NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 11-7-55 SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKS ON THE US AND KEY OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS AND FORCES THROUGH 1 JULY 1958

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 23, 1955
• Content Type: NIE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
-4 N I E ) 1-7-5 5
23 June *1955
.30P-SECICI
# 032464
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-7-55
SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKS
ON THE US AND KEY OVERSEAS
INSTALLATIONS AND FORCES
THROUGH 1 JULY 1958
Ite ? -
it e t 1 ? L
JOB ?
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, the
Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 23 June 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, In-
telligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director
for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion Representative to the IAC; and the Assistant to the
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE 4 CLASS.
fl DECLASS
CLASS. CHfr',...ED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: ,111 70-
REVIEWER: 2.7-4LII
COPY NO 20?.
/ ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ONE
DATE:
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front caster and of per-
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other De-
partment or Agency
2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-
cable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange-
ment with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should
either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be re-
quested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC?D-69/2, 22
June 1953.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION:
White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Foreign Operations Administration
Operations Coordinating Board
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
_
0 P
SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKS ON THE US
AND KEY OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS AND FORCES
THROUGH 1 JULY 1958
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet gross capabilities for attack. on the US and key US overseas
installations and forces 1 as of mid-1955 and mid-1958, without taking into account
the effectiveness of allied defenses and countermeasures.
SCOPE
In planning an attack on the US and key US overseas installations and forces, the
Soviet rulers would consider such an attack in connection with their over-all strategy
for general war. Accordingly, some of their forces and materiel, including nuclear
weapons, would almost certainly be earmarked for use against US allies and for reserve.
This estimate does not consider the problem of such allocation nor, except in section
VIII, of over-all USSR strategy, but confines itself to the gross capabilities for attack
on the US and key US overseas installations and forces as indicated by the estimated
state of USSR weapons, equipment, and facilities during the period of this estimate.
In Section VIII, the probable USSR strategic objectives and methods in attacking the
continental US and key US overseas installations and forces are considered.
CONCLUSIONS
1. In attacking the US and key US over-
seas installations and forces the major
Soviet objectives would be to: (a) destroy
or neutralize as quickly as possible US
1Key US Overseas Installations and Forces: Stra-
tegic, tactical, and naval air forces and bases, in-
cluding NATO tactical forces and bases; bases
and facilities for the support of naval opera-
tions; army depots and port complexes; major
headquarters; transportation facilities, includ-
ing key bridges, tunnels, marshalling yards, and
transloading points.
continental and overseas capabilities for
nuclear retaliation; (b) deliver such an
attack on urban, industrial, political, and
psychological targets in the US as would
Location of key US Overseas Installations:
United Kingdom, Western Europe, Far East (in-
cluding Okinawa), French North Africa-Libya,
Pacific (including Hawaii and the Philippines) ,
Middle East, North Atlantic (including New-
foundland, Greenland, Labrador, and Iceland) ,
Bermuda-Azores, Alaska, and Panama Canal-
Caribbean.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET 2
prevent, or at least hinder, the mobiliza-
tion of US war potential; and (c) inflict
such destruction on US overseas installa-
tions as would hamper or prevent the US
from reinforcing or resupplying its forces.
(Para. 110)
2. The Soviet leaders would probalily_cal-
culate that in order to achieve AUcCett in
neutralizing US capabilities for nuclear
retaliation, suchattackswould have to
be accomylished aliamtd2 -
gsamstiga0consistenty-with-the-re-
quire?1,-seale-of-attaGl. _Therefore, the
USSR would endeavor to launch its initial
attack from such bases and under such
conditions as would offer the greatest
'security from detection_. (Para. 112)
3. In order to achieve the optimum de-
gree of surprise and weight in an initial
attack on the continental US, we believe
that the USSR would place chief reliance
on nuclear attacks by aircraft. This type
of attack would probably receive the
highest priority because of: (a) the
limited capabilities of naval, ground, and
airborne forces against the continental
US; (b) the security difficulties inherent
in the delivery of large numbers of nu-
clear weapons by clandestine means; (c)
the insufficient development of other
methods of delivery of nuclear weapons
on a large scale; and (d) the insufficient
development of other mass destruction
weapons, or handicaps to their large-scale
use. (Para. 113)
4. The USSR had tested by the end of
1953, small and medium-yield weapons
and has employed thermonuclear boost-
ing principles to produce an energy yield
up to 1,000 kilotons of TNT. The 1954
test series showed stockpile types in the
medium-yield range and extensive devel-
opment in the small-yield ranges, but
there was no further development in the
large-yield range. During the immediate
future, the types of weapons stockpiled
will probably have the general character-
istics and explosive powers of weapons
already tested although the quantity of
the large-yield type that could be pro-
duced would probably be limited. We
estimate that by mid-1955, ?the USSR
could have nuclear weapons with yields
ranging from 5 KT to 1,000 KT and from
mid-1956 through mid-1958 weapons with
yields ranging from 0.5 KT to 10,000 KT.
(Paras. 23, 25)
5. The areas best located geographically
for launching long-range air operations
against the US are the Kola Peninsula;
the Leningrad complex; the Chukotski
and Kamchatka areas in northeastern
Siberia; the central Arctic area; and the
Baltic-East German area. The Chukot-
ski, Kola, and Kamchatka areas are par-
ticularly advantageous as forward bases
for ssurprise attack since great circle
routes would initially avoid overflight of
nations friendly to the US. With jet
heavy bombers and inflight refueling the
USSR would still require these advanced
bases in order to launch two-way attacks
on the most distant US targets.2 The
BEAR, turbo-prop heavy bomber with one
inflight refueling, could reach any point
in the US from interior bases on two-way
missions provided great circle routes were
flown. (Paras. 39-49, 71-72, 76)
6. The BULL (TU-4) , even if modified to
increase its radius-range in a manner
similar to the US B-29 conversion and
2 There is no intelligence to indicate that the
USSR has ever employed inflight refueling.
However, its development is readily within their
technical capability.
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
sis\
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET 3
1.)
with bomb loads limited to 3,000 pounds,
still could only attack targets in the US
Pacific northwest on two-way unrefueled
missions. On one-way unrefueled mis-
sions, modified BULLS could reach al-
most all of the US. If the USSR now has
an inflight refueling capability, BULLS
with 3,000 pound bomb loads could also
conduct two-way missions against the ex-
treme northeastern tip of the US and an
area roughly northwest of an arc
through Phoenix, Kansas City, and
Chicago, providing great circle routes
were flown. (See Maps, Appendix A) .
(Para. 74)
7. No two-way missions, even with re-
fueling, could be conducted against the
US with the BADGER (Type-39) jet me-
dium bomber, unless great circle routes
from the Chukotski area were used.' On
one-way unrefueled missions with a 3,000
pound bomb load it could reach as far as
Detroit, St. Louis, and Oklahoma City
from the Chukotski area and as far as
Boston from the Kola area. On one-way
refueled missions from these areas the
BADGER could reach most of the impor-
tant industrial areas in the US. (Para.
73)
8. The BISON (Type-37) jet heavy bomb-
er on two-way refueled missions with a
10,000 pound bomb load could reach vir-
tually all targets in the US in a combina-
tion of missions from Chukotski and Kola
areas, providing direct great circle routes
were flown. If employed on one-way =-
refueled missions, they could strike all
of the US from interior bases. On two-
way unrefueled missions the BISON
Great circle routes from Kola and Chukotski
would involve refueling over US or Canadian
territory.
could reach targets roughly within an arc
through Minneapolis, Denver, and Los
Angeles from the Chukotski area but
could barely reach the northern tip of
Maine from the Kola area. (Para. 75)
9. The BEAR turbo-prop heavy bomber
on two-way refueled missions with a 10,-
000 pound bomb load could strike any
point in the US from interior bases, pro-
vided direct great circle routes were flown.
On two-way unrefueled missions the
BEAR could reach any point in the US
except that portion south of an arc
through Corpus Christi, Atlanta, and
Norfolk from the Chukotski area, but
from the Kola area could reach only north
of an arc through Seattle, Chicago, and
Richmond. From interior bases in the
Leningrad area, on two-way unrefueled
missions, the BEAR could reach the
North Eastern part of the US as far south
?
as New York, provided direct great circle
routes were flown. If employed on un-
refueled one-way missions they could
reach any point in the US. (See Map 8) .
(Para. 76)
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR AIR ATTACK
IN MID-1955
10. Present Soviet capabilities for large-
scale air attack on the continental US are
limited by the small number of operation-
al heavy bombers and by the relatively
undeveloped base facilities in the Kola,
Chukotski, Kamchatka, and other. Soviet ,
arctic areas. They are probably also -
limited by the lack of a developed inflight
refueling capability. (Para. 70)
11. Although there is a lack of sufficient
evidence to permit a firm assessment of
the capabilities of individual bases in the
Kola, Chukotski, and Kamchatka areas
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET
for staging bomber aircraft, we believe
that by a major effort, the USSR would
be capable of launching a maximum of
about 440 aircraft from these bases in an
initial attack against the US in mid-1955.
If all were committed to one-way unre-
fueled missions, approximately 350 might
reach US target areas, not considering
combat losses. We believe it almost .cer-
tain that the USSR is psychologically
capable of employing one-way missions.
If inflight refueling were available and
used about 110 of the 440 aircraft
launched would probably be tankers and
about 330 would be bombers. In this
case 250 strike aircraft might reach tar-
get areas, not considering combat losses.
Some of these aircraft would probably be
used for electronic countermeasures or
diversion. (Paras. 39, 81-84)
12. If the USSR elected to utilize all
available bases, including those in the
Baltic East German and Leningrad areas,
and thus lessen its chances of achieving
surprise it could launch a maximum of
approximately 950 aircraft in 1955 in an
initial attack on the US. However, the
great bulk of these aircraft would have to
fly one-way missions. Not considering
combat losses, approximately 750 might
reach target areas. (Paras. 81-84)
13. Assuming the launching of 330
bombers against the continental US, the
USSR would have available about 740
bombers for attacks against key US over-
seas installations and military forces and
for reattack or for other missions.
About 600 could be immediately launched
against key US overseas installations and
forces. Not considering combat losses,
approximately 500 might reach target
areas. In addition, some portion of the
2,500 jet light bombers currently estimat-
ed to be available could be used for at-
tacks against targets within their opera-
tional radius of about 600 nautical miles.
(Paras. 64, 88-89)
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR AIR ATTACK
IN MID-1958
14. By mid-1958, we estimate ?that the
USSR will have available in operational
units about 350 jet heavy bombers and
250 turbo-prop heavy bombers, and could
have a considerable inflight refueling
capability, thus giving it much greater
flexibility in launching attacks on the US
since interior bases could be used. By
this time, moreover, we estimate that the
USSR could, by a major effort, have sub-
stantially increased the capacity of the
air bases in the Kola, Chukotski, Lenin-
grad, and Kamchatka areas. (Paras. 85-
87)
15. If the USSR did in fact increase the
capacity of these base areas and elected
to use the above areas as staging bases
it could initially launch against the US,
all medium and heavy bombers in com-
mission (approximately 1,100) . If all
were committed to unrefueled missions,
thus maximizing the number of mission
aircraft, about 850 might reach target
areas, not considering combat losses.
However, exercise of this maximum capa-
bility would involve the expenditure on
one-way missions of most of the Soviet
Long-Range Aviation. (Paras. 85-87)
16. We consider it more likely that if
tanker aircraft were available the USSR
would employ them, even if it resulted in
substantially fewer mission aircraft. In
an optimum' initial strike, the USSR
might launch about 450 tankers and
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET
about 900 mission aircraft. Of the 900,
about one-half might be launched from
the Kola-Leningrad area, one-fourth
from northeast Siberia, and one-fourth
from interior bases. About 700 might
arrive in target areas, not considering
combat losses. Even under these condi-
tions, about one-third of the total
Soviet long-range bomber force would be
launched on one-way missions. A num-
ber of these mission aircraft would prob-
ably be used for electronic countermeas-
ures, or diversionary tasks. (Paras. 85-
87)
17. If by mid-1958, the USSR decided to
use only BISONS and BEARS in an initial
attack on the US, it could launch approx-
imately 500 bombers, without using for-
ward bases. Of this number approxi-
mately 380 could arrive in target areas,
not considering combat losses. To achieve
target coverage of the entire US, inflight
refueling or one-way missions would
have to be employed. (Paras. 85-87)
18. Assuming the scale of attack in para-
graph 16 above, and the commitment of
all heavy bomber aircraft against the US,
the USSR would have 300 medium bomb-
ers left, about 250 of which would be im-
mediately available for attack against key
US overseas installations and military
forces or for other missions. We also
estimate that in 1958 about 3,150 jet light
bombers will be available for attacks on
targets within their operational capabili-
ties. (Paras. 88-89)
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR OTHER FORMS
OF ATTACK
19. Throughout the period of this esti-
mate the USSR probably would employ
other methods of attacking the US or US
5
installations overseas concurrently with
or immediately following a surprise nu-
clear air attack. The USSR is techni-
cally capable of employing submarine-
launched guided missiles with nuclear
warheads against targets in coastal areas
and they could now have several long-
range submarines equipped with guided
missiles. It is also technically capable
of attacking some US overseas installa-
tions with ground-launched guided mis-
siles up to ranges of 500 miles. In addi-
tion, the USSR could employ amphibious,
airborne, and ground forces and could
attack US installations with standard
CW agents and nerve gases. (Paras. 90-
94,99-100)
20. Clandestine attack on the US itself
by sabotage, biological warfare, and
placement of nuclear weapons, could oc-
cur against specially selected targets.
Against key US overseas installations, a
considerable capability exists for espio-
nage, sabotage, and subversion. (Paras.
95-100,108)
21. The USSR could launch both nuclear
and conventional air attacks and sub-
marine attacks against US naval strike
forces. Submarines also could attack US
overseas communications and carry out
offensive mining in the shipping ap-
proaches to US and allied harbors and
ports. (Para. 103)
22. In conjunction with any Soviet air
attack on the US and key overseas in-
stallations and forces, the USSR wOdd
probably employ ground, airborne, and
amphibious forces simultaneously with or
immediately after ?the initial attacks.
Soviet ground forces, particularly in
Western Europe, already possess a high
capability for attacking allied forces and
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET 6
installations located in forward areas.
The additional employment of airborne
or amphibious forces would enable the)
I. AVAILABILITY OF SOVIET MASS
DESTRUCTION WEAPONS
Soviet ground forces to attack other
forces and installations behind the for-
ward areas. (Paras. 101-102,105-106)
DISCUSSION
\-)paPison this allocation of fissionable material
is carried through mid-1958. If the Soviet
stockpile were allocated in this manner it
would be as follows :5
23. Nuclear Weapons.4 The Soviet atomic en-
ergy program, directed primarily toward the
production of nuclear weapons, will continue
to receive special emphasis through 1958. The
USSR had tested by the end of 1953, small and
medium-yield weapons and has employed
thermonuclear boosting principles to produce
an energy yield up to 1,000 kilotons of TNT.
The 1954 test series showed stockpile types
in the medium-yield range and extensive de-
velopment in the small-yield ranges, but there
was no further development in the large-yield
range. During the immediate future, the
types of weapons stockpiled will probably
have the general characteristics and explo-
sive powers of Weapons already tested al-
though the quantity of the large yield type
that could be produced would probably be lim-
ited. Within the limits of technological capa-
bilities as of the end of 1954, Soviet military
requirements will govern the allocation of
available fissionable material to various types
of weapons, with consideration probably being
given more to operational requirements than
to the largest total energy yield attainable.
24. In order to provide an example of -Soviet
stockpile capabilities, we have assumed that:
(a) one-third of estimated uranium-235 is uti-
lized in large-yield weapons (500 to 1,000
KT) ; (b) two-thirds is utilized in medium-
yield (70 KT) composite weapons; and (c)
the remaining plutonium is divided equally
between medium-yield (40 KT) and small-
yield (5 KT) weapons. For purposes of com-
See NIE 11-2-55, Restricted Data, "The Soviet
Atomic Energy Program," dated 25 April 1955 for
details of Soviet nuclear energy program, and
specifications of types of nuclear weapons to per-
mit determination of the aircraft types in which
they can be employed.
Mid- Mid-
1955 1958
Large-yield weapons (500-1,000 KT) 15
Medium-yield weapons (40-70 KT) 320
Small-yield weapons (5 KT) 155
50
950
250
25. However, due to continued Soviet nuclear
progress, other allocations of fissionable ma-
terial might become more likely toward mid-
1958. The USSR will probably continue
work on larger-yield weapons as well as on
smaller-yield and small-dimension weapons.
We estimate that by mid-1956 the USSR
could have weapons with ranges of yields
from 0.5 KT to 10,000 KT or more. Such
developments would permit more flexibility
In the use of nuclear weapons. Assuming
such progress on the part of the Soviets, one
of the ways in which their 1958
stockpile could be divided would be as fol-
lows:
Large-yield weapons (500 to 10,000 KT)
230
Medium-yield weapons (5 to 500 KT)
440
Small-yield weapons (0.5 to 5 KT)
570
26. There is no direct information on the na-
ture of the Soviet control organization and
facilities for storage, handling, and distribu-
tion of nuclear weapons. However, we be-
lieve that Soviet nuclear weapons will be
handled by a special organization within the
In view of the range of error applicable to the
estimate of Soviet fissionable material produc-
tion, the actual figures for the end of 1955 may
be as much as one-third lower or higher than
the figures given above. Uncertainty increases
as estimates are projected into the future and
the actual figure for mid-1958 may be as low as
one-half or as high as twice the figures given in
the table.
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
r.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET 7
Ministry of Defense and will be stored at both
a few large reserve-stockpile storage sites and
a large number of smaller sites. These small
sites will probably be located at or near air-
fields, guided missile sites, and other delivery
vehicle installations in advanced areas.
27. Radiological Warfare. It is most unlike-
ly, for technological reasons, that the USSR
will be able to stockpile militarily significant
quantities of radiological warfare weapons
during the period of this estimate. How-
ever, the significance of radioactive fall-out
following large nuclear explosions 'should be
considered in connection with Soviet capa-
bilities to produce explosions in the megaton
range.
28. Biological Warfare. The USSR is in pos-
session of all the necessary basic knowledge
for the production of most BW agents and ef-
fective dissemination devices. If the Soviets
chose to do so, they .would be able to produce
BW agents and devices for dissemination in
adequate numbers. Although there is some
evidence to indicate the USSR is engaged in
a BW program, agent production has not
been identified either as to location or type.
Since it is not feasible to stockpile large quan-
tities of most BW agents in prolonged stor-
age, most operational requirements would
have to be supplied directly from production
facilities.
29. Chemical Warfare. We assume that the
stockpile of standard agents and munitions
accumulated during World War II has been
maintained and will be available for use. In-
telligence indicated that the Soviets could
have been producing at least one of the nerve
gases since 1949, and we estimate that the
USSR is capable of employing nerve gases.
II. DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL AND
MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS
BY AIRCRAFT
Strength of Soviet Long-Range Aviation
30. In mid-1955, Soviet Long-Range ,Aviation
will have an estimated over-all authorized
strength (TO&E) of 1,600 aircraft, including
1,160 BULL (TU-4) piston medium bombers,
200 BADGER (Type 39) jet medium bombers,
20 BISON (Type 37) jet heavy bombers, 20
BEAR (turbo-prop heavy bombers) , and
200 twin-engined piston transports. The es-
timated actual strength of this bomber force
in mid-1955 will be 1,000 BULL, 130 BADGER,
and up to 20 BISON and 20 BEAR aircraft.6
All units are based in Western USSR except
the 3rd Long-Range Air Army, with an author-
ized strength of 224 aircraft, which is located
in the Far East.
31. No substantial change in the authorized
strength of approximately 1,600 aircraft
(1,400 bombers) is expected between now and
mid-1958. We estimate that the USSR will
probably not introduce into operational units
through mid-1958 any bomber types which
have not already appeared either in units or
in prototype stage.
32. The appearance during April of as many
as 13 BISONS at rehearsals for the May 1st
air show indicates a significant increase in
Soviet heavy bomber production over that pre-
viously estimaied. The BISON was first seen
inflight in the spring of 1954 and considered
as a prototype at that time. With the appear-
ance of BISONS and BEARS at this time, we
conclude that production go-ahead on the
BISON occurred about January 1952, the first
production model was produced in the first
quarter of 1954, and approximately 40 will
have been produced by 1 July 1955. Present
evidence indicates that it is being produced at
Plant No. 23 in Moscow. It is estimated that
the USSR could achieve a maximum peak rate
of 15 per month at this plant by January 1957.
It is more probable, however, due to problems
associated with supply of equipment, subcon-
tracting, and training of personnel for accept-
ance in operating units that a production rite
of about 8-10 per month would be initiated.
33. It is also possible that other plants could
now be producing the BISON and that the
Throughout this estimate, estimated actual
strengths have been used for 1955 while TO&E
figures have been used for mid-1958. Actual air-
craft strengths should be considered in arriving
at Soviet attack capabilities. However, the rela-
tion of actual aircraft to TO&E is subject to con-
siderable variance and cannot be accurately pre-
dicted for future years. By 1958 actual strength
will probably equal TO&E strength.
TOP SECRET
- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET 8
planned production rate could be as high as
20-30 per month. Similar analysis of BEAR
production has not been made at this time.
The USSR could have up to 20 BISONS and
20 BEARS in operational units by mid-1955
and, based upon tentative production esti-
mates, by mid-1958 could have about 350
BISONS and 250 BEARS in operational units.
ESTIMATED OPERATIONAL STRENGTH
OF LONG-RANGE AVIATION'
Type
Mid-1955
Mid-1958
BULL
1,000
100
BADGER
130
700
BISON
20
350
BEAR
20
250
There is no firm intelligence on the planned
balance between 'the types and categories of
long-range aircraft or on their future authorized
organizational aircraft strengths; the above
figures represent our estimate of the most prob-
able way in which Soviet Long-Range Aviation
would be proportioned during the period and
is predicated on the assumptions: (a) that no
change will occur in the total authorized number
of aircraft in long-range units; (b) that the
BEAR turbo-prop heavy bomber is currently in
series production; and (c) that the USSR is de-
voting a major aircraft production effort to the
development of a massive intercontinental attack
capability.
34. Inf light Refueling. We have no intelli-
gence that the USSR has ever employed, in-
flight refueling. However, inflight refuel-
ing techniques do not impose serious techni-
cal problems and the USSR has had access
to the wartime techniques and equipment
employed by the US in this field. It is
known to have evinced interest in Western
demonstrations of refueling techniques, and
refueling methods have been discussed in So-
viet technical literature. It is therefore de-
sirable to consider the effect of inflight- re-
fueling when assessing the maximum possi-
ble ranges of Soviet bombers. However, pro-
duction of a fleet of tanker aircraft, modifi-
cation of mission aircraft fuel systems, and
appreciable training in their operational use
would be necessary before missions involving
inflight refueling could be conducted. The
establishment of tanker units would require
the conversion of bomber types or production
of new tanker aircraft. The new turbo-prop
aircraft sighted in the fly-by rehearsals could
probably be utilized in this role. Since BULL
strength in operational use is estimated to de-
crease with the introduction of jet bombers,
numerous BULLS would be available for con-
version to tankers. We also estimate that the
USSR will have developed by the end of 1955
a four-engined jet transport which could
readily be modified as a tanker aircraft.
35. Performance Characteristics of Soviet Air-
craft. The radii-ranges and other perform-
ance data which are estimated for the various
Soviet bomber types\ are given in Tables I and
II appearing on pages 9 and 10.,
Base Areas for Air Attack on the US
36. In all, there are some 334 operational air-
fields in the Sino-Soviet Bloc with runways
as indicated below:
MINIMUM RUNWAY LENGTHS
(in feet)
8,000
7,000
6,000 5,000 Total
USSR
4
0
30
94
128
European Satellites
44
30
34
4
112
Communist China and
North Korea
1
3
39
51
94
Totals
49
33
103
149
334
Of these, approximately 50 are estimated to
be part of the base structure of Soviet Long-
Range Aviation, which includes home bases,
command and/or training bases, factory ba-
ses, and testing and development bases. Most
of these bases are concentrated in the cen-
tral portion of the Western USSR.
37. A serious gap exists in current knowl-
edge of runway development at airfields iden-
tified as home bases for operational Long-
Range Aviation units equipped with BULL or
BADGER aircraft. However, in areas where
Soviet airfields development can be observed
easily, such as the European Satellites, the So-
viets have shown themselves fully cognizant
of runway requirements and have actually
provided more than adequate runway lengths.
Assuming similar construction practices in
the USSR, we, ?stimate that concrete run-
ways at -BULL home bases have been devel-
oped to lengths between 7,800 and 8,200 feet.
Such runways would pernfit take-off of,B,VLL
aircraft.over a 50 foot obstacle at maximum
gross take-Off weights.
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET 9
Conditions
Combat Radius/
Range (nm)
a. 10,000 lb. load
. one refuel 6
b. 3,000 lb. load
one refuel
Speed/Altitude
a. Max. speed
b. Target speed
Combat Ceiling
TABLE I
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT
(Calculated in accordance with US military mission profiles)1
MODIFIED IMPROVED
BULL BULL BADGER BADGER BISON
(TU-4) (TU-4) 2 (Type 39) 1957 8 (Type 37) 4
2,000/3,600
1,500/2,900
1,900/3,700
2,750/5,300
1,700/3,100
2,400/4,300
2,800/5,000
2,100/4,000
2,660/5,180
3,800/7,300
1,950/3,500
2,300/4,100
1,700/3,300
2,100/4,200
2,850/5,500
2,750/4,900
3,200/5,700
2,400/4,600
2,940/5,880
3,900/7,500
(kn/ft.)
350/30,000
360/30,000
535/15,000
550/12,500
05/19,000
- 350/30,000
360/30,000
475/41,000
470/43,000
475/44,500
(ft)
36,500 37,500 43,500 43,500
48,000
'Firm estimates of performance characteristics of the BEAR aircraft are not available although pre-
liminary estimates indicate a combat radius/range of 3,700/7,200 nautical miles and an optimum radius
of 4,000 nautical miles with a 10,000 lb. bomb load, a combat altitude of 40,000 feet and a maximum
speed of 470 knots at 35,000 feet.
'The BULL could be modified in a manner similar to the US B-29B conversion to increase its range.
However, we have no indications that this has been or will be done.
8 The improved BADGER performance is based upon estimated installation of improved engines with a
thrust of 20,500 lbs.
4Based upon estimated installation of 20,500 lb. thrust engines. Previous estimates indicated these en-
gines would not be available until 1956. The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes engine develop-
ment has probably kept pace with the aircraft, and that 20,500 lb. thrust engines could be available at
the present time.
5 Refueling radius/range estimates based upon the use of compatible tankers.
? The altitude at which rate of climb of 500 ft/min. can be maintained at the end of the given combat
radius of the aircraft.
)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET
a
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET 10
TABLE II
ESTIMATED MAXIMUM SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE
UNDER A MODIFIED MISSION PROFILE 1
(Calculated in accordance with maximum US military mission profiles except that
fuel reserves are reduced to permit a maximum of 30 minutes loiter at sea level, and
aircraft operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius/range.)
Conditions
Combat/Radius
Range (nm)
a. 10,000 lb. load
one refuel.5
b. 3,000 lb. load
one refuel.
Speed/Altitude (1m/ft)
a. Max. speed
b. Target speed
Combat Ceiling ?
(ft) 36,500 37,500 43,500 43,500 48,000
BULL
(TU-4)
MODIFIED
BULL 2
(TU-4)
BADGER
(Type 39)
IMPROVED
BADGER
1957
BISON
(Type 37) 4
1,800/3,300
2,150/4,000
1,600/3,100
2,050/4,000
3,100/6,100
2,500/4,500
3,000/5,600
2,200/4,300
2,870/5,600 ?
4,300/8,100
2,050/3,700
2,450/4,600
1,850/3,700
2,300/4,500
3,200/6,400
2,850/5,100
3,450/6,450
2,250/5,000
3,220/6,300
4,300/8,200
350/30,000
360/30,000
535/15,000
550/12,500
535/19,000
350/30,000
360/30,000
475/42,000
470/43,500
475/45,500
'Firm estimates of performance characteristics of the BEAR aircraft are not available although pre-
liminary estimates indicate a combat radius/range of 3,700/7,200 nautical miles and an optimum
radius of 4,000 nautical miles with a 10,000 lb. bomb load, a combat altitude of 40,000 feet and a maxi-
mum speed of 470 knots at 35,000 feet.
"The BULL could be modified in a manner similar to the US B-29B conversion to increase its range.
However, we have no indications that this has been or will be done.
a The improved BADGER performance is based upon estimated installation of improved engines with a
thrust of 20,500 lbs.
Based upon estimated installation of 20,500 lb. thrust engines. Previous estimates indicated these en-
gines would not be available until 1956. The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes engine develop-
ment has probably kept pace with the aircraft, and that 20,500 lb. thrust engines could be available at
the present time.
5 Refueling radius/range estimates based upon the use of compatible tankers.
5 The altitude at which rate of climb of 500 ft/min. can be maintained at the end of the given combat
radius of the aircraft.
Estimated maximum target altitudes (100 ft/min. rate of climb) for the BISON
and BADGER on one-way missions, one hour of fuel remaining, bomb load aboard
and with maximum power, are as follows:
BISON BADGER IMPROVED BADGER
Bomb load (lbs) (altitude ft.) (altitude ft.) (altitude ft.)
20,000
55,100
10,000
56,300
49,500
51,500
3,000
57,200
51,000
53,000
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET 11
38. Little if any modification of this base
structure would be required for the use of
BISON heavy bombers or BADGER medium
bombers. The BISON at a gross take-off
weight of 365,000 lbs is estimated to require
a ground run of approximately 5,300 feet, and
8,200 feet to clear a 50 foot obstacle; the BAD-
GER at a gross take-off weight of 150,000 lbs.
requires a ground run of only 4,200 feet, and
6,300 feet to clear a 50 foot obstacle. The
ground run required for BEAR is probably
somewhat less than that required for the
BISON.
39. Owing to the range limitations of avail-
able bomber aircraft, the launching of strikes
against North America in 1955 probably
would be limited to operations staged through
one or more of six base areas within Soviet-
controlled territory ? the Chukotski Penin-
sula, the Kola Peninsula, the Central Arctic
area, Kamchatka area, the Leningrad area,
and the Baltic-East German area. ?Even the
BISON-jet heavy bomber would have to be
launched from these areas in order to hit
important US targets unless refueled in-
flight or employed on one-way missions. Air-
fields exist in all of these areas although
Long-Range Aviation units are stationed on-
ly in the Leningrad area. There is a lack of
sufficient evidence to permit a firm assess-
ment of the capabilities of individual airfields
in the forward staging areas particularly or
their suitability for long-range bomber opera-
tion. However, we believe that some of the
airfields in the forward staging areas have
at least minimal facilities for long-range
bomber operations.
40. Major construction projects would be re-
quired in all Soviet potential forward staging
areas (except the Baltic East German area)
to improve present staging capabilities for in-
tercontinental strikes. It is estimated that,
with only the construction facilities and per-
sonnel now available in the area concerned, by
mid-1958 three new airfields suitable for such
operations could be developed in the Kola and
Leningrad areas and two in each of the other
forward areas ? Chukotski, Central Arctic,
and Kamchatka. Minor improvement of
support facilities at already existing potential
staging bases in these areas could also be car-
ried out simultaneously without detracting
from the construction effort. In the Baltic-
East German area, only minor additional con-
struction and development of air facilities
would be required.
41. Chukotski Peninsula. As the result of
runway construction believed to have been
carried out at several airfields withii3. the past
two years, we believe at least foie airfields
probably now have runways adequate2Lor
staging medium bombers and at least one of
these is suitable for heavy bomber operations.
Military air units are based on some of these
airfields but none are subordinate to Long-
Range Aviation.
42. Air operations in this area are made dif-
ficult by, several factors. Construction of
permanent-surfaced runways suitable for
bomber operations is difficult (here and in
the Central Arctic) owing to the permafrost
problem, but the USSR has almost certainly
learned to solve this difficulty through fro-
zen soil studies and experiments conducted
since World War _II. They have also consist-
ently used ice and snow-impacted runways.
Cold, wind, snow, and fog, prevalent through-
out the area, also tend to make operations dif-
ficult and hazardous. The lack of modern
navigational aids hampers operations, but
there are some indications that the USSR is
steadily improving its operational potential
through installation of modern radio naviga-
tion facilities. In addition the USSR has an
ever-increasing fund of Arctic experience
which could be applied to staging operations
in this area.
43. The status of base logistical support facil-
ities required to stage long-range strike oper-
ations from the Chukotski area is unknown.
The area is accessible only by air and sea and
supply problems would be difficult. How-
ever, the USSR is considered capable of stock-
piling the necessary supplies. The area's
staging potential could be increased by using
construction facilities already available to im-
prove existing facilities or develop new instal-
lations. No additional construction units
and equipment would be required in the area
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET
to build two additional concrete surfaced run-
ways, 6,000 to 8,000 feet in length, between
now and mid-1958.
44. Kola Pfninsula. The Kola Peninsula has
at least five bases believed adequate for stag-
ing operations of medium bombers at maxi-
mum gross weights, provided the Soviets ac-
cepted a reduced safety margin on take-off
for the BULL. One other airfield is con-
sidered to be suitable for use on an emergen-
cy basis, but its extremely isolated location,
plus its apparent lack of recent development
or utilization, argue against its use as a stag-
ing base. At least four of these airfields
would be adequate for heavy _jet bombers at
maximum take-off weights if reduced safety
margins were accepted. Permanent-sur-
faced runways can be constructed through-
out the area without difficulty as it is rela-
tively free of permafrost. Prevailing climat-
ic conditions, while a restrictive factor on air
operations, are relatively more favorable than
in other regions of the Soviet Far North.
45. The status of base logistical support fa-
cilities required to conduct long range bomb-
er strikes from airfields in this area is un-
known, but it is considered that logistics
would not be a limiting factor of consequence.
Supply routes by rail and road are open to the
Kola Peninsula on a year-round basis, al-
though logistic support of large-scale air op-
erations would still pose difficulties under ex-
treme weather conditions. Moreover, the
staging potential of the area could be in-
creased by using already available airfield con-
struction unith to improve existing substand-
ard fields? or develop new installations. No
additional construction' capability would be
required in order to build three additional
concrete-surfaced runways 6,000 to 8,000 feet
in length between now and mid-1958.
46. Central Arctic. Firm information as to
the exact status of airfield development in
this area is lacking, but airfield construction
has been in progress since early 1949:Al-
though the program was carried out for the
Directorate of Polar Aviation of the Northern
Sea Route Administration, the airfields built
are estimated to have at least a limited stag-
ing capability for medium and heavy bomb-
12
ers. However, climatic conditions and logis-
tic support factors are relatively unfavorable.
Five airfields are known in this area and ad-
ditional fields probably exist.
47. Leningrad. This area contains at least
three home bases of Long-Range Aviation
units equipped with BULL aircraft which are
presently suitable for heavy jet bomber op-
erations. With available construction units
already in this area the base potential could
be increased without difficulty since five ad-
ditional airfields in the area have concrete
runways at least 6,000 feet in length, and 11
other airfields have runways in excess of 5,000
feet. With a minimum of additional con-
struction, these fields could be made suitable
for jet heavy bomber operations. None of
these additional bases, however, are known to
be associated currently with Long-Range
Aviation operations. Operations from this
area by long-range aircraft would offer the
advantage of a temperate climate and goo
logistic support. If overflight of the Scan-
dinavian area were to be avoided on an at-
tempted strike against the United States, a
dog-leg of about 600 to 750 nautical miles
over the Kola Peninsula area would be neces-
sary.
48. Kamchatka-Sea of Okhotsk area. Four
airfields in this area have runways which
would permit ground runs of at least 5,000
feet. One of these airfields is considered ad-
equate for medium bombers at maximum
gross weights, provided reduced safety mar-
gins were accepted for BULLS. However, the
other three could be used by BULLS with re-
duced take-off weights and by BADGERS pro-
viding lower safety margins were accepted.
For this reason long-range capabilities from
this area are estimated to be extremely limit-
ed but facilities could be developed to accom-
modate medium and heavy bomber operations
by mid-1958.
49. Baltic-East Germany. Poland and the
Soviet Zone of Germany have a total- of at
least 60 airfields from which medium and
heavy bomber operations could be mounted
against the US and US bases in Western Eu-
rope. However, a disadvantage of this area
as a base for air attacks on North America
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET 13
is that great circle routes from the area to the
US pass over friendly nations. In addition,
it would be more difficult to maintain secu-
rity of preparations for attacks than in other
forward base areas. However, climatic con-
ditions are most favorable and there are no
logistics problems. This base complex is
served adequately by all types of transporta-
tion.
Climatic Suitability of Staging Areas'
50. Chukotski Peninsula. The least favor-
able conditiOns occur during November
through March. The most favorable condi-
tions occur at all stations during the spring
and early summer. The weather in the in-
terior is highly favorable weather during the
summer months. Only those areas adja-
cent to the Chuckchee Sea or which lie along
the Bering Sea coast experience a relatively
high percentage of unfavorable conditions
during the midsummer months.
51. Kola Peninsula. In general the most fa-
vorable conditions occur in the late spring and
early summer. In late summer and early
autumn conditions are favorable at most sta-
tions except those adjacent to the cold waters
of the White Sea. During May through Oc-
tober conditions are favorable over 90 per-
cent of the time at all locations. In winter
conditions are slightly less favorable due to
the more frequent occurrence of low ceilings
and poor visibilities. Extremely cold tem-
peratures are relatively infrequent, less than
10 percent at any station.
52. Central Arctic. This area has by far the
most unfavorable weather of all the areas
7In order to estimate the seasonal suitability of
average weather conditions in potential staging
areas, the percentage frequency of occurrence
of those conditions which would seriously handi-
cap or altogether prohibit the mass movement
of aircraft into or out of the staging areas was
computed. Two conditions were selected as a
basis for analysis: (1) ceiling/visibility less than
300 feet/1 mile; and (2) temperature below
-20?F. The occurrence of either of these con-
ditions was considered to present a situation un-
favorable for staging operations, although stag-
ing operations could be carried out successfully
in temperatures below -20?F with adequate prep-
arations.
considered. Bad weather occurs most fre-
quently ,in the cold months of the year, No-
vember through April, when 40 to 60 percent
of all hours are unfavorable. Even the sum-
mer months are not entirely favorable due to
the high frequency of fog in the coastal belt.
However, locations somewhat protected from
the sea would probably experience a much
higher percentage of favorable conditions
than the coastal airfields now existing. The
major handicap to winter operations arises
from the frequency and persistence of ex-
tremely cold temperatures. For example, at
Tiksi over 50 percent of all observations dur-
ing January record temperatures lower than
-20? F.
53. Leningrad. The stations in this area
have the most favorable weather during the
late spring and summer, when about 97 to 99
percent of the time is favorable for operations.
Even during autumn and winter 88 to 90
percent of the weather is favorable at all sta-
tions. There appears to be little difference
between nighttime and daytime weather ex-
cept during September, October, and Novem-
ber. During these months reduced visibility
sometimes occurs during the early morning
hours, but this condition obtains in only four
to six percent of the 0700 observations. Tem-
peratures below -20? F occur less than five per-
cent of the time at all stations.
54. Kamchatka-Sea of Okhotsk area. The
weather in this area is relatively favorable for
air operations. Throughout the year the
weather on the east coast of Kamchatka Pen-
insula is the most favorable in the entire area.
In the Magadan area the best weather occurs
during the early spring and autumn.
55. Baltic-East Germany. The stations lo-
cated in the Baltic coastal area are most suit-
able for air operations during April through
August, when favorable conditions occur
about 97 percent of the time, both day and
night. The least favorable period is during
the winter, December through March, when
the frequency of favorable conditions drop to
about 75 to 78 percent. However, the un-
favorable conditions occur most often during
the night and early morning hours. Midday
and midafternoon hours remain favorable for
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET
operations about 85 to 90 percent of the time.
Very low temperatures are extremely rare in
this area.
Other Factors Affecting Soviet Bomber
Capabilities Against the US
56. Navigation. The USSR has available
through open sources virtually complete tar-
get and navigation data on North America
and its approach routes. It is even probable
that in the event of a surprise attack certain
Western electronic navigational .aids would
be available during at least part of the flight.
Similarly, meteorological reports, including
profile data at all altitudes, are regularly
broadcast in the United States and Canada in
simple cipher. We estimate that Soviet
blind-bombing and navigational radar equip-
ment is capable of equal or better performance
than the US World War II equipment which
the USSR acquired. It is also possible that
clandestinely placed navigational beacons
may be used for aircraft homing. The cur-
rent Soviet training program points to con-
tinuing improvement in air crew proficiency.
57. In addition to the basic navigational skills
of pilotage, dead reckoning, celestial naviga-
tion and radio navigation, it is believed that
Soviet Long-Range Aviation is receiving train-
ing in the use of more advanced systems and
techniques. Although we have no evidence
of long range training flights at interconti-
nental distances, some Soviet crews are prob-
ably capable of navigation to the most diffi-
cult assigned targets while all trained Soviet
crews are probably capable of navigating with
sufficient accuracy to reach such targets as
major US cities and industrial centers.
58. The bombing proficiency of Long-Range
Aviation units is believed to be below the
standard of the US SAC. We believe they
are currently able to achieve CEP accuracies
of about 1,400 feet for visual bombing from
30,000 feet, and 4,000-7,000 feet for radar
bombing from the same altitude. There are
indications that training standards are being
raised and we believe that bombing capabili-
ties will be materially increased by mid-1958 as
a result of better equipment and improved
training. Radar bombing CEP accuracies
14
in 1958 with jet bombers are estimated at 1,500
feet at 30,000 feet against well defined targets
and at 3,000 feet at the same altitude against
difficult targets.
59. Availability and Abort Rate. Mainte-
nance of Soviet aircraft, although below US
standards, has improved since World War II.
We estimate the USSR is now capable of
achieving in the forward staging areas a serv-
iceability rate of 80 percent for an initial,
deliberately prepared surprise attack against
North America and of increasing this rate to
85 percent by mid-1958 owing to greater use
of jet aircraft and improved operating condi-
tions at forward bases. The serviceability
rate for long-range bombers is estimated at
about 40 percent for sustained operations.
Cold weather operations would probably cause
some reduction in the foregoing figures. In
addition, some of the aircraft taking off would
abort and fail to reach target areas for rea-
sons other than our air defense activity. The
allowance for aborts and losses from all caus-
es (including use of marginal bases, gross er-
rors in navigation, mechanical failure, etc.)
other than combat attrition is estimated at
about 20 percent for nonrefueled and 25 per-
cent for refueled missions.
60. Replacement Rate. No appreciable re-
serves of BULL (TU-4) bombers are believed
to exist at the present time. Those which
are phased out of operational units with the
introduction of new jet bombers will become
available as a reserve unless converted for
tanker use or other special purposes. There
will be no appreciable reserves of any of the
new bomber types introduced during the pe-
riod of this estimate.
61. Weather Forecasting. The USSR has for
years devoted considerable emphasis to both
short-period and long-period meteorological
forecasting and has achieved a high degree of
success. We believe that it has the forecast-
ing capability to support long-range air op-
erations. This capability plus extensive ex-
perience in meteorological research in the ex-
treme northern latitudes, weather reporting
facilities in Siberia and on ice floes in the Cen-
tral Arctic basin, and constant access to cur-
rent North American weather reports and
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET 15
forecasts should enable the USSR to predict
both route and target weather with reason-
able accuracy. We estimate that Soviet ca-
pabilities in upper air research and in the
more complex phases of meteorological in-
strumentation are somewhat less than those
of the US; however, the Soviets have the
technical capability to overcome these defi-
ciencies within a few years.
62. Electronic Countermeasures. The USSR
has had access to several types of World War
II US defensive radar and to some US jam-
ming equipment. It is apparently well
aware of the tactical advantage to be gained
by jamming defensive radar and communica-
tions. We believe that the USSR is now tech-
nically capable of producing limited quanti-
ties of ground based and airborne jamming
equipment to cover frequencies through
10,000 megacycles and, by use of ground-
based equipment, to seriously disrupt long-
range radio communications between the US
and its overseas facilities. Between now and
mid-1958, the USSR will probably further
increase the effectiveness of its jamming
equipment as well as the proficiency and num-
ber of its trained personnel. The USSR has
probably already produced sufficient counter-
measure devices to equip some aircraft for
jamming or spoofing defensive radars and
ground/air fighter control communications in
use at the present time for the defense of
North America. The effectiveness of Soviet
countermeasures will depend on their degree
of success in analysis of signal radiations and
in other means of obtaining technical data on
the defense radar that will then be in use.
Use of jamming equipment probably would
require the employment of extra aircraft
equipped specially for this purpose.
Factors Affecting Air Attacks Against Key
US Overseas Installations and
Military Forces
63. Aircraft. In addition to the long-range
bombers discussed above, the BUTCHER
(IL-28) and BOSUN (TU-14) jet light ,
bombers are capable of carrying out attacks
on many key US overseas installations and
forces abroad. The BUTCHER is the stand-
ard light bomber of the Air Force of the So-
viet Army. The BOSUN, currently operation-
al in Soviet Naval Aviation, is believed to in-
corporate special features to carry out naval
missions such as torpedo attacks 'and mine-
laying as well as bombing.
ESTIMATED JET LIGHT BOMBER STRENGTH
IN OPERATIONAL UNITS
Mid-1955
Mid-1958
Air Force of Soviet Army
1,900
2,300
Naval Aviation
600
850
Total
2,500
3,100
64. During 1956 the USSR may also have
operational an improved jet light bomber, per-
haps a twin-turbojet swept-wing bomber. In
addition, the performance of BUTCHER and
ESTIMATED 1955-1958 P,ERFOR1VIANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET JET
LIGHT BOMBERS
Type
Bomb
Load
(lbs)
Combat Radius/Range
(nm/nm)
Max. Spd./Alt.
(kn/ft)
Combat
Ceiling
(ft.)
BUTCHER (IL-28)
a. Internal fuel
4,400
590/1,165
440/30,000
37,000
b. Internal fuel
6,600
570/1,100
440/30,000
37,000
c. External fuel
4,400
690/1,365
440/30,000
37,000
d. External fuel
4,400
595/1,180
450/sea level
low level
attack
BOSUN (TU-14)
a. Internal fuel
4,400
765/1,510
455/30,000
39,500 '
b. Internal fuel
2,000
700/1,390
465/sea level
low level
attack
New Jet Light Bomber
1956
4,400
800/1,500
500/35,000
48,000
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET 16
BOSUN may be improved during the period
of this estimate by the installation of higher-
thrust engines. By 1958 we estimate that
BOSUN will have been phased out of opera-
tional service and replaced by either BUTCH-
ER or the new light bomber.
65. The 334 Sino-Soviet airfields previously
mentioned in paragraph 26 are all estimated
to be suitable for jet light bombers. We be-
lieve that this large number of airfields would
permit light bomber attacks against most key
US overseas installations and forces. (See
Map 7) . From bases in East Germany, So-
viet jet light bombers on two-way missions
could reach the entire North Sea area, the
UK and its northern and western approaches
(including the Faroes) , France and its west-
ern approaches, and northeastern Spain.
From bases in Hungary these aircraft could
reach into the Mediterranean up to an arc
drawn southwest of Sardinia and Sicily. From
the southern USSR, they could reach an area
north of an arc Crete-Israel-Kuwait. Jet
light bombers based in the Vladivostok and
Dairen areas could reach all of Japan. To
reach Okinawa and Luzon on two-way mis-
sions, they would have to stage from bases
in Communist China.
66. From bases in the USSR, the BULL
(TU-4) , if modified, on two-way missions
could reach key US installations in the UK,
Western Europe, Iceland, Greenland, the
Azores, French North Africa, Libya, the Mid-
dle East, Japan, Okinawa, Alaska, Guam, and
the northern Philippines. To reach key in-
stallations beyond these areas, BULLS would
have to resort to inflight refueling or one-way
missiohs. Jet medium bombers from bases
in the USSR could reach all the above areas
except southern Greenland (marginal against
Thule), the Azores, Guam, and the Philip-
pines. Jet heavy bombers on two-way mis-
sions from bases in the USSR could reach key
US installations in the UK, Western Europe,
Far East including Okinawa, French North
Africa-Libya, the Philippine and Mariana Is-
lands, Middle East, Greenland, Iceland, and
the northeastern coast of Labrador, the
Azores, and Alaska. The BISON could reach
the Panama Canal on one-way unrefueled
missions. The BULL and BADGER could
reach the Panama Canal on one-way mission
only if inflight refueling were employed.
67. Bombing Accuracy. The factors discussed
in paragraph 49 for long-range operations
apply equally to Soviet air attacks against
key US installations overseas. In addition,
radar bombing by BUTCHER jet light bomb-
ers has been carried out using equipment with
characteristics similar to the US AN/APS-15
type radar. BUTCHER units in East Ger-
many are known to have practiced bombing
at night and during instrument weather con-
ditions and other jet light bomber units prob-
ably also carry out such training. We esti-
mate that jet light bomber crews could
achieve, at the present time, CEP accuracies
on the order of 1,400 feet for visual bombing
from 30,000 feet, and 4,000-7,000 feet radar
bombing from the same altitude. If the
SHORAN type navigation system was em-
ployed as a bomb control system, at a range
of 100 nautical miles from the ground installa-
tion, bombing accuracies of about plus or
minus 100 feet could be achieved. Soviet
ground fire control radar (similar to the US
SCR 584) could be used with appropriate
modifications to develop a precise short-range
bombing system (similar to the US MPQ-2).
This system would have a range of 15-20 nau-
tical miles.
68. Availability, Abort Rate, Replacement
Factors. The factors previously discussed
for long-range bombers apply generally to
light bombers. A serviceability rate of 90
percent by mid-1958 for initial attacks from
areas other than the forward northern bases,
is considered possible because of the better
facilities and logistic support in these areas.
The sustained serviceability rate for jet light
bombers is estimated to be about 50 percent.
No reserves of jet light bombers are believed
to exist at present, nor is an appreciable re-
serve likely -to be built up between now and
mid-1958.
69. Electronic Countermeasures. The Soviet
ECM capabilities previously discussed apply
also to bomber attacks against key US over-
seas installations. However, Soviet require-
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET 17
ments for ECM would probably be less because
of the less elaborate defenses around most of
these installations and the shorter times re-
quired to penetrate defenses before targets
are reached. Space and weight limitations
would probably preclude present Soviet jet
light bombers from carrying ECM equipment
(except for chaff) in addition to bomb loads.
However, the USSR has the technical capabili-
ty to produce a jet light bomber with both
passive listening and active jamming elec-
tronic equipment and probably have some air-
craft equipped for this purpose.
III. PROBABLE GROSS SOVIET
CAPABILITIES FOR AIR ATTACK
ON THE US
70. Present Soviet capabilities for air attack
on the continental US are limited by the rela-
tively small numbers of operational heavy
bombers and the relatively undeveloped base
facilities in forward areas. They are also
probably limited by the lack of a developed
inflight refueling capability. The forward
base capacities will continue to be important
during the period of this estimate, but as the
number of BEARS increase, the forward base
capacities will be less important in determin-
ing the number of aircraft which could be
launched at one time, in an intercontinental
attack. The increase in numbers of the BISON
and BEAR heavy bombers, continued Long-
Range Aviation training programs, develop-
ment of an inflight refueling capability and
extensive improvement of the forward staging
areas would result in a substantial increase in
Soviet capabilities for attack on the US by
mid-1958.
71. Base Capacity. The USSR has the capa-
bility of launching its entire long-range bomb-
er force against the United States from bases
within Soviet-dominated territory. However,
at the beginning of the period this could be
done only if bases in the Baltic-East German
area were used in addition to those within
the USSR. This area is not a likely choice
for initial strike operations, because of the
probable loss of surprise during overflight of
Western territory and the greater likelihood
that preparations in this area would be de-
tected. However, should the USSR under-
take reattacks after an initial surprise inter-
continental strike, this base area might be
used. Use of the Central Arctic area is also
believed to be severely limited because of high-
ly unfavorable weather conditions and logistic
problems, but might be used for small num-
bers of aircraft. The Leningrad area is also
unlikely to be used for initial strikes in 1955
because of the problems involved in either
overflying or by-passing Scandinavia. There-
fore, the forward bases believed to be the most
likely Soviet choices for mouhting initial
attacks on the United States in the early
part of the period are in the Kola Peninsula,
Chukotski, and Kamchatka areas.
72. By 1958 the USSR could increase the
capacity of these three forward base areas to
the point where, together with bases in the
Leningrad area they could simultaneously
launch the entire long-range bomber force.
If tankers were used for refueling operations,
the number of strike aircraft which could be
launched from these areas would be reduced.
The employment of inflight refueling with
the BISON would permit the use of a number
of interior bases, particularly in the Leningrad
area.
73. Aircraft. The principal aircraft used for
attempting intercontinental strikes between
mid-1955 and mid-1958 would probably be the
BULL, BEAR, BISON, and BADGER. At the
beginning of the period the BULL medium
bomber would probably be the principal air-
craft used for this purpose. It would prob-
ably continue to be so used, until the BISON
and BEAR appear in strength, because of
range advantage over the BADGER. We esti-
mate that the Soviets would employ the BAD-
GER medium jet bomber only for special inter-
continental operations under circumstances
in which the use of high speed and high alti-
tudes against particular targets was con-
sidered desirable. The 1955 BADGER would
require inflight refueling even for one-way
missions for coverage of the most important
industrial areas of the US, but the improved
BADGER expected in units by 1958 will prob-
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET 18
ably have adequate range on one-way missions
to cover these areas without inflight refueling.
74. Until the development of inflight refuel-
ing, the USSR will be limited, except for a
small number of BISON and BEAR missions to
two-way missions against the extreme north-
west portion of the US even with modified
BULL aircraft or to one-way missions employ-
ing both BULL and BADGER aircraft. Inflight
refueling would permit the recovery of a small
-number of BULLS launched from the Chukot-
ski region against the northwest portion of
the US. However, even inflight refueling
would not permit two-way BULL strikes
against the major portion of US targets.8 On
the other hand, provided modified BULLS
were available and varying bomb loads were
employed, the BULL on a one-way mission
without refueling could reach virtually all US
targets in a combination of strikes launched
from Western and Eastern USSR staging
bases. (See Maps 1, 3, 5) . From these stag-
ing areas, inflight refueling would permit the
use of the present shorter range BADGER
on a one-way mission to virtually all US tar-
gets. (See Maps 2, 4, 6) .
75. In the latter part of the period, the USSR
would almost certainly place chief reliance on
the BISON and BEAR for intercontinental
attacks. On two-way missions without refuel-
ing from the Chukotski area, the BISON could
reach targets roughly within an arc through
Minneapolis, Denver, and Los Angeles. From
the Kola Peninsula the BISON could under
the same condition barely reach the northern
tip of Maine. Employing refueling and dog-
legs to avoid over-flying Alaska and Canada,
BISONS on two-way missions from the Chu-
kotski area could reach Minneapolis, Albu-
querque, and lower California. On the same
type mission from the Kola Peninsula, the
BISON could only reach within an arc
through New York and Ottawa. On one-way
missions the BISON could reach all of the US
and the Caribbean area from either of these
Only once-refueled missions have been con-
sidered because of the problems involved with
two refuelings. It is possible that toward the
end of the period the USSR might develop a
capability for twice refueled missions.
areas. If dog-legs were not employed to pre-
vent over-flying allied territory, BISONS on
refueled two-way missions could reach virtu-
ally all targets in the US in a combination of
missions from the Chukotski and Kola Penin-
sula areas. On the same type mission from
bases in the Leningrad area, the BISON
could cover the arc: Minneapolis-Chicago-
Richmond. If dog-legs were employed from
these bases only the Boston area could be
reached with BISONS on two-way refueled
missions. In general, the BISON will permit
much greater flexibility in the choice of bases
and tactics. Particularly advantageous would
be the ability to employ compatible tankers
from interior bases. However, in order to hit
all targets in the US with BISON type aircraft
on two-way missions, the USSR would have
to employ inflight refueling and forward
staging bases.
76. The BEAR turbo-prop heavy bomber on
two-way refueled missions with a 10,000 pound
bomb load could strike any point in the US
from interior bases, provided direct great cir-
cle routes were flown. On two-way unre-
fueled missions the BEAR could reach any
point in the US except that portion south of
an arc through Corpus Christi, Atlanta, and
Norfolk from the Chukotski area, but from
the Kola area could reach only north of an
arc through Seattle, Chicago, and Richmond.
From interior bases in the Leningrad area,
on two-way unrefueled missions, the BEAR
could reach the North Eastern part of the US
as far south as New York, provided direct
great circle routes were flown. If employed
on unrefueled one-way missions they could
reach any point in the US. (See Map 8).
77. Staging. About a 10 hour flight would
be required to move BULL aircraft from Far
East home bases to Chukotski area bases and
about three to five hours from Western USSR
bases to the Kola area. Flying times for
BADGER or BISON aircraft would be about
half as long. We have almost no recent firm
evidence on the status of servicing and fuel
storage facilities or the availability of tank
trucks at most of the forward bases. How-
ever, the Soviets are fully capable of develop-
ing these facilities if they do not already have
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
,TOP. SECRET 19
them. For example, we believe the USSR has
a fuel truck of 6,000 gallon estimated capacity
and a pumping rate of 240 gallons per minute.
Careful preparation could permit the Soviets
to refuel successive elements of the bomber
force at forward bases, which would reduce
time on the ground and the number of refuel-
ing trucks and servicing personnel required.
When BISON and BEAR bombers appear in
service in large numbers we estimate that the
USSR will have available refueling equipment
more compatible with the requirements of
these aircraft. In order to service large num-
bers of long-range bomber aircraft at staging
bases in forward areas it would probably be
necessary to increase present stocks of POL
and servicing equipment and to establish or
increase weapons stockpiles at the various
bases.
78. Weather. Weather and climatic condi-
tions in the far northern staging areas would
have a considerable impact on the timing and
magnitude of attacks on the US. During
cold weather, the need for high speed refuel-
ing and heated hangar space are among the
critical problems which would be magnified
as numbers and size of aircraft increase. The
coordinated launching of a large-scale attack
composed of elements from widely separated
base areas would be complicated by varying
weather conditions at such bases.
79. The low temperatures of the Arctic region
pose some special problems in the handling
of atomic weapons. However, virtually all
of the components of nuclear weapons are
better able to resist the effects of cold weather
than are the delivery aircraft, and provision
of adequate shelters and equipment to over-
come the undesirable effects of cold weather
on the bombs is a much simpler problem.
We estimate that the USSR can successfully
store and assemble atomic weapons for use
at Arctic bases under any weather conditions
which will permit the operation of bombers.
The problem of storage could also be largely
eliminated by storing the bombs in rear areas
and moving them to the advanced bases as
needed, although such an operation would
introduce additional timing problems.
80. Methods employed by the USSR for
achieving effective operation of aircraft under
cold weather conditions are generally conven-
tional and believed to be effective. In addi-
tion, it should be noted that aircraft perform-
ance is improved by low ground temperatures
in Arctic areas where the higher density of
cold air increases engine thrust and increases
airfoil lift so that take-off distance may be
reduced or maximum gross take-off weights
increased.
k. Estimated Intercontinental Striking Force
in Mid-1955. Within the limits of base capac-
ity, aircraft performance, and operating con-
ditions, the magnitude of strike forces which
the USSR could launch would vary according
to the method of employment of the various
types of aircraft. Various methods of em-
ployment are open to the USSR and it is not
possible to predict which they might choose.
The figures in the tables below for mid-1955
and mid-1958 represent, therefore, merely an
estimate of optimum striking forces designed
to reach targets throughout the US with re-
covery of a portion of strike aircraft utilizing
a combination of refueled and unrefueled mis-
sions.
82. Despite the lack of evidence that the fields
in the forward staging areas are developed for
bomber operations, that long range bomber
units are stationed in these areas, or that
training has been conducted in these areas,
we believe that by a major effort, the USSR
would be capable of mounting intercontinen-
tal strikes from these areas in mid-1955. In
order to achieve maximum surprise we esti-
mate that the USSR could launch a limited
number of heavy bombers, using only interior
bases but in order to achieve optimum size in
a surprise attack, the airfields in the Kola,
Kamchatka, and Chukotski areas would have
to be used. In order to estimate the optimum
striking force in mid-1955 we have assumed
a limited Soviet inflight refueling capability
despite the lack of evidence that one exists.
We have used a planning factor of 1.2 tankers
for each refueled bomber. Under these as-
sumptions, we estimate the optimum USSR
strike capability would be as follows:
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP
ESTIMATED OPTIMUM INITIAL STRIKE
CAPABILITY IN MID-1955
SECRET 20
On Base
Launched
Arrive in
Target Area
BULL
300
250
194
BADGER
80
60
40
BISON
15
10
8
BEAR
15
10
8
Tanker
130
110
Total
5401
440
250 8
'Between 20 and 60 aircraft were allocated to each
staging base on the basis of a reasonable esti-
mate of its capacity.
2 Maximum aircraft which could be launched from
above bases, assuming an estimated serviceabili-
ty rate of about 80 percent. This serviceability
factor has not been considered in movement
from the home base to the staging area. Some
of the aircraft launched would probably be used
for ECM and diversion.
'Based on an estimated allowance for aborts and
losses from all causes other than combat attri-
tion of about 20 percent for nonrefueled mis-
sions and 25 percent for refueled missions.
STRIKE AIRCRAFT ACCORDING TO METHOD
OF EMPLOYMENT
Two- Two- One- One-
Way Way Way Way
Unre- Re- Unre- Re- Total
fueled fueled fueled fueled Launched
BULL
40
210
250
BADGER
10
50
60
BISON
10
10
BEAR
10
10
Total
20
40
220
50
330
83. Assuming that the USSR has no present
inflight refueling capability, or that the
iUSSR will attempt to maximize the size of an
initial strike force by replacing tankers on
forward. bases with strike aircraft, the num-
ber of aircraft reaching the target area could
be increased to an estimated 350.
84. If the USSR elected to utilize all availa-
ble bases, including those in the Baltic East
German and Leningrad areas, and thus lessen
its chances of achieving surprise it could
launch a maximum of approximately 950 air-
craft in 1955 in an initial attack on the US.
However, the great bulk of these aircraft
would have to fly one-way missions. We be-
lieve it almost certain that the USSR is psy-
chologically capable of employing one-way
missions. Not considering combat losses, ap-
proximately 750 might reach target areas.
85. Estimated Striking Force in Mid-1958.
By mid-1958 the capacity of the forward stag-
ing areas could be greatly increased. We have
also estimated that by this time some 350
BISON jet heavy bombers and 250 BEAR tur-
bo-prop heavy bombers will be in operation-
al use. In addition, we estimate that by mid-
1958 the USSR could have a substantial in-
flight refueling capability and a substantial
number of heavy bombers could be launched
from interior bases in initial attacks, in which
case the Leningrad base area could also be
used for some of the heavy bombers making
initial surpriser attacks on the US. Under
these circumstances, the optimum Soviet
strike capability would probably be as follows:
ESTIMATED OPTIMUM INITIAL STRIKE
CAPABILITY IN MID-1958
On Base
Arriving on
Launched Target Area
BULL
80
60
50
BADGER
430
360
280
BISON
300
260
200
BEAR
250
210
160
Tanker
530
450
Total
1,590 1
2
1,340
690
'Assuming use of the Kamchatka, Kola, Chukot-
ski, and Leningrad bases for all aircraft except
the BEAR which would be launched from interior
bases.
Maximum aircraft which could be launched
from the above bases assuming a serviceability
rate of about 85 percent except for a slightly
higher rate from the Leningrad base area since
aircraft would be operating from a home base
rather than staging forward. Some of the air-
craft launched would probably be used for ECM
and diversion.
'Based on an estimated allowance for aborts and
losses from all causes other than combat attri-
tion of 20 percent for nonrefueled missions and
25 percent for refueled missions.
STRIKE AIRCRAFT ACCORDING TO METHOD
OF EMPLOYMENT
Two-
Way
Unre-
fueled
Two-
Way
Re-
fueled
One-
Way
Unre-
fueled
Total
Launched
BULL
60
60
BADGER
360
360
BEAR
60
150
210
BISON
40
220
260
Total
100
370
420
890
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET
86. Should the USSR attempt to maximize
the size of the initial strike force by replacing
tankers on forward bases with strike aircraft
and launching all missions on a one-way un-
ref ueled basis (or two-way unrefueled basis
where possible) , the estimated number of
bombers arriving in target areas would be
approximately 850, not considering combat
losses.
87. Scale of Attack Preparations. At pres-
ent the pre-strike preparation necessary for
launching a maximum scale attack from like-
ly staging areas might require several months.
By mid-1958, only minimum preparation
would be required, providing that during the
interim, a major effort was undertaken to
improve base facilities and training, logistics,
and equipment of the Long-Range Air Force.
Under these circumstances, it might not then
be necessary to undertake such final prepara-
tions as the movement of additional personnel
and equipment.
IV. GROSS SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR AIR
ATTACK AGAINST US OVERSEAS
INSTALLATIONS
88. Assuming the USSR launched the opti-
mum scale of attacks against the ITS shown
in the tables above, it would have available
for reattacks, attack in other areas, and for
reserve, about the following number of long-
range bombers: 9
Mid-1955
Mid-1958
BULL
700
20
BADGER
50
270
BISON
5
50
BEAR
5
40
Total
760
380
Assuming a serviceability rate of 80 percent
/in mid-1955 and 85 percent in mid-1958 and
a noncombat attrition rate of 15 percent, the
number of bombers reaching target areas
would be 500 in mid-1955 and 270 in mid-1958.
These figures were derived by subtracting the
estimated number committed for attack against
the US from estimated actual total strength in
mid-1955 and in mid-1958.
21
89. We estimate that in mid-1955 the USSR
will have available a maximum of about 2,500
jet light bombers, which could be used for
attacks against the many key US installations
and forces overseas within their operational
radius. By mid-1958 this number of jet light
bombers is expected to increase to a TO&E
strength of 3,150. For maximum effective-
ness of attacks by light bombers against the
more distant targets considerable redeploy-
ment to forward bases would be required.
V. DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL AND
MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS BY
OTHER MEANS
90. Guided Missiles. 10 A Soviet guided mis-
sile research and development program is
known to exist. It is within Soviet capabili-
ties to develop and produce numerous types
Of missiles within the period of this estimate.
However, we have no firm evidence that the
USSR has these weapons available in opera-
tional quantities. The number of nuclear
warheads available for guided missiles will de-
pend upon the allocations to other weapons
systems on the bases of requirements and es-
tablished priorities. We believe that the USSR
could now have an improved version of the
German V-1 nonballistic pulse-jet winged mis-
sile with ranges up to 200 nautical miles, a
warhead of 2,000-3,000 pounds and a CEP of
roughly three nautical miles with inertial
guidance. Radar track-radio command guid-
ance could be provided to a range of 100 nauti-
cal miles and a CEP of 0.5 nautical miles could
be achieved if the missile is launched from
land bases or one to two nautical miles if
launched from submarines. These missiles
could now be equipped with nuclear warheads.
The USSR also could now have an improved
version of the German V-2 with ranges up to
500 nautical miles, a warhead of 3,000 pounds,
and a CEP of two to three nautical miles.
Such missiles could be launched from ad-
vanced bases in Communist territory against
certain key US installations.
1?For a detailed study of guided missiles see NIE
11-6-54, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Pro-
grams in the Guided Missiles Field," 5 October
1954.
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET
91. Although V-1 and turbo-jet type missiles
with nuclear warheads could be launched
from submarines, we have no firm evidence
that the USSR has converted any submarines
for missile launching. However, the feasibili-
ty of launching such missiles from subma- ,
rines has been proven by the US and this nu-
clear delivery capability could be an impor-
tant supplement to nuclear attacks by air-
craft. We estimate that the Soviets could
now have several long-range submarines
equipped to launch guided type missiles.
92. In addition, the USSR is now technically
capable of attacking targets within the US
with rocket-propelled glide bombs launched
from long-range aircraft. These bombs could
now have nuclear warheads. However, these
glide bombs would be limited to well-defined
targets, good visibility conditions, and a max-
imum range of 20 nautical miles. In 1956-
1957 an improved version with a 50 nautical
mile range could become available. We esti-
mate that a? small glide bomb launched from
light bombers could be available by mid-1958.
Although we have no evidence of Soviet work
in the matter, it is possible that such a missile
might be available as early as mid-1958.11
93. The USSR is capable of having available
early in the period a MIG-15 modified for use
as a guided missile. Such a missile could
have a maximum range of 500 nautical miles,
a 3,000-pound warhead, and a CEP of ten nau-
? tical miles with inertial guidance. With
radar tracking guidance the range would be
reduced to about 200-250 nautical miles using
a single guidance station and a CEP on the
order of one nautical mile could be achieved.
If launched from submarines, such missiles
could be used to attack targets within the
limitations of the guidance system, the range
of the missile, and the operating radius of
the submarine.
" The estimated dates given in paragraphs 81,82,
and 83 are the earliest probable years during
which small quantities of missiles have been
produced and placed in the hands of trained
personnel of one operational unit. These dates
could be one to two years earlier if an intensive
effort of the highest priority were undertaken
and if no major delays were encountered.
22
94. We estimate that in 1957 (or at the
earliest possible date, in 1955) the USSR could
have in limited operational use single stage
ballistic guided missiles capable of ranges up
to 900 nautical miles carrying a 3,000-pound
warhead and achieving a CEP of three to
four nautical miles." This missile could be
equipped with nuclear warheads.
95. Clandestine Delivery of Nuclear Weapons.
We have no evidence as to any Soviet plans or
preparations for clandestine delivery of nu-
plear weapons against the US. However,
during the period of this estimate the USSR
will be capable of producing nuclear weapons
which could be smuggled into the US either
as complete assemblies or as component parts
or subassemblies. These could range from
small-yield weapons (equivalent of 5,000 tons
of TNT or less) weighing a few hundred
pounds to larger-yield weapons (possibly up
to the equivalent of a million tons of TNT)
weighing less than ten thousand pounds.
Their size could range from that of a package
small enough to fit into the luggage com-
partment of an automobile to that of a pack-
ing case large enough to contain an automo-
bile. All of these weapons could be designed
to break down into a number of relatively
simple and readily transportable components.
Those designed to give a relatively low yield
would not require much labor or technical
training for assembly. Somewhat more la-
bor and training would be required to assem-
ble weapons designed to give high yields, and,
once assembled, they would be more difficult
to transport. It is conceivable that only the
fissionable material, in small pieces, need be
smuggled into the US, since other components
could be fabricated or procured in this coun-
try. This scheme, however, would require
careful advance planning and coordination
by supervisory personnel with engineering
skill and familiarity with the US sources of
needed components, and would take a? longer
time to carry out. It would probably result
in a reduced yield for a given amount of fis-
sionable material. It would also incur a
12 For further information pertaining to availa-
bility of possible similar missiles of longer range,
see NIE 11-6-54.
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET
substantially greater security risk than the
clandestine introduction of all components.
96. Considering the known limitations of the
means of physical detection, the USSR could
probably introduce into the US and detonate
in place a considerable number of nuclear
weapons by clandestine means. A variety of
methods of clandestine delivery suggest them-
selves. Assembled weapons could be dropped
by apparently friendly aircraft, detonated in
the hold of a merchant ship, or sown as un-
derwater mines by submarines and possibly
by merchant ships. Either components or
assembled weapons could be brought in un-
der diplomatic immunity, smuggled across
land or sea frontiers, introduced through nor-
mal importschannels, or brought in as bonded
merchandise awaiting transshipment.
97. The selection of the method of introduc-
tion and of transport and assembly within the
US would depend on the Soviet objective and
the risk of detection which the USSR was will-
ing to accept. Satellite agents and mer-
chant ships could be utilized for such attacks
as could Communists in other countries.
There are at least 5,000 Communists in Mex-
ico and 10,000 in Canada together with thou-
sands of other persons belonging to Commu-
nist-led labor unions and front organizations
who could be instrumental in clandestine at-
tacks against the US. In addition, Mexico
is considered a? traffic center for Communists
in North and South America giving Com-
munists from other countries access to the
US borders. Although these Communist el-
ements of other countries could be used, it is
doubtful if the Soviets would incur the risk of
using them in surprise clandestine attack
against the US prior to overt military attack.
98. In introducing nuclear weapons clandes-
tinely into the US, the USSR would have to
take into account not only the estimated
chances of detection, but also the consequen-
ces of such detection in forfeiting the element
of surprise in any intended overt attack and
provoking US counteraction. As the number
of weapons clandestinely introduced were in-
creased, the risk of compromise would in-
crease. This increased risk would be less a
23
function of US capabilities for physical de-
tection than of the scope and complexity of
the clandestine operations, particularly in-
sofar as larger numbers of Soviet agents be-
came involved. Considering the consequen-
ces of a breach of security, the USSR would
probably be unwilling to risk the use of even
selected and trained agents in such numbers
as would be involved in the clandestine de-
livery of large numbers of nuclear weapons.
We conclude, therefore, that, although clan-
destine attack with nuclear weapons could
occur against specially selected targets as a
supplement to overt delivery by air, the use
of large numbers of such weapons would prob-
ably be precluded by security considerations.
99. Clandestine Use of BW and CW Weapons.
Most biological warfare (BW) agents are pe-
cularily adaptable to clandestine utilization,
since the introduction of small amounts of
BW agents would be difficult to detect. Even
small-scale employment of biological warfare
agents against livestock could be highly ef-
fective. BW attacks against key personnel
concentrated in selected buildings could also
be effective. There is little likelihood that ef-
fective anticrop BW operations could be car-
ried out clandestinely.
100. CW agents are not easily adaptable to
clandestine use. They are easily identifi-
able by their immediate effects, and it prob-
ably would not be feasible to build up suffi-
cient supplies or to procure the means clan-
destinely in the required areas for their dis-
semination against large population centers.
The most practicable use would be against
personnel in key installations, but even this
would be difficult.
VI. ATTACK WITH CONVENTIONAL
FORCES
101. Attacks by Ground ,and Tactical Air
Forces. Many key US installations overseas,
such as those in Western Europe, the Middle
and Far East, are subject to attack by Soviet
ground and tactical air forces. Such at-
tacks, however, would almost certainly be an
integral part of the over-all Soviet campaigns
in these areas, and it would be impossible to
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET
separate the specific scale of attack on key
US installations from the over-all scale of
Soviet campaigns.13
102. The peacetime establishment of the So-
viet Army probably will continue at 175 di-
visions and supporting troops which can be
expected to be combat ready on D-Day. By
M+30, this force can be expanded to about
300 line divisions. These forces would be
capable of overrunning large areas of West-
ern Europe, the Middle East, and the Far
East. However, to attain a high capability
for destruction of most key US installations in
these areas the Soviet Army probably would
have to be reinforced in peripheral areas or
employ airborne or amphibious forces in con-
nection with a ground attack. It is estimat-
ed that for air support of these attacks in
mid-1955, the USSR will have an actual
strength of approximately 9,800 combat air-
craft in the Air Force of the Soviet Army and
Naval Aviation. Of this total, approximate-
ly 8,300 are jet aircraft. For mid-1958, ac-
tual combat aircraft in operational units is
estimated at approximately 11,900, of which
11,200 will be jets.
103. Naval Attack. A large portion of the
Soviet submarine forces would probably be
employed against US naval forces, especially
against carrier task forces with a nuclear de-
livery capability. In addition, Soviet sub-
marine forces could, at least in the initial
phases of an attack, inflict serious damage
on US overseas communications by attacks on
shipping and offensive mining of the ap-
proaches to harbors and ports of the US and
its allies, and could develop the capability to
launch mass destruction weapons by missile
against US or key overseas targets within
range. We estimate that the Soviet sub-
marine force, currently consisting of 236 me-
dium and long-range submarines, will prob-
ably be strengthened by the addition of about
75 long-range submarines in 1955, 80 annually
during 1956 and 1957, and about 40 during
1958, by a limited modernization of older
classes (including installation of snorkel) ,
" See NIE 11-3-55, "Soviet Capabilities and Prob-
able Courses of Action Through Mid-1960," for
Soviet ground and tactical air capabilities.
24
and by the probable adaptation of submarines
to missile launching. We also estimate that
by the end of 1955, in a maximum effort, as
many as 184 of the long and medium-range
submarines located in the Baltic-Northern
Fleet and Pacific Fleet areas ? 133 and 51
respectively ? could be made available for
attacks against US naval forces, the conti-
nental US, and key installations overseas.
By mid-1958, these numbers could increase to
about 190 and 100 respectively.
104. The capabilities of surface naval forces
for attack on the US are low. The Soviet
surface fleet is geographically divided, lacks
advance bases and does not possess a ship-_
borne ,air arm. Sporadic raider operations
are possible, but the surface fleet in gener-d1;
lacking aircraft carriers, is unsuitable for
transoceanic naval attack on any significant
scale.
105. Amphibious Attack. Because of the lack
of aircraft carriers and long-range vessels
suitable for amphibious warfare, large-scale
Soviet amphibious attacks will be limited to
areas where air cover can be provided from
Communist-controlled territory. However,
amphibious raids by submarine-borne forces
for the purpose of attempting the destruction
or neutralization of key US overseas installa-
tions are possible within a radius of 2,000
miles from Soviet submarine bases. Amphib-
ious assault against the continental US (ex-
cept Alaska) is beyond Soviet capabilities. In
assaults against Alaska, certain restrictions
would be imposed on the Soviets by: (a) the
limited number of landing beaches; (b) cli-
matic conditions; (c) problems of establish-
ing and maintaining lines of communications;
(d) the difficulties of maintaining adequate
logistic support; (e) the limited capapilities
of the Far Eastern fleet; and (f) the difficul-
ties of maintaining adequate air .cover.( These
limitations would restrict amphibious opera-
tion in Alaska to 4,000 to 6,000 troops in the
assault phase. It is more probable, however,
that amphibious operations would be limited
to actions up to battalion size with limited
support weapons-7 Amphibious attacks against
key US overseas installations, except in the
Far East, would probably be limited to am-
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET
phibious raids by submarine-borne forces.
.?2!knaphibious attacks in force up to six divisions
could be made against US installations in
Japan, Okinawa, and Formosa provided ade-
quate air cover was available.
106. Airborne Attack. The USSR has ap-
proximately 100,000 trained paratroopers in
an estimated 10 airborne divisions, plus about
100,000 trained-airborne reserves. The capa-
bility of these forces to seize and destroy key
US installations overseas would be substantial
in certain areas but is limited by the availa-
bility of transport aircraft. It is estimated
that during 1955-1958 the USSR will have
about 1,900 transport aircraft in the various
components of the Soviet Air Force. In addi-
tion, it may have built up its helicopter force
to about 600 aircraft. We also estimate that
the Civil Air Fleet will be operating at least
1,600 transports during the period of this esti-
mate, including some four-engine types.
Utilizing only those aircraft belonging to the
Aviation of Airborne Troops, the USSR can
now lift about 9,000 well-equipped and well-
trained troops with one drop on D-day or
about 14,000 with two drops. For a five-day
operation the Aviation of Airborne Troops can
lift approximately 23,000-25,000 troops de-
pending on whether one or two drops are
executed on D-day. This lift capacity can be
increased by about 1,800 troops for every 100
aircraft borrowed from the Civil Air Fleet or
the military air forces. This capability could
be increased during the period by the avail-
ability of four-engined transports. Because
of transport aircraft performance limitations,
the USSR will not be capable of launching
major airborne operations against the conti-
nental US during the period of this estimate.
However, small, highly-trained assault groups
probably could be delivered to some targets
in the US.
VII. SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR SABOTAGE
OTHER THAN BY CLANDESTINE
PLACEMENT OF WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION
107. The USSR is capable of subversion, es-
pionage, and widespread sabotage in the US
through the use of existing subversive ele-
25
ments and the placement of foreign agents.
Sabotage probably would not be initiated on
a large scale prior to an all-out attack on the
US since such efforts would nullify the ad-
vantage of surprise, if identifiable with the
USSR. Large-scale sabotage of US transporta-
tion, industrial, and communications facili-
ties, and military installations could be ex-
pected with and immediately following sur-
prise attack by the USSR. Communist party
, members and adherents are capable of organ-
izing saboteur units or teams of varying sizes
equipped with small arms and other suitable
material which could strike at especially
selected and widely separated targets simul-
taneously and without warning. Whether
such attacks would be timed with a surprise
military attack or carried out after such an
attack would be dependent upon the Soviet
appraisal of the relative advantages of such
action.
108. Soviet capabilities for subversion, espio-
nage, and widespread sabotage attacks against
key overseas bases are greater than against
the continental US, because of the much
larger percentage of Communist elements,
widespread political discontent, and lack of
adequate security measures in certain foreign
nations. In numerous other countries the
Communists almost certainly have capabili-
ties for serious acts of sabotage. The popula-
tions of these countries are experienced in
such operations and sabotage efforts timed
with large-scale military attacks could ma-
terially reduce the capability of US military
forces overseas.
VIII. SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
AND METHODS OF ATTACK
Probable Soviet Strategic Objectives in
Attack on the US and Key US
Overseas Installations
109. The foregoing discussion of Soviet capa-
bilities has assumed an all-out Soviet effort
against the US and key US overseas installa-
tions, without consideration of other strategic
objectives against which some of these forces
might be employed. The actual initial alloca-
tion of Soviet effort against various objectives
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET 26
in event of general war would depend upon
the over-all strategy of the USSR. In deciding
upon this strategy, the Soviet leaders would
be influenced by the following considerations:
a. The power of the US is the main support
of Free World opposition to the Communist
Bloc. The USSR would probably calculate
that if US war-making strength could be suffi-
ciently reduced in the initial stages of a war,
Soviet chances for ultimate success in a gen-
eral war would be virtually assured.
b. The chief immediate threat to the USSR
in event of general war is a US nuclear air
offensive. The Soviet rulers have demon-
strated their sensitivity to the danger of US
nuclear air attack by the high priority which
they have given to the development of their
air defenses. Despite the substantial progress
already achieved in building up these defenses,
it is unlikely that they would regard their de-
fensive capabilities as adequate to prevent
substantial numbers of attacking aircraft
from reaching strategic targets in the USSR.
c. The major proportion of facilities, equip-
ment, and forces which together constitute
US nuclear capabilities is located in the con-
tinental US. Soviet destruction of all key
US installations and forces overseas which
possess a capability for employing nuclear
weapons would handicap but would not pre-
clude the delivery of A very substantial num-
ber of nuclear weapons on targets within the
USSR. At the same time, Soviet destruc-
tion or neutralization of US nuclear capabili-
ties located in the continental US would not
prevent the delivery of a substantial number
of nuclear weapons from those US overseas
installations and forces which possess a nu-
clear strike capability. Consequently, Soviet
leaders would probably calculate that simul-
taneous destruction or neutralization of both
these overseas installations and forces and
those in the US would be essential. 0-
d. Soviet leaders also must realize that
other US forces and installations, as well as
those of US allies particularly in Eurasia, pre-
sent formidable obstacles to Soviet success in
operations that would occur simultaneously
with or immediately after the initial attacks.
110. In view of the above considerations it is
likely that the USSR in attacking the US and
key overseas installations and forces, would
have the following major military objectives:
(a) to destroy or neutralize US capabilities
for nuclear retaliation; (b) to deliver such an
attack on urban, industrial, political, and psy-
chological targets in the US as would prevent,
or at least hinder, the mobilization of the US
war potential and its projection overseas; and
(c) to inflict such destruction on US overseas
installations as to hamper or prevent US re-
inforcement and logistical support of over-
seas forces. We believe that these Soviet ob-
jectives would remain the same throughout
the period of this estimate although Soviet
gross capabilities for achieving them will in-
crease through mid-1958.
111. Implications of Sqviet efforts to achieve
surprise. An attempted maximum Soviet at-
tack on the continental US, key overseas in-
stallations and forces overseas, involving uti-
lization of all or most of the capabilities dis-
cussed in this estimate, would require prepa-
rations that? would almost certainly result in
the loss of surprise. If the USSR attempted
to maximize surprise it would probably be
forced to accept the following major limita-
tions: (a) no large-scale mobilization of addi-
tional units; (b) no large-scale redeployment
of Soviet air, naval, or ground forces to re-
inforce peripheral dispositions; and (c) no
unusual movement of Soviet air, naval, or
ground forces in such areas as would be likely
to indicate the imminence of attack.'4
112. In planning an attack on the US and key
US overseas installations and forces, the So-
viet estimate of the success they would be
likely to achieve against various target sys-
tems would not necessarily' be the determi-
nent of the priority of their attack. This
priority would most likely be determined by
their estimate of the necessity for destroying
or neutralizing the foremost threat to their
security ? a nuclear air attack by US forces.
The initial Soviet attack, therefore, would
" For complete discussion of the problem of achiev-
ing surprise, see NIE 11-6-55 (scheduled for pub-
lication in June 1955).
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET
probably be directed primarily toward those
areas and against those forces which comprise
the US nuclear strike capability. It is not
likely that they would take prior actions
against other target systems and thus risk
losing the advantage of surprise which they
would require for successful attacks against
the primary threat, although simultaneous
attacks against such other targets would
probably be made.
Probable Methods of Attack Against
the US
113. Nuclear Attacks by Aircraft. In view of
the deSirability of achieving both maximum
surprise and maximum weight in any attack
on the US, we believe that the USSR would
place chief reliance on nuclear attacks by air-
craft. It is probable that suCh attacks would
receive the highest priority because of: (a)
the limited capabilities of conventional naval,
ground, and airborne forces for neutralizing
US nuclear capabilities; (b) the security diffi-
culties inherent in the delivery of the neces-
sary large numbers of nuclear weapons by
clandestine means; (c) the insufficient de-
velopment of other methods of delivery of nu-
clear weapons on a large scale; (d) the insuffi-
cient development of other mass destruction
weapons, or handicaps to their large-scale
use.
114. Guided Missiles. Guided missiles con-
stitute a growing delivery capability. While
no intercontinental missiles capable of reach-
ing the US are expected to be available during
this period, guided missiles might be launched
from submarines against U.S ports and other
targets within range. In addition, air-to-
surface missiles might be employed late in the
period for terminal attack on the most heav-
ily defended targets.
115. Other Methods of Attack. The Soviet
rulers might employ other methods of attack-
ing the US concurrently with or immediately
following a surprise nuclear air attack by air-
craft. Clandestine employment of sabotage,
biological warfare, or nuclear weapons might
occur against specially selected targets.
27
Probable Methods of Attacks Against Key
US Overseas Installations and Forces
116. The USSR Would have a much wider
range of capabilities for effective attack on
key US installations and forces overseas than
on the US itself because of the shorter ranges,
greater possibilities for clandestine action,
and ability to employ varied methods of at-
tack. However, attacks on US naval task
forces would present many difficult problems,
including location and weapons selection.
117. Western Europe and the Middle East.
Attacks on the majority of key US installa-
tions in these areas (except the UK and.
Spain) , which do not possess a nuclear strike
capability, would be carried out primarily by ?
ground and tactical air forces concurrent with.
or subsequent to the initial attack onj-US nu-
clear delivery capabilities. The USSR has the
capability to launch attacks orrthese areas
from Soviet-controlled territory without in-
creasing their forces, but might elect to carry
out at least partial mobilization to increase
their chances for success of the operations.
118. Other Overseas Installations. Except
for Japan, Okinawa, and Formosa, US instal-
lations in other areas would be subject pri-
marily to air attacks. Sufficient Soviet jet
light bombers are now available in peripheral
areas occupied by or under the influence of
the USSR to permit large-scale attacks on in-
stallations in the UK, Turkey, and the Middle
East. Attacks in considerable force could be
launched by amphibious and airborne forces
against Japan, Okinawa, and Formosa. Over-
seas installations within 2,000 miles of Soviet
submarine bases might be subjected to amphi-
bious raids and guided missile attacks by sub-
marine forces. Virtually all overseas installa-
tions are subject to nuclear attacks by air-
craft. In addition the USSR possesses the
capability of making attacks on selected over-
seas installations by special small airborne
teams and could mount large-scale airborne
attacks on installations within a radius of
about 500 nautical miles of Soviet bases.
119. Likelihood of Change in Primary Methods
of Attack through Mid-1958. We estimate
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
TOP SECRET 28
Soviet gross capabilities for attack will in-
crease considerably by mid-1958 as a result of
improved aircraft, an enlarged stockpile of
nuclear weapons, increased naval strength,
improved guided missiles, and greater effec-
tiveness of ground forces due to introduction
of nuclear weapons. However, the choice of
primary method of attack will be unlikely to
change materially because Soviet capabilities
for large-scale nuclear attack by aircraft will
probably continue to be greater during this
period than Soviet capabilities for use of any
other weapons system against the US. How-
ever, it is estimated that by mid-1958 the
USSR will probably have substantially in-
creased capabilities for use of guided missiles,
particularly against US coastal areas and key
installations overseas.
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0 %kw
t./ArADI LI I It3 /-IllH1113 I ISt T ',U kJ V M3t/A3 !MT-ALLA 1-1V113
SECRETMap 7
INDIA
toi
Canton
wad.s1
0
0
ID
ladivosto
4.k
?-
?
Petropavlovsk
AI k'r
S
ARCTIC
FRENCH
WEST
AFRICA
,EttING
The internetionel boundaries shown on this map do not
necessarily correspond in ell cases to the boundaries rec.
ognised by the U.S. Government.
13445-CIA, (Revised 5-55)
MEXICO
COMBAT RADII
5?,?ce- ?
690-11,28 with External Fuel
800?New Jet Light Bomber with 4,000 lb.
Bomb Load
1700?TYPE 39 with 3,000 lb. Bomb Load
1950?TU-4/With 3,000 lb. Bomb Load
2720?TYPE 37 with 3,000 lb. Bomb Load
Al/ ranges are in nautical miles.
* US Airbase Complex
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
SECRET
?
?
J.
? .
?
;
,
Declassified and Approved For sRelease 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
From the Chukotski Area SECRET
t ref el
---With re u
Ranges are in nau
Weights indicate
Ala drte
I miles.
mb loads.
***:b
irrKoflovik
Anchorape
nder
TWII AY, 10,000 I
S ? k DARD
TWO-WAY, 3
TWO Y, 10
50 TWO-6Z, 3,000 lb. ST RA 'D
2000 TWO-WAY7,141, 00 lb. ? FIED
2400'N
?11/4 "?-
b. STANDARD 2750
lb. MODIFIED 2800
3f..3,so TWO-WAY, 3,000 MODIFIED
Quebec .4
Akontreel
?Wart
TWO-WAY, 3,000 lb
.Bomarc
Shoo Folls?
.Cheyenne ?CInctnnali CR
ndsco
NMRD
ond
f?t.Los Angeles
**Van Diego
Phoenix
.Knoxville
rnr4500 ONE-WA
36041in@NE-
000 lb. STANDARD
Ir,''TDoo lb. MODIFIED
Bermuda.
Jacksonville.
Houston. \
?
, 61.0151HED QO
rit
ONE-WAY, 3,000 lb. S WARD 4900 ,e
ONE-WAY, 1,O00 b. MODIFIED 5000"`
Under maximum perform, cc conditions, these radii/
ranges could be increase as shown in Table II,
, 3,000 IL MODIFIED 5700 .;
SECRET
13446 CIA, (Revied 5.55)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
. . ? am. f 1 NEVIS II?Nor V I'll %IS I-11W LI 1.0% III I IFL
From the Chukotski Area
SECRET
----With re
Ranges are in neat al miles
? Weights indicate loads.
Anchorage
ander
TWO Y 10,000 lb. 2100
E 39
Y, 3,000 lb
E 39
TWO
IMP 'O
MP ROVED BADGER
IMPROVED BADGER
TWO-WAY ,000 lb. IMP
D BADGER 290
PE 3 ?won
Jijb. TYPE '7
00010. TYX
Sloe Folls?
.Cheyenne
PNO-WA 0,000 lb. TYPE 37 3800X
TWO Y, t302,0 .1,14 TY('E 37 3900X.,
ON Wk5L04(14.1b. TYPE 39 4,22Ru-?,,
?Phoenix
PI she
.CIncInnoli
3300 ONE-
iladelphia
?_$")eas. Ington
amend
AY, 3,001, lb. TYPE 39
eNnaxvIlle
eilr;nsa
eMemph
Charleston
E-WAY, 10,000 lb. IMPROVED BADGER
Bermuda
Houstonv, Orleans
NE-WAY, 3,000 sTY 39
(
NE-WAY 10,010 lb. IMPROVED BADGER 1
sonville?
74 ?
08%0N"r-WAY,
IMPROVED BADGER
...Under maximum performance c nditions, these radii'
ranges could be increased as $ own in Table II,
SECRET
ONE-WAY, 3,000 lb. IMPROVE1A3AOGER 5880
ONE-WA r
10, 000 lb'.
TYPE 37
5300
ONE-WAY 10,000 lb. TYPErs37-7,3" ?
13447 CIA,(Revised 5-55)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23: CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R01012A005200020004-0
- ? - ?
From the Kola Area SECRET
---With r f
Ranges are in na
Weights indicate
cal miles.
omb loads.
Verkar
?,,) 700
FUEL
REA
A ohmage
TWO-WAYS
00 STANDARD
TIN Y, 10,000 lb.
2800 NZ',
0011V TWO-WAY, 3,000 lb.
MODIEI $
LIWO-WAY, '0 2750 STANDARD
nder
ONE-WA 10,000 lb. STANDARD 3 00
if, 3,000 lb. STANDARD 350
Y, 10,000 labbIFIED 360d.
.Minneapolls Buffalo .Nr --York
.
Dorm,
Milwaukee 4iladelphio
Slou folls? PI sista