NIE 34, APPENDIX B

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79R01012A001000010006-2
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 28, 2000
Sequence Number: 
6
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 7, 1951
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79R01012A001000010006-2.pdf26.12 KB
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STANDARD FORM NO. 64 ~~ Approved F6r Release 2000 9 : CIA- 79 1012A001000~70006-2 Office emov'~xndum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DATE: July 7, 1951 TO DnN - Mr. R. Scanunon FROM DIFf/IN IR - Rene Tron 4'~~ SUBJECT: NIE 34, Appendix B 1. The "rate at which Spain can mobilize her manpower" chart appears unrealistic (p. 9). It is stated on the following page that the ammunition supply for 40 divisions is adequate for only 3 to 12 days of combat. Factors such as this should be related to the mobilization picture. 2. Some of the material in the economic section more properly belongs in the military appendix. For example, the last two sentences on page 4 on defense of the Pyrenees and the railroad situation would seem to belong under subsection 6 of Appendix B. 3. The point at issue is not whether the Pyrenees line can be defended, but whether Spain can be utilized under certain conditions as an effective base. There is no discussion here of the problems posed by the possible use of Soviet paratroops or by sea invasion, particularly in connection with the Spanish terrain. The same factors that make the Pyrenees an effective bastiong would render it difficult to eliminate enemy elements that had by-passed the Spanish defenses. State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file DRPv' WR RT:zn Approved For Release 2000108129: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO01000010006-2