C-2 CONTRIBUTION TO N.I.E. -36: BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL OF THE PRESENT REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001100010006-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: NIE

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TAB "A"
0-2 CONTRIBUTION TO N.I.E.-36:
BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL OF THE PRESENT REGIME
*ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File*
I. STABILITY AND___ MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT
H. Size, Combat Effeotiveness and Reliability of the Military Forces
1. Ground Forces
a. Strength and Composition -- Regular and auxiliare Burmeue
ground forces are estimated to number 43,000 troops at present.
The Bums Army has an estimated strength of 26,500, orgen-
leed into four brigades and sixteen battalions.. It funotions almeatexclusiv&e.
as an infantry foroo. Supporting forooe are negligible; artillery le both lim-
ited and ineffective; a few reconditioned tanks supplemented by some.nore mrdern
personnel carriere function as an armored-oar squadron.
The Union Military Police (UMP), with an eatimatee't etrength
of 22,500, are nominally under control of the Home Office, but
re sebject to
Army taatical control in operational areas. They are organised and armed as
fifteen lightly-equipped infantry battalions and should be regarded at static
infantry rather than police.
The Government has from time to time organieed various
additional emergency or auxiliary forces, but at present those larger/ have
been absorbed into the regular components. The principal function of those
groups has been to provide small unite for local security. They areHlsualle
raieed within the area to which they are assigned and are onganiged de a com-
pany basis.
b. Direosition -- The major portion of Bur's milittry
etrength is located in the strategic central valley, deployed along bet% the
road and rail and the Irrawaddy River lines of communication between teapoon
and Mandalay. A few unitu occupy the larger towns along tho Arakan otilatei
strip and the Tenaneerlen Peninsula. The Chinese frontier area ha e a eeht
guard of two UMP battalioes and one Army battalion in the Kaohin State, one
Army battalion at Lashio, and one compere! in Kengtung.
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C. Arne. Equipment, and Logistical Considerations .- It ie
extremely difficult to obtaia accurate information on stocks of weapons and
equipment in Burma, a fact which has contributed to the poor relatiens exist-
ing between the British Services Mission and the Burma Army. The majority of
equipment and ordnance is Britieh, but there is some of Indian, ItaItan, Freaaa
Japanese, and United States manufacture. Although there are believid to bo
some reserves of weapons, reportedly sufficient to equip about five battalions.
these are primarily infantry small arms. There is little artillery and there
are few modern infantry matitank weapons, such as baaoolems. A *mai) arms and
ammunition factory of unknorm capacity hae been established near Raracon.
Despite reported weapon reserves and British and Com more
wealth assistance, estimated to have been sufficient to equip 30 battalions,
many it both of individual and organization 1 equipment are apparsntly in
short supply, principally transport and signal communicatioae. Negctiations
are in progress for additional personnel carriers. Poor maintenance, shortage
of spare parts and trained pereonnel, however, contribute to the sho.tage ef
general transport.
d. Re/lability, loyalty, and morale -- In the pant, loyalty
of the troops to the Government has been questionable. Defections azong the
regular forces have occurred from time to time because of either rao al or
political eym thiee. The Burmese do not completely trust the minorkty raciai
elements in the Armed Forces, altnaough these units from minorities haat bqlsi
among the beat in the Army, and, leith the exception of the Karen unies, have
proven reliable. The organieation of the "Sitwundan" or Socialist Party levie
was designed partly to generate a body of troops of assured loyalty te the
party and Government. The later reorganisation and integration of t!'e pot-
cally reliable elements into the regular forces, as well as the eat& liehmeat
of a "loyal officers net" on the basis of personal loyalty to the Suaeomo CI
mander, Lieutenant General No Win, appear to have secured for the Presant t;,e
continued loyalty to the High Comaand of the majority of units.
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An imporeant element in the long-term reliabilite of
Burmese troops ie the morale factor. It is charaoteriatic of Burmes) morals
that "nothing succeeds lik
defeate by reinforc
cr
euccess." Consequently, a period of opesationa'S
d ineurgent groups probably would be reflected 1 in-
ased defections. Similarly, operations against a heavy Chinese Cemmunist
offensive probably would degenerate quickly into mere guerrilla actiseity
e. Training -- in the tumultuous post-independence eeried,
training has been extremely limited and inadequate. Training now ha e been
reamed on a small scale; the British Services Mission-is oarryihg cAl some
staff and adminietrativo traineng. . However,. Burmete reluctance to eiee the
British Mieeion has limited individual officer and noncomminsioned deeicer
training. Consequently, a serious shortage of adequately-trained leedera
exists.
There is little direct information on unit traineeg.
Since new units are often committed to operations within three monthe of
formation, it is believed that little organised unit training is coneeoted.
The training of supporting arms and services is unsatisfactory. Artellery
is reportedly incapable of controlling indirect-fire. Engineers avi had nu
training in field duties, and are often used as infantry.
1. Tactics and Strategy -- Operations have been omeinoel to
the use a emall-unit infantry tactics. Aecently, several battaliene have
been brigaded, principftlly for adminietrative purposes, but only rarely 'neve
boon called upon to perform an operational mission. The scale of mote oeere-
tions and the functioning or the usual coMmand organization are revelled by
the fact that Eattalions are seldom fought as a whole. Operations nermally
consist of attacks upon insurgent-held town e and villages and of patrelline
missions during the static occupation of an area. Occasionally combieed opera-
ton, in which infantry unite are supported by river craft of the Buena Nave,
are undertaken. The Air Force also renders limited air eupeort, incleding
reconnaissance, strafing, and light bombardment missions against insuegents.
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The over-all strategy eine? 1949 has followed the Burma e
War Office plan to reopen the vital lines of communications to Mandalay and
coincidentally to isolate the principal ineurgent groups. Mhile offensive
tactical operations designed to reduce or destroy the insurgent forces have
been a part of this strategy, it is becoming increasingly clear that the ba ic
concept has been of a defensLve nature. With the successful completjon of
this phase of operations, the Government has been unable to assume the etrate-
gio offensive and apparently lacks a plan or is unable to undertake Airther
reduction of the insurgents.
C. Capabilities of the Military Forces and Recent Operations
Despite the foregoing serious limitations of the Armed Forces by
Western standards, a realistic estimate of Burmese capabilities can be made
only in relation to the insurgent forces with which they are engaged, Untie
early 1950 the Armed Forces have made substantial progress against the insur-
gents in their tactical offensives which opened the, lines of communication
to central Burma. These operations accurately reflect the Governmonts im-
proved capabilities against the armed dissidents. The Armed Forces Lre capable
of concentrating a sufficient force to operate almost anywhere withia Burma
but only at the risk of so weakening other Government-occupied areas as to ren-
der them exposed to insurgent attack. Furthermore, it must be noted that al-
though these operations have reduced the strength of the insurgents snd their
capabilities to establish and maintain control of important areas, 'Wetly have
accomplished little in the reduction of insurgent capabilities to coeduct con-
tinued guerrilla operations. In addition, the heavy commitment of armed forcer
in the central area of Burma prevents the adequate garrisoning of the border
regions gainst Chinese Communist infiltration or activity. Against legree-
sion by any considerable number of Chinese Communists, the Burma Armed Forces
could render no more than token resistance.
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II. aumagg AND MENTIONS 91.,ThiLiatillakFaaLMS
A. ILosen.1.1.ties and Objectives of_LmarsLEIrsme.
The Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) sus formed as
an instrument of the Karen Independence Movement and functioned as the
Karen Armed Forces. The KNDO has an estimated current active strength
of 1,500 in the Delta area and approximately 2,500 in eastern Burns. There
remain, however, many thousands more who are armed, though not adequately
? supplied with ammunition, but who are not presently in active opposition
to the Government. The KNDO still has the capability of conducting
sive guerrilla activities against Government-held areas.
Communist insurgents in Burma are split into two factions:
Burma Communist Party (BCP) or White Flags and the Communist Party a.f.'
Burma (up) or Red Flags.
The White Flag BCP, under the leadership of Thakin Than Tun, is
the larger and more influential group. Its numerical strength is estimated
at 5,000. The BCP also commande considerable popular support throw)!
"front" organizations and from the above-ground pro-Communist Burma torkerst
and Peasants' Party. Its leadership is reported to be the best of aay of
the insurgent groups, and its ideological indoctrination the most ripid.
Az the logical recipient of Chinese Communist aid it is probably the most
dangerous insurgent element in Burma and is capable of maintaining ccnstant
guerrilla pressure on the Government. The White Flags have suffered-aela-
tively the least reduction in strength from the Government tactical offens
in the Irrawaddy Valley.
The purpose behind continued White Flag activity appears to.
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fold: (1) To prepare for an eventual attempt to seize power through armed
action; and/or (2) so to weaken the Government through constant militaay
pressure as to enable the-above-ground Communist apparatus to bring Barns
into a pro-Communist alignment.
The "Red Flag" Communist Party of Burma is a small but active group,
ordinarily regarded as the "Trotskyite" faction of Burmese Communism. Its
activities reportedly have degenerated into sheer banditry. "Red Flap"
strength probably is not more than 500 or 1,000. Its greatest threat is the
capability of creating and prolonging the general unrest in Burma.
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The present White Band People's Volunteer Organization (W i),
composed.. principally of veterans and guerrillas of various wartime
military groups, is the insurgent faction of the PV0 which went under-
ground in opposition to Socialist Party domination of the AFPFL coalition
Government. This group recently has suffered the most significant reduc-
tion in strength and capabilities because of large-scale surrenders to
the Government. The rezaining'elements probably do not now number tore
than 3,000.
B. Present and Future Possibilities for Combined Anti-Government
mo,a4..ommarxwa6aaasca.,.. .
42,:tlejljay_leisuiegiisteFee?ces.
1. Extent of Present Cooperation, If Any.
Although there have been many reports of agreements betleen
the various insurgent groups for cooperation against the Government, evi-
dence of widespread cooperation is slight, although it ie undoubted].,
true that the BCP is attempting to expand its influence and to enlise the
cooperation of other groups.
Cooperation between the White Flag Communists and the P1.0 in
the so-called "Democratic Front" is of long standing, and at one tin vas
the controlling coalition throughout a large part of the insurgent-centrolled
area in the Irrawaddy Valley. Government pressure on the PV0s resulted in
their defection and the quick collapse of the Front. It is reported that
the remaining insurgent PlOs are still co6perating with the BOP, which is
reestablishing "Democratic Front" areas.
The Red Flags are reported to have made local agreements with
the BCP for a division of spoils and for administering areas controllId as
a result of joint operations. As yet there is no evidence of extensive. *NDC
cooperation, except in operations in the Delta area, although the BCP has
made the strongest effort to eain their support.
To date, the princfloal effect appears to have been the reduc-
tion of conflicts between insurgent groups rather than an effective degree
of coordination between the insurgent groups on a wide scale. There Nis,
however, been a tendency, particularly in the Delta area where Beall lend
of the different insurgent bodies are in close juxtaposition, to compeee
their differences and to effect a certain degree of local cooperation in
operations.
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2. Extent of Willingness to Cooperate.
While cooperation probably can be achieved temporarily Tor
operations against the Government through the promises of supplies wed
anneeition, it is unlikely that the various insurgent groups will be able
to agree upon the division of administrative authority over controlled
areas because of differing objectives and personal loyalties.
3. Capabilities for Combined Insurgent Operations..
Capabilities for extensive combined insurgent operatione
are believed to be negligible at present.
C. Chinese Communist Aid.
1. Degree and Nature of Aid or Control Which Insurgent Forces
Would Seek or Accept.
The nature of the aid and the element of control which uould
be acceptable to the insurgent groups undoubtedly vary greatly betweun
groups and no real evidence for an accurate Judgment exists. It is probable
that all insurgent groups would welcome supplies and ammunition but it is
doubtful, for example, whether the KNDO would accept Burmese Contunitts as
advisors, and extremely unlikely that they would, as a condition for secur-
ing aid, accept Chinese Communist al'. BCP control. On the other hand, the
BCP is reported to have accepted Chinese Communist control ever BCP olicy
direction, although even this was reputedly not acceptable to all the leaders
of the BCP. The other insurgent groups probably would be willing to lccept
a limited degree of control in the form of agreements to cooperate wieh the
BCP in return for tangible aid.
2. Present Nature and Teekel of Chinese Communist Assistance To
Insurgent Groups...
Adequate evidence to determine accurately the present exe;ent
of Chinese Communist assistance to the BCP is not available. It has leen
reported, however, on at least two occasions, that negotiations between
the BOP and the Chinese Communists were under way and that definite cemmit-
ments for aid were received. To date, however, the principal element of
such aid appears to be the organization of training facilities in YUnten and
the appointment of 'Chu Chia-Pi, outstanding Yunnanese Communist guerrilla
leader, to assume direction of training and control over guerrilla activities
in North Burma. A part of this effort is amervntlY dexoteed. to
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Naw Seng, a renegade insurgent Kachin leader who was driven out of Bu-ma
as a convenient tool who is entirely under Chinese Communist dominatiene.
It is probable that at least some training of the BCP is being carried on
in Yunnan. It is doubtful whether more than a few Chinese Communist edvisors
are at present in Burma for liaison or for training the BCP.
One additional significant factor, reported during the fell
of 1950, is the movement of the in BCP concentration northuard into the
Sagaing District, presumably to develop a base area close to the border in
which supplies and assistance could more easily be received from the Chinese
border. This movement has recently been reported to have been atendolied by
the BCP, and their main concentration is again reported to be in the :legu
Yomas and the Yamethin-Pyninment Districts.
3. Effect of Present Levels of Aid of Insurgent Capabilities,
Present aid to the insurgents will probably have the iniiial
effect of perceptibly increasing dissident attacks on Government-held areas
and lines of communication. Such activity is to be anticipated during the
forthcoming elections. In the long run, continued aid at the present levels
would probably enable insurgent elements to continue their activities end
thwart all Government efforts to restore essential peace and order. Ihe
continuation of unstable conditions in Burrs would reduce the prospeete
for survival of the present regime and might conceivably permit or encourage
the establishment of a pro-Communist regime.
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CAPABILITIES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS TO INTERVENE
DIRECTLY OR alEmmy.
A, Chinese Communist capabilities to provide materiel
and technical assistance.
Although materiel assistance to the Burmese and other south
East Asia insurgents was doubtless available following Chinese Commenist
consolidation of South China in late 1949, there are indications that the
Chinese Communists themselves are now becoming hard pressed for certain
items, notably ammunition, because of large expendituresin Korea. fhere are
increasing signs that available stocks in China are being diverted to the
Korean front, raising the question as to Communist ability to suppoeb with
materiel rebel activities in other areas. Combined with the Korean ex-
penditures an a limiting factoe are the increase in Chinese Communiet armee
forces and the mobilization of militia to combat local unrest and ix-intent
lines of communication. In view of these factors, it seems unlikel:' that
the Chinese Communists can supply large quantities of arms andepeepteett
to the Burmese insurgents in the near future.
The Chinese Communists are, however, capable of delivering
small quantities of arms and equipment to the Burmese Communists but with
limited hindrance due to rugged terrain, poor communications, or the
Interference by anti-Communiet guerrillas and the $500 to 4000 exeNstionaliet
troops operating in the vicinity of the 1hnnan-B1rme border. There is
border control and the flaw of materiel is not hampered except by the
above mentioned factors.
Increased levels of aid, including small quantities of as and
equipment, mould probably resteat in a significant increase in Burmese
Communist capabilities and in the long run would probably permit thi:
establishment of "liborated areae for the ultimate assault on and dentrletior
of the present government.
B. apliAls of ths.91.1,nese Communists to Eald2.2124,:t.do
forces assuming_present commitments elsewhere.
Chinese Communist Forces presently disposed within 150 miles
of the Burma border number approximately 200000. In addition there aee
no
214,000 in the general areaYannan-Southera.iimomi
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removed from the border area but available for deployment along the aurmese
and Indochinese border areas, Farther north, but capable of being etilizecl,
are some 45,0oo in the SikangeSouth Seechwan-Kweichow area, The trend of
recent troop movements, however, seems to be not in the direction (x Surma.
but eastward toward the Kwangtung-Fukien area and north of the Indoihnese
border, Thus, though a total of soda 259A00 CCF troops are availat,le for
use against Burma, their present dispositions and movements do not Jndicate
their probable use against Burma in the near future,
In view of the problem of maintaining local security an: providing
manpower for the Korean operation, it appears doubtful that the Chirose
Communists could commit more than 50,000 regular troops to an operation in
Burma,
IV. CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS TOWARD BURMA
A, Chinese Communist objectivesurobable nature of are
Soviet_m2fRonte retord_tra_Burntao
Chinese Communist objectives with regard to Burma are dot otless
the same as for the rest of Southeast Asia, namely, eventual domination as
a part of an Asian bloc of Comemnist states, To accomplieh this objective
the vehiclo of indigenous dissident elements is likely to be used, beth in
Burma and in other Southeast Asian countries, This is substantiated by
events to date in this area, It is reasonable to assume that the Chinese
Communists will continue to attempt to gain their enda in Burma by iadirect
means,
Chitese-
No reliable information is available regarding the conclz ion
of any Chinese-Soviet agreemolf:a eegarding Burma. It is to be expeced
that the Chinese Communists will be most anxious to secure recognitim by
the Soviets of paramount Chinese interest in Southeast Asia, It is elm()
quite probable that any agreement would contain claims as to Chinese
Communist military responsibilities in the area in the event of gene-al var
and delineation of responsibilities for providing training and equip nit
to Burmese dissident elements both before and after the outbreak of lorlde
wide hostilities, Any SinceeSoviet agreement regarding Southeast Asia
probably would include provisions for the use of China as a base of cpara-
tions.
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B. Effect, if any, of war in Korea on Chinese Communist int3ntions,
The extent of the effort now being made by the Chinese Cemmunises
in Korea has a direct bearing on Communist intentions in the rest of Asia.
Although ultimate intentions remain the same (i.e0 eventual dominat%on)
nevertheless a lessening of effort toward the rest of Asia has already beam&
apparent. Formosa remains "unliberatedn, while the Viet Minh offeneive in
Indo-China has been contained, to mention two prominent Communist ecojeots,
That these two ventures have not as yet been concluded is partly att,ributable
to Chinese preoccupation with their military involvement in Korea. Aside
from the drain on trained manpower in Korea and the postponement Of the re-
habilitation of a peacetime economy in China, it has recently-become evidert
that arms and equipment are in increasingly short supply. This of course
will reduce the quantities of these items available for Communist efforts
in other peripheral countries.
C, Effect of thelii.T.Lnee of troops in Chinese Communist
intentions?
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The most obvious effect of the presence of Chinese Nationalist
(KW) refugee troops in Burma is to provide the Chinese Commuhists eith an
excuse to conduct umopping--upo operations against them. It has been reported
that Chinese Communist Forces have engaged in raids across the borde in
pursuit of these) troops and in efforts to prevent their penetration Lnto
Yunnan Provincee The preeenee and activities of these Nationalist t7oops
further provide the Communists with an excuse to maintain pressure oi the
Burmese Government,
D. Relative importance of Burma in Chinese Communist calculaeions.
Burma has been relatively low in priority in Chinese Commenise
calculations. The key to Southeast Asia was considered to be Indoctenn
and attention was focusses on this area in the hope of nliberatingn ;e
by an all-out effort against the French. It was probably thought thit the
rest of the Southeast Asian counties would then fall of their own weieht.
However, it has since become evident to the Communists that the takire
of Indochina will involve a much greater effort than at first was apeerent,
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- and in the meantime interest in Burma has increased. This is not to 3ay that
Chinese Communist objectives in Indochina have been abandoned, but weth
comparable effort in the two areas, it would seem that much greater amanita
can be secured in Burma? Additional evidence that Communist interes in
Burma has increased is provided by the establishment of both the Chinese
Communist and the Soviet Embassies, the Chinese Communist commitments to
provide aid to the BOP, BOP ettempts to organize and dominate other Jalsurgent
groups, and the formation of an aboveground pro-Communist party.
It is therefore logical to expect that Burma os priority has
increased somewhat as Communist efforts to achieve a quick and deciCve
decision in Indochina are temporarily contained.
E0 Emba.e.s_Illya_pnt plans and tactics.
It is to be anticipated that Communist pressure on Burma -rill
continue, with limited amounts of direct aid in the form of arms and emmunie,
tion being supplied to dissident elements. The presence of DT troops in
the border area will doubtless continue to be a source of friction between
the Chinese Communists and the 3urmeee Government. Likewise, train6mg in
China of small groups of Burmese, and Chinese from Burma, will continue as
Will ideological support and pressure on the Chinese element in Bulmie> It
is doubtful, however, if any major, overt attempt will be made in thy near
.future to reach a decision in Burma, although the capability exists terms
of available military force. This situation can change, however, in the ov,mt
(a) of the outbreak of a general war between the Soviet and the leeelrn Biro,
(b) total success of Communiet forces in Korea, or (c) a major revisteen of
Communist strategy deemphasizing the Korean war in favor of an all-oet drive
for success in Southeast Asiao
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V. CONCLUSIONS AS TO PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL OF THE PRESENT BURMES NEGIV1
. . .
A. Against Iraureent Forces Alone
It ie oetimated that the preaent Armod Forms of Durree., dntt
!serious weakneesos, can continuo to maintain the preaent rogima inElewee b
nr
not capable at the present time of eliminating insurgant e/ometfes.
B. Against Insurrent Forcoe With Indirect Chinese Communiet 01
It is probabao that the Government forces can in the shor; eun
tinue to maintain military control over the more vital arena, but t!ae.
ions run continued aid to the ineurgenta will so weaken the Governatoe ele
enhance the prospect of the establishment of a pro-Communiot regime -;tirol
political-military afforte.
C. Against Insurront Ferces With Direct Chinese Ai0
Prospeete for survival of the present regime agoinat insulf; bv
direct aid from the Ch..inese Cormanists are alight. Militurily, Buie 'n
Foresee are not capable of rendering more than taken reniatance to a cirnet
eggression by Chinese "voluntevra". Politically, it ia doubtful whether tY1
preaent regime would long be able to eurvive tha establiehment of rliberatso
cress,
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