BLOC MILITARY CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002100030006-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: NIE

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BLOC MILITARY CAPABILITIES
62. The Bloc forces, which hold a great advantage in land power
and tactical air power, have the capability of striking at peripheral
areas within the perioof this estimate. We estimate that the Bloc
has the capability to undertake concurrent operations designed to
seize and secure continental Europe, the Middle East, the Far East
and Southeast Asia. We believe that the Bloc will, within the
period of this estimate, possess the capability to conduct these
operations simultaneously, but without assurance of sustaining all
such operations to the point of decision.
63. The Soviet forces now stationed in Eastern Europe are in an
advanced state of readiness for war, and can attack with little or no
warning. However, the Bloc forces in Eastern Europe would require
substantial reinforcements in Soviet ground forces and air forces
before they could sustain major offensive operations.
64. The Bloc does not now have, and will be unable, within the
period of this estimate, to build or obtain adequate naval forces
or sufficient shipping to mount large scale amphibious operations
against the Western Hemisphere, or even against the United Kingdom
without neutralization of its strategic potential and capture of
channel ports. However, it does have the capability to launch
short haul amphibious operations in the Baltic and Black Seas,
along the northern coast of Norway, in the northern Japan Sea,
and to launch limited amphibious operations against Alaska.
65. We believe that the Soviet submarine force has the capability
to conduct offensive patrols along most of the strategically vital
sea lanes of the world. and,possibly, simultaneously to launch
guided missile attacks against targets on both the Atlantic and
Pacific seaboards of the United States.
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yi {66.~tie es mate that the Soviet Navy, including its air arm, has
the capability to lay extensive mine fields to protect Soviet and
Satellite harbors and sea routes, to mine Allied harbors in the
Baltic, Black, North and Japan Seas, and to harass sea routes in
these areas. It also has the capability to undertake offensive mine
warfare against other Allied harbors and sea routes throughout the
world.
67. The USSR is capable of undertaking a strategic air offensive
against the United States and United Kingdom. We believe the USSR
has the capability of inflicting serious damage against the United
States by a surprise atomic attack.
68. The Air Defense Capabilities of the Bloc have increased sub-
stantially since 1945, and, we believe that an air offensive against
the principal Soviet centers would r nooi rater vigorous and determined
opposition. However, despite the marked improvements in the Bloc
air defense system (especially that of the USSR, East Germany, Poland
and Manchuria) deficiencies probably will continue to exist during
the period of this estimate. These deficiencies will be insufficient,
numbers of trained and experienced pilots and operators, modern radar,
heavy antiaircraft guns and fighters designed specifically for all
weather interception. Within the period of this estimate the Bloc
air defense system will probably not be adequate to prevent serious
reduction of the Bloc war potential by a determined retaliatory air
attack.
69. The Bloc has the capability of rapidly reinforcing with
Chinese Communist Forces and Soviet troops the Bloc forces presently
in Korea and at the same time df initiating and supporting a major
invasion by Soviet forces of the Japanese Islands of Hokkaido and
northern Honshu. However, it is improbable that a full scale
invasion of Japan could be conducted to the point of decision with
the Bloc forces now available in the Far East against the opposition
that would be brought to bear against them.,
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70. The Soviet Far Eastern submarine fleet could launch attacks
against Western shipping in the Pacific. Moreover, the Soviet air
forces could make continuing air attacks upon U. S. bases in the
Western Pacific and in Alaska. Such attacks would present a serious
threat to our operations in the Western Pacific and to our defense
of Alaska. However, the USSR does not now have and almost certainly
will not have by mid-1953 forces capable of permanently neutralizing
U. S. bases in these areas.
71. Chinese Communist and North Korean capabilities in Korea have
increased substantially since the beginning of the armistice negotia-
tions, and we believe that they will continue gradually to improve
during the period of this estimate. Communist ground forces in Korea
are credited with a high offensive potential and are believed capable
of launching a major ground attack with little warning.
72. The capabilities of the Communist air force in the Korean
area (North Korea, Manchuria, and Northeast China) have improved
steadily during the past year. The Communists now possess the capa-
bility of launching a major attack with little or no warning. They
are capable of seriously challenging the UN air effort in Northwest
Korea as far south as the Chongchon River and of expanding their air
operations southward into forward UN held territory and adjacent waters.
73. We believe that during the period of this estimate the Communists
armed forces will not be able to drive the UN forces from Korea unless
major Soviet forces are committed.
74. The Chinese Communists, while maintaining at least their present
position in Korea, are capable of undertaking military operations in
the Far East* and in Southeast Asia.
Provided that present U.S. policy with respect to Taiwan remains
unchanged and provided that U.S. naval and air forces remain available
to defend Taiwan, a Chinese Communist effort to gain control of
Taiwan would almost certainly fail.
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a. Hong Kong and Macao. The Chinese Communists will remain
capable of launching a successful attack upon Hong Kong and Macao.
b. Southeast Asia.
(1) The Viet Minh will probably.be unable to achieve a
decisive victory during the period of this estimate without
direct commitment of major Chinese Communists forces. We
estimate that the Communists have the capability to commit
and to support approximately 150,000 Chinese Communists
troops in Indochina. A force of this size could probably
compel the French and Viet Nt,m forces to evacuate Tonkin.
(2) The Chinese Communists probably could simultaneously
commit approximately 90,000 men for sustained operations
in Burma. We believe that this force would be capable of
early establishment of Communist control to all north Burma.
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