NIE-64 (PART I) SUPPLEMENT: SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES, THROUGH MID-1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002100040002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 10, 1952
• Content Type: MF

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BOARD OF NATIONAL 1 TD1ATES
10 December 1952
1 1C AND124 FOR THE INTELLIMNCE ADV13(1 Y CC zT TEE
SUBJECT: NM-a (Part I) Supplement: Soviet Bloc Capabilities,
Through W,1954
1. The attached draft estimate has been approved by the
Board of National Estinmtes pursuant to a consideration of
it by the 1AC representatives.
2. This estimate was produced at the request of the
EC Senior Staff. The basic approach used in producing this
estimate was to take NIE-64 (Part I), "Soviet Bloc Capabilities
Through tiid-1953", and make alterations necessary to make the
mid-1953 estimate valid through mid-1954.
3. The Board suggests that distribution of this estimmte
be limited to the 11SC Senior Staff and resmber agencies of the
TAC.
4. This estimate will be considered by the IAC at 10:30
Thursday, 11 Decberrs.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS, NIE-44 (PART I)
SUPPLEMENT
Page
THE PROBL 4. ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? e ? . ? ? . ? e o 1
cy/NCWSIONS. e a . ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? . . ? . ?
DISCUSSION . e a o ? . ? ? a ? . ? ? . a a ? . ? e ? . . ? 0 5
Factors Affecting Bloc Capabilities . ? . e . e ? a ? ? 5
Bloc Military Strength* . ? . . . o o e ? . . . . ? . o 10
Bloc Military Capabilities. ? ? . . . . . . a . ? a . a 14
Elements of Bloc Political Warfare Strength . e .. o . 18
Bloc Political Warfare Capabilities o e . . . . . . . . 20
NA7UREOF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE FOR ESTIMATES
OF MW AF&M STRENOTH. . . . a . ? . a a . a . a . . a 25
CONF!NNNTIAL
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ow~
ON
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
10 December 1952
CU.RTECT: N=-64 (Part I) SUPPL:y,,IT: SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES ,
TIIROUGII L'ID..1954
To extend through avid-19511 the estimates of Soviet Bloc/
capabilities for political and military warfare made in NIE-64
(Part I).
(This estimate does not undertake to speculate rega,^ding
the effects on Bloc capabilities of the many possible developments
in the Korean war.)
14 The Bloc continues to possess a significant quantitative
superiority over the Western Powers in forces in being and in con-
ventional ground and air armament.
-The ov a oc consa.sts of the USSR,. the European Satellites,,
Ccunist China,. Outer Mongolia, North Korea,, and Viet Minh.
The Kremlin also controls the international Communist movement
outside the Bloc countries.
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2, The Soviet economy is much better prepared now to sup-
port a major war effort than it was in 1940.
3. The principal emphasis of the recent Bloc military program
has apparently been upon enlarging the atomic stockpiles upon 3m.-.
proving Bloc defenses, particularly against air attacks and upon
strengthening Satellite and Chinese Communist forces. We believe
that this emphasis will continue throughout the period of this
estimate. We also believe that the Bloc military forces will not
increase greatly in sizes although they will improve significantly
in combat effectiveness.
1 We estimate that the USSR will probably have a stockpile
of 190 atomic weapons (30-100 kiloton yield) by mid-19S4. (The
actual figure may be from half to tanice as mar, as this estimate.)
It is unlikely, that the USSR will be able to develop and produce a
thermonuclear weapon by mid-1953. During the period of This estimate
(to mid-1954)., however, there is the possibility of advanced research
and field testing concerned with thermonuclear reactions.
5. The Soviet forces now stationed in Eastern Europe are in
an advanced state of readiness for war and can attack with little
or no warning. However, the Bloc forces in Eastern Europe would
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almost certainly require substantial reinforcements in soviet groixid
and air forces bcfore they could curtain major offensive operation.
6, +de estimate that the Bloc has the capability to undertake
concurrc-nt large-scale operation: in continental mope, the LTiddle
.East, and mainland Aria, The Bloc could rapidly reinforce with
Chinese Communist and Soviet forces the Ccmmtst forces now in
Korea, and at the same time undertake an invasion of Japan by Soviet
forces o
7. The ILSR is capable of undertaking the delivery of its full
stockpile of atomic weapons against targets in the tE and its overseas
bases. It also has the capability of undertaking suctaincd air of-
fensives against the UK, most of continental Europe, most of the
Middle East., and Japan, with the intensity of individual offensives
varying according to the number undertaken concurrently,
Co The Bloc air defense organization has the capability for
vigorous opposition to an air offensive against the principal Soviet
centers. However, despite marked improvements in the Bloc air defense
system (especially in the W.' R, Eastern Europe, and L:anchuria), d+>
Ziciencies will remain throughout the period of this estimated
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9. The LCSR has the capability to undertake offensive sub-
wine patrols and mining operations along most of the world's
strategically vital sea lanes. The U:.5R has the capability to
undertake short-haul amphibious operations in the seas adjacent to
Its own coasts.
ltd. Bloc political warfare is an important weapon which will
continue to constitute a serious danger to the non-Communist world
throughout the period of this estimate. The likelihood of an in-
crease in in Bloc political warfare capabilities is greatest in un..
eatable areas,, such as southeast Asia and parts of the :ladle East
and Africa. These areas will continue to be particularly vulnerable
to Bloc political warfare because of economic and social unree is
bitter racial and religious antagonisms, the widespread sentiment
against "Western imperialism,," and the ineffective leadership of
rxarr existing governments.
11 The Bloc could increase its exports to the non-Communist
world within the period of this estimate, 'fie estimate that even a
slight increase of trade with the non-Communist world would consti-
tute an important factor in political warfare,
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DISCUSSION
FACTORS AFFECTING BLOC CAPABIISTI S
12,, The Soviet reCirie is securely entrenched in power,, and
there is no an-went prospect of As control being threatened or
shaken.
13.4 Soviet control over the Satellites will almost certainly
remain virtually complete. It ensures the subservience and re-
liability of the governments,, and continued economic and military
contributions to the USSR from the Satellite area.
].ls. The Chinese Communist regime has firm control over
mainland China9 and there is little likelihood of its control being
threatened or shaken by domestic forces within the period of this
estimate. We believe that Communist China accepts Pdoscotit leadership
in the international Communist movement but retains some capability
for independent action and a capability to exert influence upon the
shapire of Communist policy in the Far East. The character of the
current Sinn-Soviet relationships will probably remain relatively
constant throughout the period of this estimate.
15 The USSR is engaged in a large-scale research and de-
velopment program. This includes both pure and applied research9
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with an emphasis upon applied research in fields of military appli-
cation, especially atomic energy-,, electronics, jet aircraft, guided
missiles, and submarines. In all of these fields, Soviet scientists
and technicians have domonstrated a high level of proficiency.
16, The USSR has developed a very high capability for j t,ng
radio transmissions up to and including HF bands. Soviet capabilities
in related electronic fields indicate that they are now capable of
developing equipment for jamming VHF and UHF bands. These capabilities
constitute a serious threat to Western long-range and short-range mili.?
tart' radio c icationw and navigation systems.
17. The gross national product of the Bloc has been increasing
rapidly in the past few years -V Any calculation of its magnitude is
necessarily subject to considerable error, and no meaningful com-
parison can be made with prewar-years for the Bloc as a whole.
However., provisional estimates indicate that the Bi.oc?s gross national
product in 1951 was roughly 20 percent higher than in 1949, and we
believe that rapid growth will continue during the period of this esti-
mate.
This paragraph represents a substantial revision of the estimate
of Soviet economic development to 1952 contained in PdIE...64 (Part I).
The revision has been made on the basis of research undertaken in
connection with TJIE 65. The results of this research are tenta-
tively accepted by the IAC agencies for the purpose of this
Supplement, subject to further study0
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The economy of the ILSR had recovered its prewar
level of total production by 1948 and had surpassed
that level by at least one-third in 1951. -'Ie esti-
mate that the Soviet gross national product has been
increasing at an annual rate of about 11 percent, and
that it will continue to increase, although at a scene'-
what reduced rate, during the period of this estimate.
b. The combined production of the Satellites constitutes
approximately one-quarter of the Bloc's gross national
product. We believe that the Satellite gross national
product will increase at a rate approximating that of
the USSR during the period of this estimate.
co The gross national product of Communist China iu
extremely difficult to estimate, but we believe that
it represents less than IS percent of the Bloc total.
Communist China's gross national product is probably
increasing at an annual rate of 3 to 5 percents but
its output of capital goods will continue to be a
very small part of the 3loc total,
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18, The output of the Soviet economy does not ap:}roach that
of the US economy, nor does the output of the Bloc economy as a
whole approach that of the NATO states,,, USSR gross national pro-
duct in 1951 was about 30 percent that of the U5, and the combined
-rocs national product of the entire Bloc was about one-third that
of the NATO countries, These disparities are being reduced, but there
^riU be no significant change by mid-195h.
19. hIowever, comparisons in terms of total output of all types
of goods and services are misleading as indications of relative
capacity to produce military equipment in peacetime. The traditional
living standards and the controls prevailin within the Bloc enable
the Bloc states to assign a much smaller proportion of total output to
civilian consumptions particularly of scarce materials and goods, than
is feasible in Western countries. Moreover, these living standards
and controls also enable the Bloc to assign a higher proportion of
its military outlay to production of actual military end-items than
is feasible in the West.
j/ This paragraph represents a substantial revision of the estimate
of Soviet economic development to 1952 contained in INIE-64 (Part
I). The revision has been wade on the basis of research under-
taken in connection with NIL-65. The results of this research
are tentatively-accepted,by the IAC agencies for the purpose of
this Supplements subject to further study?
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20. Since the end of ii'orld War II, the Bloc as a whole has
devoted a much larger proportion of its gross national product to
military purposes than lthe 'dent. Vie believe that the USSR now de-
votes and will continue to devote roughly one-fifth of its national
product to military expenditures. We also estimate that the giantity of
resources which the USSR allocated to military production in 1952
equals the amount assigned in 1944, the peak year of Soviet war
production,
21,, The Soviet economy is much better prepared now to support
a major war effort than it was in 1940. Under continued cold war
conditions, the Bloc clearly has the capability of expanding its ill.
dustrial base and of increasing military productiono The soviet
economy is organized with a view to possible hostilities in the
near future as well as in the more remote future. These two objectives
compete to some extent in the allocation of resources,
22). The Kremlin places a high priority upon stockpiling reserves,
not only of military end-items but of food, capital equipment, and
materials needed for maintaining the economy under wartime conditions
or other emergencies.
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23, The Floc could increase its exports to the non-Co monist
world within the period of this estimate. We estimate that even a
slight increase of trade with the non-Communist world would constitute
an important factor in political warfare,
BLOC x!IISTARY STREIGTB
24, The Bloc continues to possess a significant quantitative
superiority over the Western Powers in forces in being and in con-
ventional ground and air w*mamenta. We estimate that the Bloc armed
forces now have:
ao Approximately 8,7508000 men, of which about 1,1150,000
are Soviet) 1,,550,000 Satellite; 2,350,000 Chinese
Com unist; 290,000 North Korean; and 130,000 Viet
Minh. (For more complete information on the number
of regular forces and of security forces maintained
by each Bloc State,, see NIE-6I1. (Part I) Appendices,
Appendix 3, Section VIe)
b. An actual strength of approximately 21,000 aircraft,
including about 6,700 jet fighters and 900 piston
I/ For commerit- on fie of ' the evidence available for estimates
of Bloc armed force strength, see note at the end of this estimate,
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medium bombers; an authorized strength of about 25,000
aircraft, including about 8,400 jet fighters and 1,150
piston medium bombers,
co A total of at least 164 major surface vessels and 361
submarines, including 103 long-range types.
d. A stockpile of 50 atomic weapons (30-100 kiloton
yield). (This estimate applies to mid-1952, not the
date of puilication for this report The actual figure
may be from half to twice as many as this estimate.)
e. Large stocks of conventional weapons and equirment.
25. We estimate that the r31oc armed forces by mid.195t will
probably have:
a. Approximately 9,400,000 men, of which about 4,520,000
will be Soviet; 2,000,000 Satellite; 2,150,000 Chinese
Comm ict; 300,000 North Korean; and 130,000 Viet Minh,
b. An authorized strength of about 26,700 aircraft, in-
cluding about 13,9000 jet fighters, 19250 piston medium
bombers, and possibly a few jet medium bombers0
The estimate on jet medium bomber production is based upon the
Soviet technical capability to develop and produce such aircraft,
There is no intelligence available to indicate that such aircraft
are now in production,,
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e. A total of approximately 260 major surface vessel,.
and 471 submarines., including 153 long-range types,
d. A stockpile of 190 atonic weapons (30-100 kiloton
y1e3d). (The actual figure may be from half to
twice as marr as this estimate.)
26. It is unlikely that the tSR will be able to develop and
produce athermonuclear neapon by acid-1953? During the period of
this estimate (to mid-1954), however, there is the possibility of
advanced research and field testing concerned with thermonuclear
reactions.
27. The over-all effectiveness of Bloc ground, naval., and air
forces will increase by mid-1954 because of progressive modernization
and standardization of weapons and equipment, the intensive training
program, the growth of the Soviet atomic stockpile, and the increased
combat efficiency of the Satellite forces.
28. The armed forces of the USSR and Communist China have re-
mained relatively constant in size throu^hout the past two years,,
while those of the Satellites have grown rapidly. Recent Bloc
7I,/ This includes all naval vessel types down to and including coastal
destroyers.
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military effort has apparently placed principal emphasis upon en-
larging the atomic stockpile and upon improving Bloc defenses, parti-
cularly against air attack. The Bloc has also emphasized improvement,
of the quality, of existing units and developing and marshaling the
military strength of the Satellites.
29o The USSR maintains a large air defense sylctem which not
only includes the forces assigned to the Soviet air defense organi-
zation (PUA-Stratly) but also has available to it the active air
defense resources of the Army, tactical air forces, and Navy not
otherwise committed, as well as the passive defense resources of the
police and civilian organizations. The Buropean Satellite and
Communist Chinese air defenses add to and are integrated with the
Soviet syste , Despite significant improvements in the air defense
system, there will probably continue to be insufficient nmmbers of
trained and experiended pilots and operators, modern radar, heavy AA
guns, and fighters designed specifically for all-weather interception
to provide defense for all important areas. 'Ne ee timate that by mid-
1954 the numerical strength of the air defense forces will not change
substantially. However, the effectiveness of the air defenses will
improve throughh re-equipment and training,
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BLOC ?JILITJ RY CAPABILITIES
30, We estimate that the Bloc has the capability to
undertake concurrent large-scale operations in continental
Europe, the Middle'East, and mainland Asiao The Bloc could
rapidly reinforce with Chinese Communist and Soviet forces the
Corarnunist forces now in Korea, and at the same time undertake
an invasion of Japan by Soviet forces.
31. The Soviet forces now stationed in Eastern Europe
are in an advanced state of readiness for war and can attack
with little or no warning. However,, the Bloc forces in Eastern
Europe mould almost certainly require substantial reinforce.
ments in Soviet ground and air forces before they could
sustain major offensive operations,
32. The USSR has the capability of undertaking sustained
air offensives against the UK, most of continental ;Europe, most
of the Middle East, and Japan, with the intensity of individual
offensives varying according to the number of offensives under.
taken simul.taneously0 It is also capable of undertaking the
delivery of its full stockpile of atomic weapons against targets
in these areas and against targets in the US and its overseas
bases,
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33, The Bloc air defense organization has the capability
for vigorous opposition to an air offensive against the prin-
cipal Soviet centers, However, despite marked improvements in
the Bloc air defense system (especially in the USSR, Eastern
Europe, and t:Ianohuria), deficiencies will remain throughout
the period of this estimate*
34o The Bloc has the capability to launch short haul
amphibious and airborne operations in the Baltic and Black
Seas, along the northern coast of Norway, and in the northern
Japan Seas and to launch limited amphibious and airborne
operations against Western Alaska,
35o The Soviet submarine force has the capability to
undertake offensive patrols'and'mLning operations along most
of the vrorldas strategically vital sea lanes and, possibly,
simultaneously to launch guided missile attacks against targets
on both the Atlantic' and Pacific sedboarde `ot' the US0 ' The'
Soviet Navy, including its" air arms has the capability to lay
extensive mine fields to protect Soviet Satellite, and - Chinese
Communist harbors and sea routes, to mine the waters and harbors
of the Baltic, Black, North, acid Japan Seas, and to harass sea
routes in these :areas,
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36o The Chinese Communist and North Korean capabilities
in Korea have increased substantially since the beginning of
the armistice negotiations, If the present scale of operations
continues, me believe that these capabilities will gradually
improve during the period of this estimate, Communist ground
forces in Korea have a high offensive potential and are capable
of launching a major attack with little warning?1
37. Since the beginning of the Korean war9 the Communist
Air Force in China, Which is believed to be made up of Chinese
Communist, North Koreans and Soviet elements,, has been built to
an impressive size, The Jet fighter units in the Korea- Manchuria.
North China area are believed to be progressively improvtng0 The
capabilities of the CAF in China will remain during the period
through mid-1953 largely limited to the air defense of North
China,, Manchuriap and North Korea under conditions of good
visibility and to limited attacks against UN forces in Korea and
adjacent waters, IIo-wever,, we believe that by mi&1954 the
capabilities of this air force to extend its offensive operations
beyond the present limited theater of operations will increase;
as a result of the introduction of an estimated 160 ;Set light bombers,
o7' more plate information on this subjects see M&55/la
"Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Koreas"
(30 July 195,
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We believe that the CAF in China will continue to expand gradually
during the period of this estimate but will rr-ain entirely
dependent ern the USSR for aircraft and equipnente spare parts,
and technical supervisions and almost entirely dependent upon
the USSR for aviation fuel and lubricants. Redeployment from
the Manchuria area would be necessary for sustained air operations
apainet Taiwan and Southeast Asia.
38, During the period of this estimates Soviet and/or
Chinese Cowaunist forces in Asia will alma t certainly continue
to have the capability of ccnducti.ng the following operations
concurrent3ys
a. Overrunning Hong Kong,, Macao, Indochina$
Burma, and Thailand if opposed only by
the forces concurrently in these areas
19
b. Rapidly reinforcing with Chinese Cwt
and Soviet forces the Communist forces now
in Koreas and at the same timm of undertaking
an invasion of Japan by Soviet forces.
co Attacking Western shipping in the Pacific
by submarines and mines and by conducting
~~nase ore -MG s 'invasion of Taiwan would almost certainly
fail if US naval and air forces remain available to defend
Taiwran0
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air attacks and surf -ce raids a;ainst Western
bases and shipping in the western and northern
Pacific0
ELMIM7Ta OF BLOC POLITICAL WARFARE STAM' MOTH
39o Political warfare plants an unusually important role
for Corm unists# who consider military warfare only an extension
of political warfare in their persistent campaign to undermine
the strength of the non-Communist world,, Bloc political war.
fare techniques include political and economic pressure., diplom
matic action in the UN and elsewhere, propaganda and front
activities, the action of Communist Parties and Communist Party
controlled trade unions outside the Bloc., sabotage, exploitation
of subversive and revolutionary movements and of civil wars,, and
psychological, warfare,
1OQ The principal sources of strength upon which Bloc political
warfare capabilities are based consist of the Bloc's military
capabilities; the size, power., and centralized leadership of the
Bloc; Communist doctrine; and the Communist international movement,,
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1ila We estimate that there are now 20,0070000 Communist
Party members in the worlds organized into 72 national parties)
Most Party members live within the Moos but about 3#750,000
are scattered throughout the non.-Communist world* These figures
do not include the membership of the front organizations, trade
unions, etco, which the national Communist Parties influence or
control. The discipline and fervor of the Parties make them
far more effective than their size alone indicates.
42, To serve the interests of the Blocs the national Com.
monist Parties in nor.-Communist countries seek to exploit eco.
nomics socials and nationalist grievances, to infiltrate gov-
ernment agencies and institutions to provide espionage agents
and saboteurs, to disseminate Bloc propaganda, to mobilize mass
support for Bloc policies, to create pressure groups to influence
local policy to the advantage of the Blocs and to infiltrate
and control trade unions and national labor organisations. They
have shown particular skill in creating and controlling front
organizations,
?19-
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BLOC POLITICAL WARFP,R CAPABILITIES.
43, Bloc political warfare is an important weapon which
will continue to constitute a serious danger to the non-Communist
world throughout the period of this estimate., The. Communists
and their allies will retain the capability to conduct urrlermining
attacks on established regimes,, to exploit rational r.Lralriese
to utilize minority groups and splinter political parties.,
and to capitalize upon economic., political9 and military difficulties.
4, Throughout Western Europe, the Communist Parties since
1946 have suffered severe losses both in membership and prestige,
However., the hard core of the Party has been preserved everywhere9
and in most countries the party..continues to influence large
numbers of non-Communists.
'45. The capability of Western 'European Comma is to to
conduct strikes' for political purposes 'has been shac'ply re
dulled, Nevertheless,, the Corimu xi ats will retain' at least limited
capabilities to interfere with defense production.
46o In the event of general war., the. Communist parties. would
constitute a threat in Western Europe., especially in France and
Italy., where large' Communist parties and Communist trade uni.
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strength are reinforced by well-trained Communist quasi-military
organizations. Communist capabilities for espionage, industrial
sabotage, terrorism, and attacks against transportation and
communications facilities and military installations would be
substantial,
17. The likelihood of an increase in Bloc political warfare
capabilities is greatest in unstable areas,, such as Southeast
Asia, and parts of the Middle East and Africa. These areas will
continue to be particularly vulnerable to Bloc political warfare
because of economic and social unrest, bitter racial and religious
antagonism, sentiment against "Western imperialism'" and the
ineffective leadership of many existing governments.
480 Within the Middle East, Bloc political warfare capabilities
are greatest in Iran' The Iranian situation contains so marry
elements of instability that it is impossible to estimate with
confidence for more than a few months, However, we believe that
throughout 1953 the Bloc agent in Iran, the Tudeh Party, is not
likely to gain control of the government by infiltration or to
develop the strength to overthrow the National. Front by constitutional
e estimates is paragraph supercede the corresponding
estimates made in NIE47, "Probable Developments in Iran through
1953p" (13 November 1952),
21
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means or by force, Unexpected events, such as a serious crop
failure or a split in the National Front as a result of
rivalry among its leaders, would increase Tudeh capabilities
greatly, If present trends in Iran continue unchecked beyond
the end of 1953, rising internal tensions and continued deterioration
of the economy- and of the budgetary position of the government
are likely to lead to a breakdown of governmental authority
and open the way for at least a gradual assumption of control by Ihdeh,
19, We believe that during the period of this estimate Bloc
political warfare capabilities in Southeast Asia will be largely
determined by the degree of military pressure which the Viet
Minh forces, with Communist Chinese advice and military assistance,
bring to bear against the French and the Associated States in
Indochina. While the odds now are against a decisive shift
in the political and military balance of forces in Indochina,
this balance might shift rapidly and adversely to Western interest,
A Communist victory in Indochina would probably result in Communist
control, by force or accommodation, of most or all of the Southeast
Asian mainland countries, although not necessarily within the period
of this estimates
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50. In India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, the Communists will not
have sufficient strength seriously to challenge governmental authority
during the period of this estimate. However, they will be able
to intensify vocal opposition and strengthen their party organization.
If the Communist party of India should again emphasize the role
of violencep its populaa? support would probably diminish and the
government would almost certainly revive its earlier repressive
measures.
25X6A
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52. We estimate that during the period of this estimate
the Communists will not be able to establish a Communist govern-
ment arWwhere in Latin America either by constitutional process
or by revolution. In Guatemala, the only country in Latin
America where Communists have power within the government, they
are likely to maintain and may even Increase their imf uence.
In all major Latin American countries, the Communists will retain
a : ubstantial capability for sabotage, for spreading Bloc propa.
ganda, and for stimulating anti.Anerican sentiment in nationalist,
intellectual, and organized labor groups.
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F ftWM-
NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE Fri
ESTIMATES OF BLOC ARMED STRENGTH
The estimates of Bloc armed strength are based on information available
as of 1 December 1952.
a, G.-2 comment on the nature of the evidence available for estimates
of Bloc ground force strength:
The eatimatea of strength of the Soviet and Satellite ground
forces are believed to be of a fairly high order of reliability.
These estimates are median figures; the strength of these ground
forces varies during the year as classes are inducted and dis-
charged. The Soviet, Satellite, North Korean, and Viet Minh divis-
ion figures are of a high order of reliability. Intelligence on
the strength of the ground forces of Communist China is fragile.
b. AFOIN comment on the nature of the evidence available for estimates
of Bloc air force strength:
Estimates of Soviet air strength are derived from intelligence
which is considered of acceptable reliability, but collection
coverage is Incomplete. Estimates of over-all size and composition
of Soviet Air Forces are derived from identification of individual
units and estimated Table of Organization and Equipment strengths
authorized for the various types of air regiments. Current
estimates of jet fighter and medium bomber strength are considered
reasonably valid. While aircraft count data are limited, they
support an estimate that the current average levels of actual
strength for the various types of aircraft amount to the following
percentages of authorized TO & E strengths for jet fighters,
80 - 85 percent; for piston medium bombers, 75 - 80 percent; and
for all other types of aircraft, 90 .. 95 percent.
c. ONI comment on the nature of the evidence available for estimates
of Bloc naval strength:
Evidence confirming the existence of the major surface vessels
is firm and accurate. Identification of individual ships as to
name and pennant number has been supported by evidence from a
number of sources. Reliable evidence confirms the existence of
86 percent of the submarines and supports the existence of the
remainder. Evidence regarding the naval construction program is
considered firm and accurate.
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