POTENTIAL ECONOMIC GAINS OF THE U.S.S.R. RESULTING FROM THE ACQUISITION OF CONTINENTAL WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001200010026-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: December 10, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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'she; Sc-71et Union through the acquisition of Continental Western
Europa oy4S.. under ttana conditions acquire.
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TI) ''IvTIAIJ ECONOMIC CAIRNS OF T U.S,: S,B, RESUIJING FROM THE
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Ar oxe:i ;tai r1,-9m (Table 9-A)
An estimated production capaoit7 by mid-1952 of some 8,700 armored
vehicles per an mm. In &4ition the Soviet Union would acquire some of the
15,5001 armored hides now inventoried as jr el in Western Europe,
b. & , 7$ mm and above (Tab] o 9--S)
In addition, the Soviet Union would acquire an estimated production
capacity by raid.-4952 of batter titan 9,%00 artillery pieces per annum. Also the
Soviet Union would acquiro some of the 20,500 artillery places now inventoried
as L- 1t e ; ine W~, ,eatern EuTopci p,
C. , (Table 9-C)
The Soviet Union would also acquire an estimated production-capacity
by mid-1952 of 334,400 metric tons of explosives per anr=. While it is im-
possible to estimate the mate .,.c tonnage of explosives in Western Europe
which might be acquired. by the Soviets, it would unquestionably be a substantial
J~ ou.nt o
tl. h i a. ' at e , (Table 13_B)
As no OW agent stockpiles are j n in Western Europe. and as
production installations for their manufacture are neglk-;t "n, there would be
no potential economic gain for the Soviet Union through the acquisition of
It is estimated that the Soviet Union is current].
DATE: 3.~'I,.~f.t . L
a. ds.Y'rutclM -01ii9i", AUTH: HR 70.2
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Western Europe in the field of CW agents. DOCUMENTNO.
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6,000 armored vehicles anmally within the U.S.S.R. (a margin of error is
recognized, in this estimate; maximum probable production may be 7,500) and is
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capable of increasing this production within two years, from already available
facilities, to 30,000 per annunn. In addition, the Soviet Satellites of
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany rroduce component parts for Soviet-
model armored vehicles, i.e., transmissions. differentials, tracks, turrets
and armor plate most of which is shipped to the U.S.S.R. for assembly. chile
it is estimated that Continental. Western Europe will attain a production
capacity of approximately 8, ?00 armored vehicles per annum by mid-1952, it is
doubtful that the Soviet Union would utilize this pradnetion capacity, at
least initially, for other than repair andaaaintenanoe purposes as it is
currently esti,j-.meted that the U.S.S.R. now has some 60,000;rmored vehicles
.n-being.
b. Argil.
As in the case of armored vehicles, the U.S.S.R. is also
estimated to have an impressive inventory of artillery pieces, namely, 110,000
pieces of 76 mm and above. Also, by mid-1952 it is estimated that the U.S.S.R.
will have a production capacity of 100,000 pieces of artillery per annum. it
is estimated that Continental Western Europe will attain a production capacity'
of 10,000 pieces of artillery per annum by mid-1952. It seems doubtful, In
view of the Soviets apparent policy to limit the production of ordnance# even
among their Satellites, that they would implement a vast production program
in newly acquired.territory. However, in view of their anticipation of a
sea-borne invasion, it seems probable that they might direct at least a portion
of this capacity to the production of coastal and anti-aircraft guns.
C, E loaiyes
The estimated production of explosives for Continental Western
Europe for 1951 is just short of 200,000 metric tons for all types. It is
estimated that by mid-1952 this annual rate of production could be increased
to some 205,000 metric tons, while the total production capacity is estimated
at 334,400 metric tons. By comparison. it to estimated that the U.S.S.R.
alone produced some 200,000 metric tons of explosives during 1951 and will
produce at an annual rate of 300,000 metric tons by mid-1952. It is further
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estimated that by mid.-1952 the U.S.S.R. will have a production capacity of
750,000 metric tons of explosives. On the basis of the foregoing estimates,
the Soviet Union could increase her potential production capacity for
explosives by nearly 50 porrcent through the acquisition of the production capacity
of Continental Western Europe.
Ate Ap 91
Cheimicajjfhr~
The Soviet Union is estimated an of the and of 1951 to hare an
lflVeat0Z7 of 580,000 metric tone of OW agents. By mid-1952 it is estimated
they will have a production capacity of 150,000 metric tons per annum of CW
agents. There are no CW Plants in Continental Western 1iurope known to be
in production of OW agents except for experimental purposes and the output
of these, if placed in fVt1 operation, would be almost neg1ige.ble.
3. Sts I A
The following tables are attached hereto:
Table 9-A, Armored Vehicles
Table 9-B, Artillery
Table 9-0, Explosives
Table 13-B, Gtr Agents
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