TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-45: LIKELIHOOD, CHARACTER, AND CONSEQUENCES OF A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO PROMOTE A RELAXATION OF TENSIONS (AS APPROVED BY THE IAC REPRESENTATIVES)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001300060007-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: September 10, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFIGE OF NATIONAL BSTIMATES
10 Santee 1951
SUBJECT, TERNS OF REFER 2 CE: 5 $' LI L1HOOD, CHARACTER,
AND CONSEQOIIM OF A SOP= ATTEAg'T TO PRC 1 TE
A RELAXATION OF TENSION
(as approved by the IAC Repaces+en atives )
To assess (a) whether the 1JSSR is likely to shift its
tactics and seek a temporary "relaxation of tensions";
(b) how far the USSR night go in this direction; and (c) the
probable impact of such a policy on the free world.
LEFINTTION OF THE PROBLEM
We consider that the Kremlin, looking at the world situ-
ation, is coni'ro tsd with three basic policy choices: (a) to
seek early general war before the West become too strong;
~b to attest to continue its present cold war pressures;, or
c) to seeka "relaxation of tensions" designed to lull the
West into a sense of false seourfty and to uMezvdne growing
Western strength and consolidation. Acoepting the premise
that the MR presumably prefers to achieve its ob3ectimes by
means short of general wars, two broad courses of litical war-
fare reomsin open to the Kremlin. Since co rse (b) is already
under consideration in various estimates, we believe that first
priority should be given to examining whether or not the Kremlin
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might feel compelled to make a temporary shift in its present
tactics as an even more effective means of achieving its ob-
3ectives. This third alternative might involve merely avoiding
any further risky local aggression, while perhaps intensifying
such propaganda efforts as the peace offensive; on the other
hand it might go so far as to include ostensible or actual
concessions.
We recognize that any such shift would be only temporary,
and that the USSR would move cauti+auslr and tentatively in any
new direction, constantly probing for tweak spots, and pro-
ceeding from step to step only -as results might seem to juatit'y.
We recognize, moreover, that the USSR would by no means abandon
all of its aggressive and subversive tactics; that it might
adopt a more conciliatory policy only in Western Europe, for
eooample, while continuing to expand in Asia. However, we do
believe that it is feasible to define a clearcut possible
course of action called a "relaxation of tensions." Finally,
vs recognise that considerations of are important. It
my be that the USSR will eventually feel compelled to adopt
new and mars Mors tactics, but that the Kremlin does
not yet believe that it bas to face this choice. It my be
that the Kremlin, while considering such a shift in tactics,
simply has not mode up its mind.
1 UESTIONS BEARING ON TAE PROBLEM
I.
AT FACTORS MIGHT FAVCEt OR MILITATE AGAINST TAE
Y/\I~i~~-wM1YI1~~1i~Y1~r1Y i~ I I i~ilYi~~i1
MM A BROAD RELAXATION OF TENSIONS?
A. Are t AM historical and d ri pal m adepts
Fib. a berate Rolieyfr 1? tiara of tensions?
What elements of Soviet, doctrine indicate that
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temporary relaxation is a part of Soviet thinking?
Ebb and flow? Lenin's "one step backward for two
steps forward?" How much do the Communists think
of the eventual triumph of Communism in terms per-
haps of decades rather than the next few years thus
permitting them to accept a temporary shift in
tactics?
What factors in the Kremlin's view
situation ht lead to a shift in Soviet tactics?
l? To what extent because of growing Western
strength and consolidation might the Kremlin
feel that its cold war opportunities were
steadily narrowing? To what extent might the
USSR consider that its postwar pressure tactics
had reached the point of diminishing returns
and were generating even more powerful counter-
pressures?
20 Therefore# might the Kremlin consider that, to
achieve its primary immediate objective of re-
tarding the development of Western strength
and unity, it should sooner or later resort to
a temporary relaxation of its pressures? In
Other words might the USSR now feel increasingly
compelled to shift its course and seek another
means of weakening the West? Is the USSR yet
at the point where it must seriously consider
such a sh if't?
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C. Ant ebieetivyee might tMSR aim to wchiey
through a ratio of tenons?
1. Drive a wedge between the US and the rest of
the free world by emphasising US aggressiveness
and exploiting issues with divisive possibilities
between the US and Western Europe in particular?
2. Create a false sense of security and thus under-
mine the impetus behind Western consolidation
and rearmament?
3. Prevent, deli, or hamper German and Japanese
rearmament and their association with the West?
4. Secure the propaganda advantages of actually
appearing as a peacemaker while labeling the
US an aggressor?
5. By retarding Western reagent, perhaps create
serious economic strains in the free world?
Gain time for further development of Soviet
economic and military (including atomic) cape=..
bilities?
D. 21-t
an earl& shames in the USSROs present noliCIS1?
1. To what extent does the Kremlin feel comdtted
to a continued hostile, aggressive policy?
To what extent might the USSR feel that the
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Western Powers were going to 'attar It eventually
in any ease, and that a relaxation of tensions
would therefore be f.'roi tless? Does the Kremlin
probably see sufficient further opportunities
for enlaitation to justify continuation of its
present cold war pressures?
2. What opportunities might the Kremlin feel would
be denied to it if it sought a temporary re-
lamtion of tensions? Might the Kremlin con..
eider that to carry a relaxation of tensions
to the point of achieving substantial: results
would involve costly concessions that the IIBSR
was un lling to make? Might it feel ? that.1QATO
and pr spective German and Japanese rent
can stin be forestalled or at least ~ delayed
by other means?
II. WEAT INDICATIONS ARE THERE OF A POSSIBLE S07IET ATTET
TO REDUCE WORLD TENSIONS?
A. What recent Soviet moves and developments might
indicate that such an effort is in the offing?
B. To what extent might the recurrent "peace" of-
fensive be a laying of the propaganda basis for
such a campaign?
~ 5 ..
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LMMMELG s
TACT1~?
Within the broad context of a relaxation of tension.
there is a wide range of Implementing actions which the
USSR might undertake. At a miniu m it might merely
close out the Korean war and refrain from further ova
aggressive aetiong while greatly stepping up its 'peace'
offensive and other propaganda gns. On the other
hand the Kremlin might realize that for its new policy
to have any real impact it must make a wauls series of
ostensibly teary moves P3nallyg the U$3R might
even consider that in order to achieve curtain spemina
objectives, particularly re Ceram and Japans it
would have to make major concessions to the West.
A. How far might the Kremlin expect to get without
aJr real concessions? What propaganda and other
methods 'fight it adopt?
B. What essions, such as an Austrian peace treaty
or East-West trade concessions, might the Krs
feel it could make without reap we niag its
position? Would it be willing to make these sacri-
fices? How much might the Kremlin expect to
through such msane?
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0. What far--reaching concessions really involving a
loss to the Soviet Union might the Kremlin feel
were required to achieve specific objectives, and
perhaps to insure the success of its over-all
"relaxation" tactics? What sacrifices might the
Kremlin have to accept and to what extent might
the Kremlin feel able to make such concessions?
1. Re Germany - neutralization
2. Be Japan
3. Re disarmament, atomic energy control, etc.
4. Re general broad issues such as somewhat
lowering the Iron Curtain, modifying inter-
national Commmimist activities, etc.
IV. WHAT WOULD BE THE FRCBABLE IMPACT OF A RELAXATION OF
TENSIONS ON TRR NME WORLD?
A. What might be the impact of a policy not involving
major concessions? What would be the possibil-
ities of driving a wedge between the Western
countries? To what extent might the USSR lull
the West into a false sense of security and thus
undermine the impetus behind Western reermeuneat?
1. On Western Europe and the NATO alliance?
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2. On the rest of the free world?
B. What ILght be the 3mact of the tree world of a
broader program Involving real conoesaions?
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