SWEDEN'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001500020001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 26, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

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SECURITY INFORMATION
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SWEDEN'S POSITION IN THE
EAST-WEST CONFLICT
Published 26 March 1952
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WARNING
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of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
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SECURITY INFORMATION
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SWEDEN'S POSITION IN THE
EAST-WEST CONFLICT
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff par-
ticipated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the prep-
aration of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 20 March
1952.
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SWEDEN'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT
THE PROBLEM
To assess: (a) Sweden's strategic importance; (b) its present policy in the East-
West conflict; (c) the possibilities of a change in this policy; and (d) the consequences
of Sweden's position to the NATO powers and the USSR.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Sweden's location, natural and indus-
trial resources, and considerable military
potential give it substantial strategic im-
portance to both NATO and the USSR.
Of chief importance.is Sweden's potential
role in the defense of Scandinavia, par-
ticularly Norway. Moreover, its posi-
tion, which flanks the Baltic and North
Germany, would be valuable either to the
USSR or the NATO powers for air bases,
early warning facilities, and other mili-
tary installations.
2. The Swedish armed forces are at pres-
ent capable only of fighting delaying
actions against a major Soviet attack.
On the other hand, Sweden's already size-
able military potential and resources pro-
vide the base for a marked expansion in
Swedish military capabilities, perhaps to
the point where, in coordination with the
NATO Northern Command forces, they
could successfully defend large areas of
Scandinavia.
3. Despite its pro-Western and anti-Com-
munist outlook, Sweden will almost cer-
tainly cling to its "alliance-free" policy
as long as possible, even in event of war.
4. In the event of a Soviet move against
Finland, Sweden would very likely en-
large its own defense preparations, might
enter into exploratory military conversa-
tions with the West, and would re-exam-
ine its neutrality policy. However, only if
Sweden were convinced that the Soviet
move into Finland was merely a spring-
board for an early invasion of Sweden or
Norway, would it probably enter into lim-
ited defense arrangements with the West.
5. However, Sweden might join the NATO
powers in the event of a Soviet attack on
Norway, if the Swedes thought that
NATO was capable of extending imme-
diate large-scale assistance. Moreover,
Sweden would certainly fight if attacked.
6. The chief unfavorable consequence to
the West of Sweden's "alliance-free" poli-
cy is that it severely hampers the develop-
ment of Scandinavian defenses against a
Soviet attack. On the other hand, Swe-
dish adherence to NATO under present
circumstances would increase interna-
tional tensions and might lead the USSR
to reduce Finland to Satellite status.
7. In event of war in circumstances sub-
stantially as at present, we believe that
the USSR would seek to by-pass Sweden
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in its invasion of Norway.* However, as
NATO capabilities to defend Norway in-
crease the likelihood of a Soviet attack on
Sweden would also increase.
8. If Sweden remained neutral while the
USSR occupied Norway and Denmark,
Sweden would be effectively isolated from
the West. Its valuable trade with the
West would be cut off and it would be
forced, under Soviet economic pressure, to
make an important contribution to the
Soviet war economy.
9. Despite its neutrality, Sweden prob-
ably would not actively resist the over-
flight of Western aircraft, although it
would officially protest. Sweden would
more actively defend its neutrality a-
gainst Soviet overflights, while attempt-
ing to avoid serious complications with
the USSR.
DISCUSSION
Sweden's Strategic Importance
10. Geographic. The Scandinavian penin-
sula, of which Sweden forms the greater part,
lies across the most direct air approaches to
Western USSR from air bases in North Amer-
ica, Greenland, Iceland, and the UK, or from
carriers in the Norwegian Sea. Conversely, it
lies athwart the air path from Soviet bases in
the Moscow area to most of the UK, Green-
land, Iceland, and North America. It could
provide air bases, early warning facilities, and
other military installations to either the
USSR or the Western allies. It also occupies
a strategic position with respect to control of
the Baltic and its entrance. Moreover, Swe-
den lies across the logistically preferable
routes of Soviet advance toward the valuable
air and naval base sites along the Norwegian
coast. Finally, Sweden flanks the North Ger-
man plain, the chief military route across
Western Europe, and if held securely by the
NATO powers, could be used as a base from
which to threaten Soviet lines of communica-
tion across Germany and Poland and through
the Baltic, as well as the Soviet Baltic flank.
11. Political, Economic, and Scientific. Swe-
den is a stable, politically mature democracy
of about seven million people. Its present So-
* The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence,
Department of the Army, would change this sen-
tence to read: "In event of war in circumstances
substantially as at present, we believe, on balance,
that the USSR would by-pass Sweden in its in-
vasion of Norway."
cial Democratic-Agrarian coalition govern-
ment enjoys solid popular support. Sweden
has only a small Communist party, number-
ing an estimated 27,000, which has been de-
clining in strength.
12. As one of the most highly industrialized
nations in the world, Sweden is an important
producer of ships, ball and roller bearings, in-
dustrial machinery, engines and turbines,
electrical apparatus, steel, armaments, and
numerous other manufactures, as well as high
quality iron ore. The Swedish Bofors firm de-
signs and produces excellent naval and anti-
aircraft guns. Sweden's aircraft industry is
capable of producing modern jet fighters to
replace current piston engine types and of
supporting the Swedish air force at its pres-
ent strength. Its marine engineering and
aeronautical installations are capable of ex-
tensive research and development work. Swe-
den's basic scientific and technological re-
search is excellent in a number of fields. Its
scientists rank with the world's best in fer-
rous metallurgy and medicine, for example,
and it expects to have a small underground
atomic pile operating in 1953.
13. Some 92-93 percent of Swedish trade is
with the West, the UK and West Germany be-
ing Sweden's largest customers. Sweden's
large exports of iron ore, lumber, pulp and pa-
per, bearings, machinery, and ships, etc.,
make an important contribution to Western
European economic strength. For example,
about 11 percent of the free world's iron is de-
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rived from Swedish ore. The West German
and UK steel industries are particularly de-
pendent upon Swedish ore imports, which ac-
count for perhaps 42 percent of West German
and 23 percent of UK iron ore consumption.
14. Although trade with the Soviet Bloc is of
more importance to Sweden than to most other
Western European countries, it accounts for
only 7-8 percent of total Swedish trade. It
consists chiefly of an exchange of iron ore,
ball and roller bearings, and machinery for
coal and some mineral ores. This trade has
been declining steadily over recent years, and
under Western pressure Sweden has adopted
East-West trade controls comparable to those
of the European NATO countries. It sells no
munitions to the Soviet Bloc and only sur-
renders strategic goods, such as iron ore and
ball bearings, where necessary to obtain such
essential imports as Polish coal.
15. However, Sweden's dependence on foreign
sources for two-thirds of its raw materials and
practically all of its coal, coke, and petroleum
products renders its economy critically vul-
nerable to external pressures. Any major in-
terference with the flow of imports such as
would occur in wartime would inevitably have
serious disruptive effects on the Swedish
economy.
16. Armed Forces. Sweden is slowly modern-
izing its 75,000-man armed forces. These
forces are the largest and best in Scandinavia,
although far less than Sweden's resources can
support. While the forthcoming defense
budget will probably be considerably above
that of the present fiscal year, Sweden will
still be spending only about 5 percent of its
gross national product for defense. It is build-
ing modern jet aircraft (and buying others
from the UK), enlarging and modernizing its
fleet, and expanding ground force training.
However, the armed forces suffer from serious
weaknesses which would sharply limit their
capabilities in time of war. The quality of
Swedish manpower and basic training is ex-
cellent, but the armed forces are lacking in
combat experience and in staff and command
training for large-scale operations. Serious
logistic deficiencies also exist.
17. Sweden's army of 50,000 comprises only
15,000 regulars, although mobilizable army
manpower totals some 675,000 men, most of
them semi-trained. The 9-10 month con-
scription period is inadequate by NATO stand-
ards. Many items of modern equipment, such
as tanks, heavy artillery, and electronic equip-
ment are obsolete, in short supply, or com-
pletely lacking.
18. Sweden's navy is a well-rounded combat
force designed for coastal defense. It is note-
worthy for high standards of seamanship, ma-
teriel maintenance, and discipline, but its ef-
fectiveness against attack by a major power
like the USSR, would be strictly limited to
harassing and delaying tactics and escort op-
erations. The USSR could rapidly neutralize
Swedish sea power in the Baltic. The princi-
pal effective Swedish naval units are two mod-
ern antiaircraft cruisers, twelve destroyers,
four coastal destroyers, two fast anti-subma-
rine frigates, twenty-one submarines, and
twenty-one motor torpedo boats. Antiaircraft
artillery is excellent and the mine warfare
force is apparently well developed. Although
the navy is weak in modern equipment, a new
construction and modernization program is in
progress. For example, all submarines are
scheduled to be fitted with radar, sonar, and
snorkels by the end of 1952.
19. The Air Force, second strongest in West-
ern Europe, is considered by Sweden to be its
first line of defense. It has 1,685 aircraft
(1,095 of them in operational units), of which
378 are jets. Of Sweden's 62 airfields, six can
now sustain jet fighter or medium bomber op-
erations, four more can sustain jet fighters
and be developed for bombers, and a further
ten can support limited jet fighter operations.
Sweden's air defenses have been greatly im-
but the air force's equip-
ment is inferior to that of the USSR, and it
suffers from critical logistic deficiencies, par-
ticularly fuel.
20. In the light of their military weaknesses,
the Swedish forces are presently capable only
of fighting delaying actions against a major
Soviet attack. The duration of their defensive
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effort would depend upon whether they had
sufficient time to mobilize and upon the re-
ceipt of substantial outside support. On the
other hand, Sweden's already sizeable military
potential and resources provide the base for a
marked expansion in Swedish military capa-
bilities, perhaps to the point where, in coordi-
nation with the NATO Northern Command
forces, they could successfully defend large
areas of Scandinavia. Such a build-up of Swe-
dish defenses, however, would require outside
assistance.
21. Sweden's role in Scandinavian defense.
The ultimate test of Sweden's strategic im-
portance to the USSR and the NATO powers
lies in its potential role in the defense of the
Scandinavian peninsula in event of war.
Should war come, the chief objective of both
sides would probably be to control the valu-
able air and naval bases and radar sites along
the Norwegian coast. Sweden, because of its
strategic location and sizeable armed forces,
might well be of critical importance to Nor-
way's defense. While Sweden's strategic im-
portance to the NATO powers is primarily de-
fensive, once these powers were strong enough
to defend the Scandinavian peninsula (and
perhaps Denmark), Sweden would have po-
tential value as a base for offensive air and
perhaps eventually naval and amphibious op-
erations against the Soviet Baltic flank. The
logistical difficulties of supplying NATO
forces in Sweden in the face of probable So-
viet local air superiority in the Baltic area
would doubtless limit NATO use of bases in
Sweden itself, but the valuable Norwegian
coastal bases could be protected and Soviet
egress from the Baltic made more hazardous.
Sweden's Present Policy in the East-West
Conflict
22. The Swedish people and government re-
main firmly attached to their policy of "free-
dom from military alliances." To the Swedish
public, which overwhelmingly supports the
"no-alliance" policy, the most persuasive ar-
gument in its behalf is the peace that the
country has enjoyed for approximately 150
years. The Swedes are cognizant of the So-
viet threat to Swedish security, and a major-
ity of them are convinced that involvement in
a future war is inevitable. At the same time,
they maintain their armed forces at a level
which they hope will deter an invasion. More-
over, they see no immediately persuasive al-
ternative to their current "alliance-free" pol-
icy. They are under no delusion that they
could withstand a Soviet attack without West-
ern support, but they are confident that, re-
gardless of their non-membership in NATO,
the Western Powers would attempt to come
to their assistance in event of Soviet attack.
23. While all four non-Communist parties
support in principle the "alliance-free" pol.-
icy* the leaders of the Liberal and Conserva-
tive opposition parties have criticized the im-
plementation of the policy by the Social Demo-
cratic-Agrarian Government as being too
rigid, doctrinaire, and lacking in foresight.
They contend that at a minimum Sweden
should undertake technical military planning
with Denmark and Norway, in order to facili-
tate Western aid to Sweden in event of war.
They also profess great concern over the im-
pact of Sweden's official "alliance-free" policy
on Western opinion. A small but vocal minor-
ity led by some of the Liberal party press, in-
cluding Sweden's largest daily, has gone fur-
ther and attacked this policy, arguing that
better security would be found in affiliation
with NATO. A number of high-ranking Swe-
dish military officers apparently share this
view, which, however, has not at this juncture
gained any appreciable public or political sup-
port.
24. Despite their official "alliance-free" pol-
icy, both the Swedish Government and people
are pro-Western and anti-Communist. The
Swedish people have a deep-seated fear and
distrust of the USSR. This distrust is based
largely on a long history of wars with Tsarist
Russia, which was Sweden's traditional en-
emy, but it has been strengthened in the post-
war period by the USSR's aggressive interna-
tional policies, incessant Soviet attacks on
*Sweden's small Communist party, while not ob-
jecting to neutrality as such, professes to regard
it as a fraud, alleging that Swedish foreign policy
is actually pro-Western and non-neutral.
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Sweden's grants of asylum to political refu-
gees, and the recent disclosures of Soviet espio-
nage in Sweden. Swedish relations with the
Soviet Bloc, especially with Poland, have
worsened over the past year.
25. Sweden's sympathies, as well as its major
economic interests, are with the Western
countries, particularly the US and UK. De-
spite reservations over certain aspects of
American foreign policy, there is a friendly
feeling for the American people. Swedish pol-
icy has become more overtly Western in its
emphasis since the conflict in Korea, and par-
ticularly since over-all NATO defensive capa-
bilities have begun to grow.
26. If Sweden itself were attacked by the
USSR, we believe that it would resist with all
its resources. Public opinion polls have in-
dicated that 75 percent of the Swedish people
are determined to resist Soviet attack, while
only 7 percent favor non-resistance. If Swe-
den were invaded and occupied, remnants of
the Swedish forces would flee to Allied terri-
tory, and the Swedes would almost certainly
attempt guerrilla warfare and sabotage oper-
ations.
Possibilities of a Change in Swedish Policy
27. During the Cold War. Despite its pro-
Western and anti-Communist outlook, Swe-
den is unlikely to change its formal "alliance-
free" policy during peacetime, and will firmly
resist pressure in this direction. Sweden
would be particularly resistant to Soviet
threats, although such threats might lead the
Swedes to take a more cautious approach in
their relations with the West. Sweden might
be forced to make further limited economic
concessions to the Soviet Bloc in response to
such economic warfare measures as a threat
to deny it Polish coal. It would not yield,
however, to Soviet pressures to alter its for-
eign or military policies.
28. On the other hand, the Swedes apparently
believe that the advantages of joining NATO
would be outweighed by the definite increase
in international tension and the possibility of
retaliatory Soviet action against Finland.
Moreover, most Swedes, relatively satisfied
with the state of their own defenses, have not
been greatly impressed to date with NATO
military assistance to Norway and Denmark.
30. Although opposition leaders have con-
tended that the disappearance of Finland as a
buffer for Sweden would necessitate reconsid-
eration of Sweden's policy, we do not believe
that Sweden would join NATO even if the
USSR occupied Finland. A recent public opin-
ion poll indicates that only 26 percent of the
people would favor a departure from neutral-
ity in this event. The Swedish Government's
initial reaction would probably not be deter-
mined so much by the reduction of Finland to
Satellite status as by its assessment of what
the next Soviet step would be. If it were con-
vinced that Finland was merely a springboard
for an early Soviet military move into Sweden,
Sweden would almost certainly make over-
tures to the West for some form of military
ties. On the other hand, if Sweden believed
the USSR intended to move no further than
Finland, it would almost certainly not make
any immediate overt change in its "no-alli-
ance" policy. Sweden would almost certainly
expand its own defense preparations, however,
and would probably be more willing to step up
covert military talks with various Western
Powers. Moreover, the progressive build-up of
a Soviet military threat from nearby Finland,
and the influx of Finnish refugees, would al-
most certainly increase public hostility to the
USSR and therefore would gradually make the
Swedish Government more willing to engage
in some form of military cooperation with the
West.
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