IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF SWEDEN'S POSITION TO THE NATO POWERS AND THE USSR.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001500020034-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 34
• Content Type: OUTLINE

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IF. TVE CONSEQUENCE'S OF S DEN'S POSITION TO THE NATO I ERS AND THE
USSR.
25. During e . Ths.chief consequence of a den's "non-alliance"
policy is that it hampsre the development of adequate Scandinavian defenses
and leaves Scandinavia highly vulnerable to Soviet attack Sweden's non-
adherence to NATO limits advance military planning and coordination, denies
Sweden full access to NATO advice and assistance, and hampers NATO ability
to press Sweden to strengthen its ovn defenses. On the other hands, Sweden's
growing military potential and determination to resist already constitute scrosc)
deterrent to aggressive Soviet actions. Sweden's East-West trade control
already parallel those of the European NATO countries. Moreover, Soviet policy
toward Finland is probably somewhat restrained by a desire not to force Svedwa
closer to the West. Swedish ai erenee to NATO would be considered by the NSSI
as a further step toward Western nencirclemAent' and would undoubtedly increaws
international tensions. Although it would almost certainly not be considered
as a casusbe11i by the USSR, it might lead the USSR to retaliate against
Finland, perhaps by reducing it to satellite status.
26, in event of War. The consequences of Sdeenes position during
wartime would vary according to the military strength of the NATO powers and
the resultant willingness of the USSR to undertake a Scandinavian campaign,
If war came during the period of NATO weakness, and before Norway in particular
was adequately defended, we believe that the USSR would make an early effort
to secure the valuable base sites on the Norwegian coast. So long as the USSR
considered that it could successfully occupy Norway without going through Sweden
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and that it could rely on Swedenes raining neutral, it would probably see
distinct advantages in observing dish neutrality. The USSR could thus
avoids (a) the necessity of diverting large forces to cope with the Swedish
defenses; (b) damage to Swedish industry and facilities as a result of the
fighting; and (c) the necessity of garrisoning Sweden and of coping with
Swedish guerrilla warfare,
27, If Sweden remained neutral while Norway was occupied., it would be
almost wholly isolated and its considerable exports to the West out off'o
Under these circumstances, it would probably be forced to yield progressively
to Soviet pressures and to re-orient its trade toward the Soviet bloc, If the
USSR would, provide the necessary raw materials Sweden could be forced to make
a valuable contribution to the Soviet war economy.
28, On-the other hand, wartime Swedish neutrality?
would deprive the USSR of the most direct avenues of attack against
Norway, ors should it succeed in occupying Norway, of its most direct line of
communications to its Norwegian bases.
it would probably give refuge to
fleeing Danish and Norwegian forces; and it might be used as a base for
resistance activities in Norway, Denmark and Finland. For these reasons th
USSR might well consider that an initial attack via Sweden was essential to
the success of its Scandinavian campaign.
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29. If Sweden were attacked, or if it declared war as a result of a
Soviet attack on Norway, the USSR would be compelled to employ substantially
larger forces and overall Scandinavian defense capabilities would be Increased.
During 1952 at least, it seems unlikely that the Swedish and NATO forces would
be capable of more than a delaying action, although isolated parts of Nor ay
might be held, Over a period of several years, however, Swedish and NATO
defense capabilities might have developed to the point where the addition of
Swedish forces to those of NATO would enable large areas of Scandinavia to be
held against Soviet aft,
30a Once overall NATO defense capabilities had gram substOtially, the
USSR might not undertake an early Scandinavian campaign. Under these circum-
stances, Sweden could no longer be wholly isolated.from the West, and would
almost certainly remain neutral. By this time the USSR would probably look
upon Swedish neutrality as advantageous, since a neutral Sweden would screen
the Soviet Baltic flank and weuld prevent the NATO powers from making offencirtre
use of Srediah bases,
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