SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US THROUGH 1957

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• Publication Date: February 24, 1954
• Content Type: SNIE

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TifE PRESIDENT OF NE, UNITED STATES
ortifir SECRET
J. II,/
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US
THROUGH 1957
SNIE 11-2-54
(Supersedes SE-36/1)
Approved 16 February 1954
Published 24 February 1954
DOCUMENT NO. -
NO CHP-.Nr.31.7. ;N CLASS. I.
1.] DECLASSIFIC-ID
CLASS. CHANCED TO: T
NEXT FiEVEW DATE:
A'JTI-1: HR 70-2
DAT
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 16 February 1954.
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
REVIEWER:. er,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
;les
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WARNING
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jilieSECRET
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US
THROUGH 1957
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities of the USSR to attack the continental US by open
or clandestine means, through 1957.
SCOPE
01 This estimate is concerned solely with Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the
continental US during the period through 1957. It does not attempt to assess
whether the USSR intends to attack the US during that period or what courses of
action the USSR would adopt before, along with, or after such an attack. Further-
more, the paper estimates Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the US without refer-
ences to any commitments of military forces which the USSR might make elsewhere
and without reference to any advantages which the USSR might gain for an attack on
the US by previously occupying territory that is not now within the Soviet Bloc.
A' V"
r 51' 0'
'i SOVIET MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS
Nuclear Weapons
1. General. The Soviet nuclear energy pro-
gram will continue through 1957 to have one
of the highest priorities in the allocation of
Soviet resources. The program, which is con-
tinuing to expand, emphasizes weapon devel-
opment and aims at reducing the relative
advantage of the US both in weapon develop-
ment and production. By the end of 1953
the USSR had established a substantial plu-
tonium production capacity and achieved the
production of weapon grade uranium-235.
On the basis of data obtained from the 7
Soviet explosions detected to date, we con-
clude that by the end of 1953 the Soviets had
reached a point in weapons technology at
PART I
SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES
which they were capable of producing weapon
types with energy yields ranging from the
equivalent of a few thousand tons of TNT up
to the equivalent of one million tons of TNT.
The numbers of these weapons would be
limited by the supply of nuclear materials
available rather than by technical limitations.
P1'1-4
2. Weapons Stockpiles. While there is no
clear evidence as to the specific types and the
numbers of each type of nuclear weapon that
the Soviets will actually stockpile, we believe
the weapons stockpiled will probably have the
general characteristics and explosive powers
of the models already tested. There are many
courses of action which the USSR might adopt
in establishing its stockpile of , nuclear weap-
ons. The tables which follow are based upon
four alternative hypothetical examples.
SECRET
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lopE6?.SECRET 2
Ckil)
STOCKPILE EXAMPLE ONE
(Based on the assumption that the USSR continues
stockpiling composite and pure plutonium fission
weapons as tested in 1951 and yielding approxi-
mately the equivalent of 40,000 tons of TNT each.)
End
1953
Mid Mid
1954 1955
Mid
1956
Mid
1957
Unboosted composite
plutonium weapons
(40,000 tons each)
180
240 _ 390
575
800
Total Yield (Million
tons of TNT)
7.2
9.6 15.6
23
32
STOCKPILE EXAMPLE TWO
(Based on the assumption that the USSR uses all its
fissionable material with thermonuclear boosting as
tested in 1953 to build a stockpile of plutonium com-
ponent weapons of medium yield (60,000 tons of
TNT) and small yield (5,000 tons of TNT) , and
uranium-235 weapons yielding one million tons of
TNT each.)
End
Mid
Mid
Mid
Mid
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
Boosted uranium-235
(1 million tons each)
12
18
34
54
80
Boosted plutonium
weapons (60,000
tons each)
60
85
125
175
235
Boosted plutonium
weapons (5,000
tons each)
190
250
375
525
700
Total Number of
Weapons
262
353
534
754
1,015
Total Yield (Million
tons of TNT)
16.5
24.3
43.4
65.6
97.5
STOCKPILE EXAMPLE THREE
(Based on the assumption that the USSR uses all its
fissionable material to build a stockpile of large
yield boosted weapons, e.g., uranium-235 weapons
yielding the equivalent of one million tons of TNT
each, and pure plutonium weapons yielding the
equivalent of 60,000 tons of TNT each.)
End
1953
Mid
1954
Mid
1955
Mid
1956
Mid
1957
Boosted uranium-235
weapons (1 million
tons each)
12
18
34
54
80
Boosted plutonium
weapons (60,000
tons each)
120
170
250
350
470
Total Number of
Weapons
132
188
284
404
550
Total Yield (Million
tons TNT)
19
28
49
'75
108
STOCKPILE EXAMPLE FOUR
(Based on the assumption that the USSR uses all its
fissionable material to build a stockpile of small
yield boosted weapons, e.g., composite and pure plu-
tonium weapons yielding the equivalent of 5,000 tons
of TNT each.)
End
1953
Mid
1954
Mid
1955
Mid
1956
Mid
1957
Boosted composite
pure plutonium
weapons (5,000
tons each)
550
725
1,175
1,725
2,400
Total Yield (Million
tons TNT)
ir) tra. P
2.8
3.6
5.9
8.6
12
3.' Margin of Error in Estimate. While the
figures given in the tables above represent the
most probable estimates for the examples pre-
sented, the actual figures for weapons stock-
piled at the end of 1953 may be as much as
one-third lower or higher than those given.
The uncertainty as to amounts of fissionable
material produced increases proportionately
as estimates are projected into the future.
Thus the actual figures for 1957 may be as
low as one-half or as high as twice the figures
given in the tables above.
t -1 01
4y Future Developments. The USSR will
probably continue work on small-yield and
small-dimension weapons, and further devel-
opments of this type of weapon could be tested
during 1954. The possibility cannot be ex-
cluded that the USSR will develop nuclear
warheads for weapons other than bombs dur-
ing the period of this estimate. The USSR
will probably also continue Work on develop-
ing weapons with energy yields in excess of a
million tons of TNT. This program possibly
could result in a prototype weapon by 1957.
If this research is successful and as a conse-
quence the USSR develops weapons in which
thermonuclear reactions contribute directly a
major portion of the energy yield, the energy
yield of a portion of the Soviet weapon stock-
pile could be multiplied by a factor of approxi-
mately five without any increase in fissionable
material production or in numbers of weapons.
It is improbable, however, that conversion of
weapons in stockpile in this way will take
place on a substantial scale during the period
of this estimate.
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??'SECRET 3
-C?C
Radiological Weapons
5. It is most unlikely, for technological rea-
sons, that the USSR will have the capability to
produce militarily significant quantities of
radiological warfare agents during the period
of this estimate. However, the USSR will
have available small quantities of gross or
separated fission products which might be
employed as RV agents.
>(,I,
Biological Warfare
6. The Soviet Union is in possession of all the
necessary basic knowledge for the production
of most BW agents. If they chose to do so,
they would be able to construct or operate
plants for BW production and weapons for
dissemination could be available in adequate
numbers. However, there is no evidence at
present that such weapons are being devel-
oped. Since it is not feasible to stockpile
large quantities of most BW agents in pro-
longed storage, operational requirements
would have to be supplied largely from cur-
rent production.
f,-VC
Chemical Warfare
7. The USSR can probably engage in chemical
warfare on a large scale. We assume that the
stockpile of standard agents and munitions
accumulated during World War II has been
maintained and will be available for use dur-
ing the period of this estimate. The USSR
has the facilities and scientific knowledge
necessary to produce at least one of the nerve
gases, and could employ nerve gases during
the period of this estimate.
DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL AND MASS
DESTRUCTION WEAPONS BY AIRCRAFT
eN JO/
Long-Range Aviation
8. The TU-4. Soviet Long-Range Aviation
constitutes the long-range striking force of
the USSR. It consists of 3 Air Armies, 1 in
the Far East and 2 in the western USSR, plus
1 corps of undetermined subordination in the
western USSR. The TU-4 medium bomber,
which was copied from the American B-29, is
the only Soviet bomber known to be in opera-
tional use and capable of carrying nuclear
weapons to distant targets. As of 1 January
1954 a total of about 1,000 TU-4's was esti-
mated to be available in operational units.
(Table of Equipment strength of Soviet air
regiments known to be equipped with or in
process of being equipped with TU-4 aircraft
totals 1,220 aircraft, but the TU-4 regiments
are currently estimated to be at only about 85
percent of T/E strength.) As of 1 January
1954 approximately 180 TU-4's (six regiments
with an aggregate T/E strength of 220) were
located in the Far East. It is believed that
deliveries of TU-4's to operational units are
continuing.
9. Turboprop Heavy Bomber. We have very
little information on Soviet development work
on new types of medium or heavy bombers.
No medium or heavy bomber other than the
TU-4 is known to be in series production in
the Soviet Union. At the Moscow Air Show in
1951 a single four-engine aircraft considerably
larger than the TU-4 was observed in flight
and was designated by Allied intelligence as
the Type-31. In mid-1953, 7 distinctive air-
craft, with tails reported as being approxi-
mately 5 feet higher than the TU-4, were seen
on the ground by competent observers. This
and other information (including the sighting
at Kazan Aircraft Factory of 5 aircraft re-
ported larger than the TU-4) suggest that a
bomber larger than the TU-4 may have en-
tered series production in 1953. This aircraft
could be a heavy bomber similar to the Type-
31 and it could be powered by turboprop en-
gines. The status of _ Soviet production, of
turboprop engines is unknown, but the USSR
has developed and tested a prototype turbo-
prop engine based on the design of the Ger-
man JUM0-022.
10. Jet Heavy Bomber. Part of the config-
uration of a single new large aircraft with a
swept-back vertical tail was observed at a So-
viet experimental establishment in mid-1953
and designated by Allied intelligence as the
Type-37. The aircraft appeared to be larger
than the US B-47 medium jet bomber and
could fall within the heavy or near-heavy
bomber category.
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11. Jet Medium Bomber. Based on known
development work stemming from German
projects in the medium jet bomber field, it is
estimated that a few Soviet bombers of this
class will appear in operational units by mid-
1955. There is no indication that it is at
present in production.
12. Summary Table. The following table of
estimated strength and composition of the
bomber force of Soviet Long-Range Aviation
is based on the assumptions:
a. that series production of a heavy bomber
with turboprop engines began in April 1953;
b. that series production -of a medium jet
bomber will begin in 1954; and
c. that series production of a heavy jet
bomber will begin in 1956.
ESTIMATED STRENGTH IN OPERATIONAL UNITS
January 1954 End 1957
Medium Bomber
Piston (TU-4) 1,000
Jet
Heavy Bomber
Turboprop (possibly a few)
Jet
TOTAL 1,000
E,0
Aircilift Characteristics
475
325
5001 (about 200 of
these might
have im-
proved 7,000
ESHP
engines)
(a few)
1,300
13. The TU-4. The TU-4, under normal op-
erating conditions, is estimated to have a
combat radius of 1,700 nautical miles and a
combat range of 3,100 nautical miles with a
10,000 pound bomb load. Under cruise con-
trol conditions necessary to reach distant tar-
get areas, its speed would be approximately
175 knots at an altitude of about 10,000
feet. However, it is capable of attaining a
maximum speed of 350 knots at about 30,000
feet for short intervals. Although there is
1 Should the USSR be able to shorten the period
necessary to produce a long-range jet bomber,
the USSR might not produce a turboprop long-
range aircraft in this quantity.
4
no intelligence to indicate that it has done
so, the USSR is considered capable of modify-
ing the TU-4 to increase its range in the
same manner that the American B-29A was
stripped to produce the B-29B. This modi-
fication involves removal of defensive arma-
ment, except for the tail turret, and increase
in the fuel capacity, with a net weight reduc-
tion of 2,600 pounds in take-off weight. So
modified, a TU-4 would have markedly re-
duced defense capabilities against interceptor
attack, but its combat radius would be in-
creased to 2,150 nautical miles and its combat
range to 4,000 miles carrying a 10,000 pound
bomb load.
14. Turboprop Heavy Bomber. Assuming in-
stallation of a turboprop engine, a heavy
bomber of the Type-31 class could have a
combat radius of 2,500 nautical miles and a
combat range of 4,800 miles, with combat
speeds up to 325 knots at an altitude of 35,000
feet. By the end of 1957 technical modifica-
tions and improvements, particularly in the
engines, on such a heavy bomber might per-
mit a combat radius of 3,000 nautical miles,
and a combat range of 5,600 nautical miles,
with combat speeds up to 360 knots at an alti-
tude of 35,000 feet.
15. Jet Heavy Bomber. Available information
on the Soviet jet engine program is not ade-
quate to determine when a Soviet engine suit-
able for use in a jet heavy bomber may be
available. Based on an assumption of instal-
lation of a 10,000 pound thrust power plant
believed to be under development, a jet heavy
bomber could have a maximum speed of 450
knots at 40,000 feet, a combat ceiling of 44,000
feet; a combat radius of 2,500 nautical miles,
and a combat range of 4,800 nautical miles
with a 10,000 pound load.
16. Jet Medium Bomber. It is estimated that
the jet medium bomber which the USSR could
have operational by mid-1955 could have a
combat radius of 1,500 and a combat range of
2,900 nautical miles carrying a 10,000 pound
bomb load. A Soviet jet medium bomber hav-
ing these characteristics could reach targets
in the United States only from the Chukotski
base area. On a one-way mission it could
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reach targets north of an arc drawn through
Los Angeles, Denver, and Minneapolis. On a
two-way mission with inflight refueling it
could just reach Seattle.
17. Inflight Refueling. No intelligence is
available concerning Soviet inflight refueling
capabilities. However, inflight refueling tech-
niques do not impose serious technical prob-
lems, and the USSR has had access to the
techniques and equipment employed by the
US in this field. It is therefore necessary to
consider the effect of inflight refueling in ex-
tending the range of Soviet bomber aircraft.
A fleet of tanker aircraft, and appreciable
training in their operational use, would be
necessary before two-way missions on a large
scale could be conducted. The establishment
of tanker units would require the conversion
of TU-4's or production of new tanker air-
craft. With one refueling the cofnbat radius
of the USSR's long-range aircraft, with a
10,000 pound load, could be increased as
shown in the following table.
18. Summary Table. The estimated 1957
maximum performance characteristics of So-
viet long-range aircraft are summarized in the
following table:
Type
Medium Bombers
Combat Rad./ Max Combat
Range (n.m.) Spd/Alt Ceiling
10,000 lb. load (kn/ft) (feet)
(1) TU-4
1,700/3,100
350/30,000
36,500
TU-4
(Modified)
2,150/4,000
360/30,000
37,500
TU-4
(Modified,
with one
refueling)
3,000/5,600
(2) Jet Med
Bomber
(with one
refueling)
1,500/2,900
2,100 radius
500/30,000
48,000
Heavy Bombers
(1) Type-31 class
(with 5,600
ESHP turbo-
props)
(with one
refueling)
2,500/4,800
3,500 radius
325/35,000
36,000
Type-31 class
(with 7,000
ESHP turbo-
props)
3,000/5,600
360/35,000
38,000
5
Type Combat Rad./ Max Combat
Range (n.m.) Spd/Alt Ceiling
10,000 lb. load (kn/ft) (feet)
(with one
refueling)
(2) Jet Heavy
Bomber
(with one
refueling)
4,200 radius
2,500/4,800 450/40,000 44,000
3,500 radius
It should be noted that the performance char-
acteristics given for all aircraft are based on
calculations which in turn depend on assump-
tions.
Base Areas for Direct Air Attack on the US
19. General. Three base areas, the Chukot-
ski area in northeast Siberia, the Kola area in
northwest USSR, and Soviet and Soviet-con-
trolled territory along the Baltic and in East-
ern Germany, are the closest to the United
States.2 The Chukotski and Kola areas are
particularly advantageous as bases for sur-
prise attacks since great circle routes would
avoid initial overflight of nations friendly to
the US. The extension of bomber ranges by
the end of 1957 will not be great enough to
allow the enemy to dispense with these areas
if important targets in the whole of the "United
States are to be reached on other than one-
way missions. It is therefore reasonable to
suppose that at least until the end of the
period of this estimate any large-scale attacks
would involve the use of these areas. From
any of these base areas the stripped-down
TU-4 with one inflight refueling, and the
Type-31 class and the jet heavy bomber, on
one-way missions, could reach any target in
the US. TU-4's having the 5,600 nautical
mile range, and the Type-31 class could also
operate from bases in the interior of the So-
viet Union on one-way missions against the
US.
i
20. 'Chukotski Area. Of the three base areas
mentioned, the Chukotski area is nearest to
the United States. The standard TU-4 on a
two-way mission (with no inflight refueling)
could not reach the United States. On a one-
2 See Appendix A for maps depicting Soviet long-
range bomber capabilities for attack on the con-
tinental United States from these bases.
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way mission it could reach targets within an
arc drawn from San Diego to Lake Superior.
The stripped-down TU-4 on a two-way mission
could reach Seattle without inflight refueling.
With outbound inflight refueling on a two-
way mission, this type of aircraft could reach
targets within an arc drawn from San Diego
through Lake Superior. A one-way mission,
without inflight refueling, would permit the
stripped-down TU-4 to reach targets in all
parts of the United States except Florida from
the Chukotski base area. By 1956 the im-
proved Soviet Type-31 class turboprop heavy
bomber, operating from the Chukotski area on
a two-way basis with inflight refueling, could
reach targets anywhere in the US, and with-
out refueling could reach targets north and
west of an arc drawn from San Diego through
Lake Superior. The jet heavy bomber operat-
ing from the Chukotski area on a two-way
mission with inflight refueling, could reach
targets north and west of an arc drawn
through Dallas, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh,
and without refueling, could reach targets
north of an arc drawn through San Francisco,
Ogden, and Bismarck.
.1)
21.0 operational Conditions in the Chukotski
Area. Long-range air operations from the
Chukotski area would encounter many diffi-
culties because of basic logistic limitations and
adverse climatic conditions. Logistically the
area is served principally by sea-lift limited
to the ice-free months of the year. Moreover,
there are no known airfields which could be
used for sustained operations from the
Chukotski area, although it is estimated that
the area contains four airfields capable of
supporting limited medium bomber staging
operations. There are additional airfields
which could be improved to support long-
range bomber operations. It is also possible
that frozen surfaces might be employed dur-
ing the Arctic winter to provide staging air
strips or assembly parking areas.
22. Kola and Baltic-East German Areas. TU-
4 aircraft sortied from the Kola and Baltic-
East German areas could not reach the United
States (except the northern tip of Maine) and
return to their bases, even with one outbound
refueling. From the Kola area, a stripped-
down TU-4 on a one-way mission (range 4,000
nautical miles), could reach targets roughly
north and east of a line from Charleston,
South Carolina, through southern Oregon.
From the Baltic area, such a range would
enable TU-4's to attack targets north and east
of an arc drawn from Charleston, South Car-
olina, through Montana. All of the north-
eastern industrial centers of the United States
could be reached from either area. The Type-
31 class heavy bomber, on two-way missions
without refueling from either the Kola or the
Baltic area, could only reach the northern
tip of Maine. On two-way missions with one
inflight refueling, the Type-31 class, operat-
ing from the Kola or Baltic areas, could reach
targets in all of the US north of an arc drawn
from Charleston, South Carolina, through
Minneapolis. A jet large bomber operating
from these areas could not reach the United
States on two-way missions without refueling,
but with one inflight refueling could reach the
New England area.
1-1
11'23. Operational Conditions in Kola and
Baltic-East German Areas. There are 2 air-
fields estimated to be capable of supporting
medium and heavy bomber operations for at
least a limited period from this area. In addi-
tion, there are 7 airfields of 4,000 feet or more
in length, some of which could probably be
improved and extended to support long-range
bomber operations. Both Alakurtti and Mur-
mansk-Vayenga are favorably situated logisti-
cally, and great circle routes from this area
would avoid initial overflight of nations
friendly to the United States. The Baltic-
East German area has adequate bases to sup-
port large numbers of medium and heavy
bombers. The Leningrad area contains at
least 4 airfields which are presently suitable
for long-range operations. Improvements of
other airfields in the area could provide addi-
tional facilities during the period. The area
including Poland and the Soviet Zone of Ger-
many has at least 40 airfields that could be
used for long-range bomber operations. These
bases are favorably situated with respect to
communications and weather and are ade-
quately served by existing transportation
facilities. A major disadvantage is that great
circle routes to the United States from these
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cr( 7
bases pass over portions of Western Europe off
Scandinavia, and any attempted air strike
might be detected early enough to provide
warning. vy. ,o?
24. Targeting and Bombing Accuracy. Soviet
long-range aviation has available through
open sources virtually complete target and
navigation data on North America and ap-
proach routes. It is even probable that in the
event of a surprise attack, certain Western
electronic navigational aids would be avail-
able, at least during part of the flight. Sim-
ilarly, meteorological reports, including profile
data at all altitudes, are regularly broadcast
in the United States and Canada in simple
cipher. We estimate the Soviet blind-bomb-
ing and navigational radar equipment is capa-
ble of at least equal or better performance
than the US World War II equipment which
the USSR acquired. It is also possible that
clandestinely placed navigational beacons
may be used for aircraft homing. The cur-
rent Soviet training program points to contin-
uing improvement in air crew proficiency. In
view of these factors and Soviet ability to
select a time of attack with respect to favor-
able route and target weather conditions,
there can be little doubt that Soviet air crews
would have the ability to navigate with suffi-
cient accuracy to reach the major population
and industrial centers of the United States
and to achieve bombing accuracy, by either
visual or radar means, generally within the
effective radius of the weapons available, al-
though the effectiveness of attack delivered by
radar alone could be materially reduced by
defensivp,@lectronic countermeasures.
_01_1+,2-4 -s
25. Availability, Abort Rate, Replacement Fac-
tor. Maintenance of Soviet aircraft, although
below US standards, has improved since World
War II and is considered adequate. By the
end of 1957 the Soviets should be capable of
achieving in the forward staging areas a serv-
iceability rate of 85 percent for an initial, de-
liberately prepared surprise attack against
North America. The sustained serviceability
rate for bombers is estimated at about 40 per-
cent for normal operations. Cold weather
operations might cause some reduction in the
foregoing figures. In addition, we estimate
that up to 20 to 25 percent of the aircraft
taking off would fail to reach target areas for
reasons other than our air defense activity.
In view of the fact that most US target areas
could be reached only by one-way missions or
on two-way flights employing range extension
techniques, aircraft losses would be high. No
appreciable reserves of TU-4's are believed to
exist at the present time. If a tanker fleet is
created, or TU-4's are converted for other spe-
cial purposes, appreciable numbers of TU-4's,
phased out of operational bomber units dur-
ing the period of this estimate, would probably
not be available as a reserve. There will be no
appreciable reserves of any new types of air-
craft introduced during the period of this
estimate.01
26. Weaker. The USSR has consistently de-
voted considerable emphasis to both short and
long period meteorological forecasting. Spe-
cial techniques for upper air research and
improved synoptic methods are being devel-
oped for use in weather forecasting for periods
longer than one month, although we cannot
estimate the degree of success which will be
achieved during the period of this estimate.
By 1955 it is believed that the USSR will have
achieved a short period prediction capability
in at least the European USSR of 85 percent
reliability as compared with the present reli-
ability of 60 percent. This prediction capa-
bility plus extensive experience in meteorolog-
ical research in the extreme northern lati-
tudes, good weather reporting facilities in
Siberia, availability of records of weather con-
ditions which have prevailed throughout
North America for many years, and constant
access to current North American weather
conditions and forecasts should enable the
USSR to predict both route and target weather
with reasonable accuracy.
8-
27. Electronic Countermeasures. The USSR
has had access to a wide variety of US defen-
sive radar and to some US jamming equip-
ment. The USSR is apparently well aware of
the tactical advantage to be gained by jam-
ming defensive radar and other communica-
tions. We believe that the USSR is now tech-
nically capable of producing limited quantities
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of ground based and airborne jamming equip-
ment to cover frequencies through 10,000
megacycles, and that the USSR can seriously
disrupt long-range radio communications be-
tween the continental US and its overseas fa-
cilities. We further believe that the USSR
will increase the effectiveness of its jamming
equipment as well as the proficiency and num-
ber of its trained personnel throughout the
period of this estimate. Airborne counter-
measures are likely to be available for use
against defensive radars and ground/air fight-
er control communications in use at the pres-
ent time for the defense of North America.
The effectiveness of the future countermeas-
ures will depend on the degree of success ob-
tained from Soviet analysis of signal radia-
tions and from other means of obtaining
technical data on the defense radar that will
then be in use. It is believed probable that
the USSR has produced sufficient electronic
countermeasures devices to equip some TU-4
aircraft. It is not known whether Soviet
TU-4's have in fact been equipped with such
jamming equipment, or how effective those
devices would be against US defensive radar.
Use of effective jamming equipment probably
would require the employment of extra air-
craft equipped specially for this purpose.
01 -3
28. Estimated tScc_gpi Air Attack in 1954.3
Soviet gross capabilities for air attack on tar-
gets in the continental United States are pres-
ently limited by dependence on the TU-4
bomber, by the apparent lack of a developed
inflight refueling capability, and by the rela-
tively undeveloped character of the Chukotski
and Kola base areas. Nevertheless, it is esti-
mated that the USSR, by a maximum effort,
could launch approximately 300 aircraft from
the Chukotski and Kola areas in a surprise
attack against the United States. If the bulk
of these aircraft were committed to one-way
unrefueled missions, approximately 250 might
reach target areas, not considering combat
losses. If, however, approximately 50 aircraft
were refueled inflight, requiring the use as
tankers of 65 of the aircraft launched, the
number reaching target areas might be ap-
proximately 200, not considering combat
losses. Some of these aircraft reaching the
target probably would not be bomb carriers,
since a number would be used for electronic
countermeasures, escort, or diversionary tasks.
29. Estimated Scale of Air Attack in 1957.
The Soviets could, by a major effort, have suffi-
cient facilities to launch a maximum of ap-
proximately 1,000 aircraft in an initial air
operation against the US by the end of 1957,
if their entire heavy and medium bomber
force were employed. The number of mission
aircraft in this total would vary considerably,
depending on the types of missicins employed.
If a combination of missions designed to
achieve optimum weight of attack with recov-
ery of a sizable part of the attacking force
were employed, approximately 550 aircraft
could be mission aircraft with approximately
450 used as tankers. (This is a maximum
capability under the stated conditions. Its
exercise would involve very difficult opera-
tional and logistical problems, particularly
those pertaining to the creation of a tanker
The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Assist-
ant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army,
feel that available intelligence on over-all Soviet
capabilities for long-range air attack is insuffi-
cient to warrant a finite estimate of the number
of aircraft which might arrive over target areas
in the US in 1954. They therefore believe that
paragraph 28 should read as follows:
Soviet gross capabilities for air attack on tar-
gets in the continental United States are pres-
ently limited by dependence on the TU-4 bomber,
by the apparent lack of a developed inflight re-
fueling capability, and by the relatively unde-
veloped character of the Chukotski and Kola
base areas. The Soviets have sufficient TU-4's to
attempt the delivery of all or a substantial part
of their atomic stockpile (the number depending
upon types of weapons stockpiled) against the
United States from bases in Soviet-controlled
territory.I'his capability is dependent upon
their willingness to accept the loss on one-way
missions of a substantial portion of their long-
range aircraft and to risk the loss of surprise for
a portion of the attacking force by launching an
attack from Baltic-East German bases, and upon
their employment of range extension techniques.
Such an attack might be launched without de-
tection, although aircraft launched from Euro-
pean bases would in all probability be detected
while transiting non-Soviet territory. Some of
the aircraft reaching target areas probably
would not be bomb carriers since a number would
be used for electronic countermeasures, escort,
or diversionary tasks.
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fleet and the training of both tanker and mis- CLANDESTINE DELIVERY
sion aircrews.) Of these 550 mission aircraft
approximately 450 could arrive over target Nuclear:1 Weapons
areas, not considering combat losses. If the
USSR should decide not to create a tanker
fleet, and to commit the bulk of its forces to
one-way unrefueled missions, it is estimated
that the magnitude of the attack might be on
the order of 700 aircraft reaching target areas,
not considering opposition or combat losses.
Some of these aircraft reaching the target
areas probably would not be bomb carriers,
since a number would be used, as in 1954, for
electronic countermeasures, escort, or diver-
sionary tasks.
DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL AND MASS
DESTRUCTION WEAPONS BY OTHER MEANS
Guided Missiles
30. 'General. There is no positive information
that the USSR now has any guided missiles in
series production. It is known that the USSR
has been conducting an intensive research and
development program, and has made certain
developmental improvements on the V-1 and
V-2 type weapons, which were used operation-
ally by the Germans during World War II.
31. V?.1 Characteristics. The USSR has con-
tinued development on the V-1 missile. A
single pulse-jet version could carry a 2,000
pound warhead to a range of 210 nautical
miles at a speed of 370 knots. A twin pulse-
jet version has been developed which could
carry a warhead up to 4,500 pounds for shorter
distances. There is no positive evidence of
Soviet experimentation in the field of sub-
marine-launched guided missiles; however, it
is estimated that the Soviet Union could equip
a number of submarines for the launching of
V-1 type missiles. It is probable that such
missiles could be given some guidance up to a
range of about 200 nautical miles, although
accuracy limitations would probably preclude
general use against other than area targets.
32. V-2 Characteristics. The USSR has car-
ried forward the development of the German
V-2 type ballistic missile. This missile, how-
ever, could not be a threat against the con-
tinental US during the period of this estimate.
9
33. General. The USSR is capable of pro-
ducing nuclear weapons which could be smug-
gled into the US either as complete assemblies
or as component parts or subassemblies. The
assembled devices could range from small-
yield weapons (equivalent of 5,000 tons of TNT
or less) weighing a few hundred pounds to
larger-yield weapons (possibly up to the equiv-
alent of 1,000,000 tons of TNT) weighing sev-
eral thousand pounds. Their size could range
from that of a package small enough to fit
into the luggage compartment of an automo-
bile to that of a packing case large enough to
contain an automobile. All of these weapons
could be designed to break down into a num-
ber of relatively simple and readily transport-
able components. Those designed to give a
relatively low yield would not require much
labor or technical training assemble. Some-
what more labor and training would be re-
quired to assemble weapons designed to give
high yields, and, once assembled, they would
be more difficult to transport. It is conceiv-
able that only the fissionable material, in
small pieces, need be smuggled into the US,
since other components could be fabricated
or procured in this' country. This scheme,
however, would require careful advance plan-
ning and coordination by supervisory person-
nel with engineering skill and familiarity with
the US sources of needed components, and
would take a longer time to carry out. It
would probably result in a reduced yield for a
given amount of fissionable material. It
would incur a substantially greater security
risk than the clandestine introduction of all
components.
34. Methods of Delivery. A variety of meth-
ods of clandestine delivery suggest themselves.
Assembled weapons could be dropped by ap-
parently friendly aircraft, could be detonated
in the hold of a merchant ship, or could be
sown as underwater mines. Either compo-
nents or assembled weapons could be brought
in under diplomatic immunity, smuggled
across land or sea frontiers, introduced
through normal import channels, or brought
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in as bonded merchandise awaiting transship-
ment. The selection of the method of intro-
duction and of transport and assembly within
the US would depend on the Soviet objective
and the risk of detection which the USSR was
willing to accept.
35. Security Considerations. Considering the
known limitations of the means of physical
detection, it is probable that the USSR could
introduce into the US and detonate in place a
considerable number of nuclear weapons by
clandestine means. However, the USSR would
have to take into account not only the esti-
mated chances of detection, but also the con-
sequences of possible detection in forfeiting
the element of surprise in any intended overt
attack and in provoking US counteraction.
As the number of weapons clandestinely in-
troduced was increased, the risk of compromise
would increase. This increased risk would be
less a function of US capabilities for physical
detection then of the scope and complexity of
the clandestine operations, particularly inso-
far as larger numbers of Soviet agents became
involved. Considering the consequences of a
breach of security, the USSR would probably
be unwilling to risk the use of even selected
and trained agents in such numbers as would
be involved in a clandestine attack on a scale
comparable to that which might be delivered
overtly by aircraft. We conclude, therefore,
that, although clandestine attack with atomic
weapons might occur against specially se-
lected targets as a supplement to overt deliv-
ery by air, such an attack, on a scale com-
parable to that which might be delivered
overtly by air, would probably be precluded by
security considerations.
36. Lack of Evidence on Clandestine Delivery
Plans. We have no evidence to indicate
whether or not the USSR has actually made
any plans or preparations for the clandestine
delivery of nuclear weapons.
Biological Weapons
37. Some BW agents are peculiarly adaptable
to clandestine introduction. The introduc-
tion of small amounts of BW agents would be
difficult to detect or identify as to source, but
10
Soviet operatives would be required for their
dissemination. A large number of people
would be required for extensive dissemination
of BW agents, and Soviet security considera-
tions would be a limiting factor in the scale
and timing of such an attack.
A
'Chemical Weapons
38. CW agents are not easily adaptable to
clandestine use. In addition to the limita-
tions noted above as applicable to BW attack,
CW agents are easily identifiable by their im-
mediate effects and it probably would not be
feasible to build up sufficient supplies or to
procure the means clandestinely for their
dissemination against large population cen-
ters. The most practicable use would be
against personnel in key installations, but
even this would be difficult. We have no evi-
dence to indicate whether or not the USSR is
developing the means for the clandestine de-
livery of chemical weapons.
ATTACK ON THE US WITH CONVENTIONAL
NAVAL AND AIRBORNE FORCES
pr).- eal (t^:\
Conventional Naval Attack
39. The submarine force of the USSR could, at
least in the initial phases of an attack, inflict
serious damage on US overseas communica-
tions and carry out offensive mining in the
shipping approaches to US harbors, in addi-
tion to its potential for delivery of mass de-
struction weapons. It is expected that during
the period of this estimate the submarine
forces will be enlarged and strengthened by
the addition of additional numbers of im-
proved ocean patrol types, by the progressive
modernization of existing types (including in-
stallation of snorkel) , and by the possible
adaptation of submarines to missile launch-
ing. The capabilities of surface naval forces
for attack on the US are low. The Soviet sur-
face fleet is geographically divided, lacks ad-
vance bases, and does not possess a shipborne
air arm. Sporadic raider operations are pos-
sible, but the surface fleet in general, lacking
aircraft carriers and long-range amphibious
types, is unsuitable for transoceanic naval or
amphibious attack an any significant scale.
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Airborne Attack
40. Soviet capabilities for airborne attack
upon the continental US (except Alaska) are
also very limited. Attacks would require the
use of TU-4's adapted for troop-carrying serv-
ice and operating at the same ranges and un-
der the same conditions as the TU-4 bomber.
We have no evidence to indicate whether or
not the USSR had made any plans for the
dropping of airborne forces in the US, but the
USSR could, if it chose, drop small specially
trained assault and sabotage forces for attack
upon important but difficult bombing targets.,
PART II
CERTAIN FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET EMPLOYMENT
OF THE FOREGOING CAPABILITIES ASSUMING
A SOVIET DECISION TO ATTACK THE US
41. The Soviet rulers would expect a direct
attack on the United States to precipitate gen-
eral war. In such a war the Soviet rulers
would expect to have an initial preponderance
of military power on the Eurasian continent,
but in their attack upon the continental US
would be concerned to prevent: (a) US air
attack on the Soviet Union with nuclear weap-
ons; (b) mobilization of the superior war
potential of the Western allies, particularly
that of the United States; and (c) US rein-
forcement of anti-Soviet forces in Eurasia.
11'
;(- ())
42. _11 e Soviet rulers have demonstrated their
sensitivity to the danger of US air attack with
nuclear weapons by the high priority which
they have given to the development of de-
fenses against such an attack. Despite the
substantial progress already achieved in build-
ing up their defenses, it is unlikely that they
would regard their defensive capabilities as
adequate to prevent substantial numbers of
attacking aircraft from reaching strategic
targets in the USSR. It is likely, therefore,
that in initiating nuclear warfare the USSR
would be concerned: (a) swiftly to destroy or
cripple US capabilities for retaliation in kind;
(b) to deliver such an attack on industrial
and psychological targets in the United States
as would prevent, or at least hinder, the
mobilization of the US war potential; and (c)
to retain the means to counter any US rein-
forcement of Europe. Moreover, in any at-
tack on the United States it is considered al-
most certain that some portion' of the nuclear
stockpile would be employed against other
objectives outside the continental limits of the
United States, or retained against other con-
tingencies.
43. As among the available forces and weap-
ons for attacking the continental US, the
USSR's highest capability lies in open mili-
tary attack with nuclear weapons delivered
by long-range aircraft, for the following
reasons:
a. the limited capabilities of conventional
naval forces and airborne forces;
b. the security difficulties inherent in the
delivery of comparable numbers of nuclear
weapons by clandestine, means;
c. the insufficient development of other
methods of delivery of nuclear weapons on a
large scale; and
d. the insufficient development of other
mass destruction weapons, or handicaps in
their large-scale use.
44. The Soviet rulers might, however, employ
other methods Of attacking the US concur-
rently with or immediately following an open
and direct nuclear attack. In the cases of
guided missiles, airborne attack, submarine
bombardment, chemical and biological war-
fare, Soviet capabilities appear to be relatively
limited.
-
45. Clandestine attack in the form of sabo-
tage or small-scale biological warfare might
occur at any time, and without an overt attack
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S4`
ever being launched. The USSR must weigh
the timing and value of the sabotage in rela-
tion to their complete plan of attack and its
effect upon the capability of the United States
to? launch__ a retaliatory military attack.
Clandestine attack with nuclear, weapons
might occur against specially selected targets
as a supplement to overt delivery by aircraft.
12
Subsequent to an overt attack, clandestine at-
tack in any form could be expected to the
maximum practicable extent.
46. We believe that the considerations affect-
ing Soviet employment of their capabilities
will remain throughout the period of this esti-
mate essentially the same as those outlined
above.
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APPENDIX A
Range Capabilities of Soviet Long-Range Bombers, Mid-1954 to End-19571
I. From Chukotski Area
Map 1 TU-4 Standard
TU-4 Modified
Map 2 Type-31 class (5,600 ESHP engine)
Type-31 class (7,000 ESHP engine)
Map 3 Jet Medium Bomber
Jet Heavy Bomber
II. From Kola Area
Map 4 TU-4 Standard
TU-4 Modified
Map 5 Type-31 Class (5,600 ESHP engine)
Type-31 class (7,000 ESHP engine)
Map 6 Jet Medium Bomber
Jet Heavy Bomber
III. From Baltic-East German Area
Map 7 TU-4 Standard
TU-4 Modified
Map 8 Type-31 class (5,600 ESHP engine)
Type-31 class (7,000 ESHP engine)
Map 9 Jet Medium Bomber
Jet Heavy Bomber
The estimated capabilities of aircraft using inflight refueling are based on an
assumed single refueling point for attacks launched from each area. The esti-
mated area coverage is thus subject to considerable error.
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?
\
,,,,,,--' "?:_?:. -f--<
Pi!
REFUEL ? \ 17
AREA \\ T , 0-
\ \ rli,k?li
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4Oancler
?Botte
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nlo
.Minneapolis
Buffalo
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?tiValsington
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TWO-WAY/
ONE
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Map 1
laa,aaa
Louis
Cy
3100
N50,1/y4,AY
?Dollas
?Knoxville
4Memphis
Charleston
'Atlanta
r
,
Jacksonvilte?\
Houston.
TU-4, STANDARD
AND MODIFIED
From the CHUKOTSKI AREA
---Standard
-- Modified
Ranges are in nautical miles and are assumed ?
on the basis of i0,000 lb. bomb load. 4700
/ SECRET
ONE-WA
ONE REF EL \
6
-5600
or?i:WAy
A ONE REFUEL
13152 CIA, 2.54
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,
? ,"
7'
66
?
REFUEL
AREA 14)
f'`C,
\\
\\TA
\.pSidd10
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Soke
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t,
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.BrAgor
Angeles
? A.San Diego
, _ -,,iii, .?-Boston
Asmarck / ---`, tar n /
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1 ,
,roli j`, ? Buffalo1. .4.York
Detroit
olls? aulree. 00,06--7.p.,hilldelphia
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"?'1nrashington
- _3000?TW0:WAY "rdin.*nd
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-(3'18;
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Atlanta Charleston
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Map 2/? ,
')J\-A
HEAVY TURBO-PROP s;r:IrR-eFuL\,(
BOMBER (Type 31 Class) .)
From the CHUKOTSKI AREA
?5600 6-IP Engine TWO\--.WAY,
ONE REFUEE:-...,""
-- 7000 ESHP Engine
Ranges are in nautical miles and are assumed
on the basis of 10,000 lb. bomb load.
/SECRET
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...,cAnchorog
JO?WAY
ONE 'REFUEL / .Butte
.Bcrise
Ouebec?
Montreol?
Map 3
. ',San Diego
?Phoe +ix
'Albuquerque
snrortkz t-or
inneopolisi(1 Bulf?1? .14w.York
Detroit
Milwaukee:
Piosbuzg
2900 ''01"" /
??Illenond
.Kutsr .51. Louis /
? Zphis
.Charleston
.Dallos/// locksonville?
JET MEDIUM AND'..-o_wAy (
JET HEAVY BOMBER ONE REFUEL
From the CHUKOTSKI AREA
-- Medium
-- Heavy
Ranges are in nautical miles and are assumed ?
on the basis of 10,000 lb. bomb load.
/ SECRET
13154 CIA, 2-54
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A003400040001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A003400040001-1
SECRET
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Vel'kal'.
Map 4
0
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jr;iSeot e
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fon Francisco
00
r
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g
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City
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Cheyenne
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;Van Diego \ *Alb
*pho,,,
ONE-WA N
ONE REF
TU-4, STANDARD
AND MODIFIED
From the KOLA AREA
--- Standard
--- Modified
Ranges are in nautical miles and are assumed
on the basis of 10,000 lb. bomb load.
SECRET
Il
,
\--.7t(717?'
/aebecWO.YVAY
/ ONE REFUEL
1-r:83),%-
Buffalo
',Washington
?RIchmond
tint?
anncipolis!
cDetrol
\Chica/a
*Cincinnati
*St./Alls
,Ku7
/ *Memphis
.0k181;;rna
"Atlanta
*Dallas/ lockconville?
HO ,rvew
UMA'.
*Knoxville
ONE-WAY
ONE REFUEL
?TCharleston
a
X%
13155 CIA, 2-54
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A003400040001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A003400040001-1
SECRET
Ala
ci
j
h
urtti
8Ck
To
,56
--e
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Seattle
'.Porila id ?
.But
.Elsruarck
?Ainneopolii
Milwaukee!
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ls Ange'
4800 ?oscno?
ON E-WA/Y
Siou
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Folls?
?Phoenix
*Albuquerque
Ko ?sj
City
.0 18yonwa
Map 5
HEAVY TURBO-PROP
BOMBER (Type 31 Class)
From the KOLA AREA
5600 ESHP Engine
-- 7000 ESHP Engine
Ranges are in nautical miles and are assumed
on the basis of to,000 lb. bomb load.
'ECRET
,
lousier, ? us Orleans
Oeirol/
Gtk\
E Ft) EL
Af
AREA
II
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uebec?
ntreol?
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TWO-WAY\
ON E REFU EL
P
'Woihington
.Cincinnati ?4TAInuund
? .Knoxville
:Memphis .4sswws. TWO-WAY
lockson;Sille?
5600 0 N E,WAY
ONE REFUEL