NIE-64 (PART I): SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES THROUGH MID-1953.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002100020003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 30, 1952
• Content Type: MF

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DEPATToF? ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ArISTANT CHIEF OF ST#F, G-2, INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C. TSC-- b 3 -4
TOP SECRET CONTROL SECTION
A. C. of S., G-2, DA
G2 ?PR
80 APR 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: NIE-64 (Part I): Soviet Bloc Capabilities Through
Mid-1953.
1. Reference is made to CIA memorandum, subject as above,
dated 4 April 1952.
2. In accordance with request contained in reference
memorandum, attached hereto as Tab "A" is the Department of the
Army contribution to NIE-64 (Part I), prepared by the Office of
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, Department of
the Army.
FOR IkIE ASS/3.1111C CHIEF OF STAFF, G-'
1 Incl
Tab "A" (8 cys)
w adt-kat
HARVEY If.
Crgenel, es
t!let, Production Division, 04
*ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File*
Review of this document by CIA has
determined that
CIA has no objection to declass
It contains information of CIA
Interest that must remain
classified at TS S
Authority: HR 704
Rats
H c ntains nothing of CIA Interest
Reviewer
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A. C. 0 . G-2. DA
G-2 COBTRIBRION TO 2113t-6k _part I)
Internal Political Factore Affoeting Boviet Bloc Capabilities for
3.=??.....bm????
Political and Militmilaefare
A. What is, the relationnhip now exioting in the U,S.Sat, between
the Communist Party, the Secret Police and the military forces?
Are there any strains within any of these groups?
The Soviet Communist Party holds complete and effective control
over the country. However, there in considerable evidence of frictions
and strains within and between the various groups making up Soviet society.
A few of the more important include jealcupies among officials on lower
levels of the Communist Party, peasant resentiment of the controlling
authorities,. and dissatisfaction with conditions within the Ai*. These
are all exploitable psYehol teeny and, ptrticularly in wartime, would
require certain attention from the Soviet Government. It is believed,
howeter that these problems do not constitute any particular obstacle to
Soviet political warfare or that they would hamper a Soviet military effort
to any significant degree.
D. What is the extent of the Kremlin's control over the European
Satellites and haw is it exercised? To what extent does Soviet "control
denend upon Soviet noitem anA v1414.Enr7 reeee. ueon Satellite nolice and
military force? How successful hes the Kremlin been in winning active
aupport for ite peliciee? In eliminating effective opposition to those
policies?
Soviet control over the European Satellites is complete in the
sense that there is no present likely threat to the continuance of the
Communist regimes. In all the Satellites except East Germany, the
local security forces, backed by the Satellite Armies, probably are
sufficient to maintain Communist power. In every country, however, the
proximity, if not the actual presence, of the Soviet Amy is the basic
element of control.
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The Kremlin has had little success ineinning active support for
its policies, except among youth groups, opportunists, and Cc:amen/et elements.
Popular discontent is general in the Eurocean Satellites. It affects all
population categorieo, and is caused primarily by econoadc hardships
resulting from Soviet demands and by Communist interference with personal
liberties. Sege hostility to Communist rule, particularly intense among the
older generation, is to be found even within the structure of the Satellite
regimes all Of which still conain some Ratiocalist elements.
The Kremlin's police methods have been almost cempletely successful
in controlling all popular discontent and prevent it from seriously
threatening Soviet goals. In no Satellite is there a resistance group or
combination of groups which appeare to have the slightest chance of over-
throwing the regime or even of raterially slowing down its program. The Kremlin
has been highly successful in eliminating upen resistance, although in all
the Satellites guerrilla bands rtill carry cut limited and sporadic activity.
These underground organizations are presently preoccupied with efforts to
avoid annihilation and to conserve their strength until it can be used
effectively. They do, however, eenstitute a nucleus which could be reactivated
if given outside aid and hope of liberation. Passive resistance, apparently
increasing as opportunities for overt resistenee have diminished, at times
constitutes a vexing harassment for the Satellite regimes, but not a seridus
threat. However, in a car which offered hope of liberation, passive
resistance might be expected to increase and to play an important role in
reducing Soviet capabilities.
E. What is the extent of :',.remain influence or control over Communist
China and hiw is it exercised?
The relationship betweee Communist China and the Soviet Union is
unique among Communist-Bloc countries. The ereciee nature of the Sino
Soviet relationship results from external and internal conditions affecting
both Soviet Russia and Commueist Chine.
China cannot be termed e "satellite in the same sense that
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other Communist-dominated countries are "satellites"; Soviet influence and
control over C mist China ie not exercieed.in the same degree and manner
as that over Communiet-Bloc countries of Eastern Europe and ASIA. Communist
China may well be on the road to beceming a complete satellite; or it may
achieve a full, though Junior, partnership with the Soviet Union. The
special position of Communist China may not be one desired by the Kremlin,
but. it is an existing one which the Soviets evidently feel they must accept
f r the present at least.
The extent of Soviet influence and control is seen in Chinese
Communist foreign policy. Hero the,:ainese Communists have openly touted
Kremlin leadership in Communist world strategy, and Chinese Cemmunist
foreign relations appear at least to follow Soviet guidance, if not obey
Soviet dictation.
By a co ination of circumstances the Soviets are precluded from
"taking over" full control of Communist China. They can, however, effectively
direct Chinese Communist relations with other countries and, to a lesser
degree, internal development. This oapability derives fr
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the community of
interest existing between the Soviet and the Chinese C mist leaders.
It is greatly reinforced by tha Soviets ? capability of seising Manchuria,
Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang and by Chinese Communist dependence upon the
Soviet Union for military and industrial modernization.
F. Whtb political or social problems within the Satellites may
develop in such a way as either to weaken or to strengthen Bloc capabilities
for political or military warfare?
l. European Setellitee
Soviet Blm capabilities for political warfare would not
be affected by the development of Satellite political or social problems. Tie
only exception would be the possibly, thoaeh highly improbable successful
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emergence of farther "Titoism" within the SLtellite orbit resulting in the
defection of another Satellite state from the Soviet Bloc.
, Soviet Bloc capabilities for military warfare, however, are
limited by passive resistance to Communist political repression and
socialization. Such resistance, which has increased as social and economic
hardshipa have multiplied, takea many forms. It varies from annoyance of
the Communist regimes by ridicule and apathy to more serious harassment and
interference with Cemmunist goals through peasant and worker resistance.
Although not serious threats to the Satellite regimes, popular apathy,
indifference, and noncooperation have to date placed an upper limit on
what the regimes can extract fr the people.
In war, the Kremlin's failure to fully Sovietize the Satellite
peoplea would become more significant. If the war promised liberation,
indications are that passive resistance would grow and become widespread,
would hamper the Satellite economics, and would eventually tie down a
significant number of troops as security forces.
The only political-social development which will operate to
increaae Soviet military capabiXities is Communist success in the indoc-
trination of youth, which can te expected ultimately to produce a
Cemmunist-indoctrinated generation which will compensate for the present
lack of whole hearted support by the older groups.
2. China
The pn.titical and social developments within, Communist ,
China moat likely to affect Mazo capabilities for political and militery
warfare are those which will probably flow from Chinese Communist success
or failure to solve fUndamental economic problems. The moat pressing of
these problems is that of increasing goverment revenue, Which, in turn,
is related to the mere fundak ntal economic problem of increasing production.
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Two basic facts restrict Chinese Communist capabilities in any
immediate attempts to cope with their economic difficulties. The first is
that the Chinese economy is able to produce only a small surplus over
minium requirements for subsistence. The second is that by far the
greater part of total national income and of government revenue is derived
from agriculture.
Because the Chineee economy is operating so near the subsistence
level, increases in taxes can rapidly become intolerable, resulting in a
falling of industrial production and in widespread peasant discontent. The
Chinese Communist regime--in spite of the size and effectiveness of its
organieati --still does not have enough trustworthy and c petent personnel
to operate all of China's industry or to regulate all its agriculture. The
Chinese Communieto Lack men and means to create a bureaucracy able to manage
effectively the whole economy. Widespread resistance not only liquid be
difficult to suppress but would certainly cause such a fundamental cleavage
within the Chinese Communist party as could seriously weaken the stability of
the regime,
That the Chinese Commentate have handled with some degree of imam
their basic. economic problems appears to be indicated by the apparent
relative stability of the Chinese economy over the past two years. Chinese
Communist military operations in Korea have so far been carried by Manchuria,
leaving China proper more or lees insulated against the effects of the war.
Manchuria is one of the few regions of China which produces a substantial
surplus and is, therefore, an area in which the tax burden can be increased
without seriously affecting production.
Therefore, Chinese Cocain/et capabilities for political and military
warfare are largely dependent upon the aucCess of economic policies in
Manchuria. Failure in Manchuria will increase the burden in China proper
where econamic resources are much less flexible.
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3. Indochina
Two political pessures are currently evident within the
Viet Minh party machinery. The first is the etrengthening of the Indo-
chinese C niet Party'e control of the Viet Minh united front. Since 1950,
the Viet Minh have neglected their original policy f emphasising the
nationalistic bane of its struggle against the French; and have openly
identified their regime with the Asiatic Commnnist movement. In this process,
the identity of interest with the Chinese C*ie nist "Feople?8 Revolution" to
frequently emphasised.
The seconCpolitical pressure results front the increasingly
active role in the Viet Minh of Chineee Coemunists in the political and,
partieularly, the militere fields. This Viet Minh dependence upon Chinese
Communist aneletance has heightened the traditional antipathy of the
Vietnameee people for the Chinmee, and available information indicates that
some Viet Minh leaders fear the dChinese Communists? more sing influence
and control.
However, it seems probable that during the period of this
estimate, the traditional Vietnamese dislike for the Chinese will be
subordinated to the Viet Minh ' niet policy of cooperation with the
Chinese COmmuniets. There shorld thus be a continued strengthening eat=
military and political capabilities in Indochina.
be
G. What Will/the probable effects upon the political situation
Within the Moe of the Continuntion of the cold war and of the present
conflicts in Korea and Indochina, of extension of the war in the Far Fasts
of limited attacks in the Mtddle Fast, of general war without the Use of
mass destruction weapons, of general war with the use of mass destruction
weapons?
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The continuation of the cold war and of the present conflicts in
Korea and Ind hina are not likely to have serious adverse internal political
effecte within the Bloc, but will probably result in a further tightening .
of control over local populations. In particular, advantages to be gained
by the Chinese -Communists by the present type of United war appear to
outweigh the probable economic and political disadvantages. This conclusion
is subject to the qualification that the greater part of the economic
burden of the war continues to be carried by the Manehurian economy, and
that the Soviet Union continues to provide substantial aid.
The Wobable political repercussions of an extension of war in
the Ear East viii depend largely upon the form which this extension of war
takes, the areas of Communiet China which it affects, and the military
objectives of this warfare. Assu ,ng that such an extension of warfare would
consist principally of. effective air attadre on industrial and communications
targets of strategic importance in Manchuria and North China, the Chinese
Communist ability to maintain forces in Korea could be crippled, and China
proper could be cut off both from substantial material aid from Soviet
Russia and fr the economic re3ources of Manchuria. Since the economic
burden of supporting the war would-then, in a larger measure, be trans-
ferred to the sconamk of China proper, the probability Oft adverse political
repercussions would be greatly increased.
On the ether hand, if extension of warfare in the Far East is
limited to air attacks on strategic targets in Central and South China, the
probable political repercussions viii not seriously damage either Chinese
C tat military or political potential. Not only would it be difficult
to cripple the econo,v of this part of the country by attacks on strategic
targets, but it is doubtful that adverse soonomic developments in South
China woUld greatly affect the Chinese Communist military capabilities in
Korea?
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The internal political effects which will probably result from a
general war will depend, to a large degree, upon the effect such a var would,
have on the continuation of Soc-det material assistanae 40,-upon the.. military
pressure maintained against the Chinese Communists. Deprived of Soviet
Military assistance and under heavy military pressure, the Chines, economy,
would be subject to such strain that ?trona political opposition to the
Chinese Cemmunist regime could readily develop. On the other hand, even if
ComManist China were deprived of Soviet aid but not subjected- to military
pressure Sufficient to put a serious drain on her resource?, the political
repercussions are not likely to be serious.
The probable internal political effects of the use of mass
destructi weapons are largely unpredictable, for they depend, to a great
degree, both on the reaction of the people and upon the skill with which
this reaction is exploited.
H . In each of these instances, how viii the resultant political
developments within the Bloc affect Bloc capabilities for political and
military warfare?
A continuation of the cold war and of the present conflict in
Korea and Indochina would, in seneral, favor the Communiat capabilities for
political and military warfare. The Chinese Communist econoss. has not yet
shown signs of serious strain; its army is being modernised and trained in
'modern warfare, and no politteal opposition to the Chinese Communist regime
has shown signs of boo BOTiOUS. As long as the present conditions
:continue, the Chinese Communists can increase their military potential while
exploiting the OportunAties for:political warfare during the period of
great uncertainty.
While it to true that continuation of the cold war is depriving
-Communist China of the benefit of normal trade relations with non-Communist
countries, Conmunist China is increasing, Its degree of economic self--
sufficiency and is.constructinc alternate lines of communication with
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the Soviet Unica?thus improving her war potential.
III. SORTZET BEOC CAPABILITIES FOR POLITICAL WARFARE
B. To what degree does Soviet Bloc nilitary power contribute to the
effectiveness of the Bloc's political warfcret
1. Military power--or the threat inherent in the possession of
military power?is One of the key weapons in Soviet political warfare.
This weapon constitutes the owl serious Obstacle to Western programa
designed to reduce the threat of Communist power to the point where it is
no longer a threat to international security. The Soviets use military
power in three major uays in a "cold war" senses
a. The threat value of a force in being,
b. The use of Satellite forces against non-Communist areas and,
c. The use of military-economic aid to insurgent groups.
2. The mere threat of Soviet military action, in Europe or
Asia, has several political effect'''. Wherever Soviet military forces are
present, the West is faced with the necessity of deploying opposing military
fortes to prevent other areas from being absorbed. Obviously, Western
failure to defend peripheral areas could result in their loss. Of equal
importance, however, are the inherent political disadvantage(' of Western
maldeployment arising from Soviet ability to mass in any given area greater
force than the West possessee. Similarly, the massiveness of Soviet power
in any given location tends to induce despair, the feeling that little
effective oppositien could be offered to a Soviet invasion. Efforts to
overcome this feeling of futility and neutralism require an impressive
amount of Western political effort.
(b) Of perhaps greater value is the type of operation
exemplified in Korea wherein Cosmanist forces are employed to achieve
territorial advantage and cause attrition in Western forces without directly
eameitti Soviet Forces. Such operations have the dual effect of permitting
further C list expansion at far less rinks of global war than would be
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the case where Soviet forces themselves employed and of increasing the
instability of large areaa of the world for exploitation by other means.
(0)
Finally, the naterial ettength of Soviet military-
?commie force in being enables the Soviets to provide extensive aid to
insurgent movements attempting to achieve control in emerging natiemal
states. Such aid has contributed materially to the success of the Communist
or Communist supported groups iv such areas.
C. To what extent has the emergence of Communist China affected
Bloc political warfare?
The principal effect of the emergence of Communist China is the
capability this development has given to the Bloc of posing major military
threats in the Far East as well as in Westin% Europe and the Middle East.
It has also given the Bloc greater flexibility and greater roan for maneuver
in the execution of political varfare. A threatening military posture in
one part of the world can be aecompanted by proposals of "peaceful settlement"
in another. Coesunist China can be engaged in a limited war with the United
States while Soviet proems-nada preaches the feasibility of "coexistence" of
capitalism and socialism.
The emergence also appears to have uade it more profitable to the
Bloc to place greater emphasis on political warfare in Europe by pursuing a
"peace offensive." Because the Bloc's military capabilities in Europe are
quite thoroughly appreciated, the Bloc does not need to resort to bellicose
demonstrations to remind Western Europeans of the military threat it poses.
Chinese Communist forces have the capability of invading Indochina
and Burma. But probably more tmportant is the stimulus given to Communist
penetration of all Southeast Asia by the material and technical assistance
which the Chinese C nista are now able to give Southeast Asian Communists.
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The emergenee of Communist China has also greatly strengthened
Mee political capabilities with reference to Japan and India. While
keeping the military threat in the background, the Bloc can, among other
things, place propaganda emphaeis on the economic advantages of reestablishim
economic ties with continental China. At the same time the laze can exploit
the propaganda value of the continued presence on Japanese soil of United
States forcee and the fear that United States policies will draw the world
into another war.
146. What is the ttitude of the e ?ward rearmament? Toward the
nttSqgglet
The attitudes of the peoples toward rearmament in the various geo-
graPhic areas. greatly. In Latin America a traditionally isolationist
attitude Their Interest in increased. rearmament is principally
ooncerned. with the problem of quelling internal disturbances. Within Western
Europe, the people of most nations are resigned to the neceosity for
refusing to meet the present Communist threat but have not anthusiastioallY
accepted this condition. Moat of the Trench people are torn between their
anti-Communist, pro-Western syapathies and their fear of a resurgent Germany,
Pr this reason theylreuld. mamma soma solution Which might reduce the Soviet
threat end prevent German rearasnent. The people of Italy generally support
remment. On the Oerman side, their endorsement of the remanent program
is tempered by the fear that such action may jeopardize unification0
is for the Near and Middle Bast, only Greece and. Turkey are fully
cooperative with the Wst. The peoples of the Arabia countries are not par-
ticularly iaterested in anymmemmemxt progranihich has as its &lathe
active support of Western policies. The people of X'an and Afghanistan,
because of their proximity to the U.S.S.R. and. their inherently weak military
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potential even with consideroble lbsterr aid, are interested In develop-
ing strong armed forces principallr for internal security purpodes. In
south Central and. Southeast Asia, inforred public opinion is generally
against rearmament. This Element fears that such a course of action
will hasten rather than delay general wzr and in turn will deny to them
a prolonged. period of peace, whicb they feel is needed. for strengthening
the strained economy of the area and for stabilizing internal political
situations. India, in particular, is generally apathetic towards war-
fare due to their religious beliefs and Gandhian principles of non-
violence. Support for rearrament in Southeast Asia is L.trongest in
Indochina, but even there is found conaiderable anxiety that the
strengthening of defending forces might lead to an invasion by Communist
China. In Burma and Indonesia there appears to be wide-spread public
support for governmental policies of neutrality, Among the Japanese,
there is no widespread enthusiasm in support of rearmament, but avast
majority of the people have accepted this course as an inevitable neces-
sity. Chief opposition Is centered in the Socialist and Communist
Parties, but some apprehension is found among conservatives over the
Japanese ability to support economically such rearming.
Attitude on the East-Weet struggle is similar to that on
rearming. The people of Latin America show little interest and are in
no position economically to become involved in heavy rearmament. The
people") sympathies in these countries are with the West however, and
In the event of general hostilities their active support could be
expected. In spite of fairly large Communist Parties in France and
Italy, all of the Western European nations are aligned with the Vast,
raw EEC NET
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and the majority of the people can be expected to continue thie eUpport.
In the Diddle and Veer at, Grow,' and Turkey are pre-Western, but
generally the fear of the Soviets and interest in the Nast-Weet Struggle
is progreseivai-weaker as the distance from the Soviet border increases.
The people are concerned principally with local problem Popular
opinion in South Central and Southeast Asia has been generally to shy
away from alignment with either aide; however, there appears to be a
growing sympathy for the West as opposed to the Communiat Nations. Sharp
criticism often received by the West from, people of Asian countries is
attributed more to antipathy against colonialism than to orientation
toward Cammuniam. In Japans the present Government, dominated by the
Liberal Party, and the major conservative opposition parties favor
alignment with the West. The Socialists largely favor neutrality while
the Cammuniet Party is, of course pro-Bast.
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A. What is the over-all ontloek for Bloc political warfare capabilities
during the period of this estimate?
In Communist eyes, political warfare techniques are not distinct from
warfare in general. All premoures -- political, psychological, economic, and
In the final analysis military -- are considered part of a general offensive
designed to achieve the Communiet goal of world domination by the Kreklin.
Accordingly, it is necessary tc consider present cold-war activities as a part
of and contributing to the over-all program of Communist expansion.
In this context Soviet political warfare efforts are designed to gain
as much, as possible short of ear; they are also designed to improve the absolute
military position of the Communist Bloc in the event that war occurs. Thule
political preseures applied against India are designed inter alia to increase
the macifistic tendencies of that country, both to prevent its active partici-
pation in the struggle against Communism on the side of the West and t improve
the Soviet ability to achieve domination over that country -- either by military
or non-yilitary means -- whichever may at some future time appear most suitable.
Similarly, Communist proaganda designed to foster neutralism in Europe are
designed to have the same dual effect.
So long as the Communist ma= holds the offensive in political warfare
efforts and the initiative in propaganda designed to show its devotion to peace,
so long may neutralism and opposition to Western defense efforts be expected to
continue.
At the same time, Communist Bloc political pressures designed to cause
or increase disagreement betweee the Western Powers and other countries of the
non-Communist world weaken the individual ability of the several nations to
resist Coranuniemse attacks either military or psychological. It also reduces
the rate of Western efforts to develae a potter position capable of achieving
balance with that of the Communist Bloc by causing maldeployment of Western
political, economic, or military pressures. Thus, by association df Communist
elements with anti-colonial and emergent nationalist groups in Southeast Asia
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