ARGENTINE ATTITUDE TOWARDS IN ACTION AND HEMISPHERE DEFENSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002300010034-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: March 7, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12\ CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300010034-0
SEC ITY INFORMA TIOAq~j
Intelligence Report
'73i~03
No. 5818
DESTROY AFTER
ARGENTINE ATTITUDE TOWARDS UN ACTION
AND
HEMISPHERE DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of Intelligence Research
Date : March 7 p 1952
review of this document by CIA has
deievmi:sed that
CIA has no objection to declass
It co lairs information of CIA
Interest that M "I remain
classified at TS S
Authority: Itf1 70.2
Q Il contains nothing of CIA Interest
Dale 31 Ma& go i Reviewer
MWA RI q- =--
-COPY N
S$6URITY INFORMATION
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300010034-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300010034-0
SECRET
Security Information
This report was prepared from information available through
March 4, 1952,. by the Division of Research for American Republics.
TABLE OF CONTT!;NTS
Page
Abstract
I
Rio Treaty
1 _ ,^
II
Argentine Support for US and U Action in Korea
1 - 2
III Argentine Return to the Third Position
2 - 5
IV
Hemisphere Defense . .
5 - 6
V
Peron's Attempts to Revive ABC Coalition
6 - 8
VI
Conclusion
g _ 9
This report is distributed by OIR/IDR, telephone extension 4148
or 4149. When it has outlived its usefulness please return it to
OIR/IDR, Room 101, SA-1,
SECRE2
Security Information
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300010034-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300610034-0
SECRET. - ,
Security Information
ABSTP~CT . .
In the wake of tre Corimuni.st attack' on South Korea in
June 1950, Argentina anpeared about to abandon its traditional,
isolationist attitude towardswbrld conflicts between the Great Powers
and actually cooperate with 'the. US and the UN, ; 'A.rg } t~,ne. rat , ication
of the Rio Treaty, which `had been tabled since 1945'' the Chazber is
of Deputies, seemed to indicate that Argentina was also ready to
ccoperate with the US in erecting an effective sys~em,of hemisphere
defense. The basic anti-US sentiments of the ' Peron`Administration,
.however, appear: to have been only temporarily pushed into the back
ground by Argentine's immediate. desire for US assurances as to,.
allocation ' of markets,,essential._, imports, credits and military _ supplies.
.in the event that a,Th.ird World 1-Jar-was-Imminent. When it become
evident that an all-out East-West conflict'was not at hand and that
Argentine public opinion was adverse to active participation in Korea
with the UN, Peron retreated to his former anti-US and isolationist
policy. His backtracking was probably hastened by resistance within
the Peronista Party and by the.insistence of the Opposition Union
Civica Radical Party that Argentina maintain her traditional policy
of keeping out of world conflicts between the greatowers.,:
It was thought, that the virulent anti: -US campaign of the
Peronista propaganda machine might drop off sharply.after the national
elections of 1951. The de-cline has,been only relative, however, and
the emphasis has been shifted to alleged sinister Tjj',rJesigns on the
sovereignty and the economies of other Latin American countries. The
present Peronista Dress and radio attack on US efforts to organize
an effective defense system for the Western Hemisphere may reflect
some fear of'~encirclement" as a result of US military assistance
negotiations. Argentine propaganda media have also tried to promote
a bloc of Latin American producers of strategic materials to secure
hig e' fix prices:l'xo" m._e US, Peron has openly sought a revival of the
ABC block as a preliminary to a Latin American confederation which
under Argentine leadership would be a barrier, to. US, plans for defense
of the Hemisphere.
Although the Peronista press and radio have bitterly criticized
US negotiations for military assistance agreements with other. Latin
American countries, Peron may take the risk involved in"seeking a
similar agreement if it aRpe^rs there is no other way to maintain
Argentina's position vis a vis Brazil and Chile. Iffgranted, however,
Argentine use of military assistance might not be in accordance, with
SECRET
Security Information
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300010034-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300010034-0
...CRm, ,
Security Information.
what the US may consider to be the-best interests of the Hemisphere.
Although an armed attack on its neighbors seems unlikely, Argentina
might use US arms to coerce those neighbors or to regain Argentinats
er Arreden -..the ?alkiand Islands-or to make good Itgentine
claims in-thp Antartic regions. The record of Argentine failure to
cooperate ofectively with the US indicates that Argentine assurances
Would be designed as a temporary expedient to achieve Argentina's
immediate needs anQ?would be'subject to domestic political requirements.
Security Information
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300010034-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300010034-0
SECPET
Security Information
3NTINE'?ATTTTIJDE x0?~?t I S iJN . C'TION A T3: L'~~IISP '~ UEIt'EA?
:`~:'.?"":; '?'.v`.L .a'ri ';ri?i ~~?t" :.{1: :tYi:?':~_i.7.':`..t
.~ ,.? :>; .,?., ...:r ' :.,
'lta"';Rio;:Tty f r' _ G
? r _ 'i ^.."';'?~?:.?i t l?cy'' '.L `? Y ?? . ?.'i~R?. '::. ' ::: ?' !i1 C. ~ i?~V. `::, , _
{ r - Argentiif61-s ned 'the Rio Treaty,' with `?reservat`ions, on' `
Septeinber?2, .39`IvS'. F rho' r entire' Senate,:"appro~ved'ratification
on
Duty 22t''1948.:?:=:Itr` August 19 ?3 ' at-`w.P?s- tebled in the Chamber
ofr. De Duties',, Altho'u h"tl e' Perb, isth-blac' hac1 `the-'necessary votes to
secure approval, Peron.-a*-b aTently preferred not. to `risk an open ebate
with the- Opposition" on ' 'ore1 'n policy`' unt31 "the _time'. 'was right
On June 28, 1950 i1n"the `atinosphe e; of awr crisis, ' the ,Peronista
block. ir.: the .`C'.ember of Deputies brought~'up,'annrgval of the Treaty and
forced it' through .the :Chamber 'that'tsaire `day. The Oprosition' Union,
Cfvica Radical (UCR) Deputies abstained from voting after the'ir.requests
for more time to examfne.: fhe: s ,v ..t~ere::.cverri&len;:: UCR-leader'Arturo
Frondizi connected Peronista zeal -for approval to thegreuting ,of the
425;000,?00.0. US Export-Import 1Bank: loan"arid decl red his Party t
preferred the maintenance of the national dignity a't'whatever 'economic
a-~_
a n
l
or
s
c ,a
.: ' Peron ! s action -.,in securing, ratificetion? =of the Rio Treaty{ appears
to' .have. been: mpt3 vated_' by .-Argentine-I's -.1mneLf ate =reds. 'If...
lurid War III
were imminer}t,::atifi?cation? would,- improve Argen'tijrats! Position ;in
securing US aaurances as 't41?a2l.ddati6 ` of:'ets;' esseritial_imJaarts'and
finanGia1credits as ;wel?~:?as armsshiprdents. The yv~:sit"~of Ass~.sta t
Secretary of ,:State February . 1950;?:and? the' Export-Ihiport:
Bank 'l'oan ha,4 also helped by improving US-Argentine re1?ations' .which had
detor4drated in 1948-1949. The Peronista press mace haste to justify
,the Administration Is desertion of its vaunted Third,...Posi.tion..and.. it
seemed--as',thOu gh'Argentina was about to support the,_US with more than
II. rr_,
.ne'-Sti dirt for US:?erid ,;UN?:Aution aim Korea,.
In the perioYiimmediately fQllotir rr , rata fica t on. -
g i ? of.:tlge R~.o
Treaty, Arger)t3r;e official stites eiits,-:the .Pernnista'=press' anti' Peron-s
own speeches inclic~ted : rnroyal of , and ;:support for : ,UN. aril+,US' action
I. ' Republica .Ar ennagmarA-.,4 -Diputados, -,M6'
r
10-de 'Sesiones
June 28, 1950.
Security Information
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300010034-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300010034-0
SECRET 2
Security Information
in Korea.1 In early July 1950, Peron- told::ra group of visiting US,
newspapermen that he believed the.:: US was. acting very intelligently
and that the UN. could count - ?on the support of the metn~ier nations to
give effect to"its"decisions. 2 In an official reply to the. Secretary
General of'the UN, made public on July 18, 1954,-Argentina:: stated that
she was at the disposal of the Unified. Command ;and'wo4d fulfill her
commitments under the United Nations Charter'.3'' Although Cr$a,.an
Administration daily, -had suggested on July 16.': that, contingents of
volunteer troops would be sent to Korea ForeignMinister':Paz,in his
press conference`bn,the day the Argentine reply,was::made?public, assured
the, Argentine public. that "consultation.of'the people" would precede.
-involvement- in military action. abroad.4 This brief oeri od--to July 18,
1950--was the., high tide of Argentine, pro-UN sentiment." To?..date (March,
1952) the sum of direct Argentine assistance. for thew UN `in' Korea
been to send a shipment of canned?meat to Korea.
hixd Position
tine Return to the 1'
e
A
III
n
rg
_
.
The. Argentine reaction to the. prospect of, actual participation
in?,.Korea indicated th,?t it was, not an issue populer..enough6to create
widespread public support for .abandonment of isolationism. On July, :18,'
1950,lPeron. backtracked with a declaration that ""In the` face of the present difficult international situation- Argentina. will adopt only...
the attitude dictated by her people `Argen'tina ' has? her ~ own plans' 9-Or' the present and future, 'and: whatever she -does must redound .to `the'
benefit of her ? own interests,. and.not to. those ofd. some-` one,.eIse.
Thereafter the. Administration :and its propaganda.machine'_ lamd. .no'reasing
Stress on the Third Posi.tion`:as Argentinats salvation..inwhat, i'
1. T-559 and T-561, BuenosAires,.June 29, 1950. (Restricted ;_;
T-564, Buenos Aires;'?Tune 30, 1950. (Restricted) ...Weeka
No. 26, Buenos Aires, June 30, 1950.? Confidential). D-7
Buenos Aires,.July 5, 1950..,:(Rest
3. D-71, Buenos .Aires, July 18,. 1951. {Rest_,~?rcted)
).
.1950. (Restricted
July 20
. Buenos Air
s
D
86
,
e
,
-
,
4.
5. D-966, Buenos Aires, December :15~ 1951. Restricted).
6. D-86, Buenos Aires, July ,20, 1950. (Restricted . Weeka?-N6.." .28,.
Buenos Aires:, 'July 14, 1950. (Confidential. ?.
7. D-71, Buenos Aires, July 18, 1950... ?? -Restreted) . J 105, Buenos'
Aires, July 24, 1950. {Re- tricted).
? SECRET
Security Information
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300010034-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300010034-0
",SECRET--
Security Information
?3escri~bed,a :'a sti gl e beWeen 'the' US ariii `soviet `Russia tor :world
donirat1,t7n.;, The.: obvibZs'-burboso `of "the:`tdri1inistratiori`'s. tactics
:.has ,bc en to ~re.inf'o'ce r ubli`c''resistaiice- to any abandonment of isolationi
In November; X95?;=,Juan':'Otex~oy 'Argentine Ambassador 'to Moscow; is reporter
to. .have, toad-- thee: Brazilian press that , 1--w iatis taking, place inn, Korea
is -a re?p tftion-'of f that which occurred on' o~tYier `occasions, since it
concerns an,extremely wealthy re ion and is, thus sought. after. by
governments of `'other'- cotntries.; It Since: January 2951, ? the" theifiehat~the stru le in, Kox'es ' is a
prel:imiftary to. an :inevitable war between.the imperialist'ic.;foroes of
,Communism and capitalism; .spearheaded by the`Soviet'Union.an the US
respectively, ~has"be?en .increasing1y;,emphasized by? all the :propaganda
media- at, the'dj_-SO.osal -of -the Peron Administration. _ Ain article ,ln an
August ?195] : issue of El L der, they organ of ftiriister of the I'riterior
:Borlengl i, _-state& that the US-was locking ?to other countries "for; "human
material" ::to eight its battles and 'thus save US .lives.The article
cony] uded :by declaring that "Even.. though` Pa#~ Amen can . sol dari ty; has
not.been denied by any .of the Latin American coiix~tre"s, i,t is yu to
evident that; our s~ tuation and our obligations and responsibilities
in.,-,the;event`of:,another. war"'cannot. be considered` on t e.?samep.].gne
as those of:.the United- States aril the'ir' allies `and' Tur?opean dependents.."
The articles -szgned'4Descartes- vhich Embassy Buenos Aire.s believe.
are ..authorized, if. not; written by: 1'? i cn, have consistently defended the
`.Third Position with more brickbats for the; US than for ?. the Soviet
Union:.... Descartes has: written that World, War III is:: inevitable :iecause
the l?preparation"s, have -reached a?'st ge :inhere the -wiser course.. of..
avoidance~?-of-`taar :taorxld.-bring-economic aisrster (to'the Us).. ,According
::?.to Descartes: capitalisiii'and ccmmunisin are tioutli to disappear. ..The
a .,th3 rd ,Grand
followers.--of Peron ! thus 'have no' reason for engy grog in
every one will "lose and 'wYiic'i has o'. meaning for the
Pa'ronistcs;:.who':Y 3ve -s?ol' 'ed, `all their : probl iris,
- -
+.? rrc. c. SLCi avtr .~.~,. uc.3a.w._a~.a..s. wi.9.v ,.u ... ,,. ~..f ._.r/Jv"p
~v-u..aii_-___ ?.aitai)?
2. _FBIS - November 21, 1950. (Restricted),
3'' D-295'x,. Buenos=. Ai.,res?,' August 29, 195]. c1.osure'Nosif ;:
4 D-401, Buenos Aires, September 14, 1951 En'cl sure. No. Restric
5. ti3 ' 2 7 1951 : Enclp. u re tricted .
SECRET
Security .:Tip .brmation,.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300010034-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300010034-0
Security Information:::
In meetings of the UN General Assembly prior to the last session
the Argentine delegation has usually given good :.support. to the~'US?'on
East-Test issues after : ~iak ng ` it cl'e'zr`''tha t the, Argentine position-
was independently takent During the Sixth
Session of ,the General=
..
Assembly. in-: Paris (?la#.e. 19SI and early 1952) there. ?was a? noticeable
change in .the, Argentine vof dig record. Argentina held. more- closely,
to its Third Position' ths'ti-,before and on `important matters pertaining:::`
to the East,-Nest' :conflict frequently abstained-, from,- voting
Argentine isolationism in conflicts involving the Great Powers..
has deep roots in the Argentine oast The nation yae akept?: t.-'of `World
War I by Fxesident' Irigbjtezi"arid very-reluctaritly onto-add ..World' Wer `II
only after. the.;,outcome was. ~cle ly evi ien't. The:UC t block :ins the Chamber' ?.
of Deputies hasp consistently` advocated: an isolationist policy for
Argentina and in so doing 'hasut pressur Or' .the ,dministrarti~on to
pe maintain a..simi,ar::p'os.itian becauseY bf isolat .on3.sm~.e apaeal _to'the '. -
masses to .the e-xtre se:? riatiohalists and to an imuor'tant- sector of "the
Peronista???Party r~' Redibaltleadera have made it; clear that: their adiafra~ion
,.. for the ' has t~infi'uenced their to~'support..,the.,Utd...in the Far -East.
On September 1
:;1~S0Dell piano` ''Radical -representative on 'the Chiambers
y
.Foreign Affairs-,Committee, 'declared that if Chinese' leaders arneareci
bound. to Moscow it :ties: because of extern e? oiti Lions;.. In: '.the'
' ?;'
December 27, .19'51 debate .'.in . the' Chamber -over approval of 'the` apanes~e
Peace Treaty,' Frandiz ,the`. leader''o'f"'the Radical bloc, described the
,Treaty as figuring conspicuously in the., strategic, plans. .-f a: sossible ``.
future Ia
He stated-?'flotl-f r that Ar
r.
entines should. have nothiin
'
,
g
a
g
..,; do with the struggle`--f-or, domination` over' Asia : and the, Pacifia` O een.2
It is qu stior ble.?if: Peron would have given .even ;vocal support ~' `
to UN action in Ko ` rea -had he-More'sen''`thet ubl~:~c?~;rea,ction :-against':
Argentire vow ,
e ;x3 ement':= .Elie abi-%ity to suppgrt,,.tYie,.,UN--even die he
wish to do so -has been me retunecribed` by the forces ,:of isolationism
4Rm
and national?
to ,prgeritinA4 Cringi so' National, 3, a:de;t'Se ipne
September 950.
2. Republ ca lrgen ina,. Cozig ~eso`'Naci6tal,' Diar o de a Tones:
December
SECRET
Security Information
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300010034-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300010034-0
~~it 1. r'1%f:> - ? .L -. ", f.~ ?~. , -, t. ~.. S :i~~', :~ ..~ ,{
Hem~spYiere'Defense`'
fit. 'sr+_ ,. ~'.~..u+ ~i;~,'.. 3,. ~. ,-~? ` '?? j
The 'eron ; Admir}istration is brief enthusiasm 'for~~the Rio Th ety
` or -ugh t rie~a assurances of rgerstine solidhr ty for measures to be :taken
in _ r~'efen'se of . the es tern Iemisphere r: ' T lose as"sur~aii'c~es' Piave silica '
1d 0
Security' Information
pla`ce' MoD g zarre .some. ,ch tchat:2... ' . '. :' _ "
Descartes;' hoa-desc ' es. the. UAT .as a':me a ins' riairient' of" the. US and.' the
Aygentryines to'a on)t sf'~ci' ferent rc',cvF'l ?~rThe'''Peron,s`bn'press`~'inc udi*+O
Conference convened,;,' It .a ,
,~ ,, , pparentJ:y.'was, -secured=irr,gdod part~by tactful
US handling of- both- the Argentine delegation and the issues !resented
before the conference.
:'+ t 1 i' f' i. +' + ?? ? ? ? ? s'2
Argentine agreement .to_?meas?gyres taken to tighten he disphere defent
was, however, wc& erred by, the, reservtion:`th6t'- .se`-'of'its armed forces
, Conference of Foreign,; I .n ste3^s ifi Washing ton' etas; not as'sUred i he i'" the
really of f ectiue; r eiiti e co Aeration at t~4e`"I ar h-April 1951
AMerzcan`; ggver`rinien~s have --publ4 cly: interpretad `the under?akings~ in
A s~mi1 or sense Peronista 'gas's a? ?tacks on the Corference,'Yiowever,,,,
h6ve sia~rorted neutrality anc eondejnne'd;:US teresn mil .tary
cooperatzon as an affront to I tin rnericar~ soVereignty Only in Guate-al.a'has "anotherofficial prop aganda?m'-chineebeeti turned :against
the US position. Military and economic differences'we:r headlined?'in
an attempt to portray Argentine as successfully opposing the United
States on these two aspects of hemisphere,, cooperation..:. The--Argentine
- .theme."that--the..best.-t:aybo -VW~comatCommunism- in Latin-America-.is too
raise the levels ,of ?,lu ring ,pyqaying ;~~fa3.r!' prices - o Latin ier caii'
i 1 prodticers`G~as later ireque ttly c tad ?an support" of a i~aw `ma eras'`
nroducer'hi ~~. uric?a~ :ni ran+ ,r~~' iaartrrq -4 y ?? .. . ,. + '~ t : *' .
neighbors Bdiiv3atand Chile, have been enecuraged'to `riot ,on'al e their
Lst American:x~esentz ant over econo iz 'losse's a 1 egedly suffered
l9's"a" esult`:of`,'nfl; tad p ices .for US expo is fb'lloidng 'crld _ar''II
. ''has b en ;carefully cultivated~ y Ar ant ne. pro a nc iec1'ia. Argentina t:
-10 vfrll
1. D-1239, Buenos Aires, February i,;:I95 "-(Secret).
2. D-1060, Buenos Aires, January'10,,--195 (Restricted). D-1092.p
Buenos Aires, January 14, 1952. (Unclassified).
'
SECRET
Security Information
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300010034-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300010034-0
0
Security 7nforiaatipa..
SECRET
. tin. and copper resources to? end !'Yankee explpitation.!"':_: Even-.through;
nationalization wou d nbt cut off ;U3 supplies` pf these_. two.,vital materials .
proOuction might= cenceivablyy decrease - and prices mig) t besubstan ally
increased. Argentine propaganda has also urged Latin American countries
to reserve their supplies of raw materials for the future, and?,to hold.,,;. ;
out for higher prices from the US. '~?
One. Of. most "uhsavory,1episodes . in the obstructionist campaign ,
directedfromrthe Casa osada was the exploitatioi .of the. ,alleged :-Benson..
plot. ; This. myth of raid 1951 was " head'J fined b ,the ' rams press; and
radio in. a deliberate' attempt to dis.9redit the Armed Forces.of the US
and disrupt hemispheric cooperation. Tl'iis deliberate , lfe; w.as ,-.given:
.; quasi-offie1a3 `sanction t. lien . 1rsed ;by the Colw nist : esca'rte3s, who, r ,f
not Peron .'himself,. at the ? vent' At has; ~'eron e, bl easing.. .. r:
V. Peron's Attempts to Revive ABC Coalition
Ano er Peron attempt to interfere' with US plans tor developing....r,.
.? ,.,.
an effective`'systemo defense for the Western Hemisphere. has: been. his,.
0group; (Argeritina, ';Brazil and. Chile ,
appeals, fora revival ;of the"'
The-Argentine =Pires3:dent suggested union .of the, tl'iree countries. as .a: . .
solution to their problems ifs duly' 1950.; 4 2n' late":August 191,;;he
warned that victory` i . a 'third: world war by ;the ~ Do ~,a~r urtaint";::countri..er
we . willbe uncongtieable ::n3 f . ' .....
2.
D-1046, Buenos'Aires,''December,28, 1951,:;;:; ~(Restr cted),.:,?....,?..,-, ?,.. _
D-3875, Buenos Aires, June'1, 1951. L(Restst
._ icted,DD-1939,) Buenos '
..
Aires June 14,:1951. (Confidential) _ i
3.
D-1724, -Buenas-.Aires, Flay 4, .3952. (Restr.acted}... 'D-109.5,. Buenos r......
w. N
Aires, June 7, 1951. (:Restricted) : D-1959, Buenos Aires., June 14f:
1951:(Con fidential). D-1139, Buenris Aires, January.l$.;.,1952
(Re4 ; ..
5.
D-392, Rio de Janeiro, September 5, 1951. Enclosure No. 1. (Restrict
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300010034-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300010034-0
0 0
Security Ip1 cTr4ation
On December 20, 1951, Descartes expanded this theme by suggesting
that Argentina, Brazil and Chile unite as a preliminary to the formation
-a '`Sau~tks;, An ericar3.e federatisn; spr ad n = :northwa d".and;1 tng ng
.together: all not, oneof": ,at n; oarig n.;,; xhe .oiumn s . returned: fax this
thenie1 -te i ? anuary 952., when lie f tad, alleged ~ JB` .designs. or ;Canada
.as pro[o:.;that. I~atiri American; countries t:nte ,3n order' rtoratect
such. a
=='themselves against ;the, ;US;2 ohs fact:. hat, Peron 's plans; or
oonfederat SSn ;or even. an ABC:'bloc under .Argentine lea ership: appear to
hive little,'-chance',,of a.:ucceeding .should anot.:be peir n teed:;" to.;..~b cure
the main point.--that Argentine -: propagazd4,. has.,cons4.s en ly attempted
to-.einbarraos ?,US ; #,empt5. ,to, organ ze< an, ;e fec4ver.sy tem .of..he sphere
, ..defense. ?' . `... =
... ;. :The 'eroniata: press;, has bitterly crIticized,~UB:"ne of ations with
other< Iat3ri-:l ryfean:.governments" fox .b teral~ military as1 ce
;; ..agreement 'as, authorized; by'-`the. 19 ...: its:has
del iterate y attempted .- o ..obstruct.. the .-cons.ummatior~ : of ,these agreements
it ,charges! :that :they. W 11. ;ead to., U Se Ii~vas :ori of the..~..gn3ng aountryt s
sovereign ., .Where the ..U negotiat ..ons with Iexico,:br.oke ddown the pro-
amggp rt''nd
' n3stratx _ ere: Buenos. Aires 'S e#
exploited . it.witih obvious?:pleasure 4Theygave the,.iZnpxessiarn to-the
e
Argentine; pz bljc that .the:Mexican-US negot ations- broke down 1cause
Mexico refused, to send. .troops . abroad,?.would. not,:perm t ;US trgops.ton
Mexican soil and rejected US demands which would "gravely -affect' Mexie
agriculture and industry. The Peronista press empba,si.zed,Mexicof,s
alleged defense of her sovereignty and criticized the`Pentegon`f`or its
" rur e" demaric?'s in :retu 'n ;or; xf~ terry. aid.., On .:Fe3bri ryt28, 1952
"Des cartes assured .hia. re a.ders -.,that r ,,since Latin , Arica. was. prg.te cted
by.sits-is oletec posiitior},, confine, tai defens .,could be?=beet iss ed
' . by :individual action-of; each country without the costly . vd .of ,tbe US 4
., Argent na ..he got been i~ -r t t aye; a. mill tart' ;assistance
~g a nto;; Fore gn::Mini star. Remorzno has. :, xprs::ssod"
: h -fear... tha# , as
a consequence, -the bal,anee of ?9Wer Southern $q]}th ,Ames ca w~ l be all
:~tb ,Argentiuakdisadva~itage~ Argent a leas tttediti;ona ly relten~ that
:I
ti
Demo cia:;.:Buenos;?Aires.,> Decem ter 20, 1 51~ ;: p=lO 8~ Buenos
...._ ,... ,
;AireDecem1)er ?26,, -19:51.. eistricte
: ;. Democgacia, Buenos; Aires, January 24~ 1 S y.?.." x.1171, Buenos Aires,
} ~ ~ Ste' T: ~ - ~ ?~.. '._`=.`.{ ._..
Security formation
3. D-1314, Buenos Aires, February 27, 1952. (Unc].assified).-
4. I-A Democracig, Buenos Aires, February 28, 1952.
_ . D-1134, Bue.nos,Aires, January 17,.1952. (Confidential).
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12: CIA-RDP79R01012A002300010034-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300010034-0
SEEMT... :
Security Information
solat on ,si ` vrhfo a`-.he; -has. nurtkire :woulsI :die: a `atrongaO, drrfng' factor.
'Inathe.;short 'ruin=tYie :.US.ls perhaps most useful to Per~?n as`'a scapegoat
fir .his.:econarn c difficult es:= Over th ...l'orf rur. he. may feel that a
,
.
y
that he 'cannot. otherwise forestall, closerBrazilian' `and Chilean` ties'"
with the USA Perim may eventually feel, forced to seek'srmilar' agreements
such action would alienate the nationalistic and isoletionist'sentiments
he .has cultivated and depended upon for public -support. If. Peron decided
to take that-.risk, Argentina might be able to qualify for military
assistance under US legislation and would probably give the necessary
assurances. Domestic political needs might main rule, hotirever, as
regards carrying out such., a,q ree. ~ent)). _once -Peron had. secured what he
wanted in the way of 'military assist r'iee...; Strengthened Argentine Armed
Farces :might ;n'ot,necessarily' be used in what the : US would conceive to
be'the':best. riterests