NIE-41: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE TO THE END OF 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: September 4, 1951
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEITCY
BOARD OF t1ATIOUAL CSTI'ATES
4 September 1951
101MWIDUI1 FOR THE f ItENCE ADVISORY CCR 21fl TEE
SUBJECT: IM-41: probable Developments in the Kashmir Dispute
to the 2nd of 1951
1. The attached draft estimate has been approved by the
Board of National i:stimatea pursuant to a consideration of it by
the IAC representatives.
2. In an effort to restrict the "Conclusions" to bare
essentials, with a minim= of explanation, the Board has shortened
this section of the draft sozaewhat fun, the draft as considered by
the IAC representatives. It is believed that no changes of sub-
stance have been riade in this process.
3. This estimate has been placed on the agenda of the IAC
facet scheduled for .10x30 Thursday, 6 September 1951.
25X1A9a
Distribution "A"
CLASS. CHANGED
bbEctA'S
DATE: M '~ .I REVIEWER:Oi
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ev.ri '~r~~' rte
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
4 September 1951
SUBJEC T a NTL.141, s PROBABLE DVII,Or=Ro1' IN TILE KASIIISIit
DISPUTE TO THE END OF 1951
To estimate probable developments in the Kashmir dispute
during 1951s with particular reference to the possible use of
arated forces and to indicate the consequences for % securit*'
Interests of mar between India and Pakistan,
1n India and Pakistan have once again reached a critical,
state of tension over Kachmirm The nfl.itary force: of both
countrioc are deployed in readiness for mars and very few
additional measures would be required for either to initiate
hostilities.
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2. The Indian Government (GOI) is unlikely to precipitate
war deliberately, but is prepared to accept sear and is unlikely
to act to reduce the tension.
3. The Pakistan Government (GOP) is unlikely to precipitate
war deliberately co long as the MI appears to GOP leaders to offer
hope of effective action. however, there is a possibility that
the GOP would deliberately launch or sponsor local action in Kashmir,
especially between 15 3eptenber and 1 November.
!t. There is some chance that, in the current high state of
tension, military, political, or religious pressures might bring
on hostilities.
5. In the event of war, there will almost certainly be
fighting not only in Kashmir, but also in the Punjab and probably
Bast Pakistan (Bengal). It is unlikely that the UN could effect
a ceasefire, if either side had gained a material advantage from
the fighting.
6o In any extended conflict India would probably be victo.
riou:, but An victory would not be quick or easy.
7. The most important consequence of war would be internal
deterioration in both countries, which might open the way for a
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Comr: unist seizure of power in parts or all of India. In addition,
ar might adversely affect tX3 relations with both countries, and
would probably deprive the LF of potential air bases in Pakistan
and of important raw materials frc n Indian
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The Current Situation
8o Troop mavemenys by both India and Pakistan since May
have greatly increased the tension between the two countries and
the possibility of major hostilities, Almost 90 percent of
India'e and 70 percent of Pakista &e ground ocsbat forces are now
deployed opposite each other in Kashmir itself,, and on the Punjab
and Last Pakistan (gal) frontiers?
9Q , Pursuant to a Security Council resolution of 30 March
19511:, Dro Frank Graham is now in the subcontinent seeking to
achieve agreement on demilitarization of Kashmir as a prelude to
an Impartial plebiscite to determine its permamen-t aff iliartion0
Gram is due to report to the Council. by 29 September, though ha
may seek a a orb
100 The chief fc is of dispute at the present time is the pro-
jected election of a Constituent Lssemb?, in the area of Kashmir
control-led by Indian forces under the 1.R .9 UN cease-fire and oonem
taining about three quarters of the pope ationo These elections
are scheduled far 10-30-September, under the auspices of the pro-
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Indian Government of Kaahmirs headed by Sheikh Abdu11a ,, for the
declared purpose of establishing a constitutional government for
all of Kashmir.
lla The Constituent Assembly elections ab,e bitterly opposed
by Pakistan,, and Prime Minister Kiaquat Ali than has threatened
war to prevent them,, Although the UN has written a letter to 'India
Stating that the elections are contrary to the spirit of the March 30
resolution,, .Abdullah and the Indian Government have reiterated their
intention to pro3eed with the plan,
Basic Objectives of the Parties in Kashmir
l2o The do inant motivating force of both. India and Pakistan
on the Kashmir issue is nationalism tinged with r3ligion, The ;
issue focuses tht deepest passions of both countries,, and since
1947 public opineon,, particularly in Pakistan,, has made it one
of national prestigeo To Pakistn,, founded on the principle of a
Moslem nation,, it seem intolerable that the largest of the sub?
continent?a princely states,, containing a predominantly (78 percent)
Moslem population:,, should be handed over to India, To the Indians,,
who have waged a vigorous campaign to take over the princely states
left uncommitted by partition,, it appears all but unthinkable to
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give up a stag, whose ruler formally acceded to India in l9it7o
Nehru?s feelings about Kashmir 'are intensified by his long association
with Sheikh: Abderlaha by the fact that he himself is of Karhmiri
descent, and by his strong belief in the concept of a secular state
embracing both 3oslsms and Hindus.
13o Strategically, the Pakistanis view Kashmir as an
important military gateway that would enable India to threaten
Pakistan?s principal military base area at Rawalpindi and also
major agricultural areas. Indian strategic interest is leas
,narked; a Pakistani Kashmir would outflank much of the East Punjab,
but the border terrain is difficult.
lLo Economically, Kashmir?s trade is with Pakistan rather
then India0 Possession of Kashmir would slightly improve Pakistanis
control over the vital water supply obtained from the four major
tributaries of the Indus River, though it would not prevent India
from carrying out a present threat to impair the flow of two of these
tributaries, that cross Indian territory before entering Pakistan,,
150 Eventually, both India and Pakistan might be satisfied
with less than the whole of Kashmir. However, both are adamant In
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demanding control of the Vale area, the heart of the state,
which has a Moslem majority but is an the Indian side of the
cease-fire" linen
Political Prospects in the Absence of War
16. Indiape trump card is its present control of the Valeo
A plebiscite conducted under impartial auspices in the near future
would probably produce a majority in the Vale for accession to
Pakistan. However, Indian control, with the inevitable intimida-
tion and ban on pr-wPakistan religious campaigning, would presumably
produce a result favorable to India in sx Constituent Assembly
elections.
17o Thereforre, it is extremely unlikely that India will
postpone or cancel the elections. There is no indication of any
further UN action to block the elections and almost no chance that
India would heed the UN if it did take such action.
18? If the elections are held, the resulting Constituent
Assembly will undoubtedly pass some form of.resolution in favor
of final affiliation with Indian Although Indian spokesman have
conceded that such a resolution would not be binding on the UND
? 7 ca
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India will certainly make maximum propaganda use of it and may
later reverse its position. Moreover, the creation of a constitutional
,independent" government (in contrast to the 11puppets' Azad Govern-
ment of the Pakistan-occupied part of Kashmir) may enlist growing
loyalty and support among the Kashmiris. In this way the Indians
undoubtedly hope eventually to present the world with a fait
acc i at least as to the areas now under Indian control.
19, Confronted by this sequence of events, Pakistan -- if
it did not go to war - would certainly seek' further UN action.
Because of its willingness to accept an impartial plebiscite,
Pakistan undoubtedly believes that it hasa superior moral case
at this stage of the dispute and that further UN resolutions will
be favorable to it., At the very least it can count on firm
political support from Arab and Moslem nations and to a large extent
from the British Commonwealth nations. Present reports indicate
that Dr. Graham has little chance of obtaining an agreed solution.
He may propose the appointment of an arbitrator (already rejected
by India) or perhaps formulate his own plan for demilitarization,
and these recommendations would go to the Security Council. At
the same time Pakistan would almost certainly propose a. new resolution
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specifically denouncing and refusing to recognize the Constituent
Assembly elections. Reference to the General Assembly in November
is also a possibility (and need not mean withdrawal of Security
Council jurisdiction); Pakistan might welcome this move as a more
effective means of bringing the pressure of world opinion to bear
on Indian
Indian and Pakistani Military Capabilities
20. The recent Indian troop movements have brought Indigos
strength in Kashmir itself to an estimated 68,,000 mend In the
East Punjab,, India has a striking force of 759000, including an
armored division and an independent armored brigade. Close to
the borders of East Pakistan in Bengal, India has 25,000 to 289000
21o In Kashmir itself, Pakistani and Azad Kashmir troops
ember about 18,000. In the Lahore=Wazirabad area of the Punjab,
Pakistan has 57,000 mend Another 15,000 are in reserve a;Peshawar,
and could be moved rapidly to either.fronto ,Elsewhere in West
Pakistan,, about 209000 men are deployed on internal securityo In
East Pakistani, Pakistan?s forces total an estimated 10,0000
* Full details on the comparative strengths of the Indian and
Pakistani armed forces are given in an Appendix attached to this
estimated
~9w
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22o The Indian Air Force and Navy9 though smal.l9 are
superior to Pakistan?s and India has far greater trained reserves
and manpower resourceso Moreover9 India has some industrial
capacity for arms production- while Pakistan has virtually none
and-would be heavily dependent on outside supplieso Another
major Pakistan weakness is the fact that its transportation and
communications network in West Pakistan parallels the Indian frontier
and is extremely vulnerable to attacko
23, In an all-out war with Pakistan9 India probably would
be victorious provided Pakistan received no substantial outside
helpo Initially9 probably neither country would gain a decisive
victory9 and in*the first stages Pakistan might even win some
battleso But in time the balance would be tipped in India?s favor
by its overall advantageso The Indian Navy could blockade Karachi9
West Pakistan?s only major porta and the ;ndian Air Force could
neutralize the Pakistani Air Force9 though its own offensive
capabilities are meagero
24o In a limited actt * designed by either country solely
to take all or part of Kashmire India would probably also be
victorious9 but its success would not be quick or easyo India?s
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present troop superiority in the area would be partially offset
by the mountainous terrain and by the difficulty of bringing up
supplies and reiAforcements over the single road between India
and Kashmir, Pakistan?s communications Into the area are, on
the other hand, relatively good, There are better roads,, easier
passes,, and lower grades,
25o Important elements in any conflict between the two
countries would be the attitude of Afghanistan and of the Pathan
tribesmen of the North West Frontier Province, ,Afghanistan itself,
which has been diligently courted by India,, would probably make
border raids on Pakistan; past raids have already resulted in
the deployment of elements of two Pakistani divisions near the
Afghan frontier, On the other hand, in spite of continuing Afghan
propaganda, some of the Pathan tribesmen would probably fight
again on the Pakistani side, as in 1947, and if so their warlike
qualities would substantially augment initial Pakistani strength
in Kashmir?
26o Weather conditions would seriously hamper military oper-
ations in Kashmir and the Punjab until after the Southwest.
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monsoon ends. generally about 15 September. For a short time
thereafter, major rivers in the Punjab area would be deep and
unfordable, and it has been reported that flood conditions now
exist in the Lahore area and will prevent operations there until
at least 1 October, Thereafter, fighting conditions should
be most favorable in Kashmir to the and of November and in the
Punjab until next Apri q although winter conditions would not
preclude operations in Kgshmiro In Bengal,, the monsoon ends
later, and the most favorable period would be December and January,
Likelihood of War to the End of 1951
&, Deliberate War by India
270 Ii general, Indian forces are now depl ed so that they
cad either conduct defensive operations or launch strong attacks
in the Punjab and against most of the important centers of East
Pakistan, No other movement of troops would be necessary for
India to make war on all fronts, and it is believed that the Indian
forces have sufficient supplies to carry out at least a major
initial attack,
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28. We estimate thate despite its troop dispositions, the
Indian Government (G0I) is unlikely to precipitate a war deliberately
during this period. Its reasons against war are formidable: (a) India
already controls the disputed area; (b) war would disrupt the Con-
stituent Assembly elections and subsequent plans; (c) time is all
on ' India ge side - even if the elections were postponed,, its
possession of most of the disputed areas would still leave it
in a strong position; gradually to win over the Kashmiris; and
(d) any extended war would be a serious. threat to Indian economic
and political stability and would :almost certainly lead to widespread
communal rioting between Hindus and aoslema. The only contrary
arguments. of any possible weight are that: (a) a war that led to
quick victories in the West Punjab and East Pakistan would help
the'government?a wavering prestige; (b) most of India, including
Nehmug opposed partition and would welcome an opportunity to re-
integrate Pakistan. However,, Nehru is almost certainly too well
aware of the risks to be swayed by the first of these aonsiderations,,
and anti-partition sentiment does not generally go to the length of
seeking war,
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29. Indian actions are consistent with this view of Indian
intentions, Its recent troop movements were probably designed
to forestall Pakistani interference with the Constituent Assembly
elections while farther deterring Pakistan by the threat of a
Punjab counteratko.
30o N etheless8 India is clearly willing to accept war
and is extremely unlikely on its own initiative to withdraw its
forces in such a way as to relax the tension. In the event of wars
India would be unlikely to permit hostilities to be confined to
Kashmir,, but would probably take advantage of its superiority on
the Punjab front and perhaps In Bengal,
B0 Deliberate War by Pakistan
3110 Pakistan0s troops are deployed defensively,, but are in
positions in the Lahore-Wazirabad area from which they could attack
either the Jammu City area of Indian-controlled Kashmir or the
East Punjab. In the latter cases however' an attack could not be
in are than division strength unless forrard movements were first
made from the Wazirabad area. The Pakistani forces in Kashmir
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INNOW-F
itself could not launch more than a very limited attack at this
time without substantial reinforcements, which would require
major troop movements from other areasa
32o The Pakistan Government (GOP) appears unlikely to
precipitate war deliberatelyo It is possible, however, that the
GOP would deliberately launch or sponsor local action in Kashmir,
as it did in 19I7o This possibility will be greatest during
and immediately after the Constituent Assembly elections (roughly
15 September to 1 November)?
33. There are strong reasons that should deter Pakistan
from resorting to waro In a long war Pakistan would almost
certainly lose East Pakistan (containing 60 percent of its
population) and major Punjab areas, and its economic and political
stability - even its very existence - would be threatened. Hoe-
ever, the extreme statements of Liaquat and other Pakistani leaders
indicate that they may be reaching a dangerous mood of frustration
in which these considerations would be outweighed by the desire to
thwart the Constituent Assembly electionso Moreover, the Pakistani
leaders, some of whom tend to be contemptuous of Indian fighting
qualities, may believe that their forces could make quick gains in
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Kashmir (even to capturing Srinagar) and conduct a holding action
in the Punjab (possibly aided by the reported floods)S after which
Pakistan would appeal for a new UN cease-firoo Pakistani state-
ments have used every possible argument to put India in the wrong
and encourage support for a-contention in the UN that military
action in Kashmir is justified because of Indian obduracy and the
illegality of the Constituent Assembly electionso There is some
possibility that Pakistan might encourage both the tribesmen
and the Azad Kashmir forces (aided by Pakistan regulars "on leave")
to attack in Kashmir and then disclaim responsibilityo GOP leaders
might believe that$ at the very leash, hostilities in Kashmir
would bring about immediate UN action favorable to Pakistano
340 If the Constituent Assembly is elected and convenes.,
the OOPns course of action will depend on whether the UN offers
real hope of a solution that would offset the effect of the
elections and permit an impartial plebisciteo The actions of the
Constituent Assembly, plus Indian 1cruwinge?" will undoubtedly tend
to increase afar and popular pressure for war, and if the Security
Council failed to take even the steps of denunciation and arbitration9
the GOP might give way to this pressure and start a war deliberately.
However, so long as the UN appears to GOP leaders to offer any hope
of effective action, the GOP will probably not resort-to war deliberatelyo
_16-
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CO 3premeditated War
35, Apart from the possibility of deliberate war, we estimate
that there is some chance that war will be brought on during this
period by a chain reaction of explosive factors. These include
ISO Unauthorized military action by elements of the
Pakistan Army. For some time a militant group in
Pakistan has agitated for aggressive action. An
anti-government plot from this source was nipped in
the bud by the GOP in the spring of 19510 While
a recurrence of actual revolt appears improbable,
members of this group might succeed in turning
,a border incident into a large-scale conflict
at any time o
Popular feeling in Pakistan. The GOP has exercised
effective control over the press and radio to date,
and US Embassy Karachi believes the GOP can continue
to suppress inflammatory statements if it so desires.
Nevertheless, the possibility of a dangerous surge
of feeling exists.
17 -
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?o Renewal of the widespread communal rioting that
took place in Bengal in the spring of 19510 This
would further arouse feeling in both countries0
do Indian internal politicao Popular sentiment in
India is no less intense but notably calmer than
In Pakistan1 and Nehru appears to enjoy virtually
unanimous support on the Kashmir issue, Hawever8
some elements of the right wing of the Congress
Party are sympathetic to the strongly anti-Moslem
and antiiPakistan Hindu Nahasabha,? and there is a
possibility of inflammatory statements for political
advantage?
360 The chance of unpremediated war arising from the above
factors is likely to diminish only if there is a substantial re-
laxation of tensiono Neither side is likely to rely the tensico
by withdrawing troops but there is a bare possibility that Nehru
might make some conciliatory statement or that he and Liaquat might
temper the situation by meeting to settle subsidiary issuess such
as the water dispute0 So long as India pursues the Constituent N
Assembly plan,) the only real chance for relaxation appears to lie
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in UN action that would offer hope, not only to the leaders of
the Pakistan Government but also to the army and people of
Pakistan, that the effects of the Constituent Assembly plan would
be of!seto
Conse of War for US Seeerit Interests
370 It is unlikely that a war between India and Pakistan
could be confined to Kashmiro At the very outset of hostiili ties,Q
the IN might be able to achieve a caa aes-five though India probat r
'would not accept one that left Pakistani forces in control cif' the
Valet Once hostilities were fully under way, cease-fire would
be unlikely so long as either side had hope of major immediate
gains0 War on a broad scale would have a serious effect on US
security interesto
38 In the first place,, war would increase general world
tension and un.certai,ntyo Diplunaticallye its i edi.ate effect
would be to subject the US to heavy pressures for stupport from
both sideso tether or not the US took an active role in attempting
to settle the conflict, war would increase the risk that US policy
'M 19
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might alienate one of both of the parties and adversely affect
their positions in the East-West conflict,
39, Militarily, war would almost certainly remove any
early prospect of Pakistan's joining in plans for defense of the
Middle east against a Communist attack, US security interests
would also be affected directly through the denials by an immobilized
or neutralist Pakistan, of potentially important air base sites that
could be used for bomber strikes against any part of the USSR,
40o From an economic standpoint, If hostilities spread to
Bengal, the shipment of important raw materials from Calcuttan
including Baca, kyanites and jute, would be impeded or halted,
General disorder in India might also cause interruption of ship-
manta of manganese, which would have serious effects on US in-
dustry since over 30 percent of the US supply currently comes
from India- While replacements for these supplies could almost
certainly be found in the long-runs there would be awe short-run
procurement problems,
i1, By far the most important probable develop ants however,
would be internal deterioration in India and Pakistan0 Although
the outbreak of hostilities might initially strengthen the respective
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governments' control, any extended fighting would so weaken both
countries as to make the maintenance of orderly governmeit a matter
of question, There would almost certainly be vast communal dis-
turbances and a resulting increase in the severity of the refuges
problem, Such conditions might permit the Indian Communist Party
to take over variozm local areas, and there is a possibility that
it would be able, with Chinese help, to assume control of the
governmento* Outright Communist control is extremely unlikely
in Pakistan, but a state of internal chaos and immobilisation would
be probable,
The consequences of Communist control of India to US security
interest vis-a-vis the USSR, especially in Southeast Asia and the
Near East, are considered in NIE 23s '$Fbsition of India in the
EastWest Conflict,"
?21`^
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NM-41 APPENDIX
COMPAR.A.TIVE STRENGTHS OF INDIAN AND PAKISTANI ARMED FORCES
India
Pakistan
Active strength
laoo,OOO
198,000
Organized National Guard
a
b
Major tactical units:
Divisions c
6 Info 1 Arrrxi, 1 Loft
I Inf
Independent brigades
13
1 Axed
Independent infantry batallions
45
-
Eashr 1 battalions d
10
20
National Guard battalions in service
7
a. India has been organizing a. Territorial Army. Its ultimate size
is programmed for 130,,000, but thus far India has had only limited
success in recruiting man for this force The mission of the
Territorial Array is to serve,.. not as a combat forces but as an
internal police 'force in time of war,
b? Pakistan has a part-time National Guard, unarmed., with a personnel
strength of about b7,,0000 (Seven battalions, totalling; about
6,700 mane were recently called to active duty.)
co According to their respective tables of organization', Indian
divisions consist of about 21,500 man and Pakistani divisions of
about 18,000 men? Brigades of both countries consist of about
3,000 men. However, Indian units are very elastic and are often
considerably over strength.
d. Kashmiri battalions in the Indian Army are believed to be at full
strength, i0e, 1,000 men per unite but they are probably inferior
in quality- to the regular Indian units. Although the Xashmiri
battalions in the Pakistani Arniy contain only about 650 men e ach,
they are nearly as good in quality as the regular Pakistani units
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II,
NOT
India
Pakistan
Light cruisers
1
`?"
Destroyers
3
3
Frigates
6
4
Large minesweepers
6
(3 inactive)
8 (3 inactive)
Lesser types and auxiliaries
18
III. AIR FCCE
India Pakistan
Jet fighters 22 Vampires* 1 Vickers Attacker**
Conventional fighters 328 Tempests 84 Hawker Furies.
Light Bombers 27 B-24?a 7 HaliCaze8
2-engine Transports 57 24
India has 17 additional jet fighters on order from the UK. None
of the 22 on hand have been assigned to tactical units.
Pakistan has 35 additional. Jet fighters on order from the UK. Its
one jet on hand is not assigned to a tactical unit.
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