WORLD REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A004800040001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 28, 1954
• Content Type: SNIE

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SNIE 100-6-54
28 November 1954
032130
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 100-6-54
WORLD REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE
US COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST
COMMUNIST CHINA
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 28 November 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy
Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant to
the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
NC) CHANC E IN C
DOCUMR\ . NO.
DOCUMFINMI4e.
CLASS. C: NO CHANGE *a CLASS. b
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DATE: LCA:
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CLASS. CHANGE* TO: TS 8 NEXT REV!
NV(rPIEVtEW DATE.
MTN: irt 713-2
DATE, 'VIEWER: ___31.-----.00,2044
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REVIEWER: ___1220P
COPY NO. 13I?
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
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I. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
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partment or Agency
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3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
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quested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22
June 1953.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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WORLD REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES
OF ACTION AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA
THE PROBLEM'
To estimate Communist and non-Communist reactions to an offshore and/or an
inshore blockade2 of Communist China imposed unilaterally by the US in retaliation
for the recent sentencing by Communist China of US citizens to prison terms.
ASSUMPTION
The imposition of the US blockade would be publicly announced and its scope
defined and would be preceded, or accompanied, by a formal US statement, possibly
in the UN, of a "bill of particulars" against Communist China, and an expression of
support from the US Congress, possibly in the form of a Joint Resolution.
THE ESTIMATE
I. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE BLOCKADE
1. A blockade of Communist China which in-
cluded Port Arthur, Dairen, Hong Kong, and
Macao (paragraph 4 considers the effects of
excluding these ports from the blockade)
would cut off Communist China's seaborne
foreign trade which was estimated to have in-
cluded, in 1953, at least 1.5 million tons of
imports and 3 million tons of exports. If the
blockade were extended to coastal waters it
1 This paper does not take into account the legal
aspects of the posited blockade either from the
domestic or international point of view.
2Within the context of this paper an Offshore
Blockade assumes that the blockading forces are
maintained at a distance from the coast, and
that all designated traffic, entering or departing
Communist Chinese ports from or for overseas
destinations, will be intercepted.
An Inshore Blockade is assumed to include, in
addition, all oceangoing coastwise traffic between
Chinese Communist ports and between Chinese
Communist and adjacent foreign ports. Depend-
ing on the tightness of the blockade commercial
or fishing junks may or may not be included.
would be only partially effective against local-
ized junk traffic but would virtually eliminate
oceangoing coastal traffic estimated for 1953
at approximately 4 million tons per year.3
2. The Communists would probably estimate
that the Bloc would be able to supply from its
own production or by transshipment from the
West a substantial portion of the essential
imports presently entering Communist China
by sea. Overland transportation routes to
China would be adequate to handle the extra
burden of tonnage coming from the USSR.
In terms of internal transport adjustment, the
The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Dep-
uty Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, be-
lieve that paragraph 1 should be extended as
follows: "The imposition of an inshore blockade,
involving only oceangoing shipping (1,000 GRT
or over) engaged in coastwise traffic, would have
immediate and serious effects on the Chinese
economy already considerably dislocated by the
recent floods. If the blockade were extended to
junk traffic, fishing and commercial, and even
If it were only partially effective, the effects
would be more far-reaching."
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ACiiiagteniagr
blockade would require the costly reorienta-
tion of China's present rail traffic pattern and
the acceptance by an already strained railroad
system of a significant burden of long-haul
traffic now handled in coastwise and overseas
oceangoing vessels.4 Moreover, there are
large portions of China, specifically the Chek-
iang and Fukien provinces, which are almost
completely isolated except for seaborne trade
since no rail lines are available in these areas.
3. Communist China's economic adjustments
to the blockade would require considerable
time and in the short run the blockade would
impose serious economic problems. Addition-
al strains would be placed on the inadequate
internal transportation system and trade
would be reduced. The Bloc would not be able
to fill entirely Chinese Communist require-
ments for certain critical items. The sum of
these adverse effects would, however, be small
in relation to Communist China's gross
national product or to Communist China's
budgetary expenditures but would retard
Communist China's economic growth. Over
an extended period, the adverse economic
effects would decrease as Communist China
expanded its own production of critical goods
and as the expected growth in the Soviet abili-
ty to export capital goods takes place over
the next two to five years.
4. Should the blockade exclude Port Arthur
and Dairen, the economic effects would be
lessened since Port Arthur and Dairen and the
supporting rail network can handle substan-
tial additional tonnages. Exclusion of Hong
Kong (and Macao) would also lessen the eco-
nomic effects of the blockade with the exact
effect depending on the nature of trade con-
trols maintained by the UK on transship-
ments into the mainland.
The Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army;
and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The
Joint Staff, believe that the second and third
sentences of this paragraph should read:
"However, the overland transportation routes
into China and the inland transportation sys-
tem in China would probably not be adequate
to handle additional essential imports unless
there was a reduction in less vital tonnage pres-
ently being carried."
II. PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS
General Considerations
2
5. The Chinese Communists would be seri-
ously concerned over the economic effects of
the blockade, but their reactions against the
blockade itself and with respect to the issue
of US prisoners would be determined to a
much greater extent by political and military
considerations and by the counsel of the
USSR.
6. Peiping probably feels that it has a con-
vincing case against the US prisoners, or at
least against certain of them. More impor-
tantly, it would feel that its prestige as a
leading Asian power had been directly chal-
lenged by the US blockade. Peiping would
probably estimate that the blockade would
offer possibilities for the Communists to iso-
late the US on this issue. Peiping would
probably be surprised at the vigor of the US
reaction and would be concerned lest it signi-
fied a US intention to take still more aggres-
sive action against Communist China. In
any case, Peiping would probably believe that
the US was willing to proceed without its
allies and that the US was psychologically
prepared at the moment to attack the main-
land in reaction to any attack against the
blockading forces.
Offshore Blockade
7. In this situation we believe the initial Chi-
nese Communist reactions to an offshore
blockade would not include either the use of
military force against it, release of the US
prisoners, or initiative to negotiate on the
prisoner issue. We believe Peiping would at-
tempt propaganda exploitation of the issue,
playing on the fears of war of the non-Com-
munist world, and would produce a substan-
tial volume of evidence designed to refute
official US denials of the validity of the espi-
onage charges. For a time not presently
determinable, the Communists probably would
take no military counteraction while they
gauged non-Communist reactions, the effect
of these reactions on official and popular
sentiment in the US, and their own relative
capabilities. They might expect that eventu-
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ally the US would accept some resolution of
the impasse which did not diminish Commu-
nist China's prestige.
Inshore Blockade
8. If the blockade were extended to coastal
waters, we believe the Communists would al-
most certainly use their limited naval capa-
bilities, and their air capabilities, in hit and
run raids against the blockading forces in
widespread efforts to reduce the effectiveness
of the blockade. The extension of the block-
ade would be interpreted as an added indica-
tion of US determination and would increase
Peiping's apprehension over the possibility of
war. In this case they might be more dis-
posed to seek a face-saving solution than in
the case of the offshore blockade, but we
believe that even here they would be unlikely
to effect an early release of the US prisoners.
Offshore and/or Inshore Blockade
9. Without regard as to whether the blockade
were offshore and/or inshore, the USSR would
counsel Peiping to caution and exert its in-
fluence to localize any incidents growing out
of US-Chinese Communist encounters.5 How-
ever, it would afford Communist China what-
ever support seemed necessary to execute the
courses of action on which Peiping had em-
barked, and would resort to political and psy-
chological means to exploit the issue, includ-
ing raising it in the UN as a threat to the
peace. In addition, the USSR might react to
a naval blockade by attempting to bring mer-
chant ships into Port Arthur and Dairen
(where it retains its position until June 1955),
by attempting to breach the blockade at other
points, or by increasing Communist China's
capability to wage mine and submarine war-
fare against the blockading forces. Although
the USSR would be unlikely to initiate gen-
eral war solely because of incidents arising
out of attempts to force the blockade, it would
not be deterred from attempts at counter-
action by the risk of general war.
5 The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of
the Army, believes that this sentence should be
deleted since there is insufficient evidence to
substantiate such a broad conclusion.
3
III. PROBABLE NON-COMMUNIST
REACTIONS
10. The ROK, Nationalist China, probably the
SEATO nations of Southeast Asia, and ele-
ments in other countries would approve such
action and would regard it as indicative of
US willingness to take firm action against the
Communists. Opinion in most other non-
Communist countries of the world would vary
from indifference to strong criticism. In
those nations which have been hoping for a
general relaxation of tensions or for extensive
trade programs with Communist China, it
would be asserted that the US had seized upon
the Chinese Communist action as a pretext
to bring about full-scale war with Peiping, if
not preventive war against the USSR. Nor-
mally middle-of-the-road opinion would prob-
ably be appreciably affected by the continuing
extensive propaganda of the Communists on
the subjects of "peaceful co-existence," the de-
sire of the US to eliminate the Peiping regime,
and the horrors of nuclear warfare. India
would almost certainly condemn the US
action and would, in the United Nations and
elsewhere, attempt to bring about a solution
in favor of Communist China. Accordingly,
and based to a large extent on fear of general
war, certain non-Communist nations would
critically reappraise their confidence in US
leadership. There would almost certainly be
a sharp rise in neutralist sentiment in many
states now in alliance with the US. NATO
states, France, in particular, would fear that
this US engagement in the Far East would
prejudice its support of NATO. However, as
time went on, and if no large-scale warfare in
Asia ensued, we believe that the free-world
nations would in varying degrees adapt them-
selves psychologically to the US action while
continuing to attempt mediation of the issue
in a calmer diplomatic climate.
11. The reactions of the UK and Japan would
probably be of the greatest importance to the
US interests. Initially the UK and Japan
would probably bring considerable pressure on
the US to abandon the blockade. Although
remaining extremely critical of the US, the
UK would continue to castigate the Chinese
Communist action in regard to the prisoners
1401,1Mittl'
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as barbarism in international conduct. We
do not believe that the British would consider
that they had any alternative but to acquiesce
to the US blockade, but they would attempt
by all feasible means to convince the US that
it was destroying free-world unity and bring-
ing on a general war that was unacceptable
to the allies of the US. However, if the US
blockade excepted Hong Kong, the British
would not feel that their prestige of trade was
appreciably harmed. The UK would fear that
if Hong Kong were associated with the block-
ade the Chinese Communists would take ac-
tion to make the British position in Hong
Kong untenable. A US blockade which in-
cluded controls on Hong Kong trade would
thus place a severe strain on US?UK relations.
Japanese public opinion, at this time strongly
influenced by hope of trade with mainland
China, and highly fearful of any steps which
in the Japanese view involve risk of general
war, would probably be comparable to that
of the neutralist countries. The Japanese
Government probably would seek to avoid
direct use of its ports and facilities by US
blockading forces.
12. The ROK and the Chinese Nationalists
would strongly approve the US action and
would see in it an opportunity to involve the
US in war with Communist China. The US
would have increasing difficulty in restraining
both the ROK and the Chinese Nationalists
from undertaking actions which they felt
might lead to the involvement of the US in
open war with Communist China.
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