NIE 63.1-3-55: PROSPECTS FOR VIETNAM THROUGH JULY 1956

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005900030011-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 2, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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L.)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2 June 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (Om)
Colonel Paul S. Reinecke? USA (G-2)
Captain B, E. Wiggin, USN (ONI)
Colonel Willis B. Sawyer, USAF (AFOIN-2B2)
Colonel Floyd E. Dunn, USA (JIG)
SUBJECT NIE 63.1-3-55: Prospects for Vietnam Through
July 1956
1_ The attached terms Of referende were agreed on at
the meeting of the IAC representatives on Wednesday, 1 June.
2. All agencies are invited. to contribute to any section
within their competence to do so.
3. It is requested that contributions be received in
this office by the close of business on Monday, 1 August.
Distribution 111111
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PAUL A. BCREL
Acting Assistant Director
National Estimates
STAT
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N 7 RAL IN'.2ELLIGENCE AGENCY
2 :une 1955
SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 63.1-3-55: PROSPECTS FOR VIETNAM*
' THROUGH JULY 1956
THE PROBLEM,
To estimate the prospects for the development of a Vietnamese
government with the capability to defend itself against internal -
subversion and uprisings, with sufficient authority and administrative and
to deal adequately with the many problems facing it, and with sufficient
political appeal to risk national elections in mid-1956.
QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
I. PRESENT SITUATION
?
In what manner -have events of the past several months affected
the strength, stability, effectiveness, and popular appeal
of the Vietnamese government? To what extent, if any, have
The area south of the 17th Parallel will be referred to herein as
Vietnam.
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these events fundamentally changed the political situation
in Vietnam?
a?
What are the major non-Communist Vietnamese political
groups at the present time? What are their strengths
and sources of support; objectives; policies; principal
leaders; potential for national appeal; cleavages within
relations with the French
themselves; relations with one another,/and relations with
the Viet Minh? For whom or what do they speak other than
themselves and their' particular interests? To what extent
and in what manner, if any, have events of the past
several months increased political awareness and participa-
tion among previously inert social groups?
b. To -what extent do these groups presently support or
oppose Premier Diem? What is the constancy of this
support or opposition? What is Diem's resulting political
strength and nationalist appeal at present?
c. What is the present situation with respect to ad hoc
political bodies such as the "People's National Revolutionary
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? Assembly"? What are their relationahips with Diem and
their status with respect to the government? What
differences exist in aims and tactics between these
bodies and Diem? Who are their dominant leaders?
Whom do they represent? What Communist influence exists
within these bodies?
d. What are Diemts present aims and policies toward France
and the French in Vietnam? Bao Dai? The sects? The
Viet Minh in Vietnam?
e. In what manner (as appropriate) and haw effectively
is the present government of Premier Diem: (l)
dev-Jloping a sense of national unity and purpose among
the people; (2) imposing its will and authority and
establishing order and security throughout Vietnam;
(3) performing the normal functions of civil government;
(4) overcoming such problems as inefficiency, corruption,
and lack of trained leadership and civil servants;
(5) dealing with the problems created by the refugees;
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(6) reducing, by political means, the position of the
sects; and t7) fostering an awareness among Vietnamese of the
course of events in North Vietnam under Communist rule?
f. Who are possible siccessprs to Mem as Premier?
What are their respective abilities, political
complexions, and followings?
2. What is the present'Situation with respect to internal security?
a. What, briefly, is the present situation with respect to
hostilities between the VNA and dissident armed groups,
in particular the Binh Xuyen and dissident Hoa Hao
forces? What is the present strength, leadership,.
effectiveness, morale and loyalties, and general
dispositions of the semimilitary forces opposed to
the government? What are their relations with the
French? What Communist ialuendel if any, exists
in these groups?. What are- current VNA capabilities
for dealing with these groups?
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b. What are the present identity, strength, location and
influence of Communist and pro-Communist groups in
Vietnam? What are the identity and strength of individual
leaders of these groups? What are' their relations with the
French? To what extent are they organized for and capable
of subversive activity against the local government? In
particular
That is their capacity to infiltrate present
influential political groups and important institutions of
government? To infiltrate the army? What are the
possibilities that such groups or individuals would
rally to 4 strongly nationalistic anti-Communist
government?
c. What are the present strength, leadership, effectiveness,
general dispositions, and morale of the Vietnamese
armed forces, including police and militia? The
semimilitary forces which have rallied but are not
entirely under national control?
d. To what extent is the VNA loyal to Diem asan
individual? To the legally constituted government?
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To Bao Dai? To specific Military leaders? To
present
What extent 4O/VNA leaders have political ambitions?
Do these leaders have any significant following
in the VN/ or among political groups?
e. What are the plans and prospects of the Vietnamese
government for Improvement and development of the armed.
forcesZFor the succeSeful, integration or dissolution
of sect armies?
3 To what extent and in what manner are political developments
within Vietnam affected and influenced by the following
external forces?
a. Bao Dai? What is the extent and nature of his remaining
legal powers? His remaining political influence and
following?
b. The French? What are the current attitudes and policies
and short and long term objettives in Victnam of the
French, both official and unofficial? Towards Diem?.
Towards the .sects? ToWards the development of a truly
nationalist and independent Vietnam?
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What is the impact of the French presence, attitudes,
and actions in Vietnam on the Vietnamese political
situation? What is the nature, extent, and importance
to France of its economic interests in Vietnam? Of
developments in French domestic and international policy?
C. The US? To what extent and in what manner are
Vietnamese internal political developments influenced
by US policies in Vietnam and elsewhere .in Asia?
What are Vietnamese attitudes toward the US, with
particular respect to technical and economic aid; .
military assistance; and advice and suggestions with.
respect to political, economic, and military developments?
d. Others?
(1) DRV (Viet Minh) policies?
(2) Chinese Communist policies and activities in Asia?
(3) Developments in the Taiwan Straits area?
(4) The attitudes and policies of Cambodia and Laos?
Of other South and Southeast Asian countries?
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.---(5) The Manila Pact?
.(.6)? The _Overseas Chinese in Vietnam?
(7) The attitudes and policies of the UK toward. Vietnam?
Toward other Psian coUhtries?
What is the general economic situation in Vietnam? What
effect does the economic situation have upon political
stability, domestic security, and determination to
resist Communist pressures and inducements? What
progress, if any, has the present government taken towards
solving its major economic problems?
II. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS
a. What is the outlook for the creation of a national
determination to resist the Viet Mph?
b. What is the likelihood that Premier Diem will retain
and strengthen his control of the government? Will he
control the Revolutionary Assaibly and other such
nationalist groups?
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c. Betwee now and mid-1956, what is the outlook for the
strength, appeal, and collective threat to the govern-
ment of the various sects and other non-Communist
groups?
d. What trends in the policies of Diem can be expected in
the next year with respect to; (1) broadening the base
of his government; (2). integrating the sects; (3) holding
elections in Vietnam for -a representative assembly;
(4) dealing with the refugee problem; (5) major economic
problems; (6) Viet Minh in Vietnam; (7) relations with
Pao Dai; and (8) relations with France and the French
in Vietnam?
e. What degree ofsuccess will Diem meet in these -.policies?
To what extent will his government be able to exercise .
its authority throughout Vietnam? What is the prospect
that he will administer government more effectively, by
Vietnamese standards, than he has in the past?
f. What is the outlook for the strength, effectiveness,
loyalty, and morale of the Vietnamese national forces?
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g. What developments are likely in Vietnam's foreign
relations and international position? To what extent
will developments in Vietnam be affected by events
elsewhere in Asia? In the world?
h. What effect would Diem's replacement as Premier have upon
political stability? What line-up of forces would
compose the government most likely to succeed Diem?
What would be the probable strength, orientation,
policies, and attitudes of such a government? How would
these developments differ with the manner of Diem's removal,
as for example, ass:-ssination, replacement by a representa-
tive assembly, etc?
i. What courses of action are the French (official and unofficial
in Vietnam and in France) likely to follow, particularly with
respect t
(1) Relations with the Diem government? The VNA?
Support of US policies in general?
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(2) The revolutionary movement? The position of Boo Dal?
(5) The sects?.
(4) Military and economic assistance to Vietnam?
Joint US-French training of Vietnamese troops?
(5) The position of the FEC and the ultimate withdrawal
of French military and civilian official from Vietnam?
The withdrawal of private French citizens?
(6) The Viet Minh?
j. What is the outlook for US influence in Vietnalla
k. What is the outlook for Communist political appeal and
influence in Vietnam? For Viet Minh capabilities
for subversion and guerrilla warfare? What is the -
likelihood that the Viet Minh will seize power in Vietnam
by infiltration and subversion? What courses of action
are the Viet Mint likely to follow in Vietnam, particularly
with respect to:
(1) Economic relations with Vietnam?
(2) The development of ?, military and political base
in rural areas of Vietnam?
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(3) The continued flight of refugees to Vietnam?
1. -What are the prospects that general elections will
be held in North and South Vietnam by mid-1956?
(1) What are the probable desires and plans with
respect to the holding of the elections, and to
the organization and character of elections, of:
The Vietnamese government? Other Vietnamese
leaders or-groups'? The Viet Minh? The French
government? The UK government?
(2) What would be the outcome if relatively honest
elections were held in mid-1956 for a unified
North and South Vietnam government?
(3)
If at any time within the next year these elections
should for any reason be delayed or denounced by
the Vietnamese government or the Viet Minh, what
'would be the likely political or military reaction,
if any of: the other party; Communist China;
the French; the ICC; other Geneva signatories?
m. What would be the general outlook in Vietnam if
elections should not be held, in mid-1956?
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