SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH MID-1959

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A003500010001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 68
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 14, 1954
• Content Type: NIE

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NE ,11-4-54
14 September 1954
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-4-54
(Supersedes NIE 11-5-54)
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES
OF ACTION THROUGH MID-1959
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following organizations participated in the preparation
of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency; the intelli-
gence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 14 September 1954. Concurring were the Special, Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director
for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion Representative to the IAC. The Assistant to the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being
outside of its jurisdiction.
f:1,5
IS'?
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-
sons under,his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other De-
partment or Agency
2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-
cable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange-
ment with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should
either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be re-
quested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22
June 1953.
WARNING
This material contains information -affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION:
White House
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Subject ?Page
CONCLUSIONS 1
I. BASIC COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES AND BELIEFS. . 4
II. SOVIET POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND DOMESTIC
DEVELOPMENTS
5
The Soviet Political System 5
Stability of the Regime 5
Domestic Policies 6
III. SOVIET-SATELLITE RELATIONS 8
IV. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 8
V. SOVIET ECONOMY POLICY 8
VI. SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH 9
VII. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 11
Population 11
Labor Force 11
Scale of Living 12
Labor Productivity and Industrial Efficiency . . . 13
Raw Material Supply 13
Energy Base . . . 13
Transpottation /13
Stockpiling 14
VIII. DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET INDUSTRY
14
Capital Goods Production . . . . 14
Consumer Goods Production 15
Military Goods Production 15
IX. DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE . . 16
X. DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE . . 17
Trade Within the Bloc 17
Soviet Trade Outside the Bloc 18
XI. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS 19
XII. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES IN PAR-
TICULAR FIELDS AFFECTING MILITARY CAPA-
BILITIES 20
Nuclear Weapons 20
22
Guided Missiles
Electronics
Electromagnetic Weapons
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Subject
Biological Weapons
Chemical Weapons
Radiological Weapons
XIII. SOVIET BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH
XIV. BLOC GROUND FORCES
Page
24
24
24
25
25
Soviet Army
25
Soviet Security Forces
26
European Satellite Armies
26
Chinese Communist Army
27
XV. BLOC NAVAL FORCES
27
Soviet Navy
27
Satellite and Chinese Communist Navies
28
XVI. BLOC AIR FORCES
29
Soviet Air Force
29
European Satellite Air Forces
30
Communist Air Forces in China
31
Bloc Air, Defense System
31
Soviet Civil Defense
31
XVII. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET BLOC
31
General
31
Offensive Capabilities
32
Air Defense Capabilities
33
XVIII. THE SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION
34
Soviet Estimate of Non-Communist Capabilities .
34
Soviet Estimate ,of Non-Communist Intentions . .
?
35
Soviet Estimate of Non-Communist Vulnerabilities
?
36
XIX. PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION
38
Present Soviet Objectives
38
External Courses of Action
38
General War
38
Diplomacy and Propaganda
39
Trade
39
Europe
39
Asia
40
Middle East
41
Latin America
41
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APPENDICES
(Graphs, Tables, and Map)
1. Appendix A (Political)
Integration of Communist Party (CPSU) and Soviet Government,
Mid-1954
2. Appendix B (Economic)
Figure 1: Metals and Minerals Production
Figure 2: Chemiaals Production
Figure 3: Energy and Transport
Figure 4: Manufacturing
Figure 5: Military End-Item Production
Figure 6: Agricultural Production
Figure 7: Direction of Flow of USSR Foreign Trade, 1937 and
1948-1953 (Total Trade Turnover)
3. Appendix C (Scientific)
Comparison of US and USSR Major Scientific Groups as of Mid-
1954
4. Appendix D (Military)
Table 1: Estimated Strength of Bloc Active Military Personnel
Table 2: Estimated Strength of Bloc Ground Forces and Trained
Reserves, Mid-1954 and Mid-1959, and Estimated
Ground Mobilization Potential, Mid-1954
Table 3: Estimated Bloc Naval Forces, Mid-1954 - Mid-1959
Table 4: Estimated Bloc Air Strength in Operational Units, Mid-
1954 - Mid-1959
Table 5: Estimated 1954-1957 Soviet Long-Range Aircraft Capa-
bilities (Calculated in accordance with US Military
Missions profiles)
Table 6: Estimated 1954-1957 Soviet Long-Range Aircraft Capa-
bilities under a Modified Mission Profile
Table 7: Estimated Production of Major Army Weapons in 1953
(Soviet Bloc and NATO)
Table 8: Estimated Postwar Production of Aircraft (Soviet Bloc
and NATO)
Table 9: Estimated Total USSR Naval Production, 1954-1959
Table 10: Estimated Composition of Bloc Merchant Fleets, Mid-
1954 and Mid-1959 (Vessels 1,000 Gross Tons Upward)
5. Appendix E (Population)
Population Map of the USSR showing Ethnic Groups
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SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES
OF ACTION THROUGH MID 1959
THE PROBLEM
.To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable courses of action through mid-1959.
CONCLUSIONS
General
1. We believe that the stability and au-
thority of the Soviet regime will not be
significantly affected during the period of
this estimate by conflicts for power or dif-
ferences respecting policy within the
ruling group. Any internal conflicts
arising out of such developments would
probably be resolved within the confines
of the ruling group and the higher eche-
lons of the Communist Party and would
not lead to civil wars or disturbances of
major proportions.
2. The appearance of new leadership in
Moscow has had no apparent effect on the
character of relations between the USSR
and its Satellite states in Eastern Europe.
We believe that Soviet authority over the
Satellite regimes will remain intact dur-
ing the period of this estimate.
3. Communist China is more an ally than
a Satellite of the USSR. It possesses some
capability for independent action, possi-
bly even for action which the USSR might
disapprove but which it would find diffi-
cult to repudiate. We believe that de-
spite potential sources of friction between
the two powers arising from occasional
conflicts of national interests, the cohe-
sive forces in the relationship will be far
greater than the divisive forces through-
out the period of this estimate.
Economic
4. The rate of growth of the Soviet econ-
omy has declined in the past five years
from the very high rate of the immediate
postwar period. We estimate that during
the next two years Soviet gross national
product (GNP) will increase by about 6
or 7 percent, and in 1956-1959 by about
5 or 6 percent, per year. If US GNP
should increase during the period of this
estimate at its long-range annual average
of 3 percent, Soviet GNP would at the end
of the period be about two-fifths of US,
as compared with about one-third in
1953.
5. The pattern of resource allocation in
the Soviet economy in 1953 showed about
14 percent devoted to defense, 28 percent
to investment, and 56 percent to con-
sumption. Current economic programs
indicate that for at least the next two
years the amount of expenditure on de-
fense, instead of continuing the rapid in-
crease that prevailed in 1950-1952, will
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remain about the same, while expendi-
ture on investment and consumption will
increase. We believe the chances are
better than even that the Kremlin will
continue its policies along these lines
throughout the period of this estimate.
The chief emphasis will almost certainly
continue to be on further development of
heavy industry.
6. The chief weakness of the Soviet econ-
omy as a whole has been in agricultural
production, which has remained since
1950 at approximately the prewar level,
though the population is now about 10
percent greater than in 1940. Soviet
leaders appear to have recognized that
continuation of the serious lag in agricul-
ture would ultimately make it difficult to
meet the food requirements of the grow-
ing urban population, the raw material
requirements of the expanding industrial
economy, and the export requirements of
Soviet foreign trade, in which agriculture
plays a major Dile. To remedy the situ-
ation the regime has embarked on a
vigorous program, with the aim of a-
chieving by 1956 a 50 percent increase in
agricultural production over 1950. We
believe that this goal will not be met, and
that even in 1959 agricultural production
will be no more than 15 to 20 percent
higher than in 1950. Even this increase,
however, would be sufficient to achieve a
moderate increase in the per capita avail-
ability of foodstuffs and textiles.
Military
7. We believe that, generally speaking,
the size of Soviet armed forces-in-being
will remain approximately constant dur-
ing the period of this estimate. However,
the over-all effectiveness of these forces
will increase, mainly because of the fol-
lowing factors:
a. A great increase in numbers of nu-
clear weapons, and in the range of yields
derived from these weapons;
b. An increase in the number of all-
weather fighters and jet medium bombers,
and the introduction of jet heavy bombers
in 1957;
c. A great increase in the number of
long-range submarines;
d. An increase in combat effectiveness
of Soviet ground forces, primarily due to
improved weapons, equipment and organ-
ization, and to changes in doctrine and
tactics designed to increase their capabil-
ities for nuclear warfare.
8. The principal limitations of Bloc
? armed forces during the period of this
estimate will be: deficiencies in experi-
ence, training, and equipment for long-
range air operations and air defense; lack
of capability to conduct long-range am-
phibious and naval operations; and the
logistic problems, especially for opera-
tions in the Far East, arising from the
size of Bloc territory and the relatively
inadequate road and rail network and
merchant fleet. The questionable politi-
cal ? reliability of the Satellite armies
places a significant limitation upon their
military usefulness.
Probable Courses of Action -
9. We believe that during the period of
this estimate the Kremlin will try to
avoid courses of action, and to deter Com-
munist China from courses of action,
which in its judgment would clearly in-
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volve substantial risk of general war.'
However, the USSR or one of the Bloc
countries might take action creating? a
situation in which the US or its allies,
rather than yield an important position,
would decide to take counteraction in-
volving substantial risk of general war
with the USSR. We believe, moreover,
that the Kremlin would not be deterred
by the risk of general war from taking
counteraction against a Western action
which it considered an imminent threat
to Soviet security. Thus general war
might occur during the period of this esti-
mate as the climax of a series of actions
and counteractions, initiated by either
side, which neither side originally in-
tended to lead to general war.
10. The progress being made by the USSR
in the development of nuclear weapons,
and the increasing Soviet capability to
deliver these weapons, are changing the
world power situation in important re-
spects. Soviet leaders almost certainly.
'The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Direc-
tor of Intelligence, USAF, believe that the fol-
lowing should be substituted for the first sen-
tence of paragraph 9: "Although the Kremlin
will probably try to avoid courses of action and
to deter Communist China from courses of
action that entail substantial risk of involving
the USSR in general war, it may be more willing
to support courses of action that would involve
risk of a localized war between the US and Com-
munist China. The support given such courses
of action would depend largely on Soviet judg-
ment as to the probable outcome of the war. If
the Soviet leaders believed that it would result
in a severe defeat to Communism, or the full-
scale participation of the USSR in general war,
they would probably exert pressure on the Chi-
nese to avoid courses of action which would
precipitate hostilities. On the other hand, if
they estimated that the conflict could be lim-
ited to war localized in the Far East, and that it
would result in greater relative damage to US
strengths than to Communist strengths, they
probably would support more adventurous
courses of action on the part of the Chinese
Communists."
believe that as Soviet nuclear capabilities
increase, the unwillingness of the US, and
particularly of its allies, to risk general
war will correspondingly increase, and
that the Kremlin will therefore have
greater freedom of action to promote its
objectives without running substantial
risk of general war. In any case, the
USSR will probably be increasingly ready
to apply heavy pressure on the non-Com-
munist world upon any signs of major
dissension or weakness among the US and
its allies. Nevertheless, we believe that
the Kremlin will be extremely reluctant
to precipitate a contest in which the
USSR would expect to be subjected to
nuclear attack. The extent to which the
Kremlin uses its increasing freedom of
action will depend primarily on the de-
termination, strength, and cohesiveness
of the non-Communist world.
11. We believe that the USSR will con-
tinue to pursue its expansionist objectives
and to seek and exploit opportunities for
enlarging the area of Communist control.
It will be unswerving in its determination
to retain the initiative in international
affairs and to capitalize on successes in
order to keep the Free World on the de-
fensive. For the near term, however, the
Kremlin will almost certainly continue to
direct its external policies towards the
immediate objectives of weakening and
disrupting the mutual defense arrange-
ments of non-Communist states, prevent-
ing or retarding the rearmament of Ger-
many and Japan, undermining the eco-
nomic and political stability of non-Com-
munist states, and isolating the US from
its allies and associates in Europe and
Asia. At the same time it will continue
to expand the industrial strength of the
Bloc, and to maintain large modern
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forces-in-being as a guarantee of the in-
tegrity of the Bloc and as an instrument
of intimidation in support of its policies
abroad.
12. The Communists will vary the meth-
ods used to accomplish the foregoing aims
and will time their actions so as to exploit
situations that in their judgment offer
the most favorable opportunities. For
the time being, the Kremlin seems to feel
that its foreign objectives will be best
served by a generally conciliatory pose
in foreign relations, by gestures of "peace-
ful co-existence" and proposals for mu-
tual security pacts, by tempting proffers
of trade, and by playing on the themes
of peace and disarmament. The purpose
of these tactics' is to allay fear in some
parts of the non-Communist world, to
create the impression that there has been
a basic change in Soviet policy, and there-
by to destroy the incentive for Western
defense and to undermine US polices. At
the same time, however, the Communists
continue to support and encourage na-
tionalist and anticolonial movements, and
to maintain their efforts to subvert gov-
ernments outside the Bloc. We believe
that the Kremlin will revert to more ag-
gressive and threatening conduct when-
ever it feels that such conduct will bring
increased returns. By such varieties and
combinations of tactics the Soviet leaders
almost certainly consider that they can
improve the chances for further Commu-
munist strategic advances. We do not
believe that such tactics indicate any
change in basic Communist objectives, or
that they will involve any substantial
concessions on the part of the Kremlin.
13. We believe that Southeast Asia offers,
in the Communist view, the most favor-
able opportunities for expansion in the
near future. The Communists will at-
tempt to extend their gains in Indochina,
and will expand their efforts to intimidate
and subvert neighboring countries by po-
litical infiltration and covert support of
local insurrections. We do not believe
that the Communists will attempt to se-
cure their objectives in Southeast Asia by
the commitment of identifiable combat
units of Chinese Communist armed
forces, at least during the early period of
this estimate. However, we find the sit-
uation in this area so fluid that we are
unable to estimate beyond this early
period.
DISCUSSION
I. BASIC COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES AND
BELIEFS
14. The Communist leaders now in power in
the USSR, or any that are likely to succeed
them, almost certainly will continue to con-
sider their basic objective to be the consolida-
tion and expansion of their own power, in-
ternally and externally. In pursuing this
policy most Soviet leaders probably envisage
ultimately: (a) the elimination of every world
power center capable of competing with the
USSR; (b) the spread of Communism to all
parts of the world; and (c) Soviet domination
over all other Communist regimes.
15. Soviet leaders probably are also committed
to the following propositions concerning the _
expansion of the power of the USSR:
a. The struggle between the Communist
and the non-Communist world is irreconcil-
able;
b. This struggle may go on for a long time,
with periods of strategic retreat possibly inter-
vening before the final Communist triumph;
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c. The struggle will not necessarily involve
general war, though general war is always a
possibility;
d. During the period of "coexistence of the
two camps" of Communism and capitalism,
the Communists must steadily build up the
economic and military strength of the USSR,
its Satellites, and Communist China; and
e. At the same time, the Communists must
constantly try to divide and weaken the non-
Communist world.
II. SOVIET POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS
The Soviet Political System
16. The Soviet political system is a one-party
totalitarian dictatorship, and the enforced
and absolute primacy of state over individual
interest colors and shapes every aspect of So-
viet life. The elaborate system of ideological
and physical controls is focused on building
up state power, on keeping public opinion
under tight rein, and on rendering popular
discontent impotent. The will of the Kremlin,
which finds political expression in the direc-
tives of the Communist Party and the Soviet
Government, is unfettered by direct popular
checks and controls.
17. Political power in the USSR is concen-
trated in the small group of less than ten men
in the Presidium (formerly Politburo) of the
Communist Party. This ruling group, now
composed mainly of men in. their fifties and
early sixties with long administrative and
party experience, exercises absolute power in
the governmental apparatus, the leading or-
gan of which is the Council of Ministers.2 It
regulates the various bureaucracies through a
highly centralized system of multiple and in-
terlocking controls designed to prevent the
emergence of independent and competing cen-
ters of power. The authority of the ruling
group is absolute and rests primarily on the
Communist party apparatus, on the police
power embodied in the omnipresent internal
For a chart showing the roles in party and gov-
ernment of the principal Soviet leaders, see Ap-
pendix A.
5
security forces and, in the last resort, on the
armed forces.
18. The Communist Party, which now has a
membership of nearly seven million, consti-
tutes the most important institution through
which the ruling group wields its authority
over the Soviet state. The party operates as
the main institution of mass persuasion, ad-
ministrative surveillance, and personnel re-
cruitment in the state. Its chain of command
descends through the network of regional and
local secretariats and penetrates every stra-
tum of national life. The party controls the
police, military, and administrative bureau-
cracies by assigning party members to key
position, by enforcing party doctrines as the
official creed for all, and by imposing the will
of the party leadership rigidly on all subor-
dinates.
Stability of the Regime
19. Events since Stalin's death do not indicate
any essential changes in the institutional
bases of Soviet power. The system of party
controls over the police, armed forces, and the
bureaucracy remains intact. The Beria affair,
during which the influence and status of the
MVD were reduced, confirmed the effective-
ness of party controls within this important
instrument of power. Despite the increased
prestige granted to certain military career -
officers since Stalin's death, there is no evi-
dence of any relaxation of party controls over
the armed forces.
20. The men who now rule the USSR are the
same small group, minus only the former
pollee chief, L. P. Beria, who were Stalin's
chief associates. The most powerful leader is
probably G. M. Malenkov, Chairman of the
Council of Ministers. N. S. Khrushchev, First
Secretary of the Communist Party and general
manager of the day-to-day business of party
administration, has risen rapidly in stature,
particularly since the elimination of Beria, and
may now be on a level with Malenkov. There
has been a strong emphasis on "collective"
leadership, and other members of the party
Presidium besides Malenkov and Khrushchev
appear to have some voice in determining
Soviet policy and considerable responsibility
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for supervising its administration. However,
the other members of the regime occupy dis-
tinctly lower positions of power than Malen-
kov or Khrushchev, and for the most part spe-
cialize in fields of administration for which
their experience qualifies them. V. M. Molotov
evidently operates mainly in the field of for-
eign affairs, N. A. Bulganin in military affairs,
L. M. Kaganovich in heavy industry and com-
munications, and A. I. Mikoyan in trade.
21. This uneven but relatively fixed balance of
power among the members of the ruling group
may last for some time, especially if most of
the top leaders feel that their interests require
its preservation. There is bound to be a tend-
ency for secondary members of the ruling
group to rally to the support of the "collective"
system in order to protect their position in it
whenever any one man begins to make pre-
liminary moves to establish himself as an in-
dependent single authority. Now that power
has been successfully transferred after Stalin's
? death and Beria has been efficiently disposed
of, the Soviet regime may continue with some-
thing comparable to the current modus
operandi for some time.
22. On the other hand, such a system of ",col-
lective" authority in a totalitarian society has
inherent elements of instability. Each leader
must be under some compulsion as a result of
distrust of his colleagues, if not because of his
own ambition, to try to build up his own per-
sonal power, since only in this way can he be
sure of preventing someone else from be-
coming sole dictator and proceeding to elimi-
nate his principal former colleagues as poten-
tial rivals. When certain leaders become
especially powerful, as Malenkov and Khrush-
chev seem to be now, the lesser members of the
ruling group are under some pressure to align
themselves with one leader or another, and
the whole group tends to polarize around po-
tential rivals. The stresses of this situation
are likely to be greatest at times of impending
transfer of power (as at the time of the death
of an outstanding leader) , in the event of
radical disagreement on crucial policies, or
when a basic policy supported by the regime
has demonstrably failed andY scapegoats are
required.
23. If an individual leader should make a bid
for absolute supremacy, the crisis probably
would be settled within the very top echelons
of the regime. One or another of the con-
tending factions would win supremacy in the
higher councils of the party, and the unsuc-
cessful contestants would quickly lose the
power to continue the struggle. Thus the
armed forces and the security police would
not be likely to become involved as independ-
ent instruments of power in open conflict with
one another or with the regime.
24. We believe, therefore, that the present
Soviet regime is firmly in power and that it is
unlikely to be dislodged either by a grouping
of forces outside the top leadership or as the
result of a struggle within it. Significant
changes may take place in the composition of
the ruling group or in the relative power posi-
tions of its members; one man may even suc-
ceed in gaining absolute power. We believe,
however, that the new Soviet regime will be
able to resolve such conflicts within the con-
fines of the ruling group and the higher eche-
lons of the Communist Party. Consequently,
we believe that whatever conflicts for power
or differences respecting policy may develop
within the ruling group, they are unlikely to
affect significantly the stability of the regime
or its authority within the country, or to pre-
vent it from making policy decisions and
carrying them out. These policies and their
implementation will continue to reflect the
fundamental agreement which evidently ob-
tains among the leaders concerning the basic
objectives of the Communist regime.
Domestic Policies
25. Although there has been no weakening
in the authority of the Soviet regime, there
has been an apparent effort to moderate some
of the more rigorous aspects of the system de-
vised by Stalin. Since the death of Stalin the
regime ? has promised the people an improve-
ment in their standard of living and increased
personal security for average law-abiding citi-
zens. The regime has backed these promises
with a variety of measures designed to impress
upon the population at large the 'seriousness
of its intentions.
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26. In addition to these measures affecting the
population as a whole, the post-Stalin regime
has taken steps to broaden its support within
particular social groups. The promises of a
stricter observance of legality, the granting of
greater prestige to certain military leaders,
and the according of greater prerogatives to
the managerial elite have almost certainly met
with favor within the important military, ad-
ministrative, and intellectual groups. More-
over, in view of their higher earning power and
elite status in the Soviet totalitarian system,
these elements have the most to gain from the
program to increase the output of consumer
goods, particularly the relatively high-priced
goods which figure most conspicuously in the
program.
27. By means of these privileges the regime
apparently intends to provide the important
social groups in Soviet society with increasing
vested interests in the existing order. Insofar
as this effort succeeds, the regime as a whole
will be stronger than ever before. Despite
these measures, however, the regime has
neither altered the essentials of the Soviet
totalitarian system nor eliminated the funda-
mental causes of discontent in Soviet society,
particularly the low scale of living and the
pervasive state control and surveillance.
28. The regime has also undertaken measures
to relax somewhat the pressures on the less
favored population groups. Although living
standards in the cities have improved sub-
stantially since the low point of the war and
are relatively higher than in the countryside,
the lot of the average worker is still plagued
by wretched housing, high prices, and scarci-
ties. The present program to raise living
standards is modest in relation to the size and
needs of the Soviet population, but it will prob-
ably be sufficient to achieve a substantial im-
provement in the living conditions of the ur-
ban masses. The regime has also granted eco-
nomic concessions to the rural population in
order to stimulate greater agricultural pro-
ductivity as well as to mollify peasant discon-
tent. These concessions, which for the first
time in Soviet history are greater than those
made to the urban population, are still in-
sufficient to remove the basic cause of discon-
7
tent in the Soviet countryside, which is the
system of collectivized agriculture itself. In
fact, these concessions have been counter-
balanced somewhat by measures to increase
the regime's control over the peasants.
29. It is impossible to estimate with certainty
the fundamental reasons behind these deci-
sions of the new regime: The transfer of
power itself from an old dictator with the
habit of arbitrariness to a new generation
of leaders may be an important reason. How-
ever, we believe it likely that the present Soviet
leadership had come to regard certain aspects
of past policies as damaging to the morale and
productivity of important segments of the
population, particularly the peasantry, and
therefore as detrimental to the interests of the
state. Stalin's successors probably believed
that a continuation of some of Stalin's policies
threatened to produce a state of apathy which
ulitmately would have seriously affected the
public will to work in time of peace and the
potential reliability of the population in time
of war. We also believe that the regime's
apparently more prudent exercise of its ab-
solute power derives from a conviction that
the regime can best attain its objectives in this
way, and not from any fear of popular unrest
or any reluctance to use force whenever neces-
sary to maintain governmental authority.
30. We believe that the Soviet regime's pres-
ent efforts to moderate certain aspects of the
dictatorship and to raise living standards
sprang from a considered revision of the ex-
tremes of Stalin's manner of rule and were
not merely the temporary concessions of a new
regime. We believe that the Soviet leaders
recognize that a reversal of this program, ex-
cept in the event of an external threat or ac-
tual war, would result in serious public dis-
content which would tend to retard the
growth of Soviet economic strength. Conse-
quently, these measures will almost certainly
be continued for the next two or three years,
and possibly throughout the period of this
estimate, if the pressure of external or internal
circumstances does not require their reversal.
The result may well be an improvement of
morale, especially among the more privileged
elements of the population. However, if the
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concessions made to the peasant population
do not achieve sufficient increases in agricul-
tural production, or if they result in renewed
resistance to the system of collective farming,
the regime will probably resort again to more
repressive measures against the peasantry.
In this event, the regime might find itself
faced with serious problems of low public
morale and low productivity.
III. SOVIET-SATELLITE RELATIONS
31. The appearance of new leadership in Mos-
cow has had no apparent effect on the charac-
ter of the relations between the USSR and its
Satellite states in Eastern Europe. We believe
that Soviet authority over the Satellite re-
gimes will remain intact during the period of
this estimate. Widespread political discon-
tent and serious difficulties in building up the
Satellite economies will continue. However,
during the next five years the Satellite con-
tribution to Soviet power will gradually in-
crease. Soviet control will continue to depend
primarily on the presence or proximity of So-
viet armed forces, and in the absence of gen-
eral war popular dissatisfaction almost cer-
tainly will not develop beyond the stage of pas-
sive resistance and occasional localized out-
breaks of violence.
IV. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
32. The relations of the USSR with Commu-
nist China are markedly different from those
prevailing between the USSR and any other
Communist country. Communist China is
more a Soviet ally than a satellite. It possesses
some capability for independent action, possi-
bly even for action which the USSR might dis-
approve but which it would find difficult to
repudiate. However, the main outlines of
Communist policy in Asia are probably jointly
determined by Moscow and Peiping. While
the Soviet voice probably will remain prepon-
derant, Communist China appears to be in-
creasing its stature within the Sino-Soviet
partnership. Soviet propaganda and diplo-
macy have recently given great emphasis to
China's claim to an acknowledged position in
international affairs, and the USSR has given
evidence of a willingness to have Communist
China assume greater responsibilities in fur-
8
thering Communist interests in Asia. In par-
ticular, Communist China seems to have an
increasingly important role in the execution
of Communist policy in North Korea and Indo-
china.
33. The national interests of the USSR and
Communist China are in some cases conflict-
ing, and constitute potential sources of fric-
tion between the two powers. We believe,
however, that throughout the period of this
estimate the cohesive forces in the Sino-Soviet
relationship will be far greater than the divi-
sive forces. The USSR and Communist China
share a common ideology. Both of them re-
gard the US as the chief obstacle to the
achievement of their objectives, and consider
that their interests are threatened by US poli-
cy and power. Moreover, each partner profits
at the present time from its alliance with the
other. Communist China receives essential
Soviet political, military, and economic sup-
port. Soviet leaders recognize in China a
valuable ally, which provides the USSR not
only military strength and defense in depth
in the Far East, but also a base for further
advancing Communist aims in Asia.
V. SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY
34. Over the past 25 years the USSR has been
transformed from an industrially backward,
predominantly agrarian nation into an indus-
trial and military power second only to the
US. By socialization of industry and collec-
tivization of agriculture, the Soviet regime ob-
tained complete control over the economy and
dictated a sustained policy of maximum in-
dustrial expansiorf, the main features of which
have been large investments in heavy indus-
try, high levels of military production, and
severe restriction of consumption. Consump-
tion has accounted for a generally declining
proportion of total output. The result has
been an economic structure heavily weighted
in favor of the maintenance of a rapid' growth
in basic industrial and military potential, but
poorly equipped to meet the needs of con-
sumers.
35. The relatively narrow, though steadily ex-
panding, base of primary industrial materials
and the competing claims for resources in-
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volved in industrial expansion and military
preparedness have required a rigid system of
priorities in the allocation of resources. In
fixing the order of priorities, agriculture, con-
sumer goods, housing, and domestic trade
have been regarded as subordinate to heavy
industry. Consequently, in its drive to reach
industrial parity with the US, the Soviet re-
gime has neglected certain economic sectors
which are vital for future development of the
economy -as a whole.
36. Since manpower and plant capacity have
in general been fully used in the Soviet econo-
my, military production has competed with
investment and consumption for scarce re-
sources. In the period 1937-1940 and again,
to a certain extent, after 1950, sharp increases
in military production were accompanied by a
decline in the rates of growth of investment
and consumption. In the post-1950 period the
slowing of growth was far more pronounced
in consumption than in investment. The new
Soviet leadership still faces the problem of
allocating limited resources among the com-
peting claims of industrial expansion, military
strength, and consumption.
37. The present regime in the USSR has not
fundamentally changed the traditional policy
of placing primary emphasis on the rapid de-
velopment of heavy industry and war poten-
tial. The new regime has, however, devoted a
great deal of its attention and energies to a
revision of current economic plans aimed at
speeding up the production of agricultural
commodities, especially foodstuffs, and manu-
factured consumer goods. Soviet leaders have
stated that this goal is to be achieved without
decreasing the tempo of heavy industrial de-
velopment, but they apparently intend, at
least for the next two years, to limit defense
outlays to approximately the high level
reached in 1952 and maintained in 1953. This
modification of Soviet economic programs is
designed to overcome deficiencies in certain
sectors of the economy, particularly agricul-
ture.
38. In terms of resources allocated, Soviet ag-
riculture is the principal beneficiary of the
current program to raise consumption levels
in the "USSR. The great air of urgency with
which the Soviet leaders are attacking the
agricultural problem indicates their belief
that expansion of agriculture is essential for
the future development of the Soviet economy.
The Soviet leaders appear to have recognized
that continuation of the serious lag in agricul-
ture would ultimately make it difficult to meet
the food requirements of the growing urban
population, the raw material requirements of
the expanding industrial economy, and the ex-
port requirements of Soviet foreign trade, in
which agriculture plays a major role. ?
39. We believe that Soviet economic policy
will continue, at least through 1955, to place
primary emphasis on the further growth of
heavy industry, while maintaining defense
outlays at approximately a constant level, and
giving increased attention and resources to
agriculture and consumer industries. Since
advances in consumption are likely to fall far
short of expectations, the chances are good
that the regime will feel it necessary to con-
tinue the pattern of resource allocations along
present lines through 1959. However, if at
any time the Kremlin estimates that "inter-
national tension is rising dangerously, then it
will almost certainly increase defense alloca-
tions.
VI. SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH
40. The USSR reached approximately prewar
levels of output in 1948 and has steadily ex-
panded in nearly every field since that time.
The rate of growth of the Soviet economy,
however, has declined in the past five years.
Figures for gross national product (GNP) provide
the most concise and convenient means of de-
scribing the size and composition of the economy
of a nation, and (in a very rough way) compar-
ing it with other national economies. However,
considerable technical difficulties arise in calcu-
lating the GNP of any country. In the case of
the USSR, the limited nature ,of the evidence
available makes calculation and interpretation
especially difficult. For these reasons the esti-
mates given in the following paragraphs regard-
ing GNP and its principal components must be
considered as approximations. We believe never-
theless that they present a reasonably accurate
index of trends in the Soviet economy.
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From 1948 through 1950 Soviet gross national
product (GNP) increased at an average an-
nual rate of approximately 10 or 11 percent,
but this rate fell off rapidly thereafter. The
unusually high rate of growth through 1950
and the slower rate of growth thereafter were
due to several factors, chief _among which
were: (a) during the earlier period the Soviet
economy was still being reconstructed and
hence capacity was brought into operation by
comparatively little investment; (b) average
growing conditions in agriculture were more
favorable in 1949 and 1950 than in 1951 and
1953; and (c) the nonagricultural labor force
grew less rapidly after 1950 than in the 1948-
1950 period. In addition, the rate of growth
of Soviet GNP in 1953 was reduced as a result
of the adjustments required by the revisions of
economic plans introduced in that year.
41. We estimate that in the next two years
the rate of growth of the Soviet economy will
be about 6 or 7 percent per annum and in the
period 1956-1959 about 5 or 6 percent per
annum. The higher rate of growth in the
next two years is expected to result from the
resumption of a high rate of increase in total
investment, including additional investment
in the traditionally lagging sectors of the
economy ? agriculture and consumer goods
industries. On the other hand, the rate of
growth in the period 1956-1959 will be some-
what retarded, due- mainly to a decline in the
rate of growth of industrial production.4 Even
so, the estimated average annual growth rate
for the entire period 1953-1959 will be nearly
double the long-range average annual increase
in GNP of the US economy of 3 percent, and
substantially above the annual increase of just
over 4 percent which the US economy has
shown in the 1948-1953 period. If US GNP
should continue to increase at a rate of 3 per-
cent per year during the period of this esti-
mate, then the ratio of Soviet to US GNP
would increase from about one-third in 1953
to about two-fifths in 1959.
For a discussion of the factors which will work
to reduce the rate of growth in industrial pro-
duction see paragraph 61.
10
42. Changes in the composition of Soviet GNP
will continue to reflect the basic trends in So-
viet economic policy. The pattern of Soviet
GNP in the period 1948-1952 was marked by
a rising trend in the proportions devoted to
defense and investment, and a declining trend
in the proportion devoted to consumption.
Economic programs as modified in 1953 indi-
cate that for at least the next two years the
trends in the major sectors of Soviet GNP will
be as follows: (a) defense, which in 1953 ac-
counted for about 14 percent, will have a
slightly declining share; (b) investment,
which in 1953 constituted about 28 percent,
will show a slightly rising percentage; and
(c) consumption, which in 1953 accounted
for about 56 percent, will remain at about the
same level, or may increase very slightly, in-
stead of continuing the decline of previous
years. In absolute terms, over the period from
the end of 1953 to mid-1956, we estimate that
defense outlays will remain about the same,
investment will increase about 24 percent and
consumption about 21 percent. Per capita
consumption by mid-1956 will thus increase by
about 14 percent.
43. If the present pattern of resource alloca-
tion in the USSR continues substantially un-
changed throughout the entire period of this
estimate, then, in absolute terms, consump-
tion for the year 1959 will be about 43 percent
greater than for the year 1953 (about 30 per-
cent greater per capita) and total investment
about 59 percent greater, with defense ex-
penditures remaining unchanged or slightly
Increased. We believe the chances are better
than even that the Kremlin will continue its
economic policy through 1959 along these
lines, assuming no marked changes in the
world situation. It will always be possible,
however, for the Kremlin to make substantial
changes in its policy for the allocation of
economic resources, favoring one sector of the
economy at the expense of others. The Krem-
lin could, for example, very substantially in-
crease its annual defense expenditures while
continuing to achieve an absolute increase in
consumption, though this increase would un-
der such circumstances be substantially less
than that estimated above.
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VII. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Population
44. By 1949 the Soviet population reached 196
million and was roughly the same as in the
same territory in 1940, the natural increase
having made up for war losses. Since 1949
population has increased annually by about
one and a half percent, representing a net
addition of somewhat over 3 million persons
per year and resulting in a present (mid-1954)
population of nearly 216 million, of which
over 60 percent is rural. The population will
'continue to grow at a somewhat declining rate
during the entire period of this estimate,
reaching an estimated total of 223 million in
mid-1956 and 236 million in mid-1959. Over
the long run, the gradual redress of the sex
balance, which presently shows an acute
shortage of males, may reverse the present
decline in crude rates of natural increase.5
45. The age-sex composition of the Soviet pop-
ulation will change appreciably during the
period of this estimate. During 1954-1956
the number of males available for new mili-
tary classes should increase somewhat over
those available in the preceding three years
because of the entry into the military age
group of several classes unaffected by losses
during the period of agricultural collectiviza-
tion. The male population of military age
(15-49) will probably increase in these years
as a result of these new entries and because
of the movement out of this group of a male
population decimated by World War II. Be-
tween 1956 and 1960, however, the number of
males available for new military classes and
the number of new workers entering the labor
force will increase more slowly than in the
previous five years because of the low birth
rate during World War II.
Labor Force
46. The Soviet civilian labor force has ex-
panded rapidly throughout the postwar
period. The total labor force has increased
For a population map of the USSR, showing
ethnic groups, see Appendix E.
by over 10 million since 1948, bringing total
employment (excluding forced laborers) to
about 95 million at the present time (mid-
1954) . In line with past trends, nearly all
of the net addition to the labor force went
into nonagricultural employment, which now
accounts for about 43 million workers. This
development reflects the traditional Soviet
policy of drawing on the rural population to
fill the growing manpower requirements of
industry, as well as the successful retention
in the urban labor force of large numbers of
collective farmers who had been recruited
originally for temporary work during the war.
47. The rapid increase in nonagricultural em-
ployment has aggravated several major prob-
lems facing the regime. On the one hand, the
influx of labor into nonagricultural employ-
ment has been consistently well above planned
levels throughout the postwar period, thus
worsening the already severe housing shortage
in Soviet cities. On the other hand, the grow-
ing disparity between urban and rural living
standards after 1948 induced many collective
farmers, especially males, to seek nonagricul-
tural employment. This increased the short-
age of adult males, particularly specialists,
in the agricultural labor force, with resultant
adverse effects on agricultural production.
Thus, contrary to official Soviet plans, which
implied an increase in the agricultural labor
force through 1955, the manpower position of
Soviet agriculture appears to have deterio-
rated somewhat between 1950 and 1953. Con-
sequently, the regime was compelled to direct
skilled labor back to the countryside in 1953-
1954.
48. The nonagricultural labor force will grow
much less rapidly during the period of this
estimate than in the preceding five years as
the result of several factors, the most import-
ant of which are: (a) the new agricultural
measures will require a larger increase in the
agricultural than in the nonagricultural labor
force in 1954-1956, thus reversing temporarily
the long-established trend; (b) the amount of
labor transferred from rural to urban work
will be limited by the availability of housing
in urban areas; and (c) the low birth rate
during World War II will reduce the number
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of new entries into the labor force after 1956.
New entries into the labor force are expected
to decline from an estimated annual average
of almost one and a half million for 1953-1956
to less than one million per year for the re-
mainder of the decade. The decline in the
growth of the nonagricultural labor force will
tend to reduce the average annual growth rate
of industrial output even if no additional man-
power is directed into agriculture after 1956.
TABLE I
Crude Composition of Soviet Labor Force,
Mid-1954 - Mid-1959
(in millions)
Category
Mid-1954
Mid-1956 Mid-1959
Agricultural labor
52.5
54.5
54.0
Nonagricultural labor
42.5
43.9
46.0
Total
95.0
98.4
100.0
Scale of Living -
49. The scale of living of the Soviet popula-
tion as a whole has risen steadily since the
end of the war, and in certain respects the
living scale of large segments of the urban
population is somewhat higher now than in
the immediate prewar period. The increase
in supply of consumer goods to urban areas,
although far greater for manufactured items
than for foodstuffs, has been principally re-
sponsible for the rise in per capita availabili-
ties in the postwar period. Moreover, since
1948 there has been a steady rise in the per
capita real income of the urban population
as a result primarily of successive annual price
reductions. By 1953 urban per capita real
income probably exceeded the 1937 level by
some 20 percent, but was still somewhat below
the 1928 level. On the other hand, postwar
construction and restoration of housing, de-
spite a rise to 17 percent of total investment
as compared with the prewar 9 percent, has
still barely kept pace with the growth of the
urban population, now totalling more than
80 million. Per capita urban dwelling space
is still only about equal to the miserably low
prewar level.
50. The gains made by urban consumers in
the postwar period have not been matched in
12
the Soviet countryside, which contains more
than half the Soviet population. Oppressive
agricultural taxation and procurement poli-
cies have allowed the regime to collect an in-
creasing share of agricultural products for
urban markets, even though agricultural pro-
duction did not rise appreciably between the
prewar and postwar periods and actually de-
clined in several categories of foodstuffs.
These policies depressed the position of the
rural population and contributed to the de-
terioration in the quality and size of the agri-
cultural labor force.
51. The current program to increase the sup-
ply of consumer goods and agricultural prod-
ucts generally represents a more concrete and
far-reaching approach to the problem of living
standards than others put forward by the re-
gime in the past. Although some of the pro-
duction goals appear unrealistic, particularly
those dependent upon sharp increases in agri-
cultural production, the output of most con-
sumer goods will probably expand sufficiently
during the period of this estimate to provide
a significant increase in per capita consump-
tion. The emphasis in the program on man-
ufactured items and higher quality consumer
durables makes it clear that the urban con-
sumer, in particular the higher income groups,
will get a substantial share of these gains.
On the other hand, the measures that the
regime has adopted toward the rural popula-
tion indicate that a serious effort is also being
made to raise living conditions in the country-
side. The general improvement in the materi-
al welfare of the population will still leave the
scale of living in the USSR by the end of the
period far below that of most countries of
Western Europe. Nevertheless, both the better
living conditions and the hope of further im-
provements will probably tend to generate
some improvement in morale among the
masses.
52. Allocations for urban housing construc-
tion-have been increased since Stalin's death
and will probably continue to increase during
the period of this estimate. Achievements
thus far have fallen short of plans, but some
gains have been registered, and we believe
that there will be a moderate increase in per
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capita availability of housing in the USSR
by mid-1956. Nevertheless, Soviet housing will
still be extremely poor by Western standards.
Labor Productivity and Industrial Efficiency
53. The rapid expansion of the Soviet indus-
trial base over the past quarter century has
been accompanied by large increases in in-
dustrial labor productivity, reflecting primari-
ly rapid technological progress and large in-
vestment in plant and equipment. Immedi-
ately after World War II productivity in-
creased with particular rapidity because of the
return to operation of unused and damaged
plant. Thereafter, according to official So-
viet statistics, annual increases in industrial
labor productivity declined sharply from 15
percent in 1948 to 6 percent in 1953. This
slower rate of increase in recent years has
caused the Soviet leaders concern, probably
because of their intense desire to close rapidly
the large gap in productive power which still
exists between their economy and that of the
West.
54. The present regime has therefore placed
great stress on measures to increase labor
productivity and to reduce inefficiency in the
Soviet economy. Most important in this con-
nection are the efforts of the regime to im-
prove living conditions and to provide greater
incentives for the working population. In
addition, a series of organizational and admin-
istrative changes designed to increase man-
agerial efficiency have been undertaken. The
powers of industrial ministries and their sub-
ordinate organs over resource utilization have
been increased, and greater responsibility has
been given to local management. These meas-
ures were probably intended to increase man-
agerial initiative and efficiency at both central
and local levels without actually relinquish-
ing Moscow's over-all control of the Soviet
economy. We believe it probable that the ef-
fect of all these measures taken together will
be to tend to arrest the decline in the rate of
increase of labor productivity.
Raw Material Supply'
55. The USSR has nearly all the natural re-
sources required to develop further its already
13
strong and modern industrial economy. In
general, the production of metals and min-
erals has been adequate to promote rapid in-
dustrial growth and also to permit the accum-
ulation of substantial stockpiles. Some items
(e.g., industrial diamonds, natural rubber)
are lacking or in short supply within the Bloc,
but so far the USSR has been able to acquire
sufficient quantities through foreign trade.
The natural resource base will not place seri-
ous limitations upon the rate of development
of the Soviet economy during the period of
this estimate, but to support a continued rapid
rate of industrial expansion over the long run,
increasingly heavier investments in the de-
velopment of the basic materials industries
will have to be made.
Energy Base'
56. The production of fuel and energy (coal,
petroleum, and electricity) has grown rapidly
in the postwar period, reaching at least double
prewar output in 1953. Coal production,
which is by far the major source of fuel and
power in the USSR, will continue to maintain
a high rate of growth during the period of this
estimate. Crude oil production has already
almost reached the goal set by Stalin for 1960
and, together with refining capacity, will al-
most certainly be adequate to meet expanding
domestic requirements and to permit in-
creased exports. The high priority accorded
to electric power production will probably lead
to growth rates in this sector substantially
higher than those prevailing in industry as a
whole. Reserves of coal, crude oil, and hydro-
power are adequate to meet the expanding
needs of the economy.
Transportation
57. The existing and contemplated network
and facilities of the Soviet land transportation
system will almost certainly be adequate to
support the requirements of the economy dur-
For graphs showing trends in the USSR's pro-
duction of selected industrial raw materials, see
Appendix B, Figures 1 and 2.
'For graph showing trends in the USSR's energy
production and transport, see Appendix B, Fig-
ure 3.
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ing the period of this estimate. About 85 per-
cent of total freight transported in the USSR
is now carried by rail. This proportion will
probably not change appreciably during the
period of this estimate, despite long-range So-
viet intentions to increase the proportion
carried by other means. The Soviet Bloc mer-
chant fleet, although some 68 percent obsolete
or obsolescent by Western standards, is cur-
rently large enough to supply domestic needs,
but is inadequate to meet the demands of both
domestic and international trade simultane-
ously. Although the Soviet merchant fleet is
scheduled to expand as the result of new con-
struction, primarily in foreign yards, the
USSR will continue to rely heavily on non-
Communist shipping for international trade
with non-Bloc areas. The Bloc now employs a
monthly everage of 1,500,000-2,000,000 gross
registered tons of Western shipping, represent-
ing about 500 vessels, of which a monthly
average of about 120 vessels aggregating some
700,000 gross registered tons are estimated to
be engaged in Communist China's foreign and
coastal trade. Expansion of cargo movements
will depend more on the continued availability
of Western vessels, on improved operating
efficiencies, and on availability of repairs,
mostly in foreign shipyards, than on expan-
sion of the fleets
Stockpiling
58. The USSR operates a stockpiling program
which is independent of normal inventory
channels and includes a wide range of indus-
trial and agricultural raw materials, manu-
factured products, and equipment. This pro-
gram is designed to serve the operational and
strategic requirements of the Soviet economy
in both war and peace. The highly central-
ized control system protects stockpiles from
dissipation in normal economic operations and
insures their immediate availability to the
state in a number of contingencies including
wartime disruption of the economy, natural
calamities like droughts and floods, economic
interruptions arising from planning failures
and transport breakdowns, and plan changes.
For numbers and tonnage of ships in Bloc mer-
chant fleets, see Appendix D, Table 10.
14
Although the levels of Soviet stockpiles are
not known, the current Five Year Plan called
for the doubling of food and material stock-
piles in 1955 over 1950. The change in eco-
nomic plans in 1953, which provided for in-
creased distribution of consumer goods, ap-
pears to have occasioned substantial releases
of foodstuffs from stockpiles. It is not clear
whether these releases affected the original
plan goals for stockpiling, although the cur-
rent efforts to extend grain cultivation in mar-
ginal areas of the USSR probably reflect the
regime's concern over present levels of food
stockpiles.
VIII. DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET INDUSTRY
Capital Goods Production'
59. The distinguishing feature of Soviet Five
Year Plans has been the emphasis placed on
the heavy industries producing capital goods.
During the entire period of forced industrial-
? ization investment policy favored building up
the capacity to produce capital goods. Capital
goods output (excluding production of mili-
tary end-items) now represents about one-half
of total industrial output and its rate of
growth has been consistently higher than that
of GNP.
60. The addition of new lines of emphasis in
the economy has not affected the primary
focus of Soviet economic policy on building up
the base of heavy industry. Official declara-
tions and current programs emphasize that
goals for the most important capital goods in
the 1950-1955 Plan have not been reduced by
the new program to raise consumption. The
revised goals for consumer goods and agricul-
ture and the magnitude of the supporting in-
vestment programs are not on such a scale as
to involve a diversion of resources sufficient to
interrupt the trend since 1928 toward con-
tinuous rapid expansion of heavy industry.
61. Nevertheless, Soviet heavy industry will
advance at a slower pace during the period of
this estimate than in the previous five years.
?For graph showing trends in the USSR's produc-
tion of selected capital goods items, see Appen-
dix B, Figure 4.
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We estimate that in the next two years the
rate of growth of heavy industry will be about
11-12 percent per annum and that in the
period 1956-1959 it will decline to about 8-9
percent per annum. These projections are
based on: (a) the assumption that military
allocations will remain substantially the same;
(b) an anticipated decline in the supply of
new labor after 1956; and (c) the probability
that a somewhat larger share of total invest-
ment will be devoted in the next few years
to agriculture, and perhaps also to housing.
Consumer Goods Production"
62. The production of consumer goods in the
postwar period has been largely conditioned
by trends in Soviet agriculture and in military
production. Restoration of the prewar level
of consumer goods output was retarded by the
slow recovery of agriculture immediately after
the war. However, with the aid of good crop
years in 1949 and 1950, the production of con-
sumer goods made rapid gains, reaching the
prewar level in 1951. Thereafter, gains were
much smaller, chiefly because of the diversion
of resources from the consumer industries to
military production and the slow progress of
agriculture.
63. In 1953 the Soviet leaders promised to in-
crease substantially the volume of consumer
goods available to the population. The com-
modities emphasized in the official pronounce-
ments were mainly foodstuffs (raw and proc-
essed), textiles, and consumer durables
(mostly home furnishings) . Subsequently it
appeared that only moderate increases over
original plan levels were scheduled for basic
foodstuffs, textiles, and footwear, the produc-
tion of which is limited by the supply of agri-
cultural raw materials. Much larger increases
are planned for consumer durables, which
have traditionally been produced in small
quantities.
64. The regime has initiated a series of meas-
ures to achieve the revised consumption goals.
Planned investment in the light and food in-
dus,tries and in the trade network has been
doubled in 1954 over 1953. ,The heavy indus-
" Includes processed foods.
tries, which have customarily produced con-
sumer durables as sidelines, have been directed
to increase their production of these commodi-
ties. Moreover, in 1953 the regime made sub-
stantial releases of foodstuffs from stockpiles
and increased imports of consumer goods from
outside the Bloc.
65. Many of the production goals for con-
sumer goods, particularly durable items, are
not greatly out of line with previous achieve-
ments. Since production of consumer dur-
ables has been low, it can be rapidly expanded
by limited increases in investment and modest
diversions of plant capacities. The program
in general, however, will be impeded by short-
ages of agricultural raw materials. If current
Soviet economic policies continue through
1959, we estimate that production of con-
sumer goods will increase at an average an-
nual rate of about 9 percent during the next
two years ? considerably short of planned
goals ? and about 6 to 7 percent during the
latter part of the period.
Military Goods Production'
66. Despite the reconversion of Soviet industry
after World War II, defense production, as
measured by budgetary allotments to defense,
remained well above prewar levels. We esti-
mate that beginning in 1949, expenditures on
production of military end-items rose at an
accelerating rate and increased about 50 per-
cent between 1959 and 1952. When Soviet
expenditures levelled off in 1953, they were,
as measured in constant ruble values, approx-
imately double thOse for 1940 and roughly
two-thirds those for 1944, the peak year of
World War II expenditures. In the interim,
however, the increasing complexity of weapons
resulted in higher unit costs and consequently
in procurement of fewer items for equivalent
expenditure. The USSR now produces, in
value terms, more than 95 percent of the
Bloc's military end-items.
67. We believe that if the current measures to
raise consumption are carried out as planned,
01 For graph showing trends in the USSR's pro-
duction of selected military end-items, see Ap-
pendix B, Figure 5.
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and if planned goals for investment in heavy
industry are fulfilled, Soviet defense expendi-
tures will have to be limited approximately to
present levels, at least through 1955. Judging
by the pattern of budgetary allotments, an-
nual military expenditures for 1954-1955 will
in fact be approximately the same as for 1952-
1953. The Soviet leaders probably recognize
that their economy is unable to support the
additional heavy investment outlays in indus-
try and th'e increased requirements of the
agricultural and consumer goods program,
while simultaneously maintaining such a
rapid rate of increase in the production of con-
ventional military goods as -prevailed in the
Korean War period. Moreover, maintenance
of a constant level of military expenditures
would not imply any slackening in the Soviet
program in the field of unconventional weap-
ons. It is possible, despite the absence of
direct evidence, that the USSR will maintain
conventional military production at somewhat
lower levels for at least the next few years, but
will give increased emphasis to the develop-
ment of unconventional weapons and new
weapons systems.
IX. DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET
AGRICULTURE 12
68. The growth of Soviet agrieultural produc-
tion, particularly of basic foodstuffs, has
lagged consistently behind the growth of So-
viet industry throughout the postwar period.
During the early postwar period, when agri-
culture was recovering from war damage,
gains were fairly easy to attain, but since 1950
agricultural production has remained at ap-
proximately the prewar level, although the
population is now about 10 percent higher
than in 1940. The inability of Soviet agricul-
ture to advance over prewar levels in the pro-
duction of foodstuffs has been due to several
factors, chief among which were: (a) taxation
and procurement policies which deprived
broad segments of the rural population of in-
centives for greater production; (b) inade-
quate capital investment, particularly during
For graph showing trends in the USSR's pro-
duction of selected agricultural commodities, see
Appendix B, Figure 6.
1950-1952 when the Korean War caused a
diversion of resources to military production;
(c) loss of adult males, particularly the skilled,
to other branches of the economy; and (d)
temporary disruption accompanying the amal-
gamation of collective farms.
69. In response to this situation, the post-
Stalin regime has embarked on a program to
strengthen what it now admits to be a weak
link in the Soviet economy. The regime is
attempting to increase agricultural output by:
(a) providing greater incentives to the peas-
ant population in the form of goods and pay-
ments; (b) channeling greater state invest-
ment to agriculture (75 percent more in 1954
than in 1953) in the form of mechanical draft
power, machinery, fertilizer, and building ma-
terials; (c) providing the farms with a greater
supply of labor and of qualified technicians;
(d) improving farm organization and prac-
tices; and (e) bringing under cultivation vast
areas of semiarid virgin land, particularly in
Kazakhstan and neighboring areas. This pro-
gram is designed to rectify some of the more
pronounced shortcomings of previous agricul-
tural policies, while leaving basically intact
the collectivized system of Soviet agriculture.
70. In view of the Kremlin's public commit-
ments to increase agricultural production, we
believe that the Soviet regime will almost cer-
tainly continue the new program through
1955. Moreover, since the goals now set are
unlikely to be achieved by 1956, the regime
will probably continue the present program
through 1959. However, the magnitude of re-
sources allocated to agriculture will be de-
termined by the Kremlin's estimate of its im-
mediate strategic requirements, particularly
by the amount of resources the regime feels
it necessary to allocate to the military estab-
lishment.
71. The response of the peasant population to
the new program will be an important factor
in determining the degree of its success. In
attempting to stimulate the cooperation of the
peasant population, the Soviet regime faces
serious problems. On the one hand, present
concessions to the peasants may not provide
sufficient incentives to bring about appreci-
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ably increased production, while further con-
cessions might be considered by the regime
as too costly or as politically inadvisable. On
the other hand, greater reliance on discipline
and coercion would tend to restore the con-
ditions which the current program was in-
tended to remedy and would probably result
in another period of passive peasant resist-
ance, with adverse consequences on agricul-
tural production.
72. The expansion of cultivation in the
semiarid steppe regions places an additional
strain on agricultural resources which may
affect unfavorably the implementation of
other goals. We believe that the planned goal
of an additional 18 to 20 million metric tons of
grain annually from the newly reclaimed land
is most unlikely of achievement except under
unusually favorable weather conditions, and
that a yearly average of some 6 to 10 million
metric tons, with wide annual fluctuations, is
more likely during the period of this estimate.
73. On balance, taking into account the pro-
gram for both old and new lands, we believe
that agricultural production is unlikely (as-
suming average weather) to increase by more
than about 3 percent annually during the
period 1954-1959, making a total increase of
15 to 20 percent for the whole period 1950-
1959 as contrasted with the Five Year Plan
goal of about a 50 percent increase for the
period 1950-1955. However, even the 15 to
20 percent increase would be large enough to
achieve a moderate rise in the per capita avail-
ability of foodstuffs and textiles.
X. DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN
TRADE
Trade Within the Bloc
74. The most important development in So-
viet foreign trade since the end of the war has
been the extension of the basic Soviet policy
of autarky to cover the area of the Bloc as a
whole. As a result, Soviet trade with other
Bloc states has steadily expanded and by 1953
accounted for roughly 85 percent of total So-
viet foreign trade.13 The USSR is the largest
" For trends in Soviet foreign trade, see Appendix
B, Figure 7.
trading partner of the other Bloc states, ac-
counting for at least 25 percent of each state's
trade turnover. In three cases ? Bulgaria,
Communist China, and Rumania ? Soviet-
trade in 1952 represented more than half of
the total. On the other hand, with the ex-
ception of Communist China, no one Bloc
state accounts for more than 20 percent of So-
viet trade turnover. This situation has made
it much easier for the USSR to exert control
over the economies of the various Bloc states.
75. This vast reorientation of the trade of Bloc
countries has been the decisive factor in the
postwar decline in East-West trade.14 The
Soviet-style programs of rapid industrializa-
tion in the European Satellites have greatly
increased requirements within the Bloc for
those industrial and agricultural raw materi-
als which formed a large part of Eastern Eu-
rope's traditional exports to the West. It is
unlikely that any short-term expansion in the
volume of trade between the Bloc and the
West will alter the basic postwar trend toward
greater trade and closer economic ties between
the Soviet and the Satellite economies.
76. Sino-Soviet trade has increased appreci-
ably in the last four years, reaching almost
one-quarter of total Soviet trade turnover in
1953. The USSR will probably export an in-
creasing volume of capital goods and technical
services to Communist China, partly in con-
nection with the announced Soviet intention
to assist the Chinese in constructing and
equipping 91 new industrial installations and
50 installations already under construction.
Military equipment will probably continue to
constitute a considerable share of Soviet ex-
ports to Communist China. However, the
USSR probably will not grant substantial fur-
ther credits to Communist China, like the
$300,000,000 provided in the 1950-1954 agree-
ment. The USSR will probably insist on the
financing of this trade, except possibly for
some military items, through current exports
to the USSR and European Satellites. Com-
munist China's exports of agricultural prod-
" As used here, the term "West" includes all
countries outside the Soviet Bloc.
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ucts and industrial raw materials to the USSR
will contribute toward strengthening the eco-
nomic base of the Soviet Far East.
Soviet Trade Outside the Bloc
77. Soviet trade with the non-Communist
world, as a result of the USSR's basic policy
of autarky, has followed a long-run downward
trend and reached its lowest point in 1950. In
1951-1952, however, the volume of Soviet trade
with the West increased in response to the
increase in world demand for raw materials
and foodstuffs. In 1953, Soviet trade with the
West again declined, and the USSR was faced
temporarily with an unfavorable trade bal-
ance, largely due to a sharp decline in Soviet
exports of grain. In order to finance even its
small import program, the regime found it
necessary late in 1953 to expand its sales of
gold, and to sell increased quantities of pre-
cious metals and petroleum to the non-Com-
munist world.
78. Despite the long period of rapid industrial-
ization, the commodity pattern of Soviet trade
with the West remains virtually unchanged.
Grain, timber, and furs remain the principal
export items, although the USSR has at-
tempted to substitute such industrial raw ma-
terials as petroleum and manganese for grain
in its more recent trade agreements. Capital
equipment, merchant vessels, and industrial
raw materials have in the past constituted
the bulk of Soviet imports from the West, al-
though the USSR has recently contracted to
purchase increased quantities of foodstuffs
and manufactured consumer goods for de-
livery during 1954 and 1955. As in the past,
there will probably continue to be spot in-
creases in imports of selected consumer goods,
but the composition of total Soviet trade will
probably retain through 1959 the traditional
relationship between capital and consumer
goods.
79. The outlook for an expansion of Soviet
trade with the West depends on a number of
factors. Even if Western export controls are
further relaxed the Bloc's policy of autarky
will almost certainly continue to prevent any
large or lasting expansion in East-West trade.
Nevertheless, the record number of trade
18
agreements concluded by the regime in 1953
points to an increase in Soviet trade in 1954
and 1955 in both old and new markets. Soviet
officials have stated that the USSR could in-
crease 1953 trade turnover with the West, esti-
mated at about $800,000,000, by almost four
times in 1954. Such an increase, however,
would place a tremendous burden on the small
number of exporting sectors of the Soviet
economy and would also require a major
change in Soviet trade policy. To date there
is no evidence that such a change is taking
place or is likely to take place. Moreover, the
Bloc would encounter considerable difficulties,
under normal economic conditions, in finding
markets in Western countries for substantial-
ly increased amounts of its usual exports. In
the light of all these factors, we believe that,
even if the Soviet leaders are willing to expand
trade appreciably, the probable maximum of
Soviet trade with the non-Communist world
for this period would probably be in the neigh-
borhood of $1,600,000,000 annually.
80. An additional and exceptional factor ?
the level of Bloc gold sales abroad ? might
bring about a rise over current levels of East-
West trade during the period of this estimate.
The Bloc will probably continue to use gold
to pay for an excess of imports. In recent
years Bloc gold sales have run at an estimated
annual rate of $60,000,000 to $80,000,000; in
1953, however, these sales reached about $150,-
000,000 and apparently continued at a high
rate during early 1954. At this rate receipts
from gold sales enabled the USSR to finance
over one-third of its 1953 commodity imports
from the West. It appears that the increased
gold sales were occasioned by balance of pay-
ments considerations and especially by a
shortage of sterling within the Bloc. If the
Bloc should decide to increase its gold sales
abroad in order to obtain desired imports, then
it has available gold reserves estimated at
$3,000,000,000 to $5,000,000,000 and a current
production variously estimated at from $200,-
000,000 to $350,000,000 annually. We be-
lieve it unlikely that the Bloc would use any
substantial portion of its gold reserves to raise
the level of its imports during the period of
this estimate.
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XI. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
DEVELOPMENTS
81. Soviet scientific and technical capabilities
have increased rapidly since World War II,
and we believe that they will continue to in-
crease throughout the period of this estimate.
The USSR has given science and technology
a high priority, emphasizing particularly their
contributions to basic industry and military
capabilities. This emphasis will probably con-
tinue during this period, although increased
attention may be given to the application of
science to agriculture, health, and light indus-
try so long as current programs for raising
standards of living continue.
82. Soviet scientific and technological capa-
bilities are sufficiently well developed to pro-
vide effective support to industrial and mili-
tary research and development. At present,
the scientific assets of the USSR (the number
and quality of trained personnel, facilities,
equipment, and financial support) are smaller
than those of the US, and the assets of the So-
viet Bloc are far smaller than those of the
West. However, with respect to scientists of
the very top rank, whose numbers are few in
any country, the USSR probably has in many
fields men who are as able as their counter-
parts in Western countries. The USSR pro-
vides the bulk of Bloc scientific assets,' but
East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and to a
lesser extent Poland and Hungary, contribute
a substantial increment. Communist China
is unlikely to add significantly to Bloc scienti-
fic asssets prior to 1960.
83. The USSR has a large number of organi-
zations, laboratories, institutes, etc., engaged
in research in all fields of science. Adminis-
tration, control, and facilities appear in gen-
eral to be sufficient for effective utilization
of Soviet scientific talent. Although the USSR
continues to import some scientific instru-
ments from Western nations, it is now 'manu-
facturing or can obtain within the Bloc prac-
tically all types of scientific instruments for
laboratory research, and also industrial in-
struments for plant operations and control.
Complex research instruments and equipment
are probably less readily available in the USSR
than in the US or the UK. Consequently,
some specialized research projects of low prior-
ity are probably delayed longer than similar
projects would be delayed in the Western na-
tions, but we believe that high priority projects
are not hindered by lack of adequate equip-
ment or facilities.
84. Prior to World War II the general quality
of Soviet higher education and research in
most scientific and technical fields was
markedly below that of the US. In the post-
war period, however, it has been generally
good, and has approached US standards. Only
in some areas of biology, particularly in the
agricultural sciences, does it appear that the
present quality of Soviet education and re-
search is decidedly below that of the US, but
during this period, in view of the probable
greater emphasis upon agricultural develop-
ment, this deficiency is likely to be reduced.
85. Nearly 1,400,000 Soviet citizens have scien-
tific or technical degrees from colleges and
universities, of whom about 500,000 graduated
in the postwar years.15 The number of uni-
versity or technical institute graduates em-
ployed in the scientific-technical field in the
USSR (1,035,000) compares closely with that
in the US. It is estimated that 155,000 Soviet
scientists are engaged in advanced research
or teaching at higher level institutions in the
USSR, compared to about 240,000 so engaged
in the US. At this level, considering physical
sciences alone, the USSR has 75,000 scientists,
of whom 50,000 are estimated to be engaged
exclusively in research. In the US, there are
about 185,000 physical scientists in higher
level institutions, and about 150,000 are en-
gaged exclusively in research.
86. During 1954 and 1955 the USSR will prob-
ably graduate about 225,000 students of sci-
ence, including about 140,000 in the physical
sciences and engineering, as compared with
135,000 graduates, including 65,000 in the
physical sciences and engineering, in the US.
We believe that during the period of this esti-
" Numerical estimates of Soviet scientific person-
nel are believed to be correct to within plus or
minus 10 percent. For a detailed comparison of
USSR and US scientific personnel, see Appendix
C.
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mate the Soviet scientific manpower pool will
increase more rapidly than that of the US,
although at a declining rate after 1955. How-
ever, in view of the increasing scientific de-
mands within the Bloc, a shortage of scientific
and technical personnel, although somewhat
reduced, will probably continue throughout
the period of this estimate.
87. The USSR is not as well supplied with
technicians, mechanics, and maintenance men
as are the Western countries, where broader
sections of the population have acquired me-
chanical skills over a considerably longer
period. Standards of maintenance for all
kinds of mechanized equipment are probably
considerably lower than in Western countries
and rates of deterioration higher. In addi-
tion, the number of skilled mechanics and
technicians which would be available to the
armed forces in war is far smaller than in the
West. However, Soviet engineers have sought
to compensate for these deficiencies by build-
ing machines and equipment which are simple
in design and easy to maintain and repair.
88. Soviet science and technology are subject
to the same centralized planning and control
as are all other Soviet activities. Even though
Soviet scientists are a privileged group, their
research is subject to many of the usual total-
itarian restrictions. Some theories in chem-
istry, physics, and especially biology, have
been attacked on ideological grounds. How-
ever, the present weakness in certain fields of
biological science is probably due more to the
heavy emphasis laid on other fields of research
than to ideological restraints. There is no
evidence that ideology has seriously hampered
the development of the physical sciences, es-
pecially in applications directly affecting mili-
tary weapons.
XII. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CAPABILI-
TIES IN PARTICULAR FIELDS AFFECTING
MILITARY CAPABILITIES
89. The capability of Soviet scientists and
technicians in most areas related to the de-
velopment and production of weapons and
military equipment is sufficient to insure
modern arms to Soviet forces. We believe the
USSR has the scientific and technological
20
capability necessary to develop most weapons
and military equipment equivalent to, and in
certain cases possibly better than, those of
other nations. However, we believe that the
USSR does not hale sufficient depth of scien-
tific resources to program vigorous weapons
and equipment research simultaneously in all
fields. Important weapons developments which
the USSR may achieve during the period of
this estimate are discussed below."
Nuclear Weapons
90. By the end of 1953 the USSR had tested
small, medium and large-yield nuclear weap-
ons with energy yields from the equivalent of
a few thousand to at least one million tons of
TNT. Thermonuclear boosting principles were
included in some of these tests. The USSR
thus had reached a point in weapon technolo-
gy at which it was capable of producing a wide
varipty of weapon types, and nuclear warheads
for weapons other than bombs.
91. Based on Soviet tests, we believe that the
USSR will probably stockpile weapons of large,
medium, and small yields. Within these tech-
nological capabilities, military requirements
will govern the allocation of available Soviet
fissionable material among various types and
yields of weapons. Column A in the Table
which follows represents one method of dis-
tributing the estimated Soviet stockpile of
fissionable material among large-, medium-,
and small-yield weapons. Columns B and C
show the total yields that would be available
if the same amount of fissionable material
were made up either into large and medium
yield weapons only (Column B) , or into small-
yield weapons only (Column C) .
Large-yield weapons (1,000 KT
Mid-1954
A
each)
18
18
Medium-yield weapons (60 KT
each)
85
170
Small-yield weapons (5 KT
each) ?
250
725
Total yield (millions of tons of
TNT)
24.3
28
3.6
" The effects of these possible developments on
Soviet military capabilities are discussed in Sec-
tion XVII.
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In view of the range of error applicable to our
estimate of Soviet fissionable materials pro-
duction, actual figures for numbers of weapons
may be as much as one-third lower or higher
than the figures given above.
92. Based Upon the estimated growth of the
Soviet stockpile of fissionable materials and
the assumption that the Soviet weapons stock-
pile continues to consist of weapons of the
general characteristics and explosive powers
of those tested through 1953, the following
table illustrates one way in which the weapons
stockpile might be made up through 1957.
Large-yield weapons
Mid-
1954
Mid-
1955
Mid- Mid-
1956 1957
(1,000 KT each) -
18
34
? 54
80
Medium-yield weapons
(60 KT each)
85
125
175
235
Small-yield weapons
(5 KT each)
250
375
525
700
Total yield (millions of
24.3
43.4
65.6
97.5
tons of TNT)
Our estimate of the total Soviet fissionable ma-
terials stockpile becomes more uncertain as it
is projected into the future, and the actual
figures for mid-1957 may be as low as one-half
or as high as twice the figures given in this
table. Moreover, we estimate that by 1957
the USSR will have nuclear weapons with
yields ranging from the equivalent of one-
half a kiloton of TNT to the equivalent of 10
megatons or more. Availability of these weap-
ons will introduce further possible variations
into the stockpile examples given above.
93. There is no evidence available which in-
dicates the course that the Soviet atomic en-
ergy program will take during the period 1957
through 1959. Nor are there any specific fac-
tors which can be considered as limiting on
the growth of the program during this period.
Nevertheless, long-range extrapolations can
be carried out on the basis of assumptions of
the growth pattern the program might follow
during the period in question. Alternate as-
sumptions, which indicate a range of growth
capabilities, are:
a. No expansion of Soviet fissionable ma-
terials production facilities after 1957; or,
21
b. Continued expansion of Soviet fissionable
materials production facilities after 1957 at
the same rate as estimates for the period 1954
to mid-1957; or
c. Expansion of the Soviet program after
1957 at a rate which will increase its require-
ments for uranium to approximately 7,000 to
10,000 tons per year by 1964.
94. The fissionable materials stockpiles which,
on the basis of the above assumptions, can be
extrapolated from the most probable stock-
pile as of 1957, could be converted into weap-
ons of the following types, employing princi-
ples tested through 1953. It is to be em-
phasized, however, that because of lack of
evidence concerning the Soviet atomic energy
program for the period 1957 through 1959, it
is not possible to estimate the probable value
of fissionable materials stockpiles with an as-
sociated range of error for this period. These
examples should, therefore, be accepted only
as illustrative of the possible Soviet capabili-
ties as of mid-1959.
Assumption Assumption Assumption
Mid-1959 A
Large-yield weapons
(1,000 KT each) 132
145
168
Medium-yield weapons
(60 KT each) 350
375
510
Small-yield weapons
(5 KT each) 1050
1125
1525
Total yield (million
172 -
206
tons TNT) 158
95. The alternate assumptions on which the
above table is based do not consider the possi-
bility of rapid technological advances in the
production of fissionable materials, nor do
they reflect major advances in weapons de-
velopment which must be anticipated. De-
velopments in thermonuclear weapons with
yields well in excess of one million tons of
TNT, which could possibly be tested during
1954, could increase the total yield obtainable
from the Soviet fissionable material stockpile
by a factor of five to twenty-five over the
figures given in paragraph 94. In addition,
Soviet nuclear capabilities may be increased
by weapon developments which will permit
the adaptation of nuclear warheads to many
delivery systems.
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Guided Missiles'
96. Indications are that after World War II
exploitation of German developments in
guided missiles led to the USSR acquiring by
1948 a thorough familiarity with the German
program and by 1950 a capability for con-
tinuing work independently, except possibly in
advanced developments of guidance and con-
trol systems. It is known that an independ-
ent Soviet research and development program
is underway. However, evidence is insuffi-
cient for an estimate of the priority which
this program may enjoy as compared with
other weapons development programs, or of
the priorities accorded the various guided
missile categories within the program. It is
well within Soviet capabilities to develop nu-
merous types of missiles within the period of
this estimate, but at present we have little
information as to which types the USSR may
be developing.
97. We believe that the USSR could now have
an improved version of the German V-1
pulse-jet winged missile with ranges up to
200 nautical miles, a warhead of 2,000-3,000
pounds and a CEP of 2 to 3 nautical miles.
The USSR could also have now an improved
version of the German V-2 with ranges up to
350 nautical miles, a warhead of 2,000 pounds,
and a CEP of 2 to 3 nautical miles.
98. During the period of this estimate we be-
lieve that the following surface-to-surface
missiles could be brought by the USSR into
limited operational use ? i.e., into a stage of
development where small quantities of guided
missile systems have been produced and are
in the hands of trained personnel of at least
one operational unit. It should be realized
that subsequent large-scale production and
troop-training may require several additional
years. The dates given are the earliest
probable dates, and are based on the assump-
tion that a concerted and continuous effort
started by 1948.
17 The following paragraphs must be considered
as tentative. Detailed studies of all types of
guided missiles are currently in progress and
will provide the basis of NIE 11-6-54, "Soviet
Capabilities and Probable Programs in the
Guided Missiles Field," which will be published
in the near future.
22
a. In 1955 the USSR could have an im-
proved V-2 type missile with a range of 500
nautical miles, a warhead of 3,000 pounds,
and a CEP of 2 to 3 nautical miles. Subsonic,
turbo-jet powered pilotless aircraft missiles
with a maximum range of 500 nautical miles
and a warhead of 3,000 pounds could also
become available in 1955.
b. In 1957,18 the USSR could have single
stage ballistic missiles capable of ranges up
to 900 nautical miles, carrying 3,000 pound
warheads, and achieving a CEP of 3 to 4
nautical miles. .
c. In 1958-1960,19 the USSR could have a
two-stage ballistic missile capable of ranges
up to 1,300 nautical miles, carrying a 3,000
pound warhead, and achieving a CEP of 3 to
4 nautical miles.
99. We believe that the USSR could now have
a surface-to-air missile representing an im-
proved version of the German Wasserfall mis-
sile, and having an effective range of 20,000
to 25,000 yards at 50,000 feet. Radar com-
mand or a proximity fuze could be employed
with a warhead of approximately 600 pounds.
100. In estimating future Soviet capabilities
in surface-to-air missiles, the projects under-
taken by Germans while in the USSR offer
the only basis for extrapolation. On this
foundation, the following possibilities exist:
a. In 1955, a further improved Wasserfall
missile with effective accuracy at 35,000
yards, the maximum range of the missile.
b. In 1957-1958, a new type missile should
begin to replace the Wasserfall, with a maxi-
mum effective range of 50,000 yards at 60,000
18 The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes this
missile could be available in limited operational
quantities in 1955. This belief is based on intel-
ligence of early Soviet exploitation in Germany,
on Soviet interest in guided missiles up through
1952, and the demonstrated ability to follow a
concerted development program as witnessed by
rapid developments in aircraft, armament, and
electronics in the past 8 years. It is also possible
that accuracies better than those quoted will be
within Soviet capability.
" The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that
a ballistic missile with a range of about 1300
n.m. could be available in limited operational
quantities in 1957. This belief is based on the
considerations set forth in footnote 18.
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feet altitude and a warhead of about 500
pounds. This missile would incorporate ter-
minal homing.
Electronics
101. The USSR has made substantial progress
in expanding its electronics industry and in
adapting Western equipment. The industry
is now capable of independent research and
development, and electronic equipment of
modern design is being produced. We be-
lieve that during the period of this estimate
the USSR will have the capability of develop-
ing new or improved versions of radars for
early warning, ground control intercept, air-
borne intercept, and blind bombing and navi-
gation.
102. Early Warning Radar (EW). The USSR
has a large variety of EW radars in use.
These include World War II sets, native sets
based on Western designs, and sets of purely
native design. It is believed that most of
these sets will continue in use through 1956.
Continued use of low-frequency radars (in
the 72 mc/s region) through 1959 is indicated.
It is estimated that, by 1958, the USSR will
have several types of EW radar capable of
affording fairly reliable range coverage up to
altitudes of the order of 60,000 feet. These
radars should be capable of detecting medium
bombers and fighters at maximum ranges of
about 200 and 100 nautical miles respectively,
although specific range performances will
vary with altitude and with individual equip-
ment and installation. Low angle coverage
will still be a problem, although current use
of SCR-682 type radar for such coverage in
coastal areas may be expected to expand.
103. Ground Control Intercept Radar (GCI).
It is estimated that by 1958, the USSR will
have GCI radars of several types, including
the V-beam sets presently in use, which should
be capable of coverage on medium bombers
at maximum reliable ranges of 150-200 nauti-
cal miles and on fighters at maximum reliable
ranges of 55 to 85 nautical miles depending on
altitude, location, and other factors. The use
of transponder beacons in Soviet interceptor
aircraft, a development of which the USSR is
capable, would increase range and altitude
coverage for controlled interception. Maxi-
mum reliable altitude coverage up to 60,000
feet, though at less than maximum ranges,
can be expected by 1959.
104. Airborne Intercept Radar (Al). The
USSR acquired World War II airborne inter-
cept radar equipment from the Germans and
through lend-lease. The USSR has the tech-
nical knowledge and production capability to
produce Al radar superior to World War II
types, as well as passive detection equipment
of electronic, infrared, and possibly sonic
types. ? We believe that the USSR has begun
to introduce limited quantities of Al equip-
ment into operational use, and that Al equip-
ment will be in general operational use by
mid-1956.
105. Blind Bombing and Navigational Radar.
The USSR is making operational use of an
X-band set and has the capability of improv-
ing this type of equipment. Its best blind
bombing and navigational radar in use by
the end of 1957 will probably be capable of
operating at altitudes up to 50,000 feet and
will have a range of about 125 nautical miles
for navigation. The performance of bombing
and navigation equipment will be about
equivalent to that of present Western equip-
ment. The use of frequencies higher than X-
band is unlikely before mid-1956, but might
have operational significance by 1959.
Electromagnetic Weapons
106. The USSR now has the capability of seri-
ously disrupting Western long-range radio
communications and certain navigation sys-
tems. On the basis of known or reported
Soviet production of magnetrons, we believe
that the USSR can now produce ground-
based, shipborne, and airborne jamming
equipment to cover frequencies through 10,-
000 megacycles per second. However, Soviet
capabilities in related electronics fields indi-
cate that the USSR could develop equipment
for jamming frequencies up through 30,000
megacycles per second. We believe that such
equipment will probably be in use during the
period of this estimate.
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Biological Weapons
107. The USSR has the technical knowledge,
trained personnel, and facilities necessary for
a program of research and development in
biological warfare, and we believe that such a
program is almost certainly in progress. Firm
evidence on the subject is, however, exceed-
ingly scanty, and is likely to remain so be-
cause of the relative ease with which such a
program can be concealed. Our estimates
must be almost exclusively of what the USSR
is capable of accomplishing in this field,
rather than of what it has in fact accom-
plished.
108. The USSR is capable of producing BW
agents and disseminating devices suitable for
clandestine attacks against certain crops,
against livestock, and against personnel in
buildings or concentrated in relatively small
areas. We estimate that, if the USSR in fact
develops this capability, such attacks could
be highly effective against livestock, moder-
ately effective against humans, and possibly
damaging against crops under favorable en-
vironmental conditions.
109. Soviet capabilities for overt or large-scale
attacks with biological weapons are more dif-
ficult to estimate. Against livestock, attacks
whether overt or clandestine need not be of
large-scale to be effective, since well-planned
small-scale operations at several points
against the US would probably result in wide-
spread epidemics. Anti-crop BW against the
US, employing disease-producing agents,
would probably not substantially affect US
crop production unless carried out on a very
large scale and under favorable seasonal and
environmental conditions. The USSR is
probably capable of producing at least one
type of agent, cereal rust, in amounts needed
for such an attempt. For attacks against
personnel the USSR is probably capable of
producing BW weapons for operations on a
large scale, but we are unable to estimate
whether the effect of such operations, if car-
ried out, would be likely to be significant.
110. Soviet capabilities for defense against
BW are believed inferior to those of the US be-
cause of Soviet deficiencies in public health,
sanitation, livestock management, and plant
protection. Present information indicates
emphasis on correction of these deficiencies,
and gradual progress in this direction will
probably be made during the period of this
estimate. However, because widespread ship-
ment of livestock is not practiced in the USSR,
Soviet vulnerability to small-scale anti-live-
stock attacks is probably less than that of
the US.
Chemical Weapons
111. During World War II, the Soviet Union
is known to have produced most of the stand-
ard chemical warfare agents as well as the
necessary auxiliary equipment. The USSR
has the facilities and scientific knowledge
necessary to produce at least one of the nerve
gases and could employ these agents during
the period of this estimate. Published Soviet
research in fields closely allied to chemical
warfare ? organophosphorus chemistry, aer-
osol formation, cholinesterase, alkaloids, and
adsorption ? indicates a scientific capability
for the development of new or improved chem-
ical agents, dissemination equipment, and
protective devices. We assume that the
stockpile of standard agents and munitions
accumulated during World War II has been
maintained and that the facilities for CW
agent production are being maintained on a
stand-by basis or operated to produce other
chemicals or materiel. The USSR is probably
able to engage in chemical warfare on a large
scale.
Radiological Weapons
112. It is most unlikely,'for technological rea-
sons, that the USSR will be able to stockpile
militarily significant quantities of radiological
warfare weapons during the period of this
estimate. Although not strictly within the
category of radiological warfare, the signifi-
cance of radioactive fall-out following large
nuclear explosions becomes greater as the,
yield of nuclear weapons increases. This fac-
tor should be considered in connection with
Soviet capabilities to produce explosions in
the megaton range.
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XIII. SOVIET BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH
113. In the postwar period the USSR has
maintained its armed forces at a high level
of strength and combat readiness. Since
1945, the forces of the East European states
under Soviet control, together with the forces
of Communist China, have been added to the
military resources available to the Soviet
leaders. Soviet Bloc forces-in-being now
total about 8,000,000 men.2?
114. As a result of the levelling off of military
expenditures in 1953, selective cutbacks are
probably taking place in the production of
some conventional armaments, many types of
which are already stockpiled in quantity.
Nevertheless, military procurement, even at
the estimated 1953-1955 rate, would still per-
mit the maintenance of the Soviet armed
forces at present high levels and would allow
continuous qualitative improvement in weap-
ons and equipment.
115. During the period of this estimate we
believe that the size of Bloc forces-in-being
and expenditures for weapons production will
remain substantially unchanged. However,
the over-all effectiveness of Soviet armed
forces will increase during the period of this
estimate mainly because of the following fac-
tors: an increase in the numbers and types
of nuclear weapons; an increase in the num-
bers of modern aircraft, especially bombers
and all-weather fighters; an increase in the
long-range submarine forces; progressive
modernization and standardization of weap-
ons and equipment, particularly those incor-
porating electronic guidance and control; in-
creasing combat efficiency of the European
Satellite and Chinese Communist forces; and
some improvement of the Bloc logistical posi-
tion including facilities and possibly stocks of
essential war material.
116. The principal limitations of Bloc armed
forces during the period of this estimate will
be: deficiencies in experience, training, and
equipment for long-range air operations and
air defense; lack of capability to conduct long-
9? For detail on strengths of USSR armed forces
and those of other members of the Soviet Bloc,
see Appendix D, Table 1.
range amphibious and naval operations; and
the logistic problems, especially for operations
in the Far East, arising from the size of Bloc
territory and the relatively inadequate road
and rail network and merchant fleet.
XIV. BLOC GROUND FORCES
Soviet Army
117. The Soviet Army has been reorganized
and modernized since the end of World War
II. We estimate that the Soviet ground
forces now total about 2,500,000 men. The
estimated maximum mobilization potential is
about 12,500,000 men. In the absence of gen-
eral war we believe that the Soviet ground
forces will remain at approximately their
present size and disposition through mid-
1959.21 The concentration of Soviet ground
forces in East Germany, the Western USSR,
the Caucasus, and the Far East provides for
the defense and security of the most impor-
tant and vulnerable areas of the USSR.
118. The Soviet Army probably has a suffi-
cient stockpile of weapons and equipment,
ammunition, and supplies (except POL) to
maintain a force of 175 line divisions in Eu-
rope and Asia for an extended period (i.e., up
to one year, depending upon the intensity of
the combat). POL stockpiles are probably
sufficient to maintain operations from four to
six months. The USSR is now manufactur-
ing substantial quantities of all types of basic
ground force weapons.22 During the period
of this estimate production of ground force
weapons is not expected to increase, and may
decline somewhat. Conversion to full-scale
production of these weapons could probably
be effected quickly and efficiently.
119. The combat effectiveness of the Soviet
Army is high. Its senior command is able
and experienced; junior officers can be ex-
pected to execute orders faithfully; the indi-
vidual soldiers are courageous, and have good
" For detailed estimates of strengths and disposi-
tions of these forces, see Appendix D, Tables
1 and 2.
22 For estimated 1953 production of tanks and
artillery, see Appendix D, Table 7.
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physical stamina. Discipline is good and
morale almost certainly high. Current So-
viet line divisions possess good equipment,
generally of World War II design, in adequate
quantity. The combat support services ? ar-
tillery and engineers ? are comparable to the
quality of the Soviet Army as a whole. Mobi-
lization would lower individual unit efficiency
but the rapid increase in the numbers of
units would tend to offset this even in the
short term.
120. During the period of this estimate the
readiness of Soviet ground forces for sustained
combat will continue to grow, largely because
of the increase in armament, maneuverability,
and numbers of competent technicians. The
USSR will probably also develop changes in
the equipment and tactics of ground forces
designed to increase their effectiveness in nu-
clear warfare. Thirty Soviet divisions are
located in East Germany and the European
Satellites. It is known that these units are
well-equipped, well-trained, and combat ready.
Intelligence concerning the remaining divi-
sions, particularly those in the interior of the
USSR, is not as extensive. However, we be-
lieve that the latter are not significantly in-
ferior in effectiveness to the Soviet forces in
East Germany and the Satellites.
121. Certain weaknesses of the Soviet Army
will continue to limit its potential under full
war requirements during the period of this
estimate. The great extent of Soviet territory
and the limitations of the road and rail net-
works present difficult logistic problems, espe-
cially for operations in the Far East. The
Army lacks experience in large-scale com-
bined amphibious operations, and it has never
conducted successful large-scale airborne
operations in wartime. The Army would suf-
fer from a shortage of technicians in the
event of full mobilization.
Soviet Security Forces
122. Soviet internal security forces are con-
trolled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
We estimate that these forces number about
400,000 uniformed men organized in military
units. About 150,000 of these are in the bor-
der troops, disposed along all accessible land
and sea frontiers. The remaining 250,000 in-
clude: troops responsible for suppressing any
organized resistance in the country, for guard-
ing shipments of prisoners and strategic
cargoes, and for maintaining the security of
high-level government and military commu-
nications. These troops are a select group,
well-trained and equipped, and politically
loyal to the regime.
European Satellite Armies"
123. Satellite ground forces, now composed of
1,115,000 men organized in 82 line divisions,
constitute a substantial addition to Soviet
military strength in Europe. During the
period of this estimate Satellite ground per-
sonnel strength will probably increase to
about 1,265,000. The Satellites are almost
completely dependent on the USSR for major
equipment items, including tanks, self-pro-
pelled guns, heavy artillery, and some light
artillery. No substantial war reserve stocks
of modern equipment have been made avail-
able to the Satellite countries. By mid-1956
the Satellite armies will be almost completely
equipped with equipment of Soviet origin and
design, mostly of Soviet World War II stand-
ard. Although some quantitative and quali-
tative improvement of weapons inventories
will probably occur during the period of this
estimate, major deficiencies in motor trans-
port, heavy armor, artillery, and communica-
tions equipment will probably continue.
124. During the postwar period the Satellite
forces have been reorganized to conform to
the Soviet pattern. However, the national
units exhibit marked differences in training,
equipment, and morale, and their combat
effectiveness is greatly inferior to that of
equivalent Soviet units. The combat effec-
tiveness of Satellite forces will improve, but
will remain only fair. It is unlikely that
many of the divisions would be suitable for
offensive operations. Moreover, in case of
war the Satellite forces would be dependent
upon the USSR for logistical support.
23 For detailed strength figures by country, see
Appendix D, Tables 1 and 2.
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125. The questionable political reliability of
the Satellite armies places a significant limi-
tation upon their military usefulness. At
present the Kremlin could probably not rely
upon the majority of the Satellite armies in
a general war except for employment in sec-
ondary roles or in a defensive capacity. How-
ever, against traditional enemies (e.g., Poles
and Czechs against Germans; Bulgarians
against Yugoslays, Greeks, and Turks) Satel-
lite armies would probably fight well, at least
as long as victory appeared likely.
Chinese Communist Army'
126. During the period of this estimate the
Chinese Communist Field Forces, which now
number an estimated 2,212,000 men, will
probably increase to about 2,385,000. ? Chi-
nese Public Security Forces total approxi-
mately 1,000,000 men. However, the wide dis-
persion of these forces on security duty, their
light equipment, and lack of unit training
limit their combat potential to employment
as local auxiliaries to the field forces. Com-
munist China has no system of organized
reserves and the estimated 6,000,000 to 20,-
000,000 men in the militia cannot be classed
as trained reserves since they receive little
military training and have almost no equip-
ment. Further mobilization of Chinese forces
would be largely dependent upon acquisition
of weapons and equipment.
127. The Chinese Communist forces are bas-
ically infantry and their weapons are a heter-
geneous assortment of European, American,
Japanese, and Soviet manufacture. Exten-
sive Soviet equipment of Chinese forces has
taken place since the beginning of the Korean
War, but this aid, while continuing, has prob-
ably diminished since hostilities ceased. The
marked disparity between the equipment of
average Chinese Communist and Soviet divi-
sions will probably not be reduced signifi-
cantly during this period. Moreover, in case
" For details as to strengths and dispositions, see
Appendix D, Tables 1 and 2. For strengths of
additional Bloc forces in Asia, see figures for
North Korean and Viet Minh armies given in
the same tables.
27
of war the Chinese Communists will continue
to be heavily dependent upon Soviet logistic
support and technical aid.
128. The Chinese Communist Army is well
adapted by tradition, training, and the char-
acteristics of its individual soldiers to the type
of warfare likely to be encountered in the
extremes of weather and terrain of the Asian
region. Morale within the Chinese Commu-
nist forces appears to be high. The combat
effectiveness of the troops which fought in
Korea (over 50 percent? of total Chinese
forces) was fairly high despite major defi-
ciencies in logistics, communications, and
combined-arms technique. During the period
of this estimate combat effectiveness will
probably increase. However, deficiencies in
training, equipment, and logistical support,
and dependence upon outside aid will con-
tinue to be major limiting factors upon the
full exploitation of the organized Chinese
manpower strength.
XV. BLOC NAVAL FORCES25
Soviet Navy
129. The Soviet surface fleet during the period
of this estimate will remain deficient in capi-
tal ships, and almost certainly without air-
craft carriers. However, the Soviet subma-
rine fleet is large and growing, containing
many long-range craft of which a significant
and increasing proportion are of modern
types. Most of the major surface vessels and
all of the modern submarines will probably
be kept active, and the present rate of new
construction will permit the creation of a sub-
stantial reserve fleet. It is believed that all
such reserve or inactive units could be acti-
vated by M+180.
130. The Soviet Naval Air Force, comprising
approximately 18 percent of the total strength
of Soviet military aviation, is equipped with
modern jet aircraft of the fighter and light
bomber categories, as well as piston engined
attack, mine and torpedo, and reconnaissance
type aircraft. This force is expected to re-
25 For strengths in ships and personnel as well as
dispositions, see Appendix D, Tables 1 and 3.
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main approximately constant in strength
throughout the period of this estimate; how-
ever, improved all-weather jet fighters will
probably be introduced.
131. Since 1946, 9 light cruisers, 75 fleet de-
stroyers, and 65 long-range submarines, all of
postwar construction, have been added to the
fleet. Naval construction in the USSR is
presently estimated at about 175,000 NSDT
which represents about one-third Soviet
capacity, and one-fifth total Bloc capacity.
Battleships and carriers could be built in all
fleet areas except the Far East. There are a
few indications of the construction of a ship
larger than a cruiser, and such a vessel could
become operational during the period of this
estimate. We believe, however, that the
USSR will place primary emphasis upon the
construction of destroyer types and long-
range submarines.
132. The Soviet Navy is apparently concen-
trating on the construction of two long-range
submarine types developed since World War
II. These are equipped with snorkel and
have operating radii of about 4,700 and 6,700
miles respectively. By early 1954, 47 of these
had joined the fleet and the present building
rate is estimated as 46 per year. The Soviets
are known to have continued development of
the Walther closed-cycle engine for submarine
propulsion, and an experimental submarine
powered by such an engine could be opera-
tional now. It is also possible that, during
the period of this estimate, nuclear propul-
sion for submarines will have been developed
by the USSR. However, there is no evidence
that the USSR is constructing submarines
equipped with either of these types of pro-
pulsion.
133. Soviet naval capabilities can be expected
to improve throughout the period due to the
building program, technological development,
and intensive training. While the opera-
tional efficiency of the Soviet Navy is still be-
low that of the navies of the major western
powers, it will continue to improve during this
period. Little is known of the operating effi-
ciency of the Soviet submarine force. It is
probably still inferior in proficiency to the US
and German forces of World War II, but per-
formance standards should steadily rise dur-
ing this period. Personnel of the submarine
force are the pick of the Soviet Navy, and
their morale is high.
134. The principal weakness of the Soviet
Navy derives from the wide physical separa-
tion of the sea frontiers of the USSR. The
inability of the USSR to control the water
routes between these areas forces it to main-
tain four separate fleets and supporting facili-
ties. This seriously complicates administra-
tive control, logistic support, and strategic
mobility, although the development of the in-
land waterway system and the increased use
of the Northern Sea Route now permits some
interchange of vessels by routes under Soviet
control. The lack of adequate supply lines
to the Northern and Far Eastern areas is an
additional handicap. Other weaknesses de-
rive from the land-locked positions of the
Baltic and Black Sea fleets, which make
egress to the world sea-lanes difficult for both
surface and underwater units, and the lack
of advanced submarine bases to provide sup-
port for long-range boats. The long-range
capabilities of the Soviet Navy are also ham-
pered by lack of aircraft carriers, modern
capital ships, and auxiliary vessels suitable
for underway logistic support, and by lack of
operating and combat experience in long-
range operations.
135. There is no force in the Soviet Navy com-
parable to the amphibious forces of the US
Navy, although the naval infantry compo-
nents have received some training in am-
phibious warfare. While capable of mounting
short-range lifts ,in considerable force, the
Soviet Navy does not possess sufficient modern
amphibious craft to launch and sustain long-
haul amphibious operations.
Satellite and Chinese Communist Navies
136. The Satellite and Chinese Communist
Navies, including their naval air forces, dur-
ing the period of this estimate will remain
small. The naval forces of the Satellites will
probably be capable of aiding the Soviet Navy
in minesweeping, minelaying, escort, and
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coastal defense duties. The Chinese Commu-
nist Navy, although small and ill-equipped,
is capable of short-haul amphibious opera-
tions, coastal mining, motor torpedo attacks,
limited escort work, and minor gunfire sup-
port. The Soviet Far Eastern naval forces are
providing training, advisors, and logistic sup-
port to this force.
XVI. BLOC AIR FORCES 26
Soviet Air Force
137. During the postwar period the USSR
has maintained and continually improved its
large air force. Although in World War II the
USSR was giving primary emphasis to the
ground support role of air forces, in the post-
war period increasing attention has been given
to the development of the interceptor and
strategic bombing arms. Re-equipment with
jet fighter types proceeded rapidly in the
period 1950-1953 and is now virtually com-
pleted. Replacement of the TU-4 aircraft by
more modern types in the long-range bomber
force, and the growing numbers of all-weather
jet fighters will almost certainly be the most
important developments in the? Soviet air
forces during the period of this estimate.
138. The Soviet aircraft industry has ac-
counted for about 95 percent of total Bloc air-
craft production in the postwar period. Esti
mated Bloc production of fighter and bomber
aircraft during the period 1946-1953 has been
roughly equal to that of the NATO countries
in numbers of aircraft, although substantially
below that of NATO in terms of total airframe
weight.27 During 1952-1953 Soviet Bloc pro-
duction of fighters and bombers, both in num-
bers and weight, was considerably below that
of NATO. During the period of this estimate
Soviet aircraft industries will probably con-
tinue to operate at about 30 percent of capaci-
ty, with an annual production of about 10,000
to 12,000 aircraft, including about 5,500 to
6,500 combat aircraft. Aero-engine industries
will probably continue to operate at about 35
" For strengths of Bloc air forces in aircraft and
personnel, see Appendix D, Tables 1 and 4.
" See Appendix D, Table 8.
percent of capacity with a total output of
about 30,000 to 35,000 engines. In view of
the factor of obsolescence and of the high re-
quirements of the operating forces, these rates
of production are insufficient to permit any
significant stockpiling of aircraft engines, and
electronic devices.
139. Airfield development in the USSR and
the European Satellites during the postwar
period has kept pace with demands created by
the introduction of jet aircraft and medium
bombers into operational units. The USSR,
under this program, has created an interlock-
ing network of airfields along perimeter areas
in Europe and internal approach lines within
the USSR. During the period of this estimate,
the airfield construction program in the Far
East and in the Soviet Arctic will probably be
accelerated.
140. Combat effectiveness of Soviet military
aviation is, on the whole, not as high as that
of the air forces of the US and UK. The chief
limiting factors have been lower average air-
crew proficiency, lower standards of main-
tenance and training, and lack of -certain
modern aircraft types. During this period
the continued replacement of piston by jet
types and the introduction into operational
units of new jet types including an all-weather
fighter, and medium and heavy bombers, to-
gether with the training appropriate to these
types, will lead to a significant increase of
combat effectiveness. However, the Soviet lag
in producing many of the latest aircraft types,
and the operating problems accompanying the
introduction of advanced and complex equip-
ment in new aircraft, indicate that over-all
Soviet air combat effectiveness will remain be-
low that of the US and UK during this period,
especially in night and all-weather operations
and in long-range operations.
141. The MIG-15 and MIG-17 are now stand-
ard equipment of Soviet Fighter Aviation of
Air Defense as of other components of the
Soviet Air Force. The USSR is also believed
to be developing an interceptor with perform-
ance characteristics superior to those of the
MIG-15 and MIG-17. Limited numbers of
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aircraft with Al radar have probably been in-
troduced into operational units. We believe
that the USSR will have about 200 all-weather
fighters by mid-1955, about 1,000 by mid-1957,
and about 2,100 by mid-1959.
142. Soviet long-range aviation is now based
on the TU-4 medium bomber, which was
copied from the American B-29. This is the
only bomber available to the USSR in large
numbers and capable of carrying nuclear
weapons to distant targets. As of 1 July 1954,
a total of about 1,100 TU-4's was estimated
to be available in operational units. (Table
of Equipment Strength of Soviet air regiments
known to be equipped with or in process of
being equipped with TU-4 aircraft totals
1,340 but the TU-4 regiments are currently
estimated to be at only about 85 percent of
T/E strength.) As of 1 July 1954 approxi-
mately 210 TU-4's (eight regiments with a
T/E strength of 260) were located in the Soviet
Far East. It is believed that deliveries of
TU-4's to operational units have virtually
ceased and that with the gradual phasing out
of these aircraft as new jet models become
available only 700 will remain in operational
units by mid-1957, and 100 by mid-1959.28
143. In the past four months there have been
conclusive indications that a jet medium
bomber equipment program has been initiated
in Soviet Long-Range Aviation. During the
1954 Soviet May Day fly-by and the rehearsals
preceding it, 9-11 twin jet medium bombers,
designated by allied intelligence as the Type
39, participated. Subsequent intelligence has
associated this type with a known Soviet Long-
Range Aviation unit. We estimate that as of
1 July 1954 at least two regiments of Soviet
Long-Range Aviation with a T/E strength of
60 aircraft were in process of equipment with
Type 39 jet medium bombers. Total actual
strength of these units is estimated at approx-
imately 20 aircraft. Series production df the
Type 39 is estimated to have begun in mid-
1953, and total production as of 1 July 1954
is estimated at about 40 aircraft. It is esti-
mated that Soviet Long-Range Aviation will
30
contain an actual strength of 650 jet medium
bombers by mid-1957, and 1,050 by mid-1959.28
144. The Type 37, which was initially observed
on 30 July 1953 and later observed in flight on
seven different occasions in connection with
the 1954 May Day celebration, is a swept wing,
four-engine, jet heavy bomber with an esti-
mated gross weight of 365,000 pounds. The
aircraft, considered presently to be in the
prototype stage, is expected to appear in oper-
ational units by the end of 1956 building up to
an actual strength of about 50 aircraft by
mid-1957 and 250 by mid-1959.28
145. There has been some evidence of the
existence of a large bomber designated the
Type 31. On the basis of present evidence, it
is highly doubtful that any substantial re-
equipment of Long-Range Aviation units with
Type 31 class aircraft has occurred to date,
though possibly 15 or 20 may have been in-
troduced. The Long-Range Aviation re-equip-
ment program to replace the TU-4 is more
likely to be accomplished by introduction of
the jet bomber aircraft which have now ap-
peared, and the Type 31 class probably will
not be introduced in numbers.
European Sateliite Air Forces
146. Development of Satellite air strength and
effectiveness is dependent primarily upon the
Soviet estimate of the political reliability of
these forces. While substantial progress has
been made in the build-up of Satellite air
strength, the current operational capabilities
of these forces in required air roles are uneven-
ly developed. Emphasis will probably be
placed on the strengthening of the Satellite
fighter and light bomber establishments. By
the end of the period, the Satellite air forces
will constitute a significant increment to So-
viet air power in Europe.
147. The Satellites will
pendent upon the USSR
and virtually all aircraft
remain greatly de-
for logistic support,
will be Soviet types.
28 For radii-ranges and other performance char-
acteristics of these aircraft, see Appendix D,
Tables 5 and 6.
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Czechoslovakia and Poland will probably in-
crease their production of jet fighter aircraft,
but total Satellite production will probably
not exceed 15 percent of Bloc production.
Communist Air Forces in China (CAFIC)
148. CAFIC is, equipped primarily for defen-
sive operations. However, the acquisition of
some medium and jet light bombers has given
it some capability for offensive operations.
The combat effectiveness of CAFIC is only
fair, but will probably improve somewhat
throughout the period of this estimate, main-
ly through increased proficiency of flying per-
sonnel and improved quality of aircraft. How-
ever, since Communist China will probably
not produce combat aircraft during the period
of this estimate, over-all effectiveness will be
largely determined by Soviet willingness to
continue to supply additional aircraft, es-
pecially jet fighters, jet light bombers, and
medium bombers, together with the necessary
parts and equipment.
Bloc Air Defense System
149. The Soviet air defense system includes
the active air defense elements of all military
services under the operational control of a
single air defense organization (PVO-Strany).
The European Satellite and Chinese Commu-
nist air defenses are integrated with those of
the Soviet system. Soviet Bloc defense forces
are not uniformly distributed, and in general
are More concentrated in the eastern and
western, and less in the northern and south
central border areas. Interior defenses are
stronger in the European USSR than in areas
east of the Urals or in most of the inland area
of the Soviet Far East.
Soviet Civil Defense
150. The USSR has a large and complex civil
defense system which is integrated into the
over-all Soviet air defense organization. The
system includes a full-time civil defense staff
organization, but there is no evidence of pres-
ent mass participation in civil defense, or of
a program of passive defense measures specif-
ically designed for atomic attack. The po-
tential effectiveness of civil defense in the
USSR is probably greater than that in any
other major country except perhaps the UK.
The elaborate totalitarian controls, the high-
ly regimented character of the population,
and, to some extent, the dispersal of popula-
tion and industry, constitute strong points of
the system. However, we believe civil defense
operations in the event of an air attack would
be handicapped by a shortage of transport
facilities and materials.
XVII. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET
BLOC
General
151. During the postwar period a rough bal-
ance of military power has existed between
the Soviet Bloc and the US-NATO coalition,
Soviet superiority in conventional forces-in-
being having been generally offset by the
Western possession of superior nuclear capa-
bilities and economic potential. Since 1951
the margin of Bloc numerical superiority in
forces-in-being and conventional ground and
air armament has been narrowed markedly.
On the other hand, while still inferior in nu-
clear weapons production and delivery capa-
bilities, Soviet efforts to overcome these de-
ficiencies have greatly narrowed the gap.
152. The development of nuclear weapons and
of the ability to deliver such weapons on target
will probably in future be the most decisive
factor in determining the relative military
strengths of the Communist Bloc and the US-
NATO coalition. During the period of this
estimate Soviet capabilities in the use of nu-
clear weapons will continue to increase. At
present, the USSR's highest capability for de-
livering nuclear weapons lies in open military
attack by aircraft. However, Soviet capabili-
ties for nuclear attack by means of guided
missiles, including missiles launched from
submarines and aircraft, will increase, espe-
cially in the latter part of this period. In
addition, the increasing Bloc capability to in-
terfere with the flow of reinforcements and
materiel from the US to its allies overseas will
be an important factor in the relative military
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strengths of the Bloc and the Western coali-
tion. Nevertheless, provided there are no
significant alterations in present political
alignments, we believe that a rough balance
of military power between the Soviet Bloc and
the West will continue during the period of
this estimate.
Offensive Capabilities'
153. The core of Soviet offensive strength at
present is an ability to mount attacks against
Western Europe and the UK. The USSR
could launch a surprise attack against West-
ern Europe with the 25 to 30 Soviet ground
divisions now in East Germany and Poland.
By prior concentration of forces west of the
Oder-Neisse line, involving almost certain loss
of surprise, the USSR could attack with 50 to
60 divisions. A build-up to 75 to 140 divisions
could be accomplished by D-plus 90. Air sup-
port for these operations could come from the
approximately 2,200 Soviet aircraft presently
stationed in East Germany and the Satellites,
with reinforcements available from the air-
craft stationed in the Western USSR. Air
attacks of great weight and involving nuclear
weapons could be launched with little or no
warning against any strengths exposed in
Western Europe and the UK. In any cam-
paign against Western Europe we believe it
unlikely that European Satellite armies would
be used independently, except as security
forces or to protect Soviet lines of communica-
tion.
154. In a maximum single-lift operation the
USSR also has the capability of utilizing 32,-
000 well equipped and trained airborne troops
in an assault against the Western Zones of
Germany. . These troops could be assembled
in 10 days, and could be delivered to Rhine
river crossing sites and nearby military instal-
lations by aircraft utilizing bases in Poland
and Czechoslovakia. Successive lifts would be
on a decreasing scale because of combat and
operational attrition. During a five-day maxi-
mum-effort we believe that the USSR could
29No estimate of the success of the offensive oper-
ations described in this section can be made
without considering the effects of the actions
of opposing forces.
32
deliver approximately 77,000 troops. These
capabilities will probably increase through
1959 with the addition of new medium trans-
ports.
155. In the Far East, Soviet capabilities for
long-continued full-scale war are somewhat
limited by the capacity of the Trans-Siberian
railway, the only route by which supplies in
large amounts could be brought from other
parts of the USSR. However, the USSR has
about 30 divisions in the Far East, together
with more than 5,000 aircraft and a sizeable
naval force. Stockpiles of supplies exist suf-
ficient for a considerable period of combat.
These Soviet forces could, in conjunction with
Chinese Communist forces, renew hostilities
in Korea. They could launch an amphibious
invasion of Japan, we believe, with an initial
assault strength of one airborne and two or
three waterborne divisions, with about six
div4sions supporting. These attacks could be
launched concurrently with campaigns in the
Middle East and in Western Europe.
156. The USSR is now capable of undertaking
concurrent strategic air operations against the
US, the UK, continental Europe, the Middle
East, Japan, and the offshore island chain of
Asia. Operations against the US will, how-
ever, continue to be attended with great dif-
ficulties.30
157. At the present time, it would be tech-
nically feasible for the USSR to attack targets
within the US with missiles launched from
long-range aircraft and from submarines;
however, we have no evidence that the USSR
has developed this capability either as to pro-
duction of the missiles or as to conversion of
submarines to missile launchers. The USSR
could at present have V-1 type missiles for
launching from submarines, and in 1955 could
have for this purpose subsonic turbo-jet pow-
ered pilotless aircraft missiles with a maxi-
mum range of 500 nautical miles and a war-
head of 3,000 pounds. We believe that it will
not be within Soviet capability within the
3? For detailed treatment of this subject, see SNIE
11-7-54, "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks
On the US and Key Overseas Installations
Through 1 July 1957," published 17 August 1954.
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period of this estimate to attack continental
United States with guided missiles launched
from Soviet Bloc territory.
158. If the USSR in fact develops the guided
missiles which we have estimated to be within
its capabilities, the following possibilities for
attack would exist during the period of this
estimate:
a. At present, Soviet missiles launched from
advanced bases in Eastern. Europe could reach
targets in Western Germany and the south-
eastern portion of the Scandinavian peninsu-
la.
b. In 1955, from advanced bases in Eastern
Europe, targets could be reached in Western
Europe as far west as London, Paris, and
Rome. In the Far East, if launched from So-
viet or North Korean territory, these weapons
could reach targets in western Japan and
Alaska; if launched from Chinese territory,
they could reach targets in the Ryukyu Is-
lands.
c. In 1957,31 Soviet guided missiles could
reach all of the UK, France, Italy, Scandi-
navia, and Turkey. In the Far East, if
launched from Soviet or North Korean terri-
tory, these weapons could reach all of the
Japanese islands, and if launched from China
they could reach all of Luzon.
d. In 1958-60 32 Soviet missiles could reach
US North African bases in Tunisia, in addi-
tion to the targets listed above.
159. During the period of this estimate Soviet
offensive naval capabilities will still be limited
to undersea wart are, surf ace operations in-
volving vessels no larger than cruisers, and
air operations utilizing shore based naval air-
craft. The Soviet submarine force will great-
ly increase its capability to undertake offen-
sive patrols and mining operations along most
of the world's strategically situated sea lanes,
and possibly simultaneously to launch guided
missile attacks against targets on both the
31 Air Force believes this date should be 1955. See
footnote 18, page 22.
" Air Force believes this date should be 1957. See
footnote 19, page 22.
Atlantic and Pacific seaboards of the US.33
Major Soviet surface units and supporting
shore-based naval aircraft will probably con-
tinue to increase their capability to undertake
offensive operations in Bloc coastal areas, es-
pecially in the Baltic and Black Seas, and to
protect the seaward flank of ground cam-
paigns. The Soviet Navy will almost certain-
ly have no long-range amphibious capability
within the period of this estimate, but it will
remain capable of mounting short-range am-
phibious lifts in considerable force.
160. We estimate that the USSR now has a
stock of over 500,000 mines and the capability
to employ them to interfere seriously with
allied sea communications. In the European
area, this effort could include all the ports
and approaches of the UK and Western Eu-
rope. In the Far East, most of the vital allied
port areas and sea lanes around the perimeter
of the Bloc could be similarly attacked.
Air Defense Capabilities
161. We estimate that at present Bloc defen-
sive capabilities against air attack are insuffi-
cient to provide an adequate defense under
the variety of conditions which could be ex-
pected to prevail. Against daylight bomber
formations between 10,000 and 30,000 feet in
clear weather the Bloc air defense systems
could probably inflict severe losses against.
piston bombers and? moderate losses against
jet bombers. Because of difficulties in detec-
tion and tracking, anti-aircraft fire controls,
and fighter maneuverability at higher alti-
tudes, Soviet air defenses would be less effec-
tive against bombers at altitudes above 30,000
feet. They would be markedly less effective
against bombers above 40,000 feet or at very
low altitudes. Against multiple-pronged pen-
etrations utilizing altitude stacking, diversion-
ary tactics and electronics counter-measures,
the air defense system is subject to serious
breakdowns which would tend progressively
to lessen its effectiveness. Because of inade-
quacies in equipment and training for all-
" We believe the USSR capable of adapting sub-
marines to this use, but we have no evidence
that such modifications have been made.
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weather air defense operations, the system
would be ineffective against air attacks con-
ducted when visibility is poor.
162. Through 1957 Bloc air defenses will prob-
ably be gradually strengthened by the intro-
duction into operational units of new fighter
aircraft, new radar equipment, new anti-air-
craft weapons, and surface-to-air guided mis-
siles. All-weather fighters in limited quanti-
ties are probably already being introduced
into operational units, but problems related
to the operation and maintenance of airborne
intercept radar will probably take a minimum
of 18-24 months to solve. The filtering phase
of air raid reporting (combat information con-
trol) is expected to continue to be a major
problem 'during the period of this estimate.
However, the gradual improvement of weap-
ons, equipment, and training will be sufficient
by 1958 to provide a Bloc air defense system
substantially more effective than that now
existing.
XVIII. THE SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD
SITUATION
163. The Soviet leaders view the world as an
arena of conflict between the Communist and
non-Communist camps. Soviet policy is there-
fore extremely sensitive to changes in world
power relationships, and the Soviet leaders'
current estimate of the capabilities, inten-
tions, and vulnerabilities of the non-Soviet
world is a decisive factor in determining the
courses of action which the USSR will pursue
during the period of this estimate.
Soviet Estimate of Non-Communist
Capabilities
164. Soviet leaders have long recognized that
the core of non-Communist strength lay in the
productive power of the US economy, and
especially in its industrial capacity. They
recognize that the US is economically capable
of supporting very powerful military forces in
time of peace, and of waging full-scale war
for a longer period than any other major
power. They also understand the economic
power of the US to be a great political asset,
giving the US the capability of supporting and
34
strengthening the military and political estab-
lishments of its allies, and at the same time of
employing resources for political use through-
out the underdeveloped countries and areas
of the non-Communist world. They recognize
the economic capabilities of the US and its
allies to be greatly superior to those of the
USSR and the Bloc, but they almost certainly
believe that capitalist society will in the long
run inevitably decay because of its own in-
herent contradictions, and, therefore, that the
US and its allies are incapable of maintaining
this superiority permanently.
165. The Soviet leaders almost certainly be-
lieve that during the period of this estimate
the non-Communist world will possess such
strength in major components of military
power that general war would involve not only
the certainty of widespread destruction within
the USSR but the possibility of the destruc-
tion of the Soviet system itself. They almost
certainly believe that the West has and will
maintain through 1959 superior naval and
strategic air power, greater nuclear capability,
and greater industrial potential. However,
they almost certainly believe that the increase
of their own nuclear capabilities will, even if
these capabilities remain inferior to those of
the West, tend to nullify the significance of
the Western superiority.
166. The Soviet leaders probably recognize
that if the US should use its nuclear capability
to the maximum in the event of general war,
the USSR would be unable to prevent destruc-
tion of major portions of the industrial and
military strength of the Soviet Union. They
probably recognize that the possession by the
US of air bases encircling the USSR provides
the West with an advantage which probably
could not be entirely overcome even by sur-
prise attacks upon these bases. The Soviet
leaders almost certainly believe that even if
most of these bases were denied the US by
military or political action the US would still
be able to deliver severe attacks against the
USSR.
167. Under the most optimistic assumptions,
the Soviet leaders might believe that US nu-
clear capabilities could be at least temporarily
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neutralized by political arrangements or by
threat of Soviet retaliatory power upon the
US or its allies. Under such conditions, the
Soviet leaders would probably estimate that
present Western capabilities would be insuffi-
cient to prevent considerable initial Soviet
successes including the overrunning of West-
ern Europe. They would probably believe,
however, that the war would not be ended with
these original successes and that grave danger
would remain that the US nuclear capability
would in the end be employed. The Soviet
leaders probably believe, therefore, that dur-
ing the period of this estimate Western capa-
bilities will remain sufficient to make the out-
come of general war extremely hazardous and
uncertain for the USSR.
Soviet Estimate of Non-Communist
Intentions
168. Soviet leaders probably estimate that the
US is unlikely deliberately to initiate general
war during the next few years. They prob-
ably estimate, however, that the US would
not be deterred, by fear of the consequences
of general war, from using its full military
capabilities if it believed that its security was
imminently threatened. The Soviet leaders
almost certainly believe that the US would
Consider as such a threat any overt armed
aggression by Bloc forces against any country
formally allied with the US. They probably
also estimate that such aggression against a
state not formally allied to the US would in-
volve risk of US military reaction, but that
the degree of this risk, and the dimensions of
the US reaction, would depend upon the im-
portance to the US of the country attacked,
the circumstances of the attack, and the polit-
ical situation within the US and the non-Com-
munist world generally. Soviet leaders almost
certainly estimate that extensive Communist
political warfare will be unlikely to provoke
large-scale US military reaction, and they
probably believe that the US would be unlikely
to initiate general war against the USSR even
if the activities of political warfare should lead
to the establishment of Communist govern-
ments in countries presently non-Communist.
35
169. The USSR probably estimates that the
US will continue its development of overseas
military bases, and it probably views this
development with genuine and profound sus-
picion of US motives. These suspicions are
probably increased by such apparently hos-
tile indications as the undisguised discussion
in the US press of the vulnerability of Soviet
cities to air attack, the reports that the US
is storing nuclear weapons at overseas in-
stallations, and the widely discussed "new
look" in US defense policy emphasizing "mas-
sive retaliatory power." Many US defensive
measures probably appear to the Kremlin to
be aggressively-motivated. We believe the
USSR considers the US military base program
a serious threat to its own security, but we
also believe its estimate of the imminence of
the threat will depend upon its view of the
world political situation rather than upon the
existence of the bases themselves.
170. In Europe the Soviet leaders probably
expect the US to persist in its efforts to obtain
some arrangement that would bring a re-
armed West Germany into alliance with the
West. We believe that the Kremlin considers
the prospect of a rearmed West Germany,
closely allied with the West, as one of the
most serious potential long-range threats to
Bloc security. The Kremlin almost certainly
estimates that the US will agree to the unifi-
cation of Germany only if it is confident that
a reunited Germany will not fall under Com-
munist domination, and probably only if it
believes that Germany will be linked with the
West.
171. The Soviet leaders almost certainly be-
lieve that the US intends to maintain troops
in Europe indefinitely, and will support with
force its position in Berlin. They clearly
recognize the great political advantages which
the possession of West Berlin provides the
allies, and they almost certainly estimate that
the US would accept the risk of war rather
than relinquish Berlin under Soviet pressure.
Nevertheless, the Kremlin may estimate that
the other Western Powers would be less dis-
posed than in 1948 to resist harassment of the
Western position in Berlin, especially if made
to appear an East German rather than a
Soviet action.
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172. The Soviet estimate of US intentions in
the Far East is probably less confident than
that, for any other area of the world at the
present time. This uncertainty probably
arises because of the conflicting manifesta-
tions of opinion within the US, the apparent
conflict of policies among the Western nations
revealed during the Indochina crisis, and the
apparent reluctance of the US to adopt
courses of action in the Far East which would
alienate the neutral nations of Asia or
threaten the harmony of the Western alli-
ance. At the same time, the Soviet leaders
are aware of many statements by US leaders
indicating determination to resist the further
expansion of Communism in the Far East,
including the defense of Formosa and the
Pescadores.
173. Accordingly, the Soviet leaders probably
believe that the US will seek to avoid courses
of action carrying grave risk of general war
or seriously alienating its allies, but will at-
tempt to prevent the, consolidation of present
Communist gains and to resist further Com-
munist advances. Furthermore, they almost
certainly estimate that the US will attempt to
bring the policies of Western and Asian na-
tions into harmony with those of the US dur-
ing the period of this 'estimate and will push
forward with the development of an Asian
defense arrangement similar to NATO.
Soviet Estimate of Non-Communist
Vulnerabilities
174. In the Kremlin view, the ability of the
Western Powers to give effect to their inten-
tions during the period of this estimate will
be limited by a number of political and eco-
nomic factors which will operate to weaken
the Western alliance and undermine its capa-
bilities. The factors discussed below are
probably those which the Soviet leaders be-
lieve constitute the principal vulnerabilities
of the non-Communist world.
175. Fear of Nuclear Warfare. The Soviet
leaders probably calculate that increasing
Soviet nuclear capabilities will have a grow-
ing influence on the policies of non-Commu-
nist states. They probably estimate that no
government will willingly run grave risks of
36
war unless interests are at stake which it con-
siders vital, and that the threat of nuclear
weapons will almost certainly tend to narrow
the range of interests that any government
will consider vital. They apparently estimate
that the temper of world opinion is such that
latent fears in the non-Communist world can
be stimulated to encourage neutralist senti-
ments, shake confidence in the stability, mod-
eration, and maturity of US policy, and un-
dermine US ability to lead the non-Commu-
nist world.
176. Moreover, the Soviet leaders probably
estimate that growing aversion to general war
with nuclear weapons will cause both the US
and its allies to show increasing concern to
deal with local aggression without resorting
to acts which might lead to general war. The
Kremlin probably estimates, therefore, that
opportunities may arise in certain local situ-
ations to employ limited military action with-
out running serious risk of general war.
177. Political Conflicts. Clashes of interest
and policy among European states are prob-
ably expected by the Soviet leaders to hamper
US efforts to maintain an effective alliance
during the period of this estimate. They
apparently believe the following issues are
particularly divisive: the problem of German
rearmament; problems of East-West trade
controls; Far Eastern problems, including the
issue of recognition of Communist China;
problems of nuclear weapons control. In the
long run, Moscow apparently calculates that
differences of attitude toward these and re-
lated issues will produce wider schisms among
non-Communist countries.
178. The Soviet leaders probably estimate that
French and Italian social cleavages, economic
problems, and political weaknesses will re-
main the most serious obstacles to the build-
ing of a strong and stable Europe. They
probably estimate also that the French may
continue to veto West Germany's rearmament
and admission to the Western alliance, and
that as a result the Bonn Government may
modify its presently strong pro-Western
policy. Even the differences which on occa-
sion agitate Anglo-American relations may be
calculated by the Kremlin to carry the possi-
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bility of future estrangement between the
two strongest countries in the anti-Commu-
nist alliance.
179. The Soviet leaders probably estimate that
serious differences among non-Communist
countries will continue over policies in the
Far East, and they probably hope that these
differences over the next few years will result
in an increasing isolation of the US from the
other countries of the non-Communist world.
They almost certainly believe that he armi-
stice in Indochina has improved Communist
capabilities for further advances, further un-
dermined Western prestige in Asia, and weak-
ened Western capabilities to mobilize local
opposition to Communism. On the other
hand they, probably recognize the chance that
a too aggressive Communist policy in Asia
might tend to catalyse resistance in the non-
Communist countries of Asia, and contribute
to the development of a strong anti-Commu-
nist alliance in the area. In any event, the
Kremlin probably believes that the US will
continue to face complex problems, during
the period of this estimate, in harmonizing its
policies in the Far East with those of its allies
and-the non-Communist nations of Asia.
180. Economic Conflicts. The Soviet leaders
probably expect economic problems to assume
greater prominence during the period of this
estimate, and to test the strength and co-
hesion of the Western alliance. They profess
to believe that the capitalist economy is
afflicted by a deepening and irremediable
crisis. In particular, the Communist leaders
state that the capitalist world market has
been fatally constricted by the expansion of
the Communist sphere, and that the re-
emergence of Germany and Japan will pro-
duce critical conflicts of economic interest.
181. Anticolonialism and Nationalism in Un-
derdeveloped Areas. The Soviet leaders have
long estimated that conditions in the under-
developed areas of the non-Communist world
constitute vulnerabilities for the West. They
probably believe that in some countries of the
Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia, Com-
munist opportunities are enhanced by politi-
cal immaturity, economic and social griev-
37
ances, inadequate material and technological
resources, resentment of Western imperialism,
and extreme nationalism. The Communists
are aware that these areas are undergoing a
social and economic revolution which is con-
ducive to political instability. The Kremlin
probably estimates that US economic aid and
military assistance will not wholly overcome
anti-Western attitudes and that prospects for
the encouragement of anti-Westernism will
continue to be good.
182. Popular Aspirations. The weaknesses of
the non-Communist world are intensified and
complicated, in the Kremlin view, by the pres-
sures of discontented populations upon gov-
ernments which are sensitive to popular de-
sires and incapable of totalitarian political
controls adequate to suppress popular de-
mands. Demands for an improved scale of
living, for economic security and social wel-
fare, for greater political freedom, and for
independence in colonial areas all serve, from
Moscow's viewpoint, to create disunity and in-
stability within non-Communist countries.
The Kremlin probably believes that some gov-
ernments in the non-Communist world will be
increasingly subjected to unrealistic demands
far beyond the capacities of the governments
to grant, and that the stability of such gov-
ernments will be sufficiently disturbed to pro-
duce weaknesses in the non-Communist world.
-183. In summary, the Soviet leaders probably
believe that present world trends are not un-
favorable to Soviet strategic interests. They
may expect that the next few years will see
a deterioration in relations among the West-
ern allies and a gradual isolation of the US
from the rest of the non-Communist world.
They almost certainly believe that the US will
face increasingly complex problems in dealing
with its allies and with the other states that
make up the non-Soviet world. They proba-
bly estimate that developments which will
take place within and among the states of the
non-Communist world during the period of
this estimate will enhance Soviet opportuni-
ties for further expansion, and will reduce the
likelihood of concerted Western counteraction.
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XIX. PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION
Present Soviet Objectives
184. We believe that the developments within
the sphere of Soviet power and the Soviet
estimate of the world situation which have
been discussed in the foregoing sections have
led the Soviet leaders to assess their own sit-
uation somewhat as follows: the balance of
military power in the world and the increas-
ing destructiveness of nuclear weapons are
such that general war would involve very
heavy risks to the Communist sphere, ex-
tending possibly to the destruction of the So-
viet system itself. On the other hand, non-
Communist strength is not so great that with-
drawals from the present advanced positions
in Europe and Asia seem necessary. More-
over, the prospects probably seem good that
the increase of Bloc military capabilities, to-
gether with political defections or disunity on
the non-Communist side, will gradually shift
the balance of power in favor of the Soviet
Bloc. In the meantime, the Bloc has a full
agenda of internal problems which, while they
do not imply a weakness requiring abandon-
ment of expansionist aims or even the neglect
of opportunities for expansion under circum-
stances of limited risk, do call for attention
during the next five years at least. These
problems include the further buildup of eco-
nomic power in the Bloc as a step toward
balancing the vastly greater economic poten-
tial of the West, and the correction of certain
weaknesses in the Bloc economy, particularly
in agricultural production.
185. We therefore believe that the Soviet
leaders will concentrate on the following prin-
cipal objectives during the period of this esti-
mate:
a. To expand Soviet economic potential;
b. To maintain a high level of military read-
iness and to improve the capabilities of the
Soviet armed forces, emphasizing the devel-
opment of greater nuclear capability;
c. To increase the political and economic
instability of non-Communist states, and to
render them incapable of. decisive action by
fostering and exploiting dissensions within
and among them;
d. To weaken and disrupt the mutual de-
fense arrangements of non-Communist states,
and in particular to prevent the rearmament
of West Germany in close association with the
Western alliance;
e. To isolate the US from its allies in Eu-
rope and Asia;
f. To expand the area of Communist con-
trol in southeast Asia.
External Courses of Action
186. General War. We believe that dur-
ing the period of this estimate the Kremlin
will try to avoid courses of action, and to
deter Communist China from courses of
action, which in its judgment would clearly
involve - substantial risk of general war.34
However, the USSR or one of the Soviet Bloc
countries might take action creating a situa-
tion in which the US or its allies, rather than
yield an important position, would decide to
take counteraction involving substantial risk
of general war with the USSR. We believe,
moreover, that the Kremlin would not be de-
terred by the risk of general war from taking
counteraction against a Western action which
it considered an imminent threat to Soviet
security. Thus general war might occur dur-
84 The Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2, and the
Director of Intelligence, USAF, believe that the
following should be substituted for the first sen-
tence of paragraph 186: "Although the Kremlin
will probably try to avoid courses of action and
to deter Communist China from courses of ac-
tion that entail substantial risk of involving the
USSR in general war, it may be more willing to
support courses of action that would involve
risk of a localized war between the US and
Communist China. The support given such
courses of action would depend largely on Soviet
judgment as to the probable outcome of the
war. If the Soviet leaders believed that it
would result in a severe defeat to Communism,
or the full-scale participation of the USSR in
general war, they would probably exert pressure
on the Chinese to avoid courses of action which
would precipitate hostilities. On the other
hand, if they estimated that the conflict could
be limited to war localized in the Far East, and
that it would result in greater relative damage
to US strengths than to Communist strengths,
they probably would support more adventurous
courses of action on the part of the Chinese
Communists."
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SECRET 39
ing the period of this estimate as the climax
of a series of actions and counteractions, in-
itiated by either side, which neither side orig-
inally intended to lead to general war.
187. The Soviet leaders almost certainly be-
lieve that as Soviet nuclear capabilities in-
crease, the unwillingness of the US, and par-
ticularly of its allies, to risk general war will
correspondingly increase, and that the Krem-
lin will therefore have greater freedom of
action to promote its objectives without run-
ning substantial risk of general war. As the
period of this estimate progresses, the USSR
will probably be increasingly ready to apply
heavy pressure on the non-Communist world
upon any signs of major dissension or weak-
ness among the US and its allies. On the
other hand, we believe that the Kremlin will
continue to be extremely reluctant to precipi-
tate a contest in which the USSR would ex-
pect to be subjected to nuclear attack. We
believe that the extent to which the Kremlin
uses the increased freedom of action which its
increased nuclear capabilities appear to give
it, and the success which it achieves, will de-
pend primarily upon the determination,
strength, and cohesiveness of the non-Com-
munist world.
188. Diplomacy and Propaganda. We be-
lieve that the USSR during the period of this
estimate will almost certainly be unwilling to
settle any East-West differences at the cost
of major concessions. Nevertheless, the USSR
will probably seek to continue discussions of
major issues, and may make proposals for
settlements which will be plausible to some
non-Communist nations but unacceptable to
the US. The Soviet leaders probably hope
that such tactics will carry an implication to
the non-Communist world of Soviet willing-
ness to negotiate outstanding issues, and
stimulate doubts in the non-Communist world
regarding the reasonableness of US leader-
ship. Moves apparently intended to ease in-
ternational tension will probably be alter-
nated, however, with political warfare pres-
sures calculated to play upon the non-Com-
munist world's fear of war.
189. We believe that the USSR will place em-
phasis in its diplomacy and propaganda, dur-
ing the period of this estimate, upon proposals
for the control or abolition of nuclear weap-
ons. The Soviet leaders will probably try by
such maneuvers to hold out to the non-Com-
munist world the prospect of release from the
threat of nuclear warfare and, by seeking to
place upon the US the blame for the failure
to achieve workable control arrangements, to
stimulate doubts about the reasonableness
and moderation of US policies in this field.
190. We believe it highly unlikely that the
USSR during the period of this estimate will
agree to a system of nuclear weapons control
which would involve inspection within the
USSR under provisions acceptable to the
Western Powers. Soviet proposals regarding
the control of nuclear weapons will probably
be designed primarily to erect political and
moral barriers to US freedom of action in the
use of nuclear weapons.
191. Trade. The USSR will probably seek to
support its propaganda and diplomacy with
new overtures indicating willingness to ex-
pand its trade with non-Communist states.
Soviet trade with the non-Communist world
will probably increase somewhat during the
period of this estimate, but this trade will con-
tinue to be small in proportion to intra-Bloc
trade. New trade agreements will probably be
intended not only to obtain desired imports
but also to weaken the economic ties of non-
Communist states with the US, and to make
strategic trade controls a subject of contro-
versy between these states and the US. While
the Soviet Union will not be able to bring
about a major shift in present trade patterns,
the Communists probably estimate that po-
litical dividends can be earned from even small
increases in their current volumes of trade
with individual non-Communist states.
192. Europe. We believe that in Europe the
Kremlin will continue to pursue its general
objective of weakening Western governments
and impeding Western defense. It will con-
tinue its campaign against the present form
of NATO and against American bases in Eu-
rope. The Kremlin's immediate aim remains
to prevent the rearmament of West Germany
and its alliance with the West. France will
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probably remain the principal target of So-
viet policy designed to achieve this end. So-
viet propaganda and diplomacy will be de-
signed to strengthen French confidence in the
USSR's peaceful intentions and in the reason-
ableness of Soviet proposals, to stimulate
French fears of future German aggression,
and to sow resentment of US policy. In Italy,
as in France, the USSR possesses a powerful
weapon in the large native Communist party,
and Italy will probably continue to be an,, im-
portant target in the Soviet campaign to
alienate Western Europe from the US and
undermine NATO.
193. If the Soviet leaders come to believe that
there is little prospect for French approval of
any formula for the admission of West Ger-
many to the Western defense system, they
will probably shift their main diplomatic and
propaganda effort to West Germany. This
would be in accordance with their present
aims, first to deny Germany to the Western
defense system, and ultimately to bring it
within the orbit of Soviet influence. A major
effort will probably be undertaken to develop
cultural and economic relations between East
and West Germany aimed at direct political
negotiations beween the two for German
unity. Attractive trade offers are likely to
be employed to undermine support in power-
ful industrial circles for present Western-
oriented policies.
194. If West Germany should be rearmed and
brought into the Western alliance, we believe
that Soviet leaders would estimate that this
development involved potentially a substantial
threat to the security of the Bloc. In particu-
lar, they would probably fear that a rearmed
West Germany might influence the Western
alliance to adopt a more aggressive policy to-
wards the Soviet Bloc. However, the Soviet
leaders would probably estimate that consider-
able time would elapse before the threat to
Bloc security through German rearmament
became critical, and that during the interim
the German question might create serious dis-
sension within the Western coalition. Ac-
cordingly, we believe that the Kremlin would
react to the beginning of German rearma-
ment mainly by intensified efforts to divide
40
and destroy the Western alliance. These
efforts might include a new proposal for Ger-
man unification which would appear to satisfy
the principal conditions which the Western
powers have maintained on this issue. If
these efforts should fail, and if the threat to
Bloc security appeared to the Kremlin to be
markedly increasing by reason of the growth
of West ,German armed forces, the Soviet lead-
ers would probably increase the scale of their
own defense effort. A step-up in the arma-
ments race might therefore develop, accom-
panied by an increase in international tension.
195. Asia. We believe that the USSR regards
the situation in Northeast Asia as stabilized
for the present. We believe the Communist
leaders will not renew hostilities in Korea, or
agree to a political settlement which would
endanger Communist control of North Korea.
Soviet policy toward Japan is probably based
on the assumption that Japan is at present
effectively under US influence. However,
Soviet diplomacy and propaganda will at-
tempt to disturb US?Japanese relations and
to prevent any substantial contribution by
Japan to US military power. The Japanese
Communist Party, whose propaganda impact
is disproportionate to its size, is an important
instrument for this purpose. In their intent
ultimately to detach Japan entirely from US
influence, the Soviet leaders probably count
on the long-run effect of possible further Com-
munist gains in Asia, on Japanese political
instability, and on the urgent Japanese need
for markets.
196. Southeast Asia almost certainly appears
to the Kremlin to be the most profitable field
for Communist subversion and armed revolt
during the period of this estimate. The So-
viet leaders will probably continue to give
covert support to such activities. However, if
the activities of local Communist groups stim-
ulate anti-Communist attitudes within these
Asian states or tend to unite these states in
a program of joint resistance with Western
powers, the Kremlin may choose to hold local
Communist movements in check. The prin-
cipal concern of Soviet policy in South Asia
will be to encourage and exploit the neutral-
ism already present in the area. The Soviet
leaders probably hope thereby to promote dif-
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ferences within the British Commonwealth
over ways of dealing with Communism in
Asia. They would expect such differences to
affect Anglo-American relations adversely,
and to render difficult the efforts of the West-
ern powers to enlist the support of Asian peo-
ples in effective opposition to further Com-
munist advances in Asia.
197. We believe the Chinese Communist lead-
ers in general share Soviet views about the
world situation and about opportunities and
methods of advancing Communist interests in
Asia. During the period of this estimate,
Communist China will probably be reluctant
to undertake courses of action which it con-
siders might involve substantial risk of pro-
voking unlimited war with a major power.
The major deterrents will be: (a) Communist
China needs time to consolidate the Commu-
nist state as well as to modernize its economy;
(b) its strong ground forces are limited in
service and support units, its expanding air
force has certain limitations, its navy has
extremely limited capabilities, and it will re-
main militarily dependent upon the USSR for
logistical, air, and naval support; (c) its in-
dustrial centers will be vulnerable; and (d)
the margin of available resources over mini-
mum domestic requirements will be narrow.
In spite of these limitations and deterrents,
the possibility cannot be excluded that the
Chinese Communists may, at some time dur-
ing the period of this estimate, attempt to
carry out recent threats to "liberate" Formosa
and the Pescadores. Moreover, Communist
China will probably counter with military
force, to the full extent of its capability, any
action which it considers to be a military
threat to its borders or to constitute an im-
minent threat to its vital interests, accepting
the risks of war inherent in such action.
198. Chinese Communist leaders probably
share the Soviet view that Southeast Asia
offers the most favorable opportunities for
Communist expansion, not only because of
the vulnerability of the states in the area, but
because of the possibility of exploiting dis-
agreements between the US and its allies.
The Communists will almost certainly at-
tempt to extend their gains in Indochina, and
will probably expand their efforts to subvert
neighboring countries by political infiltration
and covert support of local insurrections. We
do not believe that the Communists will at-
tempt to secure their objectives in southeast
Asia by the commitment of identifiable com-
bat units of Chinese Communist armed forces,
at least during the early period of this esti-
mate. However, we find the situation in this
area so fluid that we are unable to estimate
beyond this early period.
199. Middle East. Since its withdrawal from
Azerbaijan in 1946 the USSR has apparently
not given high priority to Communist activi-
ties in the Middle East. This may have been
due to such factors as Soviet preoccupation
with more important theaters elsewhere, the
weakness .of local Communist cadres in the
area, and the fact that even without Soviet
initiative the trends in the area were already
unfavorable to the West. In recent months,
however, there have been signs of increased
Communist activity in the area. To the ex-
tent that the Western powers succeed in
reversing the trends unfavorable to them and
in building toward a situation of strength in
this area, we believe that the USSR will in-
crease its activities. If, for example, progress
is made in the development of the "northern
tier" plan for Middle East regional defense,
the USSR will probably increase its efforts to-
arouse anti-Western feelings and influence
the states of the area against cooperation
with the West.
200. Latin. America. The USSR will continue
its efforts through local Communist parties
and front groups, appealing particularly to
labor, students, and intellectuals, to promote
anti-US sentiment, to embarrass US business
interests, and to obstruct economic and mili-
tary cooperation of Latin American govern-
ments with the US. The type of political
action the Communists pursued in Guate-
mala, where a small Communist element was
able to obtain a decisive influence over policy
by operating through front groups, will be
the most likely pattern of Communist tactics
in Latin America. Communist strength is
insufficient to attempt open seizures of power
or to run the risk of intervention by other
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American states. At present, Soviet aims are
probably limited to establishing governments
which would pursue policies calculated to dis-
rupt the Organization of American States and
to damage US prestige. The Bloc will prob-
ably try to increase its trade with Latin
SECRET 42
America. In addition to providing a source
of needed raw materials,,such trade might be
calculated to contribute to the softening of
inter-American solidarity and to the creation
of a more receptive atmosphere for Bloc
propaganda.
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USSR
INTEGRATION OF COMMUNIST PARTY (CPSU) AND SOVIET GOVERNMENT
MID-1954
Appendix A
PARTY LEADERSHIP
GOVERNMENTAL LEADERSHIP
MINISTRIES,
COMMITTEES, AND
AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY
CPSU SECRETARIAT
CPSU PRESIDIUM
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
MEMBERS:
MALENKOV
MOLOTOV
Deputy Chairman)
PRESIDIUM
Foreign Affairs
- MALENKOV--1--(Chairman)
MOLOTOV---43--(First
KHRUSHCHEV
---KHRUSHCHEV1
(First Secretary)
VOROSHILOV 2
SUSLOV
BULGANIN
- BULGANIN---?-(First
Deputy Chairman)
Defense
=??
POSPELOV
KAGANOVICH
- KAGANOVICH-4--(First
Deputy Chairman) -
Heavy Industry and Transport
SHATALIN
MIKOYAN
MIKOYAN
Chairman)
---(Deputy
(Deputy Chairman)'
Trade
State Planning Committee
SABUROV
SABUROV
PERVUKHIN
-PERVUKHIN (Deputy Chairman) --
Electrical Industry
CANDIDATE MEMBERS:
TEVOSYAN (Deputy Chairman) ?
-0- Metallurgy
Kazakh
SHVERNIK 1'3
(Deputy Chairman)
4
Central Committee
MALYSHEV
Medium Machine Building
PONOMARENKO
-PONOMARENK01
KOSYGIN (Deputy Chairman) --
-s- Consumer Goods
(First Secretary)
Ukrainian
,Central Committee
Other Heads of Ministries and Committees
KIRICHENKO
-KIRICHENK01
(Members)
(First Secretary)
1. Also member of Presidium of U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet
2. Also Chairman of Presidium of U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet (Titular Chief of State)
3. Also Chairman of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions
4. The nuclear energy program may fall under this designation
Names are listed above in the order of ranking
given in the Soviet press prior to 8 June 19.54.
Since that date, listings hove been alphabetical.
Dual Membership
Minister
Probable area of responsibility
13394 CIA, 9-54
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0
Thousands of Metric Tons
120
100
80
60
20
0
1938 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953
METALS AND MINERALS PRODUCTION
INGOT STEEL
US
Western Allies
'62.2
Bloc
48.4
37.7
USSR
18.0
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
1000
800
200
PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY COPPER
? US
1015.0
Appendix B
Figure 1
Western Allies
.515.0
Bloc
422.2
350.0
USSR?.
115.0
0
1956 1959 1938 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953
PRIMARY ALUMINUM
US
.1135.8
Western Allies
851.0
Bloc
369.0
?
310.0
USSR_____.......?.....--/.?
/
43.8
1938 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953
13395 CIA, 9-54
80
60
1.2
40
?
20
0
'CEMENT
1956 1959
'Western Al
59.4
?
US
45.0
lies
?
Bloc
25.3
16.1
USSR
5.70
1956 1959 1938 '48 '49 '50 '51 . '52 1953
The Western Allies of the US include the other members
of NATO together with Spain and West Germany.
SECRET
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1959
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SECRET
2500
2000
?LY.. 1500
0
,j 1000
0
-c
_ 500
Millions of Metric Tons
CHEMICALS PRODUCTION
SYNTHETIC AMMONIA SULPHURIC ACID
US
2074
Bloc
,1037
USSR
/
265
535
1938 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 ' 1953
12
10
8
6
4
2
FERTILIZER
1956
1959
0
1938
USSR
6.0
3.2
'48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953'
13396 CIA, 9-54
1956
1959
Millions of Metric Tons
15
12
9
6
.3
Appendix B
Figure 2
US
'12.9
Western Allies
9.4
Bloc
4.1
USSR
1.5
2.8
0
1938 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953 1956 1959
The Western Allies of the US include the other members
of NATO together with Spain and West Germany.
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500
400
tfl
u 300
441
0
g 200
100
0
1938 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953
Appendix B
Figure 3
ENERGY AND TRANSPORT
ANTHRACITE AND
BITUMINOUS COAL
?
?
Western A lies
495.0
US
435.2
Bloc
393.3
28.0
USSR
114.5
400
300
ton
200
0
0
100
0
1956
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
1959
US
'327.6
Western Allies
?
USSR
26.3
92.9
Bloc
58.4
45.5
1938 - '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953 1956
600
500
400
0 300
00
200
100
0
1938 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953
ELECTRIC POWER
US
513.5
Western Allies
312.5
Bloc
205.1
133.0
39.6
1000
800
,
.0 600
0
400
.0
200
0
RAIL TRANSPORT
1956 I
1959
.Bloc
975.0
, US
901.1
I
Range of i
USSR pro,
,/
800.0
USSR?
/
384.4
,Western Allies
259.1
1959 1938 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953
The Western Allies of the US include the other members
13397 CIA, 9-54 of NATO together with Spain and West Germany.
SECRET
1956
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roboble
uction
1959
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SECRET
20
16
Billions of 1950 Rubles
4
MANUFACTURING
MOTORS AND GENERATORS*
0
1938
US
16.7
USSR
8
6
4
'48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953
1956
ELECTRON TUBES*
1959
US
7.3
USSR
Bloc
1.3
0.9
0
1938 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953 1956 1959
*hp view of the somewhat heterogeneous composition of the items
included in these categories, and the problems of dollar-ruble
conversion, these estimates represent rough orders of magni-
tude of production rather than precise calculations of ''quantity
or value.
160
120
0
80
0
in0
40
Appendix B
Figure 4
MACHINE TOOLS
Bloc
'141.9
USSR
53.9
88
82
Range of probable
USSR production
0
1938
200
150
50
0
1938
'48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953 1956 1959
TRACTORS
'ItC5
120
Range
"4- USSR
110
of prob
product
,
USSR ,
/
49.0
'48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953
1956
ble
On
1959
The Western Allies of the US include the other members
of NATO together with Spain and West Germany.
13398 CIA, 9-54 SECRET
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Thousands of Metric Tons
80
60
40
20
MILITARY END ITEM PRODUCTION
TOTAL AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION*
(Military and Civilian)
,
,..,
US
73.7
USSR
.ip60,?
33.8
...1\
.14.6
Western Allies
1938 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953
20
16
12
8
4
0
*Including spores
ARTILLERY
1956
1959
USSR
Bloc
11.5
11.0
-
US
2.8
Western Allies
0.24
1938
'48 '49 '50 '51 "52 1953
13399 CIA, 9-54
TANKS AND
ASSAULT GUNS
10
8
USSR
6
-J
0
_61.1
La
8 4
2
0
1938
USSR
USSR
1.5
'48 '49 '50 '51
Thousands of Metric Tons
800
600
400
200
Appendix B
Figure 5
US
9.1
7.5* Range of probable
?i.f.!7,7".,?,.....4 USSR production
?6.o*
Western Allies
?0.6
'52 1953 1956 1959
*USSR only
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION
624
USSR
544
USSR
1956 1959 1938 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953
The Western Allies of the US include the other members
of NATO together with Spain and West Germany.
SECRET
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1959
?
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Millions of Metric Tons
Millions of Metric Tons
250
200
150
100
50
0
Appendix B
Figure 6
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
GRAIN
Bloc
225
'
US
140.6
Western Allies
100.2
,88.6
\
USSR
80-81
Range of
USSR pro
1938 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953
160
120
80
40
POTATOES
robable
uction ,
Millions of Metric Tons
,12
10
8
6
4
2
0
MEAT*
US
11.0
Bloc
10.2
Western Allies
9.5
USSR
1956 1959 1938 '48 '49 '50 '61 '52 1953
Bloc
148.0
,73.8
\
USSR
, 6.4
'
Western Allies
64.5
US
10.1
1
1938 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953
13400 CIA, 9-54
1956
a
1959
1956
*Excluding slaughter fats, lard, fat cuts, and bacon.
Assuming the continuation of the policy of encouraging
consumer goods expansion.
.bAssuming the discontinuation of that policy.
1959
The Western Allies of the US include the other members
of NATO together with Spain and West Germany.
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DIRECTION OF FLOW OF USSR FOREIGN TRADE, 1937 AND 1948-53
European Satellites
Communist China
'West
(Total Trade Turnover)
3927
Appendix B
Figure 7
Millions of /95/ US Dollars
1937
13401 CIA, 9-54
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Appendix C
US AND USSR
COMPARISON OF MAJOR SCIENTIFIC GROUPS
AS OF MID-1954*
(In Thousands)
LIVING GRADUATES IN SCIENTIFIC FIELDS
IIIIIIIIIIIIII
Soviet Union -1400
United States -1700
GRADUATES
SCIENTIFIC
1035
EMPLOYED
IN
FIELDS
1115
"SCIENTIFIC
(Professional scientists
teaching in higher
155
WORKERS"
in research
educational
institutions or
institutions)
240
Health Sciences - 22
Health Sciences
435
Agricultural Sciences
33
Health Sciences
290
Physical Sciences
and Engineering
185
Agricultural Sciences
185
Health Sciences
50
Agricultural Sciences
155
Physical Sciences
and Engineering
560
Physical Sciences
and Engineering
525
Agricultural Sciences
30
Physical Sciences
and Engineering
75
Soviet Union United States
Soviet Union United States
SOVIET KANDIDATS
AMERICAN
IN SCIENTIFIC
54
AND
Ph.D.'s
FIELDS
48
SCIENCE
/954
224
GRADUATES
and /955
134
Health Sciences -
37
Agricultural Sciences
48
Health Sciences
16
Health Sciences
8
Physical Sciences
and Engineering
139
Health Sciences
43
Agricultural Sciences
10
Agricultural Sciences
10
Physical Sciences
and Engineering
28
Physical Sciences
and Engineering
30
Agricultural Sciences
24
PhYsical Sciences
and Engineering
67
Soviet Union United States
Soviet Union United States
13402 CIA, 9-54
*Numerical estimates of Soviet scientific personnel are be-
lieved to be correct to 'within plus or minus to percent.
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TABLE 1
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF BLOC ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL
Active Military Personnel Strength
APPENDIX D
Services
Country
Mid-1954
Mid-1959
-
Totals
Army
Air Force
Navy
Security
Army
Air. Force
Navy
Security
Mid-'54
Mid-'59
USSR
2,500,000
800,000 1
691,000 2
400,000
2,500,000
850,000
740,000
400,000
4,391,000
4,490,000
EE Satellites
1,115,000
88,700 a
32,300
311,000
1,265,000
115,000
42,300
331,000
1,547,000
1,753,300
Albania
30,000
200
800
10,000
30,000
800
10,000
Bulgaria
200,000
14,000
5,500
50,000
200,000
7,500
50,000
Czecho.
170,000
18,000
40,000
170,000
40,000
E. Germany
100,000
6,500
9,000
30,000
175,000
12,000
50,000
Hungary
150,000
18,000
38,000
150,000
38,000
Poland
250,000
20,000 5
9,000
65,000
250,000
12,000
65,000
Rumania
215,000
12,000
8,000
78,000
290,000
10,000
78,000
Communist
Asia
2,739,000
86,500
73,000
5
2,997,000
114,000
85,000
5
2,898,500
3,196,000
Comm. China
2,212,000
71,500 4
62,000
2,385,000
70,000
North Korea
312,000
15,000
11,000
312,000
15,000
Viet Minh
215,000
300,000
BLOC
TOTALS
6,354,000
975,200
796,300
711,000 '
6,762,000
1,079,000
867,300
731,000
8,836,500
9,439,300
lIncluding 95,000 naval aviation personnel. Included in the 800,000 are 466,000 in operational air units and 334,000 in nonoperational categories.
Excluding 95,000 naval aviation personnel and 125,000 MVD naval frontier guards who become part of the Navy during wartime, but in this
table are included under the security forces.
'Includes naval air arm.
'Includes naval air arm and 4,500 Soviet personnel.
5Because of their markedly inferior combat qualities, about 1,100,000 Communist Asian security troops are not included. Chinese Public Secu-
rity Forces total about 1,000,000 men. These forces are lightly equipped and widely dispersed on security duties. The North Korean Security
Forces number about 21,000 men.
4M.P SECRET
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TABLE 2
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF BLOC GROUND FORCES AND TRAINED RESERVES, MID-1954 AND MID-1959,
AND ESTIMATED GROUND MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL, MID-1954.
APPENDIX D
FORCES
COUNTRY
Divisions by Type, Mid-1954
Total
Line Divisions
Trained
Reserves
Ground Mobilization Potential
Mid-1954
Line'
Support-
ing
Mid-
1954
Mid-
1956-59
? Ground
M+30
M+180
Rifle
Mech.
Tank
Mid-'54
Mid-'59
Personnel
Div.
Personnel Div.
USSR (total)
110 2
40
25
453
175
175
6,250,000
8,000,000
8,750,000
300
11,875,000
475 9
Occupied Europe
5
16
9
13
30
30
.
NW USSR
14
14
W USSR51
.
..
51
W Central USSR.
.
19
19
...
Caucassus..
17
17
? ? ?
E Central USSR..
14
14
Far East
30
30
Satellites (total)
63
13
6
82
93
2,332,500
4,215,000
3,030,000
118
4,100,000
196
Albania
3
3
3
37,500
90,000
80,000
4
100,000
6
Bulgaria
12 5
14
16
550,000
800,000
500,000
20
700,000
28
Czechoslovakia
8
4
2
14
14
415,000
750,000
500,000
20
1,000,000
48
East Germany
4
3..

7
12
30,000
200,000
250,000
9
350,000
12
Hungary
12 ?
1
1
14
14
300,000
350,000
450,000
18
650,000
25
- Poland
12
5
17
19
550,000
1,000,000
675,000
25
1,200,000
42
Rumania
12 ?
1
13
15
450,000
825,000
575,000
22
1,000,000
35
Corn. Asia (total)
163
5
7
168
155
"
.
15
ii
n.
ii.
China
138 8
5
19
143
115
Korea
34
4
34
Manchuria
22
3
6
25
N China
13
1
2
14
E China
25
1
3
26
Central S China
15 ?.
2
15
.
SW China/Tibet
12
1
12
NW China
17
1
17
North Korea
19
19
24
Viet Minh
6
1
6
16
BLOC TOTALS
336
53
36
65
425
423
8,582,000
12,215,000
11,780,000
418
1-6,975,000
671
'-It is estimated that Soviet line divisions are generally at about 70 percent of their average wartime T/O strength of about 12,000 men.
2 This includes 5 cavalry divisions, and 8-10 airborne divisions.
20 artillery and 25 anti-aircraft divisions.
In East Germany: 415,000 men; 22 divisions.
? Includes 1 cavalry division.
? Includes 2 mountain divisions.
'20 artillery divisions.
'Includes 6 cavalry and 3 parachute divisions.
'Of these 475 divisions 300 could probably be equipped from stockpiles. The remaining 175 divisions would be equipped from current production
and would probably be used primarily to provide replacement units or individual replacements.
' Communist Asian forces have no system of organized reserves. The Communist Chinese have an estimated 6-20,000,000 men in the militia,
but as presently constituted these forces cannot be classed as trained reserves since they receive little military training and have almost no
equipment. With the institution of a formal military system, expected to be adopted by mid-1956, it is probable that Chinese personnel who com-
plete a term of military service will form the trained reserve available for mobilization.
' Communist Asian forces are considered fully mobilized. Any further increment in the size of the Chinese Communist forces will be depend-
ent upon the acquisition of weapons and equipment, and the size of the trained manpower pool. (See note 10 above.)
*MIX SECRET
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TABLE 3
ESTIMATED BLOC NAVAL FORCES, MID-1954 -MID-1959
APPENDIX D
FLEET
BALTIC
NORTHERN
BLACK SEA
PACIFIC
TOTALS
BLOC TOTAL
1
COUNTRY
U.S.S.R.
Sate!-
lites 4
U.S.S.R.
U.S.S.R.
Sate!-
lites 4
U.S.S.R.
Comm.
China 4
U.S.S.R.
Satell's &
Comm.
China 1
Mid-
Mid-
Mid-
Mid-
Mid-
Mid-
Mid-
Mid-
Mid-
Mid-
Mid-
Mid-
SHIPS
1954
1959
1954/59
1954
1959
1954
1959
1954/59
1954
1959
1954/59
1954
1959
1954/59
1954
1959 2
SURFACE VESSELS
A. MAJOR SURFACE VESSELS
1. aircraft carriers
.
.
.
.
.
....
2. battleships/monitors
2
33
2.
4
5'
4
5'
3. cruisers
11
22
3
3
8
12
2
2
1
24
39
1
25
40
4. destroyers
41
60
1
33
52
23
41
5
34
53
131
206
6
137
212
5. coastal destroyers
21
25
2
2
9
11
14
17
46
55
46
55
TOTAL (Major)
75
110
1
38
57
42
66
5
50
72
1
205
305
7
212
312
B. MINOR SURFACE VESSELS
(TOTAL)
989
989
58/96
188
188
278
278
94
394
394
185
1849'
1849 4
337/375
2186
2224
SUBMARINES
1. long-range
52
112
48
138
28
58
20
70
148
378
148
379
2. medium range
26
26
3
2
2
8
8
3
37
37.
73
73
7
79
79
3. coastal
51
51
3
3
41
41
49
49
144
144
144
144
TOTAL (Submarines)
129
189
3/4
53
143
77
107
3
106
156
1
365
595
7/8
371
602
'No significant changes are anticipated during the period of this estimate.
'Units considered obsolete in 1959 include?USSR: 4 battleship/monitors, 5 cruisers, 18 destroyers, 15 coastal destroyers, 17 long-range submarines, 34
medium-range submarines, 25 coastal submarines; Satellite and Communist China: 1 cruiser, 5 destroyers, 8 submarines.
'Includes one hull presently on ways estimated to be larger than a cruiser.
Construction of minor combatant vessels is uncertain and probably will be limited to replacement needs.
A submarine of unknown type was transferred from the USSR, but is also included in USSR totals.
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATED BLOC AIR STRENGTH IN OPERATIONAL UNITS, MID-1954 -MID-1959
Mid-1954 Mid-1955 Mid-1956 Mid-1957 Mid-1958
APPENDIX D
Mid-1959
USSR
EE SAT
NCAF/
NKAF
USSR
USSR
EE SAT
CCAF/
NKAF
USSR
USSR
USSR
EE SAT
CCAF/
NKAF
Fighter: Jet (Day)
10,150
1,780
1,150
10,400
10,200
2,450
1,700
9,800
9,400
8,900
2,5002
1,900
(All Weather)
A few
200
500
1,000
1,500
2,100
Piston
260
400
Attack: Jet
200
900
1001,600
.
2,100
2,300
400
120
Piston
2,350
910
240
2,300
1,600
840
360
900
400
200
600
320
Lt. Bomber: Jet
3,250
60
280
3,200
3,200
280
520
3,200
3,200
3,200
600
720
Piston
300
320
310
160
.
100
Med. Bomber: Jet
60
200
400650
.
850
1,050
Piston
1,340
10
1,200
1,000
60
700
400
100
30
100
Heavy Bomber: Jet
50
150 "
250
Tankers:4
300
500
550
750
850
Transport:' Medium
50
100
200
400
Light
1,900
140
120
1,900
1,850
180
140
1,800
1,700
1,500
270
200
Heliocopters
50
100
300
450
450
450
Reconnaissance: Jet
660
750
900
70
60
1,000
1,070
1,070
200
80
Piston
440
150
350
200
170
10
100
30
30
100
10
TOTAL
20,200
3,600
2,520
21,100
21,600
4,400
3,010
21,900
22,200
22,400
4,800
3,450
Jets
14,120
1,840
1,430
14,950
16,100
2,900
2,280
17,300
18,270
18,870
3,700
2,820
BLOC TOTAL (TO&E)
25,920
29,010
30,650
Jets
17,390
21,280
25,390
BLOC TOTAL (ACTUAL)
21,000
Jets
12,600
NOTE: a. Figures include Naval Air.
b. USSR figures are estimates of authorized TO&E strength, except in the Categories showing introduction of new aircraft types, in which case
the build-up phase in new types represents estimated actual strength. Present actual strength is estimated to be, for the various types of
aircraft, the following percentages of TO&E strength: Jet fighters, 80%; Attack, 90-100%; Jet light bombers, 60-70%; Piston medium bombers,
82-87%; Transport, 90-95%; Jet reconnaissance, 60%; Piston reconnaissance, 90-95%. Based on present reequipment trends it is considered
that the overall operational establishment will be at a figure close to full authorized strength by mid-1955. The possible effect which intro-
duction of guided missiles might have on aircraft strength in the latter part of the period cannot presently be estimated.
c. Actual overall strength of European Satellite Air Forces is estimated at about 65% of authorized strength in mid-1954, at 75% for mid-1956,
and 85% for mid-1959.
d. Actual strength of the CCAF-NKAF is about 75% of authorized strength in mid-1954, at 85% for mid-1956, and 90% for mid-1959.
'May include approximately 300 all-weather fighters.
3 Approximately 2,000 are MIG-17's.
'There is no intelligence to indicate that the Soviets have developed tanker aircraft or inflight refueling techniques. It is estimated that without pro-
ducing additional TU-4 aircraft and without reducing the actual strength of medium bombers in the long range air force, the Soviets could by convert-
ing TU-4's have about 300 tankers by mid-1955. However, this would require the conversion of almost all such aircraft not presently assigned to tac-
tical units.
'In addition to Transports, it is estimated that 300 gliders are in organized glider regiments.
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- TABLE 5 APPENDIX D
ESTIMATED 1954-1957 SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES
(Calculated in accordance with U.S. Military Mission profiles)
Medium Bomber Heavy Bomber
Conditions TU-4 T1J-4 (Modified) Type 391 Type 371 (1957)
Combat Radius/
Range (nm)
a. 10,000 lb. load
1700/3100
2000/3600
1500/2900
2750/5300
One refueling
2400/4300
2800/5000
2100/4000
3800/7300
b. 3,000 lb. load
190/3500
2300/4100
1700/3300
2850/5500
One refueling
2750/4900
3200/5700
2400/4600
3900/7500
Speed/Altitude
350/30,000
360/30,000
535/15,000
535/19,000
(In/ft)
a. Maximum speed
b. Com. speed
350/30,000
360/30,000
475/41,000
475/44,500
Combat Ceiling 2
(ft)
36,500 37,500 43,500 48,000
1 The Director of Naval Intelligence believes that the operating performance capabilities of these aircraft
could be approximately as indicated. However, he desires to note that these data are based primarily
on inflight photographs and a series of assumptions. Therefore, they may be subject to some revision,
either upwards or downwards, as more substantial direct evidence becomes available.
2 The altitude at which a rate of climb of 500 ft/min can be maintained at the end of the given combat
radius of the aircraft.
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TABLE 6 APPENDIX D
ESTIMATED 1954-1957 SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES
UNDER A MODIFIED MISSION PROFILE
(Calculated in accordance with US Military Mission Profiles
except that fuel reserves are reduced and aircraft operate
at altitudes permitting maximum radius/range)
Medium Bomber Heavy Bomber
Conditions TU-4 TU-4 (Modified) Type 391 Type 371 (1957)
Combat Radius/
Range (nm)
a. 10,000 lb. load
1800/3300
2150/4000
1600/3100
3100/6100
One refueling
2500/4500
3000/5600
2200/4300
4300/8100
b. 3,000 lb. load
2050/3700
2450/4600
1850/3700
3200/6400
One refueling
2850/5100
3450/6450
2250/5000
4300/8200
Speed/Altitude
(kn/ft)
a. Maximum speed
350/30,000
360/30,000
535/15,000
535/19,000
b. Com. speed
350/30,000
360/30,000
475/42,000
475/45,500
Combat Ceiling 2
36,500
37,500
43,500
48,000
(ft)
Estimated maximum target altitudes (100 ft/min. rate of climb) for the Type 37 and Type 39 aircraft
on one-way missions, one hour fuel remaining, bomb load aboard and with maximum power, are as follows:
Type 371 Type 391
Bombload (lbs.) Altitude (ft.) Bombload (lbs.) Altitude (ft.)
20,000
55,100
10,000
49,700
10,000 '
56,300
3,000
51,100
3,000
57,200
1 The Director of Naval Intelligence believes that the operating performance capabilities of these aircraft
could be approximately as indicated. However, he desires to note that these data are based primarily
on inflight photographs and a- series of assumptions. Therefore, they may be subject to some revision,
either upwards or downwards, as more substantial direct evidence becomes available.
The altitude at which a rate of climb of 500 ft/min can be maintained at the end of the given combat
radius of the aircraft.
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TABLE 7 APPENDIX D
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF MAJOR ARMY WEAPONS IN 1953
(Soviet Bloc and NATO)
ITEM
USSR
TOTAL BLOC
US
TOTAL NATO
Armored Vehicles
6,000
6,000
9,134
9,734
Heavy Tanks
(over 50 tons)
700
700
195
Medium Tanks
(35-50 tons)
3,700
3,700
7,816
Light Tanks
1,123
Self-Propelled Guns
1,600
1,600
Artillery Pieces
11,300
11,750
3,042
3,281
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TABLE 8
ESTIMATED POSTWAR PRODUCTION OF AIRCRAFT
(Soviet Bloc and NATO)'
APPENDIX D
ITEM
SOVIET BLOC
NATO
1946-51
1952-53
Postwar Total
1946-51
1952-53
Postwar Total
Fighters and Bombers
(Units)
28,800
12,740
41,540
18,000
14,800
32,800
Production of Other
Aircraft (Units)
28,190
'7,470
35,660
100,000
20,600
120,600
Total Aircraft
Production
(million lbs.)
311
143
454
329
318 -
647
BLOC and NATO production combined accounted for about 95 percent of world production. Except for
small, but growing, contributions from Czechoslovakia and Poland the USSR has accounted for all of
the Bloc aircraft production. The major contributions to NATO were roughly: US, 65-70 percent; UK,
20-25 percent; others, about 10-15 percent.
Trainers are included in this category.
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TABLE 9
APPENDIX D
ESTIMATED TOTAL USSR NAVAL PRODUCTION, 1954-1959
Major Surface Vessels
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
Lt. Cruisers
Fleet Destroyers
Coastal Destroyers
3
1
16
2
8
9
1
24
1
19
?
6
16
Minor Surface Vessels'
Submarine (Long Range)
40
46
46
46
46
46
1Cruiser construction, previously estimated at 35 (average) ships per annum was interrupted by the di-
version of two shipyards to the construction of tankers, which accounts for the decrease in cruiser de-
liveries 1955-1957.
Includes 12 destroyer leaders estimated to be built during the period of this estimate.
'We are unable to estimate the building rate of minor surface vessels, but believe it will be limited large-
ly to the replacement of existing units as they become obsolete or are transferred to the Chinese Com-
munists or Satellite navies.
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oftkitib SECRET
TABLE 10 APPENDIX D
ESTIMATED COMPOSITION OF BLOC MERCHANT
FLEETS MID-1954 AND MID-1959
(VESSELS 1,000 GROSS TONS UPWARD)
Mid-1954
Mid-1959
Non-Tanker 1
Tanker
Total
Non-Tanker 1
Tanker
Total
No.
GRT
(000's)
No.
GRT
(000's)
No.
GRT
(000's)
No.
GRT
000's
No.
GRT
000's
No.
GRT
(000's)
USSR
597
1,952
41
172
638
2,124
810
2,551
93
484
903
3,034
E. European Satellites
84
307
3
21
87
328
153
689
3
21
156
678
Communist China
101
262
11
15
112
277
121
367
11
15
132
382
TOTAL
782
2,521
55
208
837
2,729
1,084
3,607
107
520
1,191
4,096
'Includes passenger ships, freighters, and miscellaneous types such as crab canneries, whale factories, trawlers, and hydrographic ships.
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For Officiat Use Ord
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Population Map of the USSR showing Ethnic Groups
APPENDIX E
60 70 BO 04 00 110 120 110 140 150 60 170 BO , , 170 165
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