SUGGESTED NIE ON NATIONALISM IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA AND ITS EFFECT ON US STARTEGIC INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040019-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: April 4, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

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0. DENTAL- 9'
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
4 April 1952
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 216
SUBJECT: Suggested NIE on Nationalism in French North Africa
and its Effect on US Strategic Interests.
1. We believe that present and potential US strategic
interests in French North Africa and the probable impact :on
'these interests of the rising tide of local nationalism in the
area warrant an NIE on this subject. The native nationalist
situation and outlook not only affect US interests in the area
itself (especially in terms of potential US security problems
there): but also affect the defense potential of certain of
our allies s especially Frances and our relations With the
Moslem world.
? 2. In US strategic terms s North Africa represents:
(a) a primary defensive line in the event of an early Soviet attack
? upon Western Europe; (b) a NATO flank defenses (c) a potential
line of departure for reoffensive purposes; (d) an
important element in naval and air control of the Western
Mediterraneanland (e) an important link in the belt of
air bases for US strategic air attacks on the USSR. In
conformance with these strategic interests: the US is developing
a substantial navels air: and ground base program in North Africa.
This program is well under way in Morocco and to a lesser extent
in Algeria but the program for Tunisian bases has been delayed
by French reluctance to grant permission for military survey teams
to enter the areas. and: mere'recentlys by the unsettled Tunisian
situation itsely: Military negotiations with Spain mayijn due
courses cover the question of Sp nish Moroccan bases,
3p While direct US economic interest in North Africa is
smalls the area is of-considerable economic ea well as military
? importance to France as a reservoir of manpower and a final
redoubts and for its economic contribution: actual and potentials
to the metropole. DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
CONFIDENTIAL0 DECLASSIFIED
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
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4. We believe that the NIE on North Africa should assess
primarily the, growing nationalist movements in the area, their
probable future development, their already evident international
repercussions, and their immediate andlongivange significance to
US interests. It should also assess (drawing largely on NIE-63)
the probable French reaction to this nationalist problem and
probable French ability to cope with it. The growing conflict
between French policy and local nationalism will- in atv event,
continue to engage US policy makers in reconcilingy(a) US interests
in the security of the area; (lbj t-interest in the welfare of a..
major ally, France; (c) the traditional US position regarding
colonialism vs.selfdetermination; and (d) US relations with the
Moslem world. These implications should certainly be examined in
the NIE.
5. The State Department is at present drafting an NSC policy
paper on French North Africa, Spanish Morocco, and Libya which they
say will take some time to complete? We have asked the drafting
committee to let us have their views as to the key problems for
which they will propose policy recommendations, and toward which we might
direct our intelligence examination ? Libya was added only because
it had not been covered in the NSC paper on the Arab States, but
we recommend that it be omitted from the NIE as posing essentially
an Arab State rather than ,a colonial type problem. We might also
omit Spanish Morocco as being of essentially secondary importance?
6. We suggest the following general terms of reference,
which could be expanded if this is thought desirable. In any case,
we suggest that Board action on terms of reference be held up until we
have received the suggestions of the State people.
rif)
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SUBJECTS THE NATIONALIST PROBLEM IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA AND
. ITS EFFECT ON US SECURITY INTERESTS'
THE PROBLE
? To assess (a) the strategic importance of the areas
(b) the current strength and probable development of local
nationalism. (c) the probable French reaction and French ability
to cope midi the problem; (d) the probable international reper-
cuseions; and (e) the probable implications for US security in-
terests. This estimate should be nopen-end"; it should look as
far ahead as seems feasible.
DISCUSSION
I. WHAT IS THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE AREA TO THE US AND
ITS ALLIES?
This section should assess the importance of the area as a
'strategic complex s both in terms of its direct value to the US and
its value to NATO and Franc as well0
-
A. What are direct US strategic interests in French North Africa?
B. What is the political, economics and military portance of.
the area to France? trotA.441-4 ,
C. Is the area of any direct importance to NATO strategic interests
as a wholes aside from the above?
110 WHAT IS THE CURRENT SITUATION IN FRENCH D
MOROCCOs TUNISIA AN
ALGERIA?
This andlysiS should cover each of these territories individually
and trace the inter-relationships where operativeo
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%mem,
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. What is the level of economic development, industrially and
agriculturally? What are atrategic economic resources and
their availability? What is the extent and nature of foreign
economic participation?
. What is the distribution Of economic and political Poser among
the natives a- between the natives and foreign groups? How
'large is the European population?.
C. What is the organization, atr ngth and social support, leaders,
legal status and political position of the native nationalist
groups and their labor and other affiliates? Of Communist
groups and affiliates? The relations between, nationalist and
Communist groups?
A, What are the aspirations Of thee nationalist groups and the
means by whichthey hope to attain them? The extent of coopera-
-tion between the nationalist groups in the differentaterritories,
and of th repercussions of nationalist devaloe2ents in one area
upon the others? The extent to which the nationalist and
Communist groups are aided from outeide sourcee--- the Arab
countries, the USSR, other? The part played. by religious, and
cultural differences between thenatives and foreiat el ents?
Nationalist relations with the US?
E. What are the strength and nature of the control mechanisms
exercised by the French -- economic, political and military?
The policies of the French with regard to nationalist aspira-
tions? The extent and means by which France is seeking to
reconcile its awn interests and nationalist aspirations? The
relations between the US and France in the area? The impact
upon the French North African position of Spanish policies in
Spanish Moroceo and with respect to the Arab countries?
, What ia the relative strength and level of development of the
nationalist movement in the three territories? What are the
capabilities of each of the native nationalist groups for
violence or disruption and French security capabilities for
controlling such developments?
III. WHAT ARE THE PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS?
A. To what extent-is nationaliam likely to grotaftrther in Algeria,
Tunisia, and Norecco? What are the chief internal and external
faeters which will influence this development? To what extent :
'might there be further violent disorder or even revolution?
CONFIDENTIAL
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B0 To what extent will the French be able to cope with this
problem? To deal with it militarily in event of violence?
To dampen its appeal or divert it by reforms? What policy
is France likely to adopt?
C, What are the probable international 'repercussions of the
, further development of nationalism?
1, To what extent will the Moslem states and others seek
to put pressure on Fiance? What aid might they extend
? to the nationalists? Hew effective is their support likey
to be to the nationalist pause? "
D, What is the likelihood of these conflicts reaching UN
consideration in the Security Council? In the General
Assembly? Under what circumstances? With what probable
consequences upon US relations with the Arab countries?
Upon US-French relations? US-native relatione? Other
repercussions in the UN?
IV, WHAT ARE THE PROM= IMPLICATIONS FOR DS INTERESTS?
? A, What impact might probable developments in North Africa have
upon the US base program? Upon the availability of native
labor, of local resources, etc0?
?B, To what extent will the nationalists seek US support and
? what will be the reaction of France to this?
C, What is the probable impact of North African developmente
upon the French political scene, and on French military
and economic capabilities?
CON MENTAL
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