PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A004200020001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 17, 1954
• Content Type: NIE

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN
DOCUMENT ND
NO CHANCE IN CLA_SS_
.
NIE 27.1-54 x DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANCI D TO: TS S C
Approved 11 May 1954NEXT REVIEWDATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
Published 17 May 1954DATE: REVIEWER,
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 11 May 1954. The AEC and FBI abstained,
the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
T
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1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the re-
cipient's office who require the information for the performance of their official duties.
Further dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the
information for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other
Department or Agency
2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with
applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by
arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
3. The overseas dissemination of this intelligence will be limited to a period of
one year or less, at the end of which time it will be destroyed, returned to the forward-
ing agency, or permission requested of that agency to retain it in accordance with
IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
WARNING .
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION:
White House
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United States Information Agency
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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN
THE PROBLEM
To assess the internal situation in Spain and to estimate probable Spanish do-
mestic and foreign policies and Spain's probable role in the Western defense system.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The authoritarian Franco regime will
almost certainly remain in power for
some years to come. Franco has the
support of the armed forces, the Church,
the landowning and business interests,
and the Falange. Political and social
tensions in Spain are such that for the
foreseeable future Spanish governments
will probably have to depend on force to
remain in power. Accordingly, the Army
will almost certainly continue to play the
key role in Spanish politics.
2. There is little likelihood of an attempt
to overthrow the Franco regime by force.
Most Spaniards profoundly fear a recur-
rence of civil war. The opposition to
Franco. is severely repressed and disor-
ganized. The Communist party is out-
lawed, and Communist capabilities ap-
pear to be negligible.
3. At present there appears to be no in-
dividual in a position to succeed to
Franco's full.powers, and when Franco
dies or retires it is possible that the sharp
differences which exist between the
groups supporting him will result in a
struggle for power, the outcome of which
we cannot predict. However, we believe
that the chances are somewhat better
than even that a successor government
would be able to maintain stability. The
likelihood of stability would be greater if
a monarch had been installed for some
time prior to Franco's death or retire-
ment. . We believe that any government
likely to succeed the Franco regime will'
follow policies generally similar to
Franco's.
4.. The Spanish economy as a whole will
probably show moderate growth over the
next few years, if weather conditions are
reasonably favorable. However, we do
not foresee any substantial progress to-
ward remedying Spain's basic economic
weaknesses, and the economy will remain
for many years generally backward.
5. The offensive capabilities of the Span-
ish armed forces will probably remain
negligible. The Army as presently or-
ganized and equipped is not. capable of
successfully resisting an invasion in force,
but it could slow an invader at the
Pyrenees. However, Spain possesses a
large reservoir of military manpower, and
US aid will help to modernize the Spanish
armed forces and to improve their capa-
bilities.
6. Spanish foreign policy will aim to en-
large Spain's role in Western European
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affairs by seeking US support, by develop- sentiment against Franco has diminished
ing closer ties with West Germany, and considerably, and admission of Spain to
by exerting pressure upon France and NATO may become feasible at a later
the UK. We believe that Spain will con- time.
tinue to cooperate with the US but that
it will remain a hard bargainer. 8. In time of general war, Franco would
7. We believe that Franco will not seek almost certainly permit the US to use
to join NATO but will continue his efforts bases in Spain. In addition, he would
.to strengthen Spanish security by bila- probably be willing to send troops to fight,
teral arrangements. Opposition to close abroad if he believed that they would not
association with Franco is still strong in become involved in a general Western
most NATO countries, but the political debacle.
DISCUSSION
L. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SPAIN
9. From the point of view of Western defense,
Spain's most important asset is its strategic
location. The Iberian Peninsula dominates
the Western entrance to the Mediterranean,
flanks the Atlantic approaches to Western
Europe, and lies on the normal air routes
connecting Western Europe with South Amer-
ica and parts of Africa. Its rugged terrain
provides strong defensive positions. Air and
naval bases developed in Spain for US use
would supplement those in North Africa, else-
where on the European continent, and in the
UK.
II. PROBABLE POLITICAL TRENDS
The Franco Regime
10. Spain is an authoritarian state under
General Francisco Franco Bahamonde, the
Chief of State, who is 61 years old. Franco
won power through military force, and he
maintains large and loyal police and military
forces. He appoints, directly or indirectly,
all important government, Church, military,
and party officials, and he apparently possess-
es their personal loyalty. He has great pres-
tige throughout the country because of his
military exploits, his ability to maintain
order, and his recent success in promoting
Spain's interests abroad. Franco has virtu-
ally eliminated organized opposition and has
curtailed civil liberties, although the highly
individualistic Spaniards retain some freedom
of discussion. Dissatisfaction within Spain
is widespread, especially among the urban
workers, but Franco's position is probably
stronger than at any time since 1940. Since
most Spaniards profoundly fear civil war,
there is little likelihood of an attempt to over-
throw the regime by force.
11. Franco's position is based upon his control
of the armed forces and upon the support of
the Spanish Catholic Church and of the land-
owning and business interests. In addition,
he uses the Falange, the only legal political
organization, as an instrument of control.
The Army, the Church, the landowning and
business interests, and the Falange all partic-
ipate in the government, and are the major
groups in the Franquist coalition. These
groups often differ on foreign and domestic
policy, but they are united by their determina-
tion to retain power and by their strong fear
of the Left. Franco plays upon this deter-
mination and fear to bind the coalition to-
gether. At the same time, he exploits policy
differences within the coalition to prevent
alignments against himself. His skill in
handling these powerful but disparate groups
is a vital element in the maintenance of the
regime's stability.
12. The present regime and its successors will
continue to face a number of problems whose
interaction has often in Spanish history pro-
T
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yoked civil disorder. These include : the low
real income of the people and the wide
fluctuations. in that income; the anticlerical=
ism of the workers; the separatist tendencies
of the Basques and Catalans; the illiteracy of
about half the population; and the inability
or unwillingness of most Spaniards to com-
promise and to cooperate with each other.
Spain in the past has undergone alternating
periods of political extremism and apathy.
So long as progress is not made toward re-
lieving political and social tensions, Spanish
governments probably will have to depend on
force to remain in power.
13. The Army and the Police. The most im-
portant element in the Franquist coalition is
the Army, which is represented at the highest
levels of government, and which will almost
certainly continue to play the key role in
Spanish politics. The Army is firmly under
Franco's control, and its leaders are convinced
that their interests and the interests of Spain
require maintenance of the regime and sup-
port of its policies.
14. The Spanish national police forces are
directly controlled by Franco's Minister of
Interior. They include the uniformed Civil
Guards (63,000), the Armed and Traffic Police
(24,000), and the plainclothes General Police
(7,200). The two former are quasi military or-
ganizations- and in time of emergency would
be quickly integrated into the Army. The
national police are loyal to the regime, the
quality of personnel is fairly high, and they
are feared because of their extraordinary
powers. The Minister of Interior has indir-
ect control over the unarmed urban police,
who are normally recruited from the Falange
by municipal authorities, and over the rural
Home Guards.
15. The Church. Catholicism is the religion
of the vast majority of the Spanish people,
and the Catholic Church is a powerful force
in every sphere of Spanish life. The Church
supports Franco and tolerates -the Falange,
with which it is in frequent and strong dis-
agreement, largely because it sees no other
means of preventing a return of the Left to
power. Its support of Franco is also based
on his adoption of some Church-sponsored
programs and his granting the Church sub-
stantial influence and financial assistance.
However, there is disagreement in ecclesiasti-
cal circles about many of Franco's policies,
and Franco is frequently criticized by mem-
bers of the hierarchy, by priests, and by Cath-
olic lay organizations for being either too
radical or too conservative.
16. Landed and Business Interests. The land-
ed and business interests support Franco be-
cause his is a conservative government. They
have a deep fear of political and economic
change. However, these groups have gained
little from the regime, which in their opinion
mismanages the national economy through
state competition with private enterprise,
forced ' loans, and unwise economic controls.
17. The Falange. The Falange is the only
legal political party in Spain, and member-
ship in the party or party-controlled syndi-
cates is required for virtually all Spaniards.
Franco uses the Falange to control the verti-
cal syndicates in which Spanish labor, man-
agement, and government are represented, to
channel political activity, and to counter the
views and power of the Church. The Falange's
leaders include militant Fascists, autocratic
Carlists (a. monarchist faction), rabble
rousers, opportunists, political hacks, and so-
cial reformers. However, -the Falange as a
whole now has little dynamism, and many of
its leaders appear primarily concerned with
perpetuating their positions in the bureau-
cracies. Despite its strongly nationalistic
flavor, the party is unpopular, especially with
the conservative groups, largely because its
leaders advocate increased state domination
of national life and seek greater political
power for themselves.
The Opposition
18.. Dissatisfaction with the Franco regime is-
widespread. However, opposition activity has
been systematically curtailed by police action,
and the opposition is largely disorganized and
leaderless. Its potential influence is further
diluted by traditional divisions along regional,
functional, class, and political lines.
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19. The Monarchists. Spain has been nom-
inally a monarchy since 1947, when Franco's
proposal to reestablish the monarchy (with
Franco as Chief of State) was supported by
the Spanish people in a referendum. How-
ever, Spain has no monarch, and it is clear
that Franco is not yet prepared to surrender
power, or even a share of power, to a king.
Consequently, Franco lists the Monarchists
among the opposition groups, although he
does not repress them severely and although
a few high government officials are monarch-
ists. Don Juan, the chief claimant to the
throne, has several rivals, and the Monarch-
ists are deeply divided also by their political
and economic views. Moreover, Franco helps
to keep them disorganized by appearing at
different times to support different pretend-
ers.
20. The Communists. The Spanish Commu-
nist Party is outlawed and relentlessly pur-
sued by the Spanish Government, and it is
ostracized by the non-Communist opposition
groups. There have been no known Commu-
nist-led strikes or acts of sabotage since the
end of the civil war, and the party's present
capabilities appear to be negligible. Esti-
mates of Communist party membership vary,
but the hard-core membership is probably
about 3,000.
21. Other Opposition Groups. The Franco
regime has forcefully destroyed and discredit-
ed the political parties which provided the
main support for.the Republic. The republi-
can tradition in Spain is extremely weak, and
the Republican Government-in-Exile has neg-
ligible and ever declining influence. The
principal opposition groups, the Anarchists,
Socialists, and Basques, are forced to carry
on most of their limited political activities
from abroad, and now appear willing to ac-
cept a constitutional monarchy.
The Succession
22. We believe that the Army, the Church,,
the landed and business interests, and the
Falange will continue to work together under
Franco's rule. Since most Spaniards pro-
foundly fear a recurrence of civil war, there
is little likelihood of an attempt to overthrow
the regime by force. Franco's regime will
therefore almost certainly remain in power
as long as his good health continues.
23. The Law of Succession of 1947 gives
Franco the right to nominate a monarch and,
if necessary, a regent, and to install. them in
office before his death. It is possible that
he will declare himself regent for Juan Carlos,
the -16-year-old son of the principal pretender.
In any event, we believe that Franco will re-
tain power in his own hands as long as he is
in good health.
24. If the succession has not been settled be-
fore Franco's death, the law provides that the
principal officials are to select either a king
or regent. Under such circumstances, the
most likely development would be the selec-
tion of a king (probably Juan Carlos) with a
general as regent. The chances are some-
what better than even that such a successor
government would be able to maintain stabili-
ty. The likelihood for stability would be
greater if the monarch had been established
for some time before Franco's death. So far
as we" can determine, there is no individual
in a position to succeed to Franco's full pow-
ers, and it is possible that the sharp differ-
ences which exist beween members of the
Franco coalition will come to the fore once
he disappears from the scene. In such an
event, a struggle for power might ensue, the
outcome of which, we cannot predict. We be-
lieve that any government likely to succeed
the Franco regime will follow policies gen-
erally similar to Franco's.
III. PROBABLE ECONOMIC TRENDS
25. Spain is a - predominantly agricultural
country, but it produces many minerals and
a wide range of manufactured goods. The
level of living is lower than that of any West-
ern European country except Portugal,
though higher than that of Yugoslavia,
Greece, and Turkey. Spanish GNP is in the
neighborhood of eight-nine billion dollars.
Over the next decade, it will probably increase
unevenly but at an annual average rate - of
three to four percent, provided weather con-
ditions are not abnormal.
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26. The Spanish economy has considerable
potential for growth and industrial develop-
ment, although deep-seated weaknesses will
make the realization of this potential difficult.
a. Agriculture. Spain is capable of pro-
viding its growing population with more and
better foods. Wheat, olives, grapes, and citrus
fruits are the principal agricultural products.
Spain also has adequate supplies of livestock,
particularly sheep, and ranks third in West-
ern Europe after Norway and the UK in its
fish catch.
b. Manpower. Spain has adequate man-
power reserves available for increasing indus-
trial and agricultural production. There are
an estimated 3,000,000 unemployed or under-
employed.
c. Other Resources. Spain has extensive
reserves of bituminous coal, lignite, high qual-
ity iron ore, mercury, potash, and iron and
copper pyrites. It has important reserves of
tungsten, lead, zinc, antimony, fluorspar, and
cement. The country has a hydroelectric po-
tential of approximately three times its pres-
ent developed capacity. It has a productive
forest area of about 20 million acres.
27. The principal basic limitations on Spanish
economic and industrial development in-
clude :
a. Weather. Spain is the driest country in
Europe, with a broken terrain and poor soil.
About 90 percent of the cultivated land is
suitable only for dry farming and on most of
it, no matter what technical progress is
achieved, the range of crops that are grown
must remain limited. The scanty and irregu-
lar rainfall has severe effects on the entire
economy and is a serious obstacle to steady
economic development.
b. Foreign Trade. Although Spain's total
foreign -trade is small (only five percent of
GNP in 1952), Spain has a chronic foreign
payments problem which arises from the com-
position of its trade. Spain is heavily depend-
ent upon foreign sources for such essential
imports as petroleum products, high grade
coal, cotton, nitrogenous fertilizer, and vari-
ous types of machinery. In drought years,
it must also import foodstuffs. In contrast
to the essential nature of its imports, Spain's
exports comprise mainly a few raw materials
and luxuries, for which world demand is var-
iable, and some agricultural products, which
suffer sharp and erratic fluctuations in out-
put.
28. In addition to these basic structural
weaknesses in the Spanish economy, there are
numerous other obstacles to the development
of Spain's agricultural and industrial poten-
tial.
a. Agricultural productivity is low because
of the land tenure system and deficiencies in
irrigation, use of fertilizer, farm roads, storage
and marketing facilities, agricultural educa-
tion systems, farm machinery, pest control,
and high-quality seed. Capital resources for
overcoming these deficiencies are not suffi-
cient and, even if these resources were avail-
able, it would take many years before signifi-
cant production increases could be achieved.
b. Fuller exploitation of Spain's extensive
mineral reserves will require substantial capi-
tal outlays for modernization and expansion,
as well as the use of foreign technicians.
Industrial production is handicapped and in
many fields well below capacity. Limitations
include obsolescence of equipment and in-
adequacies in such basic sectors of the econo-
my as mining, electric power, and transport.
Spain's railroads are poor. The tracks are
in bad condition, and there is a shortage of
rolling stock. Although Spanish main high-
ways are in good condition, they are not built
to stand up under heavy military or com-
mercial traffic. There is also a shortage of
trucks.
c. The policies and actions of the Franco
regime are an additional obstacle to the de-
velopment of Spain's economic potential.
Cumbersome and inefficiently administered
governmental regulations of all phases of
business, combined with the regime's nation-
alistic economic policies, are a strong deter-
rent to the investment of foreign capital
necessary for the modernization of Spain's
mining and industrial plant. The adverse
economic effects of crop failures during
drought years are increased by the govern-
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ment's inefficiency in collecting and distribu-
ting available foodstuffs. There has been a
steady rise in prices, although government
control of prices and wages has prevented
runaway inflation. The strong disagreements
among the groups supporting Franco prevent
the adoption of economic policies which would
increase incentives for greater production by
workers, peasants, and private business.
29. If the agricultural sector of the economy
is not hampered by prolonged drought, the
Spanish economy as a whole will probably
show moderate improvement over the next
few years. The US economic aid and base
program, by supplying Spain with capital
goods, raw materials, and munitions produc-
tion equipment, will assist in alleviating the
power and transportation problems and will
help bring about moderate increases in in-
dustrial. and agricultural production. The
inflationary impact of the program will prob-
ably be minor. However, we do not foresee
any substantial progress toward remedying
Spain's basic economic weaknesses. The econ-
omy will remain for many years generally
backward, with a low level of living for the
vast majority of the people.
IV. PROBABLE MILITARY TRENDS
30. The Spanish armed forces are effectively
controlled by Franco and constitute the major
element in the regime's control system. Des-
pite the fact that low pay creates a morale
problem, the officers and men are generally
loyal, to Franco. Most of them also support
the US-Spanish agreements.
31. Army. The Spanish Army numbers 335,-
000 men organized into 19 divisions - one
"cavalry," one "armored," four mountain,
12 infantry divisions, and one special mixed
coastal group of division size - and numerous
independent brigades, regiments, and battal-
ions. An additional four infantry divisions
could be formed by grouping existing units
in Spanish Morocco. The actual strength of
the infantry and mountain divisions is 5,600
and 9,000, respectively, although the table of
organization strength is 8,900 and 11,800.
About two-thirds of the Army are professional
soldiers, while the remainder are two-year
draftees. The army-trained reserves are esti-
mated at approximately 1,030,000, but their
mobilization would be hampered by the lack
of heavy equipment.
32. The Army suffers from training deficien-
cies and lack of modern weapons and equip-
ment. The troops are tough and well dis-
ciplined, and the number of officers with com-
bat experience is high. The quality of leader-
ship is generally good. The combat effective-
ness of the Army is fair, and the Army can
be depended upon to fight courageously to
defend the homeland. Infantry weapons and
field artillery pieces up to medium calibre are
sufficient for army needs. However, heavy
artillery, self-propelled guns, armored vehi-
cles, and dependable motor transport are
insufficient for sustained combat operations.
Spanish industry produces sufficient light
weapons for the Army but is incapable of
producing tanks, medium and heavy artillery,
and military vehicles in quantity. US aid
will improve the defensive capabilities of the
Army.
33. The Army is capable of maintaining in-
ternal security, but not of resisting success-
fully an invasion in force. However, it could
slow an invader at the Pyrenees. Spain's
offensive capabilities are negligible.
34. Spain represents to the West a potential
source of military strength. The populace,
particularly the Army, has been oriented by
the State and by the Catholic Church toward
a strong anti-Communist policy and attitude.
We believe that the Spanish soldier is capable
of absorbing the necessary technical training
required in a modern army and that he has
the will to fight.
35. Air Force. The current capabilities of the
Spanish Air Force are negligible, due to ob-
solete equipment and insufficient experience
in tactical operations. At present there are
33,000 men in the Air Force, including 1,000
pilots and 200 student pilots in varying stages
of training. Although the Spanish Air Force
has approximately 900 aircraft, this total
represents a variety of obsolete domestic and
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foreign types, and less than 100 of these are
considered operational by US standards.
36. With US assistance, the, Spanish Air Force
by 1957 is to be equipped with six squadrons
of jet fighters and one rescue squadron com-
prising amphibians and helicopters. By mid-
1958, the seven squadrons should attain a
high state of combat readiness and will pro-
vide Spain with an improved air defense
capability. Spain will be well equipped with
air bases; in addition to the present nine
major airfields, at least five others currently
less well developed will be improved by 1958
with US assistance. US funds will also build
an inland pipeline servicing the major air-
fields and will help to remedy defects in base
operating facilities. While the Spanish air-
craft industry will not be capable of producing
modern high performance aircraft at least
for some years, US aid should enable it to
furnish maintenance support for the newly
equipped Spanish Air Force.
37. Navy. The personnel strength of the
Spanish Navy is approximately 34,000 officers
and men, of whom about 7,500 are members of
the Naval Infantry. Vessel strength includes
five old cruisers of various classes, 19 destroy-
ers, six submarines, 26 escort and patrol ves-
sels, 16 mine-warfare vessels, and 49 miscel-
laneous auxiliary and amphibious types. Com-
bat effectiveness is limited by want of experi-
ence in naval warfare and. by lack of POL
reserves, modern electronic detection gear, AA
and ASW armament, and mine countermeas-
ures equipment.
38. US aid will modernize and reequip the
smaller units of the Spanish Navy and will
help to transform it into a force capable of
effective patrol, escort, ASW, minelaying and
sweeping, AA defense, and submarine opera-
tions. Ship modernization will include instal-
lation of modern armament and electronic
equipment. US funds will greatly expand
naval facilities for US-Spanish use at four
and possibly six ports.
V. SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY
39. Franco's foreign policy has aimed at ex-
tricating Spain from the political quarantine
established in 1946 when the UN recom-
mended that member states withdraw their
chiefs of diplomatic missions from Madrid
and barred Spain from membership in UN
specialized agencies. Franco's government
was later excluded from Marshall Plan aid
at a time when Spain was undergoing severe
economic difficulties. The French Govern-
ment in 1946 closed the Pyrenees border for
two years. In its efforts to break out of iso-
lation, Spain cultivated close relations with
other countries, primarily with the Latin
American and Arab states. It also sought to
strengthen its ties with Portugal, to negotiate
a concordat with the Vatican, and to improve
relations with the US.
40. Franco's efforts have had considerable
success. Most nations outside the Soviet Bloc
now maintain formal diplomatic relations
with Spain, agreements have been signed with
the Vatican and the US, and Spain has been
admitted to some international, organizations.
Franco is currrently attempting to develop
closer ties with West Germany in the hope
of increasing Spain's foreign trade and of im-
proving Spain's international position.
41. Relations with the US. In 1953, the US
and Spain concluded three bilateral agree-
ments covering US construction and joint use
of Spanish air and naval facilities, military
end-item assistance, and economic and tech-
nical assistance (defense support). These
agreements represent a commitment by the
Franco government to side with the West,
but will have little influence toward liberaliz-
ing the authoritarian character and policies
of the Franco regime. Although disappointed
over the relatively small sums (especially of
economic aid) allotted to Spain, Spanish offi-
cials represent the agreements as a triumph
for the policies of the regime.
42. The Spanish Government, aware of the
reservations of some members of the Falange
and of the Church hierarchy toward the base
agreements, has gone to great lengths in
asserting that Spanish sovereignty will not
be impaired by the agreements or by the
presence of US troops on Spanish bases.
Spain has agreed to the stationing of US
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8
military personnel in Spain, but will insist
upon limiting the number, at least during
peacetime. Most Spaniards are more inter-
ested in the economic than in the military
implications of the agreements.
43. We believe that the Franco regime will
continue to cooperate with the US, but that
it will remain a hard bargainer. It will sup-
port the US because of Spain's strong anti-
Communist attitude and because the regime
considers the US the strongest bulwark
against Communist aggression and a source
of military and economic aid. It will also
seek US support for Spanish foreign policy
objectives.
44. Relations with NATO and the NATO
states. We believe that Franco will not seek
to join NATO but will continue his efforts to
strengthen Spanish security by bilateral
arrangements. The Spanish Government,
takes the line that NATO's value will remain
severely limited as long as the organization
subordinates military affairs to political con-
siderations and as long as important member
states have large Communist parties. It also
believes that the US is shifting the emphasis
of its defense policy toward reliance upon
peripheral bastions, of which Spain would be
one of the most important. Spain might ac-
cept NATO membership if Franco felt that
such membership would increase his prestige
and enable him to play a more important role
in international affairs. The likelihood of
Spain's accepting NATO membership would
be substantially increased if US aid were con-
tingent on Spanish membership or if West
Germany became a NATO member.
45. In most NATO countries, there is strong
opposition to close association with Franco
Spain, although political sentiment against
Franco has diminished considerably since the
immediate postwar period. There is also
some distaste for the agreements providing
US economic and military aid to Franco,
which is reinforced by the fear that in build-
ing up Spain the US Is demonstrating an in-
terest in peripheral strategy. However, West-
ern Europeans are increasingly aware of the
contributions which Spain could make to the
common defense, and the admission of Spain
to NATO may become feasible at a later date
if relations with France and the UK become
less strained.
46. Franco is now harassing France and the
UK over Morocco and Gibraltar, respectively.
He almost certainly does not estimate that
the UK will surrender Gibraltar to Spain,
though he may believe that he will be able
to increase Spanish power and influence in
Morocco. Franco is probably using these
issues primarily as levers to negotiate a gen-
eral settlement of outstanding problems with
France and the UK.
47. In time of general war, Franco would al-
most certainly permit the US to use bases in
Spain. In addition, he would probably be
willing to send troops to fight abroad if he
believed that they-would not become involved
in a general Western debacle. The regime
would be unlikely to send Spanish troops
abroad to participate in actions against local
aggressions, except to the extent that Franco
has committed himself to do so.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/25: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04200020001-4
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/25: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04200020001-4
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