FRANCE'S PROBABLE FUTURE ROLE IN THE WESTERN SECURITY SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002000020001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 23, 1953
• Content Type: NIE

4 7
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curx NU.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,ONE
SECURITY INFORMATION
030410
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
FRANCE'S PROBABLE FUTURE ROLE IN THE
WESTERN SECURITY SYSTEM
NIE ? 63
DOCUMENT NO 2
NC,CHANGLI IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S C
NEXT REVIEW CATE:
Published 23 January 1953 AUTH: tfl 70-2
DATE: REVIEWER:
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central In-
telligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
concurred in this estimate on 15 January 1953.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
STAT
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RE T
FRANCE'S PROBABLE FUTURE ROLE IN THE
WESTERN SECURITY SYSTEM
THE PROBLEM
To assess those conditions and trends in France which will affect: (a) France's
determination and ability to cope with its key domestic and international problems;
and (b) its role in the Western security System.
CONCLUSIONS
1. France is over-extended. It cannot
simultaneously: (a) maintain domestic
economic stability and politically tolera-
ble standards of living; (b) meet Lisbon
NATO force goals; (c) maintain at least
parity of strength and influence with
respect to Germany; (d) continue a ma-
jor military effort in Indochina; and (e)
cope with the lesser but growing problem
of nationalist unrest in North Africa.
2. Even if US aid is continued at present
levels, France, under its present govern-
mental system, will be unable to meet all
these requirements because of social,
political, and economic weaknesses which
impede the mobilization of its substantial
human and material resources.
3. French morale is not likely to be such
as would support much increased sacri-
fices for rearmament, although some im-
provement in French morale is probable
if free world strength in general con-
tinues to grow. We also believe that in
event of major reverses in the initial
stages of a European conflict, French
will-to-resist in France itself would be
highly uncertain.
4. French governments will probably
continue to be moderate rightist in char-
acter, at least until the 1956 elections.
Gaullist strength is likely to decline fur-
ther. A slow decline of Communist effec-
tiveness is also likely, but the Commu-
nists will probably continue to be one of
the major political parties and to retain
considerable propaganda, espionage, sub-
version, and sabotage capabilities.
5. Conservative French governments will
probably succeed in attaining a greater
degree of economic stability, though
largely at the expense of rearmament
and of economic expansion. We esti-
mate that French outlays for rearma-
ment are approaching the practicable
peacetime maximum, and that for the
next several years French politico-eco-
nomic capabilities will not support out-
lays substantially higher than the level
reached in 1952.
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6. We estimate that France will not flat-
ly reject the EDC treaty, but will almost
certainly impose conditions on its ratifi-
cation which might require re-opening of
negotiations and thus further postpone
West German rearmament. Should the
French insist on a settlement of the
Saar issue prior to EDC ratification, such
ratification might be even further post-
poned.
7. Moreover, even if the EDC comes into
effect, France will seek through its in-
fluence in this and other European insti-
tutions to prevent the emergence of Ger-
many as the dominant Western Euro-
pean power.
2
8. France's overriding desire to maintain
parity with Germany in Europe and its
growing concern regarding North Africa
will probably lead to further efforts to
reduce or shift the burden of the war in
Indochina.
9. France will almost certainly remain
committed to the NATO alliance. How-
ever, the over-extension of French com-
mitments, fear of Germany, dissatisfac-
tion with the scale of US support, and
fear of general war may lead the French
to pursue policies diverging from those of
their NATO allies, including the US.
This divergence might become so marked
that it would require re-examination of
the bases of US security policies.
DISCUSSION
10. France will continue to be a major ele-
ment in the Western security system, if only
by virtue of its geographic position in Europe
and that of the French Union in the world.
Moreover, its 42,000,000 population, well-
developed industry, and sizable military es-
tablishment are important resources of the
NATO alliance. France is currently making
a major contribution to free world security in
Indochina and in NATO. However, the fu-
ture role of France in the Western security
system remains uncertain. France is still de-
pendent on US aid to meet its global security
commitments, while maintaining its economic
stability. The political, social, and economic
structure of France will place serious ob-
stacles in the way of the effective mobiliza-
tion of French resources, whether or not those
resources are adequate to sustain France's
global commitments.
PROBABLE, TRENDS IN FRENCH
SOCIAL STABILITY AND MORALE
11. French society is essentially static and is
likely to remain so over the next decade bar-
ring general war or world-wide depression.
This static situation rests upon an equilibrium
among many conflicting interests, especially
as regards the distribution of the national in-
come. Economic issues have been aggravated
by the failure of the working class to make
any significant postwar gains in real wages
and by the effects of inflation, especially on
the middle class, but the balance of forces in
French society is such that no basic change
is expected.
12. On the one hand, the multiplicity of con-
flicting interests tends to prevent the develop-
ment of any revolutionary situation in France.
If any one group such as the Communists be-
comes disproportionately strong, other nor-
mally divergent groups form loose coalitions
to contain and isolate it. On the other hand,
the sharp cleavages in the French social
structure militate against united and positive
governmental action in the political and eco-
nomic fields. These cleavages are reflected in
the characteristics of French political institu-
tions ? the proliferation of political parties
and even party factions, weak coalition gov-
11011Witriftatfilw
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ernments, and numerous cabinet changes. 1
It is difficult for a French government to fol-
low a positive line of policy because many,
powerful vested interests are always ready to
combine against it.
13. In addition, war weariness and fear of a
new war permeate most of French society, and
affect French attitudes toward rearmament
and the East-West struggle. The sheer phys-
ical losses of two world wars have sapped
French will and ability to rise to new crises
and have produced what is akin to defeatism
among important segments of the population.
14. Nevertheless, there has been a slow im-
provement in French morale and will-to-
sacrifice, and we believe that some further im-
provement is likely if the West continues to
grow in unity and strength. More national-
istic policies on the part of future French
governments may also catch the popular
imagination and improve morale. We be-
lieve, however, that within the next few years
French popular morale will not be equal to
much greater sacrifices for rearmament pur-
poses. We also believe that in the event of
major reverses in the initial stages of a Euro-
pean conflict French will-to-resist in France
itself would be highly uncertain.
PROBABLE POLITICAL TRENDS
15. The political trend in France during the
last few years has been to the right. This
trend has been facilitated by the gradual re-
moval of the wartime "collaborationist" stig-
ma from the traditional right-wing parties.
Conservative voters no longer feel obliged to
cloak their preferences as they did in the first
postwar elections, and a number of prewar
leaders have re-emerged. We believe that
French governments will continue to be gen-
erally moderate rightist in character between
I However, the strength of the centralized admin-
istration and the fact that most cabinet changes
are merely reshuffles of the same men permit a
greater continuity in French policy than would
appear likely in the face of frequent cabinet
changes.
3
now and the next probable elections in 1956.2
Except in the event of war or prolonged eco-
nomic crisis, political power will probably re-
main focussed in the hands of the predomi-'
nantly conservative peasants and middle class.
Further cabinet changes will probably take
place with somewhat less rapidity than over
the past five years and consist largely of a
reshuffling of moderate rightist and center
leaders. It is unlikely, however, that any ex-
treme rightist government will come to power.
16. Gaullist strength will probably continue
to wane, which will also strengthen the mod-
erate right. The Gaullist forces have been
weakened by the defection of a conservative
group which supported the recent Pinay cab-
inet. The support of this group was obtained
largely by Pinay's adoption of many Gaullist
economic proposals. That government also
stole Gaullist thunder by taking more aggres-
sive action against the Communists, and by
greater "firmness" in dealing with the US.
Further defections from de Gaulle are prob-
able if he opposes any coalition with other
political groups. If, on the other hand, de
Gaulle permits the leaders of his party to
negotiate with other parties, not only will his
"non-political" position before the electorate
be weakened but he will have difficulty in
keeping together his heterogeneous group,
which is already split between those repre-
senting highly conservative interests and
those holding social reformist views. Thus,
whichever policy de Gaulle may follow, his
party is likely to lose. It may even disinte-
grate. Nevertheless, de Gaulle himself will re-
main a significant political personality and, in
the event of a major economic or international
crisis, he might still be elevated to power.
17. Another important factor in the trend to
the moderate right is the weakened and di-
vided condition of the left. The Socialists
suffer from weak leadership and are essen-
tially a middle class party, with only limited
working class support. The working class
2 Elections before the end of the present Assem-
bly's term are unlikely although constitutionally
possible. In the last eighty-odd years, the last
Parliament is the only one which has ever cut
short its term, and it did so by only six months.
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e.
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continues largely to vote for the Communist
Party, which is isolated politically in the Par-
liament. Thus the working class continues
to be without direct influence in the govern-
ment, and this fact reacts to the benefit of the
rightist parties.
18. An anti-conservative alliance between the
Communists, the Socialists, and the MRP is
highly unlikely, at least over the next few
years. The Socialists and MRP disagree
sharply over state aid to Catholic schools, and
both are strongly anti-Communist. The MRP
still has a left-wing element and may again
move toward the Socialists, but is more likely,
if the evolution of center forces under the
Third Republic is any guide, to retain its cen-
ter position or move gradually toward the
right.
19. The political weakness of the left is in-
tensified by the declining strength and nu-
merous divisions among the trade unions.
French trade union strength is now at one of
its low points. There are fewer than three
million organized workers, as compared with
about six million at the end of the war. The
workers are currently in a skeptical mood to-
ward all trade unions, largely because the
Communist-dominated unions do not con-
sistently base their actions on economic
grievances, while the non-Communist unions
have been ineffective in increasing real wages.
PROBABLE TRENDS IN FRENCH
COMMUNIST STRENGTH
20. The decline of the trade unions, the in-
creased political isolation of the Communists,
and repressive governmental measures have
weakened French Communist effectiveness.
Party membership has dropped from some
900,000 in 1947 to an estimated 450,000 at
present. The Communist press, while Still a
major propaganda network, has suffered a
considerable decline in circulation. Most im-
portant, recent Communist efforts to organize
political strikes and demonstrations have
been signally unsuccessful. However, the
Communists will remain a major political
party, principally because of the absence of
any alternative working class and general pro-
test party. In particular the Communists are
4
likely to maintain their pre-eminence in the
trade union movement.
21. The Communist element in the active offi-
cer corps in the armed forces is estimated to
be not more than 2 percent; none are known
among active flag or general officers. There
is some Communist influence among reserve
officers. In event of a general mobilization
Communist influence within the armed forces
would become a serious security problem be-
cause of the large number of Communists and
Communist sympathizers who would be in-
ducted.
22. Despite their continued strength as a
mass organization, the Communists will re-
main unable directly to influence government
policy. We believe that for the next few years
at least the French Communists are likely to
minimize direct action tactics and will at-
tempt to reduce their political isolation and
recoup their strength. This policy is likely
to meet with little success, and a further de-
cline in Communist effectiveness is likely, at
least in the short run. The government
clearly intends to take further anti-Commu-
nist measures, although it is unlikely to out-
law the party.
23. However, by playing on French fear of
war, economic grievances, and anti-American
sentiment, the numerous party propaganda
organizations will probably continue to arouse
some popular resistance to general defense
policies. Moreover, in event of serious eco-
nomic depression, Communist popular sup-
port probably would again increase and the
party would regain some of its lost political
power. Finally, the Communists will prob-
ably retain some para-military capabilities
and will almost certainly be capable of exten-
sive sabotage. In the event of war, Commu-
nist exercise of these capabilities, together
with the demoralizing effect of Communist
propaganda, would adversely affect French
will and ability to resist.
PROBABLE ECONOMIC TRENDS
24. French production, aided by the Euro-
pean Recovery Program and the Monnet Plan,
has increased substantially since World War
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II. In the year ending June 30, 1952 indus-
trial output was 144 percent of 1938, agricul-
tural output 110 percent, and the real gross
national product about 130 percent. The in-
crease in industrial output is the result of a
15 percent increase in hours worked per week,
a 6 percent increase in employment, and an
18 percent increase in productivity per man-
hour.
25. Real personal incomes after taxes did not
keep pace with the growth of production, pri-
marily because the government now takes a
larger share of the national product for in-
vestment and defense; also, corporations are
plowing back a larger proportion of their in-
creased profits. Compared with 1938, real
wages and salaries after taxes rose only to the
extent that the work week was lengthened;
average hourly earnings (including employ-
ers' and government contributions to the
social insurance system) in 1951 were no
higher than before the war, in terms of real
purchasing power. This diversion of re-
sources to investment and defense has given
rise to serious inflationary stresses.
26. The effective utilization of France's sub-
stantial human and material resources con-
tinues to be impeded by social and political
institutions and attitudes of? long standing.
In particular, the inability of the government
to eliminate budget deficits, to impose ade-
quate restraints on credit expansion, and to
carry out direct economic controls has con-
tributed to financial instability and persistent
inflationary pressures. The unwillingness of
the Assembly to increase taxes, together with
widespread tax evasion, limits government
ability to mobilize resources by non-inflation-
ary means. Lack of confidence in the franc
has led to hoarding and capital flight and has
inhibited private investment. The restric-
tionist attitudes Of French management and
labor, the prevalence of uneconomic small-
scale industrial enterprises, and the relative
immobility of the French labor force have also
retarded economic growth. Inflation and
low productivity have placed French exports
in a poor competitive position abroad. France
still has a sizable balance of payments deficit,
5
particularly with the dollar area. Because of
the weaknesses in the French economy,
France's current Indochina and armament
outlays have proven a serious strain. 3
27. Probable French Economic Policies. The
French Government is faced with a threefold
economic problem: (a) coping with inflation
and stabilizing the economy; (b) providing a
sufficiently high investment level to mod-
ernize French industry and sustain economic
growth at a rate comparable to West Ger-
many; and (c) meeting increasing rearma-
ment demands. To achieve all these goals
would require strict limitations on consump-
tion and substantial tax increases. We be-
lieve that present day French institutions
and French political will are not equal to this
task.
28. Future French governments will probably
continue the Pinay policy of giving priority to
controlling inflation and stabilizing the econ-
omy, limiting both investment and rearma-
ment outlays to the extent necessary. The
government clearly intends to reduce the level
of public investment, and the Monnet Plan
of investment in basic industries, which
ended in 1952 with modest success, is un-
likely to be renewed in as extensive a form.
Future governments are unlikely to under-
take radical fiscal and administrative reforms
or to impose substantial new taxes and ade-
quate controls. There are apparently no
plans for overcoming France's budgetary or
foreign trade deficits, except by continued
reliance on US aid. Barring unfavorable in-
FRENCH DEFENSE EFFORT IN 1951/52, COM-
PARED WITH THAT OF SELECTED NATO
COUNTRIES
DEFENSE
EXPEND-
ITURE AS
% OF GNP
MEN ON ACTIVE
MILITARY DUTY
TOTAL 30
JUNE 1952
AS % OF
TOTAL
POPULA-
TION
France 9.1 899,000 2.1
Belgium-Luxembourg 4.6 162,000 1.8
Italy (incl. Trieste) 4.8 365,000 0.7
Netherlands 5.2 97,000 0.9
UK 9.8 946,000 1.9
US 12.9 3,611,000 2.3
Canada 7.8 97,000 0.7
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ternational economic developments, the net
result of such policies will probably be to
produce greater economic stability, though
largely at the expense of rearmament and
economic growth.
29. Prospects for Further Economic Growth.
The rate of increase in French GNP is already
levelling off, as the bulk of postwar recon-
struction is completed; it will probably not
exceed an average annual rate of 21/2 percent
over the next several years. The share of
GNP devoted to investment is likely to aver-
age at best 13-14 percent over the next several
years, as compared with the 1947-1952 aver-
age of 15 percent.4 Other factors inhibiting
growth probably will be continuing restric-
tionist attitudes and relative inefficiency in
management and labor, immobility and static
size of the labor force, and industrial bot-
tlenecks. A forthright attack on these prob-
lems would require: (a) effective fiscal, mon-
etary, and/or direct controls on a scale not
politically feasible; and (b) fundamental
changes in French economic attitudes which
could at best occur only over an extended
period.
FRANCE'S PROBABLE FUTURE
SECURITY EFFORTS
30. Availability of Economic Resources. In
the light of the above, we see little likelihood
of sufficient further increase in French GNP
over the next several years to provide sub-
stantially increased resources for defense.
Moreover, we believe that only a small part
of any increase in output will be allocated to
defense and priority investment.
31. If we assume: (a) an annual 2? percent
increase in GNP; (b) average gross domestic
investment of 14 percent of GNP; (c) con-
sumption of the same proportion of the in-
crease in GNP each year as over the past few
years; (d) no consumer rationing, redistribu-
tion of income, or extensive monetary re-
forms; and (e) government non-defense ex-
penditures held near present levels, about
These figures for investment include public in-
vestments, which accounted for about one-half
of the total.
6
1,415 billion francs could probably be made
available from domestic resources for rearma-
ment in 1953, some 1,507 billion in 1954, and
1,605 billion in 1955, exclusive of US aid. This
would permit increases in military expendi-
tures out of French resources of 16.7 percent
in 1953 and only 6.5 percent in each of the
following years.
32. Actual French arms expenditures over the
next three years are likely to fall short of
even the above projections. The French Gov-
ernment apparently fears that military out-
lays of this magnitude would prove inflation-
ary and probably will not vote military budg-
ets substantially in excess of that for 1952.
While willing to increase French military
strength, France is apparently relying on in-
creased US aid to provide the necessary budg-
etary resources, and is attempting to pro-
mote a broader form of NATO "burden-shar-
ing" to achieve this end.
33. Because of the limitations of its resources
and especially its difficulty in mobilizing these
resources effectively, France will almost cer-
tainly be unable simultaneously to: (a) stabi-
lize and expand its economy; (b) continue a
major effort in Indochina and cope with the
lesser problem of growing North African na-
tionalism; (c) maintain at least parity of
strength and influence with respect to Ger-
many; and (d) still meet its Lisbon NATO
force goals. In committing itself to these
objectives, France is already over-extended;
its commitments have outrun its available
means. Even if US aid is continued at
present levels, we believe that France will be
unable to achieve the above objectives.
34. Probable NATO Force Contribution.
French military strength has increased sub-
stantially since 1948 as a result of extensive
US aid and increased rearmament outlays.
The morale of the armed forces, although now
only fair, is improving as new equipment and
better training facilities become available.
The French army now has about 743,000 men
under arms, some 43,000 more than it had
prior to the outbreak of war in 1939. How-
ever, there are almost 200,000 fewer men (in-
cluding 8,000 fewer officers) available for the
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defense of Europe and North Africa because
of increased overseas commitments, arising
primarily from the Indochina war. More-
over, the fact that French conscripts by law
may not be sent to Indochina and the con-
sequent drain on regular officers and NCO's
reduces the effectiveness of France's NATO
force. There are trained reserves totalling
1,500,000 men, but no adequate plans exist to
mobilize, arm, and equip these reserves. The
Navy is in a good state of training and com-
bat readiness, although most vessels are old.
The Air Force is hampered by certain funda-
mental weaknesses but is gradually improving
as new MDAP and French equipment becomes
available and training is stepped up. Less
than 100 jet aircraft are estimated to be in
operational units which meet NATO stand-
ards. In addition, facilities scheduled to be
completed by 1954 would permit the produc-
tion of a few atomic bombs per year, and
longer range plans may permit an annual
rate of 10 to 15 bombs by 1957. Present
known uranium sources in France proper
appear adequate for these programs. There
are also some indications of substantial
uranium deposits in Morocco, which, ' if
proven, would make a significant contribu-
tion to Western atomic capabilities.
35. France has come close to meeting its Lis-
bon commitment for the end of 1952, i.e.:
12-1/3 divisions, 478 aircraft in operational
units, and 28 major and 32 minor naval units,
except that many of these forces are far be-
low acceptable NATO standards of readiness.
However, France will almost certainly be un-
able to meet its tentative Lisbon goal for 1954
at acceptable NATO standards, i.e.: 22-1/3
divisions and 2,018 aircraft in operational
units and a naval contribution of 36 major
and 54 minor naval units. Given US end-
item aid, France has the physical capacity to
expand its force contribution to this level.
On the other hand, it lacks the financial re-
sources to do so, except in the event of a sub-
stantial increase in external assistance and/
or a major reduction of its overseas commit-
ments, notably in Indochina.
36. The manpower and financial drain of the
Indochina war (roughly 1/3 of the current
7
military budget) has critically impeded
France's ability to increase its military
strength in Europe. The French have ap-
parently been counting on a / progressive
reduction of their Indochina burden, both
through an improvement in the situation and
the development of the Vietnam national
army to replace French troops. However, we
believe that there is unlikely to be sufficient
improvement in the Indochina situation in
the next two or three years to permit a major
reduction in French financial outlays or large-
scale redeployment of troops. In particular,
the development of effective Vietnamese forces
is unlikely to be sufficiently rapid to permit
such replacement of French forces in the
next year or two. Consequently the French
probably will not be able to achieve a major
reduction in their Indochina commitments
without critically hampering their ability to
maintain the struggle.
37. Moreover, we believe that increasing
nationalist resistance to French control in
North Africa will ? over a period of years ?
create an additional strain on French mili-
tary resources. Current French plans con-
template using as part of their European
NATO forces several divisions from North
Africa, but in the event of war many of these
troops may have to be retained in that area
to meet internal security needs. Moreover,
the reliability of North African native troops
in general may eventually decrease under the
stimulus of nationalism, thus reducing the
value of this major military asset.
PROBABLE TRENDS IN FRENCH
EXTERNAL POLICY
38. Despite the limitations and strains on its
resources, France is attempting to maintain
its position as a great power and is insistent
that it be recognized as such by its allies.
It is attempting simultaneously to: (a) play
a major military role in NATO and other
projected regional alliances; (b) assert its
leadership in Europe in the face of a reviving
West Germany; and (c) hold firmly to its
overseas possessions. However, French con-
sciousness of the weakness of France's posi-
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8
tion has intensified the preoccupation with
security which has long dominated French
foreign policy.
French Policy toward
Germany and the USSR
39. The foreign policy of France is mainly
shaped by two problems, that of security
against Germany and that of security against
the Soviet Union. It is this dual nature of
French security preoccupations which pro-
duces contradictory impulses in French policy
and raises the most serious problems for the
US. On the one hand, the French are driven
by their own recognition of the Soviet threat
and by the urging of their allies toward
accepting the revival of a strong Germany.
On the other hand, traditional fears and
concern over future German intentions con-
strain them to resist this development, post-
pone it wherever possible, and as a last resort
devise every feasible means of controlling it.
40. The French see German revival as pre-
senting a triple danger. First, they fear that
West Germany, because of its larger popula-
tion and industrial superiority, will ultimately
overshadow the power and influence of France
in Western Europe. Second, they foresee the
possibility that a rearmed West Germany, in
an endeavor to unify the German nation,
might either seek a rapprochement with the
USSR or drag the West into dangerous and
provocative courses of action leading to gen-
eral war. Finally, many Frenchmen are
fearful lest German rearmament be viewed by
the Kremlin as an unacceptable threat,
necessitating a Soviet attack on the West.
Should the USSR advance plausible proposals
for a neutralized, disarmed, and unified Ger-
many, we believe that France would demand
full exploration of the proposals.
41. With respect to the Soviet Union, the
French Government and to a lesser degree
the French people are aware of the threat it
offers to their own nation and to the free
world. They are also conscious of the weak
position of continental Europe in face of the
Soviet army. Therefore, the French are
above all anxious to avoid provocation of the
Kremlin. They are averse to pursuing
strong policies on such issues as that of Ber-
lin. Their desire to assist in the strengthen-
ing of the free world is balanced by an in-
sistence that this strength be used with
caution.
42. To cope with these security problems,
France has two principal policies. The first
is to keep the US and UK involved as far as
possible in commitments on the European
continent, in order both to strengthen West-
ern Europe against the USSR and to provide
a counterweight to a rearmed West Germany.
This is the double virtue of NATO in French
eyes. The French also regard the NATO alli-
ance as providing some assurance that US aid
and support will continue at a high level.
They regard such assistance as essential if
France is simultaneously to meet its NATO
and Indochina commitments, maintain par-
ity with Germany, and hold on to North
Africa. We believe, therefore, that the
French will almost certainly remain com-
mitted to the NATO alliance.
43. The second major line of French policy is
to construct in continental Europe such
supra-national institutions as the European
Coal-Steel Community and European Defense
Community (EDC) , in order to increase West-
ern European strength and unity and to im-
pose further limits on West German freedom
of action, even though they limit French sov-
ereignty as well. The French clearly desire
a closer association of the US and UK with
these supra-national institutions, and are
proceeding on a continental basis only be-
cause of the US and UK unwillingness to
join.
Prospects for EDC Ratification
44. Although the French initially sponsored
the EDC as a means of controlling German
rearmament, they still have serious reserva-
tions ?about ratifying the EDC. West Ger-
many's rapid resurgence and France's own
heavy Indochina burden have led many
French leaders to fear that France will be
unable to maintain military parity with a
reviving Germany, and that Germany will
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come to dominate a united Europe. There-
fore, the French Government will probably
first seek further concessions, in particular in-
creased US aid, so that France may be able to
meet its Indochina commitments and at the
same time maintain its position vis-a-vis West
Germany. It may also seek US-UK guaran-
tees against German withdrawal from the
EDC and for the retention of US-UK forces in
Germany even after the build-up of German
military strength. Furthermore, the French
may inject the Saar issue into their consid-
eration of the EDC. They are anxious to
secure a "permanent" solution of the Saar
problem before their bargaining power de-
clines. While willing to accept some form of
"Europeanization" of the Saar, they will
probably insist on the maintenance of some
economic ties with France as a counterweight
to German strength.
45. On the other hand, it is difficult for the
French to find any alternative to the EDC
which would not lead to West German rear-
mament under circumstances even more detri-
mental to French interests. Therefore, we
estimate that France will not flatly reject the
EDC treaty, but will almost certainly impose
conditions on its ratification which might
require re-opening of negotiations and fur-
ther postpone West German rearmament.
Should the French insist on a settlement of
the Saar issue prior to EDC ratification, such
ratification might be even further post-
poned.
46. Even if the EDC goes into effect, France
will seek through its influence in this and
other European institutions to prevent the
emergence of Germany as the dominant
Western European power. While EDC ratifi-
cation would mark a step toward Franco-
German rapprochement, French support for
further Western policies designed to increase
West Germany's contribution to Western
security will depend upon: (a) the extent to
which European integration measures reduce
French fears of Germany; (b) France's abil-
ity to maintain parity with Germany; and (c)
the policies which West Germany itself will
follow. In particular France will continue to
be sensitive to any pressures for early West
9
German admission to NATO. At the same
time it will probably favor the development
of further continental supra-national institu-
tions, such as the projected European Politi-
cal Authority, as additional means of limiting
West German freedom of action. Thus,
there are likely to be further tensions in
Franco-German relations over the next few
years, even if the EDC goes into effect. These
tensions might reach proportions which
would seriously weaken the Western Euro-
pean security structure and offer divisive
opportunities to the USSR.
French Policy toward the French Union
47. Future French governments will almost
certainly make every effort to maintain con-
trol over the French Union as essential to
France's position as a great power. In par-
ticular, the French believe they cannot afford
to relinquish control over French North
Africa, which they regard as a counterweight
to West Germany's potentially superior
strength in Europe. The proximity of North'
Africa to France, its strategic location and
manpower resources, the large and well-en-
trenched French population, and the exten-
sive French investments in the area have
created a unique colonial relationship. The
French recognize the necessity for some de-
gree of evolutionary political change in the
area, but almost certainly will insist on re-
taining essential controls. 5
48. In contrast, we believe that the French in-
creasingly look upon Indochina as a liability,
which represents a continuous and heavy
drain on French financial and military re-
sources without hope of a commensurate re-
turn. They feel that this drain seriously re-
duces France's ability to meet other pressing
problems, particularly those of maintaining
military parity with West Germany and hold-
ing on to North Africa. At the same time the
government can see no feasible way to extri-
cate itself from the Indochina war. There-
fore, France is apparently seeking to conduct
5 See NIE-69, "Probable Developments in French
North Africa," 12 September 1952, for a fuller dis-
cussion of French policy.
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T .1131rweh. WOE T 10
a "holding action" while: (a) attempting to
reduce its commitments by transferring a
larger share of the burden to the Associated
States and obtaining greater US assistance;
and (b) hoping to secure as part of any, gen-
eral Far Eastern settlement some solution
which would retain Indochina in the French
Union. 6 Should the Indochina drain con-
tinue withbut any more hopeful outlook, we
believe that French will and ability to con-
tinue the Indochina struggle will seriously
weaken. In view of France's greater interest
in maintaining its position in Europe and
North Africa, Indochina is the most likely
area in which France will seek to reduce its
commitments.
49. Increasing French National Sensitivity.
Recent French governments have shown in-
creasing national sensitivity in their external
relations, particularly with the US. Many
Frenchmen complain of US interference in
purely French affairs and of US policies as
being more and more pro-German in their im-
plications, and naively "anti-colonial" in cer-
tain areas at the expense of America's Euro-
pean allies. There are strong pressures,
especially from French right-wing groups, for
a more "independent" policy, and the political
shift to the right in France is reinforcing this
? See NIE-35/2, "Probable Developments in Indo-
china through Mid-1953," 29 August 1952, for a
fuller discussion of French policy.
trend. We believe that the French Govern-
ment will tend to be increasingly insistent
upon points of prestige and upon full recogni-
tion of French interests.
50. Implications for the US. We believe that
the next several years will be a period of con-
tinued strains and irritations in Franco-US
relations. Above all, French preoccupation
with the 'German problem will continue to
pose obstacles to achievement of the US ob-
jective of integrating a strong West Germany
into the NATO system. The French will also
show continued resentment at any form of US
"interference" in French affairs and at US
policies which appear contrary to French in-
terests. At the same time France will almost
certainly continue to insist that a high level
of US economic, military, and/or political sup-
port in Europe, North Africa, and Indochina
is essential to French acceptance of German
rearmament and to French fulfillment of
NATO goals.
51. France will almost certainly remain com-
mitted to the NATO alliance. However, the
over-extension of French commitments, fear
of Germany, dissatisfaction with the scale of
US support, and fear of general war may lead
the French to pursue policies diverging from
those of their NATO allies, including the US.
This divergpnce might become so marked that
it would require re-examination of the bases
of US security policies.
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11.
TeikatieREP-,
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