NIE-90: SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES THROUGH MID-1955

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9
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• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 13, 1953
• Content Type: NIE

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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR , ONE
SECURITY INFORMATION
IAL 031273
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
APPENDICES
NIE-90: SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES THROUGH
MID-1955
Appendices Approved 29 September 1953
Appendices published 13 October 1953
)DOCUMENT NO. _ 1
(Supersedes Appendices to NIE-64/1
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
NIE-90, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities Throutbh DECLASSIFIED
Mid-1955," published 18 August 1953CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S
'NEXT REVIEW DATE: tiqt
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE:17 t REVIEWER:
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 29 September 1953. The FBI abstained, the
subject being outside of its jurisdiction.
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
"2. q
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
?
Page
APPENDIX A: Non-Military Factors Affecting Bloc Capabilities
. 1
Internal Political Factors
1
Economic Factors
3
Scientific and Technical Factors
5 '
APPENDIX B: Estimated Bloc Military Strength
9
Summary
9
Bloc Ground Strength
10
Bloc Air Strength
13
Bloc Naval Strength
" 16
Bloc Air Defenses
19
APPENDIX C: Bloc Political Warfare Strengths
23
Definition of Bloc Political Warfare
23
Factors Affecting Bloc Political Warfare Strength
23
Probable Development of Bloc Political Warfare Strength .
. 25
Tables on Bloc Military Strength
29-33
Nature of the Evidence Available for Estimates of Bloc
Armed Strength
34
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APPENDIX A
NON-MILITARY FACTORS AFFECTING BLOC CAPABILITIES
INTERNAL POLITICAL FACTORS
USSR
1. It is inherently unlikely that the 25-year
rule of Stalin could be ended, and his suc-
cessors assume control, without at least tem-
porary uncertainties and confusions within
the USSR and the Bloc generally. Stalin's
death removed from the Soviet power struc-
ture its chief arbiter and final authority ?
the leader who provided a stabilizing influence
for the regime and a living symbol around
which to rally the population. Despite the
extensive bureaucratization of the Soviet
Party and governmental structures, the co-
hesion of the system depended in part on
personal relations which have probably been
upset by shifts of position among the topmost
leaders and by the uncertainty that accom-
panied these shifts. The turnover among
Party chieftains, which on the top included
Presidium members Beria, Melnikov, and
.Bagirov and Party Secretary Ignatiev, has
been greater than for any comparable period
since the purges of the 1930's. Extensive per-
sonnel changes throughout the apparatus of
power may continue for some time, and it is
possible that Soviet and Satellite leaders will
be preoccupied by the prospects and the prob-
able consequences of such changes. There
may consequently be occasional uncertainties
in tactics and hesitancies in deciding on
policy, even though the basic economic and
military strength of the USSR and of the Bloc
is virtually unaffected.
2. The emphasis placed on the principle of
"collective leadership," the strictures against
one-man rule, and the condemnation of the
cult of heroes suggest that no individual is yet
ready to occupy the place of Stalin. Relation-
ships among present Soviet leaders are not yet
clear. The reversal of the doctors' plot, the
removal of several high-ranking persons from
the Presidium, the many personnel changes in
the governments of the Soviet Republics, and
above all the arrest of Beria establish that
there has been sharp dissension within the
Soviet hierarchy. It is not yet clear whether
this dissension arose principally from a strug-
gle for power or from differences over basic
policy, nor is it clear whether Beria's fall has
ended the dissension.
3. The considerations cited above must be
taken into account in estimating the situa-
tion within the Bloc. On the other hand,
there is no evidence that the authority of the
Soviet regime has in any fundamental respect
been weakened by Stalin's death or by the
events since that death. There are no indica-
tions that Soviet Bloc military and economic
capabilities will be reduced, during the period
of this estimate, by reason of a weakening of
the Soviet regime. Since March 1953, the
Party and governmental structure at both
central and regional levels has been reor-
ganized and consolidated. Power has been
placed in the hands of a group almost identical
with the Stalinist Politburo. Malenkov ap-
pears to be increasing the firmness of his hold
on the leading position of power, even if he
has not yet assumed the peculiarly elevated
position of Stalin. There is no evidence of a
weakening of the Party's control over the
security and military forces, or of a loosening
of the regime's hold over the population.
Furthermore, " the bureaucratization of the
Soviet system and the interlocking character
of Soviet controls gives the system a certain
inertia and stability which will probably pre-
vent open conflicts from breaking out during
the period of this estimate.
The Satellites
4. Soviet control over the European Satellites
is essentially physical in character; i.e., it is
1
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founded on military domination and is main-
tained by force. The force, however, is for
the most part not exercised directly by organs
of the USSR. Rather, it is exercised for the
Kremlin by Satellite organs ? principally the
local Satellite Communist leadership ? which
are firmly under Moscow's control but which
are made to appear distinct from Moscow and
autonomous. These are intended to serve as
a facade of ostensibly independent national
government in each Satellite state, behind
which Soviet policy can operate with mini-
mum use of Soviet manpower and with mini-
mum loss of efficiency through conflict with
local usage and sensibilities. The depth and
extent of the various Soviet controls vary
somewhat from Satellite to Satellite.
5. Recent developments in Eastern Europe
indicate that the Soviet leadership continues
to be faced with problems in the Satellites.
During June and July new programs, both
political and economic in nature, which called
for a modification of extreme Sovietization
policies, were announced in East Germany and
Hungary. More limited changes in existing
programs were also announced for the other
Satellites. In East Germany these changes
were accompanied by a popular uprising (16-
17 June) which has seriously undermined the
prestige and authority of the East German
Government, and compelled the USSR to use
overt military force to keep the anti-Commu-
nist demonstrations under control.
6. However, we believe that Soviet ability to
maintain effective control in the European
Satellites has not been impaired by anything
that has happened since the death of Stalin.
Soviet suppression of the riots in East Ger-
many demonstrated the thoroughness of that
control, while at the same time indicating that
the Satellite governments themselves may be
unable, without Soviet armed force in reserve,
to maintain their populations in subjection to
the will of the Kremlin. The possibility that
the Satellite populations will be encouraged
to follow the example of popular resistance in
East Germany may require the Soviet leaders
to devote more attention and resources to the
problem of control in the Satellites and thus
somewhat reduce over-all Bloc capabilities.
Communist China
7. The Chinese Communist regime has firm
control over the territory which it administers,
and there is little likelihood of this control
being threatened or shaken by domestie forces
within the period of this estimate. The rela-
tions of Communist China to the USSR are
more those of an ally than a Satellite. The
alliance is based on a common ideology and at
least a temporary community of interests
which is not likely to be affected by changes
in Kremlin leadership. Moscow and Peiping
are apparently agreed upon the following
aims:
a. To eliminate Western power and influ-
ence from Asia.
b. To increase Communist strength in Asia.
c. To prevent the resurgence of an armed
and non-Communist Japan.
d. To advance the world Communist move-
ment; in particular, to divide the non-Com-
munist countries and to weaken their ability
and determination to combat Communism.
8. The military dependence of Communist
China upon the USSR will almost certainly
continue. The Chinese Communists have
launched an industrialization program, which
will require large-scale imports of capital
equipment. So long as Western trade con-
trols continue, these requirements can be met
only by imports from the Bloc. However,
should there be a reduction of tension in Asia,
the military and economic dependence of
Communist China upon the USSR might be
reduced.
9. Sino-Soviet relations may be strained by
problems relating to levels of Soviet economic
aid, by the extent of Soviet military commit-
ments to Communist China, by disagreement
over the control of border territories, and by
the definition of Mao's role in the Asian Com-
munist movement. We believe that the new
Soviet leadership will deal cautiously with Mao
and that a split between Peiping and Moscow
is unlikely during the period of this estimate,
unless the stability of the Soviet regime should
be seriously weakened. Mao Tse-tung may
become disposed to increase the scope of his
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independent activity in Asia, especially if any
uncertainty of leadership within ,the USSR is
long continued. However, the continuing
military and economic dependence of Commu-
nist China on the USSR will limit Communist
China's capacity for independent action.
ECONOMIC FACTORS
Introductory Note
10. Estimates of Bloc economic developments
must still be based largely upon an analysis
of published Bloc economic plans and of re-
cent general trends in the USSR, the Satel-
lites, and Communist China. There are vari-
ous indications that the Bloc may in the near
future devote a somewhat greater proportion
of resources to the production of consumers'
goods, and a smaller proportion to the produc-
tion of capital goods, than in the recent past.
These indications are clearest with respect to
East Germany and Hungary, but they are not
lacking for the USSR itself. As yet they are
insufficient to warrant an estimate that sig-
nificant changes in over-all Bloc economic
policy have occurred or are likely to occur.
We believe it unlikely that any changes which
may be made in Bloc economic policy will
significantly alter either the basic emphasis
placed upon development of heavy industry
and military potential or the general trends of
Bloc economic development which have been
observed since 1945, and on which our present
estimate of probable future Bloc economic
developments is largely based. However, the
rate of increase in the production of capital
goods, and perhaps of military end-items, may
be smaller than that set forth in the projec-
tions presented in this estimate.
General Trends
11. The Soviet Bloc is self-sufficient in food,
has a strong modern heavy industry, and
possesses adequate supplies of nearly all the
natural, resources required further to develop
its industrial economy. The economies of the
Satellites are being progressively integrated
with that of the upsR in the interests of pro-
moting Bloc self-sufficiency and the growth of
Bloc military production capacity. During
the period of this estimate, the Soviet Bloc
3
economy will be capable of supporting a major
war effort.
12. The gross national product (GNP) of the
Bloc has been increasing rapidly during the
postwar years. Calculation of its magnitude
and comparisons with prewar years are neces-
sarily subject to considerable error. We esti-
mate, however, that by 1948 the over-all level
of production in the Bloc as a whole was ap-
proximately equal to that of the same terri-
tories in 1938. We estimate further that by
1952, Bloc GNP was about one-third greater
than in 1948, thus having increased on the
average about 7-8 percent per annum.
13. We believe that Bloc GNP will continue to
increase, although at a somewhat reduced
rate, during the period of this estimate. Un-
less there is a drastic reorientation of Bloc
economic programs, the rate of growth of the
Soviet economy will almost certainly remain
higher than the rate which the US or any
major Western state will maintain, and the
rate of growth of the Bloc GNP will be about
one and one-half times that of the NATO
states.
ESTIMATED GROWTH OF THE BLOC GROSS
NATIONAL PRODUCT, JANUARY 1953-JUNE 1955
(in percent)
PROPORTION
OF BLOC
GNP IN 1952
AVERAGE
ANNUAL
RATE OF TOTAL
GROWTH INCREASE
USSR
55.8
6.5 ? 8.0
17 ? 21
European Satellites
23.0
3.5 ? 5A
9 ? 14
Communist China
21.2
2.0 ? 2.8
5? 7
Bloc Total
100.0
5.0 ? 6.2
13 ? 16
14. Despite Soviet achievements during the
postwar years, the output of the USSR during
the period of this estimate will remain much
lower than that of the US, and the output of
the entire Bloc will remain much lower than
that of the NATO states. We estimate that
Soviet GNP was about one-quarter to one-
third that of the US in 1952, and that the GNP
of the entire Bloc was about one-third that of
We believe that for the Satellites the average
annual rate of growth and the total increase
in GNP during the period of this estimate will
tend to fall close to the upper limit of the esti-
mated ranges.
14*****Imir
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uunrium
the NATO states. These disparities in ratio
terms will probably be reduced slightly dur-
ing the period of this estimate, although the
Western superiority in absolute volume of
production will be somewhat increased. Bloc
output in the basic industries ? energy, min-
erals, metals, and chemicals ? will remain
substantially below that of the NATO states.
15. However, comparisons of total output of
all types of goods and services are not neces-
sarily indicative of relative capacity to pro-
duce military equipment in peacetime. Since
the end of World War II, the USSR has di-
verted a much larger proportion of its GNP
to military purposes than has any Western
state. We estimate that about one-sixth of
the Soviet GNP is now devoted to military
outlays, and that the proportion will probably
remain at about this level through the period
of this estimate.
Probable Developments in Major Sectors
of the Bloc Economy
16. During the period of this estimate, the
Bloc, and especially the USSR, will probably
continue to concentrate upon expanding its
industrial base. The level of Soviet indus-
trial production will probably be about one-
quarter higher in mid-1955 than at the end of
1952. Output of producer goods and military
end-items (measured in value terms) will con-
tinue to increase at faster rates than that of
consumer goods, although, in line with Malen-
kov's recent announcement, output of con-
sumer goods may be increased more rapidly
than we have estimated.2 Barring a drastic
revision of economic programs, Satellite in-
dustrial production will probably increase 12
to 15 percent during this period. Although
Communist China's industrial output will
probably rise by 20 to 23 percent during this
period, it will continue to be a small part ofi
the Bloc total.
17. The growth of Bloc agricultural produc-
tion will probably continue to lag behind the
growth of industrial production. Barring
2 For detailed estimates of the growth of selected
sectors of the Bloc economy during this period,
see the table on page 6.
4
heavy drought, Soviet agricultural output dur-
ing the period of this estimate will probably
increase by 5-8 percent. However, imple-
mentation of the agricultural tax, price, and
procurement policies announced by Malenkov
may result in somewhat larger agricultural
output. Assuming the continuation of grad-
ual collectivization of agriculture in the Satel-
lites, we estimate that Satellite agricultural
production in mid-1955 will increase by only
3-5 percent, and will remain below prewar
levels. As a result of population increases, a
slight decline in per capita food supply in the
Satellites can be expected. Agricultural out-
put in Communist China which was unusually
high in 1952 will probably not increase over
that level during the period of this estimate,
although it is probable that the general post-
war recovery trend in Chinese Communist
agriculture will continue.
18. Trade between the countries now compris-
ing the Bloc and the West3 has declined mark-
edly in the postwar period owing largely to
the Bloc policy of economic self-sufficiency
and to Western trade policy. In 1951, the last
year for which full-year statistics are avail-
able, this trade amounted to roughly 2 per-
cent of the total trade of the West, compared
with 6 percent in 1938. Bloc trade with the
non-Communist world consists primarily of an
exchange of Western capital goods, textile
fibers, and industrial raw materials for coal,
agricultural, and forest products from the
Bloc. In 1951, textile fibers and manufac-
tures (21.8 percent) , machinery and transport
equipment (21.1 percent) , crude rubber (12.8
percent) , metals and manufactures (9.3 per-
cent) , and chemicals (8.6 percent) accounted
for almost three-quarters of total Bloc im-
ports from the West. Similarly, Bloc exports
of food products (39.7 percent) , coal (13.0 per-
cent) , forest products and manufactures (6.8
percent) , and textile fibers and manufactures
(8.0 percent) accounted for approximately
two-thirds of total Bloc exports to the West.
19. The gradual eastward shift in the center
of gravity of Soviet industry will probably con-
tinue during the period of this estimate.
a As used here, the "West" includes the whole non-
Communist world as presently constituted.
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However, the older industrial regions (includ-
ing the Urals) will still provide the bulk of
Soviet industrial production. Although pro-
grams to disperse Soviet industry and to
create self-contained regional complexes will
continue, the production of many basic mate-
rials and of most equipment will remain geo-
graphically concentrated.
20. The USSR has a stockpiling program
which is designed to maintain vital sectors of
the economy under peacetime and wartime
conditions and to facilitate the conversion of
industry to a wartime footing. Stockpiles of
food, raw materials, and capital equipment
are maintained in regional base depots and in
plants and warehouses. In peacetime, these
stockpiles are used in emergencies, but only
after normal plant stocks and inventories have
been depleted. We are unable to estimate
the magnitude and composition of the Soviet
stockpiles, but increases in total production
through mid-1955 will support an enlarged
program. The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-
1955) called for doubling of Soviet stockpiles.
Soviet-type stockpiling programs are being
adopted throughout most of the Bloc.
21. By mid-1955, the Bloc economy will have
achieved a higher level of self-sufficiency than
at present, altho,ugh certain imported items
will remain of substantial importance to cur-
rent Bloc industrial and military production.
These items include electronic tube com-
ponents, certain chemicals, certain types of
machinery and equipment with their spare
parts, and probably also tin, natural rubber,
copper, zinc, and cork. If these items of im-
port ceased to be available, bottlenecks would
appear in the Bloc productive system and dur-
ing a limited period of time adverse repercus-
sions would spread through the economy.4
22. We estimate that by mid-1955 the Bloc
economy will be better prepared to support a
major war than in any previous year. The
increase in the aggregate mobilization poten-
tial will result primarily from the expansion
of the Bloc economy, especially the industrial
base, and the continued growth of stockpiles
4 For more detailed discussion of this problem, see
INZIE-59, "Probable Economic Effects of a Sev-
erance of East-West Trade" (16 April 1953) .
5
essential to maintaining production under
war conditions. For example, in 1955 the
USSR will probably produce 42 million tons
of steel, in comparison with annual produc-
tion during World War II of less than 10
million tons. However, the Bloc output in the
basic industries (energy, minerals, metals,
chemicals), and Bloc resources in technical
manpower, machinery, and facilities will re-
main substantially below those of the NATO
states during the period of this estimate.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FACTORS
23. Soviet scientific and technical capabilities
have increased rapidly since World War II,
and we believe that they will continue to in-
crease throughout the period of this estimate.
The USSR has given science and technology
a high priority and has given great emphasis
to increasing the contribution of science and
technology to Bloc military capabilities, with
results most evident in the development and
production of nuclear5 weapons, and to a
lesser extent in air defense equipment.
24. The scientific assets of the US (the num-
ber and quality of trained personnel, facilities,
equipment, and financial support) are greater
than those of the USSR, and the assets of the
West as a whole are far greater than those of
the Bloc. However, the USSR is expending
great effort to reduce this disparity, and in
some fields the USSR may have equalled or
excelled the US.
25. Soviet higher education in most scientific
and technical fields is roughly comparable to
that of the West, but a shortage of scientific
and technical personnel will continue
throughout the period of this estimate. We
estimate that there are about 1,440,000 Soviet
citizens who have received scientific or tech-
nical degrees from colleges and universities
(about 80 percent the US total) . About
185,000 people are engaged in scientific re-
search and in teaching science in the USSR,
compared to about 240,000 similarly engaged
5 The term nuclear weapons as used in this esti-
mate means all weapons employing the principle
of nuclear fission or fusion or both in combina-
tion to contribute energy either directly or in-
directly to an explosion.
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ESTIMATED GROWTH OF SELECTED SECTORS OF THE BLOC ECONOMY, JANUARY 1953 - JUNE 1955
SECTOR
USSR
SATELLITES
COMMUNIST
HINA '
TOTAL BLOC
% GNP
1952
TOTAL
INCREASE %
(JAN. '53 TO
JUNE '55)
% GNP
1952
TOTAL
INCREASE %
(JAN. '53 TO
JUNE '55)
% GNP
1952
TOTAL
INCREASE %
(JAN. '53 TO
JUNE '55)
% GNP
1952
TOTAL
INCREASE %
(JAN. '53 TO
JUNE '55)
GNP 100.0
INDUSTRY 41.8
Consumer Goods 10.8
Producer Goods 21.0
Military End-Items 10.0
17-21
22-25
13-16
22-25
30-33
100.0
40.2
na 2
na
na
9-14
12-15
na
na
na
100.0
14.4
na
na
na
5-7
20-23
na
na
na
100.0
35.0
na
na
na
13-16
19-22
na
na
na
AGRICULTURE
20.1
5-8
20.8
3-5
51.1
_ 0 '
26.3
3-5
TRANSPORTATION
& COMMUN.
9.3
14-17
6.3
13-16
1.7
13-16
7.9
13-16
TRADE
4.1
12-15
14.1
5-9
na
na
(
(
SERVICES
18.2
14-17
14.2-
1-4
(
32.8
na
( 30.8
na
(
(
CONSTRUCTION
6.5
13-16
4.4
10-14
'
na
na
1 Because of the fragmentary nature of the data available, our estimates of Chinese Communist eco-
nomic development are extremely fragile.
2 Not available.
This estimate represents initial thinking by agricultural specialists. It is subject to revision as a
result of current research efforts.
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in the US. We believe that during the period
of this estimate the USSR will probably grad-
uate about 1.4 times as many people in engi-
neering and the physical sciences as will the
US.
26. Soviet science and technology are subject
to the same type of centralized planning and
control as all other Soviet activities. Even
though Soviet scientists are a privileged group,
their research is subject to many of the usual
totalitarian restrictions. Such restrictions
will probably have a more deadening effect
upon long-range theoretical research than
upon practical applications within the period
of this estimate. While numerous theories
in chemistry, physics, and biology have been
attacked, there is no evidence that ideological
restraints hamper developments directly af-
fecting military weapons.
27. East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and to
a lesser extent Poland and Hungary, possess
scientific and technical manpower and facili-
ties which provide a significant increment to
the total resources at the disposal of the Bloc.
On the other hand, Communist China, be-
cause of the extreme shortage of scientific and
technical manpower and facilities, is unlikely
to contribute to Bloc science.
Scientific and Technical Capabilities in
Particular Fields
28. The quality .of Bloc research in the sig-
nificant scientific fields varies greatly. In
some fields, notably in mathematics, physics,
and microbiology, much research is original
and of high quality. On the other hand, pub-
lished Soviet research in most biological
sciences and in medicine indicates that capa-
bilities in these fields are generally mediocre.
29. Since World War II, the USSR has made
substantial achievements in atomic energy,
aircraft design and production, and electron-
ics. Soviet science will continue to contribute
substantially to the increase of Bloc military
strength and capabilities throughout the
period of this estimate, particularly in the
following fields:
a. Nuclear Weapons. The Soviet atomic
energy program will continue to have one of
E4
7
the highest priorities in the allocation of Bloc
resources. Soviet capabilities for atomic re-
search will remain considerably less than
those of the US in both personnel and equip-
ment. We believe that the Soviet atomic
energy program will continue to concentrate
almost entirely upon the development and
production of weapons.6
b. Aircraft. The aircraft industry is esti-
mated to be technically capable of completing
development and placing in production dur-
ing the period of this estimate the following
types of aircraft: a heavy bomber, a jet
medium bomber, an improved jet day inter-
ceptor, and a jet all-weather interceptor. In
addition, several Soviet projects in the turbo-
jet field, including axial flow engines in the
10,000 pound thrust class and at least one
turbo-prop engine, are known to be in ad-
vanced stages of development.
c. Electronics. The USSR has made sub-
stantial progress in expanding its electronics
industry and in adapting Western equipment.
The industry is now capable of independent
research and development, and electronic
equipment of modern design is being pro-
duced. We believe that during the period of
this estimate the USSR will have the capa-
bility of developing new or improved versions
of the following equipment: early warning
radar, fire control radar, blind bombing/
navigational radar, and airborne intercept
equipment. Some of these improved equip-
ments may be placed in production during the
period.
d. Electromagnetic Warfare. The USSR
now has the capability seriously to disrupt
Western long-range radio communications
and certain navigation systems.7 Soviet capa-
bilities in related electronics fields indicate
that the USSR is now capable of developing
a See paragraphs 2 and 3 of Appendix B for esti-
mated size of the Soviet nuclear weapons stock-
pile, and for a discussion of Soviet capabilities
in this field.
7For information concerning Soviet jamming
capabilities, see SE-38, "Probable Soviet Courses
of Action in Electromagnetic Warfare" (24 April
1953), and Appendices to SE-38, "Soviet Bloc
Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in
Electromagnetic Warfare" (12 June 1953).
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equipment for jamming frequencies up
through 30,000 megacycles. On the basis of
known or reported Soviet capabilities in the
development of magnetrons, we believe that
the USSR is now technically capable of pro-
ducing limited quantities of ground based and
airborne jamming equipment to cover fre-
quencies through 10,000 megacycles. It is
considered unlikely, however, that the USSR
will have significant jamming capabilities in
the frequency ranges above 10,000 megacycles
during the period of this estimate.
30. Chemical Warfare. The USSR has the
capability to produce and disseminate stand-
ard CW agents. It also possesses scientific
and technical capabilities for the production
of nerve gases. Although there is much evi-
dence of research closely related to chemical
warfare, there is no evidence that any bas-
ically new chemical warfare end-item is likely
to be developed by mid-1955..
31. Biological Warfare. Soviet microbiolog-
ical research will probably continue to em-
phasize modification and stabilization of bac-
teria and viruses and, thereby, could lead to
an increase of BW capabilities. On the basis
of known and estimated Soviet capabilities, it
is estimated that the USSR can produce and
disseminate during the period of this estimate
several highly virulent BW agents. The effec-
tiveness of these agents against livestock
would probably be severe, against certain
crops possibly severe, and against humans
questionable.
8
32. Guided Missiles. While no Soviet mis-
siles are known to be operational now, the
USSR Icould have several types operational
within the period of this estimate. This esti-
mate is based principally upon the fact that
the USSR has exploited the missiles in the
German World War II program; the nature of
Soviet work and the rate of progress subse-
quent to full utilization of German knowledge
is largely unknown.
a. Surface-to-Air Missiles, based on German
designs (Wasserfall) with improved guidance,
control, and homing, could be available now or
in the immediate future. In addition, a sur-
face-to-air missile of native design could be
developed by 1955.
b. Surface-to-Surface-Missiles. It is known
that the USSR has built at least a limited
number of German V-1 and V-2 type missiles.
A single stage ballistic missile, powered by a
120-metric-ton thrust engine, could be near
the prototype stage of production by 1955.
The range of this missile with a one-ton war-
head would be less than 900 nautical miles;
we believe that an "intercontinental" missile
will not be available within the period of this
estimate.
c. Air-to-Surface Missiles. The USSR is
capable of producing subsonic types, and some
of these are probably available now. By 1955,
a high subsonic speed rocket-powered glide
bomb could probably become operational.
d. Air-to-Air Missiles. Although the USSR
has knowledge of two German subsonic
winged rockets, there is no information on any
Soviet interest in air-to-air guided missiles.
CONHDENTIAL
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APPENDIX B
ESTIMATED BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH
SUMMARY
1. We estimate the present and probable
future strengths, as of mid-1955, of the Bloc
armed forces as follows:
Mid-1953
a. Personnel Strength
Soviet
Satellite
Corn. China
North Korea
Viet Minh
Mid-1955
4,100,000 4,100,000
1,395,000 1,805,000
2,500,000, 2,500,000
295,000 300,000 I
123,000 125,000'
Total 8,413,000 8,830,000
b. Security Troops
Soviet 400,000 400,000
Satellite 290,000 305,000
Corn. China 1,450,000 1,450,000
Viet Minh 62,000 62,000
Total 2,200,000 2,217,000
c. Air Forces (organizational strength)
Total combat a/c
strength 26,000
Major categories
Jet Fighters 11,600
Piston Med.
Bombers 1,200
Jet Light
Bombers 2,400
Jet Medium
Bombers
Heavy Bombers
d. Soviet Naval Forces
Major combatant
ships 8
Submarines
184
348
(Incl. 112
long-range)
27,400
13,600
1,100
3,800
502
200'
240
377
(Incl. 149
long-range)
This estimate is based on a continuation of
present conditions and is therefore highly
tenuous.
The estimate of heavy bombers and jet medium
bombers is based on assumption of series pro-
duction of these types beginning by mid-1953
and April 1954, respectively. There is presently
no intelligence to indicate that either type is
in series production or in use in operational
units. If production actually begins before or
after the dates indicated, the strength estimates
shown will be affected accordingly.
Major combatant-type surface vessels include
battleships, heavy and light cruisers, and fleet
and coastal destroyers. Some are obsolete or
obsolescent. See attached Table for details.
The number of weapons estimated is based on
the assumption that the entire amount of fis-
sionable material believed available to the
Soviets is fabricated into fission weapons of 30-
100 KT yield.
9
2. We believe that the USSR now has a stock-
pile of about 120 nuclear weapons of from
30 to 100 kiloton yield. By 1955 the total
number may be about 300 weapons of the
same range of energy yield.4 In view of our
uncertainty concerning the production of
fissionable materials, particularly uranium-
235, the actual number of nuclear weapons
may be as low as two-thirds or as high as
twice this estimate. In the event that the
USSR should choose to stockpile weapons of
smaller or larger yield, the estimated number
of weapons in the stockpile would be altered
accordingly.
3. On the basis of information now available
on the Soviet explosion of 12 August 1953, it
is concluded that the USSR is capable of pro-
ducing air delivery type nuclear weapons with
explosive powers in the range of a few thou-
sand tons of TNT to approximately one million
tons of TNT. Throughout this range ther-
monuclear reactions may be used to increase
the energy yield from the fissionable mate-
rials present without directly contributing a
substantial amount to the total energy yield.
Having demonstrated the capability to utilize
thermonuclear reactions to increase energy
yields from fissionable materials, the Soviets
may direct efforts toward the eventual modi-
fication of the estimated stockpile of 30 to
100 KT weapons in one or more of the follow-
ing ways:
a. Increase the number of 30 to 100 KT
weapons.
b. Increase the energy yield per weapon in
the stockpile, the number being approximately
the same.
c. Produce very high yield weapons (e.g.,
500-1,000 KT) by accepting corresponding
reductions in the total number of weapons in
the stockpile.
The 12 August test may also indicate an ad-
vanced stage, but not the culmination, of a
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thermonuclear program having as an objec-
tive the production of weapons yielding more
than a million tons of TNT in which thermo-
nuclear reactions directly contribute a sub-
stantial amount to the total energy yield.
BLOC GROUND STRENGTH
The Soviet Army
4. We estimate that the Soviet ground forces
now total about 2,500,000 men, and that the
internal security forces constitute an addi-
tional 400,000 troops. The Soviet Army is
estimated to consist of 175 line divisions (of
which 105 are rifle divisions, 40 mechanized,
25 tank, and 5 horse-cavalry) and 45 support-
ing divisions (25 antiaircraft and 20 artillery
divisions). On the basis of present mobiliza-
tion plans, estimated trained reserves, and
estimated stocks of military equipment, we
believe that the Soviet Army and internal
security forces could expand to a total
strength of 7,500,000 organized into 300 line
divisions, by - M+30 days. The estimated
maximum mobilization potential by M-1-360 is
12,500,000 men. In the absence of general
war, however, we believe that the Soviet
ground forces will remain at approximately
the present size through mid-1955. The
armament, the mobility, and capability of
these forces for sustained combat will con-
tinue to improve, but the various armies,
corps, and divisions will continue to vary
greatly in quality.
5. The Soviet ground forces are estimated to
include approximately 100,000 trained para-
chutists and another 100,000 men in partially-
trained, air-transportable units. Airlift ca-
pacity is believed sufficient to permit a
maximum-effort, single lift of about 28,000
fully-equipped airborne troops, depending
upon the availability of air facilities.
6. The Soviet Army is the most powerful land
force in the world today. Its combat effec-
tiveness is high; the senior command is dy-
namic and experienced; junior officers can be
expected to execute orders faithfully; and the
individual soldiers are courageous and have
good physical stamina. Soviet equipment is
plentiful and adequate in quality. In gen-
10
eral, Soviet weapons compare favorably with
Western types. Mobilization would lower in-
dividual unit efficiency but the rapid increase
in numbers of units would tend to overcome
the effects of this drop even in the short
term.
7. The Soviet Army has been reorganized and
modernized since the end of World War IL
We believe that current Soviet line divisions
probably possess good equipment, generally of
World War II design, in adequate quantity.
The Soviet ground forces in Eastern Europe,
particularly in Germany, probably constitute
the best-equipped and best-trained units of
the Soviet Army. Soviet forces in the Far
East may also be at a somewhat higher level
of readiness than other units in the USSR.
The thorough Soviet training program prob-
ably ensures a high degree of combat skill.
Discipline is good, and morale is almost cer-
tainly high. The training system provides an
input to the ground reserve of something
under 500,000 men each year.
8. Soviet ground forces are concentrated pri-
marily in East Germany, the Western USSR,
the Caucasus, and the Far East. This dis-
position facilitates logistical support and also
provides for the defense and security of the
most important and vulnerable areas of the
USSR.
9. The USSR is now manufacturing substan-
tial quantities of all types of basic ground
force weapons. The volume of production is
ample to meet the current requirements of
the Bloc armed forces. During the period of
this estimate, production of ground force
weapons, with the possible exception of
armored vehicles, is not expected to increase.
10. Certain weaknesses of the Soviet Army
will continue to limit its offensive capabilities
during the period of this estimate. The great
extent of Soviet territory and the limitations
of the road and rail networks present difficult
logistic problems. The Army lacks experi-
ence in large-scale combined amphibious
operations, and it has never conducted suc-
cessful large-scale airborne operations in
wartime. The Army suffers from a shortage
of technicians, a weakness that is being met
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by intensive pre-military and military train-
ing and by the recall of some specialists from
the reserve.
Soviet Ground Forces in Europe
11. Soviet ground forces in Eastern Europe
are organized into 30 line divisions totalling
535,000 troops, of which 22 divisions com-
prising about 400,000 troops are in East Ger-
many. While not at full war strength, the
highly mechanized Soviet group of armies in
East Germany are in a high state of combat
readiness and represent the core of Bloc mili-
tary power in Europe.
The Satellite Armies
12. Satellite ground forces constitute a sub-
stantial addition to Soviet military strength
in Europe. We estimate that the Satellite
armies including the East German Garri-
soned Peoples' Police (KVP) now total 1,286,-
000 men organized into 75 line divisions (57
rifle, 1 cavalry, 11 mechanized, and 6 tank) ,
2 artillery divisions, 6 antiaircraft divisions,
and various independent brigades and regi-
ments. The Satellite Security Forces consti-
tute an additional force of some 290,000
troops. We estimate that by mid-1955 Satel-
lite ground forces will be stabilized at a
strength of about 1,690,000 men, organized
into about 100 line divisions. All Satellite
forces will remain dependent upon Soviet
logistical support. Trained reserves of the
Satellite ground forces amount to approxi-
mately 5,000,000 men (of which only about
1,500,000 are considered fully-trained). By
mid-1955 trained ground reserves will total
4,850,000 men, of which 2,500,000 will prob-
ably be fully-trained. There is little equip-
ment available for reserves, except in Bul-
garia and except for the equipment and stock-
piles of Soviet forces now stationed in East-
ern Europe.
13. The Satellite 'armies are equipped largely
with Soviet World War II equipment of good
quality. The Satellites are now manufactur-
ing for their own use non-combat vehicles,
light artillery, small arms, and ammunition.
They are dependent upon the USSR for most
of their tanks, self-propelled guns, and heavy
artillery, and for some of their light artillery.
11
The most obvious deficiency is in motor trans-
port; few Satellite divisions are motorized or
mechanized. However, a concentrated effort
is being made to overcome this weakness by
increasing deliveries of motor vehicles from
the USSR and from Czechoslovakia and by
some vehicle production in other countries.
There will be major shortages of heavy armor
and artillery at least until 1955. The Satel-
lite ground forces are also weak in communi-
cations equipment, and their antiaircraft de-
fenses have few gun-laying radars.
14. Although the Satellite ground forces are
being reorganized to conform to the Soviet
pattern, differences still exist in training,
equipment, morale, and general capabilities.
Satellite war readiness should improve, how-
ever, by mid-1955 as the combat units become
better organized and better equipped. The
Bulgarian Army is considered the best of the
Satellite forces. The Hungarian and Polish
Armies, however, are being pushed toward the
Bulgarian level of achievement.
15. However, the relative unreliability of
Satellite armed forces is a factor detrimental
to Bloc military capabilities. The Kremlin
could not now rely Upon the majority of the
Satellite armies in a general war except for
employment in secondary roles. If political
tension and popular resistance in the Satel-
lites increase, the USSR may find the military
usefulness of Satellite forces and Satellite ter-
ritories greatly reduced.
Logistical Position
16. Bloc ground forces in Europe al.e in a
good logistical position. We estimate that
the Soviets have a stock of equipment and
supplies in Germany sufficient for 22 divisions
for 80-90 days, or 60 divisions for 60 days of
combat. We believe that. military stockpiles
within the USSR, except for POL, are prob-
ably sufficient to maintain 175 divisions in
combat for an extended period (i.e., up to one
year, depending upon the intensity of com-
bat) The road, rail, and inland waterway
G We have no estimate of POL stockpiles for
ground forces alone; for all Soviet armed forces
POL stockpiles are estimated sufficient for from
4 to 6 months of combat.
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nets in Eastern Europe are adequate to per-
mit full utilization of those Bloc divisions now
in Eastern Europe and, in addition, to move
and to support a considerable number of addi-
tional divisions from the USSR.
Soviet Forces in the Far East
17. The USSR represents both the founda-
tion and the arsenal of Bloc military power
in the Far East. Soviet ground forces in the
territory east of Lake Baikal operate within
n autonomous command structure. These
forces total an estimated 415,000 men, organ-
ized into 30 line divisions, of which 5 are
mechanized and 1 tank. There are also 78,-
000 Soviet security troops in this area. We
estimate that the USSR could mobilize an
additional 15 divisions by M+30 days from
three military districts which constitute the
Soviet Far East.
18. Transportation facilities constitute the
major limitation upon the support of large-
scale military operations in the Far East over
an extended period. The Trans-Siberian
Railroad carries at least 90 percent of the
*military supplies shipped from the western
USSR to the Far East. The USSR has at-
tempted to reduce the danger deriving from
this transport limitation by maintaining large
reserves of military and other supplies in the
Far East. However, the USSR has equipped
and provisioned the North Korean Army and
has furnished large amounts of equipment
and POL to the Chinese Communists. While
we do not know what proportion of these
supplies were drawn from stocks in the Far
East, we believe that Soviet forces in the Far
East now have sufficient supplies and equip-
ment (with the exception of POL) to support
30 divisions in combat from 6 to 8 months.
Chinese Communist Army.
19. The over-all strength of the Chinese Com-
munist Field Forces is estimated at 2,380,000
troops, organized into 65 armies and 221 line
divisions (194 rifle, 7 cavalry, 5 armored, 12
artillery, and 3 parachute) and various inde-
pendent units.
20. The Chinese Communist forces are bas-
ically infantry. Their weapons are a hetero-
geneous assortment of European, American,
Japanese, and Soviet manufacture. Limited
amounts of Soviet heavy equipment (tanks,
artillery pieces, and trucks) have been re-
ported in various parts of China, but the ex-
tent of Soviet equipping of Chinese Commu-
nist units other than those in Korea is not
known. Most of the armored equipment was
apparently shipped to the Chinese Commu-
nists during late 1950 and early 1951, but
ammunition and other types of material for
the Chinese Communist armies in Korea has
sinee been furnished on a continuing basis.
Communist China has become increasingly
dependent upon the USSR for ammunition,
spare parts, POL, and replacement equipment,
although this dependence has become less
urgent with the termination of hostilities in
Korea. We estimate that despite the flow of
Soviet material, the disparity between the
equipment of the average Chinese Communist
division and that of the average Soviet divi-
sion will probably not be reduced significantly
in this period.
21. The morale and .combat effectiveness of
the Chinese Communist troops in Korea and
Manchuria are high. We estimate that the
combat effectiveness of the Chinese Commu-
nist troops elsewhere will be lower because of
the heterogeneity of the weapons and equip-
ment, deficiencies in heavy weapons, equip-
ment, training, and the lack of supporting
services. The combat effectiveness of the
Chinese Communist Army has also been
limited by the absence of tactical air support.
However, if Soviet aid in the form of advice
and equipment continues, the over-all combat
effectiveness of Chinese Communist forces will
almost certainly continue to increase.
North Korean Army
22. We estimate that the North Korean Army
now totals about 280,000 men, organized into
18 rifle divisions, 7 infantry brigades, 6-10
armored units up to regimental size, 2 mortar
regiments, and 2 artillery regiments.
23. The North Korean soldier in 1950 was well
trained, but severe casualties forced the in-
duction of large numbers of untrained men
into combat units. Recent evidence indicates
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that the past 12 months have been utilized
to raise the standards of training and equip-
ment. Rigid discipline, experienced leader- .
ship, and Soviet staff advice will continue to
give the North Koreans a general over-all
combat efficiency rating of from fair to good.
Viet Minh Army
24. We estimate that the Viet Minh military
forces consist of a regular army of 123,000
(organized into 6 infantry divisions, 1 artil-
lery division, and numerous independent for-
mations) , 62,000 regional troops, and 115,000
poorly armed irregulars. The combat effec-
tiveness of the regular Viet Minh forces is
considered fair, to good, considering the ter-
rain, climatic conditions, and type of opera-
tions conducted. Three-fifths of the regulars
are deployed in the strategic Tonkin area.
BLOC AIR STRENGTH
Soviet Air Forces6
25. We estimate that the Soviet Air Forces
have an organizational strength of about
20,500 aircraft, including 10,200 fighters,
(8,700 jets) ; 2,600 attack aircraft; 3,500 light
bombers (2,250 jets) ; and 1,200 piston medium
bombers. We also estimate that the Soviet
stored reserve of military aircraft is approxi-
mately equal in number to the aircraft in
units. There are insufficient data available to
permit a sound estimate of the composition of
the reserve; however, we believe that most re-
serve aircraft are World War II piston types.
26. Although the size of the total air establish-
ment is not likely to change appreciably
through mid-1955, we estimate that a signifi-
cant increase in over-all operational effective-
ness will result as conversion to jet fighters
and bombers progresses. We estimate that
6 Current estimated over-all actual strength is
about 85 percent of the estimated organiza-
tional strength. Actual strength of piston
fighter, attack, and piston light bomber regi-
ments is estimated at 95-100 percent; transport
and reconnaissance regiments are estimated at
90-95 percent of organizational strength; jet
fighter units are estimated to average approxi-
mately 80-85 percent; medium bomber 75-80
percent; and jet light bomber, and jet recon-
naissance, 60-65 percent of organizational
strength.
by mid-1955 the Soviet Air Forces will have an
organizational strength of about 20,500 in-
cluding 10,000 jet fighters; 2,500 attack air-
craft (1,000 jets) ; 3,700 light bombers (3,500
jets) ; and 1,050 piston medium bombers, 50
jet medium bombers, and 200 heavy bombers.7
27. The Soviet Air Forces have been under-
going steady modernization. We estimate
that about 50 percent of the aircraft are jets,
compared with about 33 percent in mid-1952
and about 40 percent in January 1953. We
estimate that about 70-80 percent of organiza-
tional aircraft will be jets by mid-1955.
MIG-15 types will probably be retained as a
standard fighter aircraft through mid-1955.
Improved fighter aircraft, probably an out-
growth of the MIG-15 type, are entering
operational units but their characteristics are
unknown. An all-weather jet interceptor may
also have been developed, and may be in op-
erational use by mid-1955. During this
period, bombers will probably receive consid-
erable emphasis. The 11-28 and Type 35 (jet
light bombers) will constitute standard Soviet
equipment during the period of this estimate.
A new and improved jet light bomber may
also enter service by mid-1955. Within the
period of this estimate, the USSR may com-
plete development and begin series produc-
tion of a jet medium bomber. A heavy bomber
may already be in production and, if it be
assumed that series production began in mid-
1953, about 200 may be available by mid-1955.8
28. The combat effectiveness of Soviet military
aviation is, on the whole, not as good as that
of the air forces of the US and the UK, and is
expected to remain below US and UK stand-
ards throughout the period of this estimate.
By mid-1955, air crew proficiency, quality of
equipment, and standards' of maintenance and
7 The estimate of heavy bombers and jet medium
bombers is based on assumption of series pro-
duction of these types beginning by mid-1953,
and April 1954, respectively. There is presently
no intelligence to indicate that either type is in
series production or in use in operational units.
If production actually begins before or after the
dates indicated, the strength estimates shown
will be affected accordingly.
8For more detailed information, see SE-36/1,
"Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US
through Mid-1955" (3 August 1953).
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training will have improved generally. How-
ever, units operating advanced and complex
equipment (e.g., in all-weather fighters) prob-
ably will not have resolved all of the problems
which accompany the introduction of such
equipment.
29. The aircraft industry has been maintained
in steady operation throughout the postwar
period. Soviet aircraft and aero-engine in-
dustries are estimated to be currently operat-
ing at about one-third their maximum peak.
We believe that two years would be required
for the industry to reach capacity production.
We estimate combat aircraft production in
1952 was:
TYPE
Jet fighters
Piston light bombers
Jet light bombers
Piston medium bombers
Jet medium bombers
Piston heavy bombers
Jet heavy bombers
1952
5,280
240
1,280
4,10
none
none
none
TOTAL 7,210
30. The present logistical position of Soviet
military aviation is good, and will probably
improve during the period of this estimate.
31. We believe that about 60 percent of the
present total Soviet air strength, including
nearly 65 percent of the jet fighter force and
almost 85 percent of the medium bomber
force, is now concentrated in Eastern Europe
and the western and southwestern portions of
the USSR. We believe that these dispositions
will not change significantly by mid-1955 ex-
cept that a greater proportion of the total
medium bomber strength will be stationed in
the Far East.
32. There are five major combat components
of Soviet military aviation: The Air Force of
the Soviet Army, Fighter Aviation of Air De-
fense, Long-Range Aviation, Naval Aviation,
and Aviation of Airborne Troops.9
The Civil Air Fleet, while not an operational
component of Soviet military aviation, is under
the War Ministry. Together with other civil air
organizations, it operates about 1,650 transports
on scheduled and non-scheduled operations. It
could make an estimated 1,000 of these available
for military purposes. However, this would pro-
duce a corresponding reduction in Soviet domes-
tic air transport.
a. The Air Force of the Soviet Army
(1) The Air Force of the Soviet Army,
consisting of units assigned to the 14 Tac-
tical Air Armies and to the 4 Military Dis-
trict Air Forces, is the largest component of
Soviet military aviation. The primary mis-
sions of the Air Force of the Soviet Army are
to carry out tactical operations in support
of ground forces and to defend areas against
penetration by hostile aircraft. In areas
where other fighter forces are available, the
interception mission is shared with fighter
units subordinate to Fighter Aviation of Air
Defense, or to Naval Aviation.
(2) We estimate that the Air Force of the
Soviet Army has an organizational strength
of 11,100 aircraft including 4,020 jet fight-
ers, 1,750 jet light bombers, and 2,440 at-
tack aircraft. The estimated organiza-
tional strength by mid-1955 will also be
11,100 aircraft, of which 4,400 will be jet
fighters, 2,600 jet light bombers, and 900 jet
attack aircraft. The Soviets are continu-
ing to employ the I1-10 (Stormovik) piston
attack aircraft for close support operations.
There are indications, however, that the
MIG-15 and the 11-28 may assume ground
support roles on an interim basis, until an
aircraft specifically designed for this work
appears in operational units.
b. Fighter Aviation of Air Defense
(1) Fighter Aviation of Air Defense has
the mission of defending important target
areas in the USSR. In many areas it shares
this mission with fighter elements of the
Air Force of the Soviet Army and Naval
Aviation. The force has an organizational
strength of 3,500 interceptor aircraft, of
which 3,100 are jets. By mid-1955, the
estimated organizational strength will be
3,500 jet interceptor aircraft.
c. Long-Range Aviation
(1) Long-Range Aviation, consisting of
3 Air Armies, 1 in the Far East and 2 in
Western USSR, plus units of undetermined
subordination, constitutes the strategic
striking force of the Bloc. This force has
an estimated actual strength of 1,000 piston
medium bombers (TU-4's) ; and an organi-
zational strength of 1,220 piston medium
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bombers. By mid-1955, we estimate that
the bomber force of Soviet Long-Range
Aviation will maintain approximately 'its
present organizational strength, but may
include up to 50 jet medium bombers and
200 heavy bombers.n During the period of
this estimate, the TU-4, the only known
operational Soviet bomber capable of de-
livering the atomic bomb in the US, will
remain the principal vehicle for Soviet inter-
continental operations. The TU-4, under
normal operating conditions, is estimated to
have a combat radius of 1,700 nautical miles
and a combat range of 3,100 nautical miles
with a 10,000 pound bomb load."
(2) We believe that the over-all combat
effectiveness of Soviet Long-Range Aviation
will continue to remain well below that of
the US strategic air arm. The average
Soviet medium bomber crew is considered
less skilled than the average US medium
'bomber crew of World War II. Moreover,
Soviet staff planners lack the extensive
operational experiences obtained by the US.
However, Soviet Long-Range Aviation is
known to be undergoing a training pro-
gram for strategic bombing missions, and
selected crews probably could, within the
limitations set by equipment, approach
standards attained by present average US
crews. Moreover, bombing capabilities are
enhanced by the abundance of Western
target and navigational data which is read-
ily available to the Soviets.
(3) On the whole, the chief limiting fac-
tors in the operational effectiveness of
Soviet Long-Range Aviation in the conduct
of long-range strategic air missions are:
(a) the absence of advanced bases; (b) the
performance characteristics of the TU-4
1? The estimate of heavy bombers and jet medium
bombers is based on assumption of series pro-
duction of these types beginning by mid-1953,
and April 1954, respectively. There is presently
no intelligence to indicate that either type is in
series production or in use in operational units.
If production actually begins before or after the
dates indicated, the strength estimates shown
will be affected accordingly.
"For more detailed information, see SE-36/1,
"Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US through
Mid-1955" (3 August 1953) .
15
aircraft and its associated equipment; (c)
the current lack of a true intercontinental
bomber; and (d) the lower proficiency of
the average Soviet long-range bomber crew,
compared to its US counterpart. By mid-
1955, it is expected that the USSR will have
made progress in overcoming some of the
limitations cited above.
d. Naval Aviation is responsible for cooper-
ation with naval surface and submarine units,
furnishing close support for the seaward
flanks of the Soviet ground forces, and for air
defense of certain areas, a mission which it
shares, in most cases, with fighter elements
of Fighter Aviation of Air Defense and the
Air Force of the Soviet Army. It is capable
of providing fighter cover for naval units
within a combat radius of 360 nautical miles
from shore bases. Naval Aviation can per-
form antisubmarine patrol, aerial reconnais-
sance, and aerial-mining, and it is equipped
to deliver torpedo, rocket, and bombing at-
tacks against surface vessels. It is estimated
that Naval Aviation has an organizational
strength of 3,600 aircraft, including 1,960
fighters (1,560 jets) ; 940 light bombers (490
jets) ; and 390 reconnaissance aircraft (310
jets).
e. Aviation of Airborne Troops has the
mission of conducting airborne training
and providing airlift and equipment for air-
borne operations. Its organizational aircraft
strength consists of approximately 550 trans-
port aircraft and 250 gliders. Transport air-
craft from other Soviet aviation components
and the Civil Air Fleet would have to be uti-
lized to supplement the aircraft of this com-
ponent for large-scale airborne opera-
tions. (See paragraph 5, Appendix B, for
Airborne troop strengths.)
Satellite Air Forces
33. It is estimated that the jet fighter re-
equipment program of the Satellite air forces
will have been completed by mid-1955. In
addition, the Soviets have begun to re-equip
at least one of the Satellites with jet light
bombers (I1-28's). These developments por-
tend increased operational capabilities. How-
ever, development of these capabilities will be
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dependent on the Soviet assessment of the
political reliability of the Satellite air forces.
We estimate that these air forces have an
organizational strength of about 3,200 air-
craft, including 1,430 jet fighters, 310 piston
fighters, 680 ground attack, 470 light bombers
(80 jets), and 140 transports.12 The organi-
zational strength of the Satellite air forces,
by mid-1955, will be approximately 3,300 air-
craft, of which 1,500 will probably be jet
fighters and 120 jet light bombers. The
Satellite forces will remain almost completely
dependent upon the USSR for logistic sup-
port, and virtually all aircraft will be Soviet
types.
Communist Air Forces in China (CAFIC)
34. The strength and capabilities of the Com-
munist Air Forces in China have been in-
creasing steadily. The estimated organiza-
tional strength of the CAFIC is 2,400 opera-
tional aircraft, including 1,500 jet fighters,
200 piston fighters, 160 ground attack, 360
light bombers (100 jets) , 10 piston medium
bombers, and 170 transports.13 Assuming
that Soviet support continues in the future
on the same scale as in the past, it is esti-
mated that by mid-1955 the organizational
strength of this force will be about 3,550 air-
craft, including 2,100 jet fighters, 300 piston
fighters, 300 ground attack, 510 light bombers
(160 jets), 50 piston medium bombers, 240
transports, and 50 piston reconnaissance.
We estimate that the CAFIC will remain de-
pendent upon the USSR for aircraft and
equipment, spare parts, technical supervision,
and aviation fuel and lubricants.
35. CAFIC combat potential has been in-
creased during the past few months by the
conversion of two light bomber regiments in
Manchuria to 11-28 light bombers., The
" It is estimated that the over-all actual strength
of Satellite air forces is about 65 percent of
organizational strength. The actual jet fighter
strength is estimated to be 40 percent of organi-
zational fighter strength.
" It is estimated that the over-all actual strength
of Chinese Communist air forces is about 85
percent of organizational strength. The actual
jet fighter strength is estimated to be 75 percent
of organizational fighter strength.
CAFIC has not demonstrated any capability
for carrying out either air-ground support
operations or high-altitude bombing. The
effectiveness of the CAFIC will probably con-
tinue to improve throughout the period of
this estimate through increased proficiency of
flying personnel. However, over-all effective-
ness will be largely determined by Soviet will-
ingness to continue to supply additional air-
craft, especially jet fighters and jet light
bombers, together with the necessary parts
and equipment.
BLOC NAVAL STRENGTH
Soviet Naval Forces
36. The tasks assigned the Soviet Navy (in-
cluding Naval Aviation) in the discharge of
its mission are:
a. Offshore and inshore defense of the
maritime frontiers;
b. Protection of the sea approaches and
coastal lines of communications;
c. Conduct and support of amphibious
operations;
d. Offensive action against hostile naval
units and enemy sea lines of communications;
e. Protection of the seaward flank of a
ground campaign.
37. The total surface strength of the Soviet
Navy is about 184 major combatant-type sur-
face vessels,14 and some 2,000 escort, patrol,
mine, amphibious, and auxiliary types. Ma-
jor ship strength centers around 6 effective
heavy cruisers, 15 effective light cruisers, and
116 effective destroyers. We further esti-
mate that there are 348 submarines,15 of
which 112 are long-range (combat radius of
3,500-6,000 nautical miles), 88 medium-range
(combat radius of 1,000-1,800 nautical miles),
" Major combatant-type surface vessels include
battleships, heavy and light cruisers, and fleet
and coastal destroyers.. Some are obsolete or
obsolescent. See Table for details.
Obsolete submarines have been omitted from this
figure; included are 12 long-range, 32 medium-
range, and 38 coastal submarines which are
obsolescent (overage) by US standards.
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and 148 coastal submarines.16 Naval Avia-
tion has an authorized strength of 3,600 air-
craft of which 1,560 are jet fighters.
38. The Soviet Navy has an estimated per-
sonnel strength of about 895,000 men, in-
cluding about 95,000 attached to Naval Air.
This total includes 400,000 General Service,
of whom 100,000 are in training, 275,000 in
Coastal Defense and Naval Infantry, and
125,000 in coastal (border) security opera-
tions, such as beach patrols and lookouts,
offshore patrol craft and small bases for pa-
trol craft, and communications for coastal
security. Current reserve strength of the
Soviet Navy personnel is approximately
1,000,000. We estimate that reserve strength
will be maintained at this level through mid-
1955.
39. There is no force in the Soviet Navy
comparable to the amphibious forces of the
US Navy, although the naval infantry com-
ponents have received training in amphibious
warfare. The Soviet Navy does not possess
sufficient modern amphibious vessels and
craft to launch and sustain long-haul am-
phibious operations. It is capable, however,
of mounting short-range lifts in considerable
force.
40. We estimate that by mid-1955 the Soviet
Navy will have a total of 240 major com-
batant-type surface vessels, centering around
6 effective heavy cruisers, 21 effective light
cruisers, and 163 effective fleet destroyers.17
The total of minor and auxiliary vessels prob-
ably will not increase substantially, but will
comprise a greater percentage of new and
modernized units. We also estimate that by
mid-1955 there will be 377 submarines, of
which 149 will be long-range, 72 medium-
range, and 156 coastal types.18 Newly con-
" We have no evidence that Soviet submarines are
fitted with snorkel, other than the 16 acquired
from the Germans. We estimate that they
could be so fitted at the rate of about 25 percent
of the force per year. We believe new Soviet
submarines are or will be so fitted, but feel it
unlikely that those approaching the end of their
fully effective life will be so equipped.
" See Table for details.
" Obsolete submarines have been omitted from the
1955 totals; a number of obsolescent but still
usable submarines are included.
17
structed submarines will probably have in-
creased combat radii. We believe that the
organizational strength of Naval Aviation
will be about 3,600 aircraft in 1955. How-
ever, almost all aircraft will be jet types.
41. The operational efficiency of the Soviet
Navy is still below that of the navies of the
major Western Powers. However, it will con-
tinue to improve during this period, and by
mid-1955 it will probably equal that of West-
ern navies in the employment of small craft.
It may approach US standards in operations
involving major combatant-type ships. Rel-
atively little' is known of the operating effi-
ciency of the Soviet submarine force, but it
must be assumed that it has profited by the
lessons of World War II, and from German
experience. Personnel of the submarine force
are the pick of the Soviet Navy, and their
morale is high. Like other elements of the
fleet the submarine force is believed to be in a
good state of operational readiness.
42. We estimate that adequate supplies of
ammunition, stores, and POL are now avail-
able in all areas except the Far East to service
the Soviet fleet for a period of one year at the
present scale of operations. In the Far East,
POL supplies are adequate only for six
months.
43. The mine warfare capabilities of the
Soviet Navy are extensive, and pose a serious
potential threat to Allied naval operations in
Europe and the Far East. Nearly all Soviet
warships, including most of the lesser vessels,
are equipped to lay mines, and the capabili-
ties of submarines and aircraft in this respect
extend the range of the threat to the Western
approaches of the British Isles, the Far East-
ern island chains, and the Mediterranean
area. Large stocks of German World War II
mines were captured by the Soviets, and de-
velopmental work has been given a high pri-
ority. The Soviet Navy is known to have
large stocks of mines, probably including all
types.
44. Naval construction in the Soviet Union
is presently estimated at about 175,000 NSDT
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(Naval Standard Displacement Tons) per
year, broken down as follows:
Cruisers 3.5 Ocean Patrol
Destroyers 20 Submarines 20
Smaller Types 110 Coastal
Submarines 20
We believe this tonnage total could be raised
to 485,000 NSDT per year by utilizing the
entire Soviet ship-building capacity on a one-
shift basis, and, by using Satellite facilities, to
773,000 NSDT. Currently 6 large vessels, of
which 3 are known to be cruisers, are under
construction. Probably 4 of these have
reached the fitting-out stage. Construction
of battleships and carriers is possible in all
fleet areas except the Far East. There is no
firm evidence of such construction, and we
believe it unlikely that any ships of these
types will become operational during the
period of this estimate.
45. The operating forces of the Soviet Navy
are divided among four major fleet areas,
Baltic, Northern, Black Sea, and Pacific. The
Baltic and Pacific Fleets are each sub-divided
into two components covering the northern
and southern sectors of their areas of respon-
sibility. Each of the six fleets has a naval air
component directly under the operational con-
trol of the naval commander. In addition to
the fleets there are three flotillas which serve
as local defense forces ,on the Amur and
Danube Rivers, and the Caspian Sea. (See
Table for detailed composition of these fleets.)
a. Baltic: This is the largest Soviet fleet
concentration; it consists of the 4th and 8th
Fleets, to which should be added the Polish
and East German sea forces. Submarine
forces assigned are estimated at 138, of which
88 are long and medium-range craft. With
the use of merchant shipping normally in the
area (approximately 450,000 GRT) , amphibi-
ous lift and support for a force of 100,000 men
could be provided, but the port capacity in the
target area selected would be the controlling
factor in determining the actual size of the
force to be lifted. Naval Aviation assigned to
the Baltic Fleets has an organizational
strength of 1,020 aircraft including 340 jet
fighters and 160 jet light bombers.
b. Northern: The Northern Fleet comprises
2 cruisers, 31 destroyer types, and approxi-
mately 192 escort, mine, amphibious, and
auxiliary craft. Submarine strength is esti-
mated at 33, all but 4 of which are long or
medium-range types. With merchant ship-
ping normally in the area, amphibious lift for
about one division (14,000 men) is available.
Naval Aviation assigned has an organizational
strength of 370 aircraft, of which about 170
are jet types, largely fighters.
c. Black Sea: The Black Sea Fleet comprises
2 battleships, 8 cruisers, 26 destroyer types,
and approximately 298 escort, mine, am-
phibious, and auxiliary vessels. The Black
Sea Satellites (Rumania and Bulgaria) add
5 destroyers and some 90 other craft to this
total. Naval Air has an organizational
strength of 600 planes, including 300 jet
fighters and 90 jet light bombers. About 70
submarines are assigned to this Fleet, of which
27 are long and medium-range types. Mer-
chant shipping in the area generally averages
about 188,000 GRT, and amphibious lift for
40,000-45,000 troops and their continuing re-
supply is possible. Port facilities in the tar-
get area would determine the actual size of
the assault.
d. Far East: The 5th and 7th Fleets in the
Far East total 2 cruisers, 47 destroyer types,
and about 340 escort, mine, amphibious, and
auxiliary vessels. The Chinese Communist
Navy could provide another 130 minor vessels.
An estimated 107 submarines are based in the
area, of which more than half are long and
medium-range types. Naval Air assigned to
the Far Eastern Fleets has an organizational
strength of 1,610 aircraft, of which 800 are jet
fighters and 200 jet light bombers. With the
use of merchant vessels, amphibious lift for
about 120,000 troops against Japan is avail-
able. In addition the Chinese Communists
have sufficient shipping to lift about 200,000
troops for a short distance. Early acquisition
of port facilities and good weather conditions
would be essential for any assault in force.
46. The principal weakness of the Soviet Navy
will continue to derive from the division of its
major surface forces, which, because of their
widely separated bases, are not mutually sup-
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porting. This seriously complicates admin-
istrative control, logistic support, and strate-
gic mobility, although the development of the
inland waterway system and the increased
use of the Northern Sea Route now permit
some interchange of vessels. A further weak-
ness is the lack of adequate supply lines to
the Northern and Far Eastern areas.
47. The tasks assigned Naval Aviation in-
clude: air cover and support for amphibious
operations, antishipping strikes, aerial mine-
laying, air reconnaissance, and antisubmarine
operations. It also has the function of pro-
viding air defense within its operating areas.
In this regard it is closely integrated with the
over-all air defense system. Each of the 6
fleet commanders in the 4 major sea areas has
direct operational control of the naval air
components assigned. During the postwar
period training has been stepped-up, with the
emphasis on night and all-weather flying, for-
mation flying, gunnery, and bombing. Night
and all-weather capabilities nevertheless re-
main relatively low. Exercises aimed at the
improvement of coordination between air, sur-
face, and sub-surface elements have been
noted.
Satellite and Chinese Communist Navies
48. The strength of both the Satellite and
Chinese Communist Navies during the period
of this estimate will remain negligible. The
naval forces of the Satellites will probably be
capable of aiding the Soviet Navy in mine-
sweeping, minelaying, escort, and coastal de-
fense duties. The Chinese Communist Navy,
although small and ill-equipped, is the largest
indigenous naval force in the Far East. It is
capable of short-haul amphibious operations,
coastal mining, motor torpedo attacks, limited
escort work, and minor gunfire support. The
Soviet Far Eastern Naval Forces are providing
training, advisors, and logistic support to this
force.
Bloc Merchant Fleet
49. We estimate that the Soviet Bloc seagoing
merchant fleet (including Communist Chinese
vessels) totals 788 ships (1,000 gross tons up-
ward) of 3,393,025 deadweight tons. More
19
than 80 percent of these ships are slow and
overage. Since the end of World War II the
Bloc has continually sought to strengthen the
merchant fleet, and still retains, despite re-
peated requests for their return, some 38 lib-
erty ships from US Lend-Lease. We estimate
that by mid-1955 the merchant marine of the
Soviet Bloc will reach a total of 873 vessels of
3,641,740 deadweight tons.
BLOC AIR DEFENSES
Soviet Air Defense System'
50. The USSR maintains a large air defense
system which includes the active air defense
elements of all military services under the
operational control of a single air defense
organization (PVO-Strany). A passive de-
fense organization, which includes the re-
sources of the police and other civil organiza-
tions, is also under control of PVO-Strany.
The European Satellite and Chinese Commu-
nist air defenses are integrated with those of
the Soviet system. We estimate that the Bloc
has the capability of providing vigorous op-
position against air attacks on critical targets
in the interior of the USSR, under conditions
of good visibility. Under clear moonlit night
conditions, Bloc defense capabilities are fair
against piston bombers and negligible against
jet bombers. Under conditions of poor visi-
bility, day or night, Bloc interception capa-
bilities are negligible. Deficiencies are re-
lated generally to equipment and to associated
training which is directly conditioned by the
availability and capabilities of equipment.
The lack of operational interceptor units
equipped and trained for all-weather opera-
tions is the most critical deficiency. A limited
number of all-weather jet interceptors may be
in operation by mid-1955. We believe that,
during the period of this estimate, gradual
improvements will be made in the following
aspects of the air defense system:
a. Early Warning
(1) While areas along the northern and
southern borders may have some radar gaps,
it is believed that significant numbers of
early warning and GCI radars will be found
" See paragraphs 32-a and 32-h, Appendix B.
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on approaches to the most important areas
in the USSR. Radar coverage during the
period of this estimate is expected to develop
further along lines indicated during the
past two years, the most notable feature of
which will be the introduction of more mod-
ern radars in the early warning system.
Low altitude coverage will continue to be a
problem and will be only partially, offset by
the use of ground observers.
(2) It is estimated that by the year 1955,
the Soviets will have several types of early
warning radars which when suitably em-
ployed together in an early warning system
should afford reasonable coverage against
medium bombers flying up to 60,000 feet
altitude; such a system should provide reli-
able detection range from 120 to 170 nau-
tical miles. Detection ranges against fight-
er aircraft at the same altitude should be no
more than 75-80 nautical miles.
b. Ground Control of Interception
(1) The capacity of the air warning and
control system will probably show a steady
increase during the period of this estimate.
The advancements in the technical equip-
ment field will not be reflected immediately
in increased system capacity. ? As new and
improved equipment becomes available and
training continues, the system capacity will
improve as a result of increases in the num-
ber of targets one radar can hold under
surveillance, increases in the over-all target
reporting capacity before saturation point
is reached, and an increased fighter aircraft
control capacity.
(2) Improvements in radar, communica-
tions (particularly through use of UHF
radio) , and identification methods should
result in more effective use of close control
methods for fighter interceptions. Present
use of fighter grid and zonal systems em-
ployed in controlling fighters is expected to
be largely replaced by vectoring for close
control.
(3) Within the period of this estimate,
the USSR is expected to have GCI radar of
several types, including the V?Beam sets
presently in use, which should be capable
of detecting medium bombers at a maxi-
mum range of 120-170 nautical miles.
They also should provide reliable coverage
for interceptor control, without the use of
transponder beacons, to a maximum range
of 70-85 nautical miles and an altitude cov-
erage up to 40,000-42,000 feet. The use of
transponder beacons in Soviet interceptor
aircraft, a development of which the Soviet
Union is capable, would increase range and
altitude coverage for controlled intercep-
tion.
c. Communications
(1) Control center operating procedures
are expected to improve. The filtering
phase of air raid reporting procedures will
continue to be a major problem during the
period of this estimate. The increasing
numbers of V?Beam radars will probably
reduce the amount of filtering required at
the collection center level since much of the
filtering will probably be completed at the
radar site. However, filtering will still be
required at the various control centers
where overlapping coverage will result in a
duplication of information.
(2) Wider use of newer radars will tend
to increase warning time available and will
tend to improve the handling capacity of
the raid reporting system by reduction of
filtering requirements. The increasing use
of multi-channel microwave radio link sys-
tems will improve air defense capabilities as
well as greatly increasing security and de-
creasing vulnerability to jamming. None of
the equipment changes are expected to alter
reporting procedures mate.rially; however,
some refinement of present procedures will
undoubtedly take place in order to improve
the passing of raid reports for timely ap-
praisal and action.
d. Fighter Aircraft
Improved fighter aircraft, probably an out-
growth of the MIG-15 type, are entering
operational units, but their characteristics
are virtually unknown. An all-weather jet
interceptor may also have been developed,
and may be in operational use by mid-1955.
e. AI Radar
We know that the USSR has World War II
airborne intercept equipment obtained from
the Germans and through Lend-Lease. We
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estimate that the USSR has the technical
knowledge and production capability to pro-
duce an Al radar superior to World War II
types as well as passive detection Al equip-
ment of electronic, infrared, and possibly
sonic types. The USSR almost certainly now
has experimental quantities of some type of
Al equipment. It may now have some type
of Al equipment available for limited opera-
tional use, although the indications are not
yet conclusive. We estimate that Al equip-
ment will come into operational use within
the period of this estimate. (See d. above.)
f. Antiaircraft Weapons
(1) AAA. It is estimated that during the
period under consideration the Sbviets will
employ a family of antiaircraft artillery
weapons capable of delivering continuously
pointed fire against subsonic aerial targets
at all altitudes up to 36,000-38,000 feet with
barrage types of fire up to about 45,000
feet. Sufficient numbers of directors and
gun-laying radar will be available for em-
ployment with the medium and heavy type
guns.
(2) Unguided AA Rockets. Supersonic
unguided AA rockets may be available, but
it is believed that dispersion problems will
limit their employment as a predicted fire
weapon to about 40,000 feet with a barrage
fire capability up to about 50,000 feet.
(3) Surface-to-Air Missiles. Surf ace-to-
air missiles based on German designs
(Wasserf all) with improved guidance, con-
trol, and homing could be available now or
in the immediate future. In addition, a
surface-to-air missile of native design could
be developed by 1955.
(4) Air-to-Air Missiles. Although the
USSR has knowledge of two German sub-
sonic winged rockets, there is no informa-
tion on any Soviet interest in air-to-air
missiles. Air-to-air unguided rockets un-
doubtedly would be used; it is possible that
air-to-air rockets might incorporate homing
heads.
Satellite and Chinese Communist
Air Defenses s
51. The European Satellite and Communist
Chinese air defense systems are integrated
21
with the Soviet system. They deepen the
Bloc early warning coverage net. Despite
some increase in the air defenses of the Satel-
lites and of Communist China (notably in
the Korea-Manchuria area), we estimate that
during the period of this estimate the air de-
fenses of both the Satellites and Communist
China will remain inferior to those of the
USSR.
Soviet Civil Defense
52. The USSR has a large, complex, and well-
organized civil defense system which is in-
tegrated into the over-all Soviet Air Defense
Organization (PVO). The civil defense sys-
tem includes a full-time civil defense staff or-
ganization. Comprehensive plans have been
made for utilizing existing agencies and facili-
ties, and for training large groups by various
mass organizations, but there is no evidence
of present mass participation in the civil de-
fense program, or of a program of passive
defense measures specifically designed for
defense against atomic attack. In addition,
civil defense needs are apparently considered
in urban and regional planning, in stockpil-
ing, and in decentralization programs.
53. The USSR probably has a greater civil de-
fense capability than any other major coun-
try, except perhaps the UK. Its present civil
defense system appears well-planned and or-
ganized, although we cannot estimate its ef-
fectiveness in dealing with wartime emer-
gencies', especially atomic attack. The
elaborate totalitarian control system, the
highly regimented character of the popula-
tion, and, to some extent, the dispersal of
population and industry constitute strong
points in the Soviet civil defense system.
However, we believe that a serious shortage of
transport facilities and of materials would
handicap efforts to meet a wartime civil de-
fense emergency.
Soviet Coastal Defense System
54. The Soviet Coastal Defense establishment,
which includes radar nets, coast watchers,
coast artillery, antiaircraft, and naval infan-
try, has an estimated strength of 275,000
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men. 'Defenses have been established in im-
portant ports, harbors, and straits. Coastal
security personnel total an estimated 125,000.
While not part of the Coastal Defense estab-
22
lishment, these forces would in wartime help
provide surveillance of the coast for detecting
the arrival of raiding forces, agents, or
saboteurs.
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APPENDIX C
BLOC POLITICAL WARFARE STRENGTHS
DEFINITION OF BLOC POLITICAL WARFARE
1. Political warfare plays an extremely im-
portant role for Communists, who consider
military warfare only an extension of political
warfare in their persistent campaign to un-
dermine the strength of the non-Communist
world. Bloc political warfare techniques in-
clude: diplomatic action, both through nor-
mal intergovernmental channels and in such
international organizations as the UN; propa-
ganda and front activities; political and eco-
nomic pressures and inducements; the action
of Communist parties and of Communist-
controlled trade unions outside the Bloc; in-
filtration of Communists or their sympa-
thizers into key governmental posts; espio-
nage and sabotage; the fomenting of civil un-
rest, civil war, and colonial revolt; and the
exploitation of nationalist and revolutionary
movements. ?
FACTORS AFFECTING BLOC POLITICAL
WARFARE STRENGTH
2. The principal sources of strength upon
which Bloc political warfare capabilities are
based consist of the Bloc's military capabili-
ties; the size, power, and centralized leader-
ship of the Bloc; Communist doctrine; and
the Communist international movement.
Size, Power, and Centralized Leadership
3. The USSR, which is the base of the Com-
munist world revolutionary movement, covers
8,500,000 square miles and has a population
of about 200,000,000 people. The Bloc now
includes 10 states,' which control a territory
of about 13,320,000 square miles (one-fourth
1USSR, Communist China, Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland,?
Rumania, and North Korea. For the purposes
of this general discussion, Communist China is
included among the states forming the Bloc.
However, it should ,be noted, as paragraph 7 in-
dicates, that the Sino-Soviet relationship is sig-
nificantly different from the other Soviet-
Satellite relationships.
of the world total) and a population of about
750,000,000 (one-third of the world total).
The size of the Bloc and the rapidity with
which the Bloc and the Communist move-
ment have expanded, particularly since World
War II, constitute important elements of
Bloc political warfare strength.
4. In its conduct Of political warfare, the
Bloc benefits greatly from centralized leader-
ship and from effective discipline and con-
trol, which make possible flexibility in the
selection and use of particular courses of
action. The Bloc's unique ability to conceal
the realities of life within the Bloc from for-
eign observation enables Soviet propaganda
to ,present a deceptive picture to, the outside
world. The freedoms and opportunities pro-
vided Bloc agents and supporters in the non-
Communist world also constitute important
advantages for the Bloc in the conduct of
political warfare.
5. Bloc political warfare depends to a large
degree upon the stability and power of the
USSR, which is the nucleus of the complex of
Bloa states, national Communist parties, and
auxiliary organizations. Bloc political war-
fare strength would be seriously reduced if
the authority of the Soviet regime were weak-
ened by a prolonged and indecisive struggle
for power within the USSR. However, we do
not believe that any power struggle is likely
to lead to a breakdown of the authority of the
Soviet regime within the period of this esti-
mate.
6. The USSR determines the fundamentals of
Bloc political warfare. The Satellites and the
national Communist parties outside the Bloc
are under the control of the USSR. The na-
tional Communist parties outside the Bloc
accept Soviet authority even at the expense
of lessening their power and influence in their
own national affairs, alienating significant
elements of their membership, and intensify-
ing the repressive measures directed against
them by national governments.
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7. Communist China occupies a unique posi-
tion within the Bloc. It remains dependent
upon the USSR for military and economic
support. However, it appears to be more an
ally than a Satellite, and it almost certainly
participates in the formulation of Commu-
nist policy in Asia. The prestige and mili-
tary power of Communist China help to in-
crease Bloc political warfare strengths in
Asia, while at the same time they strengthen
Chinese Communist national power. As a
consequence, Communist China exercises
some influence, the exact degree of which we
are unable to estimate, on the national Com-
munist parties and movements of Asian
countries.
Communist Doctrine
8. Communist doctrine constitutes a power-
ful force for the international Communist
movement. Much of this force, however, de-
rives from the fact that Communism is the
official ideology of one of the world's most
powerful nations, which uses it in the pursuit
of its foreign political aims. Aside from this
consideration, the considerable attraction of
Communism stems from its Utopian message.
Many are attracted by its promise to end
social, and particularly economic, injustices,
and may, in addition, find in it a secular reli-
gion which provides them with a certainty of
purpose. For the party member Communism
provides a system of values and a guide to
action. Furthermore, the doctrinal tenets of
Communism involve acceptance of a rigid dis-
cipline which provides the leadership with a
unique measure of control. These tenets are
an important source of Communist resolution
and of the Communist will and capability to
fight.
9. The ideas and doctrines developed in the
nineteenth century by Marx and Engels have
had varying degrees of influence throughout
most of the world. Marxist doctrine had exer-
cised great influence in the West before the
Russian Revolution, and Lenin and Stalin
both profited from the fact that the philoso-
phies of many 'non-Communists and even anti-
Communists had been influenced by the
philosophy upon which they began the erec-
tion of the Soviet state. Since 1917, Marxist
doctrine, although not necessarily as inter-
preted by the Kremlin, has spread even fur-
ther; for example, it exercises a strong influ-
ence in Japanese universities today, and it has
helped to create groups of fellow-travelers in
most non-Communist countries.
Communist International Organization
10. The international Communist movement
is a vital element of Bloc political warfare
strength, and its rise to international im-
portance has been one of the major political
phenomena of the twentieth century. The
Bloc now has a network of more than sixty
national Communist parties with an esti-
mated 24 million members, as well as a variety
of international mass organizations. Most
party members live within the Bloc, but at
least 3,250,000 are scattered throughout the
non-Communist world. These figures do not
include the membership of the front organiza-
tions, trade unions, etc., which the national
Communist parties influence or control.
While the power of the national Communist
parties to influence national policy is rela-
tively small in the Western Hemisphere and
in West European countries, except for Italy
and perhaps France, these parties have dem-
onstrated the power to organize, maintain,
and control armed rebellion on a significant
scale in a number of the underdeveloped coun-
tries of the world, to create economic and
political disruption in a number of other coun-
tries, and to maintain important espionage
and propaganda efforts in nearly all countries.
11. The Bloc controls and operates the largest
and most complex system of mass communi-
cation in the world. For example, the USSR
leads the world in volume of international
radio broadcasting, and the combined output
of the Satellites and Communist China ex-
ceeds that of any other state. The Bloc sys-
tem of mass communication, which includes
radio, publications, posters, demonstrations,
agitators, etc., enables the Bloc to disseminate
a tremendous stream of propaganda and to
attempt to mobilize public opinion among
key groups throughout the world in support
of Bloc policies. The themes which Bloc
propaganda employs ? "peace," "national in-
dependence," "anti-Americanism," "anti-im-
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perialism," etc. are designed to encourage
neutralism, to exploit national rivalries, to
bring nationalist movements under Commu-
nist leadership and control, and to cause di-
versions of strength from the centers of West-
ern power.
12. The Bloc has frequently been able to take
the initiative in the East-West struggle. This
has been due in large part to the Bloc's or-
ganizational strength and its great experience
in the techniques of political warfare, but it
also derives from the fact that the Bloc has
succeeded in identifying its revolutionary ap-
peals with the social and national aspirations
of many dissident forces throughout the
world. Thus, the Communists have obtained
control over some of the major labor confed-
erations in France, Italy, Indonesia, Latin
America, and many individual unions else-
where, and they have gained influence or con-
trol over a number of nationalist movements
in colonial areas.
13. There are some factors, however, which
tend to place limitations of varying degree
upon Bloc political warfare strength. These
include the limitations of Communist philoso-
phy and Communist world outlook, especially
in evaluating political developments in the
non-Communist world; the Communist in-
sistence upon the maintenance of totalitarian
controls, which has increased the awareness of
Communist objectives and techniques in the
non-Communist world; occasional conflicts
between the policies of the Kremlin and the
interests of national Communist parties out-
side the Bloc, which have reduced the strength
of some of the national Communist parties;
and increasing awareness in the non-Com-
munist world since 1945, especially in the
West, of the actual conditions prevailing with-
in the Bloc and of the Kremlin's aggressive
intentions.
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENT OF BLOC
POLITICAL WARFARE STRENGTH
14. One of the bases of Bloc capabilities for
political warfare has been a stable, centralized,
and unified leadership in the Kremlin. It is
probable that these capabilities were tern-
25
porarily reduced by the transfer of power to
new leadership and by the evidences of top-
level dissension, provided especially by the fall
of Beria, which have accompanied this trans-
fer. We believe, however, that the temporary
weakness and confusion which marked Bloc
political warfare in recent months will not be
serious or prolonged. Only a continuing
struggle for power within the Soviet hierarchy,
or a sierious impairment of the authority of the
Soviet regime, would significantly weaken Bloc
political warfare capabilities. Such develop-
ments are unlikely. Moreover, the death of
Stalin has given the Kremlin an opportunity
to gain credence for its claim that Soviet
policy is motivated by a sincere desire to lessen
international tensions and to coexist peace-
fully with the West. In this sense Bloc
political warfare capabilities may have been
enhanced by the death of Stalin.
Western Europe
15. The strength of Communist parties in
Western Europe varies from country to coun-
try, from the illegal party of an estimated 150
members in Ireland to the mass parties of
France and Italy. Throughout Western Eu-
rope, the Communist parties since 1946 have
suffered losses both in membership and pres-
tige. However, the hard core of the party has
been preserved everywhere, and in most coun-
tries the party continues to influence large
numbers of non-Communists.
16. The popular strength of the Communists
remains highest in France and Italy, where
the Communists are a strong minority in the
parliaments, control many municipal govern-
ments, and hold the leadership of the most
important trade unions. We estimate that
the Communist Party of France now has 450,-
000 members, compared with the peak of 850,-
000 in 1946. However, in each national elec-
tion in France since 1945, the Communist
Party has obtained more than 5,000,000 votes,
about one-quarter of the total vote cast. The
Communist Party of Italy is estimated to have
1,700,000 members, compared to only 5,000 in
1943 and to the peak of 2,300,000 in January
1948. In the 1948 elections in Italy, the Pop-
ular Front coalition, dominated by the Com-
munist Party, polled 8,000,000 votes, about 30
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percent of the total vote cast. In the June
1953 elections, the Communist Party polled
6,122,638 votes, about 22.5 percent of the total
vote cast, and the left-wing Socialists polled
3,440,222 votes, about 12.2 percent of the total
vote cast.
17. As a result of a decline in direct-action
strength in recent years, marked by the fail-
ure of mass political strikes and demonstra-
tions, the French and Italian Communist
Parties have concentrated on increasing their
popular following through the tactics of the
"United National Front" and on attempting
to attract individuals and groups from all
political parties and sections of society to sup-
port the Communist goal of neutralizing Eu-
rope's role in the East-West conflict. The
Communists have tried to make common
cause with individuals of all social groups on
the basis of a broad program of "peace, na-
tional independence, and democratic liber-
ties." In directing their appeals against the
Western coalition, and against the US in par-
ticular, the Communists have attempted to
link international issues with pressing domes-
tic problems, such as wages, taxes, and hous-
ing. Thus, the Communists' basic appeal in
France and Italy is to the sense of interna-
tional insecurity and to the deep dissatisfac-
tion over domestic conditions which have long
existed, and which would exist in the absence
of the Communists.
18. We estimate that the French and Italian
Communist Parties will retain their electoral
and parliamentary strength throughout the
period of this estimate, and that they will
maintain their influence through numerous
front organizations, their extensive party
press, and Communist leadership of the
largest trade union federations. In both
France and Italy, the Communists, as the
heirs of the strong tradition of the extreme
left, will continue to lead the groups discon-
tented because of social and economic condi-
tions.
19. In the other countries of Western Europe,
the Communists have little mass appeal.
Communists do hold important positions in
some trade unions and in some strategic in-
dustries in most countries, but they are much
26
less numerous and influential than they are
in France and Italy.
Middle East and Africa
20. The forces of nationalism, anti-Western-
ism, and social unrest, instead of the institu-
tional strength of Communist parties, provide
the main vehicles for Bloc political warfare
in the Middle East and Africa. The strength
of the Communist parties in this area will
probably remain low during the period of this
estimate. Most Communist parties have been
forced underground, and only that in Iran
and those in North Africa linked to the French
Communist Party have thus far had any
marked influence. However, despite the
slight organizational gains of the Commu-
nists, the continued growth of nationalist and
anti-Western extremism and of social unrest
will continue to provide the Communists with
opportunities for increasing their influence
among students, workers, and peasants.
21. The Bloc agent in Iran, the Tudeh Party,
had prior to Mossadeq's downfall an esti-
mated hard-core strength of 1,000, a card-
carrying membership estimated at from
20,000 to 45,000, and probably an additional
80,000 fellow-travelers. It has been the only
sizable united and disciplined political party
in Iran, demonstrating great cohesion and
considerable organized strength. It has de-
veloped techniques for the controlled use of
mass demonstrations, strikes, and riots for
political purposes.
South Asia
22. Communism does not now pose a major
immediate threat to India or Pakistan, al-
though the Indian Communist Party and al-
lied parties received 6,000,000 votes (of 106,-
000,000) in the 1952 elections. The Indian
Communist Party still has only about 40;000
members, but it has small vocal groups in
several state legislatures and the national
legislature. The Communist Party members
in the national legislature will be able to do
little more than to embarrass the government
and to use their positions to spread Commu-
nist propaganda. In those states where
Communist strength is., greatest, the party
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may be able to obtain representation in local
coalition governments and even seriously to
disrupt parliamentary processes.
23. At the present time, the major task of
the Indian Communist Party is to build up
its organizational strength. In urban areas,
the party uses trade unions and "peace"
movements as vehicles of propaganda, and in
rural areas, peasant organizations are used
to stir up the agrarian population and to
enlist support for subversive activities. To a
considerable extent, party strength in respect
to organization will depend on the policies of
the Indian Government toward the party.
Far East and Southeast Asia
24. Although the Japanese Communist Party
now has less than 100,000 members (about
half of whom are underground) , it is well
organized and well disciplined and has a sig-
nificant potential for espionage, sabotage,
and propaganda, as well as for promoting at
least limited and sporadic incidents of mass
violence. However, the strength of the party
will continue to be limited by the official re-
straints of the Japanese police and intelli-
gence services and by the party's open identi-
fication with and virtual subordination to the
interests and policies of the USSR. The
existence of such issues as trade with the
Bloc, especially China, fear of Japanese in-
volvement in a general war in Asia, the pres-
ence of US forces in Japan, and a peace treaty
with the USSR, should provide the Bloc with
considerable opportunities for political pres-
sure on the domestic and international levels.
25. Bloc political warfare strength varies
throughout Southeast Asia. It is greatest in
Indochina where the Viet Minh is a forceful
instrument of control and terror. The Viet
Minh retains considerable nationalist appeal
and maintains heavy military pressure upon
the French, with Chinese Communist assist-
ance. The Viet Minh has received diplomatic
recognition by the Bloc states, it has the sup-
port of numerous non-Communists not only
within the zones of its control, but also in the
Franco-Vietnamese areas. The continuation
of the Viet Minh's popular hold on substantial
proportions of the populations in its own
27
zone, based partly on military prestige, partly
on continued nationalist appeal, and partly
on the mechanism of compulsion and terror,
will depend upon the degree of military power
and ideological appeal which the free world
may be able to bring to bear against it.
26. The prospects for Bloc political warfare in
Burma, Thailand, and Malaya will depend
largely upon developments in Indochina. In
Burma and Malaya, the Communists are
capable of conducting guerrilla operations in
small scattered areas. In Thailand, the Com-
munist Party is small and relatively ineffec-
tual. However, Communist political war-
fare strengths in Thailand would probably
grow considerably if the Viet Minh or the '
Chinese Communists ' should consolidate a
position along the Thailand borders.
27. The Communist movement in Indonesia
has gained considerable political strength
since the end of World War II. Communist
strength derives from representation in par-
liament and support from some non-Com-
munist members of parliament; from Com-
munist control of SOBSI, the dominant In-
donesian labor union; and from successful
adoption of united front tactics, which have
frequently resulted in participation by front
parties in the government.2
28. In the Philippines, Communist strength
has declined considerably since 1951, and,
except for some influence in labor unions,
tenant farmer groups, and women's and
youths' leagues, is confined almost exclusively
to the greatly weakened Huk movement.
Latin America
29. The Communist threat in Latin America
is greater than the present party membership
of about 200,000 in the area would suggest,
because of the ease with which a relatively
few Communists operating behind labor, in-
tellectual, and other fronts can exploit the
social unrest and Yankeephobia already exist-
ing in the non-Communist population. Guate-
mala is a prime example of how a small Corn-
2 The current critical situation in Indonesia has
been examined in SE-51, "The Significance of
the New Indonesian Government" (18 Septem-
ber 1953) .
1M
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UUrinULli I ki
munist minority? can, through its militant
advocacy of social reforms and nationalistic
policies and through its occupancy of key posi-
tions in labor and governmental agencies,
convert a government into an effective,
though indirectly controlled, instrument of
the Communists.
30. The organizational strength of Commu-
nist parties in Latin America has declined in
recent years, and in many countries the
parties have been officially suppressed. Never-
theless, Communist influence is great in
Guatemala, considerable in British Guiana
and the French West Indies, and moderate in
Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, and Cuba.
This influence will probably be maintained
during the period of this estimate and may
even increase in the event of a decline in eco-
nomic activity. The Communists dominate
completely one of the three Latin American
international labor federations, the Confed-
eration of Latin American Workers (CTAL) ,
and, through their influence in labor, they
have gained a considerable potential for in-
stigating and prolonging strikes in strategic
industries, such as in the Bolivian tin and
28
Chilean copper mines. In Brazil, the Com-
munists have been influential in preventing
the development of Brazil's petroleum re-
sources by US capital. In most Latin Amer-
ican countries, the Communists have worked
closely with the ultranationalists, and they
have attempted to form "national liberation"
fronts based on labor unity and the exploita-
tion of local nationalist issues, such as the
bilateral military pacts between the individual
republics and the US.
31. The Communists have also been success-
ful in penetrating Latin American educa-
tional systems, intellectual circles, and those
patriotic organizations formed to give expres-
sion to the spirit of ultranationalism. By
employing front organizations and sponsoring
"peace" congresses, the Communists have ex-
ploited the fear of war and have stressed that
Latin America has nothing to gain and much
to lose from embroilment in a world conflict.
These local Communist propaganda activities
have received support from Soviet radio broad-
casts to Latin America, which have increased
in volume since the outbreak of the Korean
war.
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ESTIMATED BLOC ACTIVE MILITARY AND SECURITY PERSONNEL STRENGTH
July 1953 - July 1955
PERSONNEL STRENGTH (IN THOUSANDS)
TOTALS
COUNTRY
SERVICES
JULY 1953
Jur.x 1955
JULY 1953
I JULY 1955
ARMY
AIR FORCE
NAVY
SECURITY
ARMY
AIR FORCE
NAVY
SECURITY
USSR
2,500.
800.
800.1
400.
2,500.
800.
820.1
400.
4,500.
4,520.
SATELLITES (total)
1,286.
79.
30.6
290.5
1,690.
79.2
36.9
305.
1,686.1
2,110.9
Albania
40.
0.2
0.8
10.
40.
0.2
0.9
10.
51.
51.1
Bulgaria
220.
14.
4.8
40.
250.
14.
6.
40.
278.8
310.
Czechoslovakia
185.
14.
35.
250.
14.
.. ..
50.
234.
314.
East Germany
100.
6.5
8.
25.
250.
6.5
10.
25.
139.5
291.5
Hungary
185.
12.
37.5 ,
250.
12.
.
40.
234.5
302.
Poland
330.
20.3
9.
65.
350.
20.3
11.
65.
424.3
4463
Rumania
226.
12.
8.
78.
300.
12.
9.
75.
324.
396.
COMMUNIST
Asia (total)
2,873.
75.2
58.
1,512.
2,785.4
75.4
66.
1,512.
4,428.
4,438.
China
2,380.
60.
58.
1,450.
3,948.
North Korea
280.
15.
295.
Viet Minh
123.
? ? ? ?
62.
185.
BLOC TOTALS
6,569.
954.
888.6
2,202.5
6,975.
954.
922.9
2,217.
10,614.1
11,068.9
Excluding 95,000 Naval Air personnel, but including 125,000 Naval security personnel. "
'Not including 5,000 of unknown subordination.
This estimate is based on continuation of present conditions and is therefore highly tenuous.
Air Force strengths are carried at 1953 levels in the absence of sufficient information on which to base an estimate for 1955.
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Table 2
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CONFtDENT
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF BLOC GROUND FORCES, JULY 1953
COUNTRY
FORCES
Dry'sroNs BY TYPE, JULY 1953
LINE
CAV.
RIFLE
MECH.
ARNE'D
OR
TANK
SUP-
PORT-
ING
USSR (total)
105 40 25 45
Occupied Europe
Caucasus MD's.
NW. MD's.
W. MD's. ?Not available by type ?
W. Central MD's.
E. Central MD's.
Far East
SATELLITES (total) 1 57 11 6 8
Albania 3
Bulgaria 1 11
Czechoslovakia 8 4
East Germany 2 1
Hungary 9 1 1 4
Poland 12 5 1
Rumania- 12 1 3
COMMUNIST ASIA 7 218 5 16
(total)
China 7 194 5 15
North Korea 18
Viet Minh 6 1
BLOC TOTALS
TOTAL
LINE
DIVISIONS
DISTRIBUTION, JULY 1953
WESTERN
CAUCASUS
CENTRAL USSR
FAR EAST
JULY
JULY
PERSONNEL
LINE
PERSON-
LINE
PERSON-
LINE
PERSON-
DIV'S
1953
1955
DIV'S
NEL
DIV'S
NEL
Dry's
NEL
LINE
175
175
1,385,000
95 220,000 17
455,000
33
415,000
30
30
30
535,000
30
17
17
220,000 17
14
14
190,000
14
51
51
660,000
51
19
19
275,000
19
14
14
180,000
14
30
30
415,000
30
75
98
1,286,000
75
3
3
40,000
14
16
220,000
14
15
185,000
3
12
100,000
11
15
185,000
17
22
330,000
13
15
226,000
246
191
2,783,000
Est.
221
184
2,380,000
18
280,000
7
7
123,000
471
2,671,000
170 220,000 17
455,000
33
3,198,000
30
CONFIDFIVTiAi
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9
Table 3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9
CONFIDENTIAL.
PRESENT ESTIMATED TO/E STRENGTH AND GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF
BLOC AIR FORCES (Aircraft Types)
USSR
SATELLITES
CAFIC
Distribution
Type A/C
East
Ger.
West
USSR
S. W.
USSR
South
USSR
Cen.
USSR
Far
East
TOTALS
Alban.
Bulg.
Czech.
East
Ger.
Hung.
Poland
Rum.
TOTALS
TOTALS
Jet
?bn Piston
c) Jet
ce
Piston
.4_
;..,
:142 Jet
Piston
al
g t. Jet
..-cl
Ii E Piston
GIC.)1
2,42 Jet
Piston
E-4"
a.)
Jet
0 ca
a) w Piston
0
1,400
570
340
260
170
30
120
2,570
500
1,030
1,030
420
630
830
200
210
1,170
250
130
90
110
400
160
60
40
1,130
100
120
120
60
30
60
300
200
120
120
40
60
30
2,130
450
630
540
460
190
590
200
100
8,700
1,500
2,600
2,240
1,290
1,220
1,870
520
560
10
290
50
130
130
30
40
220
50
170
30
...
60
110
110
50
? ? ?
80
80
30
550
50
220
80
100
20
40
150
100
80
80
30
30
1,430
310
680
80
390
- 140
170
1,500
200
160
100
260
10
170
20,500
3,200
2,400
roafts**0-am,
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9
31
.1.
Table 4
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9
C40 F MM
E
ESTIMATED BLOC AVAL FORCES JULY 1953- JULY 1955
FLEET
BALTIC
NORTHERN BLACK SEA
PACIFIC
TOTALS
BLOC TOTALS
SHIPS AND PERSONNEL
USSR
SATELLITES
USSR
USSR
SATELLITES
USSR
COMMUNIST
USSR
SATELLITE
JULY JULY
1953 1955
1953 1955
JULY JULY
1953 1955
JULY JULY
1953 1955
1953 1955
JULY JULY
1953 1955
CHINA
JULY JULY
1953 1955
& COMMUNIST
JULY JULY
1953 1955
1953 1955
CHINA
Surface and Shore Personnel
348
357
Naval Air (000)
32
32
Surface Vessels (Total)
1,254
1,275
A. MAJOR COMBATANT (Total)
66
87
Battleships/Monitor
2
2
Cruisers
11
19
Destroyers2
40
54
Coastal Destroyers
13
13
B. MINOR COMBATANT (Total)
1,188
4
Submarines (Total)5
138
165
Ocean Patrol
49
65
Medium Range,
39
34
Coastal
50
66
15 19
2 2
87 137
1 ?1
86 136
2 2
2 2
98
100
162
165
? 13
17
192
198
58
66
800
820
86
100
886
920
9
9
21
21
.3
.3
33
33
...
95
95
2
2
97
97
225
236
334
346
136
138
389
400
131
137
2,202
2,258
354
378
2,556
2,612
33
44
36
48
5
5
49
60
1
184
240
7
7
1918
2473
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
4
4
4
2
2
8
8
.
.
2
2
11
23
31
1
1
24
32
29
40
19
31
5
5
36
47
124
172
6
6
130
178
2
2
7
7
11
11
33
33
33
,
33
192
4
298
4
131
133
340
130
136
2,018
4
347
371
2,365
.
33
49
70
75
1
1
107
88
348
377
3
3
351
380
26
40
18
19
19
25
112
149
112
149
3
3
9
9
1
1
37
26
88
72
3
3
91
75
4
6
43
47
51
37
148
156
148
156
On side in 1949 ? Present status unknown.
2 Based on continued construction at estimated present rate on building facilities presently utilized.
These figures include some overage types useful primarily as amphibious support ships, i.e., the battleships/monitor, 2 cruisers, 8 destroyers, and 16 coastal de-
stroyers. By mid-1955 the estimated number of overage cruisers will increase to 4.
These will remain at about present strength.
5 Based on estimated construction programs. Obsolete boats are deleted from USSR totals. All Satellite submarines are obsolete, and thus effectiveness is nil.
CONFIDFNTIAI
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9
32
Table 5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9
ORPFIDE
ESTIMATED COMPOSITION OF BLOCHANT FL MIDr
-1953 AND MID-1955
FLEETS
(Vessels 1,000 Gross Tons Upward)
MID-1953
MID-1955
COUNTRY
SHIPS
NON-TANKERS'
TANKERS
BLOC TOTAL
NON-TANKERS1
TANKERS
BLOC TOTAL
No.
1 Dwt.
No.
Dwt.
No.
Dwt.
No.
Dwt.
No.
1 Dwt.
No.
I Dwt.
USSR
569
2,513,794
36
184,329
605
2,698,123
626
2,677,334
50
218,104 -
676
2,895,438
SATELLITES
(Total)
85
405,583
2
21,490
?87
427,073
99
456,983
2
21,490
101
478,473
COMMUNIST
CHINA
85
249,739
11
18,090
96
267,829
85
249,739
11
18,090
96
267,829
BLOC TOTALS
739
3,169,116
49
223,909
788
3,393,025
810
3,384,056
63
257,684
873
3,641,740
'Includes passenger ships, freighters, and miscellaneous types such as crab canneries, whale factories, trawlers, and hydrographic ships.
33
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9
???.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9
CUNHULN
,
34
NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE FOR ESTIMATES
OF BLOC ARMED STRENGTH
a. G-2 comment of the nature of the evidence available for estimates of Bloc ground force
strength:
The reliability of Order of Battle intelligence on Communist countries varies directly
with distances from friendly areas; accessibility or degree of contact being the major
factor. For example, for CCF and North Korean units recently in contact, Order of
Battle information is excellent and considered reliable. To 'a slightly lesser degree,
Order of Battle information on Soviet units in Eastern Europe can be considered
"reliable."
This degree of reliability decreases, however, as distance from contact increases. As a
result, elements of Order of Battle intelligence in the interior of the Soviet Bloc, such as
subordination of units, names of unit commanders, or even precise knowledge as to
exact location of major units are often lacking in reliability. This condition applies
equally to both the interior of USSR and to Communist China.
b. AFOIN comment on the nature of the evidence available for estimates of Bloc air force
strength:
Estimates of Soviet air strength are derived from intelligence which is considered of
acceptable reliability, but collection coverage is incomplete. Estimates of over-all size
and composition of Soviet Air Forces are derived from identification of individual units
and estimated Table of Organization and Equipment strengths authorized for the various
types of air regiments. Current estimates of jet fighter and medium bomber strength
are considered reasonably valid. While aircraft count data are limited, they support
an estimate that the current average levels of actual strength for the various types of
aircraft amount to the following percentages of authorized TO and E strength: for jet
fighters, 80-85 percent; for piston medium bombers, 75-80 percent; for jet light bombers
and jet reconnaissance, 60-65 percent; and for all other types of aircraft, 90-100 percent.
c. ONI comment on the nature of the evidence available for estimates of Bloc naval strength:
Evidence confirming the existence of the major surface combatant vessels is firm and
accurate. Identification of individual ships as to name and/or pennant numbers has
been supported by evidence from a number of sources. Reliable evidence confirms the
existence of 80 percent of the submarines and supports the existence of 15 percent; there
is doubt about 5 percent. Of the 95 percent (333 submarines) whose existence is con-
firmed or supported, 308 have been identified. Future strength estimates are based on
current strength, observed building rates, identified new construction activity, and
obsolescence factors.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9