PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE TO THE END OF 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: September 14, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

pro -d For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A0012000r0VP31 3 4
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
KASHMIR DISPUTE TO THE END
OF 1951
NIE-41
Published 14 September 1951
r:NT
CHA, LASS. /
?ekt.4DECLASSIFIE
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE:IP_WiaREVIEWER: LUZ/
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : C
12A001200020011-3
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's
office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Further
dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa-
tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, for the Depart-
ment of State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
f. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other
Department or Agency
2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with
applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by ar-
rangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
DISTRIBUTION (NIE Series) :
Office of the President
National Security Council
National Security Resources Board
Department of State
Office of Secretary of Defense
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Department of the Air Force
Atomic Energy Commission
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Research and Development Board
Munitions Board
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
wmg
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : Cl
A001200020011-3
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
KASHMIR DISPUTE TO THE END
OF 1951
NIE-41
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff
participated in the preparation of this estimate. All mem-
bers of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 10 September.
semaserw
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE
TO THE END OF 1951
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable developments in the Kashmir dispute during 1951, with
particular reference to the possible use of armed force, and to indicate the conse-
quences for US security interests of war between India and Pakistan.
CONCLUSIONS
1. India and Pakistan have once again
reached a critical state of tension over
Kashmir. The military forces of both
countries are deployed opposite each other
on the frontiers, and few additional
measures would be required for either to
initiate hostilities.
2. The Indian Government (G01) is un-
likely to precipitate war deliberately, but
is prepared to accept war and is unlikely
to act to reduce the tension.
3. The Pakistan Government (GOP) is
unlikely to precipitate war deliberately so
long as the UN appears to GOP leaders to
offer hope of effective action. However,
there is a possibility that the GOP would
deliberately launch or sponsor local action
in Kashmir, especially between 15 Sep-
tember and 1 November.
4. The Kashmir issue has generated high
military, political, and religious pressures
one or more of which might well lead to
hostilities.
5. In the event of war, there will almost
certainly be fighting not only in Kashmir,
but also in the Punjab and probably East
Pakistan (Bengal). It is unlikely that
the UN could effect a cease-fire, if either
side had gained a material advantage
from the fighting.
6. In any extended conflict India would
probably be victorious, but its victory
would not be quick or easy.
7. The most important consequence of
war would be internal deterioration in
both countries, which might open the way
for a Communist seizure of power in parts
or all of India. In addition, war would
have a serious adverse affect on US rela-
tions with both countries, and would prob-
ably deprive the US of potential air bases
in Pakistan and of important raw mate-
rials from India.
4141slielie*
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
1
Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIANO12A001200020011-3
DISCUSSION
The Current Situation
8. Troop movements by both India and Paid-
stan since May have greatly increased the ten-
sion between the two countries and the
possibility of major hostilities. Almost 90
percent of India's and 70 percent of Pakistan's
ground combat forces are now deployed oppo-
site each other in Kashmir itself, and on the
Punjab and East Pakistan (Bengal) frontiers.
9. Pursuant to a Security Council resolution
of 30 March 1951, Dr. Frank Graham is now
in the subcontinent seeking to achieve agree-
ment on demilitarization of Kashmir as a
prelude to an impartial plebiscite to deter-
mine its permanent affiliation. Graham is
due to report to the Council by 29 September,
though he may seek a delay.
10. The chief focus of dispute at the present
time is the projected election of a Constituent
Assembly in the area of Kashmir controlled
by Indian forces under the 1949 UN cease-fire
and containing about three quarters of the
population. These elections are scheduled
for 10-30 September, under the auspices of the
pro-Indian Government of Kashmir, headed
by Sheikh Abdullah, for the declared purpose
of establishing a constitutional government
for all of Kashmir.
11. The Constituent Assembly elections are
bitterly opposed by Pakistan, and Prime Min-
? ister Kiaquat Ali Khan has threatened war to
prevent them. Although the UN has written
a letter to India stating that the elections are
contrary to the spirit of the March 30 resolu-
tion, Abdullah and the Indian Government
have reiterated their intention to proceed with
the plan.
Basic Objectives of the Parties in Kashmir
12. The dominant motivating force of both
India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue is
nationalism tinged with religion. The issue
focuses the deepest passions of both countries,
and since 1947 public opinion, particularly in
Pakistan, has made it one of national prestige.
To Pakistan, founded on the principle of a
Moslem nation, it seems intolerable that the
largest of the subcontinent's princely states,
containing a predominantly (78 percent)
Moslem population, should be handed over to
India. To the Indians, who have waged a
vigorous campaign to take over the princely
states left uncommitted by partition, it ap-
pears all but unthinkable to give up a state
whose ruler formally acceded to India in 1947.
Nehru's feelings about Kashmir are intensified
by his long association with Sheikh Abdullah,
by the fact that he himself is of Kashmiri
descent, and by his strong belief in the concept
of a secular state embracing both Moslems and
Hindus.
13. Strategically, the Pakistanis view Kash-
mir as an important military gateway that
would enable India to threaten Pakistan's
principal military base area at Rawalpindi and
also major agricultural areas. Indian strate-
gic interest is less marked; a Pakistani Kash-
mir would outflank much of the East Punjab,
but the border terrain is difficult.
14. Economically, Kashmir's trade is with
Pakistan rather than India. Possession of
Kashmir would slightly improve Pakistan's
control over the vital water supply obtained
from the four major tributaries of the Indus
River, though it would not prevent India from
carrying out a present threat to impair the
flow of two of these tributaries that cross In-
dian territory before entering Pakistan.
15. Eventually, both India and Pakistan
might be satisfied with less than the whole of
Kashmir. However, both are adamant in de-
manding control of the Vale area, the heart of
the state, which has a Moslem majority but is
on the Indian side of the cease-fire line.
Political Prospects in the Absence of War
16. India's trump card is its present control of
the Vale. A plebiscite conducted under im-
partial auspices in the near future would prob-
ably produce a majority in the Vale for acces-
sion to Pakistan. However, Indian control,
with the inevitable intimidation and ban on
pro-Pakistan religious campaigning, would
presumably produce a result favorable to In-
dia in any Constituent Assembly elections.
jibiittsirro,
Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
2
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CtiONIM6012A001200020011-3
17. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that
India will postpone or cancel the elections.
There is no indication of any further UN ac-
tion to block the elections and almost no
chance that India would heed the UN if it did
wPOIP take such action.
18. If the elections are held, the resulting
Constituent Assembly will undoubtedly pass
some form of resolution in favor of final affili-
ation with India. Although Indian spokes-
men have conceded that such a resolution
would not be binding on the UN, India will
certainly make maximum propaganda use of
it and may later reverse its position. More-
over, the creation of a constitutional "inde-
pendent" government (in contrast to the
"puppet" Azad Government of the Pakistan-
occupied part of Kashmir) may enlist growing
loyalty and support among the Kashmiris.
In this way the Indians undoubtedly hope
eventually to present the world with a fait
accompli, at least as to the areas now under
Indian control.
19. Confronted by this sequence of events,
Pakistan?if it did not go to war?would cer-
tainly seek further UN action. Because of its
willingness to accept an impartial plebiscite,
Pakistan undoubtedly believes that it has a
superior moral case at this stage of the dispute
and that further UN resolutions will be favor-
able to it. At the very least it can count on
firm political support from Arab and Moslem
nations and to a large extent from the British
Commonwealth nations. Present reports in-
dicate that Dr. Graham has little chance of
obtaining an agreed solution. He may pro-
pose the appointment of an arbitrator (al-
ready rejected by India) or perhaps formulate
his own plan for demilitarization, and these
recommendations would go to the Security
Council. At the same time Pakistan would
almost certainly propose a new resolution
specifically denouncing and refusing to recog-
nize the Constituent Assembly elections.
Reference to the General Assembly in Novem-
ber is also a possibility (and need not mean
withdrawal of Security Council jurisdiction) ;
Pakistan might welcome this move as a more
effective means of bringing the pressure of
world opinion to bear on India.
Indian and Pakistani Military Capabilities*
20. The recent Indian troop movements have
brought India's strength in Kashmir itself to
an estimated 68,000 men. In the East Pun-
jab, India has a striking force of 75,000, in-
cluding an armored division and an independ-
ent armored brigade. Close to the borders of
East Pakistan in Bengal, India has 25,000 to
28,000 men.
21. In Kashmir itself, Pakistani and Azad
Kashmir troops number about 18,000. In the
Lahore-Wazirabad area of the Punjab, Paki-
stan has 57,000 men. Another 15,000 are in
reserve at Peshawar, and could be moved rap-
idly to either front. Elsewhere in West
Pakistan, about 20,000 men are deployed on
internal security. In East Pakistan, Paki-
stan's forces total an estimated 10,000.
22. The Indian Air Force and Navy, though
small, are superior to Pakistan's and India has
far greater trained reserves and manpower
resources. Moreover, India has some indus-
trial capacity for arms production, while Paki-
stan has virtually none and would be heavily
dependent on outside supplies. Another ma-
jor Pakistan weakness is the fact that its
transportation and communications network
in West Pakistan parallels the Indian frontier
and is extremely vulnerable to attack.
23. In an all-out war with Pakistan, India
probably would be victorious provided Paid-
stan received no substantial outside help.
Initially, probably neither country would gain
a decisive victory, and in the first stages
Pakistan might even win some battles. But
in time the balance would be tipped in India's
favor by its over-all advantages. The Indian
Navy could blockade Karachi, West Pakistan's
only major port, and the Indian Air Force
could neutralize the Pakistani Air Force,
though its own offensive capabilities are
meager.
24. In a limited action designed by either
country solely to take all or part of Kashmir,
India would probably also be victorious, but its
* Full details on the comparative strengths of the
Indian and Pakistani armed forces are given in an
Appendix attached to this estimate.
WOWSIQ*
Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
3
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CI 12A001200020011-3
success would not be quick or easy. India's
present troop superiority in the area would be
partially offset by the mountainous terrain
and by the difficulty of bringing up supplies
and reinforcements over the single road be-
tween India and Kashmir. Pakistan's com-
munications into the area are, on the other
hand, relatively good. There are better roads,
easier passes, and lower grades.
25. Important elements is any conflict be-
tween the two countries would be the attitude
of Afghanistan and of the Pathan tribesmen
of the North West Frontier Province. Afghan-
istan itself, which has been diligently courted
by India, would probably make border raids
on Pakistan; past raids have already resulted
in the deployment of elements of two Pald-
stani divisions near the Afghan frontier. On
the other hand, in spite of continuing Afghan
propaganda, some of the Pathan tribesmen
would probably fight again on the Pakistani
side, as in 1947, and if so their warlike quali-
ties would substantially augment initial
Pakistani strength in Kashmir.
26. Weather conditions would seriously ham-
per military operations in Kashmir and the
Punjab until after the Southwest monsoon
ends, generally about 15 September. For a
short time thereafter, major rivers in the
Punjab area would be deep and unfordable,
and it has been reported that flood conditions
now exist in the Lahore area and will prevent
operations there until at least 1 October.
Thereafter, fighting conditions should be most
favorable in Kashmir to the end of November
and in the Punjab until next April, although
winter conditions would not preclude opera-
tions in Kashmir. In Bengal, the monsoon
ends later, and the most favorable period
would be December and January.
Likelihood of War to the End of 1951
Deliberate War by India
27. In general, Indian forces are now deployed
so that they could either conduct defensive
operations or launch strong attacks in the
Punjab and against most of the important
centers of East Pakistan. No other movement
of troops would be necessary for India to make
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-R
war on all fronts, and it is believed that the
Indian forces have sufficient supplies to carry
out at least a major initial attack.
28. We estimate that, despite its troop dispo-
sitions, the Indian Government (GOI) is un-
likely to precipitate a war deliberately during
this period. Its reasons against war are for-
midable: (a) India already controls the dis-
puted area; (b) war would disrupt the Con-
stituent Assembly elections and subsequent
plans; (c) time is all on India's side?even if
the elections were postponed, its possession of
most of the disputed areas would still leave it
in a strong position gradually to win over the
Kashmiris; and (d) any extended war would
be a serious threat to Indian economic and po-
litical stability and would almost certainly
lead to widespread communal rioting between
Hindus and Moslems. The only contrary ar-
guments of any possible weight are that: (a)
a war that led to quick victories in the West
Punjab and East Pakistan would help the gov-
ernment's wavering prestige; (b) most of In-
dia, including Nehru, opposed partition and
would welcome an opportunity to reintegrate
Pakistan. However, Nehru is almost certainly
too well aware of the risks to be swayed by the
first of these considerations, and anti-parti-
tion sentiment does not generally go to the
length of seeking war.
29. Indian actions are consistent with this
view of Indian intentions. Its recent troop
movements were probably designed to fore-
stall Pakistani interference with the Consti-
tuent Assembly elections while further deter-
ring Pakistan by the threat of a Punjab
counterattack.
30. Nonetheless, India is clearly willing to ac-
cept war and is extremely unlikely on its own
initiative to withdraw its forces in such a way
as to relax the tension. In the event of war,
India would be unlikely to permit hostilities
to be confined to Kashmir, but would probably
take advantage of its superiority on the Pun-
jab front and perhaps in Bengal.
Deliberate War by Pakistan
31. Pakistan's troops are deployed defensively,
but are in positions in the Lahore-Wazirabad
area from which they could attack either the
012A001200020011-3
4
Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-
a ? ?
Jammu City area of Indian-controlled Kash-
mir or the East Punjab. In the latter case,
however, an attack could not be in more than
division strength unless forward movements
were first made from the Wazirabad area. The
Pakistani forces in Kashmir itself could not
launch more than a very limited attack at this
time without substantial reinforcements,
which would require major troop movements
from other areas.
32. The Pakistan Govgrnment (GOP) appears
unlikely to precipitate war deliberately. It is
possible, however, that the GOP would delib-
erately launch or sponsor local action in Kash-
mir, as it did in 1947. This possibility will be
greatest during and immediately after the
Constituent Assembly elections (roughly 15
September to 1 November) .
33. There are strong reasons that should deter
Pakistan from resorting to war. In a long war
Pakistan would almost certainly lose East
Pakistan (containing 60 percent of its popula-
tion) and major Punjab areas, and its eco-
nomic and political stability?even its very ex-
istence?would be threatened. However, the
extreme statements of Liaquat and other
Pakistani leaders indicate that they may be
reaching a dangerous mood of frustration in
which these considerations would be out-
weighed by the desire to thwart the Constitu-
ent Assembly elections. Moreover, the Paki-
stani leaders, some of whom tend to be con-
temptuous of Indian fighting qualities, may
believe that their forces could make quick
gains in Kashmir (even to capturing Srina-
gar) and conduct a holding action in the Pun-
jab (possibly aided by the reported floods),
after which Pakistan would appeal for a new
UN cease-fire. Pakistani statements have
used every possible argument to put India in
the wrong and encourage support for a con-
tention in the UN that military action in
Kashmir is justified because of Indian obdu-
racy and the illegality of the Constituent As-
sembly elections. There is some possibility
that Pakistan might encourage both the
tribesmen and the Azad Kashmir forces (aided
by Pakistan regulars "on leave") to attack in
Kashmir and then disclaim responsibility.
GOP leaders might believe that, at the very
2A001200020011-3
least, hostilities in Kashmir would bring about
immediate UN action favorable to Pakistan.
34. If the Constituent Assembly is elected and
convenes, the GOP's course of action will de-
pend on whether the UN offers real hope of a
solution that would offset the effect of the
elections and permit an impartial plebiscite.
The actions of the Constituent Assembly, plus
Indian "crowing," will undoubtedly tend to
increase army and popular pressure for war,
and if the Security Council failed to take even
the steps of denunciation and arbitration, the
GOP might give way to this pressure and start
a war deliberately. However, so long as the
UN appears to GOP leaders to offer any hope
of effective action, the GOP will probably not
resort to war deliberately.
Unpremeditated War
35. Apart from the possibility of deliberate
war, we estimate that there is some chance
that war will be brought on during this period
by a chain reaction of explosive factors. These
include:
a. Unauthorized military action by elements
of the Pakistan Army. For some time a mili-
tant group in Pakistan has agitated for ag-
gressive action. An anti-government plot
from this source was nipped in the bud by the
GOP in the spring of 1951. While a recur-
rence of actual revolt appears improbable,
members of this group might succeed in turn-
ing a border incident into a large-scale con-
flict at any time.
b. Popular feeling in Pakistan. The GOP
has exercised effective control over the press
and radio to date, and US Embassy Karachi
believes the GOP can continue to suppress in-
flammatory statements if it so desires. Nev-
ertheless, the possibility of a dangerous surge
of feeling exists.
c. Renewal of the widespread communal
rioting that took place in Bengal in the spring
of 1951. This would further arouse feeling in
both countries.
d. Indian internal politics. Popular senti-
ment in India is no less intense but notably
calmer than in Pakistan, and Nehru appears
to enjoy virtually unanimous support on the
Kashmir issue. However, some elements of
wariffealti#114
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
5
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA#411,24001200020011-3
the right wing of the Congress Party are sym-
pathetic to the strongly anti-Moslem and anti-
Pakistan Hindu Mahasabha, and there is a
possibility of inflammatory statements for
political advantage.
3. The chance of unpremeditated war arising
from the above factors is likely to diminish
only if there is a substantial relaxation of ten-
sion. Neither side is likely to relax the ten-
sion by withdrawing troops, but there is a
bare possibility that Nehru might make some
conciliatory statement or that he and Liaquat
might temper the situation by meeting to set-
tle subsidiary issues, such as the water dis-
pute. So long as India pursues the Constitu-
ent Assembly plan, the only real chance for
relaxation appears to lie in UN action that
would offer hope, not only to the leaders of the
Pakistan Government but also to the army
and people of Pakistan, that the effects of the
Constituent Assembly plan would be offset.
Consequences of War for US Security
Interests
37. It is unlikely that a war between India
and Pakistan could be confined to Kashmir.
At the very outset of hostilities, the UN might
be able to achieve a cease-fire, though India
probably would not accept one that left Paki-
stani forces in control of the Vale. Once hos-
tilities were fully under way, a cease-fire would
be unlikely so long as either side had hope of
major immediate gains. War on a broad
scale would have a serious effect on US secu-
rity interest.
38. In the first place, war would increase gen-
eral world tension and uncertainty. Diplo-
matically, its immediate effect would be to
subject the US to heavy pressures for support
from both sides. Whether or not the US took
an active role in attempting to settle the con-
flict, war would increase the risk that US
policy might alienate one or both of the parties
and adversely affect their positions in the East-
West conflict.
39. Militarily, war would almost certainly re-
move any early prospect of Pakistan's joining
in plans for defense of the Middle East against
a Communist attack. US security interests
would also be affected directly through the
denial, by an immobilized or neutralist Paki-
stan, of potentially important air base sites
that could be used for bomber strikes against
any part of the USSR.
40. From an economic standpoint, if hostili-
ties spread to Bengal, the shipment of impor-
tant raw materials from Calcutta, including
mica, kyanite, and jute, would be impeded or
halted. General disorder in India might also
cause interruption of shipments of manga-
nese, which would have serious effects on US
industry since over 30 percent of the US sup-
ply currently comes from India. While re-
placements for these supplies could almost
certainly be found in the long-run, there
would be some serious short-run procurement
problems.
41. By far the most important probable de-
velopment, however, would be internal dete-
rioration in India and Pakistan. Although
the outbreak of hostilities might initially
strengthen the respective government's con-
trol, any extended fighting would so weaken
both countries as to make the maintenance of
orderly government a matter of question.
There would almost certainly be vast commu-
nal disturbances and a resulting increase in
the severity of the refugee problem. Such
conditions might permit the Indian Commu-
nist Party to take over various local areas, and
there is a possibility that it would be able, with
Chinese help, to assume control of the gov-
ernment.* Outright Communist control is
extremely unlikely in Pakistan, but a state of
internal chaos and immobilization would be
probable.
* The consequences of Communist control of India
to US security interest vis-a-vis the USSR, espe-
cially in Southeast Asia and the Near East, are
considered in NIE-23, "Position of India in the East-
West Conflict."
6
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : C
APPENDIX
012A001200020011-3
COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS OF INDIAN AND PAKISTANI ARMED FORCES
India Pakistan
I. ARMY
Active strength
Organized National Guard
Major tactical units:
Divisions 8
Independent brigades
Independent infantry battalions
Kashmiri battalions 4
National Guard battalions in service
II. NAVY
Light cruisers
Destroyers
Frigates
Large minesweepers
Lesser types and auxiliaries
III. AIR FORCE
Jet Fighters
Conventional Fighters
Light Bombers
Transports, 2-engine
400,000
1
6 Inf
1 Armd
1 LofC
13
45
10
1
3
6
6 (3 inactive)
18
42 Vampires
91 Tempests
76 Spitfires
27 B-24's
68 C-47's
8 Doves
198,000
2
1 Inf
1 Armd
20
7
' ?
3
4
4 (3 inactive)
8
4 Vickers Attackers
68 Hawker Furies
26 Tempests
6 Halifaxes
36 C-47's, Bristols
'India has been organizing a Territorial Army. Its ultimate size is programmed for 130,000, but thus far
India has had only limited success in recruiting men for this force. The mission of the Territorial Army
is to serve, not as a combat force, but as an internal police force in time of war.
'Pakistan has a part-time National Guard, unarmed, with a personnel strength of about 47,000. (Seven
battalions, totalling about 6,700 men, were recently called to active duty.)
According to their respective tables of organization, Indian divisions consist of about 21,500 men and
Pakistani divisions of about 18,000 men. Brigades of both countries consist of about 3,000 men. However,
Indian units are very elastic and are often considerably over strength.
4Kashmiri battalions in the Indian Army are believed to be at full strength, i.e. 1,000 men per unit, but
they are probably inferior in quality to the regular Indian units. Although the Kashmiri battalions in
the Pakistani Army contain only about 650 men each, they are nearly as good in quality as the regular
Pakistani units.
7
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
2
76
28
24
Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
12065
U.S.s
68
72
76
80
CHINA
CHINA
AM
M U NO6-7"N
Gilgit
5.
36
?? Pe"shawar0
RwalpIrtdI
Fort Sa?-ideman
( Amritsar
Lahore0 t o
'??.?
?,1
32
28
24
oKharan Kalat
oKhairpur./
Hyderabad
JAMMU AND KASHMIR
International boundary
Area in dispute
Approximate cease-fire line between
Indian and Pakistani forces
National capital
Scale 1:11,000,000
100 200 Miles
100 200 Kilometers
RESTRICTED
12065 CIA, 9-51
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
CIA Reproduction
Approved For Release Vi80/08/29 : CIA101110414001012A00120%7011-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGE upE AGENCY
BOARD CF TTATIONAL ESTIIIATES
28 August 1951
ILIKTUalDWFOR: Vr. Allan Evans, OIR
Colonel B. B. Talley, G-2
Captain Ray- Valpass, ONI
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AMIN
Captain R. G. 1161361, JIG
SUBJECT NIE-41: Probable Developments in
the Kashmir Dispute to the End of
1951
1. The attached draft estimate is forwarded
for review.
2. It is requested that your representative
meet with us at 10:00 on Tuesday,; 4 Septoriber, in
Room 146, South Building.
25X1 A9a
Distribution 'gin
Iheautive Secretary
WENT NO:
E IN CLASS. I
.7CDECLA
CLASS. CHANGE S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE;
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE:gt PAW! REVIEWER;
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
Approved For Release *0/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A00120?9011-3
IMIONE*
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGE/ICY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL E3T1MATES
28 August 1951
SUBJECT: NIE.141: PROBABLE DEVEWFIENTS IN THE KASIEM
DISPUTE TO THE OM OF 1951
(For consideration by IAC Representatives)
THE PROBLET1
To estimate probable developments in the Kashmir dispute
during 1951, with particular reference to the possible use of
armed force, and to indicate the consquences for US security
interests, of war between India and Pakistan.
CONCLUSIODE
1. India and Pakistan have reached a critical state of tension
over Kashmir, chiefly because of the plan to hold Constituent Asserili4,
elections between 10 and 30 September in the Indian-controlled area
of Kashmir.
2. The military Agrees of both countries are deployed in
readiness for war, and very few additional measures would be re-
quired for either to go to war.
ArtaidEW
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
Approved For Release li(e0/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A0012000y11-3
3. The Indian Government is unlikely to precipitate mar
deliberately, but is fully prepared to accept mar and will not
act to reduce the tension.
4. While the Pakistan Government is unlikely to precipitate
war deliberately, there is a chance that it will do so to thwart
the Constituent AeseMbly elections. The danger of such action
will be greatest between 15 September and 1 November. It may
decline thereafter if the UN takes effective action toward an
impartial plebiscite in Kashmir.
50 There is sane chance that War will break out because of
army and political pressures arising from the general tension,
which is unlikely to lessen in the period of this estimate.
6. In the event of war, there will almost certainly be
fighting not only in Kashmir) but also in the Punjab and probably
East Pakistan (Bengal). It is unlikely that the UN could effect
a ceasefire unless a stalemate was reached. In any extended
conflict India woad probably be victorious, but its victory
would not be quick or easy.
7. War would Almost certainly produce serious economic and
political dislocation in both countries, regardless of the victor,
and might open the way for a Communist seizure of power in parts
- 2 -
1,8151arm
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
Approved For Release 200/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200e$011-3
011.141w,
or all of India. It might adversely affect US relations with both
countries, and would probably deprive the US of potential air
bases in Pakistan and of certain raw materials from India.
DISCUSSION
The Current Situation
8. Troop movements by both India and Pakistan since !Jay
have greatly increased the tension between the two countries and
the possibility of major hostilities. Almost the entire field
forces of both countries are now deployed opposite each other
in Kashmir itself, and on the Punjab and East Pakistan (Bengal)
frontiers.
9. Pursuant to a Security Council.resolution of 30 Larch 19510
Dr. Frank Graham is now in the subcontinent seeking to achieve
agreement on demilitarization of Kashmir as a prelude to an int,-
partial plebiscite to determine its permanent affiliation. Graham
is due to report to the Council by 29 September, though he may
seek a delay.
10. The chief focus of dispute at the present time is the pro-
jected election of a Constituent Assembly in the area of Kashmir
controlled by Indian forces under the 1949 UN cease-fire and con-
tabling about four-fifths of the population. These elections
are scheduled for 10-30 September, 'under the auspices of the pr
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
- 3
jApprdved For Releavis000/08/29 : CI01012A00124020011-3
Indianrulerof the area, Sheikh Abdullah, for the declared lure
pose of establishing a constitutionel government for 411 of
Kadher.
11. The Constituent AsseMbly elections are bitterly oeposeJ
by Pakistan, and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Than has threatenw: w?ae
to prevent them. .Although the =has written a letter to India
stating that the elections are contrary to the spirit of the March 30
resolution, Abdullah and the Indian Government have reiterated theer
intention to proceed with the plan.
Basic Objectives of the Parties in Kashmir
12. The dominant motivating force of both India and Pakistan
on the Kashmir issue is nationalism tinged with religion. The
issue focusee the detpest passions of both countries, and since
1947 public opinion, particularly in Pakistan, has made it one
of national prestige going well beyond it original foundations.
To Pakistan, founded on the principle of a Moslem nation, it
seems intolerable that the largest of the subcontinent's princely
states, containing a predominantly (78 percent) Moslem population,
should be handed over to India. To the Indians, who have waged
a vigorous campaign to take over the princely states left un-
committed by partition, it appears all but unthinkable to give up
a state whose ruler formally acceded to India in 1947. Nehru's
feelings about Kashmir are intensified by his long association
with Sheikh Abdullah? by the fact that he himself is of Kashmiri
descent, and by his strong belief in the concept of a secular state
ApprohnitAntRoWs412010:01Biliki afrief1R,79 R01012A001200020011 -3 .
- 4 -
'Approved For ReleaU00/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A0012U20011-3
13. Strategically, the Pakistanis view Kashmir as an
important military gateway that would enable India to threaten
Pakistan's principal military bare area at Rawalpindi and also
major agricatural areas. Indian strategic interest is less
marked; a Pakistani Kashmir would outflank much of the East Punjab,
but the border terrain is difficult.
140 Economically, Kashmir's trade is with Pakistan rather
then India. Possession of Kashmir would Slightly improve Pakistan's
control aver the vital water supply obtained from tributaries of
the Indus River, though it would not prevent India from carrying
out a present threat to impair the flaw of two major Indus
tributaries that cross India.
150 Eventually, both India and Pakistan might be satisfied
with less than the whole of Kashmir. However, both aro adamant in
demanding control or the central Vale area, the heart of the state,
which has a Loslem majority but is on the Indian side of the cease-
fire line.
?oliiceQts in the Absence of War
16. India's trump card is its present control of the Vale.
It is generally agreed that a plebiscite conducted under impartial
auspices in the near future would probably produce a majority in
the Vale for accession to Pakistan. However, Indian control with
? 5 ?
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
Wharigff
Approved For ReleaU00/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001W20011-3
the inevitable intimidation and ban on proePakistan religious
campaigning, would presumably produce a result favorable to
India in am. Constituent Assembly elections.
17. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that India will post-
pone or cancel the elections. There is no indication of any
further UN action to block the elections and almost no chance that
India would heed the UN if it did take such action,
18. If the elections are held, the resulting Constituent
Assembly -will undoubtedly pass some form of resolution in favor
of final affiliation with India. -Although Indian spokesmen have
conceded that such a resolution will not be binding on. the UN,
India will certainly make raximum propaganda use of it and may
later change its interpretation ,; Moreover, the creation of a
constitutional "independent" government (in contrast to the puppet
.
government of the Pakietan-occupied part of Kashmir) maarenlist
growing loyalty and support among the Kashmiris. In this way
the Indians undoubtedly hope eventually to present the world with
a fait aceemplin at least as to the areas now under Indian control.
19. Confronted by this sequence of events, Pakistan -- if it
did not go to war -- would certainly seek further UN action. Be-
cause of its willingness to accept an impartial plebiscite, Pakistan
undoubtedly believes that it has a superior moral case at this stage
- 6 -
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
'Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001249)20011-3
*OW'
of the dispute and that further UN resolutions will be favorable
to it. At the very least it can count on firm support from Arab
and Noslem nations and to a large extent from the British Common,.
wealth nations. Present reports indicate that Br. Graham has
little chance of reaching an agreed solution. Ne may propose
the appointment of an arbitrator (already rejected by India)
or perhaps formulate his affn plan for demilitarization, and these
recommendations woad go to the Security Council. At the same
time Pakistan would almost certainly propose a new resolution
specifically denouncing and refusing to recognize the Constituent
AsseMbly elections. Reference to the General Assembly in November
is also a possibility (and need not mean withdrawal of Security
Council jurisdiction); Pakistan might welcome this move as a more
effective means of bringing the pressure of world opinion to bear
on India.
Indian and P
20. The recent Indian troop movements have brought India's
strength in Kashmir itself to an estimted 63,000 nen. In the East
Punjab, India has a pouerful striking force of 7520002 including
an armored division and an independent armored brigade. Close to
the borders of East Pakistan in Bengal, India has 252000 to 28,000
nen.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
001198ffigir
' Approved For Releav.)000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001W20011-3
IstilWM"
21., In Kashmir itself?FakistaraLtroops number about 13,000,
and in the Lahore-Wazirabad area of the Punjab, 57,000. Another
150000 are in reserve at Peshawar, and could be moved rapidly
to either front. Elsewhere in West Pakistan, about 20,000 men
are deployed on guard duty. On the East Pakistan (Bengal) front,
Pakistan's forces total an estimated 10,000.
7.2. The Indian Air Force and Navy,- though smell, are superior
to Pakistan's, and India has far greater trained reserves and man-
power resources. Moreover, India has some industrial capacity for
arms production, while Pakistan has virtually none and would be
heavily dependent on outside supplies. Another major Pakistan
-weakness is the fact that its transportation and commnications
network in Wect-Paktstan parallels the. Indian frontier and is
extremely vulnerable to attack.
23. In an allout war with Pakistan India probably would
be victorious, provided Pakistan received no substantial outside
help. Initially, probably neither country would gain a decisive
victory, and in the first stages Pakistan might even win some
battles. it in time the balance would be tipped in India's favor
by her over-all advantages. The Indian Navy could blockade Karachi,
Pakistan's only major port, and the Indian Air Force could neutralize
the Pakistani Air Force, though its own bombing capabilities are
meager.
- 3 -
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
;Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001e00920011-3
FITY.1124=1.0.p..
In a limited action designed by either country solely
to take all or part of Kashmir, India mould probably Also be
victorious, but its success would not be quick or easy. India?s
present troop superiority in the area would be partially offset
by the mountainous terrain and by the difficulty of bringing up
supplies and reinforcements over the single road between India
and Kashmir. Indian forces mould also be handicapped by cold
weather in aty winter fighting, from December on.
25. Important elements in any conflict would be the attitude
of Afghanistan and of the Pathan tribesmen of the North lest Frontier
Province. Afghanistan Itself, which has been diligently courted by
India, would probably make border raids on Pakistan; the possibility
of such raids is already affecting the disposition of most of two
Pakistani divisions. On the other hand, in spite of continuing
Afghan propaganda, some of the Pathan tribesman would probably
fight again on the Pakistani sides as in 1947, and if so their
warlike qualities would substantially augment initial Pakistani
strength in Kashmir.
26. Weather conditions would seriously hamper military oper-
ations in Kashmir and the Punjab until after the monsoon ends,
generally about 15 September. For a short time thereafter, major
rivers In the Punjab area would be deep and unfordable, and it has
- 9 --
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
? Approved ForReleace2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A0010020011-3
been reported that flood conditions now exist in the Lahore
area and will prevent operations there until at least 1 October.
Thereafter, fighting conditions should be most favorable in
Kashmir to the end of November and in the Punjab until next April,
although winterconditions would not preclude operations in Kashmir.
In Bengal, the Monsoon ends latsr? and the most favorable period
would be December and January.
Likelihood of War to the End of 1951
A0 War by India
In general, Indian forces are now deployed so that they
could either conduct defensive operations or launch strong attacks
in the Punjab and against most of the important centers of East
Pakistan. No other movement of troops would be necessary for
India to make mer on all fronts, and it is' believed that the Indian
forces have sufficient supplies to carry out at leant a major
Initial attack.
280 :Wit estimate that, despite its -troop dispositions, the
Indian Government (GOT) is unlikely to precipitate a mar deliberately
during thin period. Its reasons against war are formidable: (a) India,.
already controls the disputed area; (b) mer mould disrupt the Con-
stituent Assembly elections and subsequent plans; (c) time is all
on India's side -- even if the elections were postponed, its
- 10
Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
eve
Approved For Releac1000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A0010020011-3
editakinitex
possession of most of the disputed areas would still leave it in
strong position gradually to win over the Nashairis; and (d) any
extended war would be a serious threat to Indian economic and
political stability and would almost certainly lead to widespread
communal rioting between Hindus and Ueslems. The only contrary
arguments of any possible weight are that: (a) a war that led to
quick victories in the West Punjab and EhBt Pakistan would help
the government's wavering prestige; (b) most of India0'including
Nehru, opposed partition and 'would welcome an opportunity to re-
integrate Pakistan. However, Nehru is almost certainly too well
aware of the risks to be swayed by the first of these considerations,
and anti-partition sentiment does not generally go to the length
of seeking war.
290 Indian actions are consistent with this view of Indian
intentions:6 Its recent troop movements were probably designed
to forestall Pakistani interference with the Constituent Assembly
elections while further deterring Pakistan by the threat of a
Punjab counterattack. There have been plausible but unconfirmed
reports that before these movements India obtained a copy-of
Pakistani plans for initiating war in Kashmir while conducting a
delgying action in the PUnjabo
U 4
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-It9B1012A001200020011-3
? Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A0013219020011-3
30. Nonetheless, India is clearly-milling to accept war and
is extremely unlikely on its awn initiative to withdraw its forces
in such a way as to relax the tension. In the event of war, India
would certainly not permit hostilities to be confined to Kashmir,
but would take advantage of its superiority on the Punjab front
and perhaps in Bengal.
B. alltatz,......%te_Eal.k.PaLdstan
31* PakistanIs troops are deployed defensively-, but are in
positions from which they mild attack either the Jammu City area
of Indiam.controlled Kashmir or the East Punjab. In the latter -
case, however, an attack could not be in more than division strength
-unless forward movements were first made from the Wazirdbad area
The Pakistani forces in Kashmir itself coUld-not-launch more than
a very limited attack at this tine without substantial reinforce-
ments, Which would require major troop movements -from other areas*
32. Mile the Pakistan Government (GOP) appears unlikely to
precipitate mar deliberately, we estimate that there is at least
a chance that it might do so before, the end of 1951 by launching
a local attack in Kashmir. This possibility will be greatest during
and immediately after the Constituent Assembly elections (roughly
15 September to 1 November). Thereafter it may decline, depending
chiefly on UN developments*
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-
-12-
El ?
R01012A001200020011-3
' Approved ForRelea_se2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A0010020011-3
Steer*
33. There are strong reasons that shotld deter Pakistan
froM resorting to mar. In a long mar Pakistan would almost
certainty lose East Pakistan (containing 60 percent of its popu-
lation) and major Punjab areas, and its economic and political,
stability -- even its very existence-- mould be threatened. H4W-,,
ever, the extreme statements of Liaquat and other Pakistani leaders ?
Indicate that they may be reaching a dangerous mood of frustration
in which these considerations mould be outweighed by the desire to
thwart the Constituent Assembly elections. Moreover, the Pakistani
leaders, who tend to be contemptuous of Indian fighting qualities,
may believe that their forces could maks quick gains in Kashmir
(even to capturing Srinagar) and concinct a holding action in the
Punjab (possibly aided by the reported floods), after which Pakistan
mnuld appeal for a new UN cease-fire. Pakistani statements have
used every possible argument to put India in the wrong and encourage
support for a contention in the UN that military action in Kaahmir
is justified because of Indian obduracy and the illegality of the
Constituent Assembly elections. . There is some possibility that
Pakistan might encourage the tribesmen to attack in Kashmir and
then disclaim responsibility.
34. If the Constituent Assembly is elected and convenes, the
GOPos position will depend on whether the UN offers real hope of a
solution that mould offset the effect of the elections and permit
?13.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
"OEM*
' Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
iinpar.0, 21.ebt9c-,:?te., The aic of the1/4f,enT.tv..,ent
(Awl Ind11-vt A c....rov-inz?" wv.5..cqat...1;,e4.1,y tend tO -..norease ?
ar VE-2?,, and if 'the Lieelmity Col..inoal failed to
takv,,, even tA01:16 atat:41. Girl arbilxat :.on$ thc;UOt
xight giiro. wvir to this 7ret.:sur,i., and:.,.tsrt,a w.ar G..eliberately.
7.-Ieraever :`i.ong as the UN S:pp,tirs GOF leader.. to otfr
hope or effeotivr.....- aoticn.? trip ,1OP til1 rvobatly zt resort to
vir.e.- (le:Libor t after ent scaibly c:Lcet:i..cro it it
has not dc.,re bre.fwe?,
C,
it:, o, do..aberatt. war ? xi? s r:,5:a4..-tora
th.at there &,sox chaitee that vilar uiLLi be broughj.; on 1.i%.1ring this .
per it.A. y ac.iirtn react-1'7'n of ti:c4e5i,re Laetor Thesl?: incl-,:.Ca
IfrO.uthori.v.,ed tatilit.rAry 1)y the iJaitis-?:;In 1.13r
For w,rie lame rallitar.:.t rri L Pa;d.stall i
f:ftetj?:','Fk'so An ;74,11t.710.1.',07011.11.ent
plOt from this source VCAZ; nipped in tho b1,111, 'Dy the
COP .th the sprting of 19,;.1. Vihile a :t'er.r..vm'anoe
1:.otual 4.4ppears improbable Uers
11 i;h ?31f:A.711-L.7141.., abort,ier incident
n (ronflict.:Ac, arv
CCP :has acerriLfzd
;11),cl mdio to date5?,
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
Approved For Releace2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A0010020011-3
.107?480811taw
and 119 Embassy Karachi believes it can continqe
to suppress inflammatory statements if it so de-
sires. Nevertheless the possibility of a dangerous
surge of feeling exists.
c?- enenal of the widespread commanall rioting that took
Place in Bengal in thA spring of 1951. This would
arouse feeling in both countries.
du Indian internalepolitcs. Popular sentiment in India
is no less intense but notably calmer than in Pakistan,
and Nehru appears to enjoy virtually unanimous support
or the Kashmir issue However, llama elements of the
tight lying of the Congress Party are sympathetic to the
strongly anti...Zoe:ism and anti-Pakistan Hindu Lahanabha,
and there is a possibility of inflammatory statements
for political advantage.
360 The chance of unpremeditated war arising from the above
factors is likely to diminish only if there is a substantial re-
laxation of tension. Such a relaxation is unlikely to be brought
about by any conciliatory statement on either side, although there
is a bare possibility that Nehru and Liaquat might temper the sit-
uation by meeting to settle subsidiary issues, such as the water
dispute. But so long as India pursues the Constituent Asemblyplang
the Only real chance for relaxation appears to lie in UN action that
- IS
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
NOW.
' Approved For Releasee 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A0010020011-3
ami
would offer hope, not only to the leaders of the Pakistan
Government but also to the army and people of Pakistan, that
the effects of the Constituent Assembly-plan would be offset0
stmumnsps of War for L6 Sedu_Artr Interests
37. It is unlikely that a war between India and Pakistan could
be confined to Kashmir, .or that MI cease-fire efforts would be.
successful so long as either side had a hope of major immediate
gains. War on a broad scale woad have a very serious effect on
US security interests.
38. In the first place, war would increase general world
tension and uncertainty. Diplomatically, its immediate effect
woad be to subject the US-to heavy pressures for support from
both sides. %ether or not the US took an active role in attempting
to settle the conflict, war mould increase the risk that US policy
might alienate one or both of the parties and affeet their positions
in the Eastjlest conflict. War would almost certainly remove any
early prospect of Pakistan its joining in plane for defense of the
Middle East against a Comennaist attack.
39. Specific US security interests would be affected through
the denial, by an immobilized or neutralist Pakistan, of potentially
important air base sites that could be used for baMber strikes
against any part of the USSR. In addition, if hostilities spread
- 16 .
Approved For Release 2000/08/29.: CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020011-3
ApPrbved For Re!eat:1000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A0010020011-3
voNNWP
to Bengal, ths shipment of inportant raw materials. from Calcutta,
including mica, kyanite? and jute, would be impeded or halted.
General diorder in In1121, eght also Cause interruption of ship-
ments of manganese, -which would have serious effects on US in-
dustry since aver 30 percent of the 113 supply currently comes.
from India, Ihile replacements for these supplies might be found
elsewhere, thlre would be some dislocation.
400 By fr the most important would be the internal conse-
quences in India and Pakistan. Although the outbreak of hostilities
might initial%y strengthen the respective governments control, artv
extended fif.;11-Ung would so weaken both countries is to =Ice the
maintenance of orderly goverment a matter of qucAion. There
would almost oortainly be vast communal disturbances and a resulting
increase in the severity of the refugee problem. Such conditions
might permit the Indian Communist Party to take over various looal
areas, and there is a slight possibility that it would be able, with
Chinese help, to assume control or the government,* Outright
Communist control is extremely unlikaly in PakistRn? but a state or
internal chaos and immobilization would be probab:e.
es of communist control of India to US seeurit-
interest-vis-a-vis the U5S171 especially in Southeast Asia and
the near East, are considered in detail in NiE,23, "Position of
India in the tjest Confiicton
- 17
Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA40206401012A001200020011-3