NIE-64 (PART I): SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES, THROUGH MID-1953 (FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE BOARD)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002100010001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 18, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MTGE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
18 My :952
SUBJECT: NIE.44 (Fart I): SMUT BLOC CAPABILITIFS2 THROUGH
leD-3953 (For co oration by the Boa3N1)
E PROBIBM
To estimate Soviet Bloc capabilities bus political rad
military Iswilgra, tbrough
DOCVMEN1
NO CH
L I
TO: TS
UfTE:
HR 70-2
WEB:
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I. 3Mtw4LOILT.CLAL PAgaa
A,
1,
USS4
1. The Soviet regime is securely entrenched In paver,
and there is no apparent prospect of Ito control being threatened
or shaken.
2, Stalin will almoat certainly remain =disputed
Soviet ruler through the period of this estimate', provided be
remains in good health. There probably have been disagreaments
on major policy matters within the Politburo and rivalry fbr
Stalin'e favor and for positions of advantage after Stalia's
death. However, it is most pnii1r037 that, within the period of
this estimate, these rivalries and disagreements win bar) any
serious effect upon the apparent unity and resolution of the
Politburo.
3,, The Communist Party of the USSR remains the min,
oipal foundation of authority and instrument of rule. Ito
leadership, organisation, amd discipline are apparently a f3m
as in the past, Although there maybe stresses within the Com,
monist Party and between the Communist Party, the Secret Police,
and the Soviet armed forces, there in no evidence that those
do um or will, within the period of this estimate, constitute
serious problems for the regime. Moreover, it is probable that
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the the relirg groups would increase if the regime wore
subjected to increased external pressure.
A. The regime's control over all activity within the
USSR reuales thorough and apparentler effective. Current internal
atresses and strains -- such aa the dissatisfaction of some of
the national ninotities? the recistaece of the peasants to recent
agricultural programs, ard die:satisfaction among large nulaieers of
the population over low living standards and over the severity of
police controls -- appear less serious than at aey time BiACO the
early 19301s. Moreover, the effectiveness of the regiee's cantrol
over the Soviet population will almoat certainly increase eh:cough,-
out the period of this estimate.
5. The years of isoIationiand indoctrination and the
current campaign to instill hostility tounrd the Vest have almost
certainly- reduced the reservoir of admiration for the West and of
friendship for the DS.
6. The areas Added to the USSR since 1939 have been of-
fectivaly integrated into the Soviet system. local resistance
to Soviet acquisition and to Soviet policy has been systematically
crushed and eliminated. The economic, political, and denograehic
reorganizations of those areas have weakened the foundations for
opposition to Soviet vile and have created machinery for ensuring
continued Soviet control and direction.
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7. The death of Stalin would be a serious shook to the
Soviet regime. Hammy there is no evidence to indicate that
the immediate transfer of authority to another leader or to a
group would not be effected quietly and peaceftilly. The Commu,
nist Party of the USSR, the Secret Pnlice, and the Soviet arued
fame weld almost certainly rally behind the now leadership,
at least initially. Throughout the period of this estimate, the
foreign ani domestic policies of the new leadership would almost
certainly follow thee? established during recent years. Discord
within the Politburo and between the Comunget Party, the Secret
Police, and the Soviet ad forees might develop after tha
first few months, but probable prior arrangements, Communist dis-
cipline# and fear of uforeign attack" would almost certainly pre-
vent air discord from developing to the point of open conflict,
at least within the period of this estimate.
S. Soviet control of the Satellites Would probably not
be seriously affected br the death of Stalin. Soviet relations
with Communist China after Stalin's death would probably not
deteriorate markedly, at least Initially. Soviet control over
the international Cot:mast =moment would probably decline some-
what after Stalin's death, ani continued Soviet central ovar this
movement would depend to a large degree upon the unity and reso-
lution displayed by Stalin's successors.
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B. ThSp_AsalittstfaW
9. Soviet control over the Satellites is Virt7013.3-17
plate. It mauvea the subservienee and reliability of the gov6.
dynamite and continued Soviet economic and military benefit from
the area.
10. The Krenlin has reintained and will erlokrge its
authority over the Satellites through the skillful and exp
enced use of police and rdlitary power and through political,
economic, and ideological reams.
a. The Kremlin has already decapitated and pul-
verised the old political parties and opposition gromps,
but the popular discontent now current in each Satel-
lite will persist and perhaps: increase.
b. The Kremlin in the past bas shown snob skill
end resolution in dealing with unrest and in discovering
and obliterating hostile forces that me estinste that
no issue will develop into more than a nuisance or
impediment upon the Connuniet program within the period
of this estimate.
For more complete information on this subject, 000 1172-33,
?922gLg9ZdVAQlratAQ..BndXIClgrmP::
1 COrkAt bub;
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e. The elindmation of all but trusted Stalinisto
*tenths Cemrannist hierarchies has been almoct conpleted.
Releansingu of Communist regines, however, is a ;or-
petwal process, and there will continue to be purges
within the Oonmunist Partioe, governments, armed forces,
and police forces of each of the Satellites.
d. The subservience of the Satellites will be
guaranteed by, present Soviet authority, Soviet forces
stationed within those countries or along their bordere,
Soviet control over the local Oonaunist turtles, the
power or Soviet advisers end nissions in the Satellite
governments, Soviet ammonia and military controls, the
rigorous education and training prograes, and calm,
lated use of terror to create the sense of Isolatical,
hopelessness, and pbysioal and moral fear ameng the
SItellite peoples.
U. A rapid collectivization of agriculture WOUld almost
certainly provoke strong resistance and ademrselyaMot age-
cultural production In the Satellites for some time, but it would
probably mat shake Scmiet control over the Satellites. Although
collectivization is fundamental to Stalivlist philosophy, it has
been proceeding very slowly in the Satellites, and thereto as
not likely to be increased significantly during the period of
this estimate.
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DnounlmLAW
12,, The Chinese Communist regine has firm control over
mainland Chivas amd there is little prospect of its control being
threatened or Shaken to, domestic forces within the period of this
estimate.
13. The Chinese Communists have steadily intensifiee
their eontrol since 1949. Military and police power have pluyed
the &advent role in this development. However, the regime
benefited initiallyfromi the considerable popular support it de-
rived from the restoration of order and of finaneial stability
and from the promise it gave of new power and prestige for China.
16 additions the regime has been strengthened by the Korean War,
.14.hich increased the nationalistic appeal of the regines provided
an apparent justification for the increased centralization of
authority, and gave China a dranatic fillip with the early Zem...
nunist triumphs over the nimperialistic West."
14,, However, the Korean War has also increased the. renber
and complexity of the problems facing the Chinese Communist re-
gime. The postponement of the domestic reconstruction program;
the concentration of hurrai and naterial reeources upon the 'WT.',
and the consequent austerity, high tamest fervid levies and
? ahortagee have undermined some of the initial popular enthusiasm.
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However, popular dieillusion.wiI1 alnost certainly have little
effect upon the regime, which has already crushed and elimiraled
mast oppoeition and potential opposition forces and which has
used terror ruthlessly and offectively to frighten and denorraize
the Chinese people.
15, The econonic burden of the Korean War has etrained.
the Chinese economy, despite substantial Soviet military aid.
Chinese government expenditures probably double& in 1951 OVA"
1950. Western trade restrictions have deprived Communist Chlym
of access to the resources of the non,-Communist world. The
strain upon the productive plant, partied:L=17 the railroaa and
the energy resources, has boon very severe. Nevertheless, the
Chinese Conmunists probably have the economic capability to sup-
port their present war effort at its current level for at loaot
a yearend at a lower level for the foreseeable future, evelt
dth-
out continued Soviet assistance.
D. am&Ad......4tionell
16. ComennIst Ohlna is not now, a Satellite, althouga ap-
parentky it has voluntarily accepted a political position sub-
_)( or more oomRlete infOrTmtion on this sublect, see nie-58.,
ari be
lbeatawslLamAftr_mtp_tdd=2_20arm, hci
is now in process.
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ordinate to that of the USSR in the international Communist novo-
nent, The Kremlin ban not been able to use the Soviet Arpy and
the military, political, economic, and ideological controls which
it obtained in other areas from Soviet occupation to ensure Kremlin
authority in China, because the conquest of China was achieved by.
the Chinese Communists themselves. The Chinese Communist regime
retains to a great degree the capacity to pursue its own donestic
and foreign policies and to influence Soviet courses of actior in
the ler at,
17. The current Chinese Conounist status in the Soviet
Bloc implies that Communist China is willing to nolo at least a
tenporary ad:ustment of its national interests which are incompat
ible with those of the USSR, to mihmarge any fears it may have of
Soviet expansion, and to substitute a joint Sinc6Soviet effort to
drive the Vbet from Asia for China's traditional policy of pleying
foreign powers against one another. It prObehly also indicates
that the Chinese Communist leaders estivate that close Sine-Soviet
collaboration will emsere? Chinese security from Western courtex,-
action and will provide the economic and military aid necessary
for establishing China as a great power, without at the same time
destroying China's independence.
le. On the Kremlin side, the Chinese Communist statue
leplies that the Kremlin reco7:nizes that Communist China possesses
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the determination and to a great degree the capacity to pureue
its own interests. Moreover, the current relationship provides
the Kremlin both an opportunity to extend Communist prestige end
control in Asia and the hope of ultimate Soviet dondnation of lomm.
nunist China through subversion, through the economic and rdji-
tary- dependence of China upon the USSR, and through Soviet wessure
upon the borderlands.
19. We believe that the current Sino-Soviet relatioanAip
will probably rennin relatively constant throughout the period of
this estivate. The two states have a common ideology? have desig-
mated the West, particularly the US, as the common enapy. Ma ad-
dition, neither state now boa the capability of altering the
current relationship to its advantage without great cost and gave
AChinese Communist effort unilaterally to revise the
relationship or to leave the Bloc would result in the cessation of
Soviet economic and unitary aid and support, serious dissenaion
within the Chinese Comnunist Party and arned forces, loss of borts
areas to the USSR, and perhaps an armed conflict with the usoa,.
Similarly, a Kremain effort to reduce sharply the status of Cino..
nunist China within the Bloc or to ignore Chinese Connunist ile,eresta
in the Far Feet would reduce if not destroy, Soviet influence and
prestige in China, divide and confuse the international Conumnst
novenent, and perhaps lead to aimed conflict with Communist Ch5:ne.
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1I. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FACTCRS
20. The USSR is engaged in a large-scale research and
development program. This includes both pure and applied research
in almost every field of military application, and concentrates
especially upon atomic energy, electronics, Set aircraft, al*
guided mdssiles,
21. The Soviet effort in science is revealed by the
growth of the number of people engaged in research and in leeching
science in the higher educational institutions from 30,000 in
1930 to 150,000 in 1950. The USSR now has a supply of scientific-
technical nanpower numerically comparable to that of the US. This
increase in Soviet scientifioatechnical manpower resources con-
stitutes a ender contribution to Soviet potential strength,
22. The USSR still bemefits heavily from the notablo
Ruesian scientific tradition whict it inherited, and NEEL trexed
in pre-Rsvolutionary Russia retain an importance far out of pro-
portion to their nuMber. During the period of rapid expaamricea
in the early 1930% many incompetent and inadequately trained
people became members of the USSR's scientific and technical corps.
Standards of most higher educational institutions in met seen-
tiflo fields now generally approximate those of scientific
faculties in most Western countries, and the proportion of modi-
oars and incompetent people within the Soviet scientific and
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technical corps has probably decreased, particularly in the eost
recent years. Communist leaders have made attacks upon num:wow
theories in physics, chemistry, and biology, but there is no
evidence that Ideology has been permitted to hamper developmente
directly affecting military capabilities.
25? The USSR in 1945 lagged far behind the other military
powers Lathe application of science to military capabilitiee. In
its efforts to overcame Ito industrial backwardnees and to recover
from the emphasis it placed throughout the 19384945 period upon
conventional weepcms, the USSR has profited heavily from the ex-
perience and aid of other industrial states. Throughout Weed
War T1 and in the years imendiately following the war, the a'Sa
received may kinds of new Allied equipment and much advantee
Allied scientific data. During the war, the 'USSR captured makch
equipment Ave the Germans. Since 1945, the USSR has contraled
the scientific manpower and research facilities of Eastern %rope.
Moreover, since the war, the ussn has benefited considerably
from thorough exploitation of scientific data published in the
West and from successful eepionage, especially in the field of
atomic energy.
24, The expansion and improvement of Soviet mimes
and technology have reduced Soviet relimace upon foreign Imovleige.
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Soviet achievements in atomic energy, aircraft design and pro-
duction, electronics, and other military fields testify con-
cretely to the magnitude of the contribution rade by Soviet
science and technology to Bloc capabilities.
a. 44j pop. The USSR is now believed
capable of quantity production of irani-23 3 and
plutonium for the manufacture of effective atonic
weapons. However, we do not believe that the USSR
will be able to develop and produce a thernonnclear
weapon within the period of this estimate. We esti-
nate that the USSR now has a stockpile cf
b. tAlzmil. The notable post-war achieveuents
of the Soviet aircraft industry are based upon very
high quality 1436m:rah and development in a number or
related scientific and technical fields and upon
steadily improving production techniques The ap-
pearance in 1948 of the 14I0-15 jet tighter, the sub-
sequent maim production of this aircraft
and the perfornance data from Korea all
attest to the capability of Soviet aircraft science-
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technology. The NIG-15 will probably be retained
standard figin'aor through itid-1953, but we belietre tkPAL
significant inprovenlInts in perfornrukce will occur 1.17
that date.
Two twin-
straight_vitiged light boaters, the 11.-280 and the
Type 35, which are alremV in opsrational use, Wili pi
nest certainly constitute standard Soviet equipment Ly
uld-1953.
c? Elgdmalga. The USSR hes achieved narked
progress in the field of electronics since the cod
World War /IQ The Soviet electronics industry is Z4V
CaPDELO of independent research and developments, al-
though it 411 certainly continue to adopt and earp:',& t
Western discoveries, Future Soviet progress will Ae,
pend more won Soviet policy decisions concerning thc,
allocation of resources for production of electronic
equipment than, upon Soviet scientific and technical
capabilities. Soviet ability to develop and to preelles
increased quantities of effective airborne intercept on
equipmentp inproved early warnings, ground control 12t43r-
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?option, and Wird bombing radars, and effective fire
control radar and direetors has increased Soviet mili-
tary' capabilities considerably. We estimate that this
equipuent will increase in quantity and quality durino
the period of this estimate.
d. NitdeljAmi.lea,. Soviet research and develop-
ment in guided miseiles also demonstrate Soviet cepa-
bility for fully exploiting Westeruideas, techniques:
prooesses? and equipment. With the aid of German
engineers and labor, the USSR has developed a guided
mingle program based wen German wartime designs.
While 110 guided missiles are known to be operational,
we estimate that the USSR is developing and producing
copies of the Gen= 7-1 with improved accuracy and
moderatekv improved range-speed characteristios. The
data available on the Soviet guided missile program
in old and fragmentary. However, we estimate that by
ed-1953 the USSR 'try develop and produces
2, Surface-to-air missiles effective against
piston aircraft and with limited capabilities against
presently envisaged atonic weapon-carrying aircraft.
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2. An infrared homing anal? for use against
all ccatemplated bomber types.
3. Limited quantities of all-weather air-to-
surface missiles, uith ranges of apprortme.tely 10 naut7.cal
le
e.algojp.ax,. The USE, which has an ad-
vanced chemical industm and which has had German law
-
ledge and equipmnt tvs4 3 able since 1945, bas intenstrted
research upon *heroical warfare agents, protective item-J,
and dissemination techxdques. It probably has been pro-
ducing a nerve gas since late 1949? are it probably 1411
have a significant stockpile by add-1953. Hareover, 1.?
ourrent pilot operations are successful, the USSR will be
able to begin production of a second nerve ma by ndd-
1953.
ra. E0091110 FACTaRS
A. Current Statue...of the Blcc_ggongr
25. The economy of the IFSSR had recovered its pre
wrr level of total production by 1948 and had surpassed that lcm1
by about 25 percent by the end of 1951. Mareaver? it is Gonttaring
to enend at a rapid, although eomewhat dindnishing rate. The rate
of economic expansion in the USSR in rapid compared with that of
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at other advanced industrial etates. For example, during
the years from 1949 through 1951, the VS and the USSR have
both down approximately the same average annual rate of growth --
almost '7 percent -- in gross national product,.
26. The USSR since 1948 has annually assigned about
one-fourth of its gross national product to inveetnent, ever,
though it has eiraltaneously maintained a large nilitary estab-
lishment, accumulated strategic reserves and inventories of mili-
tary and items, and slowly raised the Soviet atandard of living
freek the war-time level. Soviet capital development has emUnued
to emphasize those industries which constitute the balm boa for
further industrial growth and for direct military productior.,
As a consequence, the Soviet economy is highly mobilized stia-
tegically. It is mobilized for the twin contingencies of hca-
tilities within the foreseeable future as well as for the Litt--
term need to build an economic base for ultimate operations
against, the West. The pursuit of both of these objectives t?imul-
teneously means that each places some limitation upon the at-
conplishment that might otherwise be possible for the other.
27. The USSR from 1945 through 1950 concentrated
upon improving the quality of its military equipment, particu-
larly tanks, jet aircraft, electronic equipment, sUbmaritesc
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end long-range aireraft. At the same tire, it produced
a 13 nua 11 ar about one4ifth as much milita27 equipment as it
predt3ned in 1944, its wartime p3alc. As a cannel et IF its
operational stocks of military et-itere are extremely high.
Production of conventional rai1itax7 equipment increased an]
slightly in 1951, but planned direct expenditures for military
productice in 1952 increased sharply over thaw, of 1951. Tee
comparative stability in production rates of oonventional
armaments and the rieing budget allooatione for the armed
forces suggest that a considerable part of the ourrent Sod at
military production effort is directed toward research, the
development of prototnes, and some conversion of productiol
facilities to the output of newly developed military item.
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kir,,,,ts11121,912rtk,e. Adatatas_Jti
jus
Alaq.2017.
MassorAti
PIghter, Jet
righter, Piston
80 500
u$000
91939
Ground, Attack, Jet
Ch,ound Attack, Piston
200
5,800
200
6,7V?
Light Bceber, Jet
800
80(1
Liglit Bother, Piston
tildium Bother, Jet
9,100
20
9,6%
Medium Bother? Piston
900
9oe
Heavy Bother, Piston
0
Transport, Iledium
20
Transport, Idght
Reconnaissance, Jet
2?500
150
2,904
Reconnaissance, Piston
950
lasceilaneous
3,500
Total
4ZicallinittiatagUlaz
Out Self-propelled
18,600
Tanks
42,400
45,294f
WW1?St= (75vvi and up)
101,725
148,35C
&Elam, (81rsa and up)
78,000
97?30
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28? The Kremlin places a hieb priority upon
stockpiling reserves* not only of military ond-itens but of
food and tutorials needed for operation of the chewer:v=6n.
wartime conditions. In addition to the operational resoreet
which every industrial systemecainteins* noet Soviet factories
me1ntal3a ?untouchable mdbilisation reserves" of raw materiel,
and equipment for continuing proeuction in crime and for ceeee
version to mar production. However? stocks held In, regioeal
base depots constitute the oare of the reserve ereeerare Yore
little evidence is avullable concernieg the size of ourreet
Soviet stockpiles, but ve estimate that they amount in value
to an avereeee of about 5 P
oreent of 1952 Soviet production oe
the stockpiled itens,
29. The Soviet econew has been strengthened tbe
the acquisition of the resources* productive capacities* ad
potential industrial power of the Sate/Mee. Of-current ttAal
Bloc prmiuction, for emanrao, the Satellites contribute ap-
proximmtely 60 percent or the uranium area ard concentrate:),
49 percent of the coal* 29 percent of the electric eouer, 22
percent of the steel, 2S percent of the sulphurio acid* and 11
percent of the copper, in the eneinearing industries* the
eatellites produce an important proportion of a number of itele
eritical within the Bloc: /42 percent of total Bloc productice
of electric motors and genavateres 44 percent of electronic
tees, and 19 percent of antifriction bearinge,,
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30. North Korea and Communist China on a strictly
economic balance are liabilities to the USSR. In 1951, ship-
ments from the USSR and the Satellites to Communist China,
amounting to about $1,000,000,000, consisted primarily of mil-
itary equipment and sapplies. Chinese Communist requirements
do not now constitute a significant drain upon Bloc resources,
and limitations Imposed by transportation facilities ensure naL
present traffic will not increase substantially. Military equip-
ment for the Korean wai and for eqolpping the Chinese armies
probably snpplied from large Soviet inventories. The economie
goods provided, while important to China, represent a very minc-
fraction of total Bloc production and supply.
B. P.12S-E22E2M12-S2E2n11.ties
31. Under continued cold war conditions, -Cie Bloc
clearly has the capability of expanding its industrial base,
of increasing military production, and at the same time of sup-
porting large-scale political warfare. In addition, the USSR
has a limited economic capability to increase Its trade with
Weatern European and Middle Eastern states. The diversion of
some Bloc resources -- such as Polish coal or Soviet coarse
grains -- to international trade might hamper somewhat the Bloc's
industrial and military programs. On the other hand, we esti-
mate that this trade would constitute an important political
warfare weapon and mirht also obtain for the Bloc critical egai)-
ment and materials now difficult or impossible for it to obtain.
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2. The Bloc retnins the ?comae capability of
supporting expanded edliteaeroperations in Korea and Indoctire.
Tranoportetion feeilitieey especially eithinliuWearia, nou con-
etitute the major eciatomio lialtation upon Soviet support of
large-ocale oilltary operations in the rhr Neat. Heuevers,
USSR is attempting to reduce this lixitation by expanding ere
ventories of heavy- equipmert in the Par Fast and by
armunition and light arm plants in Manchuria and North China.
33, The USSR generally has productive facilities
adequate more than to deUble its current eroduction of mute 'y
end item, but it would require a long mobilization period to
reallocate its labor force and to shift resources. Moreoesev
one should not assume that the ussa can in fact increase it ero-
duction of all -unitary end itene to the =item estimated el-
patliy. The principol lielting faotor will probably be re-
strictiono upon Soviet dbillty to divert reeources from invweeent
and from consumption to dixect militaxy production. Conaumeteon
(Including the pereonal conaumption of the military forces)
amounted to about 47 percent of the gross national product. in
1944e It ifeunlikely that the Xretlin vial be able to reduoo this
Ohara Gm 54 earcert) nude below, the 1944 level, ihiohwas Nam
the level reached by any other belligerent?'
J1 003313UntiOrk' amounted to 70 peroent of the DS grow nation 1
product in 2949 an to almost 63 percent in 1951.
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34. Under continued cold war conditions, wo 601.4:Tate
that the Soviet greets natioral product could by. szi.d-1953 masa
11.5 percent of the 1951. level., If mi74tsa7 production by ridd-
1953 claimed 38 pervert of 3oviet moss national product, aa it
did in 1944, it would be awro:chvately 2.3 tires as great as in
1951 ard more than Wee as great as &milt rd.Litary producti,in
plus net gat* from abroad (including lezd-Lease) in 194.4.
35. Although the Soviet economy is batter prepar4
to support a major war effort than it was in 1940, certain i3S,-arerit
deficdenciee rennin which Would probably boxer grogreesive4
serious during a /ang war. II:though recent evidence indicator that
increased producticei of the materials and equipment mot crItical
in the Scarlet economr has reduced the severity of the shortages?
precision instruments, bearings, aviation gasoline, ani ferro-
ancrys rem% in insufficient supply far a major war effort, attcre-
over, the Soviet economr is dependent upon a rail vat= which
neither axle= nor efficient., Tb.o Soviet strategic stockpile Tiro-
gran and the Soviet attempt to establish autonomous economic
regions are designed in port to reduce the heavy strain upon the
transpfertation wet= and to minimize the effect which could ba
produced tr the collapse or destruction of parte of the railrend
system. However, Soviet stookpi.lee in an emergeney could net last
more than a few months, and the econccio independence of the
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various regions can never be attained. For emample,tvn
the Hoccou region inmate all of its hard coal and seven-e?
of its refined oil, 'mamma all its coal, the Bast Volga regior
four-fifths of its coal, and the Urals all their coking coal,
17. ILS=11) BLOC IIILITA4Y?STRENGTITV
A. Ewa=
36t, We estimate that the Bloc armed forces now total
appeoximstely 10,000,000 men (including seccrity forces), an
estimated authorized strength of 23,480 aircraft, inaluding
6,719 jet fighters and 800 medium bothers, and large stocks ei
convontional weapons and eqxtipsent. AB a consequence, the 2.1*;.T
now posnessee a significant quantitative superiority ewer the
Western powers in military pauer and in conventional ground atl
ir armament.
37. We estimate that by mid-1953 Bloc armed forcee
will grow to approsimetelv 10,350,000 men (including securitr
forces) and an estimated authorized strength of 25,000 alrerrl,p
including 9,950 jet fighters and 1,200 medium bombecte, We ba-
lieva that the arued forcee of the Bloc will remain reaatively
constant in size during the period of this esti:nate. FlOgOTIV'k.
For a trove thorough analyeis of Bloc military strength?
Tab A.
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the over.all ground mid air stayeagbh of the Bloc *431 probobly
increase 001Vidarabilr during the period of this estimate byaq.use
of progressive modernisation and Ertandartisation of weapons raid
equipment, the intentdve training program, the growth or the
Soviet atomic weapon stookpile, and the increased combat effloiency
of the Satellite armies.
38 Kith the exception of the Satellite armee Zart10/3:1.
which have grown rapddly throughout the past tufo years, the ermad
forces of the Bloc) have remixed relatively constant in site_
Moreover, although the atomic stoat/Ale apparently has the f:12:rat
Soviet priority, the principal emphases in the Bloc military ef-
fort have been upon improving Bloc defenses, particularly aganat
air attack, improving the quality of existing unites and developirg
and marshaling the militant strength of the Satellites.
B. 'USSR
39. The armed forces or the USSR, which constitute the
core of Bloc rdlitary power, 1411 almost certainly illereEteel
military strength through rai1-1953. If general war does not
occuri we believe that Soviet ground forces will remain at ap-,
proxinately their present strength, 2,500,000 troops orvintwei
into 175 line divisions (of which 105 are rifle, /40 macharamd,
25 tank, and 5 cavalry), 20 artillery divisions, and 25 ant,i-
aircraft artillery diwipions. The amasent, mobility, sxd cepa-
bility of these forces for eustainsd combat will continue to
improve.
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40. We estimate that the Soviet Air Forces have an
authorized strength of some 20,000 aircraft, almost half of
which are fighteraY In addition, we estimate that the Soviet
stockpile of military aircraft is approximately equal in sine
to the airceeft in wilts, but inferior in qualit3r. Although the
cite of the total air establisimasyt is not likely to dballge ap-
Prceiabir through ed4953, a sip/Moue increase in over-all
operational efficiency will result as conversion to Jet figbters
and bomber? progresses.
Nrxre than half of the Soviet fighters are now jets.
There are iniloations that the USSR has ceased production e
pisbanmengined fighters and is producing only a few pistm.
embed bombers. It1.40 light Jet bombers are in production, t-Ind
several hundred of one, the .17.48? ere in operational use. tie
estimate that Soviet long Range aviation, which now has WI Elftri..
meted authorized strength of 800 TU41s, will have about 1,200
by mid4955. Soviet defense against strategic air attack,
rapidly improved during the at year, will probably be
strengthened further by *craved Soviet electronic equipmont
1?/ We believe that actual strength of Soviet sir w3its
averages 85 percent or estimated authorize* strength.
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aM by the develoment and production of improved interceptov
aircraft and autt-aireraft equipment. However, it torill remain
incapable of providing adequate protection against aix attack,
42. We estimate that the Starlet Iavy war has a total
of 140 major aortae? vessels, including 3 old battleshipes
cruisers of various ageas and us defamers. Tic additions ve
ectiante that there are 370 submarines, of Which 104 are long-
range cruising types with a combat radius of 6,000 nautical
ndles. The submarine farce, already the largest in the world,
will pose a greater threat to allied sea ooetrunicaticeno beoavae
of the construction of an estimated 20 long-range see 30 coastal
submarines within the period of this eatiante. Bloc naval de-
femme will be strengthened by the construction of additional
cruisers and destroyers. Hever, the Soviet Navy will emblem
to lack a carrier air force, most of its surface ships 1411 ze-
main oubmodeds and wet of its personnel will lack extensive
operational everience
C. Satellitee
43, The Sa.tellite armiee ISM have an estimated 19155,000
troops organized into 69 line divisions (of which 56 are rifles
9 mechanised, and 4 tank), 3 artillery divisions, 6 anti-aircraft
diviaionss and Trarious independent brigades and regiments. The
Satellite aecurity foram constitute an additional force of a4
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least 232,000 troops. Se.tellite ground forces" are grazing in
strength and quality at a steady pace. We estimate that by
add-19$3 thee, will probably total 1,555,000 Inn, organised into
118 line divisions, including 300,000 Fast German troops me-
pulsed into 24 divisions. These forces will remain generally
deperdetrb upon Soviet logistical support.
44. Soviet re-equipping and training of the Satelllte
armies and air farces should raise thefr. combat efficienay?
*though not to the lava of the Soviet forces. The offensive
capabilities at the Satellite air forces viii remain negligible.
Although the air defkanse capabilities of the Satellites will
improve, they uill not be adequate to assure substantial iro-
tection for air attack. Satellite forces already constitute a
substantial addition to Soviet adlitary strength in Europe , if
they advtuice along the linos projected by the Krenlin, they mill
offset, at least in part, the growth of Western strength in
Europe.
D. gaseadit.
45. The Chinese Couractiet Field Forces now =ober
about 2,250,000 troops organised into 69 armies and 227 ar144013E1
of which 11 are artillery, 6 cavalry, and 4 aramod. Calmmtot
China has enormous manpower reserves, but a severe shortage of
equipment limits the Ocemmanist capability for mobilising this inn-
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power for Edlitary oervice. The capabilities of the Chinese
Columnist forces Will almmet certainly oontiamos to improve, if
Soviet assistanos is mairetained.
46. The mordie and combat efficiency of the Chinese
Communist soldier are high. CoMbat effectiveness vill continuo
to be limited bv the heterogemeit7 of the veapons and equipments,
deficienciee in beeey-weepons? equipment, and training, and laak
of supporting services.
47. Although the Chinese Communist Air Force has In-
creased in aircraft strength from 500 in :met 1951, to an esti-
rated 1,800 in July, 1952, the coast efficiency or this fordo
does not correopond to the numerice strength. Mot profialow
and sire aft maintenance are taw the otandards of the USSR and
of the US. With additional training, cothat experience, anti
Soviet support, the capabilities of this force will almost aer-
talAy continue to increase.
lkektlfRorep,
48. We estimate that the North NoremaArmy.nour totals
256,000 men, organized Into 17 rifle divisions, I avowed di.
visions 1 meohanized division, and 4 mechanized artillery Int-
gades. Recent evidence indicates that the past toelve months
have been used to return the standards of training and equipment
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to the 1950 level. Rigid diseixaros, experienced leadership/
and Soviet staff advice e11 gime the north Romans a general
over.all combat Wide/Icy rating of frau fair to goods, but
these troops trill probehly not awroach the Chinese Ocaamunist
Any in oombat effeotiveness.
P ? !bum(
49. Wo est/rate that the 'net Minh unitary forces con-
gist of a regular army of 130,000, organised into 6 infantry
divisions* 1 artillery edvisiono ant muaeroue laieperdent for-
%rational 70,000 regimel troops, and 100,000 pour3y armed
reatlars. The combat efficianoy a the regular Viet Minh forces
le considered good by the stanetards af that area of the world:,
aud morale has remained
Mitilt=Manna
.B.M.Mariate=4413.221Maiaka
50. aloo forces hem adequate manpower and materiel
to carry on the present confliote in Korea an Irdoehims, to
inorease the scale and extent of military operations in the Pm-
Past. and to support guerrilla werfare in areas contiguous to
the Ebviet Bloc. Cormautiet Few Hearten% requirements for =a-
rents and industrial items thus far bon constituted a slam
drain on the total capabilities of the Bloc. If operations in
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the Mr That wore extended and if general war did not result,
the manpower and equipment necessary for unintaining a high
level of rdlitary operations would net place a serious strain
upon the Sloe eoonotv during the period of this estime.te.
A. MagtgamcgegajatimAn.ftn.
51. Conmunist ground capabilities in Korea have in.
creased aubat.1.111daly 81030 the beginning ot the armistice
gotiations. Coesenalet ground forces have increased from 502,000
to 950,000 troops, and. adgnificant additions a armor and artil.
lery have been made, with a. resultant substantial Increase in
firepower.
52. The capabilities of the Ootenunist Air Force in the
Korean area (North Korea, Manchuria, ? and Northeast China) hevt,
IMproved steadily during the past year. The estimated Oozzunist
=bat airman strength in this area has inoreased from 500 in
'hum, 1951 to 1,250 aim:waft, includiug 800 Set fighters, in
Zuly, 1952. An apparently effective system of air varutvg in in
operation in North Korea. Oomeendst pilots SnIlanchuria have
been engaged In an intensive training program. The OCUlkuunintS
M ve aim demonstrated a significant capability to supply a.
siseable air force in lianclunda.
53. Oolaramist fore= in Korea are credited with a high
offensive potential and are believed capable of launching a major
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ground attack wl,:th little warning. We estimate that the Coma t-
aste have the logistical capability to maintain the MOMSItt1311
of a major ground offensive for frost 5 to 10 days. The Com-
waist Air Wove in the Korean area will not be capable of
launohing a successful major air attack upon United Nations
ground forces, naval and air installations, and lines of com-
ranrication until additional serviceable airfields in North talrea
are made available.
54. We est/mute that without the direct ccanniteent or
major Soviet units, the Celmaynist forces are nob capable of
driving the IKT forces from Korea during the period of this esti-
mate.
B. =tratimagagjdattim japashgtaLUAllzhatEa
55. The Chinese Commmiste are capable simultanecalgl::
of undertaking ndlitary operations elsewhere in the Far Fast arld
of maintaining their present position in Korea.
a. Te4wavi. Provided that present U3 policy ulth
respect to Taiwan rvmaine unchanged and provided that U3
navel and air forces rennin available to defend Taiwan,
Chinese Commmish operations against Taiwan would almos.
oartmy fail.
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b. ZIOR-brig-inUtal2. Regard-1mo of the cata-
comb of the armisbice negotiations, the Chinese Ceramists
remain capable of launching a 011sseenatul attack upon Hong
Nene anti Masa with few preparations ani with little
vance warning.
o. Sputhertst Ada.
. 1. The military threat to Southeast Asia
derives from the maimed capabilities of the Viet Nish
forces to Muintain pressure on the French ami from tho de-
ployment of large forces of Chinese Communist troops in
South and Southwest China near the border? of Burma and
Indochina.
a The Viet Minh oapabilityla based PK-
lumpily upon the considerable increase, in Chinese Ocessue at
advisory, training, ard logistic assistance, However, the
Viet Minh will prcibah2.7 be unable to achieve a decisive
viotory during the period of this estismte without. thit) Ci-
rept commitment of major Chinese Communist forces.
3. Even if full-ecole operations laze resumed
in Kona, the Chinese Comamists have the capability to
*rant and to support al:wadi:wady 150,000 troops in In-
dooldna, A faros of thin size could probably force the
Peeneh ami Vietnam fames to evacuate Tonkin before eT-
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teatime essistance could be mode available. The Mimeo
Ommumists probably could sitataneously commit approxi-
mately 50,000 men for sustained operations in Burma. We
believe that this force would be capable of bringing CIDIDO.
=1st control to all North Burma within two or three
tanks and to all of the strategic central valley ultbin
two or three months.
U. BIM 1141TARY OAPABAST
56, The Bloo, spearheaded by the armed forces of
the =Rs has the capability to wage offensive war. Theidive
a great advantage in land power and tactical air power, the
Bloc form have the capability of striking heavily at periiheral
areas at any time within the period of this estimate. However,
we estimate that the Bloc viii nob be capable during the period
of this estimate of defeating the entire Western worlds
57. We estimate that while the Bloc has grcemi forme
adequate to overrtm meet of continental Beropep mast of the
laddle Blast (emeept the Indian subccertinent and possibly Tue.Jay).
and most of metinland Asia in relatively short periods of
it does not peewees the balanced military forces essential to
conduct simultaneous operations on such a vast scale. tforacriart
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the Soviet forces in Europe would require substantial rein.
femme:2W in trams, air strength, and materiel before they
could obtain the superiority in arced power estimated neoessary
for a successful eurpaign in Western Europe.
50, The Soviet Bloc does not now hem and will be un-.
Likely to secure adequate naval forces or sufficient shipping
to mount effective amphibious operations again:* either the
Western Benisphere or even against the MC, Japan, the Philip-
!inn, Indonesia, or Taiwan.
59. The air forces of the Soviet Bloc, led by the Soviet
Air Forces, are capable of providing adequate tactical support
eel growl canpaigns which the Bloc might launch. At the same
time, the USSR is capable of attempting a strategic air offensive
against the US and the UK. Rowel:wit we estimate that because
of the limited size of the Soviet atomic stockpile, the limited'
Soviet capabilities ferBW and OW, and the limited maTabilitfte
of Soviet Long Range aviation, the USSR will not be capable tr
neutralizing or decisively dal:axing US productive ?speak, ard
mar Imftotdal with mass destruction weapons during the period
of this estimate,
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60, The air defense capabilities of the USSR have in?-
creased noticeably since 1945, and ve believe that an air of-
fensive against the principal Soviet centers would meet vigorous
and determined opposition However, despite the narked improve-
rasnts.in Soviet air defense capabilities, defialencies still
exist, "broom, meant conditions of air =ribs% grant a
serked general superiority to offensive weapons over defensive
equipment. Therefore, we estimate that the USSR almost certa1n:1.y
WM not be capable of providing effective defense in all stra.
tegic areas against air attack during the period of this esti-
mate, The Soviet air defense system will almost certainly :31A
be adequate to insure Soviet induatr3r and communicatione agemst
attacks which would reduce and perhaps destroy its ability to
win a war against the West.
BLOC POLITICAL WARFWALPAB
61. Political warfare Includes all operations de-
signed to weaken the enemy's will and kaapacity to resist by
memo other than orthodox military operations.
62, Bloc political warfare techniques include political
and *canonic pressure, diplomatic action in the and elscikere,
propaganda and front activities, the action of Communist Parties
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and Crammaniet Party-controlled trade unions outside the Bloc,
rapport of various kinds of subversive and revolutionery move- ?
meets, end psychological warfare. Paiticsol warfare plays an
=usually important role for Oommsanists, who consider military
warfare only an extension of political =tare in their re-
lentless campaign to undermine the strength of the non-Oomeunist
world and to hasten the ultimate victory of Comsentlem. Bloc
conduct of political warfare benefits greatly from Blot) cen-
tralisation of leadership and from effective discipline and
control, which rake possible great flazIbility In the ee3.setion,
nee, and revision of particular tactics. The Bloc's unique
ability to camel the realities of life within the Bloc from
foreign observation constitutes another important advantage,
as do the freedoms and opportunities providei Moe agents and
supporters in the non.Oommemist world.
1. pjmA]jltssklatemAwsssrbba
63. The principal sources of strength upon Which Bloc
political warfare capabilities are based consist of the size,
power, and unity of the Bloc, Communist dootrine, and Comennist
international organization, a vast network of seventy-two loyal
and disciplined national Oomeemist Parties scattered tbrougao'
the world. These sources of power are inter-related and inter,-
dependent. Together they give the Bloc a solid foundation for
political 'warfare.
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4,12.020ses.gatizatiLatitba jam.
64, The USSR, which is the tem of the mild
rovolutionaryntevement, covers 8,500,000 square miles and bee a
population of about 200400,000 people. The Bloc) now inclueve
ten states, which control a territory of about 13,320000 square
ndles (ore-rourthof the world total) and a population of about
765,000,000 (omeathird of the world total). The size of the
Bloo and the rapidity lath which, the Oommuniet novenent has em-
pauded in the past thirty-five years constitute important ele-
ments of Bloc politloallexeure strength.
65. The militarg strewth and apparent
solidity and permanence of the Bloc generate fear and ablation
In sone parts of the non-Oememnist world. As a consequences,
maw Bloc diplemetic and pmcpagarda etrategems have been effec-
tive, partioularly upon the immediate neighbors of the USSR and
upon those states whose weakness rakes themlespendally sue
ceptible to the Moo claim that Commmdsmis, indeed, *the wave
of the tateren and that efforts to realist it are futile and
dangerous.
66. The membership of Moo states in intet
national organizations prevides the Bloc an international salnding
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board, The solid core at floc votes in organizations such as
the Uli dramatizes the faces unity" and strength, card the Bloc's
own international organizatione add to its power and prestigtle,
The Bloc has mural diplamatio voices, which are used in tail=
to create an apparently thunderous roar and which are used Ira-
vidually to test non.Ocamemist reactions and to saufuee are
vide the non-Couemnadat world.
2. COlagtaifit.d2Sttidan
67. Comania doctrine constitutes a vital
strength for the international Communist reeveaent. For Com.
rounierts throughout the world, it provides a syntem of values;
a morel code, and a guide to action, It helps ensure that Com.
rtunists gthei know no doubt, It explains ascientificailyft 117,7,
pest, preseerbg and MUM, ani it describes the final and Irier4
perfect form of human somtety? It is the principal source of
Couesroist resolution and of the Comaxaaist vill and capacity
right.
68? ler fallow 'travelers, Communist ideoncL7
is not so such a rigid secular faith as it is a critique of tirv
inadequacies of 11032401M2St society and a promise for a. bati-,,er
Mine. Marxist ideas end doctrines and the Marxist vocabulaT7
have softened and corrupted =eh of the non.Couommist world during
the Past sonturY. EV012 non.Ccememists ord anti-Ocersamiets
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been Infected by COmmunist doctrine, Communist doctrine, and
the appeal it has, oonstitute the priecipal advantage OCUMXir
possesses over other nodern revolutionary moments, such vs
nisei= and Nazism.
3. corm*t_tedalaWaamoutsgUma
69. The international Communist organize,Won
is a vital element of Oceratist political warfare strength. We
estimate that there are now 15,500,000 Communists in the werld
(there were 30,000 Bolsheviks early in 1917), organized in
seventy-two national parties, All of these Communist ?artier,
with the possible exception of the Chinese, are closely con-
trolled and directed from Menem Meat Coninnxists
the Blocs but about 3,750,000 are scattered throughout the non-
Oammanist ATiproximately 3,000,000 of these are in itlatUnm
Europe, and about 750,000 are in the Americas, Africa, and Asia
(not /minding Communist China, North Korea, and last Minh).
These figures do not include the membership of the thousand -4,1r
front organisations which the national Commutist Parties in.
finance or control, nor do they indicate the disoipline and
extras Amor of the Parties, which make them far more eMe-
tive than their size alone Indicates.
70. Soviet control of the taternational Co:.
moramant is virtually complete. &Mak direction el'
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the intwernationoal Otte mist movement, ie effected through &slat
definition of ideologleal arthodow, Soviet education of Przty
leaders from ali over the weld, Soviet-oonbrolled Oomanirt
congresees and international eonferenees, Soviet and Set?1.
lite diplomatic rneenentatives, end the aesignment of covalence&
Moscouutrained organise to the national Pertise. Soviet eta.
cation/a institutions, porticularly the Lenin Institute, the Oom.
muntst university inr the Woridng %opine of the Peet (the itt-a*
Eastern, tbiversity), the Sun Tat Soo Vaivereitor, end the 111:1--
Baropeen thivaceities, have educated thousands of non-Soviat
=Lets in Oinsmonist doctrine, man/nation, pinprtgarda? aspialanzeop
askbatagf, aMorthodca as* gasrrilla military wears teohnitin&J.
The graduates of these tmilumeities eonstitute a lava and well-
fititalpLized kite "loos of professional revolubiamsries.
711 _Each national Ccommist Partyi tiglitly
oontroLled end directed. The national Ocammuist batten BCTI?:3
the interests of the Moo in their respective countries by =-
plaiting eoomonte ami social grimness, by infiltrating gavi-
ailment agendas and institutions, by angailyingBloc Wavy
and PrVagareak aid by lobilizing miss support for Bloc pelletal,
and by creatim psvanntre poi ps to influent* local policy to
the advantage of the Bloom The programs vas7 tram oxen to arok
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according to Bloc irradiate concerns, the coTOLdtatnity of
local issues, the capabilitiee of the national Thrtiee in.
volved, and the effectivenese of the opposition.
72, Communists have always placed a.heavy
.emphasIs upon en media of communication for the diffusion or
their Ideas. The Pm& Communist Party, fer emonple, nowLipub.
lishes two large Paris daily papers, more than 100 regional,
local, and special interest papers, and a large umber of part-
odlcals, pamphieta, and bodge, These propaganda media premAil)
a ruaning critique of the non.Comnunist will. They also giofy
actual.orinagined Blot achievements in production and distwl-
bution. They produce the impreselon that the Bloc Is enoraltkily
powerful and that the Bloc is the pioneer of many cocial and
economic rams. This picture of the Soviet Union has been
particularly effective in Wbartern Buxom China, and the noc.
lonialt, areas ofAsia, the Dear East, and Africa, there traet%loeal
criticism of the inadequacies of the established systems hau
tolerated readiness to accept legends concerning Soviet suocertsee.
73, The ahtionta Communist Parties have chc4n
particular dill in creating and controllim front organizatitina
and govezwents enliding the support of untargr or ignorant null.
Comnuniste? The Communists use levying methods to control the
unite. Nrongtonsnxtetta are ustmo14rplaced in nominal positicar of
national leadership, but real control remains in the bands of
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Communists,. leadership of front groups at the international
level is usually Communist. Generally, the as following of
the front organization is predcednantly non4ommunist, but skill-
ful menipalation by strategically placed Party membws welds
large numbers of sympathizers and of the uninformed into an Jur
strumant for Communist use.
74. The organizations of workers, intellectuals,
women, and stmlents have received especial attention from the
Commmaiets. The Japanese Communist Party, for example, has sm.
phasized obtaining control of the Japanese unions. By. 19475 about
75 percent of Japan's 6,500,000 ,unionmembere belonged to or-
ganizations under Communist influence or control. By. 1949, the
Japanese Communist Party had control of the principal unions in
the key industries throughout Japan. The current strength of the
Japanese Communist Partrinfluenoe mar labor lies in the metal,
construction, automobile, railroad, and utility industries.
75. On the international level, the Commu-
nist-controlled WIN Mem Inderation of Trade Unions) attempte
to weld both Communist and non-Communist unions into a cohesive
unit to support Bloc policy. Since theirithdrauml of the Western
non-Communist unions from the WITU, Communist organizers have
increased their activities In the *trade departments," whieh are
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International organizations of liorkers by crafts. Thus, When
the British Trades Mien Congress withdrew from the WPM, the
Cormamists maintained contact with British labor through af-
filiating British metal workers and lumber workers with thoir
appropriate //international trade departmental/
76. lutelleatuals and their orgautzations have alveoli
constituted an important target for Commist efforts. Writers,
journalist?, lawyers, educaturs, students, and artists bavo been
organized nationally and internationally, often to fulfill a par,-
'Koala? short-range function, such as to Influence an election
or to support a particular diplomatic rave* Intellsotnale have
been especially prominent in the peace campaigns and the peace
congresses, Which the Bloc has used in its attempt to recoup
recent losses in European mass support* Como:1st influence
among intellactuals
constitutes a strong cornpcmant in Bloc
political rfare strength.
It,EV-Dable DPV112803entp Moo 191itiora Warfare Cora.z.
bilities
77. The development of Bloc political warfare cape-
bilitiee through the period of this estimate depends to a large
degree up= forces and factors which are difficult to establish.
Pte. temple, 3Deasures adopted by the West since 1947 have re-
dueed Bloc capabilities in western Europe to a considerablo de-
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gree. Continued progress toward the unification, rearmamentv
and revival of Western Europe would restrict further the strength
of the international Communist movement in Wade= Europe. More-
over, am though the Bloc enjoys remarkable flexibility in 3G
looting c,litionlvarfare tactics, we believe that the rigid,
centralised Bloc control system and the dogmatism of Bloc 1/1
*logy w!al 14m4t Bloc tactical fleodbility, blind the Bloc to
opportunities, and Lad it into imisceloulationts.
Wegtern Eurenot
'78., Communist strength in Western Europe varies from
country to country, from the illegal party of an estimated 100
members in Eire to the :nos parties of Prance and Italy. TIveugh-
ant Western Europe, the Gammandst Parties &Luce 1946 have tlefered
severe losses bath in membership and in prestige, but the hard
care of the Party has been preserved everywhere. We estizonto
that during the period of this estimate the Bloc will not brie
the capability of estaliebing a Comma1st zovernment anywlwe in
Western Europe through election or through insurrection.
'79. European Conmunists have been able to exert sic-
nificent influence over trade union movements only in Prance and
Italy, %filer? Communist leadership is deettnsart in the largerrb
trade =ion federations and xahere Ocionsurist control is inalkoly
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to be shaken or threatened within the period of this ostimntf).
The Oemenniets have gained their largest following smog does,-
workers and laborers in the heavy indurtriee, which play a vital
role in the rearmemmxt of Western Eterope. In general, Westem
Dame= Commies no longer have the eapahtlity of initiattng
?tribal; far political purposee but Moat rely upon unity of afition
with non-Oomemist unions in strikes based upon legitinate eno-
=do grievanees. Nevertheless, the Comounists retain lizatod
capabilities to interfere with defense production in peace Vane
and a larger potential for sabotage and espionage in war Um 1.
SO. The popular strength of the Connuniste and Baal
capabilities for political active in Western Europe rein
highest in Prance and Italy, where the Ocovuunieta are in a emcee
nirrity in the parlienents, control mxreP munictipal goveratoPts,
and hold the leadership of the most inportant trade tmions.
estivate that the Connualet Party of Prance now hes 500,000
ambers, compared with the peak of 850,000 in 1946. Iliereovvc,
in each naticeal election in France since 1945, the Oomentlef;
Party has obtained more than 5,003,000 vette, about one.quarf
the total vote east. The Ocammist Bart,. of Italy is astipair;od
to have 1,500,000 members, compared to only 5,000 in 1943 are to
the peak of 2,300,000 in &wary, Me. We eetim9.te that tho
sine and power of these Ocuanalet Parties will decline, be., unly
elightly, within the period of this estimate.
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M. In the other countries of Western Europe, Com-
monist Smalltime is weak and fairly widely scattered. Com-
antedate do hold important positions in same trade unions in
lerst countries, but they are latch less numerous and influeml
than they are in Frame and Italy.
e2. The German question will probably constitute the
touchetane for Moo politiall warfare capabilities in Westrot
leurope during the period of this estimate.
83. In the event of general warp the Coraniet Parties
would eonetitute a serious threat in Europe, especially in
France arid Italy, *ere the large Coramist Parties arid Cortatnilt
trade =don strength are rehab:mad by wellatrairsed Ocirrement
para.military organizations Itith 50,000 ani 75,000 neadlera re-
speotivelyo All Sampan gownaments would probably mann! the
Outramist Parties and would attest* to arrest knotel Cormatnists,
Roarer, the Ceramist Parties would probably go undergrourrt
The espionage, sabotage, and psza.military capabilities of the
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European Cammunieb Parties is the event of war must be considored
high, and as Soviet forces approaehed they would feria a tom:IL:labia
mace to Allied communications.
U. We believe that Bloc political warfare capebilii,ies
in this area will rennin low throughout the period of this ostirante,
except posedbly in Iran. The USSR has devoted little effort to this
area, and most of the existing Coeutztist Parties have been fccoed
ickierground. Of all the Parties organized, only that in Iran tad
those linked to the Nene& Conerunist Party In Mirth Africa kayo
thus far bad any marked influence. On the other handl Axil' ?t,te
Bloc has made few gains, the oontirtued deterioration of Westela
power and influent* will provide IDA:messing opportunities for the
Bloc.
85, In Iran, the Bloc agent, the Tudeh Partor, has art
estimated rombership of about 45,000 and has covertly explcatt,
the currant situation with some suceess,. The government has ilmc
far been able to keep Tudeh activities under control, althovgl
has not been able to prevent some infiltration into its mord
fame and its civilian offices. Commis* political wo.rfare
capabilities any increase dangetrously if conditions resulting
from the oil crisis should seriously reduce the effectivenets of
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the armed fbroes ard the police. On the ether hand, if gametal
tar should break out, Tudeh capabilities would almost certainly
be increased by Iranian Comeamists inesently In the USSR and '7y
other Soviet agents. Wen so, Iranian Ceramists could make
only a limited contribution to a Soviet iMai011 of Iran.
86. In the Arab countries, estivite there are nO`
Mar 30,000 ac 40,000 Corandsts In a total population of 40,0001,000,
The Arab governments, even those politically unstable, now htr,Fo the
local Commmist Parties under control, and they are believed enpable
of oordng Idth poosible increases of Commist strength and ak,
colorations of political warfare. 1n the event of warp Corm let
capabilities for oVb.verstma and sabotage would not increase egi-
rdfloartlysi unless the otates were invaded IT Bloc forces.
fttkLARLS
87. Marmot:cm does not now pose a major immediate -LI rest
to India..., although the Indian Ocveriast rbrty and allied Partf-oe
resolved 6,000,000 votes (of 203,000,000) In the 1952 eloetimn.
The Indian Commtrdst Party now has only about 50,000 merobars, but
it has wall vocal gr.ouve In several state legislatures and the
rational legislature. The Communist Party in the national lefic
lature wir: be able to do little more than embarrass the govern-
ment and to spread priOpagands, In those states where Cemsendut
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strength is greatest, the party say be able to obtain repre-
sentation in coalition governments and even seriously to disr*,
parliamentary goverment.
88, If the Indian Ccenamist Part3r continues its veient
tactics, it probably will male) additional gains in popalar st-eneh,
liksievert we believe that there is very little possibility thrr:., the
Indian Commists can make sufficient progress seriously to evrtest
the dominant position of the Congress Party. If the 003IMIUZ1S)
Party returns again to direct action, it probably will lose IT talk
of its popular support and at the same time cause the gover. mut.
to 701fille its earlier effective repressive seattures,
89. The Pakistan government has acted with vigor rat,
determination against the small and immature liakistan Conant
Party. Moo political warfare capabilities in Pakistan throutli
the period of this estimate will almost certainly Main liut gait
although Soviet trade with Pakistan and possible Soviet poLtt:Aal
manoetrores on Kashmir ray strengthen them somesibab.
50
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ft_Mgd
89. Although the Japanese Communist Party hew hal
only about 100,000 members, it Is well-organized and well-diect-
plined.and is now conducting an aggressive political.eampaiox.
Communist influenae over Japanese labor, over various front or4ini-
mations, and in the Japanese educational systaaprovides impar:wit
instrumento for disseminating propaganda and for exploiting winomic
unrest and resentment againat the US. The Party has a discipinod
hard core with significant capabilities far subversion, espiongo?,
and sabotage. It probably will not be able to persuade the Japanese
goverommt or the Japanese people to abandon their fundamentalj-pro-
Western orientation. It will almost certainly lack the capaUth7
during the period of this 3st1mate for seizing control of tho Lvivern-
moat.
90. Bloc political warfare capabilities vary throughout
Southeast Asia. They are highest and most significant in Indohina,
where the Viet Minh, with Chnese Communist advice and militnr
assistance, maintains heavy military pressure upon the Frenea oAd the
Associated States. Bloc political warfare capabilities refloc Vet
Minh mdlitary strength and the Viet Minh appeal to nationaliam. We
believe that the Viet Minh will maintain its strong military evA
political position throughout the period of this estimate.
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9l. The Burtmese Ceramists and their sympathisere
constitute a serious threat to Burns's security and are capable, of
creating unrest throughout wide areas of the country. Baleen% flee-
Mons have strengtheemed the unstable goverment of Burma, Wel has
now begun to atteelpt to reduce the power of the Ceserunist inewgents.
tie estimate that the Burmese Caanuniste will not have sufficIet
strength 'within the period of this estimate to overthrow the greern-
meat, unless the gayer:wet is weakened by intemel factiana7_ r life
and unless the Burmese Commmiets are given technical and lopietieal
aid by the Chinese Communiets.
92. The growth of Cooratnism in Thailand has thus far
been confined largely to the Chinese community, and Cceasurdsi:
earilare capabilities in Thailand are very limited. The dereloi age a
Ccenmanist strength in Thailand will probably depend largely' tip( n eventl
in Indochina, Burma, and Malaya. Communist victories in tbove countricz
would immediately increase Commie strength in Thailand, ufaare 0:man-
atees have traditionally followed the currents dominant algal:ale in
Southeast Asia.
93. The British have the support of post MalaysnE ad
probably will be able to contain Cemmunist political and guevr:_lia =-
fare, so long as the reminder of the Southeastern Asian mairlsold re-
IMiTU3 outside the Bloc. The organized guerriLla forme, umbel:in? Ws)
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to 5000 and supported by least that number of militia, hale thus
far evaded deatruction by retiring into the jungle and by tertpemerily
merging with the Chineee population. We estimate that the Mellyen
Communists will rata the capability of haraosing the Britieh admin-
istration and disturbing the eoanmgr. However, ye believe teae the
Communists will not be able to gain wide popular support or tw.lousty
to threaten the British position.
94. The Indonesian Communist Party, the third iceyeest
perty in Inioneels, hap a membership of only about 25,000. Roemer,
its organisation and leadership are excellent, it controls the largeer;
and most important Labor federation, it receives Chinese Comaxitot ait
and it has a considerable influence an the large, restless Chi re
population. Moreover, it roulette 7 percent of the Beate in PaeLmaene,:,
and it controls a number of important front organisations for ?,,elteetante,
mem, and youth groups. We estimate that the Indonesian Colmat
Runty Will not within the period of this estimate be able to scive pause
or aerlovely to threaten the government. However, we believe Will
retain the support of various insurgent groups for sabotage anii
fin-
surreotionary especially in Java. It will probable. also Ile
able to help keep the present government neutralist. In the sleet of
war, the. Commuelets could obtain control of Indonesia only tereagh th
complete collapse of the Western position in Southeast Asia.
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95. In the Philippines, Commist politieaiwprtirt.)
capabilities hare decreased considerably since 1951. Althoot there
are still Huk raids and although the Philippine armed forces ad
polio* are not yet strong enough to cope with all raids in all 7-rte
of the Philippimeat Huk-Contnunist sti.ength will probably contiono to
decrease during the period of this estimate. Howsver? organised Caa-
manliest will not be altogether eliminated. In the went of tharo
an added covert influx of Chinese Commtmist agents may be expeTted,
continued US help will probably be necessary to control the :o ammisti9
particularly In strategi.cally important port areas.
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TAB A: ESTVATED BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH
A. Bloc Orpailtnamln
1. The Soviet Arm
1. We estimate that the Soviet ground forces now total
2,500,000 men, and the internal security forces constitute an ad-
ditional 400,000 troops. The Soviet Army is estimated to consist of
175 line divisions, of which 105 are rifle divisions, 40 mechanized,
25 tank, and 5 cavalry. In addition, the Soviet ground forces contain
20 artillery divisions and 25 anti-aircraft artillery divisions. On
the basis of present mobilization plans, estimated trained reserves,
and estimated stocks of military equipment, the Soviet Army and internal
security forces can be expanded to a total strength of 8,500,000,
organized into 320 line divisions, by M/ 30 days. In the absence of
general war, however, we believe that the size of the Soviet ground
forces will remain at approximately the present level through mid-19539
but that the armament, mobility, and combat efficiency of these forces
for sustained combat will continue to improve.
2. The Soviet Army has been reorganised and modernised
since the end of World War II, although the various corps, armies, and
divisions still very widely in quality. We believe that current Soviet
line divisions probably peewees good equipment in adequate quantity.
The Soviet ground forces in Eastern Europe probably constitute the best,
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equippad and best-trained units of the Soviet Army. The rigid Soviet
training program probably ensures a high degree of combat skill.
Discipline is good, and morale is almost certainly high.
3. Certain weaknesses of the Soviet Army will continue
to limit the scope and effectiveness of its offensive capabilities
during the period of this estimate. The Soviet Army lacks caperience
and training in large-scale use of motor transport. The complicated
logistical problems arising fram the size of USSR, fram the size of
the areas in which campaigns would probably be fought, and from the in-
adequate road and rail networks intensify this weakness. The Ary lacks
experience in large-scale combined amphibious operations, and it has
never conducted successful airborne operations in wartime. The Army
suffers from a shortage of technicians, a weakness that is being met by
intensive pre-..military andmilitary training and by the recall of some
specialists from the reserve. It has also suffered from poor communica-
tions, due mainly to insufficient radio communications equipment. This
be the principal cause for inflexibility in past Soviet operations,
particularly in the handling of artillery.
2. Bloc Europp$trenRth
a. ftrisaler_Lcm in uma
4. The USSR has been strengthening its own forces in
Eastern Europe and those of the Satellites to maintain its relative
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IN313 man
tritTmtage aver wowing 14e3tear,1 strength, Tho Melly sechapised 3aviet
group of armies in lasteria Oi.:Tzwry, cnir...?4 Into 2 ditsi,w ots:fling
185,000 tre,ps, rerreoeuta tha lore ot Bloc urillterf pamr ps
c;onstitTrtee v. poised 4-hre.).t t) tate West-, 'The.3e St.riet IT Ars
t.!eltle supplied with the rtpr,t lintieru ootlipmcixt .4ndC1 i7 g
4:74110i". training,
b.
711,..Sett.92..P.4 A/711M
5 Ife ,Astimt C.:gt t. the Satelli 'tj'i icit 11.3 tx3
Cartram Alert Pollee) !Keit tOtril 11155/C1V vim, nlareeee 1 te,
dielArz (56 rifle, 9 tt.mi. 4 -7.arit), 3 erttr1el7 di-
visions, 6 anti 41,11%treft AMU, ordver'ityceierx!t de
1)14 regiments, The Sat ;111)./e seatmity forAN.la eontAitsAis *a t4litioral
? irle of 9t :Least 242,0)C trc,)ps. Satellit.? .rocoinxt irilts z? =p.m/LK
stverigth tad quint,. a?. a ateitir rate, poi 4411 eredit tt It b5r
p: id It:63 they -total : ,551,000 okwk,orgied itii) :118 eir 4$1,013 v-#4/
'14.3,144-41 reserves of the Spi.ellite grouyx3 sztc-,,ixt ern" xtrrAtPly
'4,0;V,000 sin (or itLicli C pea' cent 81'4rioaristdsveZ tV17
--t,lirtml), but tiro.* ii . li?Als, evipmfint a'rt11&1 frivifirt-A
1'07 sore eeeplete info tratta-i, se_ Tab t; 1:11b3e 2.
10.9 1710?-0E33 the esti] gtoT carimal,x1 or 11.-s Lie, 'earner rt,
1`00,,000 mem; t.rrinteed ir,ta 24 41-4ritau
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The Satellite armies are equipped largely with Soviet
Yer:r e.74prtent of good qlity The Satellites are 110W matte
-:).'aeeerfeie. er their MAI ise lip;htes.rmored and non-comlet velticles,
e,ettilery, smell arms a'Tintmition and parts. They are dependent
epee tke ti,SSI1 for most of their tanks, self-propelled guns, and heaDzt
and for some of their light artillery and iall e.rek-i- The
eeeqoue defictency is in motor transport; few Satellite division
Tertori.Lod or xnechanised. However, a concentratceJ effort is being
te overcome the wftlness by increesinm deliveriee of notece
et elce ?rem_ the USSR and from Czechoslovakia erki tri -some -vehiele
in? the countries. The Satellite ground forces era also week
communietetions Explipment, and their anti -aircraft defenses have
itle ying radar.
Alt*e10:1 the Satellite mromd forces are being re-
rdeed, te eanfortt to the Soviet pattern:, differencee still ,3te_Ert in
equipinent, morale, a.nd general capabilities. Satellite
c.Ne-Atat e.:Z.'fleiency and reliability vary and in general are only fat
thz, Diii!aerian Army is considered the most formidable of all the
?et-ea:lite forces. The Hungaritea and Polish, and possibly the Rumanian-
ere teins :pushed rapidly toward the Itulgarian level of eche-
The CAZ.f.: eh? slavair Army will not be an effective offealiVe force
'ere the sming of 1953. The Albanian Army remains_ capable n1y of
eeeirrilla e-earations.
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C.' I tt4c1 Position.
8. The Soviet Bloc ground forces in Europe possess a
good logistical position. We estimate that military stockpiles west
or the Soviet border are 3uffieicat to maintain Soviet forces 71017
in being there for aprroxlma,tely 45 days of active combat. We believe
that military stockpiling trithin the USSR is sufficient for maintain-
ing a mobilizoxl amp- in combat for several Yoonthet without recourse to
new woduction? except in the case of POLO The oast-west road, rail?
and inland watery nets in Eastern 1arope are adequate to move troops
and materiel with sufficient speed and efficiency to permit full util-
ization of those Bloc divisions now in Eastern Europe,
3. Bloc Far E....ait_g_t_releb
a. Soviet Forces in the Far East
9. The USSR -represents both the foundation and the
allow" of Bloc military power in the Far East. The Soviet ground
forces in the Far Fast operate within an autonomous commend structure
comprising the territory east of Lake Baikal. These forces total an
estimated 427,000 men, organised into 30 line divisions, of which 7
are mechanized and 3 armored. There are also 781000 Soviet security
troops in this area. The gi'vund forces in the Far East are probably
comparable to other forces within the USSR in equipment and training.
We estimate that the USSR could mobilize an additional 15 divisions
from the three military districts whioh constitute the Soviet Par Fast.
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10. Transportation Transportation facilities constitute the major
limitation for supporting large-scale military operations in the Far
East over an extended period. The Trans-Siberian, melee carries at
least 90 percent of the military supplies shipped from the %restore
USSR, is reported to be operating at near capacity levels. The USSR
has attempted to reduce the transport limitation by tending up large
reserves of ndlitary and other supplies in the Far East. However,-the
USSR has also equipped and provisioned the North Korean Army and has
furnished large amounts of equipment and POL to the Chinese Communists.
While it is not known what proportion of those supplies were drawn
from stocks in the Par East, we believe minimum stockpile reserves
have been maintained. Although precise data on the logistical position
of the Soviet Perces in the Far East are lacking* we estimate that
these forces now have supplies (sufficient to support 30 divisions in
combat ffte 6 months to one year.
b. Chinese,P,rox
11. The over-all strength of the Chinese Communist Field
Forces is estiaated at 2,250,000 troops, organized into 69 armies and
227 divisions, including il artillery, 6 cavalry, and 4 armored di-
visions. Communist China has enormous npower reserves, but a severe
shortage of equipment limits the Communist capability for mobilizing
this manpower for military service. The size of the Chinese Communist
Army has not increased appreciably in the past three years, although
notable improvements in quality have taken place.
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12. The disposition of the Chinese Communist Field
Forces by geographical areas is as follows:
Area
Yield Forces
Line Divisions
Supporting
Korea
682,000
'3
10
Manchuria
237,000
24
6
North China
133,000
12
3
East China
404,000
38
2
Central .South China
386,000
36
Southwest China
306,000
31
?110
Tibet
15,000
1
?1111
Northwest China
77,000
????
41111.????????????
TOTAL
2,240,0001/
206
21
13. The Chinese Communist forces are basically infantry.
Their weapons consist of a heterogeneous assortment of light weapons
of European, American, and Soviet manufacture. Soviet supplies are
gradually reducing the Chinese Communist shortage of heavy equipment
in Korea, but thw probably' are net sufficient to alter significantly
the traditional shortage of equipment elsewhere in China. Hest of the
armored equipment vas apparently shipped to the Chinese Communists
during lets 1950 and early 1951, but ammunition and other types of
I/ This figure does not include 10,000 "advisors" in Indochina.
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materiel are apparently being furnished on a continuing basis.
Communist China has become increasingly dependent upon the USSR for
continued shipments of ammunition, spare parts, POL, and replacement
equipment. We estimate that despite the flow of Soviet materiel, the
disparity between the equipment of the average Chinese Communist di-
vision (8-10,000) and that of the average Soviet division (10-12,000)
mill probably not be reduced significantly in this period.
14. The morale and combat efficiency of the Chinese
Communist soldier are high, and the Chinese Communist Army is an ef-
fective force with a high degree of local tactical mobility in Korea.
Combat effeetiveness has been limited, however, by the heterogeneity
of the weapons and equipment, deficiencies in heavy weapons, equipment,
and training, and the lack of supporting Services. In the past, the
combat effectiveness of the Chineee Cormninist Amy has also been limited
by the absence of tactical air support.
c. North Korean Army
15. We estimate that the North Korean Army now totals
256,000 meno organized into 17 rifle divisions, 1 armored division, 1
mechanized division, and 4 mechanized artillery brigades. Three North
Korean corps are currently engaged in combat on the eastern front. The
remaining forces have coastal defense duties or security Mi81310139 on
lines of communication.
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16. The North Korean soldier in 1950 was well trained,
but severe casualties forced the induction of large nutbers of un-
trained men into combat units. Recent evidence indicates that the
past twelve months have been utilized in an effort to return the stand-
ards of training and equipment to the original level. Rigid discipline,
experienced leadership, and.Soviet staff advice will continue to give
the North Koreans a general over-all combat efficiency rating of from
fair to good, but these troops will probably not approach the Chinese
Communist Army in combat effectiveness.
d. net ItInh Anti
17. We estimate that the Viet Minh military farces consist
of a regular army of 130,000, organized into 6 infantry divisions, one
artillery division and numerous independent formations, 70,000 regional
troops and 100,000 poorly armed irregulars. The combat efficiency of
the regular Viet Minh forces is considered good by the standards of that
area of the world, and morale has remained high. Three-fourths of the
regulars are deployed in the strategic Tonkin area.
18. There baa been continuous improvement of transportation
routes and facilities from South China into Indochina. Chineee Com-
munist logistic assistance to the Viet Minh continues, and stockpiles
are believed to be in excess of Viet Minh requirements for present
operations.
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B. an.-431X-s_it.MM
1. .143,14,k_gra_m7c
19. We estimate that the Soviet Air Forces have an
authorized strength of some 20,400 aircraft, including 9800 fighters
(5600 jets), 2660 tate& aircraft, 4550 light bombers (670 jets) and
800 medium boMbers.1/ In addition, we estimate that the Soviet stock-
pile of military aircraft is approximately equal in number to the
aircraft in units, but considerably inferior in quality and not ident-
ical as to type. Although the size of the total air establishment
is not likely to change appreciably through mid-1953, we estimate that
a significant increase in over-all operational efficiency will result
from the continued substitution of more modern aircraft. We estimate
that by the Soviet Air Forces will have an authorized strength
of 20,500 aircraft, including 10,000 fighters (8,000 jets), 2,700 attack
aircraft (900 jets), 4100 light bombers (1500 jets) and 1200 medium
boMbers.21
20. More than half of the Soviet fighters are now jet,.
There are indications that the USSR has ceased production of piston-
engined fighters and is producing only a few piston-engined bombers.
1./ We estimate that actual strength
strength.
2/ For more complete information on
Tab B, Table 5.
is generally 85 per cent of authorized
estimated Soviet air strength, see
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Two twin-jet light bombers are in serial production and several
hundred of one type, the IL-28, are already In operational use. For
strategic bombing purposes, the USSR has an estimated authorised
strength of 800 TU-4 (B-29 type) aircraft in Long Range Aviation
Units. Although a heavy bomber appeared in the July, 1931 air show,
there is no evidence that this bomber MS an acceptable one or that
series production of any heavy bomber has begun.
21. The Soviet Air Forces are becoming increasingly
effective, particularly with respect to bomber interception. However,
the combat effectiveness of Soviet military aviation is still considered
low by US standards. We believe that the general level of training
of Soviet ground and air personnel is inferior to that of the United
States and United Kingdom personnel. The USSR is conducting an intensive
training program to improve tl-is defect.
22. The present logistical position of Soviet military
aviation is probably good. The aircraft industry has been maintained
in steady operation throughout the post.mar period, and since 1948 the
industry has concentrated on the production of jet interceptors,
notably the MIG-15. We estimate the annual rate of production as
follows:
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21
Jet fighters .
4751
5000
Light and medium bombers
1100
1400
Others
3426
2560
TOTAL
9277
8960
We believe that aircraft production could be accelerated, but that
two years would be required for the industry to reach capacity pro-
duction. We estimate that the present total peacetime requirement
of aviation fuels for the Soviet Air Forces amounts to about two-thirds
of Bloc production.
23. The modernisation of Soviet air strength it the
Far East is of especial significancewl/ Estimated jet fighter strength
there has increased
Jets now constitute about 50 percent of the fighter force in the Par
East. However, about 60 percent of total Soviet air strength, includ-
ing about 65 percent of the jet fighter force and 87 percent of the
medipm bomber fierce, is concentrated in Eastern Europe and the western
portions of the USSR.
24. There are five major combat components In the Soviet
Air Force: The Air Force of the Soviet Army, Fighter Aviation of Air
21 For For more complete information on the estimated geographical distri-
bution of the Soviet Air Force, see Tab B, Table 4.
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Defense, Long Range Aviation, Naval Aviation, and Aviation of Air-
borne Troope.2/
a. Die Air Force of thiaApILILIEmx, consisting of
units assigned to the four Military District Air Forces and to the
14 Tactical Air Armies, is the largest component of Soviet military
aviation, with an estimated? authorized strength of 12,100 aircraft,
of which 2,850 are jet fighters and 670 twin-jet light bombers. By
mid-1953, the number of jet light bombers in units may increase to
1,500. The primary mission of the Air Force of the Soviet Army Is
to provide tactical support for ground operations. On the whole, the
strategic mobility of tactical aviation is high. While the Air Fbrce
of the Soviet Army has been strengthened since World War It by re-
equipment with jet aircraft, the majority of its aircraft are still
World War II types. Use of the I1-10 piston engine attack aircraft
as the primary close support weapon results in a heavy fighter escort
requirement and reduces the counter-air capability of the fighter force.
The tactical bomber force will probably be capable of considerably
better performance than in World War It, when its operations were
relatively ineffective. /n spite of the weaknesses noted above, the
Air Force of the Soviet Army Is capable of providing effective support
for Soviet ground forces.
40.0.1.1.4.1r1.04nuseammouilwilraita1
21 For more complete information concerning the estimated strength of
the major components of the Soviet Air Force, see Tabu., Table 5.
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b. !Uhler Aviation efAir Defense has the mission of
defending Important target areas in the USSR. This force has an
estimated authorized 2,700 interceptor aircraft, of which about three-
fourths are jets. Its regiments operate from relatively permanent
installations, but their organization appears to parallel that of the
Air Force of the Soviet Any and their strategic mobility is cor-
respondingly high. While the Soviet Union has an effective day inter-
ceptor aircraft in the M1G-15, this aircraft cannot now be fully ex-
plotted 'because of a shortage of effective ground control radar equip-
ment. We believe that the USSR now has a small number of interim all,
weather intercepters with airborne interception radar around a few
important Soviet targets. These aircraft probably have only limited
interception capabilities, particularly against let bomber?. However,
because of Soviet progress in the electronics field and in the produc-
tion and operation of interceptors, we eptimate that the USSR probably
will by mid-1953 have limited operational quantities of some type of
true all-weather interceptor. We estimate that Soviet day interception
capabilities will be good around key target areas. We estimate that
night and all-weather capabilities will remain limited throughout the
period of this estimate.
C. 12
1. Long Range Aviation, consisting of three Air
Armies, one in the Far East and two in western USSR, constitutes the
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strategic striking force of the Bloc. This force has an estimated
authorized strength of 1,900 aircraft, including 800 Tu-4 bombers.
By we estimate that Soviet Long Range Aviation will probably
have about 1,200 T134's and may have a few jet medium bombers and
turboprop heavy bombers. The Tu-4, with a normal combat range of
3,320 nautical miles and a combat radius of 1,800 nautical miles with
a 10,000 pound payload, is the only known operational Soviet bother
capable of delivering the atomic bomb in the United States. Modified
in the wanner of the US B-29B, the Tu-4 would have a combat radius of
2150 nautical miles and a one-way range of approximately 4000 miles.
At least 30 airfields in the USSR and Satellites are currently suit-
able for sustained medium bomber operations, and about 75 others for
limited medium bomber operations.
2. The centralized control of Long Range Aviation
provides flexibility for shifting units to meet strategic requirements,
while operationally the mobility of the medium bomber force can be
exploited by staging aircraft from interior base areas through forward
banes around the Soviet Bloc perimeter. Units of Long Range Aviation
are known to be undergoing intensive training for strategic bombing
missions by day or night in any weather. This capability has probably
not generally been attained at present. It will be extended when radar
blind bombing and navigational devices are in more general use, and when
additional training has been completed. We believe that the overall
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combat effectiveness of Soviet Long Range Aviation remains well
below that of the US and UK strategic air arms. The average Soviet
medium bomber crew Is less skilled than the average US medium bomber
crew of World War II. Soviet staff planners leek the extensive opera-
tional experiences obtained by the US and UK.
d. Naval Aviation, which has an estimated authorized
3250 aircraft, of which 750 are jet fighters, is assigned the mission
of supporting the Soviet fleet, protecting the seaward flanks of the
Soviet Army, and defending coastal areas. It also bears a part of the
responsibility for air defense of the USSR. The lack of carriers
limits effective fleet operations to a combat radius of 300 to 700
nautical miles. Naval Aviation is probably capable of anti-submarine
patrol, aerial reconnaissance of coastal areas, and mining. We esti-
mate that the effectiveness of Naval Aviation will be improved by mid-
1953 as additional jet aircraft, both fighters and light bombers, are
assigned to naval units.
e. Aviation of Airborne Troops apparently has the mission
of conducting airborne training and providing airlift and equipment
in actual airborne operations. Its authorized aircraft strength con-
sists of approximately/40 transport aircraft and 190 gliders. It is
probable that transport aircraft from other Soviet aviation components
and the Civil Air Fleet would be utilized to supplement the aircraft
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of this component for large-scale airborne operations. We estimate
that the Soviet Army has approximately 100,000 trained paratroops,
organized into from 6 to /0 divisions. In addition, a nunber of
regular rifle division troops -- perhaps as many,as 100,000 -- have
received limited training in airborne operations.
f. The Civil Air Fleet, while not an operational com-
ponent of Soviet military aviation, is under the War Ministry. To-
gether with other civil air organizations, it operatee about 1,660
transports on scheduled and non-scheduled operations. It could make
an estimated 1,000 of these available for military purposes. Emmert
this would produce a corresponding reduction in Soviet domestic air
transport.
2. ,SatoAtttALV_inZERVY
25. The present mission of the European Satellite air
forces Is primarily defensive. These air forces possess approx1mate:17
1,280 aircraft in operational units; this nuMber includes 119 let
fighters, 410 piston fighters, 404 ground attack, /50 light bombers,
94 transports, and 103 reconnaissance aircraft. The Satellite forces
are almost completely dependent upon the USSR for logistic support,
and virtually all aircraft are Soviet types. Jet fighters are appear-
ing in increasing numbers, and intensive Soviet training of careful/7
1/ For more complete information, see NIE-33,s_attirrAsant_toL2L02.
Sattelp.tee am:1 Theta,britm. n toijj9_wer
7 November 1951 .
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selected Satellite pilots in assuring Soviet control, techniques,
and tactics. On the whole, combat effectiveness is low by Western
standards, and the Satellite air forces have only limited defensive
and ground attack capabilities.
3. Chinese Communist Air Parcel/
26. The strength and capabilities of the Chinese Com,
nunist-kii Force have been Increasing steadily. They are estimated
to have available a total of approximately 1,800 operational aircraft,
Including 1,000 jet fighters, 250 piston fighters, 160 ground attack
aircraft, 240 piston light bombers, and 150 twin-engine transports.
The main concentration of air strength is in the Korean area where
approximately 1,250 aircraft, including 800 jet fighters, are based.
27. Although the Chinese Communist: Air Force has in-
creased in strength to an estimated 1,800 aircraft, the combat effi-
ciency of this force does not correspond to its numerical strength.
The defensive capabilities of this air force have risen appreciably
as a result of continued training and combat experience. On the whole,
the Chinese Communist Air Force is formidable defensively within the
present limited area of operations in Korea. However, it would lose
much of its effeetivenese If forced to spread its strength. Moreover,
it remains wholly dependent upon the USSR for logistic support. Should
1/ This inaudes the North Korean air vats and any Russian units which
are operating ostensibly as parts of the Chinese Columnist Air Force.
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this support: be withdrawn or interdicted, the combat efficiency of
this force would decline rapidly.
C. Bloc Naval Strqngth
1., Soviet Naval Forces
28. We estimate that the Sawiet Navy has a total of
about 140 major surface vessels, including 3 old battleships, 18
cruisers of various ages, and 118 destroyers:1/ We estimate that there
are 370 submarines, of which most are short-range coastal stibmrines
and of which 104 are long-range cruising submarines with a combat
radius of 6,000 nautical miles. There are no aircraft:carriers, and
none are believed in construction.
29. The operating forces of the Soviet Navy are organ-
ized Into four major fleets because of the widely separated maritime
frontiers. Each fleet is assigned primary responsibility for a partio-
ular geographic area, the Northern coast, the Baltic Sea, the Black
Sea, and the Pacific. Both the Baltic and Pacific Fleets are sub-
divided into separate fleet components covering the northern and south-
ern sectors of their respective areas of responsibility. In addition
to the fleets, there are three flotillas, which serve as local defense
forcetein the Amur and Danube Rivers and the Caspian Sea.
1./ For more complete information, see Tab B, Table 6.
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30. We estimate that the Soviet Navy has a personnel
strength of approxillatay 675,000 men, exclusive of about 80,000
naval aviation personnel, but including 400,000 General Service and
275,000 Coastal Defense and Naval Infantry personnel.
31. The Soviet submarine force, which is the largest
in the world, is the principal offensive weapon of the Soviet Navy.
We have no information on the proficiency of this force, but it must
be assumed that it has profited from German experience and instruction.
We believe that it has the capability of seriously threatening allied
sea communications. At present, however, the strategic mobility of
this submarine force is limited by the lack of overseas bases. Although
there is no reliable evidence of submarine launching of 44 type missiles,
this is considered within Soviet capabilities. It is possible that such
weapons might be fitted with atomic warheads.
32. The Soviet fleet maintains a large number of patrol
and small craft, same 900 of which are in active service. Not of
these are sUbmarine chasers and motor torpedo boats. These small
craft are capable of mine warfare in restricted waters, short-haul am-
phibious lift and support, and defensive action against amphibious
raids and assaults.
33. The Soviet Navy has given high priority to the
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construction of cruisers and submarines, and a significant increase
in their strength is anticipated. Large nudbers of destroyer-escorts,
patrol craft and dual purpose mine vessels have been built, but no
evidence exists of large-scale construction of amphibious craft,
midget units, or hydrofoil craft. There are no indications of con-
struction of battleships, aircraft carriers or support-ship types which
would be required for overseas attacks.
34. We believe that the Soviet surface fleet is
designed primarily as a defensive weapon to support and protect the
seaward flanks of the Soviet ground forces. This is demonstrated by
the lack of aircraft carriers and of fast, modern, battleships. Cruisers
constitute the core of the surface fleet. Soviet cruiser construction
has emphasized speed, firepower, and size, with a corresponding sacri-
fice in endurance.
35. Wide geographical separation of the maritime frontiers
of the USSR has required the separation of the Nay into forces which
are not =Axially supporting. Limited operational experience and tech-
nical equipment, lack of aircraft carriers, and absence of advance base
facilities make the components of the Soviet Navy second-rate coastal
fleets. Adequate supplies of ammunition, stores, and POL are estimated
to be available in all areas to service the Soviet Navy for the early
months of's general liar. POL supplies fin, Soviet Naval Forces in the
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Far East would probably present a problem after a year, particularly
if these forces undertake extensive and sustained operations.
2.Astalite-ABLghinetaSIMERIELWATA
36. The capabilities of the Satellite and Chinese Con-
nunist navies during the period of this estimate will be negligible.
The Naval Fortes of the Satellites will probably be capable of aiding
the Soviet Navy in such fields as minesweeping, ninelaying, escort,
and coastal defense duties. The Chinese Communist Navy is email and
of uncertain effectiveness. The Soviet Far Eastern Naval Fierce* are
providing training, advisors, and logistic support to this tercet but
available evidence indicates that within the period of this estimate
it will not be an important element in the Far East.
3. Bloc Merchant Maxine
37. We estimate the combined strength of the Bloc
merchant marine at 760 vessels, totalling nearly three and one-third
nillion deadweight tons .21 This constitutes only a minor addition
to Bloc economic and military capabilities. In general, the Bloc
merchant marine is in poor condition, and there is no evidence that
its development has a high priority. Although the Bloc merchant marine
could, in theory, be used for a troop lift, the /resent character of
this merchant fleet, which lacks tankers and which is a heterogeneous
collection of vessels, varq Obsolescent, precludes its employment in
any large scale operation.
1/ For more complete information, see Tab Bp Table 7.
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D. Bloc Defegog
1. Sctet Defense
38. The USSR possessee a large Anti-Air Defense system
(PV0)0 which includes an extensive early warning network, a force of
interceptors estimated at 2,700 (including 2,000 jets), and an esti-
mated 23 anti-aircraft divisions. The early warning, fighter, and
anti-aircraft units of the Bloc armed forces are also available for
air defense. Considering tactical fighters as well as those in air
defense units, we estimate total fighter strength available to the
Bloc at about 1/0500. Other commitments mould prevent utilization of
all this force for air defense purposes.
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40. Soviet day interception capabilities have increased,
considerably with the widespread use of MIG-1.5 interceptors
The re-equipping of
Bloc fighter units outside the USSR with jet interceptors, particularly
in the Korea-Manchuria area, has increased Bloc air defense capabili-
ties.
41. Soviet antiaircraft capabilities are gradually in,
creasing as new guns of estimated 100mm caliber, with modern fire
control radar and probably with new directors, became available in
increasing nuMbers around important Soviet targets. These gens are
capable of accurate fire up to 35,000,40,000 feet. A 57Mm gun fin.
attacking high speed aircraft at lower altitudes may already have been
introduced. Surface-to-air guided missiles and rockets maybe in
operational use by-mid-1953.
42. Despite definite improvements in Soviet air defense
capabilities, major deficiencies in the Soviet air defense system
remain. During the period of this estimate, there will probably be
insufficient nuMbers of modern radar, heavy antiaircraft guns, and
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true all-weather interceptors to provide effective defenses for all
important targets. Moreover, we believe that the Soviet air defense
system, and all of its components, are subject to saturation by large
scale air attacks.
2. lemiltUtril Defense
43. The USSR has a large, complex, and well-organized
civil defense system which is integrated into the over-all Soviet
Anti Air Defense system (PVO). The civil defense system includes a
full-time civil defense staff organization. Comprehensive plans have
been made for the utilization, of other existing agencies and facilities,
and for training large groups by various mass organizations. In
addition, civil defense needs are apparently considered in urban and
regional planning, in stockpiling, and in decentralization programs.
46. The USSR probably has a greater civil defense cape-.
Witty now than any other major country, except perhaps the UK. Its
present civil defense system appears yell-planned and organized, al-
though it maybe deficient in preparations against atomic attack. The
elaborate totalitarian control system, the highly regimented character
of the propulation and, to some extent, the dispersal of population
and industry constitute strong points in the Soviet civil defense system,
although the wide separation of various industrial complexes also poses
disadvantages. In the event of a civil defense emergency, we believe
that a serious shortage of transport facilitiea and of materials wpuld
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arise, and that a serious fire hazard would develop because of the
large proportion of wood used in Soviet construction.
3. Soviet Coastal Defenses
45. The Soviet Coastal Defense establishment, which
includes radar nets, coast matchers, coast artillery, antiaircraft,
and naval infantry, has an aggregate strength of 400,000 men and consti-
tutes an effective third zone of defense. Soviet coastal batteries
in World War Il demonstrated the traditional effectiveness of Russian
gunnery. /t is impossible to defend the entire USSR coastline with
fixed emplacements and prepared positions in depth, but defenses have
been established in important ports, harbors and straits.
4. Satellite an ChineeComam
46. The European Satellites in the West and Communist
China and North Korea in the East deepen the early warning coverage
and increase the hostile area over which attackers must fly.
heir interceptor and anti-aircraft forces, Which are gradu-
ally being re-equipped by the USSR, are an additional asset. However,
despite some increase in the air defense capabilities of the Satellites
and of Communist China (notably in the Korea-Mnehuria area), we esti-
mate that during the period of this estimate they probably will not be
adequate to assure an/ substantial degree of protection from air attack
by a capable enemy.
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