RANDOM THOUGHTS ON OUR NEXT BIG SOVIET PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005000010045-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: January 7, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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? vt," I-WP V -I i.:Ab
NEMORANDUN TO:
7 January 1955
SUBJECT: Random Thoughts on our next
Soviet paper
le An excellent set of T/RIsl I like particularly the thrust of
the covering memo, which indicates). John*, hopes to do one of the main
things I thought should be done, i.e., cut down the overweening size of
11-4. These estimates will simply not have their proper impact if
they are too bulky to -wade through. Their emphasis should be more
selective than comprehensive, and John has the right pitch.
2. However, there is one additional area of selectivity he
hasn't come to grips with. This is: to what extent should the big
Soviet paper cover in detail all local Bloc courses of action and
e prospects o all lc- Communist parties? I feel myse 1 that
the 11-'4 series should be fairly generalized, leaving to specific
country or problem papers all feasible details. For examplelin
his I.A-4 need we ask "are any of these (foreign) Communist parties
likely to be able to seize power, etc."? Or in III B, 2wshould we
get dawn into too much detail on specific forecasts of probable Soviet
courses of action vis-a-vis too many countries? No doubt this is
primarily a problem of drafting, and no harm in asking the questions
in the T/R.
3. I do not feel that the relationship between Soviet dogma,
doctrine, ideology (or what have you) and actions is adequately
covered in 11-4 (cf. Gallagher's recent memos). This subject may be
controversial and we don't want to waste too much space on it, but
it may merit Some exploration.
4. I think that the estimate itself should include a brief
summation of the changes in Soviet leadership attitudes since Stalin's
death. Has anything really changed? A lot of people don't think so,
which makes this an important point. With the longer perspective of
1955 we may be able to tape this more precisely than when we wrote 11-4.
Do the Kremlin leaders really believe what Joxe told Malenkov, i.e.w
that Stalin's policies got the USSR into its present international spot?
If so, it must have a real impact on Soviet policy. We can't merely
content ourselves with reiteration of Mose Harvey's dictum that Soviet
objectives never change, therefore neither do their policies. Therefore,
I suggest a section in the T/Rs asking for a brief statement of probable
effects on Soviet attitudes and policies of shift to new leadership after
Stalin's death.
DOCUM N
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CLASS. S G D T
CO ENTIAL NEXT RE \ Ei AT
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5. In Section II, I feel we should devote at least a subheading
to the crucial question of how approaching nuclear plenty must affect
Soviet policy, just as it has had such an effect on our own. I am
convinced that the Soviets (now that they've exploded plenty of their
own stuff), must be at least as worried as we are over war in an era
of nuclear piBnty, per Malenkov's remark last March on the perils of
nuclear war. Moreover, the question as to whether the Soviets would
become more or less aggressive in a period of plenty was one of the
major disputed points in NSC 5440/1, .1.6.7 recent redo of Basic
National Security Policy. The parain 11-4, which leans to the agressive
side, needs a lot of rethinking in my view.
? 6. I agree fully with the proposed greater emphasis on strategic
policy and concepts in the military section, at the expense of too much
listing of hardware. But shouldn't I,D, 1 be beefed up some more to
ask some of the questions raised by us and the British in our recent
strategy papers, such as: (1) Is Soviet doctrine still tied more to
a conventional world War II type strategy and force basis (partly from
continued dominance of ground generals); (2) Is the balance of Soviet
forces slowly changing, as ours is; (3) Are the Soviets really building
toward all-out attack on the US if war comes or does their force
pattern suggest a more limited strategic concept (as the British suggest);
(4) Might the Soviets come to believe at any time during the period
under review that they could decisively damage US war-making capacity?
Our Soviet paper should draw the necessary over-all inferences from what
the USSR is doing in the military field, and not content itself with a
mere recitation of hardware.
7. I myself), feel that the economic section of our big Soviet
papers is in danger of becoming almost as routinized as the military
section, i.e., a straight recitation of the trends and statistics in
various economic fields similar to the listing of military figures.
Section V in NIE 11-4- is a good over-all statement about the historical
development of the Soviet economy. Could we not parallel this in the
new estimate with a few over-all paras. on how the inter-relationships
of the various trends and problems projected are likely to change the
face of the Soviet economy over the next several years? In other
words tie all the separate projections together in something more than
GNP terms. Where is the USSR heading economically? Does it have a
maturing economy? How will increases in consumargoods output affect
future demand patterns? How will trade increases affect the autarky
policy?
8. I recognize that most of the above suggestions may relate more
to the drafting stage than to the T/R stage. Nevertheless, shouldn't
we ask a few more questions about some of them?
CONFIDENTIAL R. W. KOMER
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Staff Memorandum No.
ON?MiniNOMPOIMMO?r
AOW CONF IAL
4 January 1955
Subject: Soviet Bloc Paper (NIE 11-3-55)
1. The attached terms of reference for NIE 11-3-55 "Soviet Capa,Alities and Probable
Courses of Action Through Mid-1960 :_argely follow the pattern adopted for NIE 11-4-54.
However, there are extensive sections of the latter paper which we do not think require
repetition this year. These include numerous paragraphs in the political and economic
sections which were descriptive of the nature of the Soviet system and which were put in
last year because we felt that no previous NIE on the Soviet Aloe had dealt adequately with
certain fundamental and continuing aspects of Soviet society. We hope this year to confine
ourselves more strictly to an account of recent beemmxx developments of significance and to
a forecast of pTobrble developpents
2. In the political section, for example, the essential estimates to be made have to
do with the relationships within the top leadership, the relationships between regime and
the general population, and the bearing of these on the stability and authority of the Foviet
government as well as upon its ability to pursue its ob.lectives freely and to choose among
alternative courses of action without reference to the internal stability of the Soviet power 41,
3. In the economic field we intend to continue our practice of Charting the prospects fol
Soviet economic growth, and to provide as much detail as the econonists can be induced to agreo
upon. We ehould again give particular attention to the long-run prospects in the agricultural
field, which is now receiving the regime's special attention. We should further examine in
detail the regime's probable policy with respect to the scale cf its military effort,
particulnrly in the light of probable developments in the West, and the likely consequences
for the Soviet economic situation of any major Shift in this respect which might be under-
taken.
4. We hope to save space in NTE 11-3-55 by reducing still more of the purely numerical
data in the military section of the paper to tabular form. Emphasis should be placed on
the strategic concepts governing Soviet military policy, on significant new developme7ts in
weapons systems, and on the estimate of over-all Bloc military capabilities.
5. The section on the "Soviet Estimate of the World Situation" introduced for the r
time in NIE 11-4-54 has, we think, proved its value both as an eductional exercise'
propose
essential ingredient in the logic of the paper as a whole. We Imp= to keen if
possibly to Shorten it somewhat by eliminating itsc
NO CA
t more. LID L Fl
CO NTIA
cLAS
LEXT
?11/41,iTH: 0-
1)Are: AI VIE
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6.- The section on nCourses of Action" should probably remain pretty much unchanged both
in size and content. The essential question to be answered here, of course, will be whether,
in the light of recent developments in the West or those likely to take place (especially
1
German rearmament or its failure) the USSR's generally "mild" policy of the last year or two
is likely to undergo any radical shift.
7. To meet the I May deadline se: for *kith this: paper, the meetings of the IAC
representatives should begin no later than4 April. Contributions ought therefore to be
submitted by II March,
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"CONF1 TIAL
4 Jan ry 1955
JH
01?REMEXCE: DIE 31-3-55: SOVIET CAPABILITIES ADD PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES
ACTION THROUGH EID,1960 (Draft for Board consideration)
To nimrttile the political, economic, scientific, and rrn4toxy strengths
the USSR and to estimate probable Soviet action through .m14,1960.
IIERODUOTCW
sea of
The present tezas of reference are, designed to ing out significant changes and elicit
additional information on aspects of the problerl which have become apparent since the publi-
cation of BIS 11,4-54. Significant changes in the conclusions and discussion of= 114-549
not reflected in the responses to the questions below, should be pointed out in the contri-
butions
. 11/1.13 rACTORS AFFECTING S COURSES OF ACTION
A. Political Nature
I. USSR
or
a. Have there been significant changes in the composition or/the relations within
the Soviet ruling group since mid-1954? Save there been developments In do--
nestle and foreign policy which teem likely to produce strains within the Soviet
leadership? Are changes likely to occur within this group during the: period of
this estimate which would affect the authority of the regime and its freedom
of action in domestic and foreign policy?
b. Have significant changes occurred in the institutional teses of Soviet authority
(party, police military)? Are changes likely to occur in the power relation-
ships between these groups which would affect the authority of the 'regime and its
freed= of action in domestic and foreign policy/
c. Have significant changes occurred in the regime.? policies toward the population
at large and toward selected eocial classes, or are they likely to occur? Are
agy domestic policies or political or social issues within the USSR likely to
develop in such away as either to weaken or strengthen the authority of the
regime and its freedom of action in domestic and foreign police
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d. What is the status of the regime's policies to ameliorate living conditions
and to restrict the arbitrary exorcise of the police power against the popu-
lation? Are these policies likely to be con-tinned cr are there signs of
factors developing which will alter the regime's intention to carry through
such policies? What has been the development of popular, non-Partv attitudes
tauard the regime in the post-Stalin period?
2. Soviet-Satellite Relations
a. Have significant changes occurred or are they likely to occur in bscow's re-
lations with the Satellites? Are there any developments likely to occur within
thelSatellites or in the rrea world which would affect Moscow's authority?
b. To that extent have developments within the Satellites affected Moscow's
freed= of action in domestic and foreign policy? Are changes likely to occur
within the Satellites which would affect Moscow's freedom of action within the
Satellites and Moscow's policies toward the free world?
3.Sine-Soviet RelOippe
a. Have significant developments taken place in Sine-Soviet relations? Is it
141r07 that the political, economic, and military issues involved in UK Sino-
Soviet relations will develop in such away as to affect the relationship be-
tween Vbscou and Peiping or the freedom of action exorcised by each in its re-
spective foreign and domestic policies?
15. Have changes occurred or are they likely to oaaar in the respective roles of
1106e04 and Peiping in the VietVirh and North 'Korean regimes? Are changes
likely to occur which would a Met Moscow's or Peiping's freedom of action
with respect to these regimes and Bloc policies toward the non-Comelmist world?
I. Forel= Communist Parties
a. Have apy significant changes occurred or are they likely ocaar in Moscow's
relations with foreign C at at parties?' Are any of these Ccrammist parties
likely to be dble to seize power or increase their influence significantly
during the period of this estimate?
Er. Economic Factors
1. * and Qimutitative
a. flatware the main trends in Soviet economic policy in 1954? Have significant
changes in economic policy taken place recently or are they Maly to take
place during the period of the estimate? What will be the critical factors
in Moscow's decisions on economic policy?
CONFIDENTia
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to. What were the main trends in Soviet GRP in 19541 in growth of GRP in
the allocation of GBP to defense, investment, and consumption, and in the
growth of the various sectors of the economy? What is the significance of
these trends in terms of the continued growth of the economy? that comp-
parisons can be made between Soviet and RS ORTI
a. What will be the probable growth rate of Soviet lflP during aid beyond the
period of this estimate? What would be the effect on the growth rate of al-
ternative allocations of resources (o. g.? a sharp increase in defense
expenditures)?
Economic Resource;
a. What were the mein trends it 1954 in the growth of the Soviet population,
the size and composition of the labor force, in the supply of basic ray
? materials and finished products in the stockpiling program, and in the trans-
portation system?
Is it likely that human and material
Soviet ceonaw during end beyond the
serious bottlenecks?
3. Develop:cents it the Principal Econ
in
omic Sectary,
as will limit the growth of the
of tivi54 estimate? Will there be
'Mot were the main trends in. 1954 in the three sectors of Soviet industrial
production (capital goods, consumer goods, rdlitagrinvdltotion#0 and how do
these trends compare with the past? 'What were the trends in adrdnistrative
efficiency, labor productivity, and technological development? What will be
the probable growth rates of these sectors in the period of the estimate?
b. What .were the trends (quantitative) in the production of ground, naval, and
air weapons in /9540 and how do these tremiscomvere with the past? What
comparisons can be made between Soviet and US trends in the production of
rAlitary end-items? Row would a renewed military build-up affect the other
sectors of the economy? What will be the effect of the increasingemplexity
and cost of modern weapons on levels of Soviet military expenditure?
a. What were the main developments in Soviet agriculture in 1954? What are the
principal geographic and natural liOtations on the expansion of agricultural
production, including the present ismil expansion program? Mat will be the
critical economic factors affecting the implementation of agricultural policy?
What will be the probable growth rate during the period of this estimate?
rn NIF inFNTI At
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d.?, Mut were the main trends in urban and rural livIng stprenrds in 1954?
In food consumption, in the mm047 of consumer durables pre textiles, in
the level or houzillgo and in reel income? Whet will be the probable trends
during this period? Ma:twill be the critical factors affecting the gramth
of living standards?
e. Trhat economic effects would resat free either a significant 2reftesibrictifflosatak
underfnlflilnent of the regime's welfare goals or a reversal of its:emgram
to increase comzuner benefits?
4. Eguka2a.a?42
a. Last !Tare the principal developments in the volume, conpositien, and direction
of Soviet trade in 1954 with the Satellites, Communist China, and the West?
How do these trends compare with the past? new have Soviet silipments to Com-
rerist China and the Satellites affected Soviet domestic economic programs.?
What will be the probable trends in Soviet trade during this period?
Inizt were the trends in Soviet balance of payments in trade urith the West,
indludieg the role of gold sales? What are the prospects for a Shift in
Soviet trade policy from experts of agricultural products to experts of
capital goods?
C. Scientlyfie pee Teehnicel Factors, grect4a7 Seviet CapabilWee.
1. Quantitative. (Use charts and graphs wherever possible. Include figures for
nid-1955, nid-1958, and m-1960.) What are total scientific assets or the USSR,
i. e.? manpower, facilities, financial support, etc.? Hbw do ussa figures coepare
trith the US? What proportions of these totals are engaged in activities directly
affecting military capabilities, specifically in the physical sciences, and in
basic industry, light industry., health, and agricultural research and teehnelogy2
2. Qealitative. What is the quality of Soviet scientific training and research in
major scientific fields? How do these compare with the West? How does ideb1op7.
affect quality and independence of research?
3. Pateklite and Communipt Chines Contributioa. What contributions to Soviet
scientific capaiIities are made by the Satellites and Crimminnipt China?
4. Probable War. Develoemepte During tbe Period of tbip. Wmate. Ulm:twin be
the major strengths and weaknesses of Soviet sciences? What are Soviet capa-
bilities in the most important scientific and technological fields, the probable
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developments in (Inch field, and the teal:ens and weapons systems (indluding
nuclear) which will probably be developed and produced? In general terms, will
Soviet (and Bloc) scientific capabilities nest Soviet (and Bloc) requimments
during this period?
D. Bloc Iiilitarr.clanabilitj.ep toy Wational Units)
(Detailed statements on method of analysia and probable margins of error should
be included far all production and inventory figures and statistical tables.)
1. Probable Soviet Bilitarv Strateer
a. In general terms what has been the probable Soviet military strategy
in case of general war, and what are the basic factors which have de-
termined this strategy?
b. Are agy significant changes in Soviet military strategy likely to occur
during this period,. and if so, what are the probable determining factors?
2. Bloc Battery Ames (By National Units)
a. .....t.j"ta_g_ve. (Use charts whenever possible and inalude figures for up-
dating Tobles 14, AppemiisD, NIE 11-4-54. Trmlude figures for mid-1955,
midi-1958, and mid-1960.)
(1) What is Bloc armed strength: TO&E, =tuber? possible, actual? What
is the ?apposition of Dlec armed forces, iraluding security forces?
What is the disposition of Bloc armed forces?
(2) What is the size of the Inilitary nappower pool? Of trained reservesi
What is the nebilization capacity of the Bloc for 11 /30, VI ilSO, in
terns of manpower, nilitary organization, and units?
(3) What is the size of the inventories and reserve stocks of major 27414-
taryweapois, including mess destruction weapons?
(4) What will be the probable annual production of rajar nilitary end-items
during this period? What would the probable annual productiaa be,
assuming (a) a constant absolute level of defense expenditures (1953-
1954 level); and CO a la% annual increase of military expenditures?
A 20% increase? In general terms, how will estimated Soviet strategic
requirements and the increasing unit cost and cc laxity of major
-weapons affect weapons prioritise and thus the level of production
within major sectors (ground, sea, air, nuclear, and guided missiles)
of the defense establishtent?
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b. Qualitative. (Indicate preamble basic trends durieg this period.)
What is tha quality of the Bloc armed forces from the point of view
of effectiveness, political reliability, ::nd morale? What is the
quality of combat support services? What is the General quplit7
of najor items of Soviet equipmsmt? Mud is the degree of coordination
between the major nilitary services and between the national units of
the Bloc? To that extent would logistic weaknesses limit the effective-
ness of Soviet or Bloc forces in specific areas?
3. Over-all Cavabilities
a. In general terms, how do the major Soviet Bloc political, econamic,
scientific, and military strengths and weaknesses affect Soviet mili-
tary capabilities? To what extent will new Soviet 'military developments
during this period modify present capabilities to pursue both offensive
and defensive action for localized or general war?
b. In very general terms, what aro the capabilities of the Soviet oconaq7
to suppart simultaneous land campaigns (EIG P-6)?
a. Also in general terms, what are the recuperative capabilities of the
Soviet (mammy against attacks tr mass destruction weapons (stockpiles,
concentration or industry, communications lines)?
II. SOVIET p$71121111 OT Ta7 vow) SIT1Th.T/07
A. In the Soviet view, What are the major developments during the peat year which have
had an. effect, actually or potentially, upon the strategic position of the Soviet
Bloc vis.,a-vis the non-Communist world? In particular. What is the Soviet estimate
of the world balance of forces and how in the Soviet view will the relative military
strength of the Soviet Bloc and the West develop in the fixture? What dangers to
Soviet security, and What opportunities for the ad a of Soviet interests
have emerged or are "I?Pe3y to emerge as a result of these developments?
B. What is the Soviet estimate of the actual and potential effect of those develop-
ments upon the cohesiveness and policies of the tlestern alliance?
C. What is tTle. Soviet estimate of the vulnerabilities in the non-Communist world?
In the Soviet view, What issues are potential sources of friction among thelastarn
allies, and what other weaknesses or a moral, political, or economic mature appear
susceptible of exploitation?
D. Are there major differences between Soviet and Chinese Communist estimates with
respect to any of the above questions?
)
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PROBABLE
OBJECT AND
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NURSES OF ACT ON
J. Yrobable Soviet Obiectives
1. Have the develont cU.s Issed above, or other factors, caused the Soviet
leaders to modify in aeywa their shart-term aims? Have they caused the
Soviet leaders to change their estimate of the likelihood (or the timing)
of the achievement of their
2. Have they caused the Soviet 1
aders to modify their methods?
k3. To what extent would Soviet a ms or methods be modified or extended in the
event of a major change in the'world situation, such as, for elninple, a
major increment in Western military strength?
B. Probable Soviet Courses of Action
1. In general, what courses of action will the Soviet leaders pursue during the
course of this estimate? What areas of the world will they consider most
Important, both for the immediate future and for the longer run? What major
issues will twv attempt to exploit? In what ways?
2. In particular, what courses of action will the Soviet leaders pursue in each
area of the world? (Contributions should include brief summaries of major
developments in each area of the world during the past year which may affect
Soviet courses of action. For example, recent developments in Soviet relations
with such countries as Japan, Afghanistan, Iran, Yugoslavia, and Finland should
'be uately di -t :'..L. The trends in oviet foreign trade and technical
,tan'a_yeicies, and the political implications thereof, should also be
discussed.) -
3. Has the parallelisn oi soviet and Communist Chinese policies in the Thr PAst
been affected by developments witan the past year? In what ways might the
Chinese Communists try to modify Soviet decisions and courses of action as set
forth in the answers to questions 1 and 2 above? Night the Chinese Communists
take courses of action contrary to the desires of the Kremlin? If so, what are
these courses of action, and under what conditions might they be taken?
340.11,!,4tore
CONEI:D!'i\HAL
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