NIE-42: THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ALBANIA WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GREEK, YUGOSLAV, AND ITALIAN INTERESTS AND PRETENSIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001200030002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 16, 1951
• Content Type: MF

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-21 INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, O. C.
G2 -PR
MEMOMDUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL ESTI YATES BOARD,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEiTCY
SUBJECT: NIE-42: The Current Situation in Albania with
Particular Reference to Greek, Yugoslav, and
Italian Interests and Pretensions
1. Reference is made to CIA memorandum, subject as above,
dated 20 August 1951.
2. In accordance with request contained in reference
memorandum, attached is the Department of the Army contribution
to NIE-42, prepared by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Intelligence, Department of the Army.
1 Incl
Army Contribution
to NIE-42 (8 cys)
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Infe.71 nr2st remain
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0-2 Contribution to NIE-42: "The Current Situation in Albania with
Particular Reference to Greek oslav and Malian Interests and
teneions
I. 'WHAT IS THE CURRENT INTERNAL SITUATION INALBANIA?
A. Is the Hoxha regtae firmly established in Albania?
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1781
2. Are the police and armed forces under firm political cOntrol2
Information regarding the situation in Albania following
the bomb explosion at the Soviet Legation in Tirana on 19 February 51
is scanty, but it is believed that political control of the police and
armed forces, which vas firm before the bombing incident, has become
even more strict. This control is exercised by the Prime Minister,
General of the Army Enver Hoxha, and the Minister of Interior, and
former Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Mehmet Shehu. These two officers con-
trol the Army and police respectively, and are themselves subject to
the direction of the Soviet Military Mission to Albania. To further
insure careful political control, one of the two Vice Ministers of
People's Defense is a Soviet citizen who has the additional title of
Political Director of the Armed Forces. This officer directs the activ-
ities of the political advisors (or agents) who are attached to even
the smallest units of the Albanian Army, the Security Forces and the
Police.
130 To that extent does the regime's existence depend on Soviet
support?
1.
1/111011111114?611feaeoialm.8013.S.
2. , There are no known military treaties or mutual defense
pacts in existence between the USSR and Albania, such as were concluded
by the Soviets with other Satellites; nor are there any such pacts
known to exist between Albania and the other satellites except *
mutual assistance pact concluded with Bulgaria on 16 December 1947.
Recent reports indicate that Soviet representatives in Albania care-
fully avoid making official declarations which might be interpreted as
formal pledges to support Albania in case of need. This course is
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followed in spite of obvious efforts by the Albanian Govemment officials
to encourage such pledges. There are no indications, however, that the
USSR has any intention of abandoning Albania in the event of war.
There are no known political agreements between Albania and the
USSR or its Satellites, although there are trade agreements with moat
of the Satellites and Cultural Pacts have been concluded with some of
the Satellites.
00 What resistance to the regime exists and how effective is it?
1* The Enver Hoxha.Stalinist regime enjoys the genuine sup-
port of only a portion of the 30,000 members of the Albanian Worker's
Party, and the overwhelming majority of the country1s population is
opposed to it. The retire is able to maintain itself in power by
strict control of all Means of subsistende and by police terror, but
despite such deterrents there are mall, poorly organized resistance
groups scattered about Albania, particularly in the north. These are
believed to be independent in nature, and relatively inactive. With-
in their apecifiC localities these groupwangage in occasional acti of
minor sabotage, usually as protest measures. This sort of resistance
to any central government has traditionally existed in Albania, and
would very likely continue should the Hoxha regime be overthrown and
any other central government be established.
2. There is little or no cooperation between individual
resistance groups sufficient to merit consideration. The Albanians
are a tribal people, with a long history of inter-tribal blood feuds.
Inasmuch as the limited resistance activities which take place are
carried on within the tribal structure, the long-standing rivalries
make cooperation difficult.
3 ?
4, ? For the moat part, attempts on the part. of the emigre
movements to coordinate activities with internal resistance groups have
been abortive, and no significant liaison exists at the present time.
Probably the most prominent emigre group is the Committee for a Free
Albania which is located in Rome, and is believed to receive at least
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part of its operational funds from the Italian Government* Mile
this group is eonewhat more forceful, better organized and more in-
tellectually inclined than other similar groups, its effectivenees
is limited by poor leadership, lack of a well-defined policy, and
lack of firm contact with resistarce elements within Albania.
0
The Yugoslays recently sponsored the organization in the Koemot
area of Yugoslavia, near the Albanian border, of the League of Albanian
Political fteflzgees, but for the time being this group is not being
encouraged to actively antagonize the Hoxha regime* The Greeks do
not specifically suppert any organized emigre movement at the present
time,
Italy, Yegoplavia end Greece are minimizing their assistance to
emigre groups for two reasons:
1) The emigre groups are numerous and continually at croonpurpooes, Until they come be terms among themselves, present a common
front, and have a definite plan for liberated Albania,e they represent
a poor investment, and are useful only insofar as they contribute
tonard? keeping Albania in a state of mild disturbance, in apposition
to the 'loth& regime,
2) None of the countries wishes to threaten the Heel* regime
and thus provide the USSR with a pretext either for aggression in south-
eastern Europe; or for an accelerated military buil&up of Albania..
II, DO. THE /NTERESTS OF TUG05/1171AEEECE AND ITALY IN ALBANIA ,CONFLICT
II W 7. T
A. ------
B.
C
E.
III. ASSUMING THAT THE HOXHA REGIME RETAINS POWER /N ALBANIA ARE CON,
TERES 0 ITA LYUG. D GREECE IN ALBATIA----
0 ""' THE DEVELOPME4L?TOFC?Wrriir'-Ei-7?.-.1EFEITS1T-07-S-OUTHEASTERN
N
A, Por the effective defense of southeasternaftrepe and the
Eastern Mediterranean 'title the Hoxha regime retaine po:ner in Albania,
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complete cooperation between Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece is highly
desirable. Military plans and operations should be thoroughly inte-
grated to present a common front and the defense economies of the
three countries should be adjusted on a mutually beneficial basis. In
order to accomplish these objectives, it will be initially necessary
to effect an ideological rapprochement between the three count/ilea.
.This moeld pave the way for joint defensive measures and, possibly,
formal mutual assistance agreements.
B. There are no steps being taken at present to coordinate the
defense plans of Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece. The present state of
relationo between Italy and Yugoslovia over the disposal of the
Trieste prObl makes such plans unlikely for the time being. With
regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, however, there have been recent
.vague indications that the two countries. might be milling to exchange
vital defense information, provided certain conditions Isere met by
each party concerned. .To date nothing has come of this.
00 Albania in hostile hands necessitates some diversion of .740-
slav and Greek troops to the Albanian border, thereby reducing the
treat). strength and materiel available for defense of other border
&reap* In effect, the situation requires both Iugoelavi arad Greece
to plaraa twofront'defense. With regard to Italy, which has no
tonmoh border with Albania, neva planning is particularlyaffected.
?The formulation qf defensive plans by Yugoslavia, Greece and ?
Italy must take into account the facte thatt
1) In Albania the USSR a base from which aggressive naval
warfare -- particularly submarine warfare -- could be conducted
against all three countries, as well as against the entire Mediter-
ranean areas
2) Albania could serve as a Soviet air base for limited of-
fensive operations;
'D. The primary goal of Italy, Greece and. Yugoslavia in Albania
at the present time is to remove it from Soviet domination, thereby
reducing the Communiet threat to themselven. Thus, the present
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military plans of the three countries in so far at Albania is concerned,
are in general, although unspecified, agreement. Their conflicting
interests and pretensions, which road complicate the Albanian problem
should the Hoxha regime be overthrown, have assumed a secondary position
by tacit agreement of the three powers, and as no joint defense plans have
yet been established for Southeastern Europe, their intentions visea-vis
Albania mey be expected to continue in the background for the time being..
It mutt also be considered a possibility that with the 1step-up in the
Western defense efforts and the more active participation of Italy,
Yugoslavia and Greece in such efforts, the complications resulting from
the divergent interests of the three countries in Albania mill be
solved within the Western defense stricture.
IV. ASSUMIUG THAT THE HOZBA REGIME IS OVERTHRAMR WHAT EFFECT WILL
FONIDLE =WM ' i -z: u,Armairs
A. drabawcalliriC3
B. That changes in the relations of the three countries would
be caused by the rep:Lac:anent of the Herbs. regia?
1. Should the Hexha regime be replaced by a government
friendly to the West, it would be poseible for Yugoslavia and Greece
to deeemphasiso the defense of their borders with Albania, and redistri-
bute their military strength. Italy would be in a position to revise
her naval planning with a view to assuming for the lest, domination of
the Adriatic and the Mediterranean passage between Italy and Tunisia.
The logistic prObleme for all three countries would be lessened should
the threat of Soviet interference in the Mediterranean be removed.
It mould be necessary to provide concrete assistance from
outside to any new regime in Albania, particularly with regard to arms
and equipment which presently are being obtained from the USSR.
2. If either Italy, Yugoslavia or Greece obtained a dominant
interest in a new Albanian regime, cooperation bet-men the countries
undoubtedly %mad be obstructed, but if they participated equally in
assisting the new regime or all agreed to forego interference of any
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kind, military and political cooperation would be facilitated.
C. The development ()fan effective coordinated defense of
Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean would be affected by any
change in the Albanian regime. Should any one country seek or
achieve control of Albania, the other interested nations undoubtedly
would delay, and perhaps make impossible, any effective cooperation
toward a mutual defenae. If the test could secure Albanian neutral-
ity under joint Western domination, the final decision on Albania
could be deferred and the coordinated defense of the area facilitated.
The threat of Soviet aggression from a base in Albania would be re-
moved and Southeastern Europe would be capable of consolidating
politically and militarily in the defense of the area against aggres-
aion. Albania, under Soviet domination, complicates the development
of an effective restern defense of Southeastern Europe, and thus is
of militarr value to the USSR. It would not have a comparable value
to the western powers, should Albania be aligned with the rest.
Albania could offer little to the West in the form of port facilities
and airfields, and the Albanian ground forces would constitute a
negligible addition to the troops available for defense of the area.
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