NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 11-6-55 (SUPERSEDES SNIE 11-8-54) PROBABLE INTELLIGENCE WARNING OF SOVIET ATTACK ON THE US THROUGH MID-1958

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005200010010-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 1, 1955
• Content Type: NIE

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NIE 11-6-55
Jury 1955
# 032483
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
O's1/4_
NUMBER 11-6-55
(Supersedes SNIE 11-8-54)
PROBABLE INTELLIGENCE WARNING
OF SOVIET ATTACK ON THE US
THROUGH MID-1958
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, the
Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 1 July 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intel-
ligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
0-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director
for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the Atomic Energy Com-
mission Representative to the IAC. The Assistant to the
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the sub-
ject being outside of its jurisdiction.
_
COPY NO. 200
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Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
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?
cONFIDENTIAL
PROBABLE INTELLIGENCE WARNING OF SOVIET ATTACK
ON THE US THROUGH MID-1958
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the probable degree of advance warning that could be provided by in-
telligence in the event of Soviet attacks on the United States and key US installations
and forces overseas through mid-1958.1
INTRODUCTION ?THE NATURE OF WARNING
When discussing the advance warning of Soviet attack which intelligence may be
able to provide, it is necessary, to define various possible kinds of warning:'
1. Warning of the increased likelihood of war, probably resulting: either from So-
viet actions or Soviet reactions to Western actions, but not necessarily involving any
direct military aspect;
2. Warning of increasing Soviet military readiness to attack, but without defini-
tive evidence of intent to attack or of the time of attack;
3. Warning of clear intent to attack;
4. Warning of clear intent to attack at or about a particular time.
It seems improbable that stage 4, or possibly even stage 3, would be reached conclu-
sively except in the event of high level penetration of the Soviet command, which to-
day seems unlikely, or in case of some exceptional intelligence bonus or breakthrough.
While intelligence might be able to say that the USSR would be fully prepared to at-
tack within, say 10 days, it would find it very difficult to say whether such prepara-
tions indicated a firm intent to attack, were primarily in anticipation of an expected
US attack, were a deception maneuver, or were to prepare against any contingency.
When we speak of degree of warning, therefore, it is important to bear in mind that
both time and specificity are involved, and that the earlier the warning the less spe-
cific it is likely to be. This inverse relation between time and specificity is an in-
herent limitation of the warning function.
war. It does not consider the warning likely to
1 Since the Soviet attack on the US would be tan- be given by US or allied early-warning radar,
tamount to general war, this estimate also deals nor the warning which could be obtained from
with the over-all warning which the US would a Soviet ultimatum, since such warning is out-
be likely to receive of Soviet initiation of general ' side the scope of the problem.
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The fact that warning is likely to be in some degree imprecise or contingent also
gives increased importance to other considerations affecting the warning function.
Both the nature and degree of warning which can be obtained will always be depend-
ent on many complex factors, some of them unique to any given set of circumstan-
ces. Warning will depend first of all on maximum . alertness and a maximum scale
of continuous effort by intelligence. These would probably be maintained only in
a period of rising tension and might be reduced, even unwittingly, if the tension
ceased to rise, if there were intermittent periods of apparently declining danger, or if
intelligence had previously given false warnings. The effectiveness of warning also
depends on the continued credibility of intelligence warnings to responsible officials,
for warning as a process is complete only when it is acted upon. The warning proc-
ess is thus affected by the whole context of events in which it operates, including
psychological factors and even pure chance. It cannot be regarded as a mechanical
process which it is possible for intelligence to set up once and for all and which there-
after operates automatically.
CONCLUSIONS
1. We believe that a Soviet initiation of
general war by attacks on the US, its al-
lies, or key overseas installations would
almost certainly be preceded by height-
ened political tension. While such ten-
sion would in itself constitute warning
that war was becoming more likely, the
indications of Soviet preparations which
would probably be obtained could be in-
terpreted as evidence of preparations for
defense or as part of a war of nerves.
Therefore, Soviet behavior in a period of
heightened political tension would not
necessarily give specific warning of a So-
viet intention to attack. Nevertheless,
intelligence could probably give warning
of the USSR's increasing war readiness
and could probably chart the trend to-
ward a period of maximum danger. (Par-
as. 12-15, 18)
2. It would also be possible for the Soviet
leaders, after a period of prolonged ten-
sion in which they had brought both
their political and military preparations
to an advanced stage, to bring about an
amelioration of the crisis atmosphere as
a deception move. Such a move, while
involving sacrifice of some advantages,
would almost certainly be made if the
Soviet leaders considered that a maxi-
mum degree of surprise was essential to
their strategic plans. Allied intelli-
gence, however, might still be able to de-
tect the continuation of specific military
preparations which would be particularly
significant as evidence of a Soviet inten-
tion to achieve surprise in launching gen-
eral war. (Paras. 16-17)
3. If the USSR chose to initiate war with
full-scale land, naval, and air attacks aft-
er a period of mobilization, there would
be numerous indications of military, as
well as of economic and political meas-
ures necessary to prepare such attacks.
We believe that US intelligence might be
able to give a generalized degree of warn-
ing as long as four or possibly even six
months prior to D-Day, and that the min-
imum period would not be less than 30
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days. After D-30 the number of indi-
cations would probably be reduced due to
Soviet security measures, although the
latter would themselves provide warning.
From D-10, and especially D-5, there
would probably be certain indications of
last-minute preparations, although proc-
essing and disseminating these on a
timely basis would probably be difficult.
As the time of attack drew near, indica-
tions of its approach would become in-
creasingly specific. Based on observed
Soviet military activities, warning could
probably be given from a few hours to a
few days in advance of the actual launch-
ing of the attack. (Paras. 21-25)
4. In order to gain some degree of sur-
prise, the USSR might choose to initiate
general war by attacks of less than full
scale in Europe, the Middle East, or in the
Far East directly or through the Chinese
Communists, while simultaneously at-
tacking the US and key overseas instal-
lations. The degree of prior Soviet prep-
arations would vary greatly, depending
on the location of the attack and the in-
tensity and direction of the preceding
political tensions. Even so, the mini-
mum preparations which the USSR
would have to take to put its forces in
a state of readiness to attack, and to pro-
vide support after the attack began would
probably require about 15 days. We be-
lieve that warning of the probability of
attack could be given about one week in
advance, but the period might vary from
a few hours to as much as 10 days, de-
pending on the seasonal pattern of So-
viet military activity. (Paras. 27-28)
5. We have estimated in NIE 11-7-55 that
by exercising its maximum capability the
USSR could now launch about 950 bomb-
er aircraft against the US in an initial
attack. However, virtually all of these
aircraft would be medium bomber types
(BULLS and BADGERS) ; a few would
be heavy bombers (BISONS and BEARS) .
The great bulk would have to fly one-way
missions. At present, Soviet preparatory
activities for maximum scale attack
would require at least several months, and
probably considerably longer, and would
probably become known to allied intelli-
gence, especially if carried forward with
great urgency. We believe that the in-
dicators would probably assume a mean-
ingful pattern in time for intelligence to
give a generalized degree of warning 15-
30 days prior to attack. US intelligence
would also be likely to discover significant
activities indicating the movement of
the large numbers of aircraft to staging
bases involved in such a maximum scale
attack. We believe that intelligence could
give specific advance warning of un-
usual and possibly threatening air activi-
ty on the order of 18-24 hours.' (Paras.
35-38)
6. We have estimated in NIE 11-7-55
that if the USSR attempted a surprise
attack against the US in 1955, aircraft
would probably be launched from 11
available staging bases in the Kola, Chu-
kotski, and Kamchatka areas.' There
is a lack of sufficient evidence to permit
Here and in paragraphs 6, 8, and 9 warning given
in hours is defined as the elapsed time between
the receipt of information (by a US command
or agency having authority to alert US defenses)
which indicates threat of a possible imminent
Soviet air attack, and the time such an attack
would reach the existing continental early warn-
ing line (1955) and the proposed (DEW) line
(1958).
For a full discussion of these forward bases, see
NIE 11-7-55, "Soviet Gross Capabilities for At-
tacks on the US and Key Overseas Installations
and Forces through 1 July 1958."
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a firm assessment of the capabilities of
the individual bases in these areas for
staging bomber aircraft. However, we
believe that by a major effort the USSR
could launch some 450 aircraft on initial
attack against the US. Preparations for
such an attack would permit possible de-
tection by allied intelligence and, if de-
tected, would provide a generalized de-
gree of warning of several days, and spe-
cific advance warning of unusual and
possibly threatening air activity on the
order of 18-24 hours. (Para. 42)
7. A reduced scale of attack, however, in-
volving about 250 aircraft could be
launched against the US and, accompa-
nied by an extraordinary security effort,
might be launched in 1955 with little or
no specific advance warning to US intel-
ligence. This estimate rests on the be-
lief that the forward bases may now be
capable of handling these aircraft or may
become so without detectable prepara-
tions. (Para. 43)
8. By 1958 the bases, training, and equip-
ment of the Soviet Long-Range Air Force
could, by a major effort, be advanced to
a point where only minimum prepara-
tions would be required prior to a maxi-
mum attack which could then number
about 1,100 bomber aircraft. Provided
that such a major effort has been made,
movements in and out of the forward
staging bases may also become routine.
The likelihood that these movements
would be discovered would not be much
less than at present, but the difficulty of
assessing them as warning indicators
would thus be very much greater. More-
over, by 1958, the increased speeds of jet
bombers will reduce the time required for
movement to staging bases and the prob-
able increased handling capabilities at
the bases will reduce time required for
refueling and servicing. Consequently
the specific advance warning of unusual
and possibly threatening air activity
which could be given, assuming that
movement to the staging bases was dis-
covered and correctly interpreted, would
probably be on the order of 12-18 hours.'
(Para. 39)
9. Both at present and in 1958, if the
movement to staging bases was not dis-
covered, warning could be obtained only
if almost continuous reconnaissance of
the staging areas was being maintained
and aircraft were discovered after they
had already reached these areas. How-
ever, reliance on this means alone might
reduce the warning period to a few hours,
or even virtually to zero, because of pos-
sible difficulties and delays in processing
and interpreting the results of the re-
connaissance. (Para. 40)
10. During the period of this estimate the
USSR will have a progressively increasing
capability for launching one-way attacks
on the US from interior Soviet bases
which would probably provide no specific
advance warning to US intelligence.5
Moreover, there are two other ways by
which the USSR might by 1958 (and pos-
sibly somewhat before that year) launch
4 The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that
movement in and out of forward staging bases
may become routine by 1958 if currently indi--
cated efforts to improve the bases, training, and
equipment of the Long-Range Air Force con-
tinue. He also believes it unlikely that such
movement would be discovered and correctly in-
terpreted before its value as warning had
passed. Moreover, the increased capability of
the Soviet Union to launch heavy bombers from
interior bases will further degrade this source
of warning information.
5For full discussion of Soviet long-range capa-
bilities, see NIE 11-7-55, "Soviet Gross Capabili-
ties for Attacks on the US and Key Overseas In-
stallations and Forces through 1 July 1958."
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an attack on the US in such a way that
no specific warning would be likely be-
fore its actual launching:
a. Assuming that the USSR pressed
ahead with development of its advance
bases in the Chukotski, Kamchatka, and
Kola areas, and with the general prepa-
ration of its Long-Range Air Force,
"normal" flights of aircraft to and from
these bases would almost certainly occur
in increasing number as the development
of the bases progressed. A pattern of ac-
tivity would thus tend to be established.
Under these circumstances, a consider-
able number of aircraft ? roughly the
number engaging in such "normal" ac-
tivity ? would almost certainly be able to
take off from these bases (and those in
the Leningrad area) for a surprise attack
upon the US without any such unusual
prior preparations or assembly as would
particularly attract the attention of al-
lied intelligence.
b. Assuming that the USSR acquires
an inflight refueling capability (which it
can do although there is no evidence at
present that the Soviet Long-Range Air
Force possesses such a capability) and
develops it to the necessary degree, Soviet
heavy bombers could also be launched on
two-way missions from certain home
bases without specific advance warning,
and without staging at the advance
bases.' (Paras. 35, 45)
11. If the USSR, concurrently with any
of the scales of attack discussed above,
undertook submarine operations against
Only the BEAR (Turbo-prop), with its tentative-
ly estimated characteristics, could reach all tar-
gets in the US. See NIE 11-7-55.
the US and key overseas installations, it
would be necessary for the submarines so
employed to proceed to wartime patrol
stations shortly before the expected com-
mencement of hostilities. The passage of
these submarines might give up to two
weeks warning of Soviet preparation for
attack. If the USSR undertook concur-
rent raider operations with some of the
major units of their surface fleet against
allied lines of communication, the move-
ment of these raiders might give up to
10 days warning of preparation for
attack. (Paras. 30-31)
12. Soviet preparations to receive a re-
taliatory blow from allied air power could
probably provide ,some indication of So-
viet intent to attack. Minimum prepara-
tions would probably include the alerting
of air defense forces and the civil defense
organization, preparations of military
units and installations for air defense,
the dispatching of submarines accompa-
nied by increased aerial reconnaissance to
locate US carrier forces, and the evacua-
tion of key personnel and possibly seg-
ments of population from potential target
areas. If steps such as these were taken,
they would probably provide a warning
period of as much as a week to 10 days,
and, taken in conjunction with other in-
dicators, would greatly increase the defi-
niteness of any warning US intelligence
might be able to give. We believe that in
elementary prudence the USSR would be
unwilling to forego preparation to receive
a retaliatory blow; therefore, some im-
portant indicators of this type would
probably be obtained. (Para. 46)
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DISCUSSION
I. WARNING FROM SOVIET BEHAVIOR
IN VARIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES
13. The various possible circumstances in
which the USSR might decide to attack the
US and enter upon general war would have a
considerable bearing on the degree of warning
which might be obtained.
a. There are three situations in which the
USSR might deliberately decide to attack the
US and key overseas installations, thus ini-
tiating general war. These situations would
arise if the Soviet leaders came to believe: (1)
that the USSR had acquired such military ca-
pabilities that it could be certain of success in
a general war; (2) that the US and its allies
were planning an attack on the USSR and
that the USSR's only hope of survival lay in
seizing the initiative; or (3) that an irreversi-
ble shift in the relative weight of military
power was impending which would ultimately
force the USSR to choose between certain de-
feat in war and sacrifice of its vital interests.
We believe that the Soviet leaders are unlikely
to come to any of these conclusions during
the period of this estimate.
b. There remains the possibility that gen-
eral war might occur after a series of actions
and counteractions in some local crisis which
neither the USSR nor the Western Allies orig-
inally intended to lead to general war. If
the USSR believed that the issues at stake
were vital to its security or that the loss of
prestige involved in backing down would be
equally dangerous to Soviet power, and if it
believed that the US would not yield, then the
USSR might decide that general war was the
unavoidable consequence of the crisis and
that it should seize the initiative. We be-
lieve that if the USSR decides to launch gen-
eral war in the period through mid-1958, the
decision is most likely to come as the conse-
quence of such a situation.7
The Soviet attitudes toward general war referred
to in paragraph 13 are discussed more fully in
NIE 11-3-55, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable
Courses of Action Through 1960," dated 17 May
1955, Sections VI and VII.
14. Likelihood of a Period of Tension. In
the situation described under b. above, a So-
viet decision to attack the US would be pre-
ceded by a period of heightened tension.
Moreover, even if the Soviet leaders reached
any one of the three conclusions in a. above,
they would probably do so because of an im-
portant shift in international alignments, or
because of some equally open and marked al-
teration or impending alteration, of the rela-
tive weight of military power. Such develop-
ments would themselves be likely to produce
heightened political tension. There are situ-
ations, however, in which a Soviet decision for
war could be taken in the absence of political
tension. For example, a Soviet decision mo-
tivated as under a. (1) above might be the re-
sult of some technical advance in Soviet mili-
tary capabilities unknown to the Western Al-
lies, or a Soviet decision motivated as under a.
(3) above might be the result of some secret
technical advance in Western military capabil-
ities of which Soviet intelligence learned. We
believe that such situations are unlikely to
arise. Therefore, since an attack on the US,
if it occurs, is most likely to arise from a series
of actions and counteractions not originally
intended to lead to general war (paragraph 13
b.) , it would almost certainly be preceded by
a period of heightened tension.
15. Reliability of Political Indicators in a
Period of Tension. While the existence of a
prior period of tension would in itself consti-
tute warning that war was becoming more
likely, ft would also greatly increase the dif-
ficulty of obtaining from Soviet political be-
havior a specific warning of attack. Most
of the political actions taken by the USSR
during a period of war preparation might not
differ greatly from those undertaken as rou-
tine in any period of heightened political ten-
sion. These actions might include: diplo-
matic approaches to some states designed to
influence them toward abandonment of their
alliances with the US; massive "peace" propa-
ganda directed at the populations of Western
states and intended to undermine the will to
resist or to destroy confidence in the motives
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and intentions of governments; explicit
threats against would-be aggressors; new pro-
posals to ban nuclear weapons; instructions to
Communist parties to ready themselves for
their sabotage and subversion missions; in-
tensified propaganda directed to the Bloc pop-
ulations to prepare them psychologically for
"resistence to aggression." All such actions,
however, could be interpreted as defensively
motivated or as part of a war of nerves. Thus
while they might provide warning of the in-
creased likelihood of general war, they would
not provide specific warning of attack.
16. Reliability of Military Indicators in a Peri-
od of Tension. The existence of a period of
heightened tension would also make more dif-
ficult the determination from Soviet military
preparations of a specific intent to attack.
If in such a period the USSR undertook var-
ious military preparations, it would probably
be as difficult to distinguish offensive from
defensive intent as in the case of indicators
from Soviet political behavior. In a protract-
ed situation of this sort intelligence probably
could only give warning of the USSR's in-
creasing war readiness and chart the trend
toward the period of maximum danger, but
not warn of a Soviet intention to attack. The
USSR might be carrying out military prepa-
rations not in order to initiate war but in read-
iness for instant retaliation to a US attack
which it feared might be impending.
17. Possibility of Soviet Deception. It would
also be possible for the Soviet leaders, after a
period of prolonged tension in which they had
brought both their political and military prep-
arations to an advanced stage, to bring about
an amelioration of the crisis atmosphere as
a deception move. They could offer conces-
sions as a basis for new negotiations, and sim-
ulate reduction of some of their military prep-
arations, or even actually reduce them. If
they considered surprise essential to their
plans and believed that they still could
achieve some degree of surprise in their ini-
tial attack, this would be a likely course for
the Soviet leaders to pursue. However, such
a course would involve sacrifice of some ad-
vantages. An initial surprise assault aimed
at Western retaliatory power might include
air attacks on the territories of some states
which the USSR might otherwise have hoped
to neutralize politically. It would probably
also involve the clear assumption of responsi-
bility for initiating war by aggressive action,
and thus might harden the will to resist in
some Western countries. Nevertheless, the
Soviet leaders would almost certainly accept
these disadvantages and attempt deceptive po-
litical maneuvers if they considered that the
maximum degree of surprise attainable was
essential to their strategic plans.
18. Although a large degree of deception
could be introduced into Soviet behavior, al-
lied intelligence might still be able to detect
the continuation of specific military prepara-
tions. Such indications could be interpreted
as due to Soviet caution and mistrust, but
they would also point to the possibility of a
deception maneuver and they would be par-
ticularly significant as evidence of a Soviet
intention to achieve surprise in launching
general war.
19. Summary. We believe, therefore, that
Soviet behavior in a period of heightened ten-
sions would not necessarily give warning of
attack. It would probably establish that
Soviet readiness for general war was increas-
ing; it would also establish that the likelihood
of war was increasing but would not necessar-
ily indicate that general war was probable.
It would also lead to heightened activity and
sensitivity on the part of allied intelligence.
However, neither a belligerent and unyielding
attitude nor a defensive and conciliatory one
would be a sure guide to Soviet intentions.
lh ALTERNATIVE SCALES OF SOVIET
ATTACK
20. The probable degree of warning that the
West would receive of Soviet attack would de-
pend in large part upon the type of attack
initiated. Many courses of action are open
to the Soviet planners in the event they
should decide to initiate a general war. At
one end of the spectrum would be a massive
multifront Soviet attack on the US and allied
states, undertaken after a period of intensive
mobilization. Such a plan of attack would
sacrifice strategic surprise in favor of maxi-
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mum military preparation, although the
USSR might still hope to achieve some degree
of tactical surprise. At the other end of the
spectrum would be a Soviet surprise attack,
with no prior preparations of a nature that
could be relied on to provide warning indica-
tors. Such an attack would sacrifice weight
for the advantages of surprise. This estimate
does not attempt to forecast Soviet strategy or
the probable scale of the initial attack. It only
discusses the probable degree of warning
which would be obtained if Soviet planners
selected any one of the following alternatives
for their initial attack:
a. Full-scale attack after a period of gen-
eral mobilization;
b. Soviet campaign in Western Europe
from existing deployments and simultaneous
attacks on the US and key US overseas forces
and installations;
c. Initial attacks only on the US and key
US overseas forces and installations
(1) Maximum scale attack
(2) Surprise attack.
III. WARNING OF FULL-SCALE SOVIET
ATTACK
21. A full-scale attack employing all arms in
strength at the outset of war would necessar-
ily be preceded by a period of mobilization
during which full war readiness, or a condi-
tion close to it, had been achieved. The
range of activities necessary for such full mo-
bilization of war potential in a highly indus-
trialized state like the USSR is so extensive
and ? involves so many measures affecting
broad sections of the population that even a
totalitarian government would find it impos-
sible to conceal all of them. In the economic
field, a complex redirection and intensifica-
tion of productive effort would have to take
place as materials, manpower, and facilities
were transferred from consumption and in-
vestment goods industries to armament in-
dustries. These measures would probably be
impossible without the use of public informa-
tion media. In addition, manipulation of
domestic opinion is so persistent a preoccupa-
tion of the Soviet government and its concern
over popular morale under conditions of cri-
sis is so intense that its vast propaganda appa-
ratus would certainly be openly committed to
preparing the Soviet people to withstand the
strains of general war.
22. In the military field itself, the induction
of additional military classes, formation of
new units and fleshing-out of existing units
to full strength, intensified and more realistic
training, redeployment of combat groups to
forward areas, and a variety of logistic meas-
ures would hardly escape entirely the observa-
tion of Western intelligence. In particular,
it would be difficult for the USSR to hide
large-scale troop movements in East Germany
or the other Satellites and forward deploy-
ment of its naval units. Withdrawal of a
significant portion of civil aircraft from sched-
uled flights to augment the aircraft of the
airborne forces or for other purposes might
give additional warning of full-scale attack.
At present numerous specific preparations for
a full-scale air effort against the US would
have to be made by the Soviet Long-Range
Air Force, although by mid-1958 the extent
and reliability of such indicators could be
considerably reduced (see paragraph 37
below).
23. At present, if the USSR undertook to mo-
bilize for a full-scale attack, US intelligence
would probably receive numerous indications
of large-scale Soviet mobilization during a
period of about six months to about one
month before D-Day, largely because the prep-
arations likely to be undertaken during this
period would be those least susceptible of con-
cealment. However, if the decision to pro-
ceed to full mobilization came after a period
of prolonged tension in , which preparatory
measures were initiated, or if by 1958 general
Soviet war readiness should be substantially
increased, then initial indicators might ap-
pear considerably later than six months prior
to D-Day. In any event, from roughly D-30
to around D-10 days, we would be likely to
get much less in the way of indications be-
cause the preparations in this period would
be those which Soviet security is best equipped
to conceal. Moreover, by about one month
before D-Day the progressive tightening of
Soviet security measures would probably have
reached a high point. There would almost
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certainly be a reduction in information from
sources within the Bloc; at the same time,
however, the drying up of internal Bloc
sources because of intensified security meas-
ures would in itself provide an indication of
Soviet preparations. Then, in the period from
D-10 and especially D-5 on, we could expect
indications of last-minute preparations. At
this time, however, there would be a serious
problem of processing and disseminating such
indications on a sufficiently timely basis.
24. We believe that allied intelligence would
probably be able to sort the variety of indi-
cators into a meaningful pattern at a relative-
ly early stage of Soviet mobilization for a
full-scale attack. US intelligence might be-
come aware of this mobilization as long as
four or possibly even six months prior to D-
Day. The minimum period would probably
not be less than 30 days. Even though in-
telligence was able to give only a generalized
degree of warning, showing the progressive
increase of Soviet war readiness, it would
probably still be able to chart the trend of
full-scale preparations, to anticipate their
probable course to completion, and thus to
designate the beginning of a period of max-
imum danger. It might even be able to
identify features of Soviet full-scale mobili-
zation which because of their uniqueness or
extreme costliness could be interpreted spe-
cifically as evidence of an intention to attack.
25. As the time of attack drew near, indica-
tions of its possible approach would become
increasingly specific. Based on observed
Soviet military activities, warning could prob-
ably be given from a few hours to a few days
in advance of the actual launching of the
attack. This would be rendered very diffi-
cult, however, if Soviet forces, when their
preparations for attack were known to be near
completion, undertook air, naval, and ground
reconnaissance, or attempted major feints.
These activities might provide evidence of
Soviet intention to attack, but would aggra-
vate the difficulty of determining the time of
such attack. It might also be recognized
that, in theory at least, the USSR could al-
ways refrain from or delay attacking even
after preparations were complete. Hence
the indications of military readiness, taken
by themselves, would not necessarily provide
conclusive evidence that attack was certain.
IV. PROBABLE DEGREES OF WARNING IN
THE EVENT OF LESS THAN
FULL-SCALE ATTACK
26. If the USSR were to sacrifice weight for
the advantages of surprise, it would be forced,
depending upon the degree of suprise it
sought, to accept certain major limitations:
(a) no large-scale mobilization of additional
units; (b) no large-scale redeployment of So-
viet air, naval, or ground forces, especially to
forward areas; and (c) no unusual movement
of Soviet air, naval, or ground forces in such
areas as would be likely to indicate the immi-
nence of attack. However, even if the USSR
attempted to achieve the utmost surprise in
launching general war, it would still probably
consider a minimum number of prior prepa-
rations a matter of necessity and elementary
prudence. Therefore, at least some of the
general preparations discussed in Section III
above would almost certainly have to be un-
dertaken. Some of these preparations would
be detected by allied intelligence, but it prob-
ably would be very difficult to ascertain any
such clear pattern of preparations as would '
be discernible in event of mobilization foi.
full-scale attack. Again, the degree of readi-
ness already achieved by Soviet forces would
affect the number of indicators obtained and
the general political situation would affect
the intensity of US intelligence effort and the
ability of intelligence to interpret, correctly
such indicators as it did obtain. Conse;
quently, we believe it possible that these prep-
arations would not lead to a warning of at-
tack, especially if they were carried out over
a long period of time and with careful conceal-
ment.
27. If the USSR decided to attack the US and
key overseas installations without full prior
mobilization for general war, and hence with-
out full-scale attacks in other areas, two gen-
eral alternatives would be open:
a. It could combine its attack against the
US and key overseas installations with a sur-
prise ground campaign in Europe, the Middle
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East, and in the Far East directly or through
the Chinese Communists without prior rein-
forcement of its forces.8
b. It could undertake initially air, and pos-
sibly other forms of attack, against the US
and key overseas installations, but delay its
ground campaigns and discernible prepara-
tions for other military operations until after
these initial attacks had been launched.
V. SOVIET CAMPAIGN IN MAJOR AREAS
AND SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS ON
THE US AND KEY OVERSEAS
INSTALLATIONS
28. If the USSR chose to initiate general war
by an attack with the forces currently sta-
tioned in Europe, the Middle East, and the
Far East, together with attacks on the US and
key overseas installations, the degree of its
over-all prior preparations would vary great-
ly, depending on the location of the attack
and the intensity and duration of the preced-
ing political tensions. If, as we think likely,
there had been a long period of crisis, the
USSR might have already achieved a con-
siderable degree of military and economic mo-
bilization for war, and its foreign and domes-
tic political preparation might be well ad-
vanced. Moreover, during the period 1955-
1958, measures may be taken ostensibly or
actually in response to external developments,
e.g., West German rearmament, which would
greatly improve Soviet readiness for attack.
Therefore, the indicators derived from such
activities, though warning of the increased
readiness for war and likelihood of war, would
probably be of limited significance for warn-
ing of this type of attack. Even so, the mini-
mum local preparations which the USSR
would still have to take for an attack with
forces in place would provide some degree of
warning.
8 The USSR could of course strengthen this ground
attack by some degree of prior reinforcement.
For the purpose of this estimate, however, we
take the above case as the limiting one: i.e., any
prior reinforcement would tend to provide ad-
ditional indicators and hence additional warn-
ing.
29. In Europe, for example, some time would
be required to assemble major elements in
forward positions, although this would vary
seasonally. The longest period ,required
would be between May and August when units
are split between home stations and field
training areas; a lesser period would be re-
quired between November and March when
units are consolidated at home stations; the
minimum period required would be in April
when units are moving to training areas and
in September-October when units are either
engaged in large-scale maneuvers or are being
moved back to home stations. Other mini-
mum preparations would include the release
from stocks of transport, munitions, and sup-
plies in quantities well in excess of those used
even on full-scale maneuvers. In addition,
some two weeks before the attack it would
probably be necessary to begin the movement
of large numbers of locomotives and rolling
stock from East Germany to the Soviet bor-
der in order to prepare for resupply and rein-
forcement operations' to support and expand
the offensive. Altogether, the USSR would
probably be engaged in these preparations
over a period of about 15 days and US intelli-
gence would probably begin to acquire some
indicators at an early stage, although vary-
ing with the season of the year. We believe
that warning of the probability of attack
could be given about one week in advance.
However, in the absence of other indicators
and with Soviet actions appearing to be part
of a normal pattern, the warning could vary
as follows:
a. from a few hours to a few days in April
and in September-October;
b. from two to five days in November-
March;
c. from five to 10 days in May-August.
30. If the USSR undertook concurrent sub-
marine operations against the US and key
overseas installations, it would be necessary
for the submarines so employed to proceed
to wartime patrol stations shortly before the
expected commencement of hostilities. The
passage of these submarines might give up
to two weeks warning of Soviet preparation
for attack.
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31. If the USSR undertook concurrent raider
operations with some of the major units of
their surface fleet against allied lines of com-
munication, it would be necessary for the
units so employed to proceed to their assigned
areas of operations shortly before the expected
commencement of hostilities. The movement
of these raiders might give up to 10 days
warning of preparation for attack.
32. In addition, any unusual and unexplain-
able deviation from the normal operating pat-
tern of the Soviet Bloc merchant marine could
be a supporting indicator of Soviet prepara-
tions to attack. '
33. The extent to which the preparations go-
ing on simultaneously for air attack on the US
and key overseas installations and forces
would tend to confirm and/or advance the
warning would depend somewhat upon the
planned scale of these attacks, as discussed
below.
VI. INITIAL AIR ATTACKS ON THE US
AND KEY US OVERSEAS FORCES
AND INSTALLATIONS
34. For the purposes of this estimate it is
necessary to consider two types of air attack
on the US and key overseas installations: (a)
a maximum effort using as many aircraft as
possible, and (b) an attack designed to achieve
a high degree of surprise. The USSR could
undertake these air attacks on the US and key
overseas installations and forces simultane-
ously with a full-scale attack in Eurasia or
with the less than full-scale attacks discussed
in paragraphs 26-32. Alternatively, the
USSR could initiate general war with such
air attacks only, while delaying discernible
preparations for other military operations in
order to increase the likelihood of surprise
against the US. In this case, the very dis-
parity between preparations for long-range
air operations and those for other general
war campaigns could be a highly significant
indicator of the probable nature of the initial
Soviet attack.
35. Maximum Air Attack. We have estimated
in NIE 11-7-55 that by exercising its max-
imum capability the USSR could now launch
about 950 long-range aircraft against the
US in an initial attack.9 By mid-1958 the
maximum number launched could be in-
creased to about 1,100. However, we be-
lieve extensive prior preparations would be
required, particularly in the early part of the
period covered by this estimate. These
would almost certainly include improving air-
fields, maintenance and fuel storage facilities
in the Chukotski, Kamchatka, and Kola areas,
bringing personnel and equipment to full
strength in long-range air units, probably in-
tensified training of air personnel, increased
frequency of long-distance training missions,
and raising levels of maintenance, and pos-
sibly training in inflight refueling techniques.
The critical indicators would be those relat-
ing to increased levels of activity at staging
bases in the Chukotski, Kamchatka, and Kola
areas, since in 1958 as well as at present
these bases would be essential to maximum
attacks on the US. By 1958, however, the de-
gree of Soviet dependence upon these forward
areas, and thus their significance as a' warn-
ing indicator, would decline if the USSR, as
part of a maximum scale attack, chose to
launch some or all of its heavy bombers direct-
ly from interior bases or either one- or two-way
missions or combinations thereof. Except for
the BEAR (turbo-prop) , even Soviet heavy
bombers employing inflight refueling would
still require advanced bases for making two-
way attacks on the most distant US targets.
36. At present, Soviet preparatory activities
for maximum scale attack would require at
least several months, and probably consider-
ably longer, and would probably become
known to allied intelligence, especially if/car-
ried forward with great urgency. We believe
that the indicators associated with prepara-
tion of the advance bases, taken together with
others pointing to the increased readiness of
9 The great bulk of these aircraft would have to
fly one-way missions, but the problem of ad-
vance warning by intelligence, as distinguished
from tactical warning by early warning radar,
would not be significantly different if the USSR,
in order to permit two-way missions by more
of the strike aircraft, chose to include some pro-
portion of tankers, if available, in the total num-
ber of planes launched.
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the Long-Range Air Force, would probably
assume a meaningful pattern in time for in-
telligence to give a generalized degree of
warning 15-30 days prior to attack. Never-
theless, this would be warning only of in-
creased readiness and not of intent to attack.
37. If such preparations proceeded gradually
over the next few years, they would have even
less significance for warning, since they
could well be part of a normal build-up of the
USSR's long-range air capability. Thus, by
1958, the bases, training, and equipment of
the Soviet Long-Range Air Force could be ad-
vanced to a point where only minimum prep-
arations would be required prior to an attack.
There would then need to be little in the way
of movement of personnel and equipment,
logistic activity, or training flights which
would depart from a normal pattern of activ-
ity. Under these circumstances, indicators
of the preparations taking place in the Soviet
Long-Range Air Force might be few, and
warning would depend almost entirely on in-
dicators received during the staging of air-
craft.
38. At present, US intelligence would be like-
ly to discover significant activities indicating
the movement of the large numbers of air-
craft to staging bases involved in a maximum
scale attack. Considering also the amount of
time that the aircraft would require to
reach such bases, together with the time re-
quired for refueling and servicing at the bases,
we believe that intelligence could give specific
advance warning 10 of unusual and possibly
threatening air activity on the order of 18-24
hours before the attacking aircraft reached
the early warning radar screen. It would al-
ways be possible, of course, for such a move-
ment to be a practice maneuver or a feint, and
therefore warning of actual intent to attack
could not be given with complete certainty.
Here and in paragraphs 39, 40, 42, and 44 warn-
ing given in hour terms is defined as the elapsed
time between the receipt of information by a
US command or agency having authority to alert
US defense which indicates an imminent threat
of Soviet air attack, and the time such an attack
would reach the existing continental early warn-
ing line (1955) and the proposed (DEW) line
(1958) .
39. Developments are taking place in the So-
viet Long-Range Air Force which probably
will decrease the possibility of detection, and
increase the difficulty of interpreting indica-
tors in terms of intent to attack. By 1958,
movements in and out of forward staging
bases may become routine, provided that dur-
ing the interim a major effort had been un-
dertaken to improve base facilities and train-
ing, logistics, and equipment of the Long-
Range Air Force. The likelihood that these
movements would be discovered would not be
much less than at present, but the difficulty
of assessing them as warning indicators would
be very much greater. In addition, by 1958
the increased speeds of jet bombers will re-
duce the time required for movements to stag-
ing bases, and the probable increased han-
dling capabilities at the bases will reduce time
required for refueling and servicing. Con-
sequently, the specific advance warning of
unusual and possibly threatening air activity
which could be given, assuming that move-
ment to the staging bases was discovered and
correctly interpreted, would probably be on
the order of 12-18 hours."
40. Both at present and in 1958, if the move-
ment to staging bases was not discovered,
warning could be obtained only if almost con-
tinuous reconnaissance of the staging areas
was being maintained and aircraft were dis-
covered after they had already reached these
areas. However, reliance on this means alone
might reduce the specific advance warning
period to a few hours, or even virtually to zero,
because of possible difficulties and delays in
processing and interpreting the results of re-
connaissance. Moreover, by 1958 the probable
growth in Soviet air defenses would make such
reconnaissance considerably more difficult.
11
The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that
movement in and out of forward staging bases
may become routine by 1958 if currently indicat-
ed efforts to improve the bases, training, and
equipment of the Long-Range Air Force con-
tinue. He also believes it unlikely that such
movement would be discovered and correctly in-
terpreted before its value as warning had passed.
Moreover, the increased capability of the Soviet
Union to launch heavy bombers from interior
bases will further degrade this source of warning
information.
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41. The additional preparations which would
be necessary to attack US overseas installa-
tions would not increase the likelihood of spe-
cific advance warning.12 In the event of a
maximum scale attack, the long-range air
arm would already be in a high state of readi-
ness. The readying of the jet light bomber
units which could also be used for attacks in
Western Europe, the UK, and some parts of
the Middle East and Far East could be ac-
complished without serious additional risk of
detection unless very large numbers had to
be deployed to forward bases. If guided mis-
siles were employed, no warning of their use
would be obtained, apart from the general-
ized warning which might have been derived
from prior preparations for hostilities.
42. Surprise Air Attack. However much the
Soviet planners desired to achieve surprise in
their initial air attacks on the US and key
overseas installations, they would still wish
to achieve the optimum weight of attack con-
sistent with surprise. We have estimated
in NIE 11-7-55 that if the USSR attempted a
surprise attack against the US in mid-1955,
aircraft would probably be launched from the
11 available staging bases in the Kola, Chu-
kotski, and Kamchatka areas. There is a
lack of sufficient evidence to permit a firm
assessment of the capabilities of the individ-
ual bases in these areas for staging bomber
aircraft. However, we believe by a major ef-
fort the USSR could launch some 450 aircraft
on initial attacks against the US. Prepara-
tions for such an attack would permit possible
detection by allied intelligence and, if detect-
Although variations in the relative priority as
to timing and weight of attack between the US
and overseas installations would not affect the
advance warning obtained by intelligence, they
would be of great significance for the tactical
warning derived from radar due to the varying
times at which aircraft bound for targets at dif-
ferent distances would be picked up. For ex-
ample, if the USSR chose to make attacks on
overseas installations before launching attacks
on the US itself, those attacks would alert the
continental US defense system, although the
overseas installations might obtain only radar
warning of the attack. They would probably
have been alerted, to some extent, however, by
generalized warning derived from general prep-
arations for hostilities.
ed, would provide a generalized degree of
warning of several days, and specific advance
warning of unusual and possibly threatening
air activity on the order of 18-24 hours.
43. A reduced scale of attack, however, in-
volving about 250 aircraft could be launched
against the US, and accompanied by an ex-
traordinary security effort, might be launched
in mid-1955 with little or no specific advance
warning to US intelligence. This estimate
rests on the belief that the forward bases may
now be capable of handling these aircraft or
may become so without detectable prepara-
tions.
44. As estimated in paragraphs 37 and 38, by
1958 the USSR could, provided forward base
construction, training, and equipment of the
Soviet Long-Range Air Force were sufficient-
ly developed, launch its maximum air attack
of about 1,100 aircraft against the US under
such conditions that the period of specific ad-
vance warning of unusual and possibly threat-
ening air activity would probably be on the
order of 12-18 hours, and might be consider-
ably less if the movement to staging bases
was not discovered. Thus in 1958 the maxi-
mum Soviet air attack, provided no other
warning of Soviet intent to go to war had been
received, could achieve a high degree of sur-
prise.
45. During the period of this estimate the
USSR will have a progressively increasing
capability of launching one-way attacks on
the US from interior Soviet bases which would
probably provide no specific advance warning
to US intelligence." Moreover, there are
two other ways in which the USSR might
by 1958 (and possibly somewhat before that
year) launch an attack on the US in such a
way that no specific warning would be likely
before its actual launching:
a. Assuming that the USSR pressed ahead
with development of its advance bases in the
Chukotski, Kamchatka, and Kola areas, and
with the general preparation of its Long-
Range Air Force, "normal" flights of aircraft
to and from these bases Would almost certain-
ly occur in increasing number as the develop-
" For full discussion of Soviet long-range capa-
bilities, see NIB 11-7-55.
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ment of the bases progressed. A pattern of
activity would tend to be established. Un-
der these circumstances, a considerable num-
ber of aircraft? roughly the ?number engag-
ing in such "normal" activity ? would almost
certainly be able to take off from these bases
(and from those in the Leningrad area) for
a surprise attack upon the US without any
such unusual prior preparations or assembly
as would particularly attract the attention of
allied intelligence.
b. Assuming that the USSR acquires an in-
flight refueling capability (which it can do
although there is no evidence at present that
the Soviet Long-Range Air Force possesses
such a capability) and develops it to the
necessary degree, Soviet heavy bombers could
also be launched on two-way missions from
certain home bases without specific advance
warning, and without staging at the advance
bases.14
VII. WARNING FROM SOVIET PREPARA-
TIONS TO RECEIVE RETALIATORY
ATTACKS
46. An important element not included in the
foregoing examination is that of Soviet defen-
sive preparations to receive a retaliatory blow
140nly the BEAR (Turbo-prop), with its tenta-
tively estimated characteristics, could reach all
targets in the US. See NIE 11-7-55.
from allied power. Minimum preparations
would probably include the alerting of air
defense forces and_the civil defense organiza-
tion, Preparations of military units and in-
stallations for air defense, the dispatching of
submarines accompanied by increased aerial
reconnaissance to locate US carrier forces,
and the evacuation of key personnel and pos-
sibly segments of population from potential
target areas. If steps such as these were
not taken, they would constitute serious lim-
itations on the USSR's ability to withstand
a retaliatory blow. If they were taken, they
would probably provide a warning period of
as much as a week to 10 days, and, taken in
conjunction with other indicators, would
greatly increase the definiteness of any warn-
ing US intelligence might be able to give.
The risk which the USSR would be willing to
accept as. a result of neglecting some or all
of this type of defensive preparation would
depend in part on the degree of success which
the Soviet leaders expected their own initial
attack to achieve. We believe that in ele-
mentary prudence they would be unwilling to
forego preparation to receive a retaliatory
blow; therefore, some important indicators
of this type would probably be obtained.
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