COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 30, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
."="rrimuir euri
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ,ONE
SECURITY INFORMATION
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
C Z5735
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE
COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA
COMMENT O.
CHAN Ei
DECL SSIFi
SS. liAHDE
FiZT VIEW
AUT HR 70
DAT A
WEN:
NIE-55/1
Published 30 July. 1952
DOCUMENT NO. I
NO CHANGE Hi CLASS. 0*
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 104
DATE: REVIEWER: _009256
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1
-creietrErir
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
v?-?
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
.?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18 :,CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
NOTICE
1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's
office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Fur-
ther dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the in-
formation for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, for the Depart-
ment of State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy.
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
h. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other De-
partment or Agency
2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with
applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by ar-
rangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
DISTRIBUTION:
Office of the President
National Security Council
National Security Resources Board
Department of State
Office of Secretary of Defense
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Department of the Air Force
Atomic Energy Commission
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Research and Development Board
Munitions Board
COZNION?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
IPELtrnur
4-0 P SEC RT?
SECURITY INFORMATION
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE
COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA
NIE-55/1
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff
participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the
preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelli-
gence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 28
July 1952.
d?rigamkimax:iic:.*
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES
OF ACTION IN KOREA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Communist capabilities and probable courses of action in Korea
through mid-1953.
ASSUMPTION
The hostilities in Korea are not expanded on UN initiative.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Communist military potential in
Korea has been substantially strength-
ened since the beginning of the cease-
fire negotiations. Troop strength has
approximately doubled. Jet fighter
strength has more than doubled. Com-
bat effectiveness has improved and is now
believed to be good to excellent.
,2. The enemy is capable of launching a
major ground and/or air attack with
little or no warning. However, there are
no current indications, of Communist in-
tent to launch large-scale ground or air
operations in the near future.
3. There are indications that Soviet par-
ticipation in enemy air operations is so
extensive that a de facto air war exists
over North Korea between the UN and
the USSR. The USSR almost certainly
believes that additional commitments of
Soviet air power could, under methods
presently employed, be made in North
Korea and Manchuria without serious
risk of expanded hostilities. However, it
is unlikely that the Kremlin believes that
Soviet-manned aircraft could be com-
mitted over UN-held territory without a
grave risk of global war.
4. The Communists now possess the
capability of seriously challenging the
UN air effort in Northwest Korea ,as far
south as the Chongchon River and of
expanding their air operations southward
into forward UN-held territory and adja-
cent waters.
5. We believe that, during the period of
this estimate, the Communists could not
drive UN forces from Korea unless a
major Soviet effort were applied. We do
not believe the USSR will be willing to
accept the grave risk of global war which
such a commitment would entail.
6. The Kremlin appears desirous of
avoiding global war over the Korean
1
64DIZIDE.14
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
?TOP SEZRET
issue and for this reason would probably
prefer either a continuation of the
present situation or an armistice.
7. Despite the capability to continue the
war in Korea, we believe that internal
economic and political considerations are
probably exerting pressure on the Chi-
nese Communists to conclude hostilities.
8. The Communists in Korea appear to
be prepared for either a resumption of
full-scale hostilities, an indefinite mili-
tary stalemate, or an armistice. Al-
though the possibility of a renewal of full-
scale hostilities by the Communists can-
not be ignored, we believe that the
Communists will continue to negotiate
and will not take the initiative ,to break
the present military stalemate.
9. We believe it probable that the Com-
munists wish to conclude an armistice.
I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE
KOREAN AREA
2
However, we believe that the Communists
will protract the negotiations so long as
they consider that they can win advan-
tages from the POW or any other issue,
and so long as they estimate that a con-
tinuation of the Korean war does not
entail grave risk of global war.1
10. If an armistice is concluded, we be-
lieve that the negotiation of a political
settlement will be complicated by Com-
munist injection of Far Eastern issues
unrelated to Korea.
11. Whether or not a political settlement
is achieved, we believe the Communist
objective to gain control of all Korea will
remain unchanged. The Communists
will proceed to redevelop North Korea as
a militant and armed Satellite, and to
subject South .Korea to subversion, sabo,.
tage, espionage, and guerrilla warfare.
DISCUSSION
Communist Military Forces in the Korean
Area
12,. Ground Forces. Enemy ground forces in
the Korean area have almost doubled in per-
sonnel strength during the year since the
truce negotiations began:
Strength of Enemy Ground Forces in Korea
July 1951
July 1952
North Korean
232,000
267,000
Chinese Communist
277,000
680,000
Total
509,000
947,000
In addition to the Chinese Communist Forces
(CCF) now in Korea, approximately 300,000
reserves from all areas of China could be com-
mitted provided that Peiping does not initiate
hostilities elsewhere in Asia: A further 200,-
000 troops could be committed provided the
Communists were willing to reduce their gar-
risons in China proper.
13. Fire power of the Communist armies has
been substantially increased by a major pro-
gram of reorganization and re-equipment and
reinforcement. North Korean (NK) armored
units have been brought up to strength in
equipment and new units have been organ-
ized. The CCF has introduced new artillery
units into Korea and has provided some or-
ganic artillery for tactical units. Enemy
antiaircraft artillery units have increased and
The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, concurs in the conclusion that the Com-
munists wish to conclude an armistice. How-
ever, he finds that this paragraph carries two
inferences which are not warranted by available
Intelligence:
a. That the Communists would give in on the
POW issue if the UN stands firm; and,
b. That the Communists might accept UN cease-
fire terms if the UN were to threaten an ex-
pansion of the Korean war.
Although the intelligence available does not de-
ny, it equally does not support, these inferences.
ree,-"Ti
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
the employment of fire control radar has
made their antiaircraft fire more effective. 2
14. Extensive training programs have over-
come the serious losses of trained personnel
incurred by the Communists in the spring of-
fensives of 1951. These programs have placed
particular emphasis on small-unit tactics,
leadership courses for noncommissioned and
company grade officers, and political indoc-
trination. Most officers of the grade of regi-
mental commander and higher have had com-
bat experience in Korea and they are firmly
indoctrinated Communists. Morale through-
out the Communist forces is excellent. Com-
bat effectiveness is considered to be good to
excellent.
15. The Communist logistic position has been
improved in the long period of fairly static op-
erations. A year ago Communist supplies had
been depleted and critical shortages existed in
most classes of supply. There are now suf-
ficient supplies in forward supply points to
support a major sustained offensive of from
5 to 10 days, and there are no known shortages
of major items.
16. Air Forces. The Chinese Communist Air
Force (CCAF)3 is estimated to have available
As an example of the improvement in Commu-
nist fire power, the enemy fired an estimated
total of 8,000 rounds of artillery and mortar am-
munition in July 1951. During the month of June
1952, the Communists fired an estimated 187,000
rounds ? the highest total of enemy artillery
and mortar fire recorded during any one month
of the war. In comparison of rates of fire, the
UN forces fired over 1,100,000 rounds of artillery
ammunition alone during the month of Novem-
ber 1951. Greater UN capability in ammunition
resupply is the primary reason for its superiority.
Normally, the ammunition resupply capability of
the Communists is only about 7 percent that of
the UN. By conserving and stockpiling ammu-
nition during the lull in hostilities, however, it is
believed that this resupply capability has been
increased to about 50 percent of that of the UN,
but this rate probably could be maintained only
for a limited period of time, especially in offen-
sive operations. This capability probably would
be reduced in the event of an extensive move-
ment of enemy artillery.
North Korean air units and the Soviet units
which are believed to be operating with the
- Chinese Communists are included with the CCAF
in this estimate.
a total of approximately 2,100 combat aircraft
of various types and some 200 small piston-
type trainers. Included in the total combat
figure are approximately 1,300 jet fighters.
Approximately 1,300 combat aircraft (includ-
ing 850 jet fighters) are believed to be in
Manchuria and the remainder based in China
proper, primarily around Peiping, Shanghai,
and Canton.4
17. By US criteria the Communist air force in
the Korean-Manchurian-China area is be-
lieved to be reaching a fairly high standard.
Since there are strong indications of extensive
participation of Soviet personnel in actual
combat flying, however, it is impossible to de-
termine the extent to which the continuing
improvement in combat effectiveness reflects
increased proficiency of Chinese Communist
pilots. Since April 1952 the sortie rate has
substantially decreased. Communist fighter
pilots who have been encountered have:
(a) displayed willingness to engage F-86's;
(b) demonstrated varying degrees of combat
proficiency; (c) intermittently, harassed UN
fighter bombers in the Chongju-Sunchon
area; (d) occasionally launched attacks from
cloud cover and used overcast for evasion; and
(e) launched frequent night attacks on UN
light and medium bombers.
18. Airfield construction and repair has been
underway in North Korea since June 1950.
At present there are approximately 33 air-
fields in North Korea which are or could be-
come suitable for military operations. Of
these there are two, close to the Yalu River,
which are operational for jet operations. In
addition, six others, if repaired, could handle
sustained jet operations. Since the UN/US
air forces have repeatedly bombed most of
these airfields, their serviceability varies from
time to time depending on the rate of repair
and the frequency of UN/US attacks. It is
believed, however, that all these fields could
be repaired and made operational within a
See TAB "A" and TAB "B" for a tabular and
graphic presentation of Communist air strength
since the outbreak of the Korean war, together
with a strength forecast through the period of
this estimate. See TAB "C" for CCAF aircraft
performance characteristics.
,T-O-P?S-E-C-R-E-T?
.849arazga444
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
short period of time if UN attacks on them
were curtailed.
19. Within Communist China an intensive air-
field repair and facilities build-up has pro-
duced a good system of airfields capable of
handling all types of aircraft now or poten-
tially available to the CCAF. In Manchuria
eight jet airfields are now being used oper-
ationally. The recently developed air facil-
ities in Manchuria are so located as to pro-
vide excellent bases for the air defense of
Manchuria; some are also so located as to per-
mit Communist jets to range over North
Korea and immediately behind UN lines.
20. The CCAF is wholly dependent upon Sov-
iet aircraft and equipment, spare parts, and
technical personnel. Most supplies received
from the USSR, including POL, must be sent
via the Trans-Siberian Railroad to transship-
mmit points on the Manchurian border, and
thence distributed over Chinese rail nets to
Manchuria and China proper. A portion of
the petroleum products supplied by the USSR
is shipped by tanker from Vladivostok, Dai-
ren, and the Black Sea area to Chinese ports,
principally Tsingtao. We have almost no in-
formation concerning the size and location of
aviation POL stockpiles, but we believe that
CCAF operations at the present time are not
hampered by a shortage of POL. (See TAB
"D" for estimated CCAF POL requirements.)
21. There are indications that Soviet partici-
pation in enemy air operations is so extensive
that a de facto air war exists over North Korea
between the UN and the USSR. The USSR
almost certainly believes that additional com-
mitments of Soviet air power could, under
methods presently employed, be made in
North Korea and Manchuria without risk of
expanded hostilities. However, it is unlikely
that the Kremlin believes that Soviet-manned
aircraft could be committed over UN-held ter-
ritory without grave risk of global war.
22. Naval Forces. The small prewar North
Korean Navy was largely destroyed early in
the Korean war. In recent months, however,
utilizing a miscellaneous collection of sam-
pans, junks, and fishing craft, the North Ko-
rean Navy has conducted several successful
4
small-scale amphibious operations against
UN-held offshore islands. It has also con-
ducted mining operations in coastal and har-
bor waters and manned an increasing number
of coastal defense batteries.
23. The Chinese Communist Navy is not an
effective fighting force. In the unlikely event
of its entry into the Korean war, its activities
would be limited to surprise raids on UN sur-
face vessels by motor torpedo boats, mine war-
fare, and small-scale amphibious raids.
Communist Military Capabilities
24. Ground Force. The Communist ground
forces in Korea are capable of the following
courses of action:
a. A large-scale offensive with little or no
warning;
b. Offensives to obtain limited objectives;
c. Defense in depth for a prolonged period
of time;
d. Defense on successive positions;
e. Limited guerrilla operations in South
Korea.
Each of these ground force capabilities could
be greatly enhanced by an all-out air offen-
sive. We do not believe, however, that such
an air offensive would improve enemy capa-
bilities to the extent necessary to force a UN
withdrawal from Korea.
25. If hostilities continue on the present scale,
we believe that Communist capabilities will
continue gradually to improve during the
period of this estimate. There 'will doubtless
be improvement in fire power and logistic
capability; the development of air support
techniques for close support of Communist
ground forces may accompany increases in
Communist air strength and effectiveness.
26. The Communists now possess the capabil-
ity of seriously challenging the UN air effort
in Northwest Korea as far south as the
Chongchon River and of expanding their air
operations southward into forward UN-held
territory and adjacent waters. Specifically,
at the present time, the Communist air force
in the Korean area has the capability to carry
out the following operations:
a. Large-scale day interception in North-
west Korea;
?44143r4BEVA4140
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
b. Night interception under good visibility
conditions in Northwest Korea;
c. Air-to-air battle of attrition with UN/US
air forces in an effort to eliminate UN/US
F-86 aircraft;
d. Limited fighter attacks against UN/US
ground forces, forward airfields, and
other forward installations;
e. TU-2 bombing of targets in South Korea
and adjacent waters. (The range of
these attacks would be limited if, the
Communists considered jet escort nec-
essary.)
27. The assignment of jet bombardment air-
craft to the Korean area would greatly en-
hance these capabilities.
28. Air defense has a high priority in Com-
munist China. With Soviet assistance, and
possibly direct participation, the Chinese Com-
munists have established a visual observer and
radar air warning net which gives almost
complete coverage from Hainan Island north-
ward along the coast, through Manchuria to
the Soviet frontier as well as some coverage
in the interior. In addition, there are Soviet-
.trained, and possibly Soviet-operated, anti-
aircraft defense units along the coasts for the
protection of industrial areas, harbor facili-
ties, airfields, and communications and sup-
ply network. Some important inland indus-
trial and Military installations are likewise
defended. In Manchuria, where there is a
concentration of enemy jets, vigorous day
fighter defense, and an active night fighter
defense under conditions of good visibility,
could be anticipated. Elsewhere in China,
the CCAF may be able to deploy enough air-
craft to defend a selected specific area against
air attack, but the present available forces are
too sparsely deployed for effective defense
against simultaneous attacks against several
areas.
29. We believe that the CCAF will probably
be built up to a total of at least 2,500 aircraft
by July 1953 irrespective of the outcome of
the cease-fire negotiations. (See TAB "A"
for projected strength of the CCAF.) Fur-
thermore, the over-all air defense capabilities
of the Chinese Communists with regard to
early warning, ground-controlled interception
5
and antiaircraft capabilities will probably con-
tinue to increase.
30. Naval Capabilities. Chinese Communist
and North Korean naval capabilities will prob-
ably continue to be negligible during the per-
iod of this estimate. (See paragraphs 22 and
23 above.)
II. FACTORS AFFECTING COMMUNIST
COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA
Soviet Global Interests
31. Whether the Kremlin estimates that Sov-
iet interests in the Far East can be advanced
by a prolongation or by a termination of the
war in Korea depends in large degree on So-
viet world-wide strategy. If, as we believe
probable, the Kremlin would prefer to move
toward the attainment of its objectives by
means,short of global war, the,Kremlin would
avoid courses of action in Korea which would
entail increased risks of global war. While
the Communist aggression in Korea has in-
volved, throughout, an inherent risk of global
war, the Kremlin has sought to limit its own
role in the Korean war and has not sought
to use the war as an excuse for initiating
broader hostilities. The Kremlin thus ap-
pears desirous of avoiding global war over the
Korean issue and for this reason would prob-
ably prefer either a continuation of the pres-
ent situation or an armistice.
32. On the other hand, if present Soviet stra-
tegy envisages an early global war, which we
believe is less likely, the Kremlin would prob-
ably seek to keep US military forces tied down
in Korea regardless of the risk of global war.
Sino-Soviet Relations
33. The Korean war must already have raised
the problem of the distribution of its burdens
between Peiping and Moscow. Although there
is no evidence that this problem has yet weak-
ened the Sino-Soviet partnership, a prolonged
Korean war might produce friction between
the two governments. It is highly unlikely,
however, that such frictions will, within the
period of this estimate, create major diver-
gences in the policies of the two powers with
regard to Korea.
sals&P?S-E-E3-11--E-Tib
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
6
The Internal Situation in Communist China
34. At the time of the outbreak of the Korean
war the political and economic prospects of
the Peiping regime were favorable. Internal
control had been largely established; the re-
gime enjoyed a considerable amount of pop-
ular support; fiscal stability appeared assured;
and the government had announced its inten-
tion to devote its attention to a long-range
program of economic development. Although
the war in Korea stimulated national con-
sciousness and intensified anti-foreign senti-
ment, the postponement of domestic recon-
struction programs in order to finance the
war greatly reduced the prospects of economic
improvement, and tightening of police meas-
ures decreased the regime's popular support.
The Chinese Communist Government has had
sharply to increase its mobilization and ex-
penditure of human and material resources.
Political, economic, and social strains have
developed which, while not reducing the cur-
rent capability of the Chinese Communists
to carry on the war, will increasingly affect
the long-term political and military capabili-
ties of the regime.
35. The burden of the Korean war has been
heavy. Available evidence, although ex-
tremely fragmentary, indicates that Chinese
Communist Government military expendi-
tures probably doubled in 1951 over 1950.
Austerity has been keynoted by the regime
during the past year. Western trade restric-
tions have undoubtedly added to the eco-
nomic difficulties of the Chinese Communist
regime. The operation of the existing pro-
ductive plant at near capacity levels has cre-
ated serious maintenance problems, notably
in the vital railways and power plants. The
requirements of the armed services and a rap-
idly expanding bureaucracy have confronted
the regime with severe shortages of admin-
istrative and technical personnel.
36. The Chinese Communists have under-
taken drastic measures to Meet the require-
ments of the war as well as to solidify their
political power. Taxes have been increased,
and irregular levies have become more fre-
quent. Propaganda activities have been
greatly expanded to eliminate potential oppo-
sition and to increase the centralization of
authority and the popular support of the war
effort. Organized programs of terror have
sought to purge the government administra-
tion and eliminate the power of the business
and bourgeois classes.
37. The Chinese Communists probably have
the capability, with continuing Soviet assist-
ance, to support their war effort at current or
expanded levels for at least the next year.
Current production of consumer goods is
likely to be maintained and crop prospects
both in China proper and in Manchuria are
favorable. However, the regime almost cer-
tainly estimates that indefinite prolongation
of the war will seriously retard its domestic
development program and will increase popu-
lar disillusionment with the regime. Despite
the capability to continue the war in Korea,
we believe that internal economic and politi-
cal considerations are probably exerting pres-
sure on the Chinese Communists to conclude
hostilities.
The Internal Situation in North Korea
38. Increasingly severe food shortages, con-
tinued destruction of industrial facilities and
power plants, and vanishing prospects of uni-
fication have caused deterioration of civilian
morale in North Korea. Serious unrest has
been prevented by shipments of consumer
goods, principally food, from the USSR and
Communist China, and by Communist con-
trol measures.
39. The highly effective apparatus of control
developed by the North Korean regime prior
to the outbreak of hostilities remains basically
intact. There is no evidence of serious de-
terioration in the effectiveness of the police,
or of the presence of subversives in the armed
forces and administration. In addition, the
North Korean propaganda organization, for
a time badly disrupted, has been strengthened
during the current military lull.
40. Even though a prolongation of the war
will almost certainly have an increasingly ad-
verse effect on internal conditions in North
Korea, this will probably have little bearing
on Communist courses of action in Korea.
40-11649-P?S-Re-RmE-T-?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CiA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
-T 0 12?S-E-G-R-E-T-- 7
Since the North Korean regime is controlled
by the USSR, its interests will be subordinated
to the global or regional interests of the USSR.
However, Soviet policies in Korea will presum-
ably be influenced to some extent by the So-
viet desire to restore North Korea as a "model"
Satellite of the USSR and by the fear of in-
creasing Chinese Communist influence in the
internal affairs of North Korea.
Political Developments in South Korea
41. The recent political crisis between Syng-
man Rhee and the Assembly ended in a sub-
stantial victory for Rhee. There continues,
however, to be conflict among Rhee, some of
his supporters in his recent actions against
the Assembly, and the Assembly. The con-
stitutional changes effected as a solution to
the political crisis will probably foster increas-
ing friction among President, Prime Minister,
and Assembly. In view of US pressure as well
as international disapproval, however, it is
probable that Rhee will be disposed to refrain
from further openly unconstitutional actions
and flagrant acts of intimidation. The secu-
rity of the UN forces has been maintained as
a result of the ROK political settlement, but
over a period of time the efficiency of the
South Korean military forces may be weak-
ened by the appointment of political sup-
porters of Rhee to high command.
42. Communist propaganda concerning the
political conflict in South Korea has treated
the conflict as evidence of the unpopularity
and deterioration of the Rhee regime. How-
ever, political developments in South Korea,
unless they seriously weaken the UN military
position, will probably have only minor influ-
ence on Communist actions in the area.
III. INDICATIONS OF COMMUNIST
INTENTIONS
Military Indications
43. Communist military activities in Korea or
elsewhere provide no conclusive indications of
Communist intentions. Despite the great
strengthening of Communist military ground
force capabilities since the beginning of the
armistice negotiations, the Communists have
maintained a generally defensive posture.
The ever-increasing Communist air potential
is not in itself an indication of an imminent
expansion of the enemy air effort over Korea.
However, the military strength and disposi-
tion of the Communist forces are such that
an offensive could be launched with little or
no warning.
Propaganda Indications
44. Communist propaganda has reflected con-
tinued intransigence on the POW issue in the
armistice negotiations, and has stressed Com-
munist determination not to be intimidated
by military pressure. At the same time the
propaganda has stressed the Communist de-
sire to continue the truce negotiations.
45. However, there have been some indica-
tions in Communist propaganda which can
be interpreted as preparations for a cessation
of the Korean war. There has been a grow-
ing tendency in the last six months to discuss
the war in the past tense and to emphasize
the benefits which the Communists have
achieved from the war.. The domestic propa-
ganda of the Chinese Communists has em-
phasized the regime's internal program.
North Korean propaganda has also given less
attention to the war and more to "normal"
propaganda themes such as North Korean
economic problems, attacks on the Syngman
Rhee government, and guerrilla activities in
South Korea.
Indications from the Truce Negotiations
46. During the course of the negotiations the
Communists have clearly revealed two atti-
tudes: first, that they are in no hurry to reach
an agreement, and second, that they wish to
place the onus on the UN for any breakdown
in negotiations, and for any resumption of
offensive operations. The negotiations have
been narrowed in the last few months to the
single issue of repatriation of POW's.
Indications from Communist Diplomatic
Moves
47. On the diplomatic front, there have been
a number of indications, from both the Soviet
and Chinese Communist sources, of a desire
4eerITTZIMITTirRr?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
r'
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18 : 61A-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
to find a solution for the POW issue. For
example, Indian efforts to break the Panmun-
jom deadlock met with temporary encourage-
ment in Peiping. The USSR for its part has
put out feelers at the UN.
IV. PROBABLE COMMUNIST COURSES
OF ACTION
48. During the past year the Communists
have substantially increased their military
strength in the Korean area. At the same
time they have continued negotiations for an
armistice at Panmunjom, permitting differ-
ences over truce issues to be narrowed to the
single issue of POW exchange. These nego-
tiations have recently been supplemented by
Communist diplomatic moves. Communist
propaganda, while making capital of the
armistice issues, has not closed the door to a
negotiated settlement and may, in its broader
perspectives, anticipate such a settlement.
49. The Communists in Korea appear to be
prepared either for a resumption of full-scale
hostilities, an indefinite military stalemate, or
an armistice. Although the possibility of a
renewal of full-scale hostilities by the Com-
munists cannot be ignored, we believe that the
Communists will continue to negotiate and
will not take the initiative to break the
present military stalemate.
50. We believe it probable that the Commu-
nists wish to conclude an armistice. How-
ever, we believe that the Communists will
protract the negotiations so long as they, con-
sider that they can win advantages from the
POW or any other issue and so long as they
estimate that a continuation of the Korean
war does not entail grave risk of global war.5
51. If an armistice is concluded, we believe
that the negotiation of a political settlement
will be complicated by Communist injection
of Far Eastern issues unrelated to Korea.
52. Whether or not a political settlement is
achieved, we believe that the Communist ob-
jective to gain control of all Korea will remain
unchanged. The Communists will proceed to
redevelop North Korea as a militant and
armed Satellite, and to subject South Korea
to subversion, sabotage, espionage, and guer-
rilla warfare.
See comment of the Special Assistant, Intelli-
gence, Department of State on page 2.
eseetTIEBEN-T44??
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
9
TAB "A"
ESTIMATED CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR FORCE AOB
FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1950 THROUGH MID-53
Type of
June
Sept
Dec
Mar
June
Sept
Dec
Mar
July
Projected Strength
Aircraft
1950
1950
1950
1951
1951
1951
1951
1952
1952
July 1953
Jet Ftr
37
36
110
400
700
800
900
1300
1500
Piston Ftr
200
130
180
210
200
250
250
250
240
350
Ground Attack
87
50
50
127
170
160
150
160
140
250
Lt Bomber
20
36
40
60
130
120
150
240
260
250
Transport
20
65
65
100
100
100
150
160
150
TOTAL
307
273
371
572
1000
1330
1450
1700
2100
2500
6:116-1AS7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
-
10
Z100
2000
1900
1800
TAB "B"
2100 ?
lw:aam 2100
? 1700 ?
1600 _
1500
1 400
13 00
1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
307
3 0 ? 2 7 3 ?
??????
200 ralka
?????.?
100 ?? ? ? ? ? ?
??????
?? ???
OB
1700
1900
;11800
?
1.700
p.1600
? 1 i400
ithritO
141300
1.a.4
t; 1200
1100
1000
;?11lig 900
371 ?
??????????*?????
VA O.:
??????.
??????????
"V" ??
4.4440:
??????
Ar?
0 0
JUNE SEPT. DEC. MARCH JUNE SEPT. DEC. MAR. JULY
1950 1950 1950 1951 1951 1951 1951 195i 1952
800
700
600
400
300
200
100
S R E
antai?V-mtrnrIrrilefir"
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18 : -alA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
11
TAB "C"
CCAF AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES
TYPE
MIG-15 (internal fuel only)
MIG-15 (with two external
70 gal. tanks)
MIG-9
YAK-15
YAK-9
LA-7
LA-9
FIGHTERS
COMBAT RANGE ARMAMENT
RADIUS
160 N.M. 540 N.M. 2-23mm 80 rounds/gun
1-37mm 40 rounds
Bombs unknown
315 N.M. 840 N.M. SAME
330 N.M. 750 N.M. 1-37mm rounds unknown
2-23mm 75 rounds/gun
Bombs unknown
300 N.M. 750 N.M. 2-20mm rounds unknown
6-8 German 55mm rockets
Bombs unknown
540 N.M. 1100 N.M. 1-20mm 120 rounds
2-12.7 180 rounds/gun
Rockets and bombs can be carried
300 N.M. 610 N.M. 2-20mm 200 rounds/gun
6-132mm rockets (probable
2-220 lbs. bombs)
440 N.M. 950 N.M. 4-23mm 100 rounds/gun
Rockets and bombs can be carried
BOMBERS
TU-2 500 N.M. 1040 N.M. 2-20mm 150 rounds/gun (fixed)
3-12.7mm 250 rounds/gun (flexible)
2200 lbs. bombs
400 N.M. 850 N.M. 3300 lbs. bombs
? Guns same as above
GROUND ATTACK
170 N.M. 360 N.M.
2-23mm rounds unknown
2-7.62mm rounds unknown
1-12.7mm rounds unknown
2-132mm rockets
880 lbs. bombs
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
12
TAB
ESTIMATED
CCAF POL REQUIREMENTS
Peacetime Requirements
Maximum Sustained Combat
Total Month-
ly reqmt
Total Month-
ly rqmt
Average Fuel
Average No.
(Gals) inc
Est. Total
(Gals) inc
Consumption
Flying Hr.
10% allow.
Hrs. per
10% allow.
Type
Number
per Hour
per Aircraft
for Logistic
Plane
for Logistic
Aircraft
Aircraft
(Gals)
per Month
Losses
per Month
Losses
Jet Ftr
1300
300
6.6
2,831,400
23
9,867,000
Piston Ftr
240
70
8.4
155,232
30.5
563,640
Grd. Attack
140
80
10
123,200
30.5
375,760
Lt Bomber
260
140
10
400,400
40
1,601,600
Transport
160
92
14.5
234,784
70
1,133,440
TOTALS
2100
3,745,016
13,541,440
NOTE: The CCAF is estimated to require 4,733,740 gallons of POL per month at
current rates of consumption. This represents an upward adjustment of
the estimated peacetime requirements on the assumption that the 600
Communist jet fighters in the Manchurian-Korean area average 15 flying
hours per aircraft per month instead of 6.6 hours as estimated above for
peacetime jet fighter operations.
.0ii=a}T..Bffr???
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2
40P-SEERET--
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001700020001-2