SURVEY OF AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002700040021-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: February 2, 1953
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECURITY INFORMATION
SURVEY
OF
AFRICA
COPY NO I
Oel 460 /99/
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
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, . SE.CURITY INFORMATION
SURVEY OF AFRICA
Foreword
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Part I
Introduction . . . ? ?
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A.
Race Relations . . . . .
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B.
Political Development ? ?
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C.
Economic Progress . ? ?
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D.
Communist Influence ? .
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Part II
Current Situation ? ? ? ?
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A.
North Africa . ? ? ? ?
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B.
West Africa . ? ? ? ? ?
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1. British West Africa
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a. Gold Coast . ? ?
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b. Nigeria . . ? ?
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2. Liberia ? ? ? ? ?
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3. French West Africa ?
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4. Togolands . ? ? ?
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C.
Equatorial Africa
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1. Belgian Congo ? ? ? ?
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2. French Equatorial Africa
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3. French Cameroons
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D.
East Africa ? ? ? ? ?
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1. British East Africa
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a. Kenya . . . .
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b. Tanganyika . . . .
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c. Uganda and Zanzibar .
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2. Ethiopia and Eritrea . . .
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3. British Somaliland and Somalia
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E.
Central Africa . . . .
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1. British Central Africa
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2. Portuguese Africa . .
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3. Madagascar . . .
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F.
Southern Africa . . . . ?
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1. High Commission Territories
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2. Union of South Africa
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APPENDICES:
Appendix I
Appendix II
Appendix III
Maps
Research within the U.S. Government .
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Comment on the Yergan and Jolis Reports 42
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SURVEY OF AFRICA
FOREWORD
This survey is divided into four sections. The intro-
duction, which treats the entire continent south of the Sahara
and north of the Union, emphasizes the overall problems
affecting Africa. These include race relations, political
development, economic progress and communist influence.
The second section describes the current political and
economic situation in individual countries, with the excep-
tion of French North Africa and the Union of South Africa,
which are extensively treated in recent NIE publications.
The continent has been divided into geographical areas: West,
Equatorial, East, Central and Southern Africa.
2 February 1953
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I. Introduction
SECURITY INFORMATION
SURVEY OF AFRICA
Africa, a continent of wide geographic diversity, is cur-
rently experiencing the strains and frictions produced by the
introduction of Western culture, with its techniques of
political and economic organization, into a primitive, largely
non-literate society. The problems arising from this develop-
ment are aggravated by the racial differences between Euro-
peans, who direct or enforce these changes, and the Africans.
The pace of change and the seriousness of the resulting
frictions is strongly affected, however, by the peculiarities
of the individual African territories and the varying Euro-
pean colonial policies. Four main problems have continent-
wide importance: race relations, political evolution, econo-
mic development and Communist influence.
A. Race Relations
The most explosive area in African race relations is
the belt of territory from the Cape of Good Hope to
Ethiopia which includes the Union of South Africa, and
the British areas of the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, Tanganyika
and Kenya. Here Europeans have settled in greater num-
bers than elsewhere and have laid claims to a permanently
predominating influence over Africans.
In East Africa their claim is contested by both
indigenous Africans and the Indian immigrants. But at-
tempts to unite these latter groups are hindered by the
Africans' resentment against the Indian traders who
dominate small business and money lending.
Europeans have also settled in Portuguese Angola and
Mozambique and in the Belgian Congo, but Portuguese and
Belgian policy and practice, combined with the limited
political influence of the settlers, have generally
avoided all save minor irritations between the races.
In Uganda, British West Africa and French Black
Africa, Europeans are only temporary residents -- officials,
businessmen and missionaries. Dissident movements in these
areas are protests against colonial political status
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rather than against the pressure of European settlement.
But here also racial issues are often injected into
purely political and economic disputes. Africans are
sensitive to the universal self-segregation of whites,
and publicity given the racial problems of South Africa
and Kenya has a pernicious effect on race relatinns
throughout the continent.
Similarly, the rapid development of the Gold Coast
toward the status of a native independent state has
important racial overtones and generally inspires other
Africans with the hope of self-government. To the
Europeans, it is a forecast of possible future develop-
ment in the settler communities of the Union, British
Central Africa and Kenya. This fear of an independent
African state, in which the European settler communities
would be a minority, influences many whites to judge less
harshly the South African Government, although individu-
ally they deplore many aspects of its racial policy.
B. Political Development
The political development of African territories is
largely conditioned by the traditions and policies of
the European governments.
The British are committed to granting colonial peoples
eventual independence within the Commonwealth. The partner-
ship of all races is regarded as an essential element in
the achievement of this goal. But white settlers, where
they live in significant numbers, believe that Colonial
Office concern for native rights inhibits economic develop-
ment, retards the growth of independent local political in-
stitutions and threatens their own ascendancy. This feeling
lies behind the Kenya Europeans' reiterated demand for
early self-government, schemes for a Central African Fed-
eration of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland and a vision of
Capricorn Africa which would indlude all British Central
and East Africa.
To date only Southern Rhodesia, under complete control
of a white minority, has come close to full dominion status,
a stage attained 30 years ago. The Colonial Office retains
control in the other British settler territories--Northern
Rhodesia, Kenya and Tanganyika. European settlers have
gained varying degrees of influence in the legislative
bodies of these colonies, and Africans have been accorded
very limited representation.
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Since World War II, evolution toward African self-
government has been rapid in the Gold Coast and Nigeria,
where there is no European settler population capable of
fighting British Colonial Office decisions. The Gold
Coast now has an African prime minister, a legislature
which is practically all-African and African ministers in
all save justice, defense and external affairs and finance
departments, with the promise of complete African control
in the near future. A relatively well-organized native
political party covers the whole country, and an indigenous
nationalism is supplanting tribal loyalties.
Nigeria is less advanced, although there is a majority
of African ministers in both the regional and central govern-
ments. Self-government has been retarded by serious tribal
antagonisms and because the northern region, Moslem and
semi-feudal in culture, fears domination by the Europeanized
elite of the coast. During the 1951 elections, an increase
of nationalistic sentiment was reported, though the results
again underlined the regional basis of Nigeria's political
parties. Sierra Leone, lagging behind the larger terri-
tories, is still troubled by the contrasts between a coastal
urban elite and the mass of interior "bush" natives. The
Gambia is a political and economic backwater.
The direction taken by British West Africa is anathema
to the Malan government of South Africa and privately
alarms French, Portuguese and Belgian authorities.
French policy emphasizes African assimilation of French
language and social habits, and the retention of African
territories as nominally autonomous units within the French
Union. Each French territory in West and Equatorial Africa
has been endowed by the 1946 French constitution with ad-
visory territorial assemblies and elaborate electoral pro-
cedures.
In addition, French West Africa and French Equatorial
Africa have elected Federation councils which advise the
government. "Citizenship" in the French Union has been
granted to all Africans, and each territory elects repre-
sentatives to the French National Assembly, the Council of
the Republic, and to the Assembly of the French Union. In
the most important, the French National Assembly, 80 per-
cent of the representatives from French territories south
of the Sahara are native Africans.
Senegal and the Ivory Coast of French West Africa are
the most politically sophisticated of the French territories,
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but the formal rights granted to French Africans have
been largely vitiated in practice by native inexperience
and incomprehension of political affairs, government pres-
sure for French-minded candidates, gerrymandering and
manipulation of elections. Suffrage is limited and the
territorial assemblies have no effective power.
The Portuguese territories of Guinea, Angola and Mozam-
bique are constitutionally provinces of Portugal itself.
Colonials and a few qualified natives participate in Por-
tuguese presidential elections; but the administration of
the territories is in the hands of the governors general
and all policy originates in Lisbon. As in Portugal,
the National Union is the only overt political party.
Belgian policy is materialistic paternalism with heavy
emphasis on balanced economic and social development.
Native political advance has been nil, but in both 1951
and 1952 official pronouncements have expressed a belief
that Africans should be more closely associated with the
administration. Conservative Belgians in the colony
objected strongly, and the only concrete expression of the
new outlook has been the appointment of some African nota-
bles to a council which advises the governor general.
There are no political parties and no elections.
There are three independent countries in the general
area under discussion. The Union of South Africa, as a
member of the Commonwealth, is fully self-governing and po-
sesses all the attributes of an independent nation.
Ethiopia, recently united in a federation with Eritrea,
has a long historical record of independent status, but
Western governmental practice and organization have not
penetrated deeply, and the benevolent despotism of the
emperor recalls European states of the 18th century. In
Liberia, an oligarchy descended from freed American
slaves rules the primitive native tribes. The government
party has never been defeated at the polls.
C. Economic Progress
African economic development is based on production
of raw materials for export. Among these are asbestos,
chrome, cobalt, copper, industrial diamonds, manganese,
tantalite, tin, uranium, vegetable fats and oils, cotton,
cocoa and sisal. Many African products are of strategic
importance to the United States and Western Europe.
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The economies of the continent have been relatively
vulnerable; their prosperity has depended on favorable
conditions in Europe and the United States, and a fall
in the world prices of a single commodity often spelled
economic disaster for European investors and brought un-
rest among the Africans of the territory affected. Since
1945 the growing use of commodity marketing boards in
many of the territories, a desire for international action
to soften the effect of price fluctuations, and heavy
world demand have decreased this vulnerability. Neverthe-
less, several African countries rely on a single product
for more than 50 percent of their exports: Liberia, rubber;
Gold Coast, cocoa; Northern Rhodesia, copper; and Uganda,
cotton.
In many territories -- especially in Northern and
Southern Rhodesia, and the Belgian Congo -- the exploita-
tion of mineral deposits has attracted heavy capital
investment and brought together a large African labor
force in an alien environment. In earlier periods, the
African could fall back in times of depression on his
traditional subsistence economy, but the progress of
specialization of labor and the increase in the number of
Africans who have severed their rural ties and adopted
permanent urban residence is making this increasingly
difficult. The Ten-Year Plan of the Belgian Congo seeks
to balance the economy by developing secondary industry
and an internal market; other territories have not
tackled this problem as systematically.
Two major factors hamper economic development in all
Africa. The first is a shortage of native labor caused
largely by the uneconomic use of labor in native agri-
culture, poor health of the natives, and lack of skills
and education. The mines of South Africa and to a lesser
extent those of the Rhodesias, needing far more labor than
can be obtained from local sources, have been supplied
from Nyasaland and Portuguese Mozambique. Officials of
the two latter territories are concerned about the social
consequences of male emigration, however, and there is
also a developing industrial need for labor in these
areas which threatens to reduce this supply.
In many regions not served by rails and roads, the
transportation problem limits exports to articles of
small bulk and high value. Even in areas with railroads,
narrow guages, light roadbeds, shortages of rolling stock,
and limited port facilities necessitate tonnage restrictions
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on strategically important mineral exports. In general,
the railroad systems of Africa are designed to link
producing areas in the hinterland with a port and
do not connect with each other. Most of the road
systems, particularly in the Equatorial regions, are
passable only in the dry season.
While the majority of Africans are engaged in agri-
culture, the organization of agricultural production
varies widely. Kenya's exports of wheat, pyrethrum,
sisal and coffee come largely from European-run planta-
tion farms, as do the sisal exports of Tanganyika.
Uganda's cotton is native grown. In West Africa, the
Gold Coast's cocoa is grown and gathered by African far-
mers, but graded and sold by a government board. In
Nigeria, the peanut crop in the north and both palm
products and cocoa in the south, are produced by natives,
who also sit on local marketing boards.
As a rule, the level of skills which an African may
acquire and use is higher in areas where there are fewer
white settlers. Practice in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia
and legislation in the Union and Southern Rhodesia
prevents the African from taking skilled jobs. But an
African railroad engineer takes over from a white man
when trains from Rhodesia enter Belgian territory, for
the Congo has a relatively large number of skilled
Africans and is training more. Many West Africans in
French and British territories are developing industrial
skills, but the majority of those who seek education aim
at becoming white-collar "clerks" and professionals.
There is no color bar in Angola and Mozambique, but the
scarcity of educational facilities retards individual
development.
Although their prosperity is directly related to
world economic conditions, few educated Africans have a
firm grasp of the relations between the two, and the aver-
age African is easily led to believe that a fall in his
income is caused by European employers or buyers who
are increasing their profits at his expense.
D. Communist Influence
Of the 170,000,000 Africans, relatively few have
attained even a modest degree Of education by Western
standards. Among those who have, however, many have
had some contact with Communist ideas or activity.
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Communism enters Africa overtly by means of (1) prop-
aganda mailed from Europe or issued by orbit diplomatic
posts, (2) Africans, usually students, returning from
Europe or the United States with pro-Communist sympathies
they acquired there, and (3) through contact with Euro-
pean government officials and labor leaders who are
Communists or through contact with members of UN committees.
Outside of the Union of South Africa, few Africans are
known to have become Communists while living in Africa.
Such anti-American sentiment as is found among Africans
is largely the product of African visitors' experience
with racial discrimination in the United States.
The Communists adapt their methods and programs to the
special conditions of Africa -- its lack of a large indus-
trial proletariat, lower educational standards and political
immaturity, inability of many Africans to comprehend polit-
ical ideologies, and the tribal outlook of the average
native. Communism seizes on and exploits local problems,
racial differences, social inequalities, fears of economic
exploitation by the whites, and normal resentments of
conquered against conqueror. The Communist leader's cry
is Africa for Africans, coincident with promises of the
spoils resultant from the expulsion of the white man.
The number of persons influenced by specifically
Communist ideology is believed to be greatest in British
West Africa, where Europeanized intellectuals are most
numerous and influential. But even here, only one crypto-
Communist organization, the Peoples Committee for Inde-
pendence in Nigeria, is known to exist. The British party
is believed now to give only advice to West African
Communists, since funds given earlier were probably
embezzled.
The Rassemblement Democratique Africaine party of
French West Africa, centering in the Ivory Coast and with
affiliates in French Equatorial Africa and the Cameroons,
was a vehicle for Communist penetration from 1946 until it
broke away in October 1950. Communist influence in French
territories seems to fluctuate more with the changing
prestige of the party in France, reflected by Communist
influence among French officials, than with local agitation.
The Belgian Communist Party has a colonial "commission,"
but the extent of its activity in the Congo is unknown.
Propaganda has been distributed by the Czech Consulate in
Leopoldville.
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There are few current indications of Communist activity
in Portuguese African territories. Local police believe
that some Portuguese Communist intellectuals, disgruntled
with Stalinism, have recently settled in Mozambique. They
are under surveillance.
There is conflicting information about the operations
of the Soviet Legation and Hospital in Ethiopia and their
alleged conspiracies to incite Communist agitation in
eastern Africa. There are no Communist parties or overt
activity in the East African area. However, Jomo Menyatta,
the alleged Mau Mau leader, is believed
to have visited Moscow and to have had Com-
munist contacts. Their extent of influence over him is
not known.
Communism is not overtly active in the Rhodesias,
although there have been reports of Communist influence in
the mining unions of the copperbelt area.
In summary, the danger of Communist activity in Africa
is more potential than actual, and lies in the opportunities
presented by the dislocation of African society, racial
conflict and nationalist activity.
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II. Current Situation
A. North Africa
SECURITY INFORMATION
SURVEY OF AFRICA
French North Africa is not included in this section
because it is treated in the recently issued NIE 69.
B. West Africa
1. British West Africa (Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Gambia)
Extensive constitutional changes leading toward self-
government were instituted in the Gold Coast in 1950 and
Nigeria in 1951. These events are a source of inspira-
tion to native leaders throughout Africa south of the
Sahara, and the success or failure of this experiment
will probably influence political development elsewhere
on the continent.
The road to West African self-government is beset
with several dangers: (1) the small number of Africans
capable of effectively running an administrative machine;
(2) reliance of the economy on basic agricultural or min-
eral production and consequent inability to adjust quick-
ly to world price changes; and (3) the revivalistic and
emotional character of the present electorate, political
parties and their leaders.
There is no immediate prospect of any unusual dis-
turbance in British West Africa, certainly none that
threatens any conceivable US interests. British West
Africans' adherence to the free world, however, is not
based on strong democratic convictions. Local individ-
uals or groups may look to Communist example and accept
Communist advice or money if these serve their purposes.
This attitude is not likely, however, to exercise any
extensive influence unless there is a swing toward the
Soviet bloc in the world power balance.
a. Gold Coast
There are no indications that the political course
of the Gold Coast will be altered in the immediate
future. The proposals on further steps toward full
self-government presented by Prime Minister Nkrumah
last October were moderate, and Nkrumah does not now
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seem to wish to proceed hastily. While there is
always the danger that some new messiah, taking ad-
vantage of the economic problems and strife within
the government, may attempt to outbid Nkrumah, such
a leader has not yet appeared.
Plans are under way to dam the Vota River and
provide hydroelectric power for smelting the Gold
Coast's bauxite deposits. Although actual produc-
tion is several years away, a new port which will
handle the processed aluminum is now being construc-
ted at Tema near the western frontier.
There is little organized Communist activity in
the Gold Coast, although the flow of propaganda into
the country is alleged to be considerable. The gov-
ernment recently banned the import of WFTU publica-
tions; this step was taken with reluctance by the
African ministers in the Gold Coast cabinet, whose
neutralist tendencies are a product both of their
preoccupation with local issues and of earlier left-
wing contacts of sympathies.
b. Nigeria
Nigerian nationalism is in its adolescence. The
two principal parties, Azikiwe's National Council of
Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) and Awolowo's Action
Group, draw support almost exclusively from the two
politically awakened southern tribes to which their
leaders belong. They are currently campaigning for
the support of the peoples of the Moslem emirates in
Northern Nigeria, where traditional native authori-
ties are stronger than in the coast provinces.
The effort to bring the north into the political
life of the whole of Nigeria has just begun and is
likely to move slowly. But its further progress will
make obsolete the present constitutional arrangements,
which divide Nigeria into three regions and safeguard
the Northern position, and may usher in a new period
of ferment.
Nigeria is the seat of Communist organization and
propaganda in British West Africa. If, as has been
reported, the Communists have begun in the past year
to send hard core agents into Nigeria, it is probably
with an eye to potential unrest both in Nigeria and
in West Africa generally.
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In 1951 some Communist labor leaders in Nigeria
were discredited as a result of financial scandals,
but a new crypto-Communist group, the Peoples Com-
mittee for Independence, was organized last spring.
Its program and techniques suggest that, were its
leaders not under police surveillance, it would be
a more effective organization than any of its kind
yet seen in West Africa,
2, Liberia
The 20,000 descendants of freed American Negro
slaves who compose Liberia's ruling caste are practi-
cally as alien as Europeans to the native Africans of
the country. The government payroll has long been the
principal means of support for Americo-Liberian fami-
lies, and Liberian officials have had a reputation for
venality and maladministration. While President W. V. S.
Tubman, de facto dictator of the republic, appears to be
in earnest in his attempts to raise the level of public
morality and efficiency, he still has a long way to go.
The government's only real opposition has come from
the aboriginal tribes, especially the relatively alert
Kroo people. Reports state, however, that Tubman is
establishing an increasing personal ascendancy over many
of the tribes and that relations have improved under his
regime.
Liberian finances are tied to the export of rubber,
the bulk of which is grown on the Firestone plantations.
Important deposits of high-grade iron ore are being de-
veloped by the American owned Liberia Mining Company,
and shipments to the United States have begun. The
Liberians can be expected to press for an ever larger
share of the income from these operations.
New riots, such as those of 1950 which endangered
the rubber plantations, might temporarily interrupt the
production of Liberian rubber and iron ore. There are
at present, however, no indications of large-scale
labor trouble.
Isolated Communist agitators have appeared in Li-
beria from time to time, but the present government has
acted vigorously in these cases and has generally co-
operated with the United States in adopting anti-Soviet
trade control measures.
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3, French West Africa
The political climate of the large, sprawling fed-
eration of French West Africa, eight times the size of
continental France, has cleared since the principal
cause of political disturbance, the Rassemblement Dem-
ocratique Africaine (RDA), broke with communism in Oc-
tober 1950. After four years of systematic opposition
to the government and adherence to the party line, the
RDA shifted to a general policy of cooperation with the
French administration. This was brought about by a com-
bination of pressure from the administration and dissen-
sion in the leadership over the value of association
with communism.
The RDA had been the largest native political party
with an estimated peak strength of 1,000,000 in 1947-48,
but the dissentions and disaffactions due to party tac-
tics, fluctuating enthusiasms of the native members,
counterfires set by other parties, and pressure from
the administration reduced the RDA strength to a proba-
ble 250,000 in 1951. Though it is still the majority
party in the territory of the Ivory Coast and has some
support in the French Sudan, the RDA has now dropped its
agitation on international issues and concerns itself
with purely domestic problems.
Communism's loss of the RDA has so weakened the Com-
munist movement in French West Africa that for the pres-
ent it constitutes little danger, though Communists are
known to be in the area. The potential, however, is
there, and the RDA's earlier success is an example of the
ferment which may be produced by unscrupulous native
leaders with promises of Africa for the Africans, no
taxes, and the seizure of the white man's houses and
automobiles.
Outside the few urban centers, the great mass of the
16,500,000 natives are illiterate,and firmly rooted in
the old tribal customs and traditions. Interests are
largely centered on the immediate tribal area and there
is no feeling of nationalism. Anti-French sentiment
exists, but long-time tribal rivalry and mutual dis-
trusts prevent united action. Racial strife is not im-
portant, despite RDA propaganda, due partly to French
attitudes, but principally because French West Africa
is not a settlement colony. The relatively small white
population of about 52,000 consists of short-tour gov-
ernment officials, traders, planters, and a few tech-
nical and professional men.
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Politically and economically, the area is in a per-
iod of slow transition. Native political parties have
only been formed since World War II, and though some
3,300,000 are eligible to vote on the local and terri-
torial level, only about half of this figure do so.
Most of them are more concerned with the problem of ob-
taining food and clothing.
Natives participate in district councils and terri-
torial assemblies, as well as in the Grand Council of
the Federation at Dakar, the French National Assembly,
the Council of the Republic and the Assembly of the
French Union. With the exception of the National Assem-
bly, in which French West Africa has 20 deputies of whom
75 percent are Africans, these bodies are largely advi-
sory. Firm control remains in the hands of the French.
French West Africa has an agricultural economy based
on peanuts, palm products, rice, cocoa, coffee, cotton
and timber, which account for more than 80 percent of
exports by value. Mineral deposits, aside from diamonds,
bauxite and iron ore, are relatively unexploited; how-
ever, their production will be greatly expanded in the
next few years. Canneries, sawmills, and plywood fac-
tories are located near the ports of Dakar, Abijan and
Conakry. But there is no heavy industry; development is
hindered by a shortage of trained labor, poor transpor-
tation, absence of large mineral deposits and lack of
capital.
4. Togolands
The long-standing demand of the 700,000 Ewe-speaking
peoples in British and French Togoland and the Gold
Coast to unite is the outstanding issue in Togoland.
The Ewes have not been satisfied by the administrative
gestures made by French and British trust authorities in
this direction.
In French Togoland the Ewes, some 175,000 of a total
population of about 1,000,000, initially asked only unity
for their own ethnic group. They are now demanding uni-
fication of the two Togolands and independence in five
years.
In the northern sections of the French territory,
this proposal has aroused strong opposition among the
non-Ewe inhabitants. Abetted by the French administra-
tion, the northerners regard "independence" as a blind
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for annexation to the Gold Coast. They have formed
their own political parties which propagandize locally
and petition the UN in support of either the status quo
or a unified Togoland under French control. In the
northern sections of British Togoland the natives pre-
fer amalgamation with the northern territories of the
Gold Coast.
Available evidence indicates that the principle of
unification attracts almost all groups in Togoland,
but that wide disagreements over its form will not be
resolved easily, especially since they are encouraged
by the administering authorities.
C. Equatorial Africa
1. Belgian Congo
The Belgian grip on the Congo remains tight and
paternalistic. Outstanding features of Belgian admini-
stration are its attempts at social engineering and
planned economy. Historical accident gave the Congo
government a direct and controlling interest in the
major mining enterprises; it has utilized this control
and its profits to provide extensive health and medical
services, to develop a permanent skilled labor force,
to stabilize rural and urban populations, and to direct
investment according to a definite but flexible program.
Until very recently the government relegated native
political development to an indefinite future, but it
is now cautiously considering greater African participa-
tion in political affairs. Even the limited gestures
so far announced, however, have provoked strong opposi-
tion from Belgian colonists.
The government is reportedly concerned that there
may be reverberations of the Kenya uprisings among the
natives in eastern Congo. Dissident movements have in
the past sprung up with little warning. While none so
far have seriously menaced Belgian control, natives'
contact with European communication and transportation
techniques may increase their capabilities of disrupt-
ing the flow of strategic materials. There is also a
danger that the Congo's booming economic development,
based on heavy demand for its mineral and agricultural
products and rapid growth of the European population,
may outstrip the ability of the government to meet the
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accompanying social problems, especially native detribal-
ization.
The authorities are particularly alert to the possi-
bility of subversive infiltration across Congo fron-
tiers. Strict security measures are reported to have
been taken in the Katanga mineral area, and the new
Kamina air base will provide a center from which troops
may be rapidly despatched to any scene of trouble, but
the Congo Surete does not now have effective control of
many native border crossings. Contact with French Equa-
torial territory to the northwest remains easy, and the
Czech Consulate in Leopoldville has issued propaganda
whose effect and breadth of distribution are unknown.
2. French Equatorial Africa
There is little present evidence of instability,
social unrest, or of extensive Communist agitation in
French Equatorial Africa. Many political parties exist,
but no single party is generally supported throughout
the area. The Communist Party is small, has little in-
fluence, and there is no present indication of Commu-
nist agitation. The Rassemblement Democratique Afri-
caine (RDA), formerly the vehicle of Communists, is
relatively inactive in this area.
The great mass of the 4,000,000 natives of Equa-
torial Africa are uneducated, socially undeveloped,
and politically immature. They vote for personalities
rather than programs, and loyalties do not extend be-
yond their immediate tribal areas.
3. French Cameroons
Here, as in French Equatorial Africa, there is
little evidence of political instability, social un-
rest or of extensive Communist agitation. There are
several political parties, but most of them are primar-
ily local in interest. The voters, as elsewhere Ln
Black Africa, tend to follow personalities rather than
platforms and vote for their fellow tribesmen. There
is no political party which has a country-wide appeal.
The Communist element is limited in influence, and
agitation comes principally from the Union du Peuple
Camerounais (UPC), an affiliate of thi-ro-Fmei=
Communist-
line RDA.
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The main problem at present, and a possible threat
to future stability because of its nationalistic appeal,
is the agitation for the unification of the two Trust
Territories of the British and French Cameroons, The
UPC from the French Cameroons met with interested groups
from the British Cameroons in August 1951 and formed the
Kamerun United National Congress to establish a movement
for eventual unification. The congress has petitioned
the UN to take action; the movement is new and its
strength unknown. It may become an important factor in
the future.
D. East Africa
1. British East Africa
This area is composed of four separate administra-
tions in various stages of political and economic devel-
opment. They are loosely federated in an East African
High Commission with an East African Legislative Assem-
bly empowered to act on subjects of common concern in-
cluding railroads, income tax, customs, communications,
aviation and research services.
Kenya, a crown colony and protectorate, is the most
advanced of the group. It is currently beset by a na-
tive terrorist movement based on sharp racial cleavages.
Tanganyika is a trust territory where the native
political and economic development is less restricted
than in Kenya. Here the presence of a smaller number
of European settlers has not yet aggravated the under-
lying racial tensions to an inflammatory degree.
The protectorate of Uganda, possessing a well-
established native political and economic system and a
very small European settlement, is stable and free from
much of the racial strife of East Africa. The protec-
torate of Zanzibar is governed by its hereditary sultan
and is not plagued with political or racial instability.
a. Kenya
Racial cleavages are at the root of the current
disturbances in Kenya. A white minority of about
30,000, less than one percent of the total popula-
tion, controls the life of the colony, despite the
presence of almost 100,000 Indian immigrants and
over 5,000,000 native Africans. In the Legislative
Council of 54 members, there are six nominated
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African representatives and six elected Indian mem-
bers. The Arab community has two representatives,
while 40 remaining seats are mostly held by Euro-
peans.
The European electorate vehemently opposes
Indian demands for a common electoral role because
it fears that the Indian voters would swamp the
white settlers at the polls. The settlers demand
that their unofficial representatives of the Legis-
lative Council will continue to equal the total
number of members of all other races.
The terrorist Mau Mau movement has arisen as a
result of the contact between a changing but still
primitive African society and the more advanced
Europeans and Indians. The contact with Western
civilization has brought about cultural and economic
conflict and has produced African leaders with a
smattering of Western education. They, however,
have no opportunity to achieve economic, political
or social equality. The land laws reserve the
choice agricultural areas for the whites, and the
franchise is largely limited to Europeans and
Indians. Some of the frustrated native intellec-
tuals have taken advantage of the vacuum created by
decaying tribal leadership and traditions to gain
influence among Africans by means of secret ritual-
istic organizations.
These organizations, such as Mau Mau or Dini Ya
Msambwa, are pledged to alleviate native land hunger
by seeking to expel the European settlers from their
estates. Despite the presence of British troops,
the current Mau Mau disturbances have already re-
sulted in over 100 deaths; about 20 were Europeans
and the remainder natives who would not cooperate
with the terrorists. Some of the leaders were in
contact with leftist circles when they studied
abroad. They may make use of Communist tenent and
techniques without actually desiring to further
Soviet aims.
There appear to be increasing indications of
Communist interest in the Mau Mau. Left-wing law-
yers have volunteered to defend Jomo Kenyatta,
alleged leader of the Mau Mau. The evidence still
suggests, however, that this society is fundamental-
ly not under direct Communist influence but that the
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Communists are using it to embarrass the British
Government. Some of the measures taken against
the Mau Mau are believed to be aggravating instead
of alleviating tensions.
Underlying economic, political and social fric-
tion makes it quite probable that if Britain sup-
presses the Mau Mau, a similar secret society will
arise within a few years. Eventually, a common
African front overcoming tribal differences may en-
danger the European position in East Africa.
The Mau Mau disturbance has reinforced the
settlers' skepticism toward the British policy of
gradually advancing the Africans' political develop-
ment toward partnership. The inability of the
settlers to control the situation has dimmed their
hopes of making East Africa a "white man's country"
free from Colonial Office control. The immediate
prospect is an uneasy stalemate with the initiative
in the hands of the London authorities, who have
recently appointed a Royal Commission to study the
situation in Kenya.
b. Tanganyika
This trust territory is relatively stable politi-
cally, but recent reports of May Mau threats point
up the possibility that the racial situation might
erupt with little warning. The white settler minor-
ity of 16,000 is small in comparison to an Indian
group of over 70,000 and an African majority of
nearly 8,000,000.
The European minority has more political and
economic control than its numbers indicate, but less
than the whites in Kenya. In the Legislative Council
of 29 members, only four persons not connected with
the administration are named to represent the
Africans and three the Indian community, while
seven Europe..ns are selected to represent the settler
and commercial communities. In additibn, there are
15 nominated European officials. The European set-
lers are currently disturbed over the government's
plans to provide parity for all three communities in
the Legislative Council and, as in Kenya, are skepti-
cal of British policy to advance African political
development.
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Because there are fewer European settlers in
Tanganyika and they hold less land, the problem
there is not so serious as in Kenya. African pres-
sure on the land has not yet caused native unrest.
A minor land problem, however, was created by the
resettlement of a few thousand Wa Meru natives who
were evicted from lands taken for white settlers.
This case was brought up before the UN.
c. Uganda and Zanzibar
A stable political situation exists in Uganda
and Zanzibar because of a relatively high degree of
African political development prior to the advent
of European control, the use of native institutions
for British indirect rule, and the small size of the
European minority.-- only 8,000 out of a total popu-
lation of 5,000,000.
Both areas face economic problems. Uganda has
relatively fertile agricultural areas and special-
izes in cotton and coffee, but the contemplated
exploitation of important mineral resources may
change the basis of the economy. Zanzibar faces a
declining revenue caused by a clove blight which
threatens to destroy the mainstay of the island's
economy.
2. Ethiopia and Eritrea
The 61-year old Emperor Haile Selassie is likely to
retain control of the internal politics of Ethiopia for
his lifetime. The Imperial Bodyguard, the country's
only effectively orgainzed military force, is fanati-
cally loyal to him, and he is able to pursue a policy of
judiciously balancing modernists against feudal conserva-
tives. A plot against the Emperor's life was uncovered
in 1951, and the possibility of assassination remains.
Should a coup succeed, it would probably be followed by
a period of instability, possibly of a serious nature, in
which various cliques contend for power and even the
throne itself.
The principal current problem is the integration of
Eritrea into the federation with Ethiopia proclaimed in
September 1952. The performance of the Eritrean Assem-
bly has been better than expected, while the Emperor has
taken a conciliatory tone toward the Moslem majority and
the Italian colonists. But whether the Emperor and his
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appointees can exercise their new authority without
alienating the Eritreans remains to be seen.
The Russians maintain a legation, an information
center And a hospital in Addis Ababa, all of which are
believed to engage in intelligence and propaganda activ-
ities. Available reports conflict, however, as to the
extent of these operations.
Ethiopia has sent a battalion to Korea and return-
ing veterans are reportedly enthusiastic about their
treatment there and about the United States -- so much
so that their reassimilation into the Ethiopian home
forces has posed some problems.
3. British Somaliland and Somalia
Little intelligence is received from barren British
Somaliland. It may be assumed that increasing national-
ist activity in the Arab world will find an echo here,
for the country has changed little since its earlier
history of Moslem fanaticism.
The Italian Trust Administration of Somalia is busy
creating a host of pro-administration splinter parties
to counter the influence of the nationalistic Somali
Youth League. The present state of the League, the
principal vehicle for anti-Italian agitation, is diffi-
cult to estimate. believe it receives out-
side financial aid and direction, but the source and
amounts are unknown, if they exist in fact.
The League has been blamed by the Italians for the
death of several officials in a riot at Chisimaio last
August, and, regardless of who was responsible, such
incidents are likely to recur. They will probably not
have any effect on the character or tenure of the
Italian administration, whose existence depends on fac-
tors outside Somalia.
E. Central Africa
1. British Central Africa
Three territories in differing stages of political
and economic evolution comprke British Central Africa.
Rapid economic strides nave ,..4.sarranged the normal
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political development of the area and aggravated labor
and racial tensions, particularly in Northern Rhodesia.
Southern Rhodesia, politically the most advanced of
the region because of its relatively' large European set-
tler population of 150,000, is a self-governing colony.
It has its own prime minister and legislature but is
subject to the control of the British Parliament in
matters affecting defense, foreign relations and native
policy.
The protectorate of Northern Rhodesia is under
Colonial Office supervision. The vocal settler and min-
ing minority of about 40,000 is critical of the London
policy of advancing African political development,
which has already resulted in having two Africans
elected to the legislature.
Nyasaland Protectorate, with only a small European
settler population, has two nominated Africans serving
in the legislature.
The rapid economic growth of the Rhodesian area
since World War II is based primarily on increased
mineral revenues, especially from copper, chrome and
asbestos; increased tobacco production; and from impor-
tant development in the metal processing and Consumer
goods industries.
This economic development of Central Africa, witb
its problems of labor supply, transportation, capital
requirements and limited markets, has led lodal resi-
dents, as well as the present British Government, to
seek closer regional coordination. The settler groups
who fear eventual African domination or even expulsion
of the whites from Africa have also demanded a strong
Central African state.
Prime Minister Huggins of Southern Rhodesia con-
siders that federation is the middle ground between
the complete elimination of European leadership, as in
the Gold Coast, and the repressive racial policies of
South Africa.
The proposed federation plan calls for a Federal
Assembly of 35 members, in which Southern Rhodesia will
have 17 members. Nine members will represent Africab
interests; six of them will be natives. An African
Affairs Board with seven members, of whom three will be
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Africans, is intended to prevent discriminatory legisla-
tion by requiring any bill considered against African
interests to be referred to the British Government. Any
amendments to the constitution would likewise be re-
served for British approval. The two northern terri-
tories will remain protectorates subject to Colonial
Office control in their internal affairs.
The representatives of the Central African and the
British Governments met in London in early January to
discuss modification of the plan. In April, a referen-
dum on federation is planned in Southern Rhodesia. At
this time, its result is in doubt.
It is generally conceded that most articulate
Africans in Central Africa oppose federation because
they fear that it would replace friendly Colonial Office
racial policy. Most Europeans in Northern Rhodesia
favor federation as a way to escape Colonial office
policy.
In Southern Rhodesia, however, settler opinion is
sharply split. Those who fear South African political
and economic influence want a strong central African
state as a bulwark to oppose its spread northward. Many
feel, however, that Southern Rhodesia may be outvoted in
the Assembly by a "black" north, and that Africans in
the Assembly may lead to their flooding the electoral
rolls, where there are DON fewer than 100 registered
African voters. Principal attention is directed to the
African Affairs Board, which the settlers believe will
perpetuate Colonial Office control over native policy;
without significant changes in the board's jurisdiction,
a favorable vote in the referendum cannot be assured.
A potential for Communist action exists in the
copperbelt area of Northern Rhodesia which is adjacent
to the uranium and copper-rich Katanga area of the
Belgian Congo. In the copperbelt, Communist control of
the mining unions, or sabotage of the new power network
serving the Katanga, could seriously cripple strategic
mineral production.
2. Portuguese Africa (Angola and Mozambique)
So far as is known, there are no threats to the sta-
bility of the Portuguese administration of these terri-
tories, which contain the termini of the strategic rail
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routes from Central Africa. The authorities are quick
to react against any indication of anti-government
activity. They are suspicious of outside interest, and
Portugal frequently prefers to finance development pro-
jects itself rather than accept foreign capital, even
at the cost of slowing the pace of development.
There is some sentiment among the local Portuguese
population for more self-administration, if not self-
government, and this sentiment is likely to increase as
the colonies develop economically. In the last few
months the Portuguese Government has taken steps to
cement relations by sending important missions to the
colonies, announcing a development program -- although
a large share of the program was already on the books
-- and promulgating a new Organic Law to revise the
administration of its Overseas Territories.
3. Madagascar
On the surface Madagascar is peaceful though
nationalistist and Communist propaganda continues. The
extremist nationalist party, the Mouvement Democratique
de Renovation Malgache (MDRM), which agitated the
plateau tribes into revolt in 1947 for an independent
native Madagascar, has been largely eliminated by im-
prisonment and death. The remaining nationalist parties
are intimidated, demoralized, and reduced in strength.
Before the 1947 rebellion some 23 nationalists held
seats in the five provincial assemblies; in 1952 only
three nationalists were elected to one of the five.
Nationalists currently see independence as something
to be obtained in the distant future. They are limiting
themselves to the lesser targets of enlarging the impor-
tance of Madagascar within the French Union, increasing
native participation in the administration, and obtain-
ing more education and health facilities.
Though there is some conflicting evidence, the
Madagascar Communist Party appears to be small and limi-
ted in influence. Communists' agitation, however, for
immediate and total independence, and their playing on
the residue of resentment among the natives remaining
from French repression of the rebellion, combined with
continued French opposition to giving the nationalists
even their present lesser targets, may in the long run
gain them a substantial audience.
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F. Southern Africa
1. High Commission Territories: (Basutoland,
Bechuanaland, Swaziland)
These three territories, important to South Africa
as reservoirs of native labor, are relatively unde-
veloped agricultural areas. When the Union of South
Africa was founded in 1909, they were left under the
control of Britain with the general understanding that
at the discretion of the British Parliament they might
be transferred to the Union. Since that time, in view
of South African racial policies, Britain has stated
that transfer can only occur after consultation with the
natives of the three territories.
Although economically dependent on the Union, the
territories are nearly unanimous in their opposition to
South African policy. The Union has long agitated for
their annexation, and leading nationalists have said
that transfer from Britain's control will become an
issue in the South African election scheduled for April.
If so, the areas may be the subject of a formal South
African request for a transfer; Britain will probably
not agree to it under present conditions.
In both Basutoland and Swaziland the political and
economic situations are static and, aside from develop-
ment projects instituted by the Colonial Development
Corporation, no appreciable change is expected.
Traditional government in Bechuanaland has been dis-
located because tribal chief Seretse Khama married a
white woman and was subsequently exiled from the terri-
tory. Tribal factions have not yet agreed on his suc-
cessor, while the South African Government vehemently
opposes the return of a chief whose marriage defies the
Union's racial doctrines.
North Bechuanaland is being turned into a gigantic
beef cattle ranch by the Colonial Development Corpora-
tion in an effort to satisfy much of Britain's meat
requirements.
2. Union of South Africa
The Union of South Africa is not included in the
Current Situation because NIE 72, Probable Development in
the Union of South Africa, has been recently completed.
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30 45
15
SPANtall GUI
PPINGB
040 TOW
(Pad-)
30
(5
5
AFRICA
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
SYMBOL
ON
MAP
STRATEGIC MATERIAL
PERCENT OF
U.S. WORLD
IMPORTS.
PRINCIPAL SOURCE
IN AFRICA
A
Asbestoschrysotile) No. 1 & 2
87
Southern Rhodesia
Cr
Chrome ore (chemical grade)
83
Union of South Africa
Cr
Chrome ore (me allurgical)
39
Southern Rhodesia
Co
Cobalt ore
98
Belgian Congo
Cb
Columbium ore
99
Nigeria
C
Corundum
96
Union of South Africa
D
Diamond bort
59-99
Belgian Congo
By
Kyanite
47
Kenya
Mn
Manganese ore (over 35% I
44
Union of South Africa
T
Tantalum one
91
Belgian Congo
U
Uranium
not available
Belgian Congo
P
Palm kernel oil
100
Belgian Congo
P
Palm oil
66
Belgian Congo
Sisal24
Tanganyika
CO
Copper
? / 43, d.t.
Africa is nota principal
source for the United States
at present.
CONFIDENTIAL
Gr
Graphite
Pb
Lead
PO
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So
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In
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RUANDA-
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TANGANYIKA
(Trust Ter,
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0
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A
OF
BASUTOLAN
SOUTH AFRICA
15 30
45
5
0
12471 CIA, 10-52
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SECURITY INFORMATION
15 15 3 4
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ball*
MOROCCO
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APPROXIMATE POPULATION FIGURES*
(Population In thousanas1
A
Leopoldville
)ANDA. asa
,LIRLINDI
,(Trust Ter, )
TANGANYIKA C I
(Trust Terr ) . 0 Setae..
Awn
AREA
NATIVES
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OTHER
LI/
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NORTH AFRICA
19850
1,750
Algeria .
7,500
1.000
A N 0 OLA
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Morocco F&S
9,100
500
Lab
icr.
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LAND
Tunisia
3,250
250
WEST AFRICA
50,300
69
25
NOR
NORTHERN RHODESIA ,c?
French West Africa
16.500
52
?-11
0,
Gold Coast
4,100
7
5.
Nigeria
24.500
5
SOUTHERN 47
EQUATORIAL AFRICA
22.750
106
3
Salisbury fp 4'
. ?Tana
Belgian Congo
11,250
70
1
MADAGASCAR
French Equatorial Africa
4.500
20
SOUTH
HODESIA N
EAST AFRICA
29100
58
290
S OUTH
Ethiopia
10,000
WEST
BECHUANALAND
Kenya
5.200
30
122
AF
Tanganyika
7,700
16
71
ICA
-
Adana
A
two Mantua.
Uganda
5,000
8
37
FRIC
AiMandate)
Johannesburg
A
CENTRAL AFRICA
20,000
367
17
TE
UNION bee'''.
Angola
4.100
79
Mozambique
5.700
49
OF
Doebart
Northern Rhodesia
1.700
36
3
BASUTOLAN
30
Southern Rhodesia
2,000
136
10
SOUTH AFRICA
Nyasaland
2.400
3
4
Paz_ts_Mgascar
4,300
64
II
Cape Town sr
SOUTHERN AFRICA
10,000
2,700
,500
A
Union of South Africa
8.500
2,640
1,470
L
?These figures are complete f regions but only selected count?. are shown
s ?
0 t
30 45
2122
NMI UNITED STAT ES
SOVIET
EMI CZECHOSLOVAKIA
REPRESENTATION
? Legation
0 Embassy
? Consulate
110 Consulate General
A Business
4. Hospital
MA Military Attache
NA Naval Attache
AA Air Attache
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SURVEY OF AFRICA
APPENDIX II
Research Within The US Government
Much of the research on African affairs carried on by the
Government is accomplished within the Department of State by
the Office of Intelligence Research. The African Branch of OIR
is responsible for the political and economic research needed
by the political desks of the Department of State and for a
major share of the pertinent NIS program. The latter program,
which aims at worldwide coverage, has so far resulted in pub-
lished chapters on Tunisian trade and finance; Moroccan biogra-
phy, religion, education and public information.
Economic research on the African area is carried on by the
Department of Agriculture and Commerce in support of their spe-
cific interests.
Research activities on Africa by the Mutual Security Agency
and the Department of Defense are generally limited to support
of the assigned missions, with some attention to current "hot"
spots.
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APPENDIX III
Comment on the Yergan and Jolis reports
These reports are the results of extensive travel by the
authors. They are an attempt to awaken American officials to
the problems of Africa south of the Sahara and to the poten-
tialities for the spread of communism. The authors feel that
this important area has been neglected, but their enthusiasm
has produced documents containing more missionary fervor than
objective analysis.
They emphasize race relations and tend to overlook the
underlying conditions of which racial conflicts are only the
current expression. These conflicts are serious, but the basic
strains and stresses in contemporary Africa are produced by
aboriginal societies' contact with and adjustment to the
amenities, techniques and demands of Western civilization.
The prospects for racial reconciliation in Africa are not
bright. Even if racial conflicts were solved by the elimina-
tion of Europeans as a governing class, Africans would still be
subject to the tensions which communism exploits. In fact,
Communists would probably find even wider opportunities amid
the ensuing political, social and economic dislocation than
those they are exploiting now.
To convey their sense of the urgency of US action regarding
Africa, Yergan and Jolis have chosen to point up Communist
activity and the fact that Communist ideology has attracted.
African leaders. In the interest of a more balanced view, the
following cc:aliments are offered.
Comment on Yergan report
West Africa (page 7) The experiment of granting effective
independence to the Gold Coast and Nigeria is still in a rela-
tively early stage. It is far from certain that native leaders
will succeed in meeting the economic, social and political needs
of this area or that, even if they do meet them, these leaders
will adhere to the West. In the long run, the experiment may
turn out to have promoted opportunities for communism rather
than neutralized them.
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East Africa (page 8) While land and race are immediate
causes of the present troubles, more deeply rooted tensions are
produced by the conflict between a primitive but emergent Afri-
can culture and advanced Western civilization.
(Page 9) No direct Communist influence has been proven
to exist within the Mau Mau movement. Communists are probably
interested in defending Kenyatta, who has had Communist con-
nections, and in utilizing his trial for propaganda.
South Africa (page 10) There is little evidence that the
African National Congress is Communist directed; it has been
under relatively moderate leadership, and its recently elected
president is reported to be moderate. The organization will
probably become more extremist as the passive defiance campaign
and other peaceful measures fail. The head of ANC's Cape
Western division, Njongwe, is a Communist, and Communists have
penetrated the Transvaal organ of the Congress.
(Page 10) It is doubtful whether a change of government
in South Africa would seriously alter basic policy or actually
improve race relations. Any concessions the present opposition
might make would only postpone the probable racial revolution.
It is unlikely that over 2,000,000 whites will shift their atti-
tudes sufficiently to change government policy on color question.
(Page 12) There is little evidence that Communists have
captured the African National Congress, although their influence
may be growing and they are well-placed in several regional
branches. The success of ANC would reflect racial feeling
rathern than approval of Communist ideology. None of the non-
European organizations, including ANC, represents a majority of
their populations, nor is it conclusively proven that they en-
joy active mass sympathy.
Kenya (page 14) There is no evidence that the Kenya
African Union is now in the hands of Communists. Of the three
major wings of theparty, only the extremist wing follows
Kenyatta, although the latter's popular appeal silences moderate
opposition on most issues. The KAU really represents only the
Kikuyu tribe, who comprise 20 percent of the native population.
Although Africans often join organizations for the sake of join-
ing, knowing little of their aims and later losing interest, the
KAU is an organization which bears watching.
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X
Gold Coast (page 16-17) West African intellectuals are
interested in Communism and the Soviet Union's achievements,
but these interests seem on the whole to be part of a wider
interest in any movement or country which appears to offer
lessons in how to achieve self-government or higher standards
of living and education. Interest in India seems particularly
lively at the moment. The Gold Coast agreed to ban WFTU liter-
ature last fall.
Nigeria (pages 17-18) Wider anti-British expression in
Nigeria, as compared with the Gold Coast, is also a result of
the failure of local political leaders to develop a unified
Nigerian nationalism to replace regional and tribal loyalties.
Anti-British agitation is the one theme they can agree on.
K. C. Okoro has followed a leftist line for some time; his at-
titude does not signify a recent or strong increase in pro-
Communist sentiment in Nigeria. There are indications that
Nigerian Communists may now be better organized than they have
been heretofore.
Belgian Congo (pages 18-19) There is probably some polit-
ical ferment beneath the surface tranquillity. Communist propa-
ganda has been disseminated, but how widely and with what ef-
fect is problematical.
French West Africa (page 20) CGT is an instrument of
Communist activity, but since the RDA's break with Communism
in October 1950, its turning to the leadership of ICFTU and
the growth of independent unions, CGT has seen a considerable
decline in its strength.
Sheehan's statement is overly optimistic. When it lost the
RDA, communism lost a, not the, battle in French West Africa.
It is a potential buT not ai-Timediate threat.
French Equatorial Africa (page 20-22) While it is pos-
sible that the disturbances at Moundou were Communist inspired,
information is incomplete on this event. Individual Communists,
native and European, are known to exist in French Equatorial
Africa, but there is no Communist Party as such, and the RDA
party formerly affiliated with them has broken up.
Comment on Jolis Memorandum
(Page 3) The RDA now follows an anti-Communist, pro-
administration line. CGT has also declined following RDA's
break with Communism. Ivory Coast, Senegal and French Sudan
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are the most important areas to watch for future Communist
activities in French West Africa.
(Page 4) Available information states that the Madagascar
Communist Party is small, divided and uninfluential. While
Communists exploited the 1947 (not 1948) rebellion, it was
largely provoked and directed by native nationalists.
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