NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 30-55 MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005500040007-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 21, 1955
• Content Type: NIE

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P4 IC au-55
21 June 1955
KtbUKU bur
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 30-55
MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 21 June 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intel-
ligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director
for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Com-
mission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant to the
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside their jurisdiction.
riTEDEIZTVAL
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OCDANCI BR,
DOCUMENT NO.
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MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
THE PROBLEM
To re-examine certain problems involved in the development of regional defense
arrangements in the Middle East and to estimate: (a) probable developments in
the regional defense field; (b) the effect of these developments on the states of
the area; and (c) the consequences of possible US courses of action.'
CONCLUSIONS
1. With the signature of the Turkish-
Iraqi defense agreement in February 1955
and the subsequent adherence of the UK,
a basis for establishing a formal regional
defense organization in the Middle East
now exists. Pakistan signed a similar
pact with Turkey in April 1954, and will
probably go through with promises to ad-
here to the new agreement, in which case
provisions for establishment of a joint de-
fense council will go into effect. More-
over, there is at least an even chance that
Iran will in time adhere. (Paras. 10, 20-
22,36)
This estimate is supplementary to the broad
discussion of Middle East defense questions in
NIE 30-54, "Prospects for Creation of a Middle
East Defense Grouping and Probable Consequen-
ces of Such a Development," 22 June 1954. Much
of the earlier estimate remains valid, notably the
general discussions of underlying political atti-
tudes, and basic military problems and condi-
tions. The present estimate focuses on new prob-
lems and prospects raised by the Iranian oil and
Suez settlements and particularly the Turkish-
Iraqi pact and its consequences. Like NIE 30-54,
this estimate does not consider the problems of
defense of Turkey against attack from the north,
which is a NATO responsibility, nor the defense
of the lines of communication into the area.
2. It is uncertain how effective such a
"northern tier" grouping will be in
attracting the cooperation of other Mid-
dle East states and in generally further-
ing US and uk politico-military aims in
the area. Although Iraq's signature of
a Western-supported defense agreement
with Turkey broke down the wall of solid
Arab opposition to defense cooperation
with the West, it aggravated a sharp
cleavage within the Arab world. Egypt
has viewed the move both as a challenge
to its leadership in the Arab League and
to the concept of Arab unity. Saudi
Arabia has also opposed the pact because
of its dynastic rivalry with Iraq and its
suspicions of US-UK intentions. The re-
sultant crisis in Arab affairs has been fur-
ther complicated by growing Israeli res-
tiveness over the prospective increase in
the military strength of Iraq and possibly
of other Arab states, by French maneu-
vers to safeguard the "special" French
position in the Levant, and by efforts of
neutralist and anti-US and UK elements
to block further defense progress. The
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UK, although accepting the established
fact of US participation in Middle East
affairs, remains concerned with protect-
ing as much as possible of its special in-
terests and influence in the area, particu-
larly its strategic position and oil inter-
ests in the Persian Gulf. (Paras. 11, 13-
15, 22-23, 36-37, 45)
3. At least for the next few months, and
possibly for considerably longer, Egypt
and Saudi Arabia will probably continue
their efforts to check the spread of Iraqi
influence and to undermine the Turkish-
Iraqi pact. In practice, France will con-
tinue to resist any extension of Iraqi, UK,
and US influence in Syria and Lebanon.
These various efforts will tend to restrain
the adherence of such states as Lebanon
and Jordan and will contribute to con-
tinuing instability in Syria. Although in
time even Egypt might be willing to par-
ticipate in regional or related bilateral
defense arrangements, if only out of fear
of being left behind, the danger exists
that Egypt may become a prisoner of its
present policies and be unable to modify
them. (Paras. 24-30, 33-34, 45)
4. Although further development of a
"northern tier" defense grouping would
provide a better geographical basis for
realistic defense planning, and might
serve to deter Soviet aggression, the mili-
tary effectiveness of such a grouping will
remain limited for some years to come.
The defense of the Middle East will con-
tinue for sometime to hinge almost en-
tirely on the willingness and ability of the
US and UK to commit the necessary
ground, naval, and air forces. The lack
of effective indigenous forces will remain
a basic handicap requiring a long and
costly effort to overcome. Efforts to de-
velop a tighter and militarily more effec-
tive organization will continue to be im-
peded by the distracting influence of cur-
rent tensions and rivalries within the
area. Such efforts may in fact stimulate
new differences over questions of com-
mand and subordination. Finally, any
defense organization would be impeded
to some extent unless Egypt and other
states in the near area were associated in
some fashion, and would be critically
handicapped without US participation.
(Paras. 47-55)
5. Effective Western participation in Mid-
dle East defense would depend in large
part on arrangements for base and oper-
ating rights. However, regional partici-
pants in a defense grouping (other than
Turkey, and possibly Pakistan) would al-
most certainly resist granting additional
peacetime rights in the foreseeable fu-
ture. They might in time agree to the
construction and at least wartime use of
military facilities. (Paras. 50, 54-55)
6. In the last analysis, the course of de-
velopments in Middle East defense will
depend in large measure on the actions of
the US, which is generally regarded as
the prime mover in such enterprises. US
military and budgetary assistance will al-
most certainly provide the principal in-
centives both to continued cooperation by
Present participants in Middle East de-
fense activity and to the adherence of
additional states. Moreover, there is
likely to be increasing pressure for direct
US participation or some other form of
security guarantee. At the same time,
the widespread belief will persist that in
case of Soviet aggression in the Middle
East, the military moves of the US and
UK would be made with little regard for
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regional security commitments or the in-
terests of local states. This feeling will
contribute to continued cynicism about ?
US-UK commitments under any defense
arrangements, and will increase the
tendency of each state to react to such
arrangements in terms of its own maxi-
mum political advantage. US involve-
ment in defense efforts is thus likely to
increase pressures on the US to become
more involved in intraregional political
controversies, and in particular will
sharpen the problem of Israel's position
in relation to regional defense. (Paras.
56-59)
7. The USSR will almost certainly con-
tinue its efforts to discredit a Middle East
defense grouping and to discourage the
adherence of additional states. It will
continue to strengthen its position in Af-
ghanistan, in part as a means of exerting
counterpressures on Pakistan and Iran.
The USSR would be particularly sensitive
about Iranian adherence to a defense
pact, and if such adherence appeared to
be in prospect, would probably apply pres-
sures, including threats to invoke the
1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty. We believe,
however, that the USSR will not feel it-
self sufficiently threatened by the Middle
East defense grouping to undertake ma-
jor retaliatory actions such as invasion of
any of the member states. (Paras. 35,
41-44)
DISCUSSION
I. PRESENT SITUATION
8. For nearly ten years after World War II,
the Western strategic position in the Middle
East was deteriorating almost everywhere but
in Turkey. With British power on the decline
in the area, the old British system of alliances
and base agreements came under challenge
from rising nationalist forces and grew in-
adequate to meet the postwar Soviet poten-
tial. Nationalist anti-Westernism, intensified
in the Arab states by the creation of Israel
and by the North African problem, made dif-
ficult the development of any alternative form
of politico-military cooperation between the
Middle East states and the West as a whole.
Between 1951 and 1952, two Middle East de-
fense proposals ' sponsored by the US, UK,
France, and Turkey, failed of acceptance by
the states of the area.
9. Within the last year, the situation has im-
proved in certain respects, although it has de-
teriorated in others. The long-drawn-out
Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Suez base has
now been settled on terms which offer some
hope that the base can be effectively reacti-
vated in event of emergency, and the Anglo-
Iranian oil controversy has been resolved.
Moreover the US, supported by Turkey and the
UK, has made some progress in a new ap-
proach to regional defense, dispensing with
French sponsorship. In April 1954, Turkey
and Pakistan ? occupying the anchor posi-
tions under the US-sponsored "northern tier"
concept ? were persuaded to join in a loose
agreement providing for limited defense co-
operation between the signatories, and in-
viting the adherence of other interested states.
In February 1955, Turkey took the initiative
in concluding a somewhat more binding pact
with Iraq. 2 This agreement was subsequent-
ly adhered to by the UK, which at the same
time entered into a subsidiary base agreement
with Iraq to replace the outmoded Anglo-Iraqi
Treaty of 1932.
10. This series of agreements has established
a geographical and political framework for
at least some degree of planning for area de-
fense. Moreover, these agreements, and par-
ticularly Iraq's decision to participate, have
2 The significant provisions of the Turkish-Iraqi
agreement and an accompanying exchange of
notes appear as Appendix A.
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exercised some psychological attraction with-
in other Middle East states. The Shah of
Iran, in some contrast to his government, has
displayed growing impatience to procure
greatly increased US military aid and firmer
US commitments toward Iran, though even he
has not changed his position that Iranian ad-
herence to a "northern tier" grouping would
now be premature. The Shah has also pro-
posed joint staff talks with Turkey, Iraq, and
Pakistan. The decision of Iraq, the second
strongest Arab state, to enter into US-UK
backed defense arrangements, has posed a
challenge both to the prevalent Arab tendency
toward inaction and neutralism, and to the po-
litically potent dogma of solidarity against
regional defense arrangements not sponsored
by the Arab states.
11. On the other hand, Iraq's decision has
roused the opposition of anti-Iraqi and anti-
US and UK elements and brought to the sur-
face a vast complex of intraregional rivalries
and, tensions. Iraq's decision to make a de-
fense agreement with Turkey was preceded
by months of tortuous maneuver and dis-
cussion designed largely to insure the ac-
quiescence of the other Arab states. Never-
theless, announcement of the pact was taken
by Egypt as a direct challenge to its dominant
role in Arab League councils and as an in-
dication that the US and UK no longer re-
garded Egypt as the key Arab country. To-
gether with King Saud, who reacted at least
equally strongly because of his bitter rivalry
with the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq, the
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) re-
gime in Egypt has made vigorous efforts first
to prevent and later to offset the Iraqi move.
12. Egypt was unsuccessful in its initial
efforts to marshal the rest of the Arab League
in condemnation of Iraq and to drum up
effective internal opposition to the Iraqi
government. Thereafter it attempted to pro-
mote a new Arab alignment based initially
on Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, aimed at
isolating Iraq and reaffirming under Egyptian
leadership a unified Arab position against de-
fense agreements with the West except on
Arab terms. The result has been a struggle
for influence over government leaders and
4
important political elements in the uncommit-
ted states, with Egypt and Saudi pressures
and inducements ranged against those of
Iraq and Turkey. The contest is most intense
in Syria, where the weak and opportunistic
government is under heavy pressures from
both sides, but is unwilling to commit itself
unequivocally against Iraq.
13. The Turkish-Iraqi pact has also inten-
sified Israeli alarm at the developing pattern
of defense arrangements. Israel is con-
cerned that Turkey, the only Middle Eastern
state with which it has enjoyed friendly re-
lations, has now entered an agreement with
one of its Arab enemies which provides for
mutual assistance against aggression from
any source and which, by the terms of an
accompanying exchange of notes, pledges
Turkish cooperation in carrying out the UN
resolutions on Palestine, many of which are
quite unacceptable to Israel. Israel is further
alarmed lest Turkey and Iraq succeed in ex-
tending this agreement to include Israel's
neighbors, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. Is-
rael would be particularly alarmed if a union
between Iraq and Syria resulted in a stronger
hostile Arab state along its border. Finally,
Israel feels endangered by any arrangement
involving arms aid to Arab states which is not
counterbalanced by military support and firm
guarantees to Israel.
14. Generally speaking, the outlook for de-
velopment of a US and UK-oriented Middle
East defense grouping has improved in recent
months, but moves in this direction have at
the same time contributed to area instability
by disturbing the precarious balance of inter-
relationships within the region. In partic-
ular, the Turkish-Iraqi pact has, in the eyes of
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, France, and Israel, posed
challenges to their prestige and their interests.
This in turn has had some adverse effects on
the standing of the US, which is generally
regarded as the principal backer of the defense
effort. Israel almost certainly regards US en-
couragement of Iraqi participation in Middle
East defense as an indication that US concern
for Israel's interests is decreasing. The RCC
regime in Egypt has also become embittered
against the up over recent developments in
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the defense field and has even voiced the sus-
picion that the US is attempting to undermine
the regime's domestic position.
II. POSITIONS AND INTENTIONS OF
THE STATES INVOLVED
15. Iraq. We believe that Iraq intends to
make the agreement with Turkey an effective
instrument and that it will refuse to be swayed
from this course by opposition on the part
of other Arab states. However, Iraqi coop-
eration in the regional defense sphere will
continue to be influenced by a number of mo-
tives other than that of developing an ef-
fective defense arrangement. Although Iraq's
signature of a defense agreement with Turkey
reflected some appreciation of the Soviet mil-
itary threat, it was largely motivated by such
collateral factors as: (a) the desire to replace
the old Anglo-Iraqi Treaty with an arrange-
ment more acceptable to nationalist sen-
timent; (b) the wish to promote Syro-Iraqi
union; (c) the recognition that some,positive
step toward area defense was necessary to
obtain further US military aid; (d) the wish to
increase Iraq's prestige among the Arab states
at Egypt's expense; and (e) the weight of
Turkish insistence. Iraq will of course wel-
come security guarantees and support from
Turkey and the UK, and it will also continue
to urge US adherence to the arrangement
and to hope for additional US military aid. At
the same time, it will seek to employ such
support to foster its leadership aspirations
in the Arab world.
16. In return for its efforts to lead the way
toward Arab alignment with the US and UK,
Iraq may be expected to seek outside support
for its regional aspirations. Thus for some
time, at least, Iraq will probably place a higher
'priority on bringing Syria into the existing
loose arrangements than on developing firmer
military ties with its present partners. Iraq
will continue financial and other encourage-
ment to Syrian elements which might work for
closer ties with Iraq, either directly or through
Syrian adherence to the Turkish-Iraqi pact.
If confronted with a coup by anti-Iraqi ele-
ments in Syria, Iraq might seek UK, US, and
Turkish diplomatic support for, or at least
acquiescence in, military intervention.
17. Iraq's ambitions will probably not inhibit
the consolidation of existing defense arrange-
ments, but may prevent the early inclusion
of other Arab states. So long as the UK con-
tinues to believe that Iraqi armed intervention
in Syria is contrary to British interests, Iraq
will probably not undertake such a venture.
Iraq will also almost certainly be sensitive to
US wishes in this respect, as a result of its
desire for further US military aid and for US
adherence to the pact. In addition, the
strong likelihood of violent Israeli reaction
will tend to deter an' open Iraqi move to absorb
Syria. Iraq may try to prevent the other
Arab states from joining a hostile group
rather than actively seek their adherence to
present defense arrangements at any early
date.
18. Turkey. Turkey's primary concern is
with the defense of its frontiers with the Bloc,
to which end it is interested in strengthening
its NATO ties and the Balkan Alliance.
However, it has also shown increasing interest
in protecting its exposed southern flank from
a Soviet thrust through Iran and the Arab
states, and it will probably continue to seek
the addition of Iran, Syria, and Lebanon to a
defense grouping. This policy will probably
continue to involve political and propaganda
conflicts with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The
Turks will be tempted to side with Iraq in
advocating forceful means' to end the unsat-
isfactory situation in Syria. The further de-
velopment of Arab ties will also strain Tur-
key's relations with Israel. Turkey will con-
tinue, however, to hold a low opinion of Iran-
ian and Arab military capabilities, and to seek
UK and US commitments to defense arrange-
ments.
19. Pakistan. Pakistan has promised to ad-
here to the Turkish-Iraqi pact and will prob-
ably join in the near future. Under its pres-
ent leaders, Pakistan will probably continue
to cooperate with the US in furthering anti-
Communist defense arrangements in the
Middle East. In doing so, however, it will be
motivated primarily by hopes of insuring con-
tinued and, if possible, increased US aid, cul-
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tivating its prestige in the Islamic world,
and strengthening its position vis-a-vis India
and Afghanistan. Pakistan is not likely,
therefore, to favor much more than planning
and consultative arrangements. At least for
some time, moreover., Pakistan's attention is
likely to be diverted from Middle East defense
questions by its immediate and pressing
political and economic problems, its strained
relations with Afghanistan, and its suspi-
cions of India.
20. Iran. During the past year, prospects for
open alignment of Iran with the West have
been improved by a number of factors: (a)
restoration of friendly relations with the UK;
(b) settlement of the oil dispute and revived
hopes for economic improvement; (c) suppres-
sion of Tudeh activities; (d) consolidation of
political control by the Shah and generally
pro-Western elements; and (e) continued re-
liance on US aid and guidance. Since March
1955, when the Shah returned from Europe
and the US, he has shown intensified interest
in entering defense arrangements which
would be backed by the US. Although deny-
ing any intention to join regional defense ar-
rangements in the near future, Iran rejected
a Soviet protest that such a move would in-
fringe its 1921 treaty with the USSR.
21. While Iran will probably be willing to
cooperate with its neighbors in limited and
contingent planning for defense, such as
might result from the staff talks which have
been proposed, its overriding defense objective
will almost certainly continue to be that of
securing increased military and budgetary aid
and firm security commitments from the US.
Without these, Iran will remain reluctant to
risk the Soviet displeasure which formal ad-
herence to anti-Communist defense arrange-
ments would bring. Moreover, the Shah's
genuine desire to join a regional defense
grouping will continue to be qualified by his
fear that Iran's military weakness would
relegate it to a subordinate role as compared
to Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan. Iran is thus
likely to continue a cautious policy involving:
(a) approval in principle of defense arrange-
ments; (b) limited cooperation, such as staff
talks, designed to demonstrate Iran's interest
in defense efforts and establish its claim to US
military support; and (c) reluctance to adhere
formally in the absence of substantially in-
creased US aid and guarantees. Should in-
creased instability preoccupy the Shah's at-
tention or actually weaken his position, or
should the pressure of neutralist sentiment in-
crease in Iran, the chances of Iranian partic-
ipation in defense arrangements would de-
crease.
22. The UK. Despite some initial reserva-
tions about the "northern tier" approach, the
UK now appears to have accepted it as the
best available means of providing for the de-
fense of the Middle East and of retaining
rights of US and UK access to bases in event of
war. Although the UK accepts the estab-
lished fact of US participation in Middle East
affairs, it remains deeply concerned with
protecting as much as possible of its own
-special interests and influence in the area.
The UK promptly adhered to the Turkish-
Iraqi pact chiefly because it provided a frame-
work for a new base agreement with Iraq.
British views on developing the pact, as well
as British policy toward associating other
states in area defense arrangements, will con-
tinue to reflect the UK's over-all political and
economic interests in the area as well as
military concern over the Soviet threat.
23. The UK will almost certainly favor making
the present agreements effective instruments
for cooperation with Middle Eastern states,
and will desire US aid and commitments in
consolidating defense arrangements. In gen-
eral, the UK will favor the expansion of such
arrangements in order to increase stability
and UK influence in Syria and Lebanon, and
to strengthen its special position in Jordan.
If Jordan joins the new defense pact, the UK
might consent to a revision of the Anglo-
Jordanian treaty somewhat along the lines of
its new arrangement with Iraq. In seeking to
retain its influence in the Fertile Crescent
area, while making formal arrangements less
offensive to nationalist sensibilities, the UK
will also have an eye on protecting its stra-
tegic position and oil interests in the Persian
Gulf which were weakened by the British
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withdrawal from India and Palestine, and by
British reverses in Egypt and Iran. In the
Egyptian-Iraqi controversy, the UK will prob-
ably continue to counsel moderation, in the
hope of eventually bringing Egypt around and
of avoiding a crisis which would imperil UK-
Egyptian cooperation in Suez. So far as
Iran's adherence to a defense grouping is con-
cerned, the UK may remain relatively cool,
primarily out of concern for the Spviet re-
action to such a development.
24. Egypt. Egypt, like Iraq, aspires to lead-
ership of the Arab states. However, where
Iraq sees the path to such leadership through
cooperation with the US and UK in area de-
fense, Egypt now regards such cooperation as
largely inconsistent with its own aspirations.
Egypt will look with disfavor on any policies
that unduly favor Iraq, or that undermine
the idea of Arab solidarity which is symbol-
ized in the Egyptian dominated Arab League.
At the same time, the RCC regime remains
aware of its dependence on the West for eco-
nomic aid, for military supplies, and for some
measure of protection against Israel. Hence
Iraq's agreement with Turkey and US?UK
support of the move have placed Egypt in a
dilemma. The RCC's strong negative reac-
tion indicates that for some time at least
Egypt will continue to place its desire for Arab
leadership above the advantages of coopera-
tion with the West. This disposition may
lessen Egyptian willingness to live up to the
spirit of the Suez Agreement with the UK.
25. For some time to come, Egypt, although
unlikely to attempt seriously to assert a pos-
itive leadership role over the other Arab states,
will probably continue to take negative meas-
ures to prevent Iraq from organizing other
Arab states in line with the Turkish-Iraqi
pact. Supported by Saudi Arabia, Egypt will
probably continue at least to go through the
motions of trying to establish a new Arab de-
fense alliance based initially on Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and Syria (the ESS pact). Even
though the RCC is unlikely to develop much
confidence in the military effectiveness of such
a grouping, Egypt will for reasons of prestige
feel obliged to support the project. Egypt it-
self sponsored the scheme, and it appeals to
politically influential nationalist and 'anti-
Western elements in Egypt. Moreover, it
serves as an instrument for keeping alive
Egyptian pretensions to Arab leadership, and
it supplies to other states, which might be
tempted to follow Iraq into defense arrange-
ments with the US and UK, a purely Arab
alternative. ?
26. While Egypt's most urgent short run con-
cern in its relations with other Arab states is
to keep Syria out of the "northern tier" group-
ing, it will also regard the adherence of any
other Arab state as a setback to its interests.
Egypt would prefer to create an Arab alliance
which prohibited members from entering ar-
rangements with non-Arab powers without
the consent of all, thus excluding Iraq unless
the latter repudiates its agreement with
Turkey. However, Syria has sought to have
these anti-Iraqi aspects omitted from the pro-
posed ESS agreement, and if it remains firm
in this respect, Egypt may give way.
27. So long as Egypt has hopes of preventing
other states from following Iraq, its vigorous
opposition to defense ties along "northern
tier" lines will probably continue. The danger
exists that in following this course Egypt may
become a prisoner of its present policies, and
be unable to modify them even if the eventual
success of "northern tier" arrangements were
to render such policies futile and perhaps
harmful to Egypt's interests. This danger
would increase if the RCC continued to sus-
pect that the US and UK are promoting the
"northern tier" scheme in order to weaken
and isolate Egypt. Egypt's feeling that it is
entitled to an important regional role has
probably been strengthened at least temporar-
ily by the recognition given Premier Nasr at
the Bandung Conference.
28. In the long run, it is possible that Egypt
in its own self-interest will become more rec-
onciled to US and UK defense efforts. In-
creased tension with Israel, the growing
necessity for building an effective working re-
lationship with the Sudan, and increasing in-
ternal political pressure for progress in
land development schemes and for some form
of normalization of political life, may compel
Egypt to give more attention to problems
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closer to home at the expense of its role in
Arab affairs. Under these circumstances, it
might give greater heed to its continuing need
for limited cooperation with the US and UK.
The possibility of Egypt's following this course
would be enhanced by indications that the
states aligned with the US and UK were re-
ceiving tangible benefits from this association.
In any event, Egyptian actions are likely to be
determined less by fear of the Soviet threat
than by the desire to improve the internal
position and international prestige of the re-
gime, to strengthen Egypt against Israel, and
to advance its policy in the Arab world and
Africa.
29. 'Saudi Arabia. The Saudis' extreme pre-
occupation with parochial concerns, par-
ticularly their desire to prevent strengthen-
ing the Hashemite house in Iraq, will almost
certainly continue to outweigh broader con-
siderations of strengthening the area as a
whole. Saudi Arabia will probably continue
to subsidize elements in Lebanon, Jordan, and
especially Syria in an effort to prevent defense
ties between those countries and the US and
UK which might strengthen Iraqi influence.
It will also continue to maintain close ties
with Egypt and to favor a new anti-Iraqi
alignment. However, if Egypt should aban-
don or fail in this project, Saudi Arabia alone
would be ineffective in promoting it. In ne-
gotiations with the US over the Dhahran air
base agreement, due for renewal in 1956, the
Saudis' will probably cite US support of the
Turkish-Iraqi pact as an instance of aiding
Saudi enemies, and use this argument to seek
a higher price for renewal.
30. Syria. In no other state have the tensions
resulting from the new defense developments
been so clearly felt as in Syria. After the fall
of the Khuri cabinet which was favorable to
the Turkish-Iraqi pact, Syria, led by the new
anti-Iraqi Asali-Azm government, agreed to
join Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the proposed
new anti-Iraqi alignment. Under strong Turk-
ish-Iraqi counterpressures, Syria has since
adopted a temporizing policy. These vacil-
lations reflect an unresolved struggle, with
considerable participation by interested ex-
ternal parties, for control of the Syrian gov-
ernment. So long as this struggle continues,
Syria will remain a highly unstable state and
the main arena of the power contest among
the other Arab states.
31. In this situation, one Syrian faction or
another may attempt a forceful seizure of
power, probably with outside encouragement.
At present, the most likely source of such a
coup is the anti-Iraq faction. This group is
composed of some influential army officers
led by Chief of Staff Shawkat Shuqayr, some
elements of the Nationalist Party, various
opportunistic political independents, and the
militantly anti-Western Arab Socialist-Res-
urrectionist Party of Akram Hawrani, which
has been infiltrated to some extent by Com-
munists and which exerts considerable in-
fluence both in the army and in parliament.
In general, this faction is backed by Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and France. A successful coup
by this faction would increase Syrian neutral-
ist and anti-US-UK tendencies. It would also
weaken Iraq's prestige in the Arab world. The
pro-Iraqi and largely pro-US-UK elements
in Syria, which include President Atasi, a
large segment of the Populist Party, and prob-
ably some army officers, have shown little
initiative. If confronted with a coup, the pro-
Iraqi group might seek outright Iraqi inter-
vention on the plea of protecting the legal
government.
32. Even if one faction should gain suf-
ficient control of the Syrian government to
commit it clearly to one side or the other in
the Arab power struggle, deep-seated di-
visions within the country itself would con-
tinue to limit its effectiveness as an ally.
The emotional and political attractions which
draw some elements toward the Egyptian-
Saudi alignment will continue to be counter-
balanced by the pro-Iraqi and pro-US and
UK sympathies of other factions. Syria's
trade ties with Iraq, which are far more ex-
tensive than those with Egypt, make a clear
break with the Iraqis economically undesir-
able. And if Jordan and Lebanon were to
join Turkey and Iraq, even Syria's pro-Egyp-
tian elements might have misgivings about
aligning themselves with geographically re-
mote Egypt and Saudi Arabia at the cost of
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isolation from their immediate Arab and
Turkish neighbors, and consequent exposure
to Israel. By the same token, however, a for-
mal Syrian alignment with Iraq would be
weakened in practice by strong domestic op-
position which would be encouraged by Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and at least covertly by France.
33. Lebanon and Jordan. These states also
find themselves in the middle of the Egyptian-
Iraqi controversy. Both are weak states,
whose independence in foreign policy is ex-
tremely limited. Jordan's preoccupation with
Israel, and the sentiments , of the former
Palestinians in Jordan, would make an open
stand against Egypt appear politically hazard-
ous. Lebanon's economic needs, and the in-
fluence of its Moslem elements, make it fear-
ful of alienating Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Both
states, however, are heavily dependent on the
West ? Jordan through its UK treaty ties and
subsidies, Lebanon because of its trade pat-
terns and the conviction of its Christian ele-
ments that friendly relations with the West
are necessary to continued Lebanese inde-
pendence and to their own survival in a
Moslem' world. Both states have according-
ly temporized in the present controversy in
the hope that a solution will be found which
will preserve some degree of Arab unity while
permitting beneficial relations between Arab
states and the US and UK.
34. Lebanon and Jordan will almost certainly
seek to prevent an open break between Iraq
and Egypt. Both states would probably be
inclined to side with Iraq if a choice became
necessary, partly in view of Iraq's growing
strength, but mainly because they cannot af-
ford to side with an openly anti-US and UK
group. However, they will continue to hope
that the choice can be avoided. If Egypt per-
sists in fostering a new Arab pact, Lebanon
and Jordan will be under continuing pres-
sure to join in the interests of Arab unity,
but they will probably try to stay out so long
as the pact is not open to Iraq. Jordan will
continue to place its main reliance on bi-
lateral ties with the UK. However, the UK
treaty is not popular within Jordan, and
Jordan would probably be willing to join the
Turkish-Iraqi pact as a means of revising its
bilateral relations with the UK, even over
Egypt's protests. Lebanon too would be
strongly tempted to join the pact if this ap-
peared the best way of assuring its continued
independence, though it will also probably
seek bilateral US guarantees for this objec-
tive as well.
35. Afghanistan. Afghanistan is unlikely to
membership in any "northern tier" defense
grouping in the foreseeable future because of
its exposed and isolated position, its long-
standing belief in the wisdom of remaining
uncommitted to either Russia or the West,
and its persistent quarrel with Pakistan over
the Pushtunistan issue. Afghanistan's chief
importance in Middle East defense efforts,
therefore, is likely to be as a focus for Soviet
counterpressures designed in part to intimi-
date Iran and Pakistan.
36. Summary Outlook. With the signature
of the Turkish-Iraqi agreement, and the sub-
sequent adherence of the UK, some form of
Middle East defense organization now appears
very likely. If Pakistan goes through with
promises to adhere to the new agreement,
provisions of the pact for establishing a joint
defense council will go into effect. Moreover,
there is at least an even chance that Iran
will in time adhere, thus fulfilling the orig-
inal "northern tier" concept. In addition,
Iraq's successful defiance of Egypt on the
issue of defense agreements has shaken re-
sistance in certain other Arab states to US and
UK-sponsored area defense, and has improved
the prospects for eventually forming a more
inclusive regional defense organization. The
inclusion of additional Arab states, however,
depends in part on the outcome of the strug-
gle for Arab leadership between Egypt and
Iraq. At least for the next few months, and
possibly for considerably longer, Egypt and
Saudi Arabia will probably continue their
efforts to check Iraq and undermine the Turk-
ish-Iraqi pact. Even though Egypt is unlike-
ly to regain undisputed leadership of the Arab
states, many of the latter may be unwilling to
take any definitive step toward entering de-
fense arrangement with the US and UK in the
face of Egyptian and Saudi objections. In the
short run, at least, continued US encourage-
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ment of the "northern tier" grouping would be
likely further to strain US-Egyptian relations.
III. DEFENSE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION'
37. The Turkish-Iraqi pact, following on the
heels of a US MDAP agreement with Iraq and
Egypt's assumption of control over the Suez
base, has intensified a feeling of isolation in
Israel and a fear that time is working against
Israel. Since David Ben-Gurion's return to
the cabinet as defense minister in February
1955, Israel has adopted a tougher border
policy, particularly in the Gaza area.
38. Israel will continue to make every effort,
both through Zionist and diplomatic chan-
nels, to dissuade the US, the UK, and Turkey
from strengthening the Arab states. It will
also seek Western arms aid and security
guarantees in order to counter any increases
in Arab strength and to demonstrate to the
Arab states that it still enjoys Western sup-
port. While it recognizes that the Tripartite
Declaration of 1950 provides some deterrent to
Arab aggression, Israel is likely to argue
increasingly that the Declaration offers inade-
quate guarantees to Israel and that the US
and UK are themselves violating the commit-
ment contained in that document not to upset
the military balance between Israel and the
Arab states. Israel's diplomatic and propagan-
da activities will be aimed principally at influ-
encing UK and US policy. In addition, it will
probably seek to exploit the apprehensions of
the French, who are anxious for a greater
voice in the formulation of Western policy in
the Middle East, and whose misgivings about
Syrian and Lebanese association with Middle
East defense activities give them a certain
identity of interest with Israel. Failing sat-
isfaction of its desire for arms aid and firm
security guarantees from the UK and US,
Israel would probably look increasingly to
France for military supplies.
39. In the short run, at least, US?UK defense
efforts in the Arab states area are likely to
This question will be examined in greater detail
in the forthcoming NIE 30-2-55, "Probable Devel-
opments in the Arab-Israeli Situation," scheduled
for early completion.
exacerbate Arab-Israeli tensions. In Israel,
such efforts will lend considerable support to
the view of the "activists" that diplomacy has
failed and that Israel's interests call for a
more forceful line toward the Arab states.
It appears that present Israeli efforts are di-
rected toward forcing a settlement with the
Arabs based generally on the territorial status
quo, either through direct negotiations or
through Western or UN mediation, while
Israel still enjoys military superiority and the
Arab states are divided and quarreling. Ac-
cordingly, Israel is unlikely to moderate its
policy of organized border reprisals, which
could expand into wider hostilities, and some
military and even civilian elements may be-
come increasingly tempted to risk a second
round of hostilities with the Arab states rather
than permit what they consider unfavorable
trends to continue. However, deterrents to
major military aggression by Israel will con-
tinue to be: (a) the risk of losing the .moral
and financial support of the US and of US
Jewry; (b) the UK treaties with Iraq, and par-
ticularly with Jordan; and (c) the Tripartite
Declaration of 1950.
40. On the part of the Arabs, a desire to
strengthen themselves vis-a-vis Israel will con-
tinue to be a major motivation for accepting
US?UK defense ties and military aid. Arab
states which cooperate in defense arrange-
ments are likely to bargain for greater US?UK
diplomatic support vis-a-vis Israel. Moreover,
with any increases in their own military
strength, they may feel even less inclined to
reach a peaceful settlement on the basis of
the status quo. Arab leaders who favor ties
with the US and UK may also be intimidated
from pursuing a more conciliatory policy to-
ward Israel by the charges of their opponents
that US?UK-backed defense efforts are in
reality devious moves to divide the Arab states
and bring about a settlement between them
and Israel. Nevertheless, in the long run it
is possible that Arab states which accept de-
fense arrangements with the US and UK may,
as a result of US?UK influence, be induced to
become less intransigent toward Israel, pro-
vided Israel itself becomes less intransigent.
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IV. PROBABLE REACTIONS OF OTHER
INTERESTED COUNTRIES
41. The USSR. The Soviet Union will almost
certainly continue its efforts to discredit a
Middle East defense grouping and to dis-
courage the adherence of additional states,
particularly those adjacent to the USSR.
Soviet propaganda in the area will probably
continue to argue that Western-backed de-
fense arrangements represent a disguised
form of imperialism which involves Middle
East countries in provocations against the
Soviet Union. It will probably stress the ad-
vantages of a neutralist course, and will point
to its own efforts at "coexistence" in Europe.
It will probably continue its efforts to demon-
strate support of the Arab states vis-a-vis
Israel, and will oppose any Western guaran-
tees to Israel.
42. Soviet attempts to prevent individual
states from joining Western-backed defense
arrangements will probably involve both in-
ducements and threats. In Syria, local Com-
munists will continue to associate themselves
with the anti-Iraqi element. The USSR will
encourage Syrian adherence to an anti-Iraq
Arab grouping; official Soviet policy will prob-
ably be expressed in terms of support for
Syrian independence. Forceful Iraqi inter-
vention in Syria would call forth a strong So-
viet reaction, which would probably include
raising the issue in the UN. The Soviets will
encourage Egypt's resistance to its own and
other Arab states' defense ties with the West,
and may supplement their diplomatic efforts
with offers to barter Bloc military supplies for
Egyptian cotton.
43. The USSR would be particularly sensitive
about Iranian adherence to a defense pact.
Iran's exposed position and its special treaty
relations with the USSR give the Soviets con-
siderable leverage for efforts to prevent such
adherence. In the diplomatic field, the USSR
has recently been courting Iran by settling
long-standing border and financial disputes,
but it has also shown that it is prepared to
apply diplomatic pressures to prevent Iranian
participation in a "northern tier" grouping.
Such pressures probably would include threats
to invoke the 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty, which
the USSR construes as permitting it to in-
troduce troops into Iran in case of threatened
invasion from Iranian territory; they might
also include the creating of difficulties over
recently ratified border and financial agree-
ments between Iran and the USSR, and the
instigation of incidents or a show of force
along the borders. The extensive uncovering
and suppression of Tudeh infiltration in the
Iranian government and armed forces during
the past year have reduced Soviet ability to
promote internal disorders.
44. Soviet inroads in Afghanistan through
the provision of economic aid and the intro-
duction of Soviet personnel during the past
year reflect the growing importance attached
by the USSR to the maintenance of a favor-
able position in Afghanistan. Any Afghan
tendency to align with other nations in a Mid-
dle East defense arrangement would almost
certainly result in strong Soviet pressures on
Afghanistan.
45. France. Although France insists that it
approves strengthening the Middle East
against Soviet aggression, its attitude toward
the Turkish-Iraqi pact in practice continues
to be negative. The French were offended
at being left out of the preparations for the
arrangement, and have been even more con-
cerned that a British plot was being hatched
to establish Iraqi hegemony over Syria and
Lebanon, where France maintains claims to
"special interests." France reacted by giving
covert support to anti-Iraqi elements in Syria,
and by drawing closer to Israel and Egypt.
France has assured the US and UK that it
does not oppose the pact, and at higher policy
levels it will probably support, at least in
theory, the development of a "northern tier"
defense grouping. However, France will urge
that it should participate in the planning and
leadership of such an organization. At the
same time, concern for the maintenance of
French influence in the Levant states will
probably be reflected in continuing French
covert activity designed to hold Iraqi, UK, and
US influence in check.
46. India. India's opposition to regional de-
fense groupings will almost certainly con-
tinue, particularly so long as Nehru believes
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that "power blocs" constitute a threat to
peace. Pakistan's ties with the "northern tier"
grouping, and accompanying US military aid
to Pakistan, will 'continue to be especially dis-
tasteful to India. India will oppose Arab and
Iranian adherence to Western-backed defense
arrangements, and in particular will encour-
age Egypt to take a neutralist position.
Nevertheless, a critical rift between India and
the US over the issue of Middle East defense
arrangements remains unlikely, and it is
highly improbable that disagreements with
the US over this issue would cause India to
move significantly closer to the Bloc.
47. Greece and Yugoslavia. Greece is piqued
at what it regards as excessive Turkish in-
itiative, and uneasy at British "encirclement."
Yugoslavia has opposed the Turkish-Pakistani
and the Turkish-Iraqi pacts as running coun-
ter to Yugoslav efforts to decrease tensions
between East and West. These reactions
may in some measure weaken the Balkan Al-
liance and strengthen Egypt's position.
V. THE MILITARY OUTLOOK
48. From the military standpoint, recent de-
velopments have done little to reduce the
area's vulnerability to Soviet aggression.
Turkey's agreements with Pakistan and Iraq
involve little more than general provisions
for limited cooperation which may eventually
develop into more effective joint military ar-
rangements. Except for Turkey, and pos-
sibly Israel, the states of the Middle East still
have almost no ability to withstand a Soviet
attack, and their political and military weak-
nesses continue to constitute a strategic
liability for US and its allies. The UK-Egyp-
tian agreement on Suez ended a troublesome
political conflict between the two countries,
but at the military cost of dispersing the only
powerful concentration of British military
power in the Middle East, and of breaking up
the organization and part of the facilities of
the great military base on which Western
defense plans for the area have long hinged.
And while Egypt is pledged to grant base
re-entry rights to the UK in case the Arab
states or Turkey are attacked, effective West-
12
ern use of the base in event of emergency is
now subject not only to Egyptian agreement
that such an emergency indeed threatens, but
also to the delays involved in restoring the
base to operations once Egyptian agreement
is secured.
49. Except for Turkey, Israel has the most
effective military force in the area. However,
present political circumstances preclude in-
tegration of Israeli forces into area defense
arrangements. Israel is anxious to secure
US military aid, and in event of war would
be disposed to side with the West if it were
convinced that an effective effort to defend
the area could be made. However, its will-
ingness to resist a Soviet invasion would de-
pend in part on timely action by the US and
UK demonstrating their readiness to provide
prompt military assistance.
50. The defense of the Middle East will contin-
ue for some time to hinge almost entirely on
the willingness and ability of the US and UK
to commit the necessary ground, naval, and
air forces.4 Recent defense agreements are
of military value to the West because in some
measure they improve the long-range pros-
pects for: (a) building up indigenous defense
forces; (b) developing a coordinated com-
mand structure; and (c) facilitating the de-
velopment of Western bases and Western ac-
cess to the area in event of war.
51. Prospects for Improving Indigenous
Forces. US?UK military aid and support will
continue to be necessary to effect any signifi-
cant improvement in the defense capabilities
of Middle Eastern states. And even if such
support is forthcoming, its effective utilization
would be a slow, costly, and arduous process,
requiring close US or UK supervision and
budgetary support. Even if the Middle East
countries cooperated to the fullest extent with
US training and planning groups, and if the
US provided the materiel and budgetary sup-
port necessary, it would take at least three
to five years to correct current deficiencies
4 The Union of South Africa has made a com-
mitment to supply an expeditionary force, pos-
sibly consisting of two small armored divisions,
for the defense of the Middle East in the event
of war.
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even in existing Middle East ground forces.
Given the conditions that are likely to prevail,
it is probable that the process actually would
take considerably longer in most cases. More-
over, such an effort would require a far higher
level of military aid than is now being pro-
vided Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq. The de-
velopment of effective naval and air forces
would be even more expensive, difficult, and
time-consuming.
52. Pro pects for Developing a United Com-
mand Structure. The Turkish-Pakistani and
Turkish-Iraqi agreements represent little more
than expressions of willingness to cooperate,
and many problems remain to be solved before
even these states are likely to participate in
effective joint defense planning, force deploy-
ment in accordance with over-all regional re-
quirements, or the establishment of a unified
command. Nevertheless, the Turkish-Iraqi
pact provides at least the basis on which Tur-
key and Iraq can begin to coordinate policies
for defense of their eastern flank in coop-
eration with the UK. Once a joint defense
council has been established following the ad-
herence of a fourth state, the UK will probably
work to develop a tighter, more formal defense
organization.
53. The "northern tier" states which enter a
defense grouping will almost certainly be will-
ing to support at least the principle of military
cooperation. However, the extent to which
they are likely to engage in serious joint de-
fense planning, and eventually to make com-
mitments to an over-all defense plan, will de-
pend in large measure on US and UK policies
and on the degree of US participation and sup-
port. Any real or apparent conflict of aims
between the US and UK with respect to de-
fense efforts would almost certainly impair
cooperation among the Middle East states.
54. Outlook for Western Military Access to the
Area. Although timely and effective Western
participation in defense of the Middle East de-
pends in large part on some form of arrange-
ments for base and operating rights, the idea
of such rights or of the presence of Western
troops in peacetime remains offensive to most
states of the area. The Suez agreement and
the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty have
13
served to confirm nationalist feeling that ves-
tiges of Western military occupation are out-
moded. Overt British control of bases in Iraq
has been exchanged for less open working ar-
rangements. Even Jordan's extreme depend-
ence on UK subsidies and military support
has not prevented the growth of considerable
domestic discontent over the military rights
which the UK enjoys in Jordan. In Iran,
widespread opposition to granting military
rights to the Western Powers in peacetime
would be re-enforced by fear of the probable
Soviet reaction.
55. Given this pervasive feeling, Middle East
states (other than Turkey, and possibly
Pakistan') which have or may become mem-
bers of a Western-backed regional defense
grouping would almost certainly resist grant-
ing additional peacetime base or operating
rights to Western forces in the foreseeable
future. However, having accepted the idea of
a defense grouping, they might permit con-
struction of militarily useful roads and other
communications facilities with Western as-
sistance, and might in time agree to the con-
struction of purely military facilities. While
they would seek to have such facilities remain
under their own control, their association in
area defense would offer the West greater
opportunities to effect some form of working
arrangements for wartime use of these facili-
ties, and in most cases also for limited peace-
time access, such as Iraq affords the UK.
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF POSSIBLE
US COURSES OF ACTION
56. While the US has thus far refrained from
open participation in current regional defense
arrangements in the Middle East, the belief
5We have estimated that Pakistan's present
leadership would probably be favorably inclined
toward US peacetime developments of bases for
for US use in Pakistan, but that its actual agree-
ment to such development, and the extent of
rights which Pakistan would give the US for use
of bases in peace or in war, might depend on
such factors as its current relations with India,
the state of public opinion, the probable Soviet
response, and the extent of US aid and guar-
antees it might expect to receive. NIE 52-55,
"Probable Developments in Pakistan," 15 March
1955.
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that the US was a principal though silent
partner in the enterprise has figured impor-
tantly in the calculations of the other inter-
ested parties. The attitude and actions of the
US will continue to have an important bearing
on future developments.
57. The character and amount of military aid,
including budgetary support, made available
by the US will almost certainly remain the
principal factor by which the advantages of
participating in Middle East defense activities
are judged. It is also likely to have a de-
termining influence both on the willingness
of present members of the pact to move ahead
in the field of defense cooperation and on the
the desire of other Middle East states to par-
ticipate. As progress is made toward a more
effective regional 'defense grouping, there is
likely to be increasing pressure for some more
direct form of US commitment, since it is rec-
ognized that the area cannot be effectively
defended without active US participation.
Turkey has already called on the US to take a
more active role in developing defense ar-
rangements, and the Pakistanis, before com-
mitting themselves, have attempted to get
assurances that the US will adhere. The pres-
ent signatories are also likely to seek open US
diplomatic support in their efforts to win ad-
ditional adherents among the Arab states.
58. The extent of US aid to states partici-
pating in defense arrangements will also be
14
closely watched by the uncommitted states.
A demonstrable build-up of Iraqi forces, for
example, would help to convince other Arab
states that material benefits were to be derived
from cooperation with the US. Eventually,
it might even draw Egypt toward a more co-
operative attitude, if only through fear of be-
ing left behind. Conversely, long delays in
implementing arms promises, or the provision
of clearly obsolete or only token quantities of
materiel might persuade the undecided states
that association with defense arrangements
was not worthwhile, and would provide op-
ponents of the idea with additional propa-
ganda weapons.
59. On the other hand, the belief is widespread
in the Middle East that in case of Soviet ag-
gression in the area, the military moves of the
US and UK would be made with little regard
for regional security commitments or the in-
terests of local states. This feeling will con-
tribute to continued cynicism about Western
commitments under any defense arrange-
ments and to the tendency of each state to
view such arrangements primarily in terms of
maximum political advantage. US unwill-
ingness to participate or to make commit-
ments would probably retard expansion of a
defense grouping and would almost certainly
increase the emphasis on parochial interests
among participating states.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF THE TURKISH - IRAQI PACT
The stated aim of the Pact of Mutual Co-
operation between Iraq and Turkey, which was
signed February 24, 1955, at Baghdad, is the
further improvement of good relations be-
tween the two countries in order to contribute
to world peace and security, particularly in
the Middle East. Specifically, the parties
pledge themselves to "cooperate for their se-
curity and defense consistent with . . . the
UN Charter." They agree to determine spe-
cific measures to realize this aim as scion as
the pact enters into force.
A permanent council at the ministerial
level is to be set up to implement the pact
when at least four powers have become par-
ties to it. The pact is open for accession
to any member of the Arab League or any
other state actively concerned with the se-
curity and peace of the Middle East. Acced-
ing states may conclude special agreements
with other parties to the pact.
15
The pact remains in force for five years
and is renewable for five year periods. Any
signatory may withdraw, after giving notice,
at the end of a five year period, in which case
the agreement remains in force for the other
members. The document contains such
standard phraseology as an undertaking not
to interfere in each other's internal affairs,
and a pledge to settle disputes in accordance
with the UN Charter.
An exchange of letters between the Iraqi
and Turkish Prime Ministers at the time of
signing the pact recorded their understand-
ing that the pact would enable their coun-
tries "to cooperate effectively in resisting any
aggression directed against either of them"
and "to work in close cooperation for effect-
ing the carrying out of the UN resolutions
concerning Palestine."
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/16: CIA-RDP79R01012A005500040007-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/16: CIA-RDP79R01012A005500040007-2
SECTION V
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