COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE ISLANDS OFF THE COAST OF CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005300020003-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 25, 1955
• Content Type: SNIE

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,IMI I
00ZIFID1TI1if 25 January 1955
-TOP-SECRET 032241
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 100-3-55
COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN
POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION
WITH RESPECT TO THE ISLANDS
OFF THE COAST OF CHINA
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following organizations participated in the preparation
of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the
Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the
Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 25 January 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. See, how-
ever, the footnotes taken by various members to specific
paragraphs. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative
to the IAC and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their
jurisdiction.
DOCUMENT NO.
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DATE:
CONFIEThTITK
REVIEWER:
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other De-
partment or Agency
2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-
cable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange-
ment with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should
either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be re-
quested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22
June 1953.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONFIDENtrir
NOTE
On 21 January 1955 the Director of Central Intelligence submitted to
the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency memoran-
dum entitled "Reactions to Certain Possible US Courses of Action with
Respect to the Islands Off the Coast of China." _
Subsequently, and after the President's message to the Congress of 24
January, the Intelligence Advisory Committee considered the Central
Intelligence Agency memorandum and a coordinated estimate was pre-
pared covering those paragraphs which had not been rendered moot by
the adoption of the policy set forth in the President's message. Distri-
bution of this estimate is being made to all recipients of the original
memorandum so that they may have the benefit of the views of the
entire intelligence community.
The offshore island situation will again be reviewed by the Intelligence
Advisory Committee subsequent to action by the Congress and when it
will be possible to reappraise this situation in the light of reactions to the
policy set forth in the President's message and the actions taken
thereunder.
CONFIDE'NTIAti
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CONFIDENTIAL
COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE
US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT
TO THE ISLANDS OFF THE
COAST OF CHINA
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
To estimate Communist reactions to certain US courses of actions taken in ac-
cordance with the President's message to the Congress on 24 January 1955 and Joint
Resolution 159 1 introduced in the House on 24 January 1955; specifically, Commu-
nist reactions to the following US courses of action: (a) the US to persuade the
Chinese Nationalists to withdraw their forces from the offshore islands with the ex-
ception of the Quemoys and possibly Matsus and to assist this withdrawal with US
armed forces; (b) the US to assist the Chinese Nationalists with US armed forces to
defend the Quemoys and possibly the Matsus from Chinese Communist attacks, in-
cluding appropriate military action against mainland forces and installations direct-
ly supporting Communist attacks, pending action by the UN to restore peace and se-
curity in the general area.
ASSUMPTION
Congressional approval of the President's request.
'Resolved by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, that the President of the United
States be and he hereby is authorized to employ
the Armed Forces? of the United States as he
deems necessary for the specific purpose of secur-
ing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores
against armed attack, this authority to include
the securing and protection of such related posi-
tions and territories of that area now in friendly
hands and the taking of such other measures as
he judges to be required or appropriate in assur-
ing the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.
This resolution shall expire when the President
shall determine that the peace and security of
the area is reasonably assured by international
conditions created by action of the United Na-
tions or otherwise, and shall so report to the
Congress.
CONFIDENTIAL
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ESTIMATE
Communist Reactions
1. The Chinese Communists will continue
strongly to reiterate their contention that the
status of the offshore islands, as well as Tai-
wan and the Pescadores, is a domestic matter,
and will seek to propagandize international
opinion against the US, stressing US inter-
vention, aggressive intent, and desire to main-
tain tension in the Far East.2 Simultane-
ously, the Communists will probably attempt
to portray any Nationalist evacuation as a
Communist victory, a demonstration of Na-
tionalist weakness, and as evidence of the
futility of US support. These propaganda
themes will probably be reflected in Commu-
nist propaganda worldwide.
2. We believe it is unlikely that the Commu-
nists would deliberately attack US forces en-
gaged in the evacuation of Nationalist garri-
sons, but the possibility of a serious incident
cannot be excluded.
2 Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of
State, believes that this paragraph, in addition
to indicating how the Chinese Communists would
attempt to exploit this action propaganda-wise,
should also estimate how they would in fact in-
terpret this course of action. The Special Assist-
ant would therefore begin paragraph 1 with the
following sentence: "The Chinese Communists,
imbued with the suspicions that historically have
characterized aggressors, will almost certainly
view this action as further evidence of US hos-
tility and aggressive intent against Communist
China."
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, be-
lieve that this paragraph should read as follows:
"The manner in which the posited US policy is
being adopted, with full discussion in the Con-
gress and prior Congressional acquiescence in the
use of force in defending Taiwan, the Pescadores,
and such offshore islands as were deemed neces-
sary in the defense of Formosa, would seemingly
remove from the minds of Communist leaders
any doubts as to the consequences of aggression
against these positions. Under these conditions,
the Communists, although quickly seizing con-
trol of evacuated islands, would be unlikely to
assault the positions remaining in Nationalist
2
3. We believe that even after Congressional
approval the Communists will continue prob-
ing actions against major offshore islands to
test US intentions. If the Communists were
convinced that the US was determined to pre-
vent the seizure of a particular island position
even to the extent of attacking mainland
targets or retaking any lost island posi-
tions, they would probably be deterred from
attempting such seizure in the near future.
However, they would probably continue prob-
ing and attempts to subvert the garrison.
They would also continue efforts to discredit
and isolate the US on the issue of the islands
and on the over-all issue of Taiwan and the
Pescadores. 3 4
4. The Communists will remain firm in their
intention to take the offshore islands. Over
the longer run, as their capabilities increase,
and especially if world and US opinion ap-
pears unfavorable to strong US counteraction,
hands. They would almost certainly continue
efforts to discredit and isolate the US on the
over-all issue as well as concerning those off-
shore islands remaining in Nationalist hands.
Over a long period of time, and depending upon
the resolution with which the posited US policy
was maintained, they might be tempted to put
US intentions to test. For the short term, how-
ever, the risk of war in the Far East would have
been decreased, not increased."
The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Department of the Army, believe that paragraph
3 should read as follows: "The Chinese Commu-
nists would probably not take action that they
believed would lead to full-scale war with the
US, but they would be unlikely to believe that
the seizure of any offshore island, even if the US
has indicated it would defend the island, would
lead to full-scale war. They would probably not
be deterred by fear of a purely local involvement.
If, therefore, the Chinese Communists estimated
that they had the capability quickly to overrun
any of the offshore islands, they would probably
attempt to use that capability. In any event,
they would probably continue probing action and
attempts to subvert the garrison."
4F-G-P?S-rt"nrE"r-
TCONFIDENTIA4
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the Communists will probably become inceas-
ingly impatient and less cautious in their
actions. However, they would almost cer-
tainly refrain from actions that they believed
would lead to full-scale war with the US, but
the danger would remain that Pei'ping might
miscalculate the extent of US reaction. 5 6
5. If US forces should launch major attacks
against mainland targets, the Chinese Com-
munists would probably counter with their
full remaining capabilities against the attack-
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes that the last sentence should read
as follows: "While they would probably refrain
from action that they believed would lead to
full-scale war, they might miscalculate the cir-
cumstances that would bring about US reaction.
Should this occur, the nature and extent of this
reaction would presumably be sufficiently vig-
orous to discourage early repetition of such a
venture."
6 The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Department of the Army, believe that, in spite of
US guarantees and the threat of involvement in
conflict with the US, the Chinese Communists
sooner or later might take military action, not
as a result of miscalculations, against Nation-
alist-held offshore islands, and would, therefore,
rephrase the last sentence as follows: "They
would not be likely to take actions that they
were convinced would lead to full-scale war with
the US. However, if they believed that they had
the capability quickly to overrun one or more of
3
ing forces and bases from which attacks were
launched. If the US became involved in large-
scale fighting with Communist China, Pei'ping
would probably do all in its power to make
the Sino-Soviet treaty operative. The USSR
would almost certainly try to keep the hostili-
ties under control but in the last analysis
would give the Chinese Communists what-
ever local military support appeared neces-
sary to preserve the Sino-Soviet alliance and
prevent the destruction of the regime.7
the defended islands, the Chinese Communists
might well attempt to exercise their estimated
capability."
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, would substitute the following after the
first sentence: "It should be expected that Chi-
nese Communist capabilities would be materially
impaired in the course of the action that would
ensue. Under these circumstances, the Chinese
Communists would look to Moscow and the Sino-
Soviet treaty as their remaining hope. Specific
USSR reaction would be based upon sober Soviet
judgment as to the probability of victory without
crippling damage in general war with the US.
The USSR does not now desire, nor feel that it
could win, such general war. While the USSR
might attempt to give the Chinese Communists
local military support in order to prevent the
destruction of the regime, such support would
probably therefore be confined to increased
logistic aid and to the commitment of naval, air,
and air defense forces not readily identifiable as
belonging to the USSR."
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