THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ALBANIA WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GREEK, YUGOSLAV AND ITALIAN INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001200030007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: NIE

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SECURITY INFORMATION
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 4A 3 y-/y &&-~
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ALBANIA WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO GREEK, YUGOSLAV AND ITALIAN INTERESTS
NIE-142 ()_11
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff
participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the
preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelli-
gence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on
15 November.
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE. IN CLASS. i.
[YDECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS SO
I NEXT REVIEW DATE:
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,T -- 4 - ! THE CURRENT SITUATION IN s,LMNTA WITH
GOSIAY
PARTICUTAR REFERENCE TO GREEK,
AND ITALIAN INTERESTS
THE PROBLEM
the strategic importance of Albania; to examine
Ta assess '
%
regime; and to anai Ze Greek, / ) c f .vltr
the stability, of the e)dsting
Italian and Yugoslav interests in Albania
CONCLUSIONS \ _ s
1 In its physical isolation from the
Soviet Bloc Albania s
+ to the USSR is more latent than manifest. In an area
importance
onal Russian aspirations, its continuance under Soviet
of traditj
control is a political asset and a matter of prestige to the ~/.
USSR especially in view of the defection of Yugoslavia and the !! DD__
Economically, Albania
aggression in Greece.
defeat of Communist is a liability to the USSR. By itself, Albania is of minor
military importance to the USSR. However, if overland communication
with the Soviet orbit were r etablished, it would regain the
limited military value it possessed for the USSR before the
Yugoslav defection. ?NIVI~~~IAL
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Resistance activity constitutes a troublesome problem
for the Hoxha regime but is not an imnedjate threat. As long
as the resistance effort is divided and does not receive sub-
stantial external aid, the Albanian security forces will probably
succeed in containing ito
rb The interests of Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia in
Albania conflict, and each of these three countries probably
prefers continuance of the status quo to a change which would be
favorable to the otherso
C -o Italy and Yugoslavia have officially accepted the
principle of the creation of a sovereign and independent Albania
with its present boundaries and free from Soviet control. However,
Greece, because of its claims to northern Epirusp has so far not
accepted this principle. Whether or not all three of Albania's
neighbors could actually be brought to accept an independent
Albania with its present boundaries would probably depend upon
the support given the new government by the Western Powers.
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DISCUSSION
,C . Politically, Albania is of importance to the USSR
primarily as an outpost of Communism* The USSR would regard
its loss as a blow to Soviet prestige, particularly since the
defection of Yugoslavia and the failure of the Communist effort
in Greece, Economically, Albania is,a liability
to the USSR, Militarily, Albania is of minor importance to
the USSR. Although it occupies a strategic location at the
entrance to the Adriatic, under modern conditions its-capabili-
ties for development are limited, Saseno Island and the port of
x2 07Y14*.
Valona havelpotential value as bases for mine craft, small naval
attack craft, and submarines,,
Seas, Saseno Island was a minor Italian submarine base and
there have been recurrent but unconfirmed rumors in the postwar
years of Soviet efforts to reconstruct these facilities o There
is no confirmed evidence of extensive Soviet efforts to build
up Albanian air facilities and, although Albania might be of
value as an outpost in an early warning system for air defense
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of the Soviet orbit, there is no evidence of Soviet radar
installations,, Since the defection of Yugoslavia, Albania has
lost most of its strategic importance to the USSR because of
the lack of overland communication with the Soviet orbit. How-
ever,, Albania would be of some significance to a land campaign
in the Balkans, since operations in conjunction with Bulgaria,
if successful, could separate Greece from Yugoslavia.
I A.&
TAE1RR SI ATION IN Z N T #AF
4) iq 4
The Stability of the Regime and Extent of Soviet Control
i- . Prior to the Cominform?Yugoslav rift in June 191t8,
Albania was closely tied, both politically and economically,, to
Yugoslavia. Rather than follow Marshal Tito's heresy, however,
Hoxha chose the Moscow camp and launched a vigorous campaign for
the elimination of "nationalist" elements in Albania. Hoxha not
only extricated Albania from its ties with Yugoslavia, but also
succeeded in eliminating serious competition for leadership with-
in Albania. Reported rivalry between Hoxha and the Minister of
Interior, Lt. Gen. Mehmet Shehu is likely to be of little impor-
tance as both men are apparently firmly controlled by the Kremlin,,
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C .-`a Albania is totally dependent upon Soviet support, With-
out it, the country's economy would be severely shaken within
a few months, Soviet control is reinforced by from.1000 to 1500
Soviet "experts" in key positions in the police9 military, and
civilian administrations as well as in the party hierarchy,
With Soviet support Hoxha and Shehu have thus far succeeded
in ruling the country through the usual Comtmunist methods of police
terror and rigid economic controls, Despite evidence of oppor-
tunism and disloyalty in the security forces and particularly in
the arnV., these forces cdr stitute, effective instruments for the
suppression of oppositions
.3tr Soviet support -to'Albania, however, has not included a
mutual assistance pact,, probably because the USSR desires to leave
the situation fluid and to avoid a commitment which might prove
embarrassing.* Albania has such a pace only with Bulgaria
(16 December 1947)0
# The only other Satellites which have not concluded mutual
assistance pacts with the USSR are Eastern Germany and North
Korea,
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Nevertheless, any change in the Albanian situation which
might threaten Soviet control would automatically involve a question
of Soviet prestige in an area in which one Satellite has already
defied the Kremlin, Under present circumstances,subh a change
probably could occur only with the support of one or more of the
neighboring states. Such a development would necessarily lead
to a deterioration of the international situations Soviet action
to counteract a change of this nature would depend upon broader
considerations of global strategy.
///_~ Resistance to the Present Re ime1/ i
R~ ~141~/MM ~/alw~Yr~rww ~ J / .
14-. Dissatisfaction among the Albanian people continues, to
be widespread and there has been some overt resistance within the
past few years. The regime itself has admitted the existence of
"diversionist" elements and attacks upon military and civilian
supply convoys. The most dramatic incident of resistance activity
was the bombing of the Soviet Legation in February 1951,'but
local assassination and limited economic sabotage have probably
been.more effective challenges to Communist authority. Thus far,
the Hoxha regime has been able to deal with opposition movements
by instituting further repressive measures, For example, Shehu
has organized special pursuit battalions which operate in the
mountainous areas against individual resistance groups.
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Refugees have reported the existence of various local
resistance groups, such as the "National League of the Mountains9"
"Liberty," "Skanderbeg,9"* "Call" and "National Unity," but
specific information regarding these gaups is lacking. There does
not appear to be any established cooperation among the various
dissident groups despite their common desire to rid Albania of
the Hoxha regime?
Among the Albanian emigre resistance movements the
Committee for a Free Albania, an affiliate of the National Committee
for a Free Eirope, with operational headquarters in Rome is perhaps
the most influential, The Committee comprises three groups.
(1) the National Agrarian Democratic Party/Balls Kombetar (National
Front) whose following is strongest in southern Albania$`.(2) the
Legality Party (pro-King Zog) which is strongest in central Albani
and (.3) the League of Peasants and Villagers (Agrarian Party)
which has its strongest following in the extreme north and in the
neighboring Yugoslav provinces inhabited largely by Albanianso
Although these groups have the common objective of establishing
an independent and sovereign Albania, they differ among themselves
The name of an Albanian hero of the 15th Century,
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as to the type of government to be created. The Committeets
activities within Albania have been limited to propaganda work
and some subversive efforts by agents. Its most effective
operation thus far has been the dropling of propaganda leaflets.
These leaflets have caused considerable excitement within the
country, prompting periodic official notes of protest to the
Italian Goverment and encouraging Albanians to flee Albania,
D In addition to the internal organizations and the
Committee for a Free Albania, there are operating within Albania
representatives of pro-Italian, pro$Yugoaiav, and pro-Greek
Albanian emigre groups0 Despite their common opposition to.,the
present regime, their ultimate objectives reflect the divergent
interests of the three countries0 Their activities have been
limited because of fear on the part of each country that a change
in the Albanian regime might benefit one of the other neighbors
and possible for fear of precipitating an international crisis.
r
The efforts of both the internal resistance groups and
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the emigre organizations are uncoordinated and their objectives
frequently conflict. These factors have simplified the task of
Albanian security forces in isolating and destroying individual
groups.
f/"
Under present circumstances, while resistance activity
constitutes a troublesome problem for the Hoxha regime, it is not
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an immediate threat, As long as the resistance effort is divided
and does not receive substantial external aid, the Albanian
security forces will probably succeed in containing it.
ONFLICTING INTE;Rk T.S OF ITALY,-YUGOSLAVIA . AND GRF Q
Z -. 8' Albania has long been a bone or contention among its
neighbors, Their :interests conflict to such an extent that, even
under present circumstances, the problem of Albania complicates
the development of good relations and cooperation among Italy,
Yigoalavia and Greece, Other problems,, such as Trieste and Macedonia,
are of greater immediate importance in creating dissension among
these powers, but Albania would probably become a critical issue
if the present regime were overthrown,
C
Italian Interests
'It
- 1 5 0 0 b ' Italy's objective in Albania has always been to establish
Albania as an Italian sphere of influence and to prevent any other
power from gaining a foothold from which Italian influence in the
Adriatic could be challenged. In pursuit of this objective, Italy
supported the creation of an independent Albania in 1912 and later,
in 191h, occupied the island of Saseno and the port of Valonao
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Italian troops remained in occupation until 1920. Italy was then
forced to evacuate the mainland, but retained Saseno which was con-
verted into a minor naval and submarine based By a pact of friend-
ship and security with Albania in 1926, Italy established a legal
basis for including Albania in Italy's sphere of influence. Italian
influence was manifested by loans, management of nearly all important
economic enterprises, and training and equipping of the armed forces.
In 1939, Mussolini occupied Albania and united it with Italy; in
19110, he launched his invasion of Greece from there, Under the
Italian Peace Treaty(1947), Italy recognized the independence of
Albania, ceded Saseno Island, and renounced all public and private
property' rights, concessions, claims,,.-_ c, in Albania,
.?2(ra Italy has not given ups however, its basic objectives
toward Albania: the denial of the area to other powers and the
restoration of Italian economic and political influence in Albania.
.In its official statements, the Italian Foreign Office has empha-
sized that continued Albanian independence and territorial integrity
correspond with Italian interests. Italian efforts to improve
relations with the present Communist regime have made no, progress.
Formal diplomatic relations were established in 1949 and,, despite
Communist restrictions on the Italian Legation in Tirana, Italy
undoubtedly intends to retain such relations as long as possible,
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C .235' . Italy evidently aims eventually to re-establish its
influence through the pro--Italian edle group., the National
Independent Bloc, The leadership of this group cooperated with
Italy before and during the war and enjoys the support of the
present Italian governnsent;
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Italy is particularly apprehensive of possible Yugoslav
pre-eminence in Albania in the event the Hoxha regime should be
overthrown, The Italian desire to avoid the establishment of a
foothold by any other power in Albania is so strong that Italy
probably prefers continuation of the status quo to the creation of
a power vacuum which Yugoslavia and, possibly Greece, would be in
m better position to fill,
,[- Greek Interests
[~ _$o Greek interests in Albania center upon Greek claims to
southern 41bania (northern Epirus), an area which the Greek.-> occupied
from 1912 to 1916 and which they have consistently claimed on
historicalo ethnic,, strategic and economic grounds, The Greeks also
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recall that Albania served as a base for the Italian attack an
Greece in 1940 ands in the postwar yearss, for Communist guerrilla
operations against Greece. Even at presents, Albania is a base
from which Comm .st agents are infiltrated into Greece*
L3
Greeces, like Italy and YugQslavza9 is attempting to
further its policy through the use of Albanian refugeeso Those
in Greece are primarily from southern Albania and are apparently
concentrated in camps along the Albanian border. To date, their
efforts have been largely in the field of espionage, propaganda
and the encouragement of additional emigration. Some of those
in the camp ate Yannina are reported to be formed into military
unitss intended for dventual use in southern Albania.
The Greeks probably look on partition of Albania between
Greece and Yugoslavia as the ideal solution to the problems They
are apprehensive of possible Yugoslav or Italian domination of the
entire country, and would probably attempt to occupy northern
Epirus in the event of military action in the areas such as a
Yugoslav invasion of Albania. For the present, in the absence of
Allied assurances against possible Italian or Yugoslav domination
.of Albanias, Greece probably prefers continuation of the status quo
at least so long as the Hoxha regime does not resume full scale
support to the Greek guerrillas.
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12&oslay. Interests
Serbia opposed the principle of an independent Albania
in the period from 1912 to 19180, Following World War I, the
Yugoslavs occupied northern Albania until 1921" In 1926,
Yugoslavia finally accepted the Albanian frontier as delineated
in 19134 Until the outbreak of World liar II,, Italian domination
of Albania prevented Yugoslavia. from exercising any influence?
~G.
,- ...2 'n This situation changed radically during ldorld War II
when Tito, through Albanian Communists,, managed to obtain control
of the Albanian National Liberation Movement, Tito's control was
exercised largely through emissaries attached to the headquarters
of the Albanian Army of National .Uberation,p and, from 1914 to
1918, Albania was a puppet of Yugoslavia. In 19481, Hoxha was able
to extricate Albania from its ties with Yugoslavia following the
Tito'Corninform rift,
C " Since 1948, Tito has ostensibly championed the principle
of an independent, sovereign Albania and has condemned both Greek
territorial claims and the alleged Greek proposals for the partition
of Albania between Greece and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is particularly
apprehensive of the restoration of ttal.ian influence or domination,
In the past several months Yugoslav propaganda has charged Italy
with encouraging the plans of Albanian exiles for an "ethnic"
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Albania which would include the Yugoslav provinces of Kosovo and
Metohiya, both populated chiefly by Albanians. Titoas actual
objective appears. to be the eventual creation of an anti-Soviet,
pro-Tito regime in Albania and a return to the status of 1944-1948.
It was apparently to this end that the "League of Albanian Political
Refugees in Yugoslavia" was formed in May 1951. The League, which
claims to represent some 5,000 Albanian refugees, is controlled by
Albanian Communiats who have fled from Albania since 1948. It
was- created by Belgrade as an instrument of Yugoslav policy, despite
its proclaimed objective of "an independent, free, indivisible,
democratic and republican" Albania. The League has alrea4 engaged
in some espionage, sabotage and propaganda activity, and it possesses
a considerable potential for more extensive operations. Yugoslavia's
exposed position, however, has probably deterred.Tito from using
the League to the full.. Yugoslav spokesmen have expressed the fear
that any substantial efforts to overthrow the Hoxha regime might be
taken by the USSR as a pretext for military action against Yugoslavia.
4 .
HE POSSIBIL TY OF A SETTLTTTT A,
3:=g
--29-.- The existence of an Albanian state has in the past always
depended upon the attitude of stronger powers. Although all three
of Albania's neighbors would presumably wish to see the eventual
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liquidation of the present regime in Albania, their interests in
the ultimate status of Albania are incompatible. Since Albania's
isolation from the Soviet orbit in 19b8, the policy of each of its
neighbors has been directed at establishing a position from which
it could profit in the event of the overthrow'of the Hoxha regime.
As a result, each countryhas sought to counter the moves of the
others. This has led to a diffusion of resistance efforts within
Albania. Rivalry among the three countries over Albania is also
one of the factors limiting the cooperation of these nations in
the development of coordinated defense plans in Southeastern
Europe.
J Italy and Yugoslavia have officially accepted the
principle of the creation of a sovereign and independent Albania
within its present boundaries and free from Soviet control. How-
ever, Greece, because of its claims to northern Epirus, has so far
not accepted this principle. Whether or not all three of Albania's
neighbors could be brought to accept Albanian independence would
probably depend upon the support given the new government by the
Western Powers
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