COMMENTS BY THE BOARD ON OIR'S INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 6771, "THE CURRENT SITUATION IN HUNGARY"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005400040032-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: December 17, 1954
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified and Approved ForRelease2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP79R01012A005400040032-5
1111
CECRUT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
17 December 1954
MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Comments by the Board on OIR's Intelligence Report
No. 6771, "The Current Situation in Hungary"
The following are the Board's comments on OIR's Intelligence
Report No. 6771, "The Current Situation in Hungary." OIR prepared
its paper in connection with the Department of State's current
consideration of authorization to continue "Operation Foous."
Mr. Park Armstrong had requested the Board's views on the OIR
paper.
1. The Board of National Estimates believes that the tenunt
of political and economic developments in Hungary given in IR 6771
is, in the main, objective and accurate. The Board also believes
that the judgments made in the paper, -- that the disharmony and
confusion within the regime are not now a threat to its security,
and that it is likewise not seriously threatened by present levels
of popular resistance, -- are sound.
2. The Hungarian regime is unlikely to make any substantial
progress in the near future in overcoming its economic difficulties.
?feeRET--
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21: CIA-RDP79R01012A005400040032-5
SECRET
It is possible that the regime may decide to provide greater
incentives by increasing production of consumer goods, even
at the cost of a temporary loss in total production. It is
unlikely, however: that the regime will be able in any short
period, or willing in the long run, to provide sufficient con-
cessions to overcome popular discontent.
3. Even if the economic situation in Hungary does not
improve during the next Six months or year, we believe that the
regime will still be capable of controlling any active resistance
and maintaining itself in power. Moreover, the USSR is unlikely
to allow the security of the Hungarian regime to be seriously
threatened, and would, if necessary, take whatever emergency
economic and security measures were ro-uired to maintain the
Communist power. The USSR has about 30,000 troops in Hungary.
4. The USSR would not be deterred from a radical inter-
vention by the fact that any active resistance which night develop
was receiving material and/or moral support from the 'Test. The
USSR would probably be willing to incur serious risks of wor to
preserve Communist power in Hungary, since it almost certainly
considers its control of the whole Satellite area essentiol to
its own security.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL E'TIMATES:
SHERMAN KENT
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/21: CIA-RDP79R01012A005400040032-5