G-2 CONTRIBUTION TO N.I.E. -35: INDOCHINA: CURRENT SITUATION AND PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001000020006-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORT

Appro ed For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79
G-2 CONTRIBUTION TO N.I.E.-35=
INDOCHINA: CURRENT SITUATION AND PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS
1. The Current Military Situation in Indochina
French and Associated States Position
and are composed as follows:
French
314,000
Foreign Legion
21,000
North African
29,000
Senegalese
15,000
Indochinese
50,000
Miscellaneous
1,500
The Armed Forces of the Associated States number 50,000, distrib-
utod among the three States, as follows:
Vietnam
38.500
Cambodia
7,500
Laos
4,000
The above French and Associated States regular forces are sup-
ported by 70,000 native auxiliary troops and 80,000 semi-military forces,
such as plantation guards, railroad guards, etc.
b. Dispositions and Organization of French and Associated States
Regular Forces
Tonkin
79,500
(2 light Dive, 1 Armored Regt, 1 Ind Mobile
Group, and 42 Battalion-sized units)
Annam
30,500
(26 Battalion-sisod units)
Cochin-China
64,000
(48 Battalion-sized units)
Laos
12,000
(9 Battalion-sized units)
Cambodia
14,500
(10 Battalion sized units)
TOTAL
200,500
*Army and State Dept reviews completed*
Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79R01012AO01000020006-1
T
 Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79F TI
li
00020006-1
All French and Associated States Armed Forces in Indochina are
under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief of French Armed
Forces, Far East;
In Tonkin, where the principal French strength is located, the
French have grouped for purposes of tactical coordination, some 30 battalion-
aimed units into two light divisions. Each division, composed of three mo-
bile groups (regimental combat team equivalents), has an armored squadron,
an artillery battalion, and engineer and signal units attached. These
groups, together with an independent mobile group and an independent Air-
borne Group of four parachute battalions, have proved to be effective as
mobile reserve forces, supporting the remaining 38 battalion-sized units
and one Armored Regiment located principally within the defensive perimeter
in Tonkin.
Elsewhere in Indochina, the French strength is not sufficient to
form large-eize reserve groups, and the majority of the combat units occupy
static defense posts, although in each of the territorial sectors, one or
two battalions may function as a reserve.
e. Combat Effectiveness
The French have received relatively large amounts of aid through
VD&P, much of it earmarked. for the Armies of the Associated States. The
timely reee5.pt.of certain items, such as aircraft, napalm bombs and ammuni-
tion, has proved of much value to the French forces, especially in recent
The arrival in Indochina in mid-December 1950 of General Jean de
Lattro do Tassigny, Commander-in-Chief of French Armed Force; Far East, and
High Commissioner to Indochina, has spectacularly raised the morale of the
French forces. Through his vigorous efforts, the mood of defeatism has been
dispelled, and the French forces have been infused with a new will-to$fight.
The new spirit in the French forces and the material and troop
reinforcements which are arriving have most certainly raised the combat
effectiveness of the French to a now high.
Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79ROl012jA001000020006-1
C1[SICmII
 R
Approved For Release 2002/bw66 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO010000200GQ'`--1
SET
d. Likely Changes in The French and Associated States Military
Position During the Next Six Months
During the fiscal year 1951, the French and Vietnamese Ground
Forces in Indochina are to receive $55,000,000 in W&P, plus a supple-
mental amount of $111,200,000. Materiel to be shipped includes signal,
armored, engineer, and medical equipment, ammunition, and POL. Unit
equipment for 30 infantry battalions, and various other artillery, engi-
neer, ordnance and miscellaneous units will be supplied together with
maintenance items for motor transport, engineer, artillery, signal and
medical units already existing. This materiel is now arriving and the
rate of arrival should increase during the next six months.
The French Government agreed in March 1951 to send reinforcements
to Indochina. Latest reports indicate that these reinforcements will num-
ber 15,000 to 20,000, including four organized infantry battalions. One
battalion of reinforcements has already arrived, and a substantial portion
of the total nacnbor should be in Indochina within the next six months.
The buildup of the Vietnamese Army will continue. Native offi-
cers and nan-?oommissionod officers are being graduated from training schools
in increasing numbers. Associated States units now being formed and
equipped are to be given the mission of pacifying relatively quiet areas,
thus relieving regular French forces for offensive operations.
The French, feeling that their military position is improving,
are reportedly planning to undertake a major offensive in Tonkin at the
first opportunity after the end of the rainy season sometime in September.
Viet A41nh Position
a. Stsreth
The over-all strength of the Viet Micah regular Army is 12:0,900.
This force is supported by 1,0,000 Regional militia troops and 85,000 ir-
regulars.
EC
Approved For Release 2002/08/06: CIA-RD 79R01012 001000020006-1
 00020006-1
b.
Dispositions and Organization of Regular Forces
Tonkin
85,000
(5 Dive, 11 Regts, 19 Bns,and mice dots)
Annam
12,000
(7 Refits, and mist dots)
Cochin-Chins
12,000
(U Regts, 1 Bn, and miss dote)
Laos
5.000
(8 Bns, and mist dots)
Cambodia
6,000
(1 Rsgts and mice dots)
The five Viet Minh divisions in Tonkin, with about 10,000 troops
each, are concentrated around the French perimeter. These units contain
the principal effective combat strength of the Viet Minh Armed Forces.
The remaining Viet Minh units are spread throughout Indochina,
giving the Viet Minh control over northern Tonicin, major portions of the
Annam coast, and parts of Cochin-China and Cambodia.
The Viet Minh do not have a Navy or Air Force.
o. Combat Effectiveness
The Viet Minh regular forces are well trained, experienced in
guerrilla-type operations, and have rigid discipline under fanatical leaders.
Viet Minh staff. planning, however, has failed to coordinate attacks
over wide areas, which would have prevented French concentration of their
mobile reserves; Viet Minh artillery support has been limited; there has been
almost no defense against French air attacks, particularly those involving
the use of napalm. Reports have indicated Viet Minh concern with the for=-
tion and equipping of anti-aircraft units, but little actual progress in this
field is believed to have been made. Without anti-aircraft artillery or a
small combat air arm, the Viet Minh, who are capable of passive defense mess-
urns only, can avoid French air attacks only in times of unfavorable weather.
In recent fighting in Tonkin, the Viet Minh have received consid-
orablV more casualties than the French without any gain in their military
position. There are indications that these losses and the absence of a
military success have caused a drop in morale, both in the Viet Minh High
Command mind trooped in the line.
Approved For Release 2002/08/06: CIA-RDP79R, '1 000020006-1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/06: CIA-RDP79Ra
n' .
d. Present Chinese Communist Assistance to the Viet Minh
Although small numbers of techincal personnel, including air
force and tank personnel, continue to receive training in China, the Chi-
nese Communists have ceased training major Viet Minh units there. Some
5,000 ChinesoCommuuist advisers and technical personnel, however, are now
believed to be in Indochina training and advising the Viet Minh Armed Forces.
The Chinese Communists continue to supply the Viet_Minh with ammu-
nition, infantry weapons, and some artillery. It is believed that armor
has not been supplied in any quantity. These arms are transported across
the Sino-Indochinese border, now controlled by the Viet Minh from Lao gay
east to Dinh Lap, and by sea principally from Hainan Island to the Annam coast.
There is evidence that during December 1950 the Chinese Conavsunists'
supply program may have been halted temporarily, but shipments of military
supplies were resumed by the end of the year. The present level of supply
appears to be slightly less, especially in critical heavy items, than that
at the beginning of the year.
e. Likely Changes in the Viet Minh Military Position Within the Next
Six Months
The effective size of the Viet Minh Armed Forces depends largely
on the available armament, and the scale of their military efforts depends
on the availability of ammunition end other logistical items. Since current
Viet Minh o_rmament and ammunition come largely from the Chinese Communists,
major changes in the Viet Minh military position will probably depend in
largo measure upon future Chinese Communist assistance.
During the rainy season from May to September, the Viet Minh, if
they do not choose to launch heavy attacks, will certainly have an opportunity
to further train and organize their major combat units, and also to store
supplies, while their auxiliary forces and guerrilla troops harass the French.
(Recent reports indicate that the Viet Minh may intensify their guerrilla-
typo warfare.) This rooting, refitting, and resupplying should strengthen
5
Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79ROl 01 2AO01 000020006-1
IECR T
 Approved For Release 2002/08/06 CIA-RDP79ROl
~ftw
0006-1
Current Operations
The Viet Minh are regrouping their forces in Tonkin for possible
further attacks on the French defense perimeter, Increased Viet Minh
gu,rrilla activity has broken out In all parts of Indochina. The French
have recently undertaken several local clearin? operations with reportedly
good results. Except for an incursion by a reported Chinese Communist bat-
talion in northwest Tonkin, there have been no firm reports of Chinese Com-
munist troops intervening.
11. Viet Minhas Pr apeoto for Satouaing Indochina Without Large=scale Inter`
vention by Chinese Communist Forces
From tho military point of view It seems highly unlikely that the Viet
Mirth alone could secure Indochina.
After receiving a considerable amount of aquijziwnt, training, and mili-
tary advice from the Chinese Communists since early 1950, the Viet Minh,
during the first four months of 1951, launched two largo-scale attacks sgainst
the French in Tonkin. The Viet Minh were defeated in both of those cattancke.
Continued Chinese Communist logistic support together with technical
and advisory said will certainly strengthen the Viet Minh, but this inoreased
strength will be relative to the Improved position of the French forces no
a result of the logiatio aid which they are receiving and will continue to
receive through MAP.
111. French &adVirtnaumoso Prospects for Ultimate Success Against the Viet
14inh, Assauming No Direct Chinese ConaamunistIntervention Occurs
It 9.s believed that the security of continental France and Worth Africa
would be endangered and that the French would be unable to meet their coat.
mitsaonts in the defense of Western Europe if they should increase substan.,
tially their military commitments in Indochina above those already decided
Expansion plans call for & Vietnamese National Army' of 100,000 regulars,
organised Into three infantry divisions and one mountain division. Training
6
Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDPP~CLi~1G t$
79R0110112oAO01000020006-1
91Z
 Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79R01
p20006-1
schools are producing 250 officers and 800 NCOs a year. Other NCOs are
being trained within unite at the rate of 1,200 per year. Specialists
such as drivers, mechanics, radio operators, etc., are being trained at
five schools in Indochina. Some Vietnamese officers are receiving combat
training in French unite prior to their service In the Vietnamese Army.
MBAP equipment is arriving in large quantities to supply the French-
Vietnamese forces. Pending the arrival of MAP equipment for artillery,
engineer, and service unite, the French are permitting Vietnamese special-
ists selected for these units to train with like units of the French Army,
In connection with the formation of a Vietnamese National Army, it
should be noted that until the Vietnamese gain confidence in French efforts
to prepare them for actual independence, the morale and effectiveness of
this army cannot be expected to be high.
The present Vietnamese Government under the leadership of Prime Minister
Ten Vaan Auu is coneidored too pro-French to have popular appeal. ::any
Vietnamese, including Sao Dal, Chief of State, reportedly feel that the
French are not giving the Vietnamese the freedom of political and military
action which had boon promised.
As the military position of the French improves, it seems likely that
the French regime in Indochina any tend to limit further the political free-
dom and military autonomy of the Vietnamese. This would directly affect
the morale and operation of the Vietnamese Army and hinder the joint efforts
against the common enemy.
Goncrally, the French military position in Indochina has improved con-
siderably in recent months, as a result of increased MDtP aid, a now ag-
grossivo leadership, Improved morale, promised reinforcements, and a grow-
ing Vietnamese Army.
Barring direct Chinese Communist Intervention, the French are believed
not only capable of holding the Delta aroa.in Tonkin, but also of further
Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP7S t
 Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79RR01012AO01000020006-1
extending their areas of control. In other parts of Indochina, they can
be expected to hold their present areas of control and continue to under-
take clearing operations against the Viet Minh. It is not believed, however,
that they will be able to eliminate totally Viet Minh resistance by purely
military methods in the foreseeable future.
IV. Chinese Communist Capabilities To Intervene Effectively in Indochina
Approximately 200,000 Chinese Communist Field Force troops are located
within 250 miles of the Indochinese border. Of this number, the Chinese
Communists are capable of sparing 100,000 troops for intervention in Indo-
china, while continuing their bandit suppression campaign in South and
Southwest China.
The initial increment of such on invasion force might possibly be the
"Anti-French Volunteer Army," a joint Sino-Viet Minh force already reportedly
organized for the purpose of assisting the Viet Minh. This force, estimated
at 30,000, is believed to be composed of small units withdrawn from various
formations in the border area, such me regular Field Force units, irregular
border groups of mixed Sino-Viet Minh origin, and elements of former Nation-
%list units.
Large-scale Chinese Communist intervention (on the order of 100,000
troops, equipped and supplied for sustained operation) probably would re-
sult in a drastic contraction of the French defense zone in Tonkin, although
the rench should be able to hold the Haiphong beachhead. Intervention on
a limited scale (on the order of 30,000 troops), committed over a period of
time, would result in heavy battles in Tonkin, but the French should be able
to hold most of their defensive zone.
It is believed that the Korean campaign has not out off the movement
of military supplies to South and Southwest China, although the quantities
involved may have declined. The Chinese Communists could probably increase
their logistic support to the Viet Minh, but,uador present conditions, not
8
Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP7i9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RD 1000020006-1
n~ a~llY1 m a
to the extent necessary to give the Viet Minh a decisive military victory
in Indochina. Although. the transportation network is poor, it is probable
that the Chiaoso Communists could maintain a flow of supplies into Indo-
china sufficient to sustain 100,000 troops, at least, for a short period of
tine.
Reports indicate that the railroad from Central China has been wzxtended
from Liuohou to Nanning (150 miles from the Tonkin-China frontier). other
reports indicate that this railroad is being extended as far as the frontier
itself. Logistic problems would, however, raimain difficult, est.pooi.ally
during the-rainy season in Tonkin, from Way to September, both over the
mountain supply routes and in the Delta..
It is believed that the continuing coiraaiitments in Korea, Chinese dome=optic
problems, and the added logistic burden which would be involved,atpprociably
limit the Chinese Conmaaniet capability to andortake operations against all
of Indochina..
V. Chinese Communist Probable Courses of ActionWith Regard to Indochina
Probably the most important factor in, a Chinese Commmunist; decision on
the question of intervention in Indochina is the current "unfinished business"
facing the Chinese Communist regime, including the oommi.tmont in Korea, the
capture of Formosa, and the bandit supproamioa campaign. In particular, the
h?avmy Chinese Conmiuni,st losses in Korea have undoubtedly had a sobering of-
feet on Chinese Ccranunist thinking regarding Intervention In Indochlywt. In
vier of the partial United Statsa military and industrial mobilisatioaq pro-
voked by the Karam urr, the Chinese Communists ray feel that United Nations'
support of the Republic of Korea would be duplicated and that Chinese Com-
munist Intervention, even if initially successful, would ultisaately fail.
It is believed that the Chinese Commmiiste will continue their military
assiattttce to the Vint Minh on about the same basis as at present. inter-
vention on a large scale (100,000 troops) is not considered probable at this
times. Limited Chinese Communist intor?vent"ion (on the order of 30,000 troops),
in the guise of a joint "Anti?Frenoh Volunteer Army," is a probability.
~li~lC
QA1000020006-1
it'
 Approved For Release 2002/06 : CIA-RDP79R01012AO0100002000 1
SEMC ET
The customary explanation for the failure of the Chinese Communists
to intervene during the past year has been the assumed Vlot Minh capability
for eventual victory. Unless a serious Viet Minh defeat were in prospect,
the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Communist regime could afford to lot the Viet
Minh, supported by the Chinese Communist military assistance program, con-
tinue the struggle against the French; complicated international questions
resulting from Chinese Communist intervention on a large scale would thus
be avoided.
On the other hand, the Chinese Communists possibly consider that,
because of their failure to auhiove a decisive victory in Korea, Asian Com-
munism requires a quick victory elsewhere. The Indochinese situation might
be considered suitable, since Viet Minh forces are already strongly testing
the capabilities of the French forces. However, because of the strong French
military position in Indochina, other areas in Southeast Asia would be more
vulnerable.
The corollary to the "compensation" argument mentioned above is that
Asian Communism possibly cannot afford a defeat which might be sustained
as a result of increasing United States MDAP supplies to the French and the
French reinforcements of Indochina. If the French should go over to the
offensive and if Viet Minh forces suffer successive defeats or if the Baa Del
Government gained decisive strength in the political field, the Viet Mlah
might call for Chineco Communist troops to save the situation.
Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP7 ROW01000020006-1