NIE 10-7-54: COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN ASIA THROUGH 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A003400030023-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: October 13, 1954
• Content Type: MEMO

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ovoia,Aff?
CENTRAL INTE4LIC7ENCE AGNCY
13 October 1954
ITILIORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan F4vans (On)
Colonel Tixtert CIDrlen, MA (G-2)
Captain B. S. WiLzin, USY (OVI)
Colonel Uilliam S. Boyd, USAF (AFOIN-2B2)
Colonel Floyd L. Dunn, USA (JIG)
SUBJECT NE 10-7-54: Ocamutist Courses of Action
in Asia through 1957
1. The attached terms of reference were agreed an at
the meeting of the IAC representatives on 12 October.
2. All agencies are invited to contribute on all sections
within their competence to do so.
3. It is requested that contributions be received in
this Office by the close of business on 5 November,
Distribution
PAWL A. EOREL
Del.Duty Assistant. Director
National Estimates
STAT
DOCUrvIENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. t
Ci DECLASSWIED
CLASS. CHANGEDNEXT REVIEW DATE: se:31/99J
TO: TS
AUTH: HR 70-2 t
DATE &a REVIEWER:
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CON! Fr 7NTIAE
?MET?
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
13 October 1954 ?
SUBJECT; TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 10-7-544 COMMUNIST COURSES
OF ACTION IN 'ASIA THROUGH 19571/
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Communist, and in particular Chinese
Communist, probable courses of action in Asia?" through 1957.
QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
NOTE: This estimate is undertaken to review NIE 10-2-54 in
the light of the Geneva Conference and subsequent developments.
1/ This estimate supersedes NIE 10-2,54, "Communist Courses of
Action in Asia through Mid-1955," dated 9 March 1954.
2/ Asia, as here used, includes Japan,'Taiwan, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Ceylon, and all of mainland Asia east of (but not
including) Iran and Afghanistan.
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In addition, we should like to emphasize in the new
estimate: (a) brief examinati9n of Communist, in
particular Chinese Communist, capabilities for
several specific courses of action; (b) analysis of
possible eommunist courses of action with respect
to specific problem aretis such as Indochina, Taiwan,
the 'ffshore islands, Thailand, and Korea; and (c) the
effect upon these courses of action of certain coati-
gent developments.
FACTORS INFLUENCING COMMUNIST' COURSES OF ACTION IN ASIA
Communist Aelationships
1. Indicate the nature of any change in Communist re-
lationshipb as defined in paragraphs 8-11 of
NIE 10-2-54.
2. What trends, if any, in Communist relationships are
likely -during the period of this estimate?. How
wruld these trends affect Communist determination
of policy in Asia? -What are the implications for
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Sino-Soviet relations over the long term of gradual
Chinese Communist progress toward economic strength
and self-sufficiency?
B. Communist Objectives in Asia
1. What are the Communistst-Egneral objectives in
Asia?
2. What are their specific Objectives through 1957?
(Soviet, Chinese, Viet Minh, North Korean)
? 3. Are there any serious conflicts in these objectives?
? 4. Are these objectives likely to change during the
period of this estimate?
C. Communist Estimate of US Intentions in Asia
1. Indicate briefly the nature of any change in the
Communist estimate of US objectives, capabilities,
and intentions in Asia as stated in paragraphs
21-22 of NIE 10-2-54, and 163-164 of NIE 11-4-54*?
* "Soviet Capbilities and Probable Courses of Action through
Mid-1959," dated September 1954.
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How have US actions with respect to the Indochina
War, the Geneva Conference, the Manila Pacty the
Nationalist offshore islands, and the continued
political stalemate in Korea, affected the Commu-
nist estimate of US intentions with respect to Asia?
2. Briefly, to what extent-, and in what manner does
Communist regard for the objectives, capabilities,
and intentions in Asia of non-Cotmunist powers other
the the US, in particular the UK, Ihdia, and Japan,
affect the determination of Communist policy in Asia?
D. Communist Strengths and Weaknesses
1. Indicate the nature of any changes in Communist
China's political, economic, and military strength
as stated in paragraphs 16-18 of NIE 10-2-54.
2. What are Communist China's principal vulnerabilities
to attack from outside military forces? What effect
do these vulnerabilities have upon Communist determi-
nation of policy in Asia?
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3. What, briefly, is the present strength and combat
effectiveness of the Viet Minh armed forces? What,
briefly, are the principal political and economic
strengths and weaknesses within North Vietnam af-
fecting the determination of Communist policy in
Asia?
4. What, briefly, is the present strength and combat
effectiveness of the North Korean Armed forces?
What briefly, are the principal political and eco-
nomic strengths and weaknesses within North Korea
affecting the determination of Communist policy in
Asia?
5. What effect, if any, have the Geneva Conference, the
Manila Pact and other recent developments had upon
the vulnerabilities of the non-Communist countries
in Asia to Communist pressures,- BS stated in para-
graphs 19-20 of NIE 10-2-54? To what extent do the
overseas Chinese constitute a vulnerability?
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6. What principal trends in the above Communist strengths
and weaknesses are likely during the period of this
estimate? How would these trends affect Communist
determination of policy in Asia?
II. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES TO UNDERTAKE CERTAIN COURSES OF
ACTION IN ASIA
A. Taiwan and the offshore islands
1. What is the magnitude of the combined operations that
the Chinese Communists could presently launch against
Taiwan? the offshore islands? By, mid-1955? By the
end of 1957?
2. What is the magnitude of the air attack which the
Chinese Communists could presently launch against
Taiwan? By mid-1955? By the end of 1957?
3. . What are Communist capabilities for subversion and
espionage on Taiwan and the offshore during the
period of this estimate?
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B. Indochina
1. What are Viet Minh capabilities for Subverting South
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia during the period of this
estimate? In this respect, what are Chinese Commu-
nist capabilities to assist the Viet Minh?
2. What are Chinese Communist capabilities to assist
in the rehabilitation of railroads, industries, and
mines of North VietnaMi To exploit the production
and resources of North Vietnam for the benefit of
Communist China?
C. Korea
1. What are Communist capabilities to engage in full-
scale warfare in Korea during the period of this
estimate? To counter a unilateral ROK attack?
2. What are Communist capabilities to subvert the ROK
by means short of military action?
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3. What are Chinese Communist and Soviet capabilities
to assist in the rehabilitation of North Korea? To
exploit North Korean resources for their own benefit?
D. Thailand, Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia
1. What are Communist capabilities for subverting
Thailand Burma, Malaya, and/or Indonesia during
the period of this estimate?
a. What are the capabilities of indigenous
Communists, assisted where applicable by
Communist China, the USSR, and the Viet Minh,
to develop armed rebellion in Thailand, and
to intensify armed rebellion in Burma, Malaya,
and Indonesia?
? b. What are Chinese Communist, Soviet, and Viet
Minh capabilities, through threats and induce-
ments, to cause a major change in the present
orientation of Burma, Thailand, and/or Indonesia?
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2. What are Chinese Communist capabilities' to invade
Burma and/or Thailand?
B. Other non-Communist Countries in Asia
1. What are Communist capabilities for inciting armed
rebellion in, or significantly altering the orienta-
tion of, these countries?
F. Trade
1. In general terms, what is the maximum level of trade
which Communist China could sustain during the period
of this estimate with non-Communist countries, and in
particular with Japan, without upsetting or interfering
with Peiping's main lines of planning industrial develop-
tent, acceptable domestic consumption levels, and existing
trade commitments with the Soviet bloc?
2. What are the principal ad hoc trading means which Com-
munist China could employ to advance Communist poli-
tical ends?
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What. level of trade could the USSR sustain with Japan?
In what commodities?
III. PROBABLE .COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN ASIA
1. What indications of future Communist courses of action
in Asia can be derived from
a. Communist negotiations at Geneva?
b. Major Communist post-Geneva diplomatic and
propaganda moves?
c. The extent and nature of Chinese Communist sup-
port of the Viet Minh war effort before and
after the Indochina Armistice?
cL Viet Minh implementation of the Armistice ar-
rangements in Indochina?
e. Communist war of nerves against Taiwan and the
offshore islands?
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f. The over-all disposition of Chinese Communist
forces, and the relative emphasis in the develop-
ment of various elements of the armed forces?
g. Developments in Sino-Soviet relations?
h. Developments in Sino-Soviet relations?
i. Other Communist 'actions?
2. In the light of the various factors and capabilities
elicited in sections I and II above, what are prob-
able Communist over-all courses of action in Asia --
diplomatic, economic, subversive, and military --
and what are probable Communist courses of action
in the individual countries of Asia for the period
of this estimate?
3. How might the above Communist courses of action
be modified or changed during the period of this
estimate by such contingencies as:
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a. Communist failure to subvert or otherwise gain
control of South Vietnam by elections or "peace-
ful" means during the period of this estimate?
Laos? Cambodia?
b. Communist success in subverting or peacefully"
gaining any of the above without effective Western
counteraction being evidenced?
c. The admission of Communist China into the UNGA
over the objections of the US?
d. A major relaxation of Chincom or other controls
on trade with Communist China by such nations as
the UK, Japan, and South and Southeast Asian
nations?
e. The occupation of the Nationalist offshore is-
lands without incurring US military retaliation?
.f. A Major shift in US policy toward Communist China,
either becoming conciliatory or combative?
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g.
COPENDENTIAL
The formation of some kind of US-sponsored North
or East Asia defense alliance, possibly in-
cluding Taiwan, Korea, or Japan?
h. A unilateral offensive by the ROK?
1. Others?
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