(SANITIZED) NIE 65-55, "PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA THROUGH 1955," PUBLISHED 1 MARCH 1955

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A006000040002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 21, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/09: CIA-RDP79R01012A006000040002-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
21 June 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT:
NIE 65-55, "Probable Developments
in Indonesia Through 1955," published 1 March 1955
Comments
are forwarded for your information.
Distribution "A"
:7,'ECTIET
on NIE 65-55
PAUL A. BOREL
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/09: CIA-RDP79R01012A006000040002-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/09: CIA-RDP79R01012A006000040002-1
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Comments
on NIE 65-55,
"Probable Developments in Indonesia
Through 1955
I-find the paper extremely well done in general. The comments
which follow are of a minor nature
to the numbered paragraphs of the report.
The numbers used relate
2. It should not be overlooked that the government in power
when elections are held will apparently remain the interim govern-
ment until a new cabinet is formed by the newly elected parliament.
This may be important in connection with Article 134 of the Election
Law. A reshuffle of the Ali government is of course not impossible
and it conceivably could fall.
5. I suggest that some reference be made to the Communist attempt
to seize power at Madiun in 1948. The fact that the Indonesian govern-
ment at that time suppressed the armed revolt in a comparatively short
time despite the size of the Communist controlled forces has led Indo-
esian leaders to believe the Communists here can always be defeated.
The 1948 eposide has also caused non-Communist Indonesian leaders to
think of the PKI threat principally in military terms, which obscures
the more subtle menace arising from the current Communist united front
tactics.
20. There is no doubt that the Sultan of Jogjakarta potentially
continues to retain "considerable influence" in the Army. ,It might
be well to note that he is not exercising this influence however.
29. There is growing evidence that Indonesia prefers technical
? aid through regional and UN organizations.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/09: CIA-RDP79R01012A006000040002-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/09: CIA-RDP79R01012A006000040002-1
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.37. The reason for the incapability of operating less than half
of the aircraft at any one time is crew shortage, e.g., the only pilot
capable of flying the practically new Hiler helicopter is in the United
States for four months. The Government has purchased eight Vampire ?
(jet) trainers for AURI to be delivered in 1955. The Air Forces's
potential is there but needs leadership and exploitation. Many able
officers have left the Air Force because of the activities of the A.F.
Commander.
38. There is some evidence that living standartls in Indonesia
have actually fallen since independence: i.e., that the growth in the
population has more than absorbed the slight increase in national
probt4k.
52. Admittedly election guesses are extremely?h=ardous. I am
prepared in general to accept this paragraph but believe that PIR
strength in the newly elected assembly will be less than in the present
assembly.
Finally the map showing the distribution of the principal religions
should indicate Christians on Ambon and Ceram-
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/09: CIA-RDP79R01012A006000040002-1