PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN BOLIVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A004600050001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 19, 1954
• Content Type: NIE

l o st
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN BOLIVIA
NIE 92-54-
Approved 16 March 1954
Published 19 March 1954
DCUt,AENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. t
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
DATE. ' REVIEWER: G r1
The Intelligence Advisory .Committee concurred in this
estimate on 16 March 1954. The FBI abstained, the
subject being outside of its jurisdiction.
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Qaawmaaal~
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN BOLIVIA
THE PROBLEM
To assess the current situation and probable developments in Bolivia, particularly
the character and stability of the present regime.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Bolivia is one of the most economically
retarded and politically unstable coun-
tries in Latin America. The present Na-
tional Revolutionary Movement (MNR)
regime is one of the few broadly based
governments which Bolivia has had. It
enjoys wide popular support, particularly
from labor and middle class elements.
2. The only significance of Bolivia's ex-
tremely weak military and para-military
forces lies in their ability to influence the
domestic political situation. At present
the MNR firmly controls all three com-
ponents of Bolivia's forces-the Army
(which includes the Air Force), the po-
lice, and the civilian militia. If any two
of these groups combined against the
government, however, they could almost
certainly -seize power.
3. While the' general orientation of the
MNR is left of center, dominant influence
in the government is now exercised by the
party's moderate wing. Although it has
accepted some support from Bolivia's
two small Communist groups, the MNR
is making increased efforts to reduce
Communist influence. Nevertheless, it
has hesitated to launch a frontal assault
on the Communists and they retain some
influence, especially in the school system
and among organized labor.
4. Although the MNR government was
critical of the US when it first came to
power, it has become increasingly pro-US
in its outlook because of US support of
the regime. However, should the gov-
ernment lose confidence in US support, it
almost certainly would revert to an anti-
US orientation.
5. The MNR's ambitious program to ex-
pand and diversify Bolivia's economy and
lessen its dependence on tin exports is
the most vigorous attack to date on Bo-
livia's basic economic problems, but it is
unlikely to bring about substantial in-
creases in output in less than two years.
Meanwhile,.owing largely to a sharp de-
cline in tin prices, Bolivia faces growing
economic difficulties, although emer-
gency US aid has averted economic col-
lapse.
6. After mid-1954, when emergency US
aid will be exhausted, the government's
stability and political orientation will de-
pend greatly upon its ability to obtain
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2
additional outside support. If it can se-
cure such aid, the MNR will. probably
continue its present moderate course
without any serious threat to its contin-
uance in power.
7. In the absence of external aid, the
government would soon face an economic
crisis and. its stability would become in-
creasingly tenuous. The MNR's labor
wing would probably demand and receive
an increasingly important role in the
government. It might gain a controlling
voice in the government, possibly with
Communist support. Such a leftist re-
gime would almost certainly be turbulent
and short lived.
8. Moreover, to the extent that the pres-
ent regime moved leftward it would lose
much of its moderate support. In these
circumstances the chief opposition party,
the rightist, ultranationalist Bolivian So-
cialist Falange (FSB), would probably,
over a period of time, amass sufficient
backing to bring off a successful coup.
Thus sooner or later the present govern-
ment would almost certainly be, over-
thrown.
9. An FSB regime would not be capable
of stabilizing the economic situation
without itself receiving substantial ex-
ternal aid. Even with such assistance,
the FSB would have difficulty obtaining
broad popular support.
10. In any case, the basic weaknesses of
the Bolivian political, economic, and so-
cial structure are such that no Bolivian
government will be able to prevent recur-
rent unrest and economic crises,- and
some degree of political instability will
persist for some years to come.
11. Further political and economic de-
terioration would almost certainly in-
crease Communist strength. However,
the Communists alone could not gain and
maintain control of Bolivia in the fore-
seeable future.
DISCUSSION
12. Bolivia is one of the most economically
retarded and politically unstable countries in
Latin' America. -Formidable geographical
obstacles ? and lack of transportation facilities
have hampered national growth. The small
population of some 3,500,000 is clustered
mostly on the high Andean tableland, while
the more fertile but less accessible lowlands
to the. east are largely undeveloped. Most of
the population exists on a subsistence econ-
omy. The only developed industry is mining,
particularly of tin, which provides the great
bulk of government revenues and foreign ex-
change. Normally slightly over half of
Bolivia's tin goes to the UK, and the re-
mainder to the US. The fact that Bolivia
is the- sole significant Western Hemisphere
source of tin gives it considerable strategic.
importance to the US, although Bolivia nor-
mally provides only 10-15 percent of US peace-
time requirements. -
13. Bolivia's remoteness and poverty in de-
veloped resources have greatly retarded its
social and political progress. The great bulk
of the people are illiterate Indians and mes-
tizos (persons of mixed ethnic origin) who
have had no effective voice in national affairs.
A small minority of literate whites and mes-
tizos have constituted the effective body poli-
tic. The country has been dominated by a
still smaller group of large landholders, senior
army officers, and representatives of the min-
ing interests. These groups were unable to
maintain political stability and showed little
effective interest in economic development or
social improvement. Bolivia's humiliating
defeat in the Chaco War (1932-1935) empha-
sized the ineptitude of the country's tradi-
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tional leadership and stimulated the demands
of middle class and labor elements. for social,
economic, and political reform. The contin-
uing inertia of the traditional ruling group in
the face of these demands, resulted in a pro-
gressive decline of its prestige.
14. The National Revolutionary Movement
(MNR) was organized by middle class ele-
ments- in 1941 to press for economic and social
reforms. The MNR participated in the Vil-
larroel Administration (1943-1946), but the
military elements dominant in' that regime
prevented the MNR from shaping major poli-
cies. Nevertheless, during this period the
MNR was able to broaden its political base
through its appeal to labor elements, espe-
cially to the miners. With the fall of Villar-
roel the MNR went into eclipse, but the failure
of succeeding governments to effect apprecia-
ble reforms resulted in a revival of its popu-
larity. In the 1951 presidential balloting the
MNR candidate, Victor Paz Estenssoro, re-
ceived a substantial plurality of " the vote of
the narrowly restricted electorate, but the in-
cumbent government forestalled his election
by Congress by turning over its power. to a
military junta. In April 1952, however, this
junta was overthrown by a revolution organ-
ized by-the MNR with the support of the police
and of armed workers, and Paz Estenssoro was
called from exile in Buenos Aires to assume
the presidency.
15. The policies of the MNR government, espe-
cially its nationalization of the tin mines and
agrarian reform, have aroused much interest
throughout Latin America. The other Latin
American countries are closely watching the
US attitude toward the new regime.
POLITICAL SITUATION
16. The MNR, led by President Victor Paz
Estenssoro, has formulated the first broad pro-
gram of economic development and social re-
form. It has undermined the power of the
old ruling groups by purging the Army and
creating its own militia, by nationalizing the
tin mines, and by instituting agrarian reform.
It has broadened the electorate to include the
unassimilated Indians and mestizos by decree-
ing universal suffrage with no literacy require-
ment, and is making efforts to organize rural
labor. Although these measures have in-
curred the embittered opposition of many in
the previous ruling group, they have been
generally popular and the net effect has been
to strengthen the MNR's political backing.
17. While the MNR regime is authoritarian,
it enjoys broad popular support. It has
strong backing from urban and farm labor
and a probable majority of the middle class
professionals, white collar. elements, and own-
ers of small and medium-sized farms. The
MNR has the support of the powerful mine
workers federation of approximately 45,000
members led by Juan Lechin, the leftist Min-
ister of Mines who is the second strongest
figure in the present regime. The MNR also
controls the other two major labor federa-
tions: the factory workers (about 25,000), and
transport and communications unions (about
15,000). Moreover, the MNR dominates the
Bolivian Labor Central (COB), a council cre-
ated by the MNR to represent labor at the
national level and to strengthen government-
labor liaison.
18. However, the MNR is not a homogeneous
party, and its coherence is largely dependent
on the personal relations among a few key
men. Although Paz Estenssoro is the recog-
nized leader and key figure, his party is split
roughly into a presently dominant moderate
wing, composed largely of middle class ele-
ments led by Vice President Siles Suazo and
a more radical labor wing led by Lechin. Paz
is inclined toward the moderate wing. Thus
far his unifying influence, and the feeling of
each wing that it needs the other have led
both wings to accept compromise solutions on
most issues. For example, the labor wing
pushed the MNR into immediate nationaliza-
tion of the tin mines and expropriation of
large landholdings, but the moderates pre-
vailed in securing approval of compensation
for these properties (although the amount
has not yet been agreed upon). The moder-
ates have also successfully resisted labor pres-
sures for sharp wage increases and for greater
participation in management of the mines.
Should Paz be removed from the scene,
Lechin would probably succeed him, although
not without some opposition.
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19. Leftist Influence in the MNR. Although
dominant influence is now exercised by its
moderate elements, the general orientation of
the MNR is left of center. The leftist cast of
the MNR reflects not only the nature of some
of its leadership and backing, but also the fact
that it rose to power as a revolutionary protest
movement against previous conservative re-
gimes. Allegations have been made that the
MNR is pro-Communist because it has re-
ceived varying degrees of Communist support
and because many of the objectives of the
MNR (nationalization, agrarian reform, etc.)
have also been favored by the Communists.
20. In fact, Bolivia's small and divided, but
vociferous, Communist groups have been a
source of both support for and opposition to
the MNR. They represent another manifes-
tation of the same reaction that fostered the
MNR, and have drawn their membership from
some of the same social groups as has the
MNR. They gained a foothold in Bolivia by
capitalizing on the growth of resentment
against previous regimes and on the Latin
American tendency to blame "capitalism" and
"Yankee imperialism" for most national ills.
Two small parties are currently active, the
Stalinist Bolivian Communist Party (PCB)
and a Trotskyite group, the Revolutionary
Workers Party (POR). The PCB has rough-
ly 2,000 members, drawn mostly from middle
class intellectual elements, particularly in the
school system. The POR, with roughly 1,000
members, is strongest among organized labor.
The two parties present a common anti-US
front on foreign policy, but have adopted dif-
ferent tactics on domestic issues. The PCB
has followed a policy of conditional support
for the MNR; it advocates a "united national
front" and is apparently willing to compro-
mise, at least temporarily, its long term ob-
jectives. The POR, on the other hand, has
been considerably more extreme and has in-
creasingly opposed MNR policies.
21. The advent of the MNR regime has bene-
fited the Communists in Bolivia and they en-
joy a considerable degree of government tol-
eration of their activities. However, the
MNR's attitude toward the Communists has
undergone a considerable evolution since the
1952 revolution. Initially the MNR accepted
Communist support in its struggle for power
as a matter of expediency. Once in power,
however, the MNR has tended to recognize the
fundamental rivalry between itself and the
Communists, and has gradually adopted a
more anti-Communist attitude. It has also
recognized that close association with the
Communists would diminish its chances of
getting US aid. The Communists in turn
have become increasingly critical of the MNR.
22. The MNR has made increasing efforts to
reduce Communist influence in the govern-
ment and among labor and agrarian elements.
For example, it has removed a number of
Communists and suspected Communists from
important government and trade union posts,
although the Communists retain some influ-
ence in the unions and in the school system.
While Lechin, among others, cooperated with
the Communists before the revolution, thus
facilitating the spread of Communist doctrine
in the labor movement, he and the POR are
now rivals for control of labor. However, the
MNR has hesitated to launch a frontal assault
on the Communists because of: (a) the con-
ditional support it has so far received from
the PCB; (b) its need to draw upon PCB-
influenced groups for technical and adminis-
trative personnel; and (c) its far greater con-
cern over the threat from the right and its
desire to avoid exposing both flanks simul-
taneously. -
23. The Opposition from the Right. The
rightist Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB) con-
stitutes the chief opposition to the MNR.
The FSB, a small but militant ultranationalist
group drawn mostly from conservative ele-
ments among the middle class, has become
the focal point for those opposed to the MNR,
such as high ranking army officers removed
by the MNR, the expropriated tin interests,
and some large landowners. Some- members
of the Church hierarchy also are in sym-
pathy with the FSB, although the general
Church attitude apparently is one of tolera-
tion toward the present government. The
FSB denounces the MNR as Communist dom-
inated and seeks to overthrow it in favor of
an authoritarian conservative regime. How-
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ever, the FSB has so far been unable to gain
much popular support, and its present capa-
bilities for a coup are limited. Close MNR
surveillance and security measures have re-
duced it largely to clandestine activity. Many
FSB and other opposition leaders have been
forced into exile. The FSB is also weak in the
key La Paz area, control of which has usually
been essential to a successful coup.
24. Military and Para-Military Forces. The
only significance of Bolivia's extremely weak
military and para-military forces lies in their
ability to influence the domestic political situ-
ation. At present the MNR firmly controls all
three components of Bolivia's forces - the
Army (which includes the Air Force), the
police, and the civilian militia. No one of
these groups could seize power if both others
opposed it, but any two of them combined
could almost certainly seize power.
25. The Army, the bulwark of previous gov-
ernments, was shattered by the 1952 revolu-
tion, but the MNR has rebuilt it to some
extent. It now numbers approximately 10,000
and consists largely of short-term conscripts
who receive little more than basic training.
Its usable equipment consists largely of light
infantry weapons. The Army Air Force has
454 men, 42 of them pilots, and 51 aircraft,
mostly trainers. Its sole tactical unit con-
sists of seven C-47's. The MNR has purged
the Army and the Air Force and keeps them
under close surveillance. Most active officers
are probably sympathetic toward the basic
objectives of the regime. The regiments in
the vital La Paz area and in the mining center
of Oruro are the most dependable because of
higher pay and careful screening. . However,
many officers are disturbed by the leftist and
alleged pro-Communist tendencies within the
MNR; some of the younger ones are suscepti-
ble to the influence of various exiled officers
who support the FSB.
26. There are also 4,300 National Police, most-
ly long-service personnel, armed with light
weapons. Except for the Army regiments in
La Paz and Oruro, the police are probably the
most efficient force in Bolivia, but are too few
by themselves to cope with either the Army or
the militia. They supported the MNR in the
1952 revolution and are now loyal to the
regime.
27. The civilian militia, numbering 20,000-
30,000, is composed in part of MNR party
units directly responsible to President Paz and
in part of worker units controlled by the MNR
labor leaders. The MNR organized the
militia from the. armed workers and other
groups which supported the 1952 revolution
in order to bring them under control and to
provide a counterweight to the. Army. Al-
though the militia is very poorly organized
and trained, amounting in some cases to little
more than an armed mob, large numbers of
them are fanatically loyal to the regime.
They are particularly strong in La Paz and
the mining areas.
ECONOMIC SITUATION
28. Bolivia's economic growth is hampered by
formidable obstacles to communication; low
levels of literacy, health, and living condi-
tions; lack of investment capital; and Indian
resistance to change. At least two-thirds of
the population is engaged in agriculture and
most farming is on a subsistence level. The
small amount of commercial agriculture has
been increasingly inadequate to meet the
needs of the nonagricultural population.
Thus Bolivia has to import a large part of its
food. Industrial development, aside from
mining, is limited to a few simple processing
and fabricating industries; it is retarded by
the smallness of the local market, high trans-
portation costs, and the inadequacy of domes-
tic raw materials and fuels. Thus such de-
mand as exists for manufactured goods must
also be satisfied mostly from abroad.
29. Under these conditions Bolivia's economy
is largely dependent upon mineral exports,
mostly tin, antimony, and tungsten. Tin ex-
ports have normally supplied about 70 percent
of Bolivia's foreign exchange and 90 percent
of government revenues. However, Bolivia
is an increasingly marginal tin producer and
highly vulnerable to fluctuations in the world
tin market. Since World War II, the declin-
ing tin content of Bolivia's ore and higher
extraction costs have weakened Bolivia's com-
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petitive position, thus reducing its ability to
meet essential import needs. These economic
difficulties have been aggravated by chronic
governmental inefficiency and maladministra-
tion, persistent inflation, and political and
social unrest.
30. The MNR has launched an ambitious long-
range program to expand and diversify the
economy, largely by increasing production of
foodstuffs and consumers goods. It hopes
thereby to lessen Bolivia's need for extensive
imports and consequent dependence on-fluctu-
ating exports of tin. The government is
stressing development. of agricultural, forest,
and petroleum resources in the lowlands and
the Amazon basin. It is attempting to de-
velop commercial agriculture in place of sub-
sistence farming, to expand rail and highway
facilities, and to encourage foreign invest-
ment. The MNR is utilizing US and UN tech-
nical assistance and has given a concession to
private US interests to develop oil deposits in
southeast Bolivia.
31. However, the MNR has met serious diffi-
culties in its economic stabilization and devel-
opment efforts. Its hope that the revenues
and assets gained from the nationalized tin
mines would stabilize its fiscal position and
ease foreign exchange shortages was nullified
by the precipitous decline in tin prices which
began in April 1953. Moreover, the govern-
ment also felt compelled to disburse a large
part of the liquid assets secured from mine
nationalization in bonuses and unemployment
compensation. These factors, together with
continued governmental inefficiency and poor
fiscal management, have intensified one of the
most severe inflations in Latin America. The
government's attempts to stem the tide by a
series of wage, price, and currency stabiliza-
tion measures have proved largely ineffective.
32. Nevertheless by such means as borrowing
on its foreign gold holdings, drawing on its
quota in the International Monetary Fund,
liquidating exchange reserves, and above all
securing emergency US aid, the MNR has at
least temporarily staved off economic collapse.
A US grant of $9 million, mostly foodstuffs,
in October 1953 has helped assure adequate
imports until about June 1954, and a $2
million increase in US technical assistance is
facilitating a food production program.
PROBABLE DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS
33. Bolivia's future. political stability will de-
pend greatly on the extent to which its gov-
ernment can prevent further economic de-
terioration and meet development needs.
Although the MNR has launched a vigorous,
attack on Bolivia's basic economic problems,
its ability to fulfill its ambitious program is
limited not only by lack of. capital but by the
shortage of skilled administrative and tech-
nical personnel, the feeling of insecurity in
business circles, and some continued oppor-
tunism and corruption in the government.
None of the agricultural projects now under-
way will appreciably increase food production
in the next year or two. Although the MNR
apparently intends to restrict expropriation
to relatively few landowners, uncertainty on
this point and occasional agitation over agrar-
ian reform may lead to further declines in
food production in areas affected. Moreover,
tin prices appear unlikely to rise significantly
in the near future. Therefore, we estimate
that the MNR is unlikely to be able to bring
about substantial increases in agricultural
and industrial output in less than two years.
Moreover, completion of the MNR program
will require at least five years.
34. Meanwhile, the MNR's ability to retain
broad popular support will depend greatly on
whether it can 'meet the immediate problems
of inflation and food shortages. Largely as a
result of existing US aid further serious eco-
nomic deterioration is unlikely before mid-
1954, and the MNR will probably face no seri-
ous political challenge. After mid-1954, how-
ever, renewed economic distress is likely
unless Bolivia can obtain additional external
support. If such aid were secured, the MNR
would probably continue its present relatively
moderate course; it would probably continue
to move slowly on agrarian reform and would
attempt to make some compensation pay-
ments to the tin interests.
35. On the other hand, without economic aid,
the MNR Government would soon exhaust its
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. :T
slender resources and be unable to forestall a
further inflationary spiral. Agitation from
the right and left, including the MNR labor
wing, would almost certainly increase. We
believe that in such a case the MNR would
feel compelled to move increasingly toward
the left to maintain its crucial labor support.
The MNR's labor wing would probably de-
mand and receive an increasingly important
role in the government. It might gain a 'con-
trolling voice in the government, possibly with
Communist support. However, such a leftist
regime would almost certainly be turbulent
and short-lived.
36. Moreover, to the extent that the present
regime moved leftward it would lose much of
its moderate support. In these circumstances
the FSB would probably over a period of time
amass sufficient backing, including disaffected
army and police elements, to bring off a suc-
cessful coup. Thus, without additional aid,
the present government would almost cer-
tainly be overthrown sooner or later.
37. An FSB regime would not be capable of
stabilizing the economic situation without it-
self receiving substantial external aid. Even
with such assistance, the FSB would have
difficulty obtaining broad popular support. In
particular, it would face formidable opposi-
tion from the MNR.
38. In any case the basic weaknesses of the
Bolivian political, economic, and social struc-
ture are such that we believe that no Bolivian
government, even with substantial external
aid, will be able to prevent recurrent economic
crises and social unrest from., persisting for
some years to come. Thus at best the long
term outlook is for some degree of political
instability.
39. Communist Prospects. So long as the
MNR's moderate leadership feels relatively
secure in power, it will probably continue its
efforts to contain and weaken the Commu-
nists. To the extent that the MNR program
is successful, the government's ability to
curb the Communists would be increased. By
the same token, renewed economic deteriora-
tion and consequent political unrest would
almost certainly lead to an increase in Com-
munist influence. If, in this event, the MNR
moved more to the left, it would be more
willing to accept Communist support. If the
MNR's labor wing went so far as to split off,
it would probably cooperate closely with the
Communists. Finally, a successful FSB coup
would probably lead the MNR as a whole to
cooperate at least temporarily with the Com-
munists in attempts to regain power. In any
event, the Communists alone could not gain
and maintain control of Bolivia in the fore-
seeable future.
FOREIGN RELATIONS
40. Bolivia's internal weaknesses, its past.
military defeats and losses of territory, and
its lack of access to the sea have tended to
create a national inferiority complex and
sense of insecurity. Its long-range aspiration
to re-acquire a Pacific port has occasionally
caused strained relations with Chile and
Peru. Fearful of the intentions of neigh-
boring countries, successive Bolivian regimes,
including the MNR, have sought to play for-
eign interests off against each other, as in the
case of Argentina and Brazil. Although pre-
serving cordial relations with Argentina, an
important source of foodstuffs, the MNR
government is resisting Argentine penetra-
tion, and seeking to decrease its dependence
on Argentina by developing trade and com-
munications with Brazil.
41. The MNR's program has aroused much
sympathetic interest in Latin America, and
only Peru has had a strongly unfavorable
reaction. Peru fears that the example of the
MNR program may lead to similar demands in
Peru and that the MNR might encourage the
Odria Government's opponents. Conversely,
the MNR fears that its rightist opponents,
many of whom have taken refuge in Peru,
may secure Peruvian assistance for a coup.
42. Bolivia's policy toward the US is primarily
determined by its desire for US economic sup-
port. Nevertheless, with the growth of popu-
lar demands for change which culminated in
the MNR coup; there has been a tendency to
blame alleged US "imperialism" for backing
the tin interests and for not helping Bolivia
sufficiently, especially in times of economic
, T
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T
stress. This latent anti-US sentiment has
been widely exploited by political leaders, in-
cluding the Communists, to blame the US for
Bolivia's woes. When the MNR first came to
power, domestic political exigencies and its
uncertainty as to US intentions made it quite
critical of the US. As a result of subsequent
US aid and the tolerant US attitude toward
the regime, however, the MNR has become
increasingly pro-US in its outlook and has
taken the position that Bolivia's interests will
be best served by cooperating with the US.
However, should the government come to feel
that the US was not supporting it, active anti-
US feelings would almost certainly increase
again. Bolivia has generally supported. the
US in the UN on important issues between
the US and the Soviet Bloc, although like
most Latin American states it has been less
willing to follow the US lead on economic,
colonial, and racial questions. In event of
general war, Bolivia would. almost certainly
cooperate with, the US.
43. At present, Bolivia has very limited rela-
tions with the Soviet Bloc. 'There are no Bloc
diplomatic missions in-La Paz, although the
Czech and Hungarian legations in Buenos
Aires are accredited to Bolivia. Bolivia's
trade with the Bloc is also insignificant. How-
ever, continuing economic difficulties would
stimulate greater Bolivian interest in closer
diplomatic and trade relations with the Bloc,
and thereby render Bolivian opinion vulner-
able to Communist propaganda. In these cir-
cumstances, the USSR, by applying economic
warfare measures to Bolivia, could secure im-
portant psychological advantages there and
elsewhere in Latin America.
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Puerto '
Maldonado
0 B*
Curiche
Trinidad Liverpool
BOLIVIA
STRATEGIC MINERAL RESOURCES
? Antimony Q Tungsten
sn Tin Petroleum
MAJOR TERRAIN REGIONS
Plains and low hills IZj Coastal ranges
Intermontane basins High mountains
-??- International boundary Selected road
? Capital +-I I Railroad
0 50 100 200 Miles
0 50 100 2,00 Kilometers
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