COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN ASIA THROUGH 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A003400030001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 23, 1954
• Content Type: NIE

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IN IC IV- 7-54
23 November 1954
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 10-7-54
(Supersedes N1E 10-2-54)
COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN ASIA
THROUGH 1957
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on. 23 November 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy
Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant to
the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
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COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN ASIA'
THROUGH 1957
THE PROBLEM
To_ estimate Communist, particularly Chinese Communist, courses of action in
Asia through 1957.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Although the USSR possesses prepon-
derant influence in the Sino-Soviet part-
nership, the main outlines of Communist
policy in Asia are almost certainly deter-
mined jointly by consultation between
Moscow and Peiping, not by the dictation
of Moscow. Chinese Communist influence
in the Sino-Soviet alliance will probably
continue to grow. We believe that such
frictions as may exist between Commu-
nist China and the USSR will not impair
the effectiveness of their alliance during
the period of this estimate.
2. The current tactic of the Communists
in Asia appears to be a variant of their
familial' policy of combining professions
of peaceful intent with continued efforts
at subversion and continued expansion of
the Communist capability for war. The
chief new element in this policy, evident
since the death of Stalin and particularly
since the calling of the Geneva Confer-
ence in early 1954, is a heightened effort
1 Asia, as here used, includes Japan, Taiwan, the
- Philippines, Indonesia, Ceylon, and all of main-
land Asia east of (but not including) Iran and
Afghanistan.
to convince non-Communist countries
that Moscow and Peiping desire "peaceful
coexistence," that reasonable and profit-
able arrangements with the Communist
Bloc are possible, and that US policy is
the only obstacle to a new era of peace
in Asia. This new element conforms with
present world-wide Communist tactics of
minimizing tensions and of exploiting
methods to divide the free world, and par-
ticularly to detach the US from its allies,
during a period in which the significance
of US nuclear superiority is being re-
duced. The professed Communist desire
for "lessened tensions" in Asia appears in
fact, however, to be marked by a desire
to lessen the dangers of full-scale US mili-
tary action against mainland China and
to dull the vigilance of non-Communist
Asia, while at the same time continuing
Communist expansion by means short of
open war. Within this framework, the
Communists are prepared to maintain a
state of extreme tension with the US and
Nationalist China, accepting the attend-
ant risks. In brief, Communist China
and the USSR will continue their present
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policy of wooing Asia with protestations
of peace, while at the same time continu-
ing to subvert Asia, in the expectation
that this long-range "peaceful coexist-
ence" policy will with minimum risk re-
sult in both the realization of their pres-
ent military and economic objectives and
the eventual elimination of US influence
from Asia.
3. The Chinese Communists will continue
committed to the "liberation" of Taiwan
and the offshore islands, defining this
issue as an internal affair in which for-
eign interference will not be tolerated.
Hence this issue will continue to present
the greatest danger of large-scale warfare
in Asia.
4. We believe that as long as the US con-
tinues its firm support of the Chinese Na-
tional Government, remains committed
to the defense of Taiwan, and continues
to keep major air and naval units avail-
able in the general area, the Chinese Com-
munists will not attempt a full-scale in-
vasion of Taiwan or the Pescadores.
Short of invading Taiwan, the Commu-
nists will almost certainly concentrate on
an interim policy of subversion and other
means of softening up Taiwan for ulti-
mate takeover.
5. We -believe that the Chinese Commu-
nists will almost certainly increase the
scale of their present probing actions
against the Nationalist-held offshore is-
lands, and will probably attempt to seize
some of the major offshore islands. They
would almost certainly attempt to seize
some of the major offshore islands if their
probing actions were to provoke no appre-
ciable US counteraction.'
6. We believe that the Viet Minh now
feels that it can achieve control over all
2
Vietnam without initiating large-scale
warfare. Accordingly, we believe that
the Communists will exert every effort to
attain power in South Vietnam through
means short of war. Should South Viet-
nam appear to be gaining in strength or
should elections be postponed over Com-
munist objections, the Communists prob-
ably would step up their subversive and
guerrilla activities in the South and if
necessary would infiltrate additional
armed forces in an effort to gain control
over the area. However, we believe that
they would be unlikely openly to invade
South Vietnam, at least prior to 'July
1956, the date set for national elections.
7. Elsewhere in Asia (the Nationalist-
held offshore islands and South Vietnam
excepted as per paragraphs 5 and 6
above) , the Communists will probably
not, during the period of this estimate,
Initiate new local military actions with
identifiable Soviet, Chinese Communist,
North Korean, or Viet Minh forces.
8. The Asian non-Communist countries
are dangerously vulnerable to the expan-
sion of Communist power and influence
because of their military weaknesses and
consequent fear of antagonizing Commu-
nist China, their political immaturity and
instability, the social and economic prob-
lems they face, and the prevalence of
anti-Western nationalism. The effect of
the Geneva Conference and subsequent
events has been to increase this vulner-
2 The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that
? this paragraph should read:
"We believe that the Chinese Communists will
probable increase? the scale of their present
probing actions against the Nationalist-held
offshore islands and are likely to seize some
of these islands if such action appears de-
sirable as part of their overall political-mili-
tary-psychological program."
14WIPLAt
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Vireoff4PP
ability. Accordingly, the Communist
leaders almost certainly estimate that
they have a wide area of maneuver open
to them in Asia in which they can safely
continue efforts at subversion and sup-
port of armed insurrection without in-
curring unacceptable US counteraction.
9. The Communists will probably con-
tinue to exercise considerable control in
the northern provinces of Laos and will
retain a capability for subversive activity
against the Lao Government. However,
we believe that the Laotians can limit
Communist political advances and that
an anti-Communist government will re-
main in power providing it continues to
receive outside assistance and the Viet
Minh, do not invade or instigate wide-
spread guerrilla warfare. We believe that
the nature of Communist aggressive ac-
tion against Laos will be moderated by the
Communist desire to continue their
"peaceful coexistence" line in Asia, par-
ticularly directed toward Indian reac-
tions, and to a lesser degree by the possi-
bility of US counteraction.
10. In the absence of a unilateral attack
by ROK forces, resumption of hostilities
by the Communists in Korea is unlikely.
11. Japan and India will become increas-
ingly important targets for Communist
"coexistence" policies and propaganda.
We believe that the Communists will con-
tinue their efforts to undermine Japan's
stability and present orientation and will
seek an expansion of economic and cul-
tural relations. They will make greater
effort to create the impression that their
terms for a resumption of diplomatic re-
lations with Japan are flexible, and may
offer to conclude a formal peace settle-
3
ment during the period of this estimate.
We also believe that the Communists will
focus increasing attention on India in an
effort to insure at least its continued neu-
tralism, and if possible to bring it closer
to the Communist Bloc. However, even
at the expense of friction with India,
Communist China will seek to increase
its influence in the Indo-Tibetan border
area.
12. Communist influence in Indonesia
has grown considerably since the present
government took office in July 1953, and
as a result of recent political develop-
ments the government is increasingly de-
pendent upon Communist parliamentary
support for its continued existence. We
believe the Indonesian Communists will
probably continue to support the present
government or, if it falls, to work for the
establishment of another government in
which they would participate or in which
their influence would be strong. They
will try, through both constitutional and
illegal means, to expand their influence
in the bureaucracy and the armed forces,
and to prevent the formation of a unified
and effective opposition. They will prob-
ably also attempt to strengthen their
capabilities by the organization of a
Party-controlled armed force. In gen-
eral, however, they will probably avoid
highly aggressive tactics in the near fu-
ture, lest these provoke counteraction by
the military or by domestic opposition
groups before their own strength has be-
come great enough to deal with it. How-
ever, present strengths and trends are
such that a Communist takeover in Indo-
nesia by subversion or force is possible
during the period of this estimate.
tlortteSV'
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augSWIVE 4
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
13. The net effect to date of the Geneva Con-
ference and of subsequent developments has
been to advance the Communist position in
Asia. Western prestige, in particular that of
France and the US, has suffered greatly. Ab-
sorption of North Vietnam has strengthened
the Communist strategic position in South-
east Asia, and has greatly increased Commu-
nist capabilities to subvert the remainder of
Indochina, and Southeast Asia as well. Com-
munist China's claims to great power status
have been enhanced. Lastly, the Commu-
nists' "peace offensive" has had some successes
in further deceiving many non-Communist
elements as to ultimate Communist aims.
The conclusion of the eight-power Manila
Pact and the establishment of closer ties be-
tween Pakistan and the US have some poten-
tial for countering future Communist pres-
sure, but their effect to date has not offset the
gains of the Communists.
II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Communist Objectives in Asia
14. The USSR and Communist China share
the following long-range objectives in Asia:
(a) augmentation of the military and eco-
nomic strength of Communist Asia; (b) elim-
ination of US influence in Asia, and extension
of the area of Communist political influence;
and (c) neutralization and eventual domina-
tion of non-Communist Asia.
15. We believe that Communist China seeks:
primarily, to carry out rapid industrialization
of its economy and modernization of its mili-
tary establishment and, for this purpose, to
obtain greater Soviet assistance; to increase
Chinese Communist influence over Commu-
nist movements in Asia; to gain an acknowl-
edged position as a world power and as the
leader of Asia; to gain control of Taiwan; and
to eliminate the Chinese National Govern-
ment. Communist China considers Taiwan
to be part of China, and looks upon its acqui-
sition as unfinished business of the Civil War.
Apart from this, however, we believe that the
Chinese Communists feel under no immediate
compulsion to expand China's present borders,
but will continue to keep alive certain border
demarcation disputes.
16. We believe that the USSR seeks: to make
Communist China a strong and reliable ally;
to this end, to increase Communist China's
military and economic strength, but to keep
China dependent upon the USSR; and to in-
crease Soviet influence over Communist move-
ments elsewhere in Asia.
17. Certain Communist leaders elsewhere in
Asia probably entertain objectives for their
countries which do not coincide with the
short-term aims of Moscow. and/or Peiping.
The objectives of the local parties may be con-
sidered in the formulation of Communist tac-
tics, but over-all Bloc strategy will probably be
formulated primarily on the basis of Sino-
Soviet objectives, sacrificing if necessary the
ambitions of local Communist parties.
Communist Relationships
18. The USSR has never controlled Commu-
nist China as it has its European Satellites,
but seems rather to have dealt with China as
an ally. In this partnership Moscow possesses
preponderant influence because of the su-
perior power of the USSR and because of
Communist China's military and economic
dependence on the USSR. The USSR is
acknowledged by Communist China as leader
of the Bloc. Nevertheless, the main outlines
of Communist policy in Asia are almost cer-
tainly determined jointly by consultation be-
tween Moscow and Peiping, not by the dic-
tation of Moscow. Communist China pos-
sesses capability for some independent action,
even for action which the USSR might disap-
prove but which it would find difficult to
repudiate. We believe, however, that the two
countries are disposed to act in concert.
19. The influence of Communist China in the
Sino-Soviet alliance has been growing since
1949. This growth has been accelerated since
the death of Stalin, and has recently been
made evident in the Sino-Soviet accords of 12
October 1954. This process is likely to con-
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tinue during the period of this estimate. On
a number of questions frictions may exist be-
tween Moscow and Peiping: over the control
of Asian Communist parties, the nature and
timing of action against Chinese Nationalist
territories, the amount and character of So-
viet aid to China, and perhaps other issues.
We believe, however, that such frictions will
not impair the effectiveness of the alliance
during the period of this estimate.
Communist Strengths, Weaknesses, and
Capabilities'
20. The Chinese Communist regime has ef-
fected a virtually complete consolidation of
control in continental China. There is con-
siderable popular resentment of the central
authority, but there is no indication of serious
organized resistance.
21. On the basis of present evidence, we be-
lieve that Chinese industrial expansion under
Peiping's five-year plan will result in nearly
doubling by 1957 the 1952 output of the mod-
ern industrial sector. However, farm output
has lagged during the last two years, and dur-
ing the past year the regime has moved to im-
pose more rigorous controls over the economy
in an attempt to maintain its industrial
progress. To counteract increasing consump-
tion pressures, Peiping has monopolized the
distribution of important consumer goods and
has instituted a rationing system for large
segments of the population. To increase its
controls over production, the Communist
regime is establishing a program providing
for compulsory sales of specified amounts of
farm products to the state, and has speeded up
socialization measures which by 1957 aim to
organize over half the nation's farmers and
handicraft workers into production coopera-,
tives and to place virtually all industry and
trade under state enterprises.
22. The Chinese Communists have certain
capabilities for, and have demonstrated con-
siderable skill in, employing trade or trade
overtures for political warfare purposes, even
8 Certain of these questions are discussed in detail
in NIE 11-4-54, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable
Courses of Action through Mid-1959," dated 14
September 1954.
5
with the limited means at their disposal.
Moreover, the regime has with some success
sought to convey the impression that relaxa-
tion of trade controls would open large mar-
kets for industrial products in Communist
China and would develop sources of raw ma-
terials, a development which would ease some
of ? the problems now facing industrial coun-
tries such as Japan-and certain Western Euro-
pean nations. In addition, the regime has
impressed many non-Communist countries
with its statements that trade controls are a
major hindrance to a general reduction of
political tensions in Asia. Actually, these
claims of the possibility of greatly expanded
trade appear to be largely propaganda. In
time, with the development of its industrial
base, Communist China's capability for politi-
cal warfare by economic means will be en-
hanced. The USSR's capability in this re-
gard in Asia is far greater than that of China,
but is still substantially limited by internal
Soviet demands and other pressing needs with-
in the Bloc.4
23. The Chinese Communist Army of over two
million has been gradually improving in com-
bat and organizational effectiveness. The role
of the Navy will be primarily limited to opera-
tions in coastal waters. Its capabilities may
be increased by the addition of at least 6 sub-
marines and 50 motor torpedo boats. The Air
Force, which has some 2,200 aircraft, of which
more than half are jet-propelled, is gradually
improving in numbers of aircraft, quality of
aircraft and equipment, and in combat effec-
tiveness. It is limited primarily to operations
under conditions' of good visibility, and is un-
likely to develop a substantial all-weather
capability during the period of this estimate.
During the period of this estimate, the Chinese
armed forces will remain critically dependent
on the USSR for resupply of heavy equipment,
spare parts, aircraft, and POL. However, the
strategic position of China will be improved
by the expected completion in 1955 of a new
Sino-Soviet rail link through Mongolia.
'The problem of trade controls is being examined
in detail in NIE 100-5-54, "Consequences of Vari-
ous Possible Courses of Action with Respect to
non-Communist Controls over Trade with Com-
munist China," currently in preparation.
AitIONW
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24. Chinese Communist forces are capable of
overrunning Thailand, Burma, and the free
states of Indochina against the non-Commu-
nist forces currently present in those areas,
or against any indigenous forces likely to be
developed in the area during the period of this
estimate. The Chinese Communists will have
the capability throughout the period of this
estimate to seize Taiwan, the Pescadores, and
the offshore islands if opposed by Chinese Na-
tionalist forces alone. Communist China is
capable of successfully defending itself against
any invasion effort by any non-Communist
Asian power, despite China's logistical prob-
lems and vulnerabilities to attack.
25. The demands of Communist China's do-
mestic programs, together with China's vul-
nerability to air attack, will probably tend to
inhibit Chinese acceptance of major risks in
the field of foreign affairs. If, as we believe
probable, these domestic programs go farward
without major setbacks, this progress will
augment China's capabilities for extending
Communist influence in Asia. There might
be some danger of foreign policy adventurism
in the event of major setbacks in China's
domestic programs. We believe, however,
that on balance such setbacks would have the
opposite effect ? that of dictating abstention
from military aggression.
26. The Communist regimes in North Korea
and particularly in North Vietnam augment
Chinese Communist and Soviet military and
political strengths in Asia. These two areas
will serve both as buffers protecting China
and the USSR, and as bases for further Com-
munist political or military expansion in Asia.
The economies of both North Korea and North
Vietnam will be closely coordinated with those
of the Communist Bloc during the period of
this estimate. Primarily because of Bloc aid,
North Korea will probably effect substantial
economic recovery by 1957. However, pre-
1950 levels of production in North Korea will
probably not have been attained, and heavy
demands on the populace will almost certainly
detract from willing support of the regime's
programs.
27. The Viet Minh is consolidating and reor-
ganizing its armed forces by grouping pre-
viously independent regular and regional units
to form new divisions with augmented fire-
power. This augmented firepower will result
principally from a high level of Chinese aid in
1954, including illegal aid since the cease-fire.
By the end of 1955, the Viet Minh will probably
have at least 11 or 12 infantry divisions, two
artillery divisions, and one anti-aircraft divi-
sion. These developments would more than
double the pre-Geneva combat effectiveness
and capabilities of the Viet Minh regular
army. It will exert an even greater intimidat-
ing effect upon the Vietnamese than it has to
date. A Viet Minh Air Force will probably
be developed, covertly or otherwise, during the
period of this estimate. The Viet Minh re-
gime will continue to require Bloc military,
technical, and possibly economic assistance,
and its policies will probably reflect a con-
sensus of Sino-Soviet views. The Viet Minh
is expanding and improving its transportation
and communication facilities, including rail
and highway links with South China.
28. The large overseas Chinese communities
in many Southeast Asian countries provide
the Chinese Communists with a significant
potential channel of subversion. Such sup-
port as was given by these overseas Chinese to
the Communist regime has diminished? sub-
stantially since 1950 under the impact of Com-
munist domestic policies affecting the families
and property of overseas Chinese, as well as a
consequence of Communist efforts to extort
remittances from overseas Chinese. At pres-
ent the great bulk of the 10 million overseas
Chinese tend to be politically inactive and
neutral, with the politically-minded minority
split between allegiance to the Communists
and the Chinese National Government. How-
ever, Communist influence among overseas
Chinese youth has been increasing, especially
since the Geneva Conference. In sum, the
subversive role -of the overseas Chinese in
Southeast Asia generally is limited by the
apolitical nature of most overseas Chinese, by
their isolation in the Southeast Asian com-
munities, and by the popular onus they tend
to bring to any cause with which they are too
closely associated. However, these overseas
Chinese communities maintaining numerous
ties with the Chinese mainland will provide a
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useful channel for Communist infiltration,
espionage, and propaganda activitiy, and
would, in the event of war or insurrection,
constitute a grave threat.
Non-Communist Vulnerabilities
29. Within most of the countries of non-Com-
munist Asia, a state of uneasy equilibrium
exists. No Communist party outside of Viet-
nam and possibly Laos at present possesses a
military strength sufficient by itself to threat-
en seriously the existence of the national gov-
ernment. Futhermore, no Communist party
in the area, with the exception of that in In-
donesia, has the capability of significantly in-
fluencing the national government's align-
ment. Despite these facts, the Asian non-
Communist countries are dangerously vulner-
able to the expansion of Communist power
and influence because of their military weak-
nesses and consequent fear of antagonizing
Communist China, their political immaturity
and instability, the social and economic prob-
lems they face, and the prevalence of anti-
Western nationalism. The effect of the Ge-
neva Conference and subsequent events has
been to increase this vulnerability.
30. South Vietnam remains the most vulner-
able to Communist subversion and expansion.
Developments in Vietnam will have a direct
bearing on non-Communist prospects in Laos
and in Cambodia, and in turn Communist
successes in South Vietnam, Laos, or Cam-
bodia would markedly increase the vulner-
ability of other Southeast Asian states to Com-
munist tactics.
Communist Estimate of the Situation
31. There has been no evidence of change in
the basic Communist view that the US repre-
sents the center of opposition to the mainten-
ance and extension of Communist power in
Asia. While the Communists almost certainly
believe that the ultimate US objective in Asia
is the overthrow of the Chinese Communist
regime, they interpret present US domestic
and foreign policies as indicating that the US
in the foreseeable future does not intend, un-
less provoked by Communist action, to wage
large-scale war or to run great risks thereof
in Asia. Furthermore, they probably also in-
terpret these policies, especially US restraint
in Korea and Indochina, as indicating that
immediate US policies in Asia go no further
than opposing the further expansion of Com-
munist power, and influence, building up the
strength of non-Communist Asia, and hinder-
ing achievement of Chinese Communist do-
mestic objectives.
32. The Communists probably also believe
that their capabilities for a long, primarily
political struggle are greater than those of
the US. The Communist leaders almost cer-
tainly estimate that they have a wide area of
maneuver open to them in Asia in which they
can safely continue efforts at subversion and
support of armed insurrection without in-
curring unacceptable US counteraction. The
Communists probably recognize that differ-
ences among the non-Communist powers on
many aspects of Asian policy make it difficult
for the US to bring effective force to bear
against Communist expansion through meas-
ures short of overt aggression.
33. The Communists almost certainly believe
that recent events, while demonstrating a US
reluctance to become involved in major war
in Asia, have delimited more clearly the area
in which the US would take military counter-
action to prevent Communist military con-
quest. In particular, the Communists prob-
ably believe that open military aggression
against Japan, Taiwan, the ROK, Thailand,
the Philippines, or Malaya would lead to
strong US counteraction, probably including
action against mainland China and possibly
including the use of nuclear weapons. They
probably further estimate than an overt mili-
tary attack against Laos, Cambodia, or South
Vietnam might result in at least local US
military action, and that an overt attack on
any other non-Communist Asian state would
entail serious risk of US military counterac-
tion. Moreover, there is almost certainly also
a large twilight area of possible courses in
which the Communists are uncertain of US
reactions. Such courses probably include:
attacks on the Nationalist offshore islands,
greatly intensified paramilitary subversion
in Indochina, or infiltration of armed groups
into Thailand.
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34. The Communists, particularly the Chi-
nese Communists, almost certainly regard the
orientation of Japan and India as the key to
the future balance of power in Asia. The
Communists probably believe that Japan's ties
to the West can be weakened by a policy in-
volving economic and political inducements.
They probably consider that in the near fu-
ture a policy toward India which shows at
least a superficial respect for India's position
in South and Southeast Asia will best main-
tain India's neutral position.
35. The Communist estimate of US actions
and reactions in Asia will be the factor of
paramount importance in their determina-
tion of courses of action in Asia throughout
the period of this estimate.
III. MAIN LINES OF COMMUNIST POLICY
IN ASIA
36. The current tactic of the Communists in
Asia appears to be a variant of their familiar
policy of combining professions of peaceful
intent with continued efforts at subversion
and continued expansion of the Communist
capability for war. The chief new element
in this policy, evident since the death of Stalin
and particularly since the calling of the
Geneva Conference in early 1954, is a height-
ened effort to convince non-Communist coun-
tries that Moscow and Peiping desire "peace-
ful coexistence," that reasonable and profita-
ble arrangements with the Communist Bloc
are possible, and that US policy is the only
obstacle to a new era of peace in Asia. This
new element conforms with present world-
wide Communist tactics of minimizing ten-
sions and of exploiting methods to divide the
free world, and particularly to detach the US
from its allies, during a period in which the
significande of US nuclear superiority is be-
ing reduced. The professed Communist de-
sire for "lessened tensions" in Asia appears in
fact, however, to be marked by a desire to
lessen the dangers of full-scale US military
action against mainland China and to dull
the vigilance of non-Communist Asia, while
at the same time continuing Communist ex-
pansion by means short of open war. Within
this framework, the Communists are prepared
to maintain a state of extreme tension with
8
the US and Nationalist China, accepting the
attendant risks. In brief, Communist China
and the USSR will continue their present
policy of wooing Asia with protestations of
peace, while at the same time continuing to
subvert Asia, in the expectation that this
long-range "peaceful coexistence" policy will
with minimum risk result in both the reali-
zation of their present military and economic
objectives and the eventual elimination of US
influence from Asia.
37. The Communists will attempt to impress
free-world countries, particularly Japan and
the Asian neutrals, with their willingness to
negotiate outstanding issues. In so doing,
they will probably make proposals for settle-
ments which may be attractive to some non-
Communist nations but contrary to US in-
terests, and, as at Geneva, may on occasion
make significant procedural and tactical con-
cessions. Communist China may attempt to
negotiate, on the basis of the Chou-Nehru five
points, a series of mutual nonaggression, co-
existence understandings with most of its
Asian neighbors. In these efforts, the Com-
munists will continue to seek greater recog-
nition and acceptance of the Peiping regime,
and to hold out the promise that Asian and
world problems can be solved by Great Power
deliberation if Peiping is permitted to partici-
pate therein. In addition, the wisdom of
closer diplomatic ties with Peiping will be im-
pressed upon non-Communist Asia by con-
stant exaggdration of Communist China's
strength, progress, and peaceful intent.
38. The Communists will almost certainly
make every effort to publicize the attractive
possibility for non-Communist nations of in-
creased trade with the Bloc, and to blame the
trade control program, and the US as the
chief supporter of that program, for the fail-
ure of international trade to reach higher
levels. Communist China will also seek such
trade to supplement Bloc assistance to China's
industrialization program, to reduce such de-
mands on Bloc over-all economy as this pro-
gram may now entail, to carry out politico-
economic courses of action elsewhere in Asia,
and to reduce the level of domestic political
pressures required to support economic pro-
grams. It is probable that Communist China
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SZ40,Wir 9
will continue to exchange trade missions with
many non-Communist countries and to nego-
tiate trade agreements, both formal and in-
formal, which express hopes of a high level
of trade and disapproval of trade restriction?.?
39. Except as noted below with respect to the
Chinese Nationalist-held offshore islands and
South Vietnam, the Communists will probably
not, during the period of this estimate, initiate
new local military actions in Asia with identi-
fiable Soviet, Chinese Communist, North
Korean, or Viet Minh forces. Communist
courses of action will probably be designed to
expand the area of political struggle while
maintaining and increasing capabilities for
future military action. The Communists will
almost certainly attempt increasingly to util-
ize Communist China's power and prestige in
Asia as a spearhead for Bloc policy there.
40. Despite our estimate that new Communist
military aggression in South and Southeast
Asia is unlikely, the Communists might un-
dertake new aggression in reaction to US
policies, or a result of miscalculation on their
part of probable US reactions, or because of
prospects of easy success in some area; espe-
cially if the strength and determination of
the US and states cooperating with it seemed
to be weakened. In particular, acute crises
may arise out of the Geneva settlement or out
of the Chinese Communist determination to
gain possession of the Nationalist-held off-
shore islands and Taiwan. Thus, throughout
the period of this estimate, the possibility of
war remains.
41. The Chinese Communists will continue
their efforts to subvert and exploit the over-
seas Chinese in Southeast Asia. They will
attempt to gain control over schools and
youth, commercial and other groups, and will
exploit continuing ties between these com-
munities and mainland China for financial
purposes, and as a channel for infiltration,
espionage, and propaganda. The degree of
Communist success in exploiting the overseas
The problem of trade controls is being examined
in detail in NIE 100-5-54, "Consequences of Vari-
ous Possible Courses of Action with Respect to
non-Communist Controls over Trade with Com-
munist China," currently in preparation.
Chinese will be strongly influenced by the
over-all fortunes of Communist China. How-
ever, because the usefulness of most of these
Chinese is limited (their members are apoliti-
cal, culturally isolated, and disliked by the in-
digenous populations) , the Communists will
probably concentrate their activities primarily
on the governments and indigenous popula-
tions of Southeast Asian countries. The Chi-
nese Communists may even make compro-
mises on the nationality status of overseas
Chinese, believing that such compromises
would not greatly diminish the subversive
potential of the overseas Chinese communi-
ties.
IV. SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION
Nationalist China
42. The issues between Nationalist and Com-
munist China will continue to present the
greatest danger of large-scale warfare in Asia.
The Peiping regime will continue committed
to the "liberation" of all Chinese Nationalist-
held territory, defining this issue as an in-
ternal affair in which foreign interference will
not be tolerated. The future course of Com-
munist action toward the offshore islands and
Taiwan will be determined largely on the basis
of the Communist estimate of US reactions.?
? The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that
this paragraph should read as follows:
"Chinese Communist activity against Taiwan
and the offshore islands has fluctuated during
the last four years from almost complete in-
difference to recent heavy pressure against the
Chinmens and the Tach'ens. Current pressure
appears to be part of an over-all pattern of
? Communist politico-military action. The Peip-
ing regime is committed to the "liberation" of
all Chinese Nationalist-held territory and has
defined this issue as an "internal affair" in
which foreign interference will not be toler-
ated. A successful assault against the offshore
islands is well within Communist capabilities,
and it would be unreasonable to assume that
they think otherwise. These islands pose no
particular military threat to the Chinese Com-
munists and are of only limited military, politi-
cal, and psychological value to the Chinese
Nationalists. However, the Chinese Commu-
nists, by continuing military pressure against
the offshore islands without direct assault, are
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43. We believe that the Chinese Communists
will continue to bomb and conduct iaids
against the Nationalist-held offshore islands,
to occupy undefended adjacent islands, and
to increase air, naval, and artillery activities.
They will almost certainly increase the scale
of such probing attacks on the offshore
islands, and will probably attempt to seize
some of the major offshore islands during the
period of this estimate. They would almost
certainly attempt to seize some of the major
offshore islands if their probing actions were
to provoke no appreciable US counteraction.
On the other hand, as long as the US responds
to these probing attacks with shows of force,
the Communists may not attempt all-out
assaults against the major offshore islands.
In any event, the Chinese Communists may
attempt to provoke local incidents involving
US forces which' could then be put formally
before the UN as a case of US aggression and
of US interference in the internal affairs of
China.,
44. We believe that as long as the US con-
tinues its firm support of the National Gov-
ernment, remains committed to the defense of
Taiwan, and continues to keep major air and
naval units available in the general area, the
Chinese Communists will not attempt a full-
scale invasion of Taiwan or the Pescadores.
Footnote continued from page 9
able to keep the Chinese Nationalists and the
US on the defensive wondering where the Com-
munists will strike next. In addition, Com-
munist propaganda concerning Taiwan tends
to accentuate the divergence of views between
the US and her allies on the China question."
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that
this paragraph should read as follows:
"We believe the Chinese Communists will con-
tinue to bomb and conduct raids against the
Nationalist-held offshore islands, to occupy
undefended adjacent islands, and to increase
air, naval, and artillery activities. Peiping
probably estimates that efforts to take the
Nationalist-held offshore islands may involve
a risk of war with the US. However, in spite
of their estimate that risk of war may be in-
volved, the Chinese Communists are likely to
attempt to seize some of the Nationalist-held
islands if such action appears desirable as part
of their over-all political-miltary-psychological
program."
10
They probably believe that such actions would
lead to war with the US, possibly including
nuclear weapon attacks on mainland China.
If the Chinese Communists should come to
wise that the US would not in fact defend Tai-
wan had markedly decreased, the likelihood of
a Communist assault on Taiwan would be
greatly increased. Finally, if the Chinese
Communists should come to believe in the
course of their tests of US intentions or other-
wise that the US would not in fact defend Tai-
wan and the Pescadores, they would probably
attempt to take over Taiwan by force.
45. Short of invading Taiwan, the Commu-
nists will almost certainly concentrate on an
interim policy of subversion and other means
of softening up Taiwan for ultimate takeover.
To this end, they will probably attempt to
undermine the international and domestic
position of the Chinese National Government
and to weaken its ties with the US. Through
propaganda and diplomacy, they will attempt
to embarrass and discredit the US and the
National Government, to exacerbate existing
differences between the US and its allies and
other non-Communist powers on the Taiwan
issue, to promote international favor for an
ultimate disposition of Taiwan acceptable to
themselves, and to put pressure on the US to
withdraw its military protection and support.
Meanwhile, through continuing operations
against the offshore islands, psychological
warfare, subversion, and perhaps nuisance air
raids against Taiwan, they will try to under-
mine Nationalist morale, increase their espi-
onage and sabotage potential on Taiwan, en-
courage defections, and promote political un-
rest on the island.
Indochina'
46. We believe that the Viet Minh will con-
tinue to gain in political strength and prestige
and, with Chinese aid, to increase its military
striking power in North Vietnam. The Viet
Minh probably now feels that it can achieve
control over all Vietnam without initiating
large-scale warfare. Accordingly, we believe
8 See NIE 63-7-54: "Probable Developments in
South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia through
July 1956," dated 23 November 1954.
siffatOr
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WEValtOr 11
that the Communists will exert every effort
to accomplish their objectives through means
shott of war. Viet Minh agents will continue
to subvert all susceptible elements of the pop-
ulation, to intrigue to prevent the coalescence
of the various factions and the building of any
strength in the South, and Viet Minh
"shadow-governments" and politico-military
networks will be established wherever the
failure of the national government or the
French to impose controls leaves the Commu-
_ nists a vacuum in which to operate. As a
result of their activities and probable degree
of penetration in South Vietnam, it is possible
that the Communists will succeed in convinc-
ing most Vietnamese in the South of the in-
evitability of Communist control.
47. If, on. the other hand, South Vietnam
should appear to be gaining in strength or if
elections were postponed over Communist ob-
jections, the Communists probably would step
up their subversive and guerrilla activities in
the South and if necessary would infiltrate
additional armed forces in an effort to gain
control over the area. However, we believe
that they would be unlikely openly to invade
South Vietnam at least prior to July 1956, the
date set for national elections, because: (a)
they would consider that their prospects of
gaining control over the area without resort
to invasion continued to be highly favorable;
(b) they would be concerned over the possi-
bility of US military counteraction; and (c)
they would probably fear that invasion would
induce the neutral nations in Asia to move
toward open alignments with the West.
48. The Viet Minh is adopting a conciliatory
line toward France, thus seeking to exploit
French hopes of retaining their economic and
cultural interests in North Vietnam. It
probably- hopes that French susceptibility to
an arrangement with the Viet Minh will in-
crease and consequently reduce French will-
ingness to support a strongly nationalistic
state in South Vietnam.
49. The Communists will probably continue
to exercise considerable control in the north-
ern provinces of Laos and will retain a capa-
bility for subversive activity against the Lao
Government. However, we believe that the
Laotians can limit Communist political ad-
vances and that an anti-Communist govern-
ment will remain in power providing it con-
tinues to receive outside assistance and the
Viet Minh do not invade or instigate wide-
spread guerrilla warfare. We believe that the
nature of Communist aggressive action
against Laos will be moderated by the Com-
munist desire to continue their "peaceful co-
existence" line in Asia, particularly directed
toward Indian reactions and to a lesser degree
by the possibility of US counteraction.
50. However, if South Vietnam should fall to
the Viet Minh during the period of this esti-
mate, Communist capabilities for pressure
against Laos would be substantially increased,
and the Laotian will and capability to resist
these pressures would be correspondingly les-
sened. The extent to which the Communists
chose to exploit this situation would depend
almost entirely on their estimate of the prob-
able reactions of the Manila Pact powers and
' of the neutral countries of South and South-
east Asia.
51. Although some Vietnamese Communist
troops and their dependents have been evac-
uated from Cambodia, we believe that a size-
able Viet Minh cadre has been left behind.
Moreover, the Cambodian Communist armed
bands, although ending their guerrilla activi-
ties, have failed to demobilize or to turn over
their arms. Future events in Cambodia will
be considerably affected by developments in
Vietnam and Laos. A Communist takeover
in South Vietnam would increase Communist
capabilities against Cambodia and would im-
pair Cambodian will to resist further Commu-
nist pressures, though we estimate that the
Cambodians would be more resolute than
would the Laotians under similar circum-
stances.
Japan
52. Japan will become an increasingly im-
portant target for Communist "coexistence"
policies and propaganda. The Bloc powers
will continue to seek an expansion of eco-
nomic and cultural relations, playing upon
exaggerated popular expectations in Japan of
the potential benefits of trade with Commu-
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nist China. They will continue to hold out
the possibility of negotiations leading to closer
relations with the USSR and Communist
China as a means of resolving economic and
security, problems facing Japan. The Com-
munists will make a greater effort to create
the impression that their terms for a resump-
tion of diplomatic relations with Japan are
flexible, and may offer to conclude a formal
peace settlement, possibly involving the re-
turn of some small Japanese islands such as
the Habomais, and the conclusion of a non-
aggression pact. There are no indications at
present of any change in the basic Sino-Soviet
requirement that Japan terminate its alliance
with the US as a precondition for diplomatic
relations or a peace treaty, but it is possible
that within the period of this estimate the
Communists may be willing to accept some-
thing less.
53. The Communists will continue their ef-
forts to undermine Japan's stability and
present orientation through subversion by
the Japanese Communist Party, and through
intensification of informal negotiations be-
tween nongovernmental groups. The Jap-
anese Communists will continue to subordi-
nate armed revolution to the "peaceful" de-
mands of "united front" and "unified activ-
ity" tactics. At the same time, the Japanese
Communists will continue to develop their
covert organizations and may, on occasion,
resort to sabotage and limited acts of violence.
India
54. The USSR and Communist China will
focus increasing attention on India in an ef-
fort to insure at least its continued neutral-
ism, and if possible to bring it closer to the
Communist Bloc. Communist China may
seek to conclude a formal non-aggression pact
with India, and may even agree to an informal
delimitation of respective Sino-Indian spheres
of influence in Southeast Asia. Even at the
expense of frictions with India, Peiping will
probably establish diplomatic relations with
Nepal, and seek to increase its now limited
influence there and in Bhutan, Sikkim, and
elsewhere along India's borders.
12
55. Within India, the native Communists will
probably continue their efforts, largely
through legal and constitutional procedures,
to build a united opposition against the ruling
Congress Party. They will seek to exploit na-
tionalist, neutralist, and anti-Western senti-
ments, and probably to aggravate Indian-
Pakistani differences. The Communists in
India may join in riots and employ other vio-
lent tactics on a small scale, particularly
where outbursts of violence have been insti-
gated by non-Communist groups. Local Com-
munists will try to enlarge their influence
within the Kashmir government.
Korea
56. Communist policy during the period of this
estimate will probably seek to continue a
stabilized situation in Korea. We believe that
the chief features of this policy will be: (a) to
refrain from renewing hostilities in Korea,
but to be militarily prepared for a resumption
of hostilities; (b) to refuse to accept any
settlement in Korea which either endangers
continued Communist control of North Korea
or precludes hope of eventual Communist con-
trol of all Korea; (c) to rehabilitate North
Korea and to strengthen its military and eco-
nomic power; and (d) to attempt to weaken
the ROK by infiltration and subversion.
57. The Communists probably will withdraw
most if not all Chinese troops from Korea
within the period, claiming credit for reduc-
ing tensions in Korea and thereby imposing
pressures on the US to effect further US troop
withdrawal from Korea. Dissolution of the
Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee in
South Korea, if it takes place, will almost cer-
tainly evoke a sustained propaganda cam-
paign against the US, but probably will not
lead to renewal of hostilities or serious inci-
dents in Korea. The Communists probably
will continue to urge that negotiations on the
unification of Korea, possibly in the form of
a new international conference, be reopened.
They will continue to suggest that if unifica-
tion cannot immediately be achieved, lesser
arrangements can, such as economic and cul-
tural intercourse between North and South
Korea. The Communists will almost certain-
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ly not agree to unification based on free elec-
tions under UN supervision, but will probably
be willing to make procedural concessions in
negotiations and to enter into economic and
cultural contacts with the ROK. The Com-
munists nevertheless will continue efforts to
increase their now limited capabilities for sub-
version within South Korea, and for exploiting
political instablility and grievances against
the US and Japan.
58. Communist forces in North Korea are al-
most certainly capable of repelling a unilater-
al ROK attack. The Communists would prob-
ably consider such an attack as justification
for an attempt to conquer the entire country.
We believe, however, that the Communists
would wish to avoid becoming involved again
in war with US/UN forces, and therefore that
they would invade South Korea only if they
estimated that the invasion would not lead
to such involvement.
Indonesia
59. Communist influence in Indonesia has
grown considerably since the present govern-
ment took office in July 1953, and as a result
of recent political developments the govern-
ment is increasingly dependent upon Commu-
nist parlimentary support for its continued
existence. Communist influence has been ex-
erted especially through Communist activity
in Indonesia's principal labor, veterans,
and agricultural organizations, respectively,
SOBSI, PERBEPSI, and the B.T.I. At the
same time, Minister of Defense Iwa, who has
had a long history of Communist association,
is attempting to isolate anti-Communist ele-
ments in the security forces and to develop
new military commands under his direct con-
trol. It is possible that other individuals un-
der direct Communist control will by invita-
tion participate in a government during the
period of this estimate, and in this case Com-
munist influence would probably rapidly in-
crease. If no prompt and determined coun-
teraction to this latter development were
taken, the chances favoring a complete Com-
munist takeover would be high.9
13
60. We believe the Indonesian Communists
will probably continue to support the present
government or, if it falls, to work for the es-
tablishment of another government in which
they would participate or in which their
influence would be strong. They will try,
through both constitutional and illegal
means, to expand their influence in the bu-
reaucracy and the armed forces, and to pre-
vent the formation of a unified and effective
opposition. They will probably also attempt
to strengthen their capabilities by the organ-
ization of a Party-controlled armed force. In
general, however, they will probably avoid
highly aggressive tactics in the near future,
lest these provoke counteraction by the mili-
tary or by domestic opposition groups before
their own strength has become great enough
to deal with it.
61. The prospects of the Communists in the
elections, now scheduled for mid-1955, are un-
clear, and may depend on election procedures
which the Communists will attempt to in-
fluence. If an anti-Communist government
9 The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, believes this paragraph should read as
follows:
"Communist influence in Indonesia has grown
considerably since the present government took
office in July 1953, and as a result of recent
political developments the government is in-
creasingly dependent upon Communist parlia-
mentary support for its continued existence.
Communist influence has been exerted espe-
cially through Communist activity in Indo-
nesia's principal labor, veterans' and peasant
organizations, respectively SOBSI, PERBEPSI,
and the B.T.I. Minister of Defense Iwa, who
has had a long history of Communist associa-
tion, is attemptng to isolate the more anti-
Communist elements in the security forces and
to develop new military commands under his
control. There is no indication, however, that
Communism has made any extensive inroads
in the Indonesian army, and there have been
reports of a movement to heal factionalism
within the army in order to resist the efforts
of politicians to influence that body. Direct
Communist Party participation in the govern-
ment is unlikely during the period of this esti-
mate. It is possible, however, that individuals
who have Communist connections and Com-
munist support would be invited to participate
in a government thus enabling the Commu-
nists to continue to increase their influence."
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came to power in the near future, with or
without elections, we believe that the Com-
munists, because of their present limited capa-
bilities, probably would not consider violent re-
action on a large scale to be feasible. Their
principal efforts in such a case would be de-
voted to the improvement of their local organ-
ization and of their capabilities for future
action. On the other hand, if a government
of the present character continues in power
and if Communist strengths continue to grow
as rapidly as in the period since 1953, the
chances of a Communist take-over by subver-
sion or force during the period of this estimate
will greatly increase.
Thailand"
62. The Communists probably consider that
their prospects in Thailand depend chiefly
upon the course of events in Indochina. They
will continue subversive activities in Thailand,
primarily among the Chinese and Vietnamese
communities. However, the most significant
Communist activities relating to Thailand will
be conducted from outside the country. We
believe that there will be increasing subver-
sive activity supported from southern Yunnan
and Laos. In addition, Peiping will exert
pressures on the Thai Government to join a
Peiping-organized "peace bloc." To this end,
former Thai Premier Pridi Phanomyong may
become increasingly prominent in Peiping ,as
a spokesman for such "coexistence." We be-
lieve that these tactics will not have signifi-
cant effects in Thailand as long as Western
assistance and support to Thailand continue
and the Thai are not faced with an imminent
military threat from China or major Commu-
nist gains in Indochina.
" See NIE 62-54, "Probable Developments in Thai-
land," to be published in December 1954.
14
Burma
63. The Chinese Communists face a peculiar-
ly difficult problem in determining what bal-
ance to strike between soft and hard tactics,
since obvious support of the insurgents within
Burma would probably move Burma closer to
the West and arouse Indian apprehension of
Chinese Communist intentions. Further-
more, Moscow and Peiping probably do not
consider the present Burmese Communist
leadership wholly reliable. We believe that
the Chinese Communists will attempt to pur-
sue a middle course toward Burma: continu-
ing a "peace policy," while fostering subver-
sive activities, particularly in the border areas.
Pakistan
64. Although the USSR and Communist China
will continue to maintain correct diplomatic
relations with the Government, Communist
policy will be weighted in favor of subversion
and occasional terrorism. The aims of the
Communists will be necessarily modest: to
increase their now limited strength in Pak-
istan, and to lend a hand in causing an exist-
ing government to be replaced by one less
pro-US and anti-Communist. They will
attempt in particular to exploit provincial,
ethnic, and religious differences, the unsolved
refugee problem, and differences between In-
dia and Pakistan.
Elsewhere in Asia
65. The present policy of infiltrating incipient
nationalist movements in Malaya will proba-
bly increase Communist political potential in
that area by the later period of this estimate.
Communist policy involving the Philippines,
Ceylon, Hong Kong, and Macau: is likely to
continue along present lines.
4tEfiettageT
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