PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN GUATEMALA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002700050001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 19, 1953
• Content Type: NIE

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CM -NO. S 3
Welt ASSISTANT DIRRCTOR.ONE 25x1
SECURITY INFORMATION
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
25X1
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN GUATEMAL
NI E-84
Published 19 May 1953
25X1
25X
1
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 12 May 1953. The AEC and FBI abstained,
the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN GUATEMALA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the current political situation in Guatemala and probable future de-
velopments.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The current political situation in Gua-
temala is adverse to US interests. The
Guatemalan Communists exercise a polit-
ical influence far out of proportion to their
small numerical strength. Their influ-
ence will probably continue to grow as long
as President Arbenz remains in power.
2. Communist influence in Guatemala is
based on militant advocacy of social re-
forms and nationalistic policies identified
with the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944.
It is exercised through the personal in-
fluence of individual Communists with
the President and within the pro-Admin-
istration political parties, through infil-
tration of the bureaucracy, through con-
trol of labor organizations, and through
leadership of the agrarian reform move-
ment. The Communists' present objec-
tive is not open and direct control of
Guatemala. Rather, they seek to neu-
tralize Guatemala as an ally of the United
States and to convert its Government into
an effective, though indirectly controlled,
instrument of Communism.
3. President Arbenz still exercises per-
sonal control of the Administration and
of the Army and the Police. It is still
possible for him to break his ties with
the Communists and to moderate the
policies of his Administration, but it is
highly unlikely that he will do so.
4. Implementation of the Agrarian Re-
form Law of 1952 will be the principal
objective of the Arbenz Administration
during 1953. It is to be expected that
the large Guatemalan landholders and
the United Fruit Company will be vic-
timized in the process.
5. The implementation of Agrarian Re-
form has intensified a sense of insecurity
which has had a depressing effect on
business activity in Guatemala. However,
its direct effect on agricultural produc-
tion is likely to be negligible, at least for
several years. As long as coffee prices
hold up the general economy of Guate-
mala will not be vitally affected.
6. The net internal political effect of the
implementation of the Agrarian Reform
Law will probably be to strengthen the
Arbenz Administration and to increase
Communist influence and capabilities.
Neither the landholders nor the Fruit
Company can expect any sympathy in
Guatemalan public opinion. Redistribu-
tion of their land will be used to mobilize
the hitherto inert peasantry in support
of the Administration.
WON* T
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7. The most effective opposition to the
Arbenz Administration is found in Guate-
mala City. The urban elements which
constitute this opposition are strongly
anti-Communist, but they are also
strongly nationalistic. In general they
could not be expected to make common
cause with the landholders and the Fruit
Company or to welcome foreign interven-
tion in Guatemalan internal affairs, al-
though some of them might be disposed
to accept foreign assistance in overthrow-
ing Arbenz. There is no likelihood that
this urban opposition could alter the
course of the Government by political
action. It could not succeed in a revolu-
tionary attempt opposed by the Army.
8. The Army is the only organized ele-
ment in Guatemala capable of rapidly
and decisively altering the political situa-
tion. Although a quick change of atti-
tude is always possible, there is no pres-
ent reason to doubt the continued loyalty
of the Army high command and of most
of the Army to Arbenz. The Army under
its present leaders could not be expected
to take revolutionary action unless they
became convinced that their personal
security and well-being were threatened
by Communist infiltration and domina-
tion of the Government, or unless the
policies of the Government were to re-
sult in extreme social disorder and eco-
nomic collapse.
9. So long as it remains united, the
Guatemalan Army can defeat any force
which the Governments of El Salvador,
Honduras, and Nicaragua could deploy
against it. These Governments are fear-
ful that the trend in Guatemala will lead
to Communist subversion and social up-
heaval in their territories. They are
probably giving serious consideration to
the possibility of effecting a political
change in Guatemala through clandes-
tine support of revolutionary action there.
It is highly unlikely, however, that they
would or could mount an open military
intervention in Guatemala.
10. Guatemala will probably continue to
assist Communist subversive activities in
the Caribbean area, but will probably
avoid involvement in filibustering opera-
tions like those of the Caribbean Legion
in 1948-1951. To counterbalance its iso-
lation in Central America it will seek
political support elsewhere, particularly
in the United Nations. If actually in-
vaded it would seek to invoke the Rio
Treaty as well as the UN Charter.
11. Guatemala has frequently taken
occasion to demonstrate its independence
of US leadership and in general has been
less cooperative than could be desired,
particularly in Hemispheric affairs.
Moreover, the regime has systematically
been hostile toward US private economic
interests in Guatemala. Detriment to
Hemisphere solidarity would not deter
Guatemala from any course of action
suggested by its own interests.
DISCUSSION
The Arbenz Administration
12. The present political situation in Guate-
mala is the outgrowth of the Revolution of
1944. That Revolution was something more
than a routine military coup. From it there
developed a strong national movement to free
Guatemala from the military dictatorship,
social backwardness, and "economic colonial-
10011011310
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.001011.111,-
ism" which had been the pattern of the past.
These aspirations have inspired the loyalty
and conformed with the self-interest of most
politically conscious Guatemalans. The Ar-
benz Administration still derives some
strength from its claim to leadership of the
continuing national revolution.
13. In the name of the Revolution of 1944 the
successive administrations of Arevalo (1945-
1951) and Arbenz have pursued increasingly
radical and nationalistic policies. Their per-
secution of foreign economic interests in
Guatemala, especially the United Fruit Com-
pany, and their demands for the "restitution"
of Belize (British Honduras) have had the
support or acquiescence of almost all Guate-
malans. Their promotion of labor organiza-
tion and agrarian reform has tended to neu-
tralize political opposition by creating mass
support for the present regime. Any objec-
tion to the trend of developments in Guate-
mala has been stigmatized as resistance to the
Revolution of 1944 by "feudal" and "impe-
rialistic" interests.
14. The toleration of Communist activity
which characterized the early years of the
Arevalo Administration has developed into an
effective working alliance between Arbenz and
the Communists. The pursuit of leftist and
nationalistic policies has been greatly accel-
erated under the Arbenz Administration. His
first year in office was highlighted by active
Government support for the formation of a
national labor confederation and by a joint
Labor-Government attack on the United Fruit
Company. That attack failed, but the alli-
ance of the Government with Communist-led
organized labor was firmly established in the
course of the struggle.
15. The point of reference for consideration of
the present political tensions in Guatemala is
the Agrarian Reform Law enacted in mid-
1952. This Law provides for the expropria-
tion of large tracts of unused land and their
distribution to farm workers. Although pre-
sented as a long-overdue measure of social and
economic reform, the Law has strong political
motivation and significance. Communists
and fellow-travelers played a leading part in
its enactment; they honeycomb the National
3
Agrarian Department established to adminis-
ter it. The Communists have incited disor-
derly peasant seizures of privately owned
lands. The Law is being administered in such
a way as to destroy the political effectiveness
of the large landholders and to mobilize the
hitherto politically inert peasantry in support
of the regime.
16. The recent congressional electoral cam-
paign has further emphasized Arbenz' political
alliance with the Communists. Pressure
from the President's office forced some reluc-
tant Administration supporters to accept the
newly reorganized and legalized Communist
Party (called the Guatemalan Labor Party, or
PGT) into the Electoral Front, the pro-Admin-
istration coalition. The Electoral Front swept
the country, except Guatemala City, where its
ticket was decisively defeated by a strong anti-
Communist vote. The over-all result of the
election was a reduction of Opposition
strength in Congress from eleven to five of
the 56 seats. Although Communist Party
representation remained at four, the Con-
gressional membership includes several addi-
tional crypto-Communists and a majority may
be considered sympathetic toward the Com-
munist Party line so long as Arbenz favors it.
17. A further increase in political tension has
resulted from a Supreme Court decision favor-
able to a Guatemalan landholder who had
appealed for protection from arbitrary execu-
tion of the Agrarian Reform Law. At the in-
stigation of Arbenz, the Guatemalan Congress
immediately unseated the justices who favored
this decision and replaced them with others
more reliable from its point of view. This
action provoked an intense but transitory re-
action on the part of professional and other
elements in Guatemala City already anti-
Administration in sentiment.
18. President Arbenz has a middle-class back-
ground, as have most of his political associates.
At least initially, his involvement with Revolu-
tionary forces was probably as much a matter
of simple political expediency and opportun-
ism as of personal inclination. By now,
however, he has become emotionally com-
mitted to the social and nationalistic objec-
tives of the Revolution of 1944, especially to
thedikeellar
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Agrarian Reform. Although probably not
himself a Communist, he has found Commu-
nist leaders among his most ardent and useful
supporters and values accordingly his political
alliance with them. Inasmuch as Arbenz has
thus far kept personal control of the consid-
erable powers of the Guatemalan Presidency,
it is still possible for him to break with the
Communists and to moderate the policies of
his Administration. He has shown no inclina-
tion to do so, however. As the situation in
Guatemala develops the political alternatives
open to him are steadily reduced.
Communist Strength and Influence
19. The Guatemalan Labor (Communist)
Party is estimated to have no more than 1,000
members, of whom perhaps less than one-half
are militants. The Party is in open communi-
cation with international Communism
through the Communist-controlled interna-
tional labor organizations (the Latin Ameri-
can CTAL and the world-wide WFTU) and
through visits made to the Soviet Bloc by in-
dividual Communists and front group delega-
tions.
20. The Communists have achieved their pres-
ent political influence in Guatemala, not as a
political party competing with others, but
through personal influence with the President
and through the coordinated activity of in-
dividual Communists within the leftist politi-
cal parties and labor unions which emerged
from the Revolution of 1944. This Commu-
nist infiltration of other parties and organiza-
tions has been facilitated by the coincidence of
avowed Communist social and "anti-imperial-
ist" objectives with those of the Revolution.
The recent legalization of the Party and its
acceptance into the pro-Administration Elec-
toral Front has not altered its basic strategy
of seeking power through infiltration rather
than through open political competition. Its
immediate objective is not a "People's Democ-
racy" under open and direct Communist con-
trol, but rather to neutralize Guatemala as an
ally of the United States and to convert the
Government into an effective, though indirect-
ly controlled, instrument of Communism.
21. With the assistance of the Government,
Communist and Communist-influenced labor
leaders have been the most successful organ-
izers of Guatemalan labor. Their formation of
the General Confederation of Guatemalan
Workers (CGTG) and Government pressure
for labor unity have facilitated the extension
of their control over all organized labor. In
the important railway workers' and teachers'
unions, however, there has been some rank-
and-file opposition to association with Com-
munism. In 1952, moreover, rank-and-file de-
fection from Communist leadership was an
important factor in breaking a major strike
against the United Fruit Company. The
basic weakness of Guatemalan Communist
labor leadership is that it is imposed from
above through top control of the machinery of
labor organization and cannot be sure of rank-
and-file support in all circumstances.
22. Implementation of the Agrarian Reform
Law has opened a new field of Communist or-
ganizational activity. The Communists are
seeking to mobilize the hitherto inert mass of
rural workers through the CGTG and the Na-
tional Confederation of Guatemalan Peasants
(CNCG) , in which they exercise a strong in-
fluence.
23. Through their leadership in organized
labor and their influence with the President
and within the pro-Administration political
parties, the Communists have gained many
positions of influence within the Government:
in Congress (where they dominate the Spe-
cial Committees on Agrarian Reform and La-
bor Code Revision) , in the National Electoral
Board, the National Agrarian Department, the
Institute of Social Security, the Labor Courts,
the Ministry of Education, and the Presi-
dential Secretariat of Propaganda, and in the
official and pro-Administration press and
radio. Their influence is extended by an in-
definite number of Communist sympathizers
in similar positions. At the same time, no
Communist holds any position of Cabinet rank
and the Communists appear to have made
little or no effort as yet to gain control over
the Police or the Army.
011111.16P-
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Anti-Communist Elements in Guatemala
24. Various elements in Guatemala, including
many loyal adherents of the Revolution of
1944, view with increasing concern the rapid
growth of Communist influence in that coun-
try. These elements, however, have shown
little capacity to organize for effective
counteraction. In general, each has tended
to react only as its own peculiar interests were
directly affected and all have been deterred by
the success of Administration propaganda in
stigmatizing any criticism as opposition to
the principles of the Revolution of 1944 and
support of "feudalism" and "foreign economic
imperialism."
25. Aside from US private interests in Guate-
mala,1 the large Guatemalan landholders have
been the chief target of the Revolutionary pro-
gram. During the Arevalo Administration
the landholders failed in their attempts to
alter the course of the Revolution. They now
appear to be politically isolated and incapable
of effective self-defense.
26. The Catholic hierarchy in Guatemala is
implacably opposed to Communism, but the
Church has been excluded from an active role
in national affairs since the late Nineteenth
Century. Moreover, the Church is handi-
capped by the meagerness of its resources, the
small number of priests in proportion to pop-
ulation, the fact that most priests are aliens
subject to deportation, and the lack of a pro-
gram capable of competing with the Commu-
nist-led labor movement or with Agrarian
Reform.
27. Urban opposition to Communism (largely
confined to Guatemala City) is composed of:
(a) commercial and manufacturing interests;
(b) certain professional groups; (c) university
students; (d) moderate labor elements; and
(e) the market women of Guatemala City.
This urban opposition is strongly anti-Com-
munist, but it is also strongly nationalistic.
In particular, it resents the predominance of
US private economic interests in Guatemalan
The United Fruit Company, the International
Railways of Central America, and Empresas Elec-
tricas (the principal electric light and power
company) .
life. So far the Arbenz Administration has
treated Guatemalan urban economic interests
with consideration, has supported them
against foreign competition, and has made no
sustained effort to break their strong political
position in Guatemala City.
28. The political effectiveness of the urban
opposition has been hindered by the multi-
plicity of its elements and by conflicts of in-
terest among them, as well as by their con-
tinuing loyalty to the stated objectives of the
Revolution of 1944. Nevertheless, the opposi-
tion won the mayoral election in Guatemala
City in December 1951 and even more deci-
sively defeated the Electoral Front there in
the January 1953 congressional election. The
unwillingness of urban opposition groups to
be identified with the landholders will remain
an obstacle to the unification of all anti-Com-
munist elements in Guatemala.
The Position of the Army and the Police
(the Guardia Civil)
29. The Army (6,000 men) is the only organ-
ized element in Guatemala capable of rapidly
and decisively altering the political situation.
The two regiments (1,600 men) stationed in
the capital city are an elite force trained under
the supervision of the US Army Mission and
better equipped than other units of the
Guatemalan Army. The Guardia Civil (3,500
men) is dispersed in small detachments ? it
could neither defeat an Army coup nor itself
overthrow the Government without Army sup-
port. All officers in the Guardia Civil are
Army officers.
30. Since the Revolution of 1944 the Army
and the Police have refrained from active par-
ticipation in politics while supporting the con-
stitutionally established administrations of
Arevalo and Arbenz. The present Army lead-
ers owe their personal advancement to the
Revolution, and particularly to Colonel Ar-
benz, who was a military leader in the Revolu-
tion and Minister of Defense under Arevalo
before himself becoming President. There is
no reason to question their personal loyalty to
Arbenz. Any possible disaffection in the
Army would be likely to occur at the junior
1110111Fr
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1110.11
officer level. Arbenz has sought to enhance
morale through pay increases, additional al-
lowances, quarters for many field grade offi-
cers, promotions every three years, duty-free
commissary privileges, and appointments to
desirable government positions. Especially
generous treatment has been provided for the
officers of the two regiments stationed at
Guatemala City, while less reliable officers
have been assigned to isolated posts in the
hinterland. The military units outside of
Guatemala City have little potential for effec-
tive revolutionary action because of their dis-
persion and isolation, the inferiority of their
equipment and training, and the watchful
supervision of trusted area commanders. The
rank-and-file of the Army is conscripted and is
susceptible to the same political appeals which
the regime addresses to the mass of the popu-
lation. There is little or no Communist pene-
tration or influence in the Army.
International Relations
31. Guatemalan foreign policies reflect the
nationalistic and "democratic" attitudes asso-
ciated with the Revolution of 1944. Although
they have not been systematically antago-
nistic toward the United States, Guatemala
has frequently taken occasion to demonstrate
its independence of US leadership and in
general has been less cooperative than could
be desired, particularly in Hemispheric affairs.
Moreover, the regime has systematically been
hostile toward US private economic interests
in Guatemala (the United Fruit Company,
the International Railways of Central Ameri-
ca, and Empresas Electrica) . In keeping with
its attitude toward "colonialism," it has given
tacit support to Puerto Rican nationalism.
It has complicated its adherence to the Rio
Treaty with reservations relating to its claim
to Belize (British Honduras) . It has sub-
scribed to the principle of inter-American
military cooperation, but narrowly interprets
that commitment. It voted for the UN
"Uniting for Peace" resolution, but has de-
clared that it would not implement it. These
attitudes are not unique in Latin America,
but Guatemalan propaganda in relation to
them has a strong anti-US slant. Detriment
to Hemisphere solidarity has not deterred and
6
would not deter Guatemala from any course
of action suggested by its own interests.
32. Since 1944 Guatemala has supported the
"democratic" elements of other Caribbean
countries in their struggles against "dictator-
ship" and has provided material assistance
to "democratic" exiles from such countries.
During 1948-1950 Guatemala supported the
filibustering operations of the "Caribbean
Legion" against the Dominican Republic and
Costa Rica. Since 1950 the Legion has ceased
to be operational, largely because of the with-
drawal of Guatemalan support for such opera-
tions. However, Guatemalan official propa-
ganda, with its heavy emphasis on conflict
between democracy and dictatorship and be-
tween national independence and "economic
imperialism," is a disturbing factor in the
Caribbean area. Moreover, the Guatemalan
Government, at the least, tolerates and in-
directly assists clandestine Communist sub-
versive activities in other countries. The
Guatemalan Communist Party absorbs Carib-
bean exiles into its local organization, particu-
larly into its labor and front groups, and
through them it maintains contact with dis-
affected elements in other countries, thus
enhancing its capabilities as a focal point
for subversive activity throughout the Carib-
bean area.
33. Ever since the breakup of the Central
American federation in 1839 there have been
periodic attempts to restore some degree of
union among the five states. Guatemala, as
the principal state, has usually been the
leader in such efforts. In 1951 El Salvador
proposed the formation of an Organization
of Central American States (ODECA) with
a view toward gradual economic union and
eventual political union. Guatemala at-
tempted to assume the leadership of this
movement, but El Salvador, Honduras, and
Nicaragua, alarmed by the manifestations of
Communist influence in Guatemala, showed
themselves resolved to use ODECA as a means
of combatting Communism. In consequence
Guatemala has withdrawn from ODECA,
alleging the existence of an international con-
spiracy to interfere in Guatemala's internal
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affairs. This withdrawal confirms Guate-
mala's isolation in Central America.
34. Simultaneously with its withdrawal from
ODECA Guatemala complained to the United
Nations regarding this alleged foreign inter-
ference. It is notable that Guatemala by-
passed the Organization of America States
in addressing this complaint to the UN. It
probably calculated that its charge that US
private interests (i.e., the United Fruit Com-
pany and its affiliates) were responsible for
a "vast conspiracy" to subvert the existing
regime would enlist the support of the Soviet
and Arab-Asian Blocs in addition to that of
such Latin American countries as Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico.
35. El Salvador has shown extreme sensitivity
regarding the danger of an extension of Com-
munist influence from Guatemala into El
Salvador and other neighboring states; there
are persistent reports that El Salvador is
giving serious consideration to joint military
action with Honduras and Nicaragua against
Guatemala. Other Caribbean countries, par-
ticularly the Dominican Republic, Colombia,
and Venezuela, have also shown concern re-
garding the development of Guatemala as
a center of subversive influence and even of
subversive operations.
Probable Future Developments
36. Implementation of the Agrarian Reform
Law of 1952 will be the principal objective
of the Arbenz Administration during 1953.
In the process the large Guatemalan land-
holders and the United Fruit Company will
certainly be victimized. The net internal
political effect of Agrarian Reform will prob-
ably be to strengthen the Arbenz Adminis-
tration. Neither the landholders nor the
Fruit Company can expect sympathy from
Guatemalan public opinion. Redistribution
of their land will be used to mobilize the
hitherto inert mass of rural workers in sup-
port of the Administration. Agrarian Reform
will also afford the Communists an opportun-
ity to extend their influence by organizing
the peasants as they have organized other
workers.
7
37. Agrarian Reform has already intensified
a sense of insecurity which has had a de-
pressing effect on business activity in Guate-
mala. As regards agricultural production its
immediate effects are likely to be negligible:
as presently implemented it will do little more
than increase the number of subsistence
farms. In the longer run it may seriously
curtail the production of the Fruit Company
plantations. As long as coffee prices hold
up, however, the general economy of Guate-
mala is not likely to be vitally affected.
38. The dissatisfaction of important urban
elements will probably increase, but effective
political unity among these elements is not
likely to be achieved. The political union of
rural and urban interests in opposition to
the Arbenz Administration is even less likely.
No group or foreseeable combination of groups
is likely to be able to bring about any signifi-
cant moderation of the Administration's policy
by political action. No revolutionary attempt
opposed by the Army can be expected to
succeed.
39. The Army could effect a rapid and de-
cisive change in the Guatemalan political
situation if it were to take concerted action.
Although a quick change of attitude is always
possible, there is no present reason to doubt
the continued loyalty of the Army high com-
mand and of most of the Army to President
Arbenz. The Army could not be expected
to take revolutionary action unless its leaders
became convinced that their personal securi-
ty and well-being were threatened by Com-
munist infiltration and domination of the
Government, or unless the policies of the
Government were to result in extreme social
disorder and economic collapse.
40. As long as President Arbenz remains in
power2 the Arbenz-Communist alliance will
probably continue to dominate Guatemalan
politics. Any increase in political tension in
Guatemala would tend to increase Arbenz'
political dependence on this alliance.
2 Arbenz' legitimate term in office will expire on
March 15, 1957. Whether he will reach the end
of his term, whether he would then retire, and
what the character of his successor might be
cannot now be estimated.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002700050001-8
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41. The Governments of El Salvador, Hon-
duras, and Nicaragua will continue to seek
means to oppose the Communistic tendencies
of Guatemala, and will give serious considera-
tion to the possibility of effecting a political
change in Guatemala through clandestine
support of revolutionary activities. It is
highly unlikely, however, that they would
undertake an open military intervention in
Guatemala or actually could organize an
effective operation of that character in
view of the limited strength of their armed
forces, the proportion of that strength re-
quired for the maintenance of their own in-
ternal security, the fact that their forces are
ill-equipped and untrained for field opera-
tions, the (for them) probably insuperable
logistical obstacles to an open invasion of
Guatemala, and the internal and internation-
al political difficulties which would ensue.
Moreover, foreign military intervention would
tend to cause all factions in Guatemala to
unite to repel the invasion. So long as it
remains united, the Guatemalan Army could
defeat any force which El Salvador, Honduras,
8
and Nicaragua were capable of deploying
against it. In the event of such an invasion
Guatemala could present a clear case of for-
eign intervention to the Organization of
American States.
42. The Guatemalan Government will prob-
ably continue to assist Communist subversive
activities in the Caribbean area, but will prob-
ably avoid involvement in military operations
like those of the Caribbean Legion in 1948-
1951. To counterbalance its isolation in Cen-
tral America it will continue to seek political
support elsewhere, particularly in the United
Nations. If Latin American attitudes, as re-
vealed at the UN, justify such a course, it will
probably raise the same issue of foreign inter-
ference in the Organization of American
States. It would certainly seek to invoke
the Rio Treaty as well as the UN Charter if
it were to be invaded by its neighbors.
43. Guatemala's tolerance of Communism and
hospitality toward exiles makes it available
as a convenient haven for Communist fugi-
tives from the United States.
440esiiik
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002700050001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002700050001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002700050001-8