NIE 34, APPENDIX B
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79R01012A001000010006-2
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 28, 2000
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 7, 1951
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79R01012A001000010006-2.pdf | 26.12 KB |
Body:
STANDARD FORM NO. 64 ~~
Approved F6r Release 2000 9 : CIA- 79 1012A001000~70006-2
Office emov'~xndum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
DATE: July 7, 1951
TO DnN - Mr. R. Scanunon
FROM DIFf/IN IR - Rene Tron 4'~~
SUBJECT: NIE 34, Appendix B
1. The "rate at which Spain can mobilize her manpower" chart
appears unrealistic (p. 9). It is stated on the following page
that the ammunition supply for 40 divisions is adequate for only
3 to 12 days of combat. Factors such as this should be related to
the mobilization picture.
2. Some of the material in the economic section more properly
belongs in the military appendix. For example, the last two sentences
on page 4 on defense of the Pyrenees and the railroad situation would
seem to belong under subsection 6 of Appendix B.
3. The point at issue is not whether the Pyrenees line can
be defended, but whether Spain can be utilized under certain conditions
as an effective base. There is no discussion here of the problems
posed by the possible use of Soviet paratroops or by sea invasion,
particularly in connection with the Spanish terrain. The same
factors that make the Pyrenees an effective bastiong would render
it difficult to eliminate enemy elements that had by-passed the
Spanish defenses.
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
DRPv' WR
RT:zn
Approved For Release 2000108129: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO01000010006-2