SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND MAIN LINES OF POLICY THROUGH MID-1959

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A003600020001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 7, 1954
• Content Type: NIE

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COPY 230.1
TOP E`CRET ASSISTA::T DIR CTC1,ONE
U3 1 -7 ?d
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND MAIN LINES
OF POLICY THROUGH MID -1959
NIE 11-5-54
Approved 1 June 1954
Published 7 June 1954
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE N CLASS. I
DEC!.ASS!C,ED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REViEVI DATE: AO /L
AUTH: HR 70-
DATE: Z REVIEWER: __ -6
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 1 June 1954. The FBI abstained, the subject
being outside of its jutisdiction.
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3o
TOp1SECRET
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SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND MAIN LINES
OF POLICY THROUGH MID-19591
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet capabilities and the main lines of Soviet strategic policy
through mid-1959.'
CONCLUSIONS
1. We believe that the stability and au-
thority of the Soviet regime will not be
affected during the period of this estimate
by conflicts for power or differences re-
specting policy within the ruling group.
Soviet authority over the Satellites will
almost certainly remain intact. There
are potential conflicts of,interest between
the USSR and Communist China but we
believe that during the period of this esti-
mate the cohesive forces in the relation-
ship will be far greater than the divisive
forces.
2. The economic policy of the USSR will
probably continue to place primary em-
phasis on the rapid development of heavy
industry and war potential, though with
more attention than in the past to devel-
opment of agricultural and consumer
goods production. The high rates of eco-
nomic growth achieved in the immediate
postwar years have. been declining. We
believe that the annual rate for the next
two years will be. about 6 or 6.5 percent
and in 1956-1959 about 5 or 6 percent.
3. We believe that if current economic
programs are carried on as planned Soviet
defense expenditures will have to remain
approximately constant in terms of pur-
chasing power, at least through 1955.
However; military procurement, even if it
does not rise above the high level reached
in 1952 and maintained in 1953, will be
sufficient for continuous qualitative im-
provement of the armed forces in weap-
ons, equipment, and training. Apart
from this general qualitative improve-
ment, the most significant changes in
Soviet military strength during the pe-
riod of this estimate are likely to be as
follows :
a. Increase in the nuclear weapons
stockpile;
b. Increase in the capability to deliver
these weapons by various methods;
c. Improvement in weapons systems
for air defense;
1 Although this paper is concerned primarily with
the USSR, strengths and capabilities of the other
members of the Soviet Bloc (Communist China,
Eastern European Satellites, East Germany, and
North Korea) are referred to where these add
significantly to Soviet power. Consideration is
also given to possible Chinese Communist courses
of action which may have a direct bearing on the
main lines of Soviet policy.
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d. Increase in the long-range subma-
rine force.
4. We believe that the Kremlin probably
will continue, at least for a year or two,
to avoid courses of action which in its
judgment would clearly involve substan-
tial risk of general war. Bloc leaders will
try to foster and exploit political weak-
nesses and, as opportunity offers, armed
insurrections within the non-Communist
world. Soviet leaders probably believe
that; by alternately easing the tension
and applying political warfare pressure
dexterously, they can. increase the chances
that in time there will arise new oppor-
tunities for Communist strategic advan-
ces without substantial risk of general.
war.
5. While the Kremlin may continue to
follow generally its present lines of policy
throughout the period of this estimate,
it should be borne in mind that the pro-
gress being made by the USSR in the
development of nuclear weapons, and the
increasing Soviet capability to deliver
these weapons, are changing the world
power situation in important respects.
Under these conditions Soviet rulers will
almost certainly believe that, as Soviet
nuclear capabilities increase, the aversion
of the US and its allies to general war will
correspondingly increase, and that the
Kremlin will therefore have greater free-
dom of action to pursue its objectives
without running substantial risk of gen-
eral war. Thus the Kremlin will be in-
creasingly ready to apply heavy pressure
on the non-Communist world upon any
signs of major dissension or weakness
among the US and its allies. We believe,
however, that the Kremlin will continue
to be extremely reluctant to precipitate a
contest in which the USSR would be sub-
jected to nuclear attack. At the same
time, we believe that the Kremlin would
not be deterred by the risk of general war
from taking counteraction against an
action by the US or its allies which the
Kremlin considered an imminent threat
to Soviet. security. We believe that the
extent to which the Kremlin uses the in-
creased freedom of action which its in-
creased nuclear capabilities appear to
give it, and the success which it achieves,
will depend primarily upon the determi-
nation, strength, and cohesiveness of the
non-Communist world.
6. We believe the Chinese Communist
leaders in general share these Soviet views
about the world situation and about op-
portunities and methods of advancing
Communist interests. During the period
of this estimate, Communist China will
probably be reluctant to undertake
courses of action which it considers might
involve substantial risk of provoking un-
limited war with a major power. The
major deterrents will be: (a) China needs
time to consolidate the Communist state
as well as to modernize her economy;
(b) China's strong ground forces are lim-
ited in service and support units, China's
expanding air force has certain limita-
tions, and China's navy has 'extremely
limited capabilities, and China will re-
main militarily dependent upon the
USSR for logistical, air, and naval sup-
port; (c) China's industrial centers will
be vulnerable; and (d) the margin of
available resources over minimum domes-
tic requirements will be narrow. How-
ever, China will probably counter with
military force, to the full extent of its
capability, any action which it considers
to be a military threat to its borders or to
constitute an imminent threat to its vital
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interests, accepting the risks of war in-
herent in such action.'
7. Both Soviet and Chinese Communist
leaders probably feel that Southeast Asia
offers particularly favorable opportuni-
ties for Communist expansion, not only
because of the vulnerability of the states
in the area, but because of the possibility
of exploiting disagreements between the
US and its allies. Continued Communist
successes in Indochina, or the consolida-
tion of present Communist gains in Indo-
china, would probably lead the Chinese
Communists to expand their efforts to
subvert neighboring countries by political
infiltration and covert support of local
insurrections, though probably not by the
commitment of identifiable.combat units
of Chinese Communist armed forces. The
aggressiveness with which such a policy
would be pursued would depend on the
vigor and effectiveness of non-Commu-
nist reaction.
DISCUSSION
I. BASIC COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES
AND BELIEFS
8. The regime now in power in the USSR, or
any that is likely to succeed it, almost cer-
tainly will continue for the indefinite future
to consider its basic objective to be the con-
solidation and expansion of its own power,
internally and externally. In pursuing this
policy most Soviet leaders probably envisage
ultimately: (a) the elimination of every world
power center capable of competing with the
USSR; (b) the spread of Communism to all
parts of the world; and (c) Soviet domination
over all other Communist regimes.
9. Soviet leaders probably are also committed
to the following propositions concerning the
expansion of the power of the USSR:
a. The struggle between the Communist
and the non-Communist worlds is irreconcila-
2 The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that
paragraph 6 should read as follows:
"We believe that Chinese Communist leaders
in general share these Soviet views about the
world situation and about opportunities and
methods of advancing Communist interests.
Communist China will probably not choose
knowingly any course of action likely to expose
its fundamental national strengths in war with
a major power. However, we believe that Com-
munist China's strength for conducting various
kinds of warfare are such, and the motives and
judgment of its leaders are such as to make
Communist China's courses of action dangerously
unpredictable under outside pressure of any ap-
preciable magnitude."
ble, with one system eventually destroying the
other;
b. This struggle may go on for a long time,
with periods of strategic retreat possibly in-
tervening before the final Communist tri-
umph; '
c. The struggle between the Communist
and the non-Communist worlds will not neces-
sarily involve general war;
d. During the period of "coexistence of the
two camps" of Communism and capitalism,
the Communists must steadily build up the
economic and military strength of the USSR
and its -Satellites while trying to divide and
weaken the non-Communist world.
II. SOVIET POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND
THE STABILITY OF THE REGIME
10. The regime committed to these basic be-
liefs is controlled by the small group of less
than 10 men in the Presidium (formerly Polit-
buro) of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party. Most of this, same group of
men exercise authority in governmental
policy-making through their ranking positions
in the Council of Ministers, the formal seat
of executive authority in the USSR. Their
joint control over the apparatus of Soviet
power is absolute, and the primacy of the
regime's interests continues to be enforced
rigidly by elaborate party, government, and
police controls. The regime may exercise its
police powers somewhat more moderately and
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less arbitrarily than in the past, but this re-
straint would derive from conviction that the
regime can best attain its domestic objectives
in this way, not from any fear of popular dis-
approval or any reluctance to use force if
necessary to. maintain government authority.
11. The most powerful Soviet leader appears
to,be G. M. Malenkov, ranking member in both
the Communist Party Presidium and the
Council of Ministers. Party First Secretary
N. S. Khrushchev has risen rapidly, particu-
larly since the elimination of Beria, and may
now be on a level with Malenkov. Probably,
however, neither Malenkov nor Khrushchev,
nor any of the other Soviet leaders, is cur-
rently in a position as an individual to exercise
power independently of the group. The party
has so thoroughly penetrated the security
police, government machinery, and armed
forces that independent action by any one of
these organizations at the command of an
individual Soviet leader is nearly, impossible.
We therefore believe it most unlikely that any
struggle for power among Soviet rulers will
lead to overt or widespread civil strife.
12. While such a system of joint authority in
a totalitarian society tends to be unstable, a
balance of power among the various leaders
may, nevertheless, last for some time, espe-
cially if most of them feel that their interests
require its preservation. Now that power has
been successfully transferred after Stalin's
death and Beria has been efficiently disposed
of, the Soviet regime may continue with some-
thing comparable to the current modus oper-
andi for some time. Changes may take place
in the composition of the ruling group or in
the relative power positions of its members;
one man may even succeed in gaining absolute
power. We do not believe, however, that any
significant disruption or weakening of the sys-
tem of Soviet power would accompany such
shifts in the roles of leading personalities.
13. We believe that whatever conflicts for
power or differences respecting policy may
develop within the ruling group are unlikely
during the period of this estimate to affect
the stability of the regime or its authority
within the country. Moreover, we believe the
regime will not be significantly impaired in
its ability to arrive at policy decisions and
carry them out -effectively. These policies
and their implementation will continue to re-
flect the fundamental agreement which evi-
dently obtains among the leaders concerning
the basic objectives of the Communist regime.
III. SOVIET-SATELLITE RELATIONS
14. The appearance of new leadership in Mos-
cow has had no apparent effect on the char-
acter of the relations between the USSR and
its Satellite states in Eastern Europe. We be-
lieve that Soviet authority over the Satellite
regimes will remain intact during the period
of this estimate. The existence of widespread
political discontent and serious difficulties in
building up the Satellite economies will con-
tinue to delay the process of Sovietization of
the area. However, during the next five years
the Satellite contribution to Soviet power will
gradually increase. Soviet control will con-
tinue to depend primarily on the presence or
proximity of Soviet armed forces, and in the
absence of general war popular dissatisfaction
almost certainly will not develop beyond the
stage of sporadic noncooperation.
IV. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
15. The relations of the USSR with Commu-
nist China are markedly different from those
prevailing between the USSR and any other
Communist country. Communist China is
more a Soviet ally than a Satellite. It pos-
sesses some capability for independent action,
possibly even for action which the USSR
might disapprove but which it would find
difficult to repudiate. However, the main out-
lines of Communist policy in Asia are probably
jointly determined by Moscow and Peiping.
While the Soviet voice presumably remains
preponderant, Communist China appears to
be increasing its stature within the Sino-Soviet
partnership. Soviet propaganda and diplo-
macy have recently given great emphasis to
China's claim. to an acknowledged position
in international affairs, and the USSR has
given evidence of a willingness to have Com-
munist China assume greater responsibilities
in furthering Communist interests in Asia.
In particular Communist China seems to have
an increasingly important role in the execu-
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tion of Communist policy in North Korea and
Indochina.
16. The national interests of the USSR and
Communist China are in some cases conflict-
ing, and constitute potential sources of fric-
tion between the two powers. We believe,
however, that throughout the period of this
estimate the cohesive forces in the Sino-Soviet
relationship will be far greater than the divi-
sive forces. The USSR and Communist China
share a common ideology. Both of them re-
gard the US as the chief obstacle to their
objectives, and consider that their interests
are threatened by US policy and power. More-
over, each partner profits at the present time
from its alliance with the other. Communist
China receives essential Soviet political, mili-
tary, and economic support and assistance.
Soviet leaders recognize in China a valuable
ally, which provides the USSR not only mili-
tary strength and defense in depth in the Far
East, but also a base for further advancing
Communist aims in Asia.
V. SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH
17. The USSR has maintained its basic policy
of forced-draft economic expansion through-
out the postwar period, reaching approxi-
mately prewar levels of output in 1948 and
steadily expanding in nearly every field since
that time. The rate of growth of the Soviet
economy, however, has declined in the past
five years. From 1948 through 1950 Soviet
gross national product (GNP) increased at an
average annual rate of approximately 10 per-
cent, but this rate fell off to about 6 or 7
percent per annum in the three-year period
1950-1953 and is estimated to have been only
about 5 percent in the year 1953. The unusu-
ally high rate of growth through 1950 and the
slower rate of growth thereafter were due to
several factors, chief among which were: (a)
during the earlier period the Soviet economy
was still being reconstructed and hence capac-
ity was brought into operation by compara-
tively little investment; (b) average growing
conditions in agriculture were more favorable
in 1949 and 1950 than in 1951 and 1953; and
(c) the nonagricultural labor force grew less
rapidly after 1950 than in the 1948-1950
period. In addition, the rate of growth of
Soviet GNP in 1953 was reduced as a result
of the adjustments required by the revisions
of economic plans introduced in that year.
18. It is estimated that in the next two years
the rate of growth of the Soviet economy will
be about 6 or 6.5 percent per annum and that
in the period 1956-1959 it will decline to about
5 or 6 percent per annum. The higher rate
of growth in the near term is expected to re-
sult from the resumption of a high rate of
increase in total investment, including addi-
tional investment in the traditionally lagging
sectors of the economy - agriculture and con-
sumers' goods industries. On the other hand,
the rate of growth in the period 1956-1959 will
be somewhat retarded, in part because of a
decline in the growth of the labor force result-
ing from the low birth rate during World War
II. Even so, the average annual growth rate
for the entire period of this estimate will be
nearly double the long-range average annual
increase in GNP of the US economy of 3 per-
cent, and substantially above the annual in-
crease of just over 4 percent which the US
economy has shown in the 1948-1953 period.
19. Trends for the USSR determine the gen-
eral character of economic growth rates for
the whole Soviet Bloc. Even though the rate
of growth of Bloc GNP declines, this rate will
almost certainly continue to exceed that of
the US and NATO powers. The US-NATO
growth rate for GNP is estimated to have been
2.8 percent per year during the first- half of
the twentieth century. If the latter rate
should continue throughout the period of this
estimate, then the ratio of Soviet to US na-
tional products would increase from about 33
percent in 1953 to about 40 percent in 1959,
and the ratio of Bloc to US-NATO national
products would increase from about 38 percent
to about 45 percent, respectively. However,
the absolute difference between the total prod-
uct of the Bloc and that of US-NATO (as well
as between the USSR and-the US) would be
somewhat greater at the end of the period
than it is at present.
VI. TRENDS IN SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY
20. The present regime in the USSR has not
fundamentally changed the traditional Soviet
economic policy of placing. primary emphasis
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on the rapid development of heavy industry
and war potential. The new regime has, how-
ever, devoted a great deal of its attention and-
energies to a revision of current economic
plans aimed at speeding up the production of
agricultural commodities, especially food-
stuffs, and manufactured, consumers' goods.
Soviet leaders have stated that this goal is to
be achieved without decreasing the tempo of
heavy industrial development, but they ap-
parently intend, at least for the next two
years, not to increase defense outlays above
the high level reached in 1952 and maintained
in 1953. This modification of Soviet economic
programs is designed to overcome, the lag in
the growth of certain sectors of the economy,
particularly agriculture, and to bring about a
better balanced economic growth over the long
run. r
21. The promise of Soviet leaders to increase
the volume of consumers' goods is being im-
plemented by a serious effort to fulfill or mod-
estly exceed the quotas in the Five-Year Plan
as set forth in 1950. If successful, the regime
would thus reverse the * persistent trend of
recent years whereby this sector of the Soviet
economy slipped well below planned levels as
a result of the priority in the allocation of
economic resources granted to heavy industry
and defense production. The heart of the
new economic program is the effort to increase
agricultural output by: (a) providing greater
incentives to the peasant population in the
form of goods and payments; (b) channeling
greater capital investment to agriculture in
the form of mechanical draft power, machin-
ery, fertilizer, and building materials; (c) pro-
viding the farms with an ample supply of
qualified technicians; (d) improving farm
organization and practices; and (e) bringing
under cultivation vast areas of semiarid virgin
land in the eastern USSR and central Asia.
22. An important concern of the Soviet regime
is that the inadequacy of agricultural produc-
tion has been a critical contributing factor
in the slowdown in the rate of growth of Soviet
industrial labor productivity. The Soviet
Union has been getting more and more out of
its industrial labor force each year, but the
annual increases are getting smaller and
smaller. The new economic program aims at
increasing the urban supply of food and other
consumer goods and - with this incentive for
industrial workers - steadily raising the level
of labor productivity in Soviet industry. The
new agricultural program of greater incen-
tives and increased investment may mark the
first step along lines of economic development
that Soviet leaders will find it advisable to pur-
sue for a number of years. They will almost
certainly continue them through 1955 and in
view of the likelihood that achievements will
fall far short of plan goals, they may continue
them during .the whole period through 1959.
23. We believe that agricultural production is
unlikely (even with normal weather) to in-
crease by more than about 3 percent annually
during the period 1954-1959, making a total
increase of 15-20 percent for the whole period
1950-1959 as contrasted with the original
Five-Year Plan goal of about 50 percent in-
crease for the period 1950-1955. Even so, the
annual increment to the total Soviet gross
national product will be large enough to per-
mit moderate increases in standards of living
and greater investment in enterprises produc-
ing consumers goods (including agriculture)
without jeopardizing heavy industrial growth
or the maintenance of a high level of military
expenditure.
VII. EFFECT OF MODIFIED ECONOMIC
PROGRAM ON SOVIET MILITARY
EXPENDITURES
24. We believe that if the new economic pro-
gram is carried on as planned, Soviet defense
expenditure will have to remain approxi-
mately constant in terms of purchasing power,
at least through 1955. Judging by the pat-
tern of budgetary allotments, Soviet annual
defense expenditure for 1954-1955 will be ap-
proximately the same as for 1952-1953,
whereas it increased more than 50 percent
between 1950 and 1952. We believe that So-
viet defense outlays of all categories in 1953
amounted to about 13 to 16 percent of total
Soviet GNP and that the proportion will
slightly diminish for at least two or three
years and possibly through mid-1959. In any
case, over-all war potential will steadily in-
crease as a result of the growth of the
economy.
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VIII. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
RESOURCES OF THE SOVIET BLOC
25. Soviet scientific and technological capa-
bilities are sufficiently well developed to pro-
vide effective support to industrial and mili-
tary research and development. At present,
the scientific assets of the USSR (the number
and quality of trained personnel, facilities,
equipment, and financial support) are less
than those of the US, and the assets of the
Bloc as a whole are far less than those of the
West. The consistently strong support given
to the development of Soviet science and tech-
nology has resulted, especially since World
War II, in a rapid increase in Soviet capa-
bilities in this area. We believe that military
requirements will continue to have a high
priority in the allocation of Soviet scientific
resources during the period of this estimate.
IX. MILITARY STRENGTH a AND WEAPONS
DEVELOPMENTS
26. In the postwar period the USSR has main-
tained its armed forces at high levels of
strength and combat-readiness. During the
period of this estimate military procurement,
even if continued at the 1952-1953 rate, will
be sufficient for continuous qualitative im-
provement in weapons, equipment, and train-
ing. Apart from this general qualitative im-
provement, the most significant changes in
Soviet military strength during the period of
this estimate are likely to be as follows :
a. Increase in the nuclear weapons stock-
pile;
b. Increase in the capability to deliver these
weapons by various methods;
c. Improvement in weapons systems for air
defense;
d. Increase in the long-range submarine
force.
Nuclear Weapons
27. For an estimate of the status of Soviet
nuclear research and nuclear weapons stock-
piles for the period 1954 through 1957, refer-
ence should be made to NIE 11-3A-54.
See Appendix for tables giving estimated
strengths of Soviet Bloc ground, air, and naval
forces.
28. There is no evidence available which indi-
cates the course that the Soviet atomic energy.
program will take during the period 1957
through 1959, nor are there any specific para-
meters which can.be considered as limiting on
the growth of the program during this period.
Nevertheless, long-range extrapolations can be
carried out on the basis of assumptions of the
growth pattern the program might follow dur-
ing the period in question.
29. Alternate assumptions, which indicate a
range of growth capabilities are :
a. No expansion of Soviet fissionable mate-
rials production facilities after 1957; or
b. Continued expansion of Soviet fissionable
materials production facilities after 1957 at
the same rate as estimated in NIE 11-3A-54
for the period 1954 to mid-1957; or-
c. Expansion of the Soviet program after
1957 at a rate which will increase its require-
ment for uranium to approximately 7,000 to
10,000 tons per year by 1964.
30. The Soviet fissionable materials stockpiles
estimated for 1959 on the basis of above
assumptions can be expressed in terms of
weapon technology indicated by their 1953
tests. Examples of such conversion follows:
1959 Assumption Assumption Assumption
(1) Unboosted
weapons
40 KT
each
1,250
1,355
1,700
Total yield
(million
tons
TNT)
50.
54.
68.
OR
(2) Boosted
U-235
1,000
KT each
132
145
168
Boosted PU
60 KT
each
350
375
510
Boosted PU
5 KT
each
1,050
1,125
1,525
Total yield
(million
tons
TNT)
158.
172.
206.
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31. The alternate assumptions on which the
above table is based do not consider the possi-
bility of rapid technological advances in the
production of fissionable materials, nor do
they reflect major advances in weapons
development which must be anticipated. De-
velopments in thermonuclear weapons with
yields well in excess of one million tons of
TNT, which could possibly be tested during
1954, could increase the total energy yield
obtainable from the Soviet fissionable mate-
rials stockpile by a factor of five to twenty-
five over that in example 2. In addition, So-
viet nuclear capabilities may be increased by
weapon developments which will permit the
adaptation of nuclear warheads to many de-
livery systems. ,
Jet Bombers
32. It was previously estimated that the USSR
would produce: (a) a jet medium bomber
having a speed of about 500 knots and a
radius/range of about 1,500/2,900 nautical
miles, and (b) a jet heavy bomber having a
speed of about 450 knots and a radius/range
of about 2,500/4,800 nautical miles. At the
Moscow Air Show on May Day, 1954, there
were observed in flight nine twin-engine jet
bombers, designated for intelligence purposes
Type-39, and one four-engine swept-wing jet
bomber, designated Type-37. On the basis of
preliminary analysis 4 of the photographs and
observed characteristics of these aircraft we
believe that their performance does not ex-
ceed, and may fall below, that previously esti-
mated respectively for the jet medium and jet
heavy bombers. It is estimated that both air-
craft are powered by engines of 15,000-pound
thrust.
33. Whether or not the Type-39 now has the
performance characteristics of a jet medium
bomber set forth above, we believe that the
USSR will have about 20 Type-39 bombers in
operational units by mid-1954, about 120 by
mid-1955, and about 600 by. mid-1959. This
alters previous estimates to advance by one
year the appearance of jet medium bombers
in the Soviet Air Force. Whether or not the
`Analysis of presently available evidence on these
aircraft is still in progress.
Type-37 now has the performance character-
istics we have estimated for a jet heavy
bomber, our estimate as to the development
and introduction of such a bomber remains
unchanged, that is, `a few in operational units
by mid-1957 and about 100 by mid-1959.
These dates result from a process of calcula-
tion which we believe to be basically sound
but which in-some instances has failed to keep
up with Soviet progress. Consequently, sub-
stantial numbers of jet heavy bombers may
appear in operational units prior to mid-1959
and possibly by mid-1957.
Guided Missiles 5
34. We have many indications that the USSR
is devoting great effort to its program of devel-
opment of guided missiles. From an assess-
ment of over-all Soviet technical capability,
and assuming reasonable progress in Soviet
programs based on the World War II Germany
effort, we believe that the USSR could within
the period of this estimate have considerable
numbers of guided missiles in operational use.
The type and characteristics of the missiles
produced would depend upon the Soviet
assessment of military requirements and upon
the allocation of priority among the many
possible types to be developed.
35. We have no firm evidence that the USSR
has any guided missiles ready for operational
use at the present time. The most reliable
information concerning the Soviet guided
missiles program relates to development and
improvement of German V-1 and V-2 models
acquired at the end of World War II. Based
on this information we believe it likely that
the USSR will have by 1956 a V-2 type of
guided missile with a range of 450-500 nauti-
cal miles s carrying a warhead of 2,200 pounds.
6 Detailed studies of this subject are currently in
progress and will provide the basis of NIE 11-6-
54, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in
the Field of Guided Missiles," scheduled for pro-
duction in the third quarter of 1954.
O The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that
the range of this missile would be on the order
of 300-350 nautical miles; however, he believes it
is likely that the Soviets will have, by this date,
other missiles with ranges on the order of 850 to
900 nautical miles carrying a 3,000 pound war-
head.
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Development of such a missile is well within
Soviet capabilities. It is also well within So-
viet capabilities to develop numerous other
types of missiles within the period of this esti-
mate, but we have at present no information
as to which of these various types the USSR
may be developing on a priority basis. Our
estimate of probable Soviet military require-
ments suggests that the priority accorded the
development of a surface-to-air missile would
be at least as high as that given to develop-
ment of a surface-to-surface missile.
36. We believe that it will not be within Soviet
capability before 1959 to attack continental
United States with guided missiles launched
from Soviet Bloc territory. In 1959, it would
be possible for the USSR to start series pro-
duction of a pilotless-aircraft type of missile
which could reach the US from Bloc territory;
we have no evidence of such development now
being under way. Even at the present time,
it would be technically feasible for the USSR
to attack targets within the US with missiles
launched from long-range aircraft or from
submarines. We have no evidence at present
that the USSR has developed this capability.
Air Defense Weapons
37. At present, the USSR does not have an
interception capability sufficient to prevent
effective bombardment missions under poor
visibility conditions. However, an all-weather
fighter equipped with AI radar is probably a
priority project of Soviet weapons develop-
ment. It is expected that about 500 such air-
craft will be in operational use by mid-1956
and about 2,000 by mid-1959. With the all-
weather fighters available in greater numbers
starting about mid-1958, along with improve-
ments in early warning and GCI radar and a
growing surface-to-air missile capability, it is
expected that Soviet Bloc air defense capabili-
ties will be improved substantially by 1959.
Submarines
38. The Soviet Navy is apparently concentrat-
ing on the construction of two long-range sub-
marine types developed since World War II.
These are equipped with snorkel and have
operating radii of about 4,700 and 6,700 miles
-respectively. By early 1954, 47 of these had
joined the fleet and the building rate is esti-
mated as 46 per year. The Soviets are known
to have continued development of the Walther
closed-cycle engine for submarine propulsion
and this engine could be operational by mid-
1955. It is also possible that, by mid-1959,
nuclear propulsion for submarines will have
been developed by the USSR.
X. PROBABLE MAIN LINES OF SOVIET
POLICY
39. In making their estimate of the world
strategic situation Soviet leaders probably cal-
culate that:' (a) the US is irreconcilably hos-
tile to the Soviet system and is intent on the
formation of a world-wide anti-Communist
coalition; (b) the US will meet increasing
problems in attempting to create and give
military substance to such a coalition; (c)
frustration of this effort might lead the US
either to adopt 'a policy of isolation or to un-
dertake preventive war; (d) fears of nuclear
warfare, particularly as Soviet delivery capa-
bilities grow, will increase pressure in the West
for avoidance of war with the USSR; (e) the
continuing conflict with the US can be re-
stricted to areas and issues involving less than
an all-out military effort, in which case the
USSR will eventually triumph.
40. The Kremlin probably considers that there
is at present a rough strategic equilibrium
between the Soviet Bloc and the US-NATO
coalition. On the one hand, Western strength
in air and ground forces has grown, over-all
Western naval superiority has been main-
tained, and the US has retained its superior
nuclear capabilities while improving its defen-
sive posture. On the other hand, the Soviet
Union, while retaining its strength in ground
forces, has reduced the margin of Western
naval superiority, and has built an air force
capable of using nuclear weapons in attacks
on US. allies, US forward air bases, and
even - under comparatively difficult opera-
tional circumstances - in attacks on the con-
tinental US. Soviet leaders probably believe
that they cannot be certain of winning a war,
but they show no indication of feeling that the
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balance of world power is developing unfavor-
ably to their basic interests.
41. We believe that the Kremlin probably
will continue, at least for a year or two, to
estimate the relative military capabilities of
the Soviet Bloc and the US-NATO coalition
substantially as described above. The Soviet
leaders probably believe that general war
would be a hazardous gamble for them, possi-
bly involving the destruction of the Soviet
system. On this basis, the Kremlin probably
would conclude that the USSR should try
during this period to avoid courses of action
which in its judgment would clearly involve
substantial risk of general war. The Kremlin
will, however, probably continue to consider
general war a possibility that cannot be ex-
cluded, and the USSR will almost certainly
continue to build up its military and economic
strength against this eventuality. We be-
lieve that the Kremlin would not be deterred
by the risk of general war from taking coun-
teraction against an action by the US or its
allies which the Kremlin considered an immi-
nent threat to Soviet security.
42. During the period of this estimate the
Kremlin will try, to foster and exploit weak-
nesses and, as opportunity offers, armed insur-
rections within the non-Communist nations,
while encouraging political or economic con-
flicts among them. Soviet leaders probably
believe that, by alternately, easing the tension
and applying political warfare pressures dex-
terously, they can increase the chances that
in time there will arise new opportunities for
Communist strategic advances without sub-
stantial risk of general war. Meanwhile, they
will almost certainly continue to devote great
effort to building a better balanced economic
and military strength in the Soviet Union and
the Satellites.
43. The Kremlin may continue to follow gen-
erally its .present lines of policy throughout
the period of this estimate. However, the
progress being made by the USSR in the devel-
opment of nuclear weapons, and the increas-
ing Soviet capability to deliver these weapons,
are changing the world power situation in
important respects. As these Soviet capabil-
ities increase, the US is losing a great advan-
tage which it has heretofore held in the strug-
gle. Unless defensive capabilities develop
beyond the degree now foreseen, both the US
and the USSR within the period of this esti-
mate probably will have sufficient nuclear
capabilities to cripple each other, though only
at grave risk of receiving crippling blows in
return.
44. Soviet rulers will almost certainly believe
that, as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase,
the aversion of the US and of its allies to
general war will correspondingly increase,
and that the Kremlin will therefore have
greater freedom of action to pursue its objec-
tives without running substantial risk of gen-
eral war. It may employ the threat of nu-
clear devastation as an instrument of political
warfare. It may attempt to gain some of its
objectives by local military actions, calcula-
ting that the US and its allies will be more
anxious than before to keep such local con-
flicts from' expanding into general war. It
will be increasingly ready to apply heavy pres-
sure on the non-Communist world upon any
signs of major dissension or weakness among
the US and its allies. On the other hand, we
believe that the Kremlin will continue to be
extremely reluctant to precipitate a contest
in which the USSR would be subjected ' to
nuclear attack. We believe that the extent
to which the Kremlin uses the increased free-
dom of action which its increased nuclear
capabilities appear to give it, and the success
which it achieves, will depend primarily upon
the determination, strength, and cohesiveness
of the non-Communist world.
Chinese Communist Courses of Action
45. We believe the Chinese Communist lead-
ers in general share these Soviet views about
the world situation and about opportunities
and methods of advancing Communist inter-
ests. During the period of this estimate,
Communist China will probably be reluctant
to undertake courses of action which it con-
siders might involve substantial risk of pro-
voking unlimited war with a major power.
The major deterrents will be: (a) China needs
time to consolidate the Communist state as
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well as to modernize her economy; (b) China's
strong ground forces are limited in service and
support units, China's expanding, air force has
certain limitations, and China's navy has ex-
tremely limited capabilities, and China will
remain militarily dependent upon the USSR
for logistical, air, and naval support; (c)
China's industrial centers will be vulnerable;
and (d) the margin of available 'resources over
minimum domestic requirements will be nar-
row. However, China will probably counter
with military force, to the full extent of its
capability, any action which it considers to be
a military threat to its borders or to constitute
an imminent threat to its vital interests, ac-
cepting the risks of war inherent in such
action.?
46. Both Soviet and Chinese Communist lead-
ers probably feel that Southeast Asia offers the
most favorable opportunities for Communist
expansion, not only because of the vulnera-
bility of the states in the area, but because
of the possibility of exploiting disagreements
between the US and its allies. The continu-
ation of Communist successes in Indochina or
the consolidation of present Communist gains
there would in Communist China's view open
up enlarged opportunities for a more aggres-
sive policy in Southeast Asia. Chinese Com-
munist leaders would probably expand their
efforts to subvert neighboring countries by
political infiltration and covert support of
local insurrections, but probably not by the
commitment of identifiable combat units of
Chinese Communist armed forces. The ag-
gressiveness with which such a policy would
be pursued would depend upon the vigor and
effectiveness of non-Communist reaction.
The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that
paragraph 45 should read as follows:
"We believe that Chinese Communist leaders
in general share these Soviet views about the
world situation and about opportunities and
methods of advancing Communists interests.
Communist China will probably not choose
knowingly any course of action likely to expose
its fundamental national strengths in war with
a major power. However, we believe that Com-
munist China's strength for conducting various
kinds of, warfare are such, and the motives and
judgment of its leaders are such as to make
Communist China's courses of action dangerously
unpredictable under outside pressure of any ap-
preciable magnitude."
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APPENDIX
TABLES OF MILITARY STRENGTH
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ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF BLOC
GROUND FORCES MID-1954 AND MID-1956/MID-1959
USSR
1101
40
25
452
175
175
Occupied Europe
5
16
9
13
..
30
30
West, USSR
41
9
8
26
84
84
Caucasus
9
2
0
..
6
17
17
Central USSR
9
1
0
4,
14
14
Far East
16
6
2
6
30
30
Satellites (total)
63'
-6
82
93
Albania
3
3
3
Bulgaria
12'
2
..
14
16
Czechoslovakia
8
2
..
14
14
East Germany
4
7
12
Hungary
12'
1
14 ,
14
Poland
12
17
19
Rumania
12'
1
..
13
15
Communist China
160
0
5
22
165
139
North Korea
19
0
0
0
19
24
Viet Minh.
6
0
0
1
6
?
1 This includes 5 cavalry divisions.
2 Includes 20 artillery and 25 AAA divisions.
' Includes 2 cavalry divisions and 2 mountain divisions.
'Includes 1 cavalry division.
Includes 2 mountain divisions.
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MID- MID- MID-
MID-1954 1955 MID-1956 1957 1958 MID-1959
CCAF/
USSR
EE SAT
NKAF
USSR
USSR
EE SAT
NKAF
USSR I
USSR
USSR
EE SAT
NKAF
Fighter: Jet (Day)
10,480
1,820
1,150
10,400
10,200
2,450
1,700
9,800
9,400
8,900
2,500
2,300
(All Weather)
20
. . . .
200
500
. . . .
. . . .
1,000
1,500
2,100
Piston
260
400
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
100
. . . .
Attack: Jet
200
900
100
40
1,600
2,100
2,300
400
100
Piston
2,500
800
240
2,300
1,600
840
360
900
400
200
.
600
400
Lt. Bomber: Jet
2,700
60
280
3,200
3,200
280
320
3,200
3,200
3,200
600
500
Piston
500
300
320
....
....
310
200
....
....
....
100
Med. Bomber:' Jet
20
....
.....
120
250
400
500
600
....
. ..
Piston
1
,270
10
1,130
950
....
70
650
540
400
30
100
Heavy Bomber:' Jet
....
....
....
....
....
....
...
20
60
100
Turbo-Prop
10
....
....
.100
200
....
....
330
300
300
....
Tankers:' Medium
150
...
300
500
....
....
490
600
600
....
Heavy
....
....
....
. ...
....
....
....
60
150
250
....
Transport:I Medium
....
....
....
.....
50
....
....
100
200
400
Light
1,900
150
120
1,900
1,850
180
170
1,800
1,700
1,500
270
250
Helicopters
50
....
100
300
....
....
450
450
450
....
....
Reconnaissance: Jet
500
....
....
750
900
70
....
1,000
1,070
1,070
200
....
Piston
600
160
....
350
200
170
....
100
30
30
100
TOTALS
20,700
3,550
2,520
21,050
21,600
4,400
2,960
21,900
22,200
22,400
4,800
3,650
JETS
13,700
1,880
1,430
15,950
16,150
2,900
2,020
17,020
17,830
18,270
3,700
2,900
BLOC TOTAL (TO&E)
26,770
....
28,960
....
....
30,850
Jets
17,010
....
21,070
....
24,870
BLOC TOTAL
-
(ACTUAL)
21,700
....
....
....
....
Jets
12,500
. .
....
....
....
b. USSR figures are estimates of authorized TO & E strength,. except in the categories showing
introduction of new aircraft types, in which cases the build-up phase in new types represents
estimated actual strength. Present actual strength is estimated to be, for the various types
of aircraft, the following percentages of TO & E strength: Jet fighters-80 percent; Piston
fighters-90/100 percent; Attack-95/100 percent; Jet light bombers-60 percent; Piston light
bombers-95/100 percent; Piston medium bombers-82/87 percent; Transport-90/95 percent;
Jet reconnaissance-60 percent; Piston reconnaissance-90/95 percent. Based on present re-
quirement trends, it is considered that the over-all operational establishment will be at a fig-
ure close to full authorized strength by mid-1955. The possible effect which introduction of
guided missiles might have on aircraft strength in the latter part of the period cannot pres-
ently be estimated.
c. Actual over-all strength of European Satellite Air Forces is estimated at about 65 percent of
authorized strength in mid-1954, at 75 percent for mid-1956, and 85 percent for mid-1959.
d. Actual strength of the CCAF-NKAF is about 75 percent of authorized strength in mid-1954, at
85 percent for mid-1956, and 90 percent for mid-1959.
May include approximately 300 all-weather fighters.
Figures for medium and heavy bombers represent a tentative revision of previous estimates pending com-
plete analysis of recently acquired information. See ,discussion in paragraph 33. The turbo-prop bomber
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is retained in the estimated future program at a reduced strength and build-up rate, pending develop-
ment of further intelligence bearing on the status of an aircraft of this class in the Soviet long-range
aviation program.
'Tankers have not been identified in operational units nor have inflight refueling techniques. The esti-
mate presented represents the numbers, of aircraft which could be supported if tankers operations were
introduced.
In addition to-Transports, it is estimated that 300 gliders are in-organized glider regiments.
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MID- MID- MID-
1954 1956 1959
Battleships (old) .... 3 3 3
Monitors (old) .... 1 1 1
Cruisers (modern) .. 23 24 29
Cruisers (old) ....... 2 4 5
Destroyers (modern) . 129 2 1533 183'
Destroyers (old) .... 7 . .7 15
Coastal Destroyers
(modern) ......... 37 65 100
Coastal Destroyers
(old) ............. 15 15 15
Submarines'
Long-Range ... 148, 240 378
Medium-Range 73, 73 73
Coastal ....... 142 142 142
Patrol Vessels .. .. 1,150 1 (No substantial change
Mine Vessels :....... 530 J in these figures, is ex-
Amphibious Vessels'.. 35 l pected during the pe-
Auxiliaries .......... 225 Iriod of this estimate.)
'The table gives Soviet vessels.only. The Euro-
pean Satellite and Communist Chinese contribu-
tions to total Bloc naval strength will continue
to be of minor importance and the only probable
additions to their strength would be by transfers
from the USSR. Present European Satellite and
Chinese Communist naval strength comprises six
old destroyers, seven old submarines, and about
300 minor surface vessels.
2 Up to six may be Destroyer Leaders (DL).
8 Up to 12 may be Destroyer Leaders (DL).
These estimates do not predict the possible de-
commissioning of older units, although recent
evidence has indicated a limited retirement of
units constructed prior to World War II. The
number of long-range submarines given for 1959
is based upon a continuation of the present
building rate. If this rate continues and if the
Soviets retire all pre-World War II units by mid-
1959, the composition of the force will be as fol-
lows: 334 long-range, 16 medium, 70 coastal.
About 65 of these represent the two new types
developed since World War II.
NOTE: Possible Capital Ship (type unknown)
may be added mid-1957.
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