PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN BURMA THROUGH 1953

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002500020001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 20, 1953
• Content Type: NIE

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MONET
SECURITY INFORMATION
45400
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN BURMA
THROUGH 1953
DOCUMENT NO.
NIE-74 NO CHANGE fN CLASS.
X DECLASSIFIED
Published 20 February 1953 CLASS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
(Supersedes NIE-36 and NIE-36/1)um: HR 70-2
DATE: .1.21.E&U REVIEWER
TS S C
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the
Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
concurred in this estimate on 12 February 1953.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
25X1
11111111E
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11141410aig.
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN BURMA THROUGH 1953
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable developments in Burma through 1953, and Communist in-
tentions and capabilities with respect to Burma during that period.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Internal security and economic con-
ditions have improved in Burma during
the past year. The prospects through
1953 are for a slight improvement in in-
ternal security and economic and politi-
cal stability.
2. Communist and other insurgent
groups still dominate numerous areas of
Burma, and have the capability of con-,
ducting guerrilla raids in many parts of
the country.
3. The Burmese Government's progress
in reducing the Communist insurgents is
impeded by the necessity of stationing
troops to contain the former Chinese Na-
tionalist troops in northeastern Burma.
The government also fears that the
presence of these troops, which have
made forays into Yunnan, may provide a
pretext for Chinese Communist interven-
tion in Burma. Finally, the presence of
these troops complicates Burmese rela-
tions with the US and its relationship
with the West in the UN because many
Burmese Government leaders believe that
these troops are indirectly supported by
the US.
4. There is little prospect that the gov-
ernment can achieve either a military
decision over the Karen insurgents or a
political settlement with Karen leaders
during the period of this estimate. Full-
scale military cooperation between the
Karen insurgents and the former Chinese
Nationalist forces in Burma would seri-
ously weaken the government's capability
of dealing with insurgency throughout
Burma. The likelihood of such a devel-
opment cannot be estimated with confi-
dence. However, we believe that the
apparent divergence of ultimate purposes
between these groups would make full-
scale military cooperation against the
Government of Burma unlikely during
the period of this estimate.
5. Present Chinese Communist assistance
to the Burmese Communists appears to
be very slight. There is no evidence that
the Chinese Communists have begun a
program of equipping the Burmese Com-
munist guerrillas. However, the Chi-
nese Communists have the capability of
providing them with extensive military
aid.
SPIMININIT 1
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VEMISIME141' 2
6. If an extensive program of Chinese
Communist military aid were initiated in
the near future, the Burmese Communist
guerrillas could undertake offensive oper-
ations to expand their territory in 1953
but would probably not be able to seize
control of a substantial amount of addi-
tional territory during the period of this
estimate. A continuing program of ex-
tensive Chinese Communist aid might, in
the longer run, pose a serious threat to
the government's position.
7. We believe that the Chinese Commu-
nists are unlikely to exercise their capa-
bility to invade Burma during 1953.
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN BURMA
8. The Burmese Communists will proba-
bly emphasize political tactics during
1953 While continuing guerrilla opera-
tions and maintaining a hard-core guer-
rilla force for expanded operations at
some ,future date.
9. Assuming no substantial shift in the
East-West power balance in Asia, the
Burmese Government will probably con-
tinue through 1953 its efforts to main-
tain "normal" relations with Communist
China and to maintain neutrality in the
East-West struggle. However, Burma
will probably continue to accept the
assistance of the West in strengthening
its armed forces and its economy.
DISCUSSION
The General Situation
10. The Government of Burma now displays
more cohesion and efficiency than at any
time since the granting of Burma's inde-
pendence in 1948. The current government,
established by national elections completed
in January 1952, is controlled by a coalition,
the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League.
This coalition is dominated by the Burma
Socialist Party. During the past year, the
Burmese Socialists have displayed a sense of
national purpose and an apparent willingness
to subordinate personal ambitions to coopera-
tive effort. Such unity of purpose is unusual
in Burma, where political groups have in the
past been motivated chiefly by loyalty to in-
dividual leaders.
11. Burmese armed forces have made consid-
erable progress during 1952 in combatting
insurgent forces in Burma. Although gov-
ernment control remains weak or nonexistent
in many rural areas, government forces can
now operate in almost any part of the coun-
try, and the government's ability to cope with
sabotage activities has improved. Except for
the Karen-controlled areas (see map), the
government forces have dispersed large in-
surgent concentrations and have increased
the security of important lines of communi-
cation through central Burma.
12. The Burmese armed forces now have a
strength of about 61,000, including 42,000 in
the Army, 10,000 in the Union Military Police,
6,000 in the Burma Territorial Forces, 1,000
in the Air Force, and 1,800 in the Navy. By
US standards, these forces are poorly equipped
and trained. The increased effectiveness
demonstrated during the past year is due pri-
marily to two factors: (a) the , increased
strength and reorganization of the armed
forces; and (b) a more responsible attitude
on the part of Commander-in-Chief Ne Win
and the energetic support of Defense Minister
Ba Swe. In addition, the accumulated field
experience of the Burmese field forces and
the military assistance provided by the British
Services Mission have contributed to the in-
creased effectiveness of the armed forces.
Although the Government of Burma has
given notice that the present agreement with
the British Services Mission will be terminated
in January 1954, the present UK program of
military supplies and technical assistance
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3
will continue through the period of this esti-
mate. During 1953, the Burma Government
will either seek alternative sources of military
aid outside the Soviet orbit, or conclude a
new agreement with the UK.
13. The Burmese economic situation has im-
proved during the past year, largely as a
result of improved internal security in the
country. Rice exports, the dominant factor
in the Burmese economy and the chief source
of foreign exchange, have increased gradually
since 1946 and now approximate half of pre-
war levels. As a result of improved security
of lines of communication, it may soon be
possible for the large Bawdwin lead and tin
mines to resume production for the first time
since the war. Burma has thus far escaped
serious inflation, and the financial position of
the governmeRt is good.
Threats to Burmese Internal Security
14. Despite its improved situation over the
past year, the Government of Burma still
faces a severe problem in maintaining in-
ternal security and extending areas under
effective government control. Although gov-
ernment forces have succeeded in breaking
up Communist units into smaller guerrilla
bands, the total strength of the various
groups of insurgents remains approximately
unchanged. They retain the capability to
conduct guerrilla raids in many parts of
Burma outside their present areas of domi-
nance.
15. The principal insurgent forces and their
estimated armed strength are: the Karen
National Defense Organization, 4,000; the
Burma Communist Party, 8,000; a rival Com-
munist group under the name of the Com-
munist Party. (Burma) , 1,000; and remnants
of the Peoples Volunteer Organization (an
amorphous left-wing group stemming from
the anti-Japanese movement) , 3,000. There
is also a force of about 1,600 Kachin tribes-
men in the Burma-Yunnan frontier region
under the leadership of Naw Seng. This
force has received guerrilla training in Yun-
nan from the Chinese Communists, and may
have a potential role as the core of a new
insurgent effort. However, the nature of the
present relationship between Naw Seng and
Burmese Communist insurgents is not known.
In addition to these insurgent groups, there
is a group of armed Chinese, up to 7,000 in
number, most of them former Chinese Na-
tionalist troops who have taken refuge from
the Chinese Communists in the border area
of northeastern Burma.
16. Some of these groups have made efforts
to reach agreement for effective military co-
operation. The Burma Communist Party has
for some time tried to establish effective lead-
ership over all Communist insurgents and in
August 1952 was reported to have concluded
a working agreement with the Peoples Vol-
unteer Organization remnants and the rival
Communist Party (Burma). Efforts to effect
an alliance with the dissident Karens have
apparently not been successful. On the other
hand, limited collaboration between some ele-
ments of the Chinese Nationalist troops and
Karen rebels appears to be a fact.
The Karen Problem
? 17. The Karens, the largest ethnic minority
in Burma, seek autonomy for their com-
munity. The Karen community is predomi-
nantly non-Communist and the majority of
Karens are not engaged in overt resistance.
Nevertheless, the Burmese Government has
not been able to formulate 'a program which
would attract the loyalty of the dissident
Karens. The government has promised the
Karens that it would grant them a substan-
tial degree of local autonomy and has offered
a general amnesty to Karen insurgents. The
Karens have regarded these offers as insuffi-
cient and insincere. Many Karens are con-
vinced that the real object of the Burmese
Socialists is to "Burmanize" them, by force if
necessary.
18. The Karen National Defense Organiza-
tion, with an active force of at least 4,000,
presently controls large areas of the southern
peninsula and operates sporadically through
a considerable portion of the Irawaddy Delta.
Besides the immediate threat to internal secu-
rity, the continuance of the Karen armed
rebellion slows economic progress in Burma,
places a heavy drain on Burmese military
IIMPIPIPPEor
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VOMINIEW 4
resources, and exposes the government to the
, constant danger that the Karens will join
other insurgent groups in a combined mili-
tary effort.
The Problem of the Chinese
Nationalist Troops
19. There are up to 7,000 armed Chinese,
most of them former Chinese Nationalist
troops, in northeastern Burma. Although
probably only about half of these are in or-
ganized units, their presence constitutes a
serious problem for the Burmese Govern-
ment. The necessity for stationing troops in
the Kengtung area in order to contain these
elements impedes government progress in re-
ducing the Communist insurgents. The gov-
ernment fears that the presence of these Chi-
nese units, which have made forays into
Yunnan, may provide a pretext for Chinese
Communist intervention in Burma. Appre-
hension of the government has been height-
ened by the action of splinter groups of these
' Chinese which have cooperated locally with
units of the Karen National Defense Organi-
zation. Finally, the presence of these troops
complicates Burmese relations with the US
and its relations with the West in the UN
because many Burmese Government leaders
believe that these troops are indirectly sup-
ported by the US.
20. The government urgently desires to re-
move the Chinese Nationalist forces from
Burma. It does not, however, have the mili-
tary strength to capture them, and it has
made no progress in securing agreement for
their internment or evacuation. Although
Chinese authorities on Taiwan have denied
exercising control over these forces, there is
evidence that they continue in their attempts
to do so. However, there is doubt as to the
degree of control which the authorities on Tai- ?
wan could in fact exercise over these forces.
The Communist Problem
21. Communist seizure of control in Burma
would bring great strategic advantages to
both Communist China and the USSR. Such
a coup would drive a wedge betWeen India-
Pakistan and Southeast Asia, facilitate Com-
munist penetration into other countries of
South and Southeast Asia, and support the
claim that Communism in Asia is an irresisti-
ble force. Furthermore, it would put under
Communist control the rice production of
what is potentially the richest rice surplus
area in Asia. Access to this rice production
would improve the Chinese Communist
regime's internal economic position. More-
over, this supply of rice could be used as a
political weapon against rice-deficient India,
Indonesia, Japan, Ceylon, and Malaya.
22. Within Burma, the Communists oppose
the government through political activity and
armed insurrection. The Communist-con-
trolled Burma Workers and Peasants Party
(BWPP) serves as the main instrument of
"legal" Communist activity and controls 13 of
the 250 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In
addition to denouncing the government for
its refusal to form a "united front" govern-
ment and its failure to "resist the penetration
of American imperialism," the BWPP seizes
every opportunity to exploit general criticism
of the government on such issues as its failure
to eject the Chinese Nationalist troops from
Burma.
23. The Communist guerrillas, despite their
dispersion into small groups and their present
shortage of arms and ammunition, still oper-
ate in sizable areas in Burma and are capable
of conducting raids against villages and lines
of communication in many parts of the
country. The Communist potential would be
significantly increased if agreement were
reached for effective military cooperation
among the various Communist and non-
Communist insurgent groups. The Burma
Communist Party has been urging the estab-
lishment of a united front of all insurgent
groups since 1950, but these efforts have thus
far resulted only in temporary agreements
for local military cooperation. If the Bur-
mese Communist Party were able to obtain
an effective agreement with the dissident
Karens, the resulting union of forces would
present the government with serious mili-
tary opposition.
24. Communist guerrilla capabilities could
also be significantly increased if the Chinese
Communists provided extensive military aid.
010110111116a
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MINN *INN 5
Present Chinese Communist assistance to the
Burmese Communists appears to be very ,
slight, consisting primarily of advice and
financial aid from the Chinese Communist
embassy in Rangoon to the Burma Workers
and Peasants Party, and probably special
training in Yunnan for a few Burmese Com-
munist guerrillas. There is no reliable evi-
dence that the Chinese Communists have
moved significant quantities of military sup-
plies across the border to Burmese guerrillas.
Although the ability of the Burmese guer-
rillas to absorb such assistance would be
somewhat limited by transportation difficul-
ties and a lack of technical training and
maintenance facilities, they could utilize con-
siderable quantities of small arms and am-
munition and thus increase their firepower
and combat effectiveness.
25. Besides the threat of the indigenous Com-
munist guerrillas, the government faces the
possibility of direct Chinese Communist inter-
vention, either by the infiltration of combat
units disguised as "volunteers" or by full-scale
invasion. "Volunteers" could be introduced
in support of military action by the Burma
Communist Party or in connection with a
limited invasion by Communist forces under
Naw Seng. This latter operation could be
conducted under the guise of an indigenous
Kachin insurgent movement to establish an
independent Communist state in Northern
Burma. A full-scale invasion could be ade-
quately supported by the lines of communica-
tion from Communist China to Burma, which
are believed capable of supporting an invad-
ing Chinese force of 90,000. Such a force
could be assembled from the Chinese Com-
munist troops now deployed in southwestern
China, and there are believed to be adequate
supplies on hand for an invasion of Burma.
Burmese Government forces could not offer
effective resistance to such an invasion.
26. During the past year, Communist activi-
ties directed toward winning Burma have
been characterized by caution and moderation
and by increased emphasis on political tactics.
Burmese Communist guerrillas have been less
willing to engage government forces, but have-
concentrated on preserving a guerrilla core
for future operations. At the same time, the
Burmese Communists have offered to stop
guerrilla operations in return for Communist
participation in a "coalition" government, and
have urged a joint expedition of Communist
and government armed forces to eliminate the
Chinese Nationalist troops. Communist-
front groups also have vigorously advocated a
"coalition" government. Communist China
and the USSR have in general continued to
follow a conciliatory propaganda and diplo-
matic policy toward Burma. Peiping has con-
tinued to refrain from pressing its historical
claim to border territories in Northern Burma.
Communist China has taken the initiative in
securing the exchange of semiofficial missions
with Burma, and the USSR has received sev-
eral Burmese delegations in Moscow.
27. The Communists appear to have shifted
the emphasis from violent to political activi-
ties in Burma during the past year, largely
because the Burmese Communists have made
a poor showing in military operations and
have failed to win local popular support or to
unify the insurgent movement. At the same
time, the reorganized Burma Workers and
Peasants Party gives promise of achieving
some success in exploiting popular opposition
to the government's policies.
Foreign Relations of the
Government of Burma
28. Burma has attempted to maintain a neu-
tral position in the East-West struggle. In
particular, Burmese foreign policy has been
designed to avoid any involvement in external
affairs which would antagonize Communist
China or divert national energies from press-
ing domestic problems. However, Burma has
recognized the need for outside aid. Within
the past year, the government has requested
assistance from the Soviet Bloc as a means of
restoring the appearance of a neutral policy,
while accepting US economic aid and British
military assistance. While continuing to de-
clare their willingness to accept aid from any
country, Burmese leaders have privately in-
dicated their belief that such assistance can
be obtained on acceptable terms only from the
West.
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v
SWIBIEPRIE T 6
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN BURMA
29. The Burmese Socialist Party will probably
continue to consolidate its control over the
Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League coalition
government during the period of this esti-
mate. There is a continuing possibility of a
struggle for power within the Socialist Party
leadership and of the disaffection of some
groups now in the coalition. However, the
effect of the trend toward one-party control in
Burma will probably be to facilitate a gradual
improvement in government administration
and in the stability of the present govern-
ment.
30. The Burmese Government will almost cer-
tainly continue its determined efforts to sup-
press insurrection in Burma. Government
armed forces will probably continue gradually
to increase their strength, which is already
sufficient for undertaking operations almost
anywhere in Burma, but they will probably
not achieve sufficient strength during the
period of this estimate to enable them to ex-
tend and maintain control over much addi-
tional area.
31. There is little prospect that the govern-
ment can achieve either a military decision
over the Karen insurgents or a political settle-
ment with Karen leaders during the period of
this estimate. On the contrary, Karen insur-
gents may reach additional local understand-
ings with elements of the former Chinese Na-
tionalist forces in Burma involving exchange
of food for arms and the coordination of local
defense arrangements against Burmese Gov-
ernment attacks. Local arrangements of this
nature would not in themselves seriously en-
danger Burmese internal security. However,
they would probably divert Burmese strength
from anti-Communist operations, bolster
Karen morale, and further decrease the pos-
sibility of a military or political resolution of
the Karen rebellion. Full-scale military co-
operation between the Karen insurgents and
the former Chinese Nationalist forces in Bur-
ma would seriously weaken the government's
capability of dealing with insurgency through-
out Burma. The likelihood of such a develop-
ment cannot be estimated with confidence
owing to the deficiency of our knowledge con-
cerning the objectives of the former Chinese
Nationalist forces in Burma. However, we
believe that the apparent divergence of ulti-
mate purposes between these groups would
make full-scale military cooperation against
the Government of Burma unlikely during the
period of this estimate.
32. Government forces almost certainly will
not be able to drive the Chinese Nationalist
forces out of Burma during the period of the
estimate. The government might appeal to
the UN for assistance; it is much more likely,
however, to undertake military operations on
its own against the Nationalist units, while
continuing to press for peaceful removal of
these troops. It is unlikely that the govern-
ment will seek agreement with Communist
China for joint military operations to destroy
the Nationalist forces in Burma.
33. Although there is no evidence that the
Chinese Communists have begun a program
of equipping the Burmese Communist insur-
gent forces, the Chinese Communists have the
capability of providing extensive military aid
to the Burmese Communist insurgent forces
at any time. About six months would prob-
ably be required to reorganize and re-equip
the guerrillas in their present dispersed state.
However, if an extensive program of Chinese
Communist military aid were initiated in the
near future, the Burmese Communist guer-
rillas could undertake operations to expand
their territory in 1953 but would probably not
be able to seize control of a substantial
amount of additional territory during the
period of this estimate. A continuing pro-
gram of extensive Chinese Communist aid
might, in the longer run, pose a serious threat
to the government's position.
34. A Communist-led united front of all insur-
gent forces does not appear likely during 1953.
Although the Burmese Communists may suc-
ceed in developing effective coordination with
the smaller leftist insurgent groups, includ-
ing even a segment of the Karen National De-
fense Organization, the internal security prob-
lem would not be seriously increased by a
combination of these forces. Although effec-
tive military cooperation between the Com-
munists and all present dissident Karen
40.11QOPHdth
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mdaStra 7
?
elements would seriously tax the government's
ability to retain control in substantial parts
of the territory it now holds, it is unlikely that
the Communists can reach agreement for ef-
fective military cooperation with more than a
segment of the Karen forces. The interests
of the majority of Karens are incompatible
with Communist objectives.
35. The Communists therefore appear to have
no prospect of taking over Burma during the
period of this estimate except through inva-
sion by organized Chinese Communist forces.
There are no current indications of a Chinese
Communist intent to invade Burma. The
Chinese Communists probably estimate that
Communist objectives in Burma can better be
served by a policy that does not involve the
risk of US-UN military counteraction against
Communist China and of antagonizing neu-
tralist opinion, particularly in Asia, which
such an invasion would entail. We believe
the Chinese Communists are unlikely to un-
dertake such an invasion during 1953.
36. The Communists will probably continue
to follow a dual policy in Burma, placing
greater emphasis on political tactics than on
violence. The underground groups, particu-
larly the Burma Communist Party, will con-
tinue harassing guerrilla operations, maintain
a hard-core guerrilla force for expanded op-
erations at some future date, and seek to
develop an effective united insurgent front.
At the same time, above-ground Communist
groups will attempt during 1953 to minimize
Burmese cooperation with the West and to
prevent the development of economic and po-
litical stability in Burma.
37. This Communist line of action is not likely
to reduce the cohesiveness of the present gov-
ernment coalition. We believe that the Com-
munist threat will continue to be sufficiently
recognized by Burmese leaders and that there
will be no significant change in the govern-
ment's anti-insurgent policy or in its resist-
ance to Communist demands for participation
in the government. Therefore, the prospects
through 1953 are for a slight improvement in
internal security and economic and politiCal
stability.
38. Assuming no substantial shift in the East-
West power balance in Asia, the Burmese Gov-
ernment will probably continue through 1953
its efforts to maintain "normal" relations with
Communist China and to maintain neutrality
in the East-West struggle. The government
will probably continue to promote a "third"
force Asian Socialist movement. However,
Burma will probably continue to accept the
assistance of the West in strengthening its
armed forces and its economy.
WitegalOr
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olargarr
NOTE: The map showing areas of insurgent activity represents only a
generalized picture. The size of the areas in color, have no
direct relation to the numerical strength of the insurgent
groups. In addition, it should be noted that insurgent activity
is not confined exclusively to the areas in color and that govern-
ment control does exist to a varying degree throughout much of
the colored area.
?
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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