SNIE-11-54: LIKELIHOOD OF GENERAL WAR WITH THE USSR THROUGH 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A003400050019-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: January 25, 1954
• Content Type: MEMO

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COI~fMTiAL 92
79315.1
25 January 1954
MEMORANDUM FM: Mr. Allan Evens (OIR)
Colonel W. H. Hennig, USA (G-2)
Captain Allan L. Reed, USN (ONI)
Colonel Charles F'. Gillis, USAF (AFOI1-2B2)
Captain Ray Malpass, USN (JIG)
SUBJECT : SNIE-11-54: Likelihood of General War with
the USSR through 1957
1. The NSC has requested the IAC to prepare an estimate
of the likelihood of general war (including Soviet attacks an
the continental US) during the period through 1957. The RSC
on 25 January indicated that this estimate is needed for P2=nlmv
Board consideration 11 February in preparation for Council action
on the 17th. The Board proposes to reccmmiend to the IAC that this
request be not by drafting a very brief Special Estimate (sInE.ll-.54).
2. In view of the short time allowed for UC action, the
Board has prepared the attached outline of main points for discus-
sion with reference to the problem and suggests that they be used
in lieu of formal terms of reference for this estimate. It is
requested that your representative attend a meeting at 2:00 Wednesday,
27 January, to discuss these main points, to make oral contributions
on as mater points as possible where agency positions are already
cryatallil, and to indicate the points on which you feel written
contributions must be prepared. The latest practicable deadline
for such written contributions would be 12:00 Friday,, 29 January.
3. The attached outline breaks the problem dorm into the
main topics and arguments used in previous NIE's and SE's dealing
with the problem of likelihood of general war. Wherever agreed
IAC positions are available an these topics, the outline contains
quotations of the relevant texts, with an indication as to whether
the agreed estimate extends as far as 1957 or only for a shorter
period. It is the Board's view that the present language of NIE-95
(which extends only as far as mid-1955) as described in Section II
and Section III of the attached outline could be extended through
1957 unless the critical economic and military factors listed in
Section IV of the attached outline show significant changes in the
period 1955-1957. The Board invites apecial attention to these
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CONNTIAL
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All.
for the ptuposes of the d ai. u an 27 Jan=7 mid
factors
gents the retention of agreed language vhsrevvw there ham
been no-significant change.
4. It vould therefore be appreciated if your a .wee tiw
o xld meet with us is Rom ]h6 South Building at 2 OO W ee
27 b .
PAWL A p B c
Deputy As i .at Director
Mtica1 Estimates
Distribution "B6
~IIDENTikk
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C NHU MIi 6
C2~N"1 L I T LLIGEN0E. A0 E I1C7.
MICE a TIQ A E&MMTES
. SWECTs TOM (9
5 J r~ mv~w 1954
~ K M n0?t (
V 'i tE =- a f TFR O ' 1957
t the l ood of g el (.l . . ,
Scviet stt ::e the *wt:~ ta!- ) dwtv t h I 'i
FIiLd~l &U,
s o for this ciatimto Is the nwid of the I=
t 1 Sete f the pig threes. 1957 the t ete p ?a -?
ww'Uy a p t n i rat on ea ental d f e;o % .b
1,r Nmed an, cwTunt rmtiama3 .1i1genae eetim.tward ?
val.: e o l:y tf h 1955g TMe paragraph ncr r a
N .t h, the USSR has a .a cmaebi l
a e 89 twk' on the, ate tee ~ s
it u :v-17 t t FXh. el b t y t,-"
" to iwisr , wir :dwriaw, the period coed iremt
or-tiamiep (thrm-Ch 1955)6. H umq It Is eei e
that Via, r xi rer t f , .a ~,ti
e ' , t om iie m e , a rest of e e ie of t
e t, Uo not tcf d eit , ales to have
that eye to eoww, de epltoje Savd,,-vt p e1sm-
o1mr-ta" 1 " ea r =wesq there IS no aubetantial
r . arm U61 stt the S; s .t od Its tic
2 t to the e 1 S d to u1timte objes .ve
of dadmt , the -~uoo1do & 1 0 p., for Im.
at h the defenv of ow vitale abo d
pro-
ooa4 1z a. rapid end orderly f in ,, p' ( ,. 8
CONFIDE TIAL
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NOOF .w
TOPB
QUESTIONS BEAMO ON THE PRO s
10 We hwe consist t 1 7 rwoodsed that (
ej et attawk on the aao imeaw US) Might
oath ono of the ftuouinG Uwe 3
A. The t taktW, the a tegie of?f ivd9 delit ?-
tt y :nth t> ,tioo, fsdt .te al e
the Krmlin a i t i o i p a t i n g t h a t ,it a decisively d @ , - -
f e a t the US at thweby ove3 ti , at
ob'e?,ti A
B. The USMV anti on the, stmt a de tee i p ddb
e .t r avdtdth tatf earn ai i tint a "I
wrl the iz's
1. E . hoii that the us gLi ad to attack
the U3SR and hoping to Cain the strategic adv=-
ta a of surprise by attackind first;
balleviM that the inarwaine .1itaa ' '
of the US er the whole Wootem oocUtio
conotituted a Wave throat to Sovtet se wity'
e tam. aut tegic int effite
C a , ar tba US . t` erg the otbar mti of the
West) awdenly in the eo ?se of a series of aa' ntiel
TOP S
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w . TOP SE tB Nw
H.
and cont anti not iut4mdad by site aide to
refit in remsral t d i4e that so= anti,
tn1 c a by the otb aide oo titIx4d a gave threat
to its se ity or vital strategic in ?esta o
(MB-959 'babas
Sov,et Bloc Courses of Action then xj l955n
22 Septa 1953)
A. We have said that ue believe it l.i .koly that -the
Krwlin ui11 conclude that Soviet Bloc forces had
a deieivo .ty 3uatif . the deliberate
thitiation of g , unr In eipfttatlon of early
victim. (I A above; .5, aa. 15 a 16)
B. We also have said that the Kremlin is unl:Vcely
to conclude that war was i ?t regardless of
Soviet intentions that the West coalition
was Increasing its militery to the point of
constituting a grave threat to Soviet security or
positions vital to Soviet soctity4 (I B ab ;
45s paras. 15 and 17)
C. We also h a v e said holie t h a t the x . win
try to avoid courses of action which in its 3udg
mat might Involve substantial risk of general war
(I 0 above; ...95,, ?aa. 3.6 and 19) although we
have e k ed that a acres of actlons and o ter-
aotioni Initiated by eih aided could n?r rm e
,less lea. to feral war evm though not intended
by oit ? r side to have that effect,
-.3-
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%IV TOP E
1D71Cu
A LUt:es r..e it x'75 xiy based on the fola'
1nt he? conside7rt;tiCr3 Pertinent esti!t t h5.ch
eo%sr t.h por pd trough. 1.957 are quoted
A Q Kregeln Outlook and.OWg!e,,Ivog
1... In 1ne cr .th Coiari st c cctrine 'C at
per-
rulers remrdn Drof me t coned that
manent hosttt ty ea .its between the C st
and froo prorlds, TheAbasic objettuess, there-
fire,, Conti .e to be an -,oansion of their c Am
spher? of -..)c sr and the eventual dcalmtion of
the non-Communist uor1tL" (NB-93, para. 13)
2 The Kremlin also probably believes that (a) the
struggle w i l l . oont3.nuo t b r o a u $ a ti l e Ustorleal
epoch, with historical forces working Inevitably-
to faacx the i.ne ro t e of C gat and the cue-
611ne of Icanitali ate a (b) "the fcrm
of the global conf3 et is zot necessarily rd-U.
tary, exeept pessibl7 in the fiml and tat
c1y .c stage. -9"," ( 9 .5 j para. 34)
TOP SL
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TOP SIMI ?a
wee
tai ti. 14 11 c i to exist d r x t-
i,od f A th ri itA ob f t t:i. O?t
of s ,m a., Srirf:y etth of
t,. id polit3 $ U1 t'?c
usaken thew t ? (See NI&& t ftsawlat Bloc
C p bilities t t :i9, tv, per". 66 a 67,
9 ImPmeLong TOM Dmelep=wt ?f
he Siet Bloc w2d WWam Fmar P i iO - s
is The Kremlin Mbbab27 esti tes that -
19 _28)
Prlmrr tar to g y arcs
&a the W WU r4lit o iti
tti
b0 w of the I d e
Far Beat 3. Afri"
l:i.ti . g i:-1 e, the mmOWO
vice i v iatt
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C. D s to e USSR of the IJ I.d to
Of Power
We believe that am C the pa ,od of this
eaimate t h e Cemmmist vu1 V M contimw
to consider Lem is as I a o b11 j,
tmlving at a minlimm the o t' of aide-
a ead dea tion in th9 USSR and at the
tip carrying grit it the risk that the Soviet
system its ux d be des ,? They 1MM
that the US has i atraate .e a ? paww
and naa l ea f2i.tiss, a lax g atowdo stook-
p1leg and ate Industrial pots a o2though
they probably esti to that the USM is making
a beta nt :aal progmas Its di.
tams in these rea at " ( 5g 4
16, =bw 9 t s s)
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I AV
TOP SECRET
TV. CRTTMAL FACTO INFLTJf ftG THE J ESTTYATE ? TEE 11
GARY BUMME
A. 3 at Bloc Bean=ie B
1.
L r . superiority of Western sc
and-var tent 4 spit Soviet achij
ta
during the postwar afl the output of the USSR
3 t remeJn much l r than that of the M v amd the
Output Of the entire Bloc in much l
than that of the NATO states. We estimate that the
vas about coo-third that of the NATO states. Theme
die 'itioe i ratio term will wobably be reduced
&lightly divIng the period of We satiate b although
the disparities absolute s will be videned
a evhat,. Bl output in the. in Industries - eaergyq
minerals tclas and sa sub--
stantially below that of ' thNATO otat aw (N65 a paru. 28)
quarter to ona--thi that of the US in 1952f,
that the gross national .tot of the entire
a aoua in . tome; of teal output of 11
t s of goods and ae me a hat d eleadi g
o inditetore, of relative capacity to ;avduw .vM.Itary
TOP SECRET
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cadet gross national prodwilon about
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TOP S
esk1p ft 'peaoet ? Since the end of ' ld Y
all i a MUCral product to anitary ug
than ban any 9Ue state, %Ie astute that about
of t Soviet mss tia p 4aot i.s
now devoted to milltm7 outlays, and t bat thn pro.
ion vM rams-in at least a ?v throu&b t
period of this e at3 to o (Nn-65, pam. 7.9)
J3hile Bloc v M probably Inamese at a high
9 the USSR o died a h 1r pp'tl
t P of' t We st . to already so wwh greater that
Western, superiority thm"fCTS dram s
r a t e than that of t.: cle w Powers aM the ratio
the Mae that t absolute gap tit the
two X311 widen des it, the i v r rate of We m
the Thm the West _ the ind ititt
t atiy perior to the Stet Mrs nn tot
(BF-460 9)
ttea TabAit7? of the Sit 6CCMMY, spi
amts ' LMUstry In to S to t
der Industriol reglong ( i the D MIS) d 1
Pt Ill provide the bulk of S ,et i dm tir "
ra s t4 d,i. pgr Soviet lnduat77 SM. , 6 to
TOP Sd
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TOP iEM=
Vt8 i ~3~7 t
-coned reglaral e:am Conti
but the pw ction of many b is c for v and of
t equlywnt r main ge phi ,y c
?e trated m ' (N 5,, 32)
195? the Bloc oem have achieved a
r 1 l of se fief than at Mamuts
certain Its= vM remain cif oub.
atantia Importance to 31 ' al M a it
produc ? These fUse include ci tr is tub
.y also, tine vatvna rubber,, ? rp
cork. If these 1t we or import ffbould ftass to
a h1e s `r ott? a v d r , In tom. B1c
b1nary and ui t tb spare pis,,
waver re elons v d id s to sawaoW.R
Pe m ,Tha Blee armed fames will ocstirm to No-, hx-apartM
... the comg1cated to ntles ai the min
Bloc ` rrit r and the re2atively equate r
aw ran z nt Met,,,' ('11M.650 - 53)
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uc 41. 'st . y d f a. United pr a t
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TOP SE
1. Over-an superiority of Ueat scientific .sets.
scientific amts of the (tom :bar s
quality of t o r19 facilities, u,p-
mmt9 Wo- fin"c a ) greater t o
hi r die of its soientifio and to
m
of the tJ SR.q a the assets of the West as. a vale
are for greater t twee of the B1ov0 Howe ,r'o
the is , adiag at effort to reduft this
dis h, e it wi o b b 1 y centium to devaU
nw-rm the gap between it sW the We.? even t to
ff to s this disparity, is 1i iy to
mima amts to it s than US M.
TbareforO8, the difference be%veen Sit wid L
scientific capabilities In t period not
siifi.t as the over-an Omparlarity at the
M In sole tific an t d ? 'a? 37)
ors lentifio assets of the 14eat (umbers
it7 of trained n1? fadilitias,, Lad ,-
nt) are now far ater thm them of the Stet Bloao
and t GM' n1 v W rmain grftter awer the fifteen years. f aver the R is expanding at nart
. 10
TOP IMCM
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TOP SECRET
Waste= ftwere pmbably will ,s
mint` ad0e96, t ? aantg In, el
to be better able to t a to totnvs into
q dt7, o tim MO q .f? , re r v tbe
Bloc ray en to emmeaivOy this salaxtia
to ter mnitoxy and o pmbImme -
narrming the range of t xee
dUdnishing the pmbab.Ufty of basic m t e
advmwes, ao (SE-460, pam. U)
. 2r UnlikeMood that during the pd of this eatdte
Soviet i e d lop &W ;dd, ly n
vmpon si{ LI"I tly alters the wr ,&. power e0
S psi a s 0111tary t t xd v .4 Mobab37 load
Irmlin t avoid totel VW glad
1Q The relatively =mU etek of st n bcabes 1?f, s
vM-
1953 about ( . ei O) mid-1957 abaut
?~2
(p ib _ 73354,1 ) o (659 p a 50)
U g mWarlarity the Usast ? the 'Moe
TOP S RET
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TOP SET.
was of atomic weapons. It Is likely that tba West
a d g t h e period of this e eti to , r
mper1cm to the Soviet Bloc in capabilities f
tactic use at a es whether in general
or in local ." (S E-469 para. 16)
20 Comparative erdevelop . defense system o. i st
Western atonic attack. ' 'le 9 m? Bloc d fors
continue to be bampered by o a deficiencies in
experience ? training ui nt .fig o ? . &Sz
defence ooott (M-65 para. 53)
Continued inability to eff ti y at k the US in
order tons (a) el ` the major tbmt of atomic
at k; (b) prevwt the rob ti. Wustrial
and lta potent d
USSR now has the a apabilit' to undertake
t air opratione against _ the s the ,, vaa-
t1ftntal ape, the ddle Este Ja ea and the off.
Share Wand QWn of .Asia. However, operations agminst
the US valid be difficult, than tho against
the other araw. The M SR bas the con bili to re-seh
all parts of the US and to att pit the delivery of its
f, a ile of a c ;e o f ers even a
TOP SWUM
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CO I E TIAI
eta .dT J aid reach on3,v the extrwo
n, axa owner a aims vithoit
aarla lin n with aerial refueling and
der ranp wtte ion uee, attack up= the
altrategle n air i a i .
area and up=
most -of t prImIpLI e' gic bases almost
certainly ,cl involve th
Itaft of t
attacking &Lwaraft and most of the ve. am-
way eeicaem Until it has a beavy bomber a i&
f OPIMUGMI t, the MW UM not have the
g ility toreh moat of the et tegi ,ly lepar.
taut a e In the US an tvo=wW missions, A he
bmbar bawd a t which has been men
M&t be graduation and my be ble
for x?a tied use with the trod of this
eeti to ,a ( 4 4
Nabable eantimad P r e s e n c e of sipuicant NATO
fie In SUPOP and the t 'use iemee
With to tie atmic e whiff amad be used
7 a0zinst the Soviet aised fa-me.
CONFIDENTIAL
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