, but these forces could be effectively em-
ployed within the radius of shore-based air
cover.
Clandestine Attack Capabilities
94. Subversion, Espionage, Sabotage. Soviet
capabilities for subversion, espionage, and
widespread sabotage attacks against key over-
seas bases are greater than against the conti-
nental US because of the much larger
proportion of Communist elements, wide-
spread political discontent, and lack of ade-
quate security measures in certain foreign
nations. Communists in some of these coun-
tries are experienced in such operations, and
sabotage efforts timed with large-scale mili-
tary attacks could materially reduce the capa-
bility of US military forces overseas.
95. Clandestine Delivery of Mass Destruction
Weapons. Considerations influencing the use
of clandestine methods of delivery of mass
destruction weapons by the USSR against
overseas targets will in large part be similar
to those discussed above in paragraphs 78-80.
However, because of generally greater subver-
sion capabilities and of geographic propin-
quity, Soviet capability for using these
methods overseas, while limited, is greater
than against the US.
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ANNEX A
BASE AREAS SUITABLE FOR LONG-RANGE BOMBER OPERATIONS
L Chukotski Peninsula. As the result of run-
way construction believed to have been car-
ried out at several airfields within the past
two years, we believe that at least six airfields
probably now have runways adequate for stag-
ing medium bombers and that at least two of
these are suitable for heavy bomber opera-
tions. Military air units are based on some
of these airfields but none are subordinate to
Long-Range Aviation.
2. Air operations in this area are made diffi-
cult by several factors. Recent construction of
long, surfaced runways indicates that climatic
and logistical difficulties of this area are be-
ing overcome. However, ice and compacted
snow runways are also still in use. The lack
of modern navigational aids hampers opera-
tions, but there are some indications that the
USSR is steadily improving its operational
potential through installation of modern radio
navigation facilities. In addition, the USSR
has an ever-increasing fund of Arctic expe-
rience which can be applied to staging opera-
tions in this area.
3. Cold, wind, snow, And fog, which are prev-
alent throughout the area, tend to make
operations difficult and hazardous. The most
unfavorable weather conditions occur during
November through March.1 The most favor-
able conditions occur at all stations during
the spring and early summer. Weather in
the interior is highly favorable during the
summer months. Only those areas adjacent
to the Chuckchee Sea or which lie along the
In order to estimate the seasonal suitability of
average weather conditions in potential staging
areas, the percentage frequency of occurrence
of those conditions which would handicap the
xriass movement of aircraft into or out of staging
areas was computed. Two conditions were se-
lected as a basis for analysis: (1) ceiling/visibility
less than 300 feet/1 mile; (2) temperature below
?20? F., although with adequate preparations
staging operations could be carried out success-
fully in temperatures below ?20? F.
22
Bering Sea coast have a relatively high inci-
dence of unfavorable conditions during the
midsummer months.
4. The status of base logistical support facili-
ties required to stage long-range strike opera-
tions from the Chukotski area is unknown.
The area is accessible only by air and by sea
during the ice-free season, and supply prob-
lems would be difficult. However, the USSR
is considered capable of stockpiling the nec-
essary supplies. Moreover, the area's staging
potential could be markedly increased by 1959.
By using construction elements already avail-
able in the area the USSR could build two
additional concrete surfaced runways, 6,000 to
8,000 feet in length, by 1959.
5. Kola Peninsula. The Kola Peninsula has
at least six bases believed adequate for stag-
ing operations of medium bombers at maxi-
mum gross weights, provided that a reduced
safety margin on take-off was accepted for
the BULL. One other airfield is considered
to be suitable for use on an emergency basis,
but its extremely isolated location, plus its
apparent lack of recent development or use,
argue against its use as a staging base. At
least one of these airfields would be adequate
for heavy bombers at maximum take-off
weights, provided reduced safety margins
were accepted. Permanent-surfaced runways
can be constructed throughout the area with-
out difficulty as it is relatively free of perma-
frost.
6. Prevailing climatic conditions, while a re-
strictive factor on air operations, are relatively
more favorable than in other regions of the
Soviet Far North. In general, the most favor-
able conditions occur in the late spring and
early summer. In late summer and early
autumn, conditions are favorable except at
bases adjacent to the cold waters of the White
Sea. However, during May through October
conditions are favorable at all locations over
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90 percent of the time. In winter, conditions
are less favorable due to the more frequent
occurrence of low ceilings and poor visibilities.
Extremely cold temperatures are relatively in-
frequent, and occur less than 10 percent of the
time at any base.
7. The status of base logistical support facili-
ties required to conduct long-range bomber
strikes from airfields in this area is unknown,
but it is considered that logistics would not
be an important limiting factor. Supply
routes by rail and road are open to the Kola
Peninsula on a year-round basis, although
logistical support of large-scale air operations
would still pose difficulties under extreme
weather conditions. Moreover, the staging
potential of the area could be readily in-
creased. No additional construction capabil-
ity would be required in order to build three
additional concrete-surfaced runways 6,000 to
8,000 feet in length by 1959.
8. Central Arctic. An airfield construction
and development program in this area has
been in progress since early 1949. Five air-
fields are known and others probably exist.
The development program was carried out for
the Directorate of Polar Aviation of the North-
ern Sea Route Administration, but at least
some of the airfields built probably have run-
ways of sufficient length to handle the staging
of medium bombers under conditions of re-
duced take-off weights and/or reduced safety
margins. In addition, there is one field suit-
able for the staging of heavy bombers. How-
ever, logistical support would be difficult,
probably requiring heavy stockpiling.
9. This area has by far the most unfavorable
weather of all the areas considered. The
major handicap to air operations arises from
the frequency and persistence of extremely
low temperatures. For example, at Tiksi over
50 percent of all observations during January
record temperatures lower than ?20? F. Jet
engines, however, are less adversely affected by
low temperatures than piston engines and jet
take-off requirements are considerably re-
duced. Even the summer months are not
very favorable due to the high frequency of
fog in the coastal belt.
23
10. Leningrad. This area contains at least
three home bases of Long-Range Aviation
units equipped with BULL aircraft. These
bases probably have runways of sufficient
length for heavy jet bomber operations under
conditions of reduced take-off weights and/or
reduced safety margins. The Long-Range
Aviation basing potential of the area could
be increased without difficulty by employing
available airfield construction units to further
improve existing airfields. Such development
would require only a minimum of additional
construction, as there are already 18 airfields
within 200 nautical miles of Leningrad with
concrete runways at least 6,000 feet in length,
and seven other airfields with concrete run-
ways in excess of 5,000 feet in length. None
of these additional bases, however, are known
to be associated currently with Long-Range
Aviation operations. Operations from this
area by long-range aircraft would offer the
advantage of a temperate climate and good
logistical support.
11. The bases in this area have the most favor-
able weather during the late spring and sum-
mer, when about 97 to 99 percent of the time
is favorable for operations. Even during au-
tumn and winter 88 to 90 percent of the
weather is favorable at all bases. There ap-
pears to be little difference between night-time
and daytime weather except during Septem-
ber, October, and November. During these
months, reduced visibility sometimes occurs
during the early morning hours. Tempera-
tures below ?20? F. occur less than five per-
cent of the time at all bases.
12. Kamchatka?Sea of Okhotsk Area. Four
airfields in this area have runways which
would permit ground runs of at least 5,000
feet. One of these airfields is considered ade-
quate for medium bombers at maximum gross
weights, provided reduced safety margins were
accepted for BULLS. The other three could
be used by BULLS with considerably reduced
take-off weights and by BADGERS at maxi-
mum gross weight, provided lower safety mar-
gins were accepted. For .the above reasons
long-range capabilities from this area are esti-
mated to be extremely limited, but facilities
could be developed to accommodate medium
and heavy bomber operations by 1959.
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13. The weather in this area is relatively
favorable for air operations. Throughout the
year the weather on the east coast of Kam-
chatka Peninsula is the most favorable in the
entire area. In the Magadan area the best
weather occurs during the early spring and
autumn.
14. Baltic-East Germany. Poland and the So-
viet Zone of Germany have a total of at least
60 airfields from which medium and heavy
bomber operations could be mounted against
the US and US bases in Western Europe.
However, a disadvantage of this area as a
base for air attacks on North America is that
Great Circle routes pass over nations friendly
to the US. In addition, if would be more
difficult than in other forward base areas to
maintain security of preparations for attack.
24
However, climatic conditions are most favor-
able and there would be relatively few logisti-
cal problems. This base complex is served
adequately by all types of transportation.
15. The bases located in the Baltic coastal
area are most suitable for air operations dur-
ing April through August, when favorable
conditions occur about 97 percent of the time,
both day and night. The least favorable
period is December through March, when fre-
quency of favorable conditions drops to about
75 percent. However, the unfavorable condi-
tions occur most of ten during the night and
early morning hours. The midday hours are
favorable for operations about 85 percent of
the time. Very low temperatures are rare in
this area.
?
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ANNEX B: MAPS
I. GENERAL
The following maps show estimated Soviet
long-range aircraft and guided missile range/
radius capabilities under selected conditions
against key US and overseas targets through
mid-1959. The maps depicting the capabili-
ties of the BISON (nos. 9-12) and BADGER
(nos. 5-8) are based on estimated perform-
ance characteristics of improved versions of
these aircraft estimated to become available
in mid-1956 and in 1957, respectively. The
estimated capabilities of the current versions
of these two aircraft types are shown in boxes
included on the appropriate maps. The esti-
mated capabilities of the modified BULL are
shown in boxes on the maps dealing with the
standard version of this aircraft (nos. 1-4).
Estimated range coverage under refueled
conditions is particularly difficult to depict
since many different routes and refuel points
25
could be used by Soviet strike forces. There-
fore, it should be noted that this coverage
assumes certain routes and refuel points, and
under different assumptions the indicated
coverage would be somewhat altered.
II. RANGE COMPUTATION s
In all cases the estimated coverage is based
on ranges calculated in accordance with US
military mission profiles. For estimating
ranges under unre fueled conditions it has
been assumed that Great Circle routes would
be flown, although such flights would have
to transit major Western warning and defense
positions. For refueled flights, however,
routes indicated show possible approaches in-
tended to avoid overflight of major Western
defense and warning systems. Total ranges
indicated assume a Soviet refueling capability
permitting a range extension of approximately
35 percent.
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CIA-RDP79R01012A006500040001-7 I Y UI- I ANUARD ISULLI UNI?
Map 16
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 5,300 NM
MO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 5,600 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 10,600 NM
25254 1-56
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/08_ :_ ir,,
CIA-RDP79R01012A006500040001-7 I Y UI- IMPRUVEU 1/15UNI UNREFUELEU
From Selected Interior Bases
SECRET
TOM
sibirsk
1"0
os'dovi
Keflovik
Note: CURRENT BISON
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load. 2.450 NM
1WO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,550 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 4,800 NM
ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb toad, 5000 NM
4,-vinchor
\ 4
v.,.
.,Seoffl.
\
.PortIond
\ .Boise
.11a,ston
onto
.Minneopolk offal?
Milwookeer:,
Pittsburg
4aVshington
.Cincinnoti ?Rkhmond
CftyA
not, elle
,Bormudo
*Atlanta
Charleston
Map17
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 2,750 NM
TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,800 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 5,300 NM
ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 5,600 NM
SECRET
25255 1.56
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/08:
CIA-RDP79R01012A006500040001-7 LI I Y OF IMPROVED BISON, REFUELED
From Selected Interior Bases
SECRET
AbCliatinae
Boton
Buffolo .d;.'w,york
Pittsbur.t. .1,44
?,94
?Ridynand
?Cincinnod
.5t. Louis
City
.Knoxville
..,Los Angeles
-.Son Diego
?Phoenix
Nolo: CURRENT BISON
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 3,300 NM
TWO-WAY. 3,500 lb. Bomb load, 3,450 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 6,500 NM
ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 6,800 N
Map 18
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 3,700 NM
TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 3,800 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 7,200 NM
'Albuquerque
.Memphis
*Atlanta
lacksonville
,?f?Jew Orleans
SECRET
?
a.
'?Pananso
25256 1.56
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CIA-RDP79R01012A006500040001-7 PABILITY OF BEAR, UNREFULLED
From Selected Interior Bases
SECRET
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 3,900 NM
TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 4,100 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 7,600 NM
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/08:
CIA-RDP79R01012A006500040001-7 APABILITY OF BEAR, ,REFUELEU
From Selected Interior Bases
SECRET
L.
r .Portiald
Milwaukee., HPeit?1
:Chicago
1WO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 5,300 NM
TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 5,600 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 10,600 NM
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SELECTED AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES AGAINST KEY US OVERSEAS TARGETS
z
Map 21
C.
Shanghai
?1,5.104:00
FRENCH
WEST
AFRICA
The internetionel boundaries shoe., on this map do not
necesserily totrespond in all oases so the bounderies rec.
ognized Sr She U.S. Government.
25291 1-56
MEX 1
COMBAT RADII
800?N w Jet Light Bomber with 3,500 lb.
Bomb Load
2100?Medium Jet Bomber (BADGER) with
? 3,500 lb. Bomb Load
2800?Heavy Jet Bomber (BISON) with
3,500 lb. Bomb Load
Al! ranges are in nautical miles.
* US Airbase Complex
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LSI IMA I EU
SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILE CAPABILITIES AGAINST KEY US AND OVERSEAS TARGETS
Including Submarine Launched Missile Capability Against the Continental US
SECRET
7600 Map. 22
Canton
Shanghai
a
Alakor#*
novs`.41k
Pei ropavtovsk
W E
sufall
u ;t?
SGA
11400?''
ARCTIC
FRENCH
WEST
AFRICA
The internetionel boundar;ee shown on this map do not
necessedly cortespond in ell