SOUTHEAST ASIA (INDOCHINA, BURMA, MALAYA, THAILAND, INDONESIA)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050009-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 1999
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: NIE

Southeast Asia (Indochina, BWama$ Malaya, Thsilsndv Indonesia)
Cenral _ds and Variables
1- During the period of this estimate the attitude of the
nan4amaunist countries of Southeast Asia will be heavily affected
by developments in Indochina1, and to a lesser extent by other
de9veloi*nents in the Fast West struggle. Barring a Western re-
verse in the Indochina conflict, Burma and Thailand will probably
at least maintain and may increase their present degree of pro-
Western sentiment and practical cooperation with the West,. In
Indonesia, attitudes will be whet more Independent of Indo
chins events, but are in aqy event very uncart& n.mnd difficult
to predicts Malaya is of course a special ogee, with the UK
attitude unlikely to change ( see. preceding seatiose Y. and
the main variable being the native attitude toward the Commaaist
revolt.
Z, Thus,. In the event of developaents p ain_ly unfavorable
to the West in Indochina, such as a substantial increase in
Com u ist.hsld territory or a clear French battle defeat, the
offsets would be serious in mainland Southeast Asia, It would
take vezy little additional.Cos ist pressure to bring about
a Thai accomadation to Comnnutism. _ Ho wever Thailand reacted,
loan,' s position would become so exposed that there would
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Southeast Asia (Iaedoabinal, 3uraaf, t~laleya? Thailmdp Indoeeesial 04. - )
Osn+~s?sl_Tdt and Variables
I- 1ring the period of -this estimate the attiUds of the
naI Ceeaennist countries of Southeast Asia will be heavily affected
bV developments in Ind*china8 and to a lesser extent by other
developments in the East-West struggle,: Barring a Western re-
verse in the Indochina conflict9 Burma and Thailand will probably
at least maintain and may increase their present degree of Iwo-,
Western sentiment and practical cooperation with the Westn In
Indonesia j, attitudes will be seat m we independent of Indo=
china events, but are in at event very ui a Lain. and ditttcuit
to predict., Malaya is of couree a epsaiai oasep with the UK
attitude unlikely to change- (see preceding section ), and
the main variable being the native attitude toward the Ccmmemist
2 CZhae N'9 the event of deve1 !n to plainly unfavorable
to the West In Indochina, Such as a substantial increase in
Coesmniet-held territory or a slur French baktAs feat, the
effects would be eerricaas In mainland Southeast Asian E[ rld
tAk&-Varrry-3 additional Cam ist presaur* bring ig abet
a Thai acc tion to C eern, However Thailand reacted,
Buraia? a position "ould bec ae si ea sed -4-4'" there would
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