SUGGESTED OIR REVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 18, 19, AND 20 OF N.I.E. 35/1

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001000030001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 6, 1962
• Content Type: NIE

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SUGGESTED 0IR REVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 18, 19, and 20 OF N.I.E. 35/1
rice surplus, rubber, coal and other economic advantages.
18. 1. The importance of Indochina to the Communist Bloc.
(1) Potential Importance. The potential importance of Indochina
to the Co-lmunist bloc and particularly to Communist China is based
upon the fact that in Communist hands Indochina would become (a) a
possible strategic stepping stone to further Communist conquests in
Southeast Asia; (b) a major prestige factor for the Kremlin m- the
conquest of Indochina by the Communists would seriously weaken the
determination of Thailand, Burma, and other areas to resist Commu-
nist aggressi.'n; (c) an important "buffer" area, preventing the
"encirclement" of Communist China by non-Communist states. and safe-
guarding other possible Communist conquests in Southeast Asia; and
(d) an important economic area, providing the Communist bloc with a
(2) Present Importance. Within the -Lime-context of this estiO
the long-range importance of Indochina, but the present importance) a r e Oil
or the areas now under utty con&rot, anu in paryscuiar vi,c iauw orrau1 e r ` c
(a) the existence of the DRV armed forces has compelled France to 15- ?.M ;J 40
-s
maintain a considerable military investment in Indochina, serious $;,
reducing French capabilities for contributions to NATO; (b) the
as the only Communist regime in Southeast Asia recognized by the Come
munist satellite states, represents a considerable prestige investment
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 Approved 9or Release 2000108129: CIA-RDP79RO1012 1000030001-5 SECRET
in Asia which has so far ;prevented the Associated States from assuming
full international status 'n the eyes of many "neutralists" or pro-
Communists; (c) the DRV, while not constituting a firm "buffer" for
south China, has helped to prevent the establishment of stable non-
Communist forces on China's border.
(3) Importance in case of World War. In the event of a general
Far Eastern or world war, Indochina might be of less relative impor-
tance to the Communist bloc than at present, unless a determined drive
into Southeast Asia is dictated by the Soviet need for raw materials.
If it should become necessary for the Communists to retrench their
power in the Far East during the conduct of a general war, Southeast
Asia would probably be surrendered ahead of other areas, not only
because of its remote location from the center, of Communist military
and economic strength, but also because of the fact that not only
Southeast Asia but also the-southern part of China is of comparatively
little military and economic importance to the Soviet bloc.
19. We believe that although the Chinese Communists continue
to have the capability for an invasion of Indochina, such an invasion
is not likely within the time period of this estimate. Under present
conditions the following factors appear :o mitigate against such an
invasion:
a. Current Communist strategy is bringing considerable suc?
cess in Indochina, may weaken the determination and ability
of the French and the Vietnamese to continue resistance,
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and may provide the Communists with a potential tool for
exacerbating differences among the western powers,
b. Recent moves have probably made world Communist leadership
aware that the West, and in particular the US, may react
vigorously should Communist China invade Indochina. This
fear of retaliation is probably somewhat offset by Commu-
nist recognition of divided opinions in the West as to
the merits and timing of such retaliation. On balance,
however, fear of drastic retaliatory action against the
mainland of China is probably sufficient to be a paramount
factor dissuading the Chinese Communists from intervening
in force in Indochina.
20. However, a Chinese invasion of Indochina could take place,
if the Communist 'eadershir should decide that a shift in
acC
western policiesy create a serious threat to China that could
not be countered through present Communist strategy. The Commu-
nists may desire to counter an anticipated blow by the west or
by the KMT by an attack in Southeast Asia. A Communist belief that
the west intends to attack China regardless of Chinese policies
in Southeast Asia, would destroy the deterrent effect of the esti-
mated Communist belief that the US may react to an invasion of
Indochina with a possible counterattack against the Chinese mainland.
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