PROPOSED NIE ON 'RESISTANCE OF BURMA TO INSURGENT FORCES ASSISTED BY AID FROM COMMUNIST CHINA IN 1951'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001100010009-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2000
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: April 23, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMON plowed For Release 2001 /08/315 E R I9ROl 029001100010009-8
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
State Dept. declassification & release
instructions on file
April 23, 1951
Proposed NIE on "Resistance of Burma to Insurgent Forces
Assisted by Aid from Communist China in 19
There are indications that the Chinese Communists are in the
process of implementing their agreement to provide' military aid tc
the Burma Communist Party forces and are training Burmese insurger=t
cadres in Yunnan. Meanwhile, insurgent groups within Burma are ir-
creasing their military cooperation and taking the initiative against
the Goverrgnent. Traditional Chinese claims to Northern Burma, the
absence of effective Burmese border defenses, the presence of Chir:ese
Nationalist troops in Burma which might serve as a pretext for Chinese
Communist Action against Burma, and the increasing prospect of a
unified insurgent action against the Government all contribute to
growing apprehensions as to the ability of the Government of Burnu to
maintain itself against these threats.
These considerations suggest that an NIE should be prepared e.s
a matter of urgency. Such an estimate might cover the following
points:
1. Communist Intentions toward Burma.
2. Present Stage of Chinese Communist Plans and Operations for
Military Assistance to Burmese Insurgents.
3. Chinese Communist Capabilities for Military Assistance to
Insurgents in Burma,
a. Strength and disposition of Chinese Communist forces in Yunnan.
b. Availability of materiel for supplying Burmese insurgents.
c, Availability of transport and access to routes for supplying
Burmese insurgents,
d. State of readiness of Burmese cadres training in Yunnan,.
(1) Naw Seng forces
(2) Burmese Communist cadres
e. Potentialities of opposition forces in Yunnan to obstra t
Chinese Communist operations and activities connected.
with aid to Burma.
DOSUNUIT
N?'111,flra
11 Vim. E`.L~.
(;LASS r"!
Capaci~,ay
8/31 &LtR01012A001100010009-8
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.4. Capacity of Burmese Insurgents to Utilize Chinese Communist
Military Assistance.
a. Strength and disposition of insurgent forces in Burma.
b. Military aptitude and training*
c. Cooperation between insurgent groups.
d. Attitude of insurgent groups and local population towar-
Chinese Communist military assistance.
(1) Toward materiel aid
(2) Toward use Chinese Communist advisors
(3) Toward Chinese "Volunteers"
e. Potential strength of insurgent groups if supported by
Chinese Communists,
f. Capabilities of insurgent forces to maintain strength
until receipt of Chinese Communist aid.
5.
Capabilities of Government of Burma Forces to Deal with Insurgents
supported by Chinese Communist Military Assistance.
(1)
Materiel aid
(2)
Advisors
(3)
Chinese "Volunteers"
6.
Conclusions.
Approved For Release 2001/0 CR P79R01012AO01100010009-8
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