THE EUROPEAN SATELLITE POWER COMPLEX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000900040004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 80
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 1, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTE.LICENCE AGENCI
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
CIA/RR Project 6,-451,1 Contribution to
TE E EUROPEAN SATELLITE ?CUM COPIPLr
PART I
INDIVIDUAL SATELLITE COUNTRIESt
ICONCXEC STREilGTHS AND WEAKNIMSES
joly 1951
1012A000900040004-3
1
vimmasio
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
0 DECLASSIFIED
7;70 25X1
116 A e? ti ktnr-r-1 T." rc.
" AIL AA
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CIA/BR
Project 641
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WieSECRST
THE leactim um= POUR COMPLEX
(Contribution to N/2.33)
PART I
IBDXVIDUAL SATMLITEOds
ICONOICD3 STRUMS AM VEZNISSIS
AULGARIA
The primarily agrioultaral economy of Bulgaria' is scheduled under the
Pi. Year Plan (190.63) to be reoriented drastically toward Industrialise-
tion, with over four-fiftbs.of investment Mods allocated to heavy industry.
However, it is questionable that industry will be able to attain its planned.
goal of 55 percent of nonagricultural production in 2953 in view of (1) Bulgaria's
great dependenne on. the Soviet Bloc. and an 'Wiliest for industrial materials
and equipment4.(2),Inadequatielectric power, and-(3) deficiencies in trained .
personnel. in lor event, the industrial development of the Bulgarian economi
will continue..te-depind heavily on the Soviet Bloc for financial' andIndus-
trial assistance in 1951 and1952.
Organisation of the Bulgarian swamp' for purposes of control is patterned
closely after that of the Soviet Union. Since January 1950 the government bas
extended its jurisdiction over the econcmyiand private enterprise, previoaaly
eliminated entirely in 'large industries, has been progressively reduced in
mean local industries and trades.
Soviet control over the Bulgarian edimumerwas extended in 1950 by the
plating of a large number of Soviet personnel in major economic adminis4.e.,
cos, thus facilitating the Soviet Deices adaptation of Bulgaria to a
fie role within the Bloc which will emphasize exploitation of mineral
Lnd agricultural reeources.
The increased tempo of econceeic assimilation and the extension of Control
are placing severe strains on the economy. Weaknesses are apparent in the .
shortage of trained reliable personnel and In the disaffection of the papuie,.
tient particularly evident in peasant resistance to collectivisation, Develop-
ment of the Bulgarian economy is retarded by a shortage of skilled labor and by
a generally lev level of labor productivity. Increased technical training of
Bolgerians and the influx of Soviet 'and Satellite technicians probably con-
tributed- to an improvement in Ube* productivity in 1950. Although the
government is able to redirect productive effort to a considerable extent
through discriminatory food rationing, a persistent belie weakness is the
OOP SWEET
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failure of the incentive program to overcame the Apathy of the uorker as a
step toward raising productivity.
tip : ? 1 y?
? , 3/ .? s ' . :i:;?.alt .. 4 L:
but production mmy decline. There is us
circirrl ,
is expected that by 31u17 1951 there will a carry-aver rr ? ICS
'-'*--- adequate to cover civilian requivemente for 10 to 12 weeks. Food consumption
remains .below prewar levels however* and it is considirably lower than that
of Western Europe. Although 50 percent of the arable land had been consolidated
1 by 1950 into larger units suitable for neobanised farming* and davit, the
fact that production goals ter farm nachinery may well be attained both
acreage and production are mare apt to decline than increase by 1953. Expansion
of agricultural prataction is limited principally W dislocations produced
In the accelerated collectivisation and mechanization of an essentially
primitive agrieultural economy.
The program for the industrial of Bulgaria. 4152421111 -
tattoo ?, ,/ -p.1 _ henstit of the and other
? ;t ea. ? L - end of 1950* Bulgarian ores and concentrates
contributed 4 percent of the total uraelue available to -the USE. Bulgaria
has no iron and steel industry* although it has in limited quantities most
or the rev material* nectebmanr to support a sma1l metallurgical induetryl
!winding a good grade of iron ore and eemeral Of the more impstent terra-
alloying elements. Earlier plans for development of a small steel industry
have been suspended* iron or and ferroalloy minerals being exported to the
USSR and the Satellites. Of nonferrous metals* Bulgaria exports
and sjgi4 f'Wnt enoia 2adand 1:11_1e to tlelaso. Coal supplies*
low in alizt, ar--Eirr There isno crude?
ail production in Bulgaria, and the only prospect for a domestic petroleum
industry is in the small unexploited reserves of oil shale* whioh could
eventually yield from 30 to 35 minks tons of crude oil. Postwar additions
to Bulgaria's -electric power industry, which was *oiled to an agricultural
economy, have made only a smell contribution to the .development of the
Bulgarian economy., There are sufficient fuel and water resources to supply
an expending power industry* but Bulgaria is Almost entirely dependent upon'
imports for increasing production capacity and replaoing capital equipment.
- Such ismxrrts have been received only In limited miantities. Bulgaria is
sywhich it imports from the Bloc and the West
to reqoirements. cbem4eis1s, as veil as glycerine*
gely to countries of the-T-Its slam mental selphtn. is )
* and total planned production of 40 " a .4.
In 1951 i. scheduled for shipment to Cseehoslovakia.
?. ??? -1
The very mall rubber fabrics industry is
supplied F imports of approximately 1,000 metric tons of natural rubber per
year. The small engineering industry does not now make a significant
contribution to the econopy of the Soviet Moo. The Vary large expansion
of the machine-branding industry projected by the fly. rear Plan will be
difficult of attairment. liettnohiles almost all lettalblea7 and vehieles must,
be imported. Bulgaria does not have* nor does its predominantly agricultural
economy require* extensive transportation facilities and equipment. Its
mmellmseale fogillia,juity. primarily with the Soviet Bloc.. is for the most
? U.14."
ir; ?
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part carried across the Meek Sea.
Recently Bulgaria has imported more from the USSR than it has exported
Po it. In relation to the Satellites the jagagna, though small,
more appreciable. /*ports to the USSR to ? other Satellites consist
sine concentrates, tobacco, cement, and some foodstuffs.
Imports from the Bloc include mainly cotton, metals, oil products, and
industrial and agricultural machinery. The Soviet Union obtains some
hard currency from the sale of tobacco and rose oil imported from Bulgaria.
Receipt of industrial equipment, replacement parts, and medicines thm401
extra-Orbit trade, primarily from Western }Wrap*, contributes to the economic
development program. Exports outside the Bloc consist almost entirely of
fOodstuffs such as vines and fruits. Little change in the composition or'
volume of Bulgarian trade is expected by 1953, although there may be some
increase in the export Of metallic ores to the USSR and same reduction in
trade vith Western Europe. The Bulgarian industrialisatiOn program- cannot
be expected to be sufficiently advanced before 1953 to eliminate continued
dependence on the Soviet Bloc for financial, economic, and technical
assistance.'r
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Miff
I.
ILIESILALS&MBRUZLELZHARESEZ?
Ma=
The structure of the Bulgarian econoiy, petterned closely after that of the
Soviet Union, is organised along fhnotiomal lines under the direct administration
of various Ministries. These Ministries are directed by the Ministerial Council,'
the *hie exseutive organ of the state, which, vith the adviee of the State
Planning Commission, establishes national economic goals. The najur divisions of
the annoy and the Ministries responsible for these segments maybe moonrise'
as.followst
Oprielone of the 'creep
Industry and Transportation
Farm Vorkeres Cooperatives, State
Farms Machine Tractor Station!, and
Auxiliary Enterprises
Local Industry and Communal Enterprises
State and Cooperative Trade
Htliber of Workers in State Enterprises,
the Salary Fund, and Work Productivity
and Reduction
Capital Investment
DiStributionaMIterials
Expansion or Local Industries, Agriculture,
Capital Investments, Turnover, Communal
Economy, Education, Public Health, and
Cultural Activities, under the Nrisdie.
tion of the Local Soviets
4.11kitrIPa Cort2(47100
Ministry of Trangportation
Ministry of Industry
Ministry of Forestry
Ministry of Electrification
Central Cooperative Union
Minietry of Agriculture
Ministry of Forestry
Ministry of Comma Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Trade
Ministry of Internal Trade
Central Cooperative Union
All Ministries and State.
Enterprises
All Ministries Concerned
All Ministries
Ministry of the Commune).
Economy
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Since January 1950 the government has extended its jurisdiction over
the economy. Private enterprise, previously eliminated entirely in large
industries has been provessively reduced in smell local industries and
trsdes. The Bulgarian goverment also has undertaken a militant program
of agricultural collectivization since the beginning of 1950. The proportion
of individual farms collectivized increased from 14.2 percent in January 1950
to 43.4 percent in September 1950. Cultivated land under control of the
state amounted to over 50 percent of all cultivated land at the end of 1950
The government also has intensified its efforts to strengthen the
centralized control over the country,s productive resources. A State
Coordinating Commission was formed within the tanisterial Couicil in 1950
to deal. with problems of over-all economic direction. Techniques for
controlling credits and industrial materials were refined, and special
inspection agencies, such as the state and local control commissions, were
ordered to increase the *mope of their activities. In addition, executives
at all levels of the economic hierarchy were replaced in order to assure
that the directives of the central government would be reliably executed.
From the point of view of the Soviet 'Onion, Bulgaria occupies a highly
strategic position on an exposed flank, and apparently, as a result, the
Soviets grasp every opportunity to take over the leadership of Bulgaria
and the direction of its economy. A control device used by the USSR was
the placing of large numbers of Soviet persom31 in the major economic
administrations in 1950. Their activities were facilitated by an official
order granting Soviet citizens in Bulgaria the same civil rights as Bulgarians.
Similarly, Soviet-trained Bulgarians continued to be placed in positions of
major economic responsibility.
Coincident with the extension of Soviet control over Bulgarian economic
policy in 1950 and 1951, there has been intensified emphasis on agricultural
development, as important objectives planned for 1953 in the industrialization
program are falling short of attainment.
Assimilation of the Bulgarian etonomy and the strengthening of Soviet
control permit the USSR to achieve a better division of labor for the Orbit
as a whole, as veil as assuring tho continued availability of Bulgarian
resources in support of Satellite mobilization. This trend will continue
through 1952. On the other hand, the increased tempo of edonamic assimilation
and control places severe strains on large areas of the economy. The shortage
of trained, reliable personnel needed to meet the problems of centralized
economic administration is a major bleakness in control of the econom,? but
the primary weaknesses are the disaffection of increasing proportions of the
population and, especially, the inchoate resistance of the peasants to
collectivisation. Such disaffection directly affects production levels and
will continue to be a source, of economic weakness for at least the coming year.
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Ciarlailw Direst Contrql
The Bulgarian government in committed to the policy of establishing
complete and direct control over the utilisation of the country's produotive
resources, both human and material'. This ob3ective-and the institutions
and techniques by which it is pursued are patterned after those of the
Soviet Union. The continued dedicationof'the Bulgarian Communist Patty
in utilising its monopoly of power to remake the country in the image of
the Soviet Union constitutes the overriding trend of the current period*
In areas which are of direct Soviet interests saah as foreign relations
and Soviet-Bulgarian trade, Soviet control approachei the absolute* The
USSR -alio is exercising increasing direction over the eeonomr. of Bulgaria
relying on indigenous Communist elements as the primary instrument of contra.
a. lomm1122Lanniss.
The economic policy of Bulgaria, like that of the USSR, receives its
formal expression in periodic economic plane. A plan pot only provides
policy direction but. also determines in large measure the intensity of control
required. It is also an index against whieh the effectiveness of control is
measured. I/
(1)ikeltuttignaUlen.
(a) addialatio4 or PlaBOnst -PolAer,
, Determination of policy in the process of plan preparation
is the prerogative of the highest organs of the State, and, as in the Soviet
Unions responsibility ultimately rests with the Communiet Party. The Stet*
Planning Commissicm, a body of technical planning experts, is responsible
for the over-ill direction in the preparation of the plan. 41 Following
the Soviet model, Bulgarian policy was to put primary emphasis tea shown
in tbe 1949 plan) on large-scale development of the heavy and extractive
industries, planned expansion of production in light industries and in
agriculture being relatively small. Under this policy the burden of the
program for economic developient falls on the rural peasantry, as economic
support for the expansion of the labor force, increased foreign exchange for
the importation of industrial materials and equipment, and the costs of an
extensive control apparatus are to be provided for primarily out of agricultural
surpluses. Compulsory agricultural deliveries at the level required could
only be assured by separating the independent farmers from their holdings
and placing them under the direct surveillance or the state. Therefore,
collectivisation of agriculture has been carried forward aggressively. The
industrialization program, howeveri;. as initially planneivis not being fully
SMUT
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realised, Fru* the point of view of the Soviet Union, modification of the
initial program for Bulgarian industrialization could possibly be justified
in the interest of a better division of labor within the Orbit as a whole.
(b) ItiadatajoElandbajaeraM0
The State Planhing Commission is responsible to the Ministerial
Council for the preparation of over..all national plans. The Planning
Commission is assisted in its task by planning departments in every miniatry
and all enterprises under its jurieitction and all community and Alkalize
people's soviets.* these panning depeAments are largely .independent of
the ministries and enterprises to whidh they are attached, being responsible
to the State Planning Commission.
The process of plan preparation is a continuous one. .
Annual plans are directed toward the goals of the Five Tear Plan, Quarterly
plans or estimatee are made in order to *heel progress and provide adjustments.
Dynamics of the planning process are such that plan preparation apdsplan-
execution are closely interrelated, treparation of the detailed annual plans
engages* the attention of the entire hierarchy of economic administration frau
the individual ministry to the individual farm and factory. The preparation
process is initiated publicly by the rinieterial Council in a aeries of
resolutions exhorting the chief economic ministries to correct deficiencies
and to present their planning estimates to the PlanningCcinnission within a
specified time. The Ministries in turn direct their subordinate-administra-
tions to submit annual production estimates to the Ministerial planning sections..
Basic productive units, the individual farm and factory, each prepare an
estimate of their output for the coming year. For example, the administrative
council of the. cooperative farms is charged with preparing an annual production
plan and, concurrently, a supporting labor distribution plan, broken down
for each work brigade. 4/ individual plans of the Ministries local and
regional soviets, and autonomous* public organizations are reviewed and
analysed by the State Planning Commiasion to coordinate planning between
different sectors of the eemmXgy. A separate planned estimate is made for
each of the factors which enter into the total economic process. There is,
for example, a controlled materials plan and a controlled personnel plan.
Planned estimates also are made of the allocation of the national:product.
The over-all plan is in reality a series of plans, each dealing with different
sectors of the econamy and with the distribution of the factors comprising
the national product,
The primary concern of the government in the process of
plan preparation is to insure that estimated production targets are not placed
too low. Estimates must be equated to productive capacity. As a guide to
this equation' production norms for every possible type of output are worked
out, hut higher unit in the administrative structure is responsible for
seeing that plan estimates are in line with objectives at its level. Various
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control arms of the state, Communist Party representatives and special
inspection services are utilised both to insure realistio Planning on the
part of productive units and to falog through an plan enemation.
Productive facilities which are not under direct govern..,
meat supervision present a special problem for plamriv. Previouely?
assessment estimates for the compulsory delivery of agricatural products
were made an an overman regional belie, but the trend has been to refine the
assessment on the basis of the estimated yield of the land available to the
individual farmer. 1( Little allowance is made for variable factor* in crop
yield in determining the aMoUntsto he sold by the. farmers to the state
purchasing agencies. Planners assume, no doubt rightly, that the independent
farmer will take advantage of every possibility to withheld the product of
his labor for his own consumption or for sale at noneontralled prices.
The 1910 plan VAS announced by the Ministerial Council in
a series of 10 resolutions. Each resolution is a separate plan end indicates
the lines of administrative control for the execution of the over-All plan. y
mastsusanisLusausuisuman
Bulgarian Ministerial Counql/
Resolution Subject Matter Panietriea
Concernsi
1 Fundamental Indexes
2 Phu: for Industry and Transportation
Plan for Farm Workers' Coopera..
tivei State Farms, Machine
Tractor Station's, and Auxiliary
Enterprises
4 Plan for Local Industry and
ComMunal Enterprise
5 Plan for Education, Science, Pubs.
lic Health and Social Welfare
6 ? Tian for State and Cooperative
Trade
Ministry of Transportation
Ministry of Industgy.
Ministry of Forestry
Ministry of Electrification
Central Cooperative Union
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Forestry
Ministry of Cesinunal Affairs
(An indicated by title)
Mirdetry of Foreign Trade
Ministry of internal Trade ?
Central Cooperative Union
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Resolution
7
9
10
(2)
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Subject Matter
.111.01:1011111111.00111WOOMPOMM1000.160.10.111.0.0011.NOMPoralfeMOOMINIMMVIIMIrolier
Plan for Establishing the Number of
Weirkira in State Euberprises, the
Salu7.1A:nd, and Work Productivity
ani Colt Reduction
Plan Vor Capital Investment
Plan for the Distribution of
Materials
? i
Plan for the Expansion of Local
Industries, Agrieulture, Capital Economy
investanints, Turnover, Communal
Etroticey, Education, Public Health,
and Cultural. Activities, under
the Jurisdiction of the Local
Soviets -
Ptinistries
All lenistitisii end State
ituterprises
All applicable Ministries
All Ministries
? Minis:try of the Comoneisl
ZINS...4N1104.
Importent agencies of control are (a) the material. supply Agencies,
(b) the financial agencies, (e) the State Control Consission,- (a) organs Of
special ow:tray and (e) the Coonmnist Party. All of these agellaiaa are
directly concerned with the proper fulfillment of the plan, as fellows:
(a) The Ministry of State Reserves and the Minister of State
Supply are .cherged with holding and dietritating the .raw materials stocks of
the State.. Critical materials are supplied to industrial estabilehments at
the rate required for planned production. Factory inventories are kept at
a IttellIMI, and careful audits are made of their utilisatioe.
(b) the ricistry of Finance translatea the physical components
of the plan into financial items. Through the Budget Control Comission and
the nationalised banking system, the Ylnistry is in a position to supervise
and control virtually all financial transactions. Government enterprises
are requireti to maintain nearly all of their working capital and other fUnds
as deposits with the banking erste". All credits granted by the banking
aysteft are steply counterparts of the production, plan. Ar vatehiag the bank
balances of the various enterprises, the authorities are in a position to
detect deviations from the financial Paw and to take appropriate measures.
In 1950, financial eontrols were tightened, the circulation of all fends
being placed under control of the Bulgarian National Bank. Credits for
capital develement are supervised by .the Bulgarian Investment Bank. If
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(e) The State Control Cemmigaion on ths national level is
paralleled by local Social Control Commissions.- These special inspection
agencies cheek an the fulfillment of all government dee/Wens. In practice
they direct their inspection activities into areas where the administration
is encountering difficulties. For examples.a continuous complaint of the
Bulgarian administration and of the consuming public is that production
quotas are met by levering standards of quality.
Special orders for investigation are issued on the basis.
of complaints received. from individualwmokets. People are encouraged freely
to criticise local Inefficiencies, and an attempt is made to see that such
complaints are submitted directly to the appropriate state organs eithout
observing the usual Channels. Failure of the control admissions fully to
carry cut their functions is apparent in the disparity between planned
objectives and actual attainments. 2/
CO Special control organs or inspection teams are constituted
from time to time to deal with specific problems. Late in 1949 a State
Inspection was established for assessing the harvest. It was given a broad
mandate to check on agricultural controls, the assessment of harvest yields,
end other related matters. It is probable that the work of this control
group was closely related to the intensive drive for collectivisation which
took place in 1950. joi
(e) Comosmist Party members are being severely oritleised !Or
not properly understanding and felfillim their functions. Largo areas of
the econcegy are not considered to be under effective Communiat direction.
b. A4m1ntrtret4veCesity91,0
Over-all administration of the economy is the responsibility of the
State Coordination Commission. This cosaission? whit:lbws formed in
February 1950, sets as an economic cabinet for the Ministerial Counsil.
Membership of the State Coordination Commission is as follow jas
President of the Ministerial Council
Vice President of the Ministerial Council
Special Minister appointed by the Ministerial Council
An Assistant of the Premier
Representatives of the State Planning Commission
Minister affluence
.Miniater of Labor and Social Welfare
Representatives of the Professional. Unions
The et:emission does not include representatives from line economic ministries
such as industry or agriculture. It is probable that the need for a
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coordinating body at the highest level arose as a result of serious problems
of disorganization in the administration of the wonder.
The Intra-Party struggle in Bulgaria following the death or Georg'
Matra, provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to take over the
leadership of the country. From the Soviet point of view, Bulgaria oocupied
-a highly strategic position on an exposed flank, and its dependability in
the Soviet power aligement was considered imperative. Therefore' the Soviet
'Onion tightened its grip on Bulgaria, and all of the Ministries received
large nuibers of Soviet personnel in 1950. In contrast With previous years,
the identity and activity of Soviet offidials within the Bulgprian Government
no longer kept secret. 2,1/ Soviet citizens resident in Bulgaria were
granted the same civil rights as Bulgarians, 22/ and Soviet oitizens,.or
Soviet-trained Bulgarian:a, have been pities& in strategie seadvisore.positions.
in every Ministry and with every large economic, political, social, and military
organization. lar
(1) libincr!
The dearth of information on problems of industrial organisation
In Bulgaria is probably related to the primacy of agriculture in that country
and may have eome significance in what appears to be a scaling-down of the
industrialisation program in comparison with agricultural expansion.
(2) 4A41004MM
Administrative control over the production of independent farmers
is not considered adequate by the Communiet regime. State purchasing agencies
under the direction of the Ministry of Internal Trade and the Central
Cooperative Union Continually encounter difficulties in filling their quotas
for farmers' forced sale of agricultural produce. The Party lacks the dis..
oiplined control needed to compel individual farmers to meet seheduled
deliveries.
Following consolidation of Soviet control over the central
administration of the Bulgarian regime, an intensive colleativisation drive
was launched in agriculture in 1950. This was the first sustained large-
scale effort to win complete control over the lives habits, and output of
the Bulgarian peasants. The drive was samenhat like the Soviet colleetivise.-
tion effort of an earlier period. Urban Ccononist units were dispatched to the
countryside with the same militant determination and cooperatived were formed
under the dual compulsion of force and glowing plromises. A directive of the
Ministry of Agriculture fixed the quota of new cooperatives for each district. AV
In a. pod of 9 months the amount of cultivated land under control of the
cooperatives was raised from approximately 10 to almost 50 percent.
U..
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This overzealous action brcut a peasant reaction or resentment,
sporadic open resistance and Increasing disorganisation of the productive
life of the Countryside:la ?rile Minister Cherenkov, amolatiug natal's
"make haste slowie speech In'thel9300aseelled a temporary halt to the drive.
Be stated that more than 50 percent of the farmers had joined the cooperatives
but admitted that the Party ?for the time being had failed to convince thee
that the cooperative cause MBA right.* 2411 Beery attempt is being made,
psychologically and otherwise, to convince farmers of the "rightness' of
cooperatives.
Amajor reorganisation of the administrative structure for
agriculture was undertaken simultaneously in an effort to consolidate control
over the farm labor cooperatives. A nay Ministry of Supplies and Food ,
Production also was created. This ministry is primarily concerned with
reviewing standards of production and enforcing deliveries to the State.. It
is significant in: this regard that the Minister of Interior Bud Brietose,?
was relieved of his duties In this capacity and appointed Minister of Supplies
and Food Production. Brietosov is a rough and ready Communist willing to carry
out any instructions to the letter. 22/
(3) ci if e Services (Tran tiqpG711S.. .to.)
. Bulgarian economic services are regarded by the Communist regime
as critical araascd'the economy to.controlo. As a consequence economic
services without exception have been nationalized and are clos:aradministered
by the state.
a,
(1) &tent of Nationetlisatien 9f jndustrr.
Under the 1941 Nationalisation. Law, industrial enterprises
other than these engaged in lumber and food processing, or nearly half of
the nationalised plants and factories were put under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry' of Industry. Umber and food-processing firm passed under the
jurisdiction of the Central CooperatiVe Union and the Ministry of Forests.
In addition, mire than 3,0C0 enterprises of local sigeficommt were turned over
to agencies of local goverment.. These enterprisasincludmidairies, hewing
and hotel industries, slaughter houses, and the like, In 2945, it was eetimated
that 93 percent of industrial production um. =timeline& iv Deputy Prime
Minister Poptcam reported that 'The private sector has been entirely eliminated
in large.male industry, whereas in the mall local industries it has shrank./".
to 0,2 percent in the present year (1950).3 Be also stated that the total share
of private business in the induarial sector 'mounted to 0.1 percent. Z2/
1.2
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(2) alatilitattkiibiltiaNdiall.ataild2talin?
The rapid growth el colleotivisation is indicated tr official
figures in the table below. By the end of February 1951 the number of
Individual tarn colleotivee sonetituted ?over 50 percent or the total amber
of farms In the country. The pace of coLleotivisation ins slowed douh in
1951 to permit the regime to consolidate its control, and it is probable
That the oolleatirisatian program in the Attars will mote at a slower to,
Collectivisation in Bulgaria 2g/
No.etoeszolussia."--1.--rnalLur ?L
Coopers-.
So. of Tedivid-.
Total
3'
Under
Coo ti
1 Jan 48
549
44,100
4.4
180,400
1 Jan 49
1.100
78,900
7.2
292,380
1 Ian-50
1,000
156,000
144
550,800
1 Sep 50
1 Oct 50
2,053
2,479
362,000
474,800
33.0
434
4433.300
1,883,080
V Cultivated
3.8
5.9
114
29.4
39.2
W One hectare equals 2.471 sores0
b.
tv, -
During the'indnetrial nationalisation drives Individual artisans
were famed to 3nin cooperatives. rif 2949, with 44,100 Implores swelled
In 1,000 artisan otoOperatives the state was in a position to direst the
output of inlividual fauftsmeL The totems:A is taking iUrther measures
to stavngthen. Its ecartwol over artisans. Produstion combines have been
estahlished far all artisan enterprises, bringing together artisans doing
the same trpe or vomit in a partioular region in order to aneroise non
effective supervision over work standards end output. The artisan Gobbles
In Sofia are broken clown into row groupie
Shoemakers, shoe repairers, glove.manufaoturers, leather workers;
2) Tailors;
3) None services, including locksmiths, electricians. , painters,
plumbers, sod tinkers;
(4) Nissellensous, including watchmakers, goldsmiths, oboe patithers,
chimney sweeps, photographers, etc.
WRIT
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II. Pozoottfr or ba w
2aisice
The agrieultural labor form in &aorta has been astimated at 2,700,000
in 1949 and 2,650,000 in 1950, indiesting a drop of about 109 Pireent? Zt
emigration to Turkey continues, the -supply .of agrioultars1 labor will probably
doom's. at approximately the same rat* until 1953, but this Is not 41111pettei
to have a sigaitleant *Mot on agrienliarral preach:lotion. On the other hand,
the nonagricultural labor force is estimated to have increased from (109,000
in 1:9413 to 865,000 in 1949, or about 7 percent, principally In the fields of
industry, mining, and construction. ? In 1950, mush Inbar totaled 891,000,,
an Inaroase of about 3 percent. Unless the planned industrial goal is
changed, the annual rate of increase during the next 3 years mill be tely
slightly above that of 1950.
The technical training of natilia personnel is Increasing Vela the
assistance of Soviet and Satellite technicians, but although predbativity
has apparently inareased in the pest year, it is still believed to be
relatively low.
1. AlicaulAtialladlaultiniaschafa.
The estimated size of the Bulgarian labor force, by category, Is tabulated
below.
Civilian labor Pores
(Estimated as of 1 Zanuary) Thousands
3242.. AUL 19LIL. 222. 122..
Agriculture 2,9700 _ 2,650 2,600 2,550 2,500
Industry,
and Construotion 341W 383.2/ 407 4/ 434 460 5/
Transportation and
Communications 114 1/ 98 2/ 100 gi ? 102 2/ 104 2/
Commerce, Public
ImP1070 etc. 20/ 384 384 3a4 384 384
Total 1.2112 MU Ida 14212 2.1411
The decrease in total esployment is landeictbtediy osased t increases in
zeilitary, paramilitary, and forced labor groups. lath the data at hand it is
SNILIE
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SACHET
difficult to determine the exact else of the famed labor group. However*
it is estimated at 75'0000 j2/
The estimate of the agricultnral labor fordo is *object to a seargia
error of 10 percent, 'thief: idil inerease with the passage of tisane/ems
additional Intelligence collection produces MOM aoaerate based far estleates.
The figures for total nonagricultural civilian emplqinent and far industry
(including construction) and Oansport are believed to be =greet, aseneft
the Accuracy of pehlisbed, data. No data are available for Immerse and
public employment* tut as &residual figure within the total nenagrieultaral
labor faros it appears to be held oonstant.
The Increase In the nonagricultural labor force was smaller is 1950
than in 1949 because the vindsplqired group was being absorbed into the
economy and the aunnal innrement in the next 3 years is alpented.to be
only slightly above that of 1950. The4Imnolrear Plan shows the govarnsentia
interest In increasing both industrial employment and employeent In conetrue-
tion, The growth of the &instruction labor fume ban been aleable, and the
planned percentage increase in constzuction labor for 2951 in Mud at a
higher 'goal than the total Increase in the nonagricultural labor fares*
The total member of persons engaged in construotion is difficult to gannet
however, because at the aeasonal fluotnatiosie. thie trade and thous* of
labor troops (Trudosinne), short.term ftdlanteera labor brigades, and !breed
labor in addition to free labor. jai -
26 LerelpfTeehnicallteininaeSicilloplpiOrrieiency?
Plitieal appointees replamelmanyof the tembnieigns endurance= who
were in Bulgaria at the end of the war: In 1948 tbo Oulgerien press reported
that there were 3,000 engineers and architects and 16,000 tedhnicians in the
country. 2,2/ The native tecbnical gr baa been supplemented with Soviet
and Satellite personnel. The Soviets, in particular, are lawn to be
numerous, but data are insaffloient tamales an accurate estimate.
Training programs for apprentices, as well as for engineers and
technicians, hate been expanded. /n.1949 there neve 61,000 students in
intermediate vocational schools and 30,80D in trade sebools14,4 and 6,543
engineers and technicians were reported to have been gradaxted. 15/ In 1951
there are to be 66,000 students in profeseional training sehoo1e;,16,
Trainees are also sent to the USSR and to other Satellites. j2/
Little specific recent data relative to efficieney and produetivity
are available, the 'best clues coming !Mtn publiebed and broadsast complaints
concerning defnctive production and inefficiency and from the eneannent of
remedial measures. Percentage increases in productivity are of little value
in the absence of an adequate base, but the increase of 13 pereent reported
at the end of the first quarter of 1951 over the preesaggyear is a 'feeble
gain in view of the failure to moot productivity goals in 1950. UV
15 .
=RR
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3.BIZSDIGUILISLICILMINISAIMILICAULXIINT-11=0,-
There are same indioatioas that ?lefties wort is practiced, but the extent
is not loom. &ideation of absenteeism woad add psrhape 10 percent to the
Ilkan.bour inpatat The =wool= of the nonagrioullural labor farce planned
te .
for 1952 is than that of the previous yeer. The ammel increase in
population of eating eget howerer? woad permit some expension in the labar
form even with larger isiliter7 forams, as would the *ore widespread employnent
of women,
13110811T
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Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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SWEET
rito balm Trade and ylatneee
AMU
Bulgaria's postwar commorse is estimated as being 85 percent with the
Soviet glee, initially almost entirely with the USSR and more recently
with other Eastern European countries of the Bloc as well. Bulgarian
exports to the USSR consist primarily et lead and sine concentrates, tobacco,
cement, and some foodstuffs. In exchange for these the SovietUnion sends
Bulgaria cotton, metals, oil products and industrial and agricultural
machinery. The USSR enjoys special benefits from this trade by importing
Bulgarian tobasce and rose oil, which is then sold an world markets for
hard currency.
Bulgarian trade with the other Eastern European Satellites dhows a
somewhat larger excess of imports into Bulgaria than does its traie with
the USSR. The general oommodity composition resembles that of the trade
with the Soviet Union.
Bulgaria's trade with non-Bloc countries is primarily with Western Europe
and la of significant benefit to Bulgaria's economic program. Experts
consist almost entirely of foodstuffs, such as wines and fruits. ,Imports,
on the other hand, are composed ins nly of industrial equipment and parts
and medicines.
It 11 probable that there will be little Change in the pattern of
Bulgaria's foreign trade between now and the end of 1952. Some increase
in ore exports to the USSR, and possibly a ought reduction of trade with
Master% Europtoan be expected. The Bulgarian industrialisation program
makes it probable that Bulgaria's imports from the Bloc will exeeed its
exports to that area throagh 1952. Benefits of this industrialisation
program will not become evident before 1953. The total amounts involved,
however, are so small as to have little effect on the economic potential for
war of the Soviet Union.
1. bdazsdustax.
The primitive agricultural nature of the Bulgarian wow is refloated
in the composition and Tatum of its foreign trade Practically 411 industrial
goods and means of transportation must be imported and paid for by soles of
agricultural products.
SECRET
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SECOS
Bulgaria obtains frosVestern Europe materials stieh are not readily
available from within the Bloc, intending precision instruments, abrasives,
railroad equipment, textile machinery, automotive and aireraft equipment,
ball bearings, and bolting silk. In certain instances the quantities sought
have inAlcated that some of these imports may be destined for third parties*
Imports from the West are beginning to be curtailed by export controls. The
denial of a German license for aithrake spares, for .example, will considerably
handicap Bulgaria's strained railway system.
231/11.101.12,3
9gagelo
Switserland, Italy, Austria, and West Germany have amounted for the
bulk of Bulgaria's trade with the West. This trade has been complicated
by Bulgaria' e- inability to :supply commodities desired by the West, as:wale*
by trade practices such as the refusal to accept agreed-ion secondary items
under a trade pact with Italy and the undercutting of legittmate business
in Austria in dealing through USIA (the Seviet..controlled firms in Austria),
Failure to reach settlements regarding compensation for nationalized iestern
properties further deters expansion of trade*
bp lingalL12.bitailadaRiaga.
Tne largest Bulgarian exports to non-Soviet areas are foodstuffs,
During the first half of 1950, Dor instance, Bulgarian exports to West
Oermmqr oonsisted of eggs, fruits, tobasco, mine, and *rude ohemicals. The
extent of this trade is small, totalling only 03440000 for the helfwyears
rts to Italy for the same period, composed mostly of grain, with moms
meets and eggs, wore 3354,0000 .2/ Other food exports included such items
as tomato paste, rose oil, and red pepper.A/
40 Imports frontUomrSoviet Bloc Countries.
Imports have been oharaeteristioany Industrial* Per example,
machinery, electrical equipment, and noppreeious metals and manufactures
comprised the great bulk of Bulgarian imports from Sweden in 1949 and
during the first 9 months of 1950. There was, however, a noticeable shift
in emphasis during this period from imports of technical equipment to imports
of metals and metal products. 3/ The regular trade agreement with Belgium
provides for Bulgarian Imports of eleetrical equipment, machinery, and
transport equipment. A/ In addition to this, Bulgaria is reported to have
completed a recent agreement for 360,000 Belgian francs worth of ait.
compressor hammers to be paid for with Bulgarian vines. 4/ Austria is
Bulgaria's largest trading partner outside the Soviet Bloc and provides
bearings, steel products, electrical apparatus, machine tools and.parts,
transportation equipment and parts, and chemicals.
23
SICREP
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WORM
Trade with the other Western leropean countries fellows the same
pattern. Other countries outside the Soviet Bloc, such as Egypt and
Argentina, aupply raw materials (cotton, wetly hides, and quebracho, et 7,)
ahloth are utilized by Bulgarian fabricating industries.
d. Itsmga.
It is probable that the general composition of Bulgarian trade with
non-Soviet Bloc countries will remain Omit the ease In 1951 and 1952 82
it was in 19500 Imports of equipment from Soviet Bloc countries, however,
will gradmally reduce Bulgarian dependcnee upon Western European countries
for replacements and spare parts* This shift to Soviet Bloc sources, coebined
with Western expert controls, may reduce the volume of Bulgarian trade with
the Wasta
3. Insbudnusisciatauusaatan,
Trade with other countries of the Soviet Bloc composed about 80 to 85
percent of Bulgarials total trade in 19490 or this amount, the Soviet
Union accounted for about one-ftird of the imports and onsAalf of the
exports, and ?eland, Czechoslovakia, and the USIA together provided about
one-third of the imports. Czechoslovakia was the most important recipient
of Bulgarian exports after the USSR.
a.
11122121.12.kda.M211.491=2?.
The USSR, and, to amnoth lesser extent, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
and Hungary, import all of Bulgarian ore exports* The most important of
these are lead and sine concentrates and some copper. In addition, the
USSR receives the bUlk of Bulgarian tobacco and rose oil and, sells most
of these items on world markets far the Soviet account. This adds to the
Soviet Unionos supply of hard currencies. In addition, the USSR receives
from Bulgaria foodstuffs, wines, and ether agricultural prodects.
Reports to Czeohotlevakia consist primarily of tobacco, hides, wheat,
other agricultural products, and some nonferrous ores and concemtrates* Those
exports represented about 10 percent (about $10 million) of Bulgarian exports
in 1949c
Bulgarian feodstuffs have been melange& in large quantities for
Industrial goods from US/A. These exports of foodstuffs are of Importunes
to the Soviet Union, because of the Austrian black-market operations of USI
Imports from Bulgaria are usually brought in without passing through customs,
thus giving the USIA outlets a big competitive advantage In the Austrian
markets. Bulgaria exports goods of similar categories to the other Satellites
but In lesser quantities.
CD 24 de,
SERV
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Apart' from Soviet Bloc Countries.
Bulgarian industrialisation* such as it is, is being developed
primarily with importwermaterials? supplies* and equipment from Soviet
Bloc countries. The Bulgarian econceyidil thus became less and less
dependent -upon imports rran ether countries for replacements and spare parts.
Purthermare since the Bloc absorbs the overwhelming proportion of its
exports, Bulgaria would be unable to pay for any large quantity of imports from
the West.
?
Imports fres the Soviet Union* totalling about $46 million to $449
minion in 1949, included for the most part iron and steel products
nonferrous products machinery, petrolaue products, cotton, ma* and
chemicals. 9,t Imports fron Poland are second only to those from the Soviet
Union. They totalled $24 million in 1949 and were eomposed primarily of roada
building and other heavy machinery and chemicals. 2r Bulgaria receives
from Czechoslovakia machinery, electrical apparatus transportation. equipment*
eonstruction equipment, and Industrial mathinery. The total of this trade
was about $10 million for 19499 9/ DS/A supplies large amounts of truas,
some electromotore, and other industrial products to Bulgariac. IQ/ Electrical
apparatus and instruments are the main imports Ileasifungar7. Petroleum
products come from Rumania. Trade tdth Albania is untepertant.
c. rrobahle Trends.
The Bulgarian Five Tear Plan as originally oonesived projected a
large-scale and intensive development of foreign trade. Support of then=
by the USSR and the rest of the Soviet Bloc called for a considerable effort
on their part. There have recently been indications that, in Bulgarian '
development, the emphasis on industrialisation may be reamed and promotion of
agriculture increased. Such a shift in emphasis would, of course, in the
long run reduce Bulgarian requirements for capital goods and industrial
materials below the levels at which they would otherwise have been. However*
shipments of construction equipment, agricultural equipment, and industrial
equipment continue. The probability is that sufficient Industrialisation
will be inslertaken to develop further the nonferrous Metals industry, to
Increase someehat the electric power capacity* to complete the nitrogenous
fertiliser plant, la/. and generally to provide the maintenance and repair
facilities for Increased mechanisation of agriculture and of related elements
of the econopy* such as transportation.
Trade with the Orbit is likely to continue along present lines for
the next year and a half, with possibly some increases In volume. Trade
with the Soviet Union in 1950 reportedly increased 20 percent over 1949. 13/
This trend will probably contdnnes although it is doubtful Whether Bulgaria
can greatly expand the actual volume of its total exports before 1953. In the
meantime, the Soviet Union and particularly the ether countries of the
.25.
=car
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SEWS
Soviet Bloc will continue to provide Bulgaria with the industrial products
needed to sustain the eco noey and increase agricultural and metals production.
4. bombard_ or TradeLyith NonmSovie Bloc Areas.
Bagariass trade with nenmSeviet Bloc. areas is about 15 to 20 percent
of Its total trade. The bulk of its non.,00bit trade is with Western Bdrope
and will undodbtedly decrease as Bulgaria's exports became more absorbed
within the Bloc and as Western contras on trade with the Bloc increase.
5. jruccueensated Deliveries to the USSR.
At the end of the war the Soviet Union traded German assets in Bulgaria
for Bulgarian assets in Germany, making a net profit of about $100 minion
on the transaction. 14/ Other war claims and assets were settled to the
benefit of the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1948, including one goods
credit of $19 minion. Di There are at present no Soviet or joint.otoek
companies in Bulgaria, nor does Bulgaria pay any reparations to the USSR, 13/
Financial manipulations however,'provide o =Mod of Soviet exploitation which
Is used in trade with glgaria. The official rate of the lova has been
progressively reduced from 15 to the ruble to 100 to the rehle in additions,
the disproportionate increases in Soviet prices have lessened the return to
Bulgaria for its exports. IV
6. ItandLC;
The primary trends reflected by the Bulgarian Five Year Plan (194845)
shows sharp increase in the exports of animal products and processed goods
and a decrease in the exports of industrial crops, as well as a sharp increase
in the imports of machinery, equipment? and metal products and a decrease
In the imports of raw materials. : The pattern of trade until 1953 probably
will continue to reflect these trends. Iges the Miming table an porsent460
allocations in Bulgarian tarsi= trade.)
MUT
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da7
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Bulgarian Foretell Trade
194849
=ions at tf MUM,
Country
Eastern Bump.
Orbit
USSR 59.2 47.5
Czeohoslovakia 15.5 10.4
Hungary 1.5 8.5
Poland 6.0 2400
Rumania 2.0 4.0
USIA (Soviet Zona) 6.0 10.0
Subtotal 2214 Iasi
NeenOrbit
Finland 0.5 0.4
'Yugoslavia 6.8
Subtotal 2a3. gaik
Western Europe
Austria 2.6 5.9
Belgium 0.8 2.4
Denmark 0.6 0.3
Prance 1.1 0.5
Germany oa 04
Italy 2.7 2.5
Netherlands 0.3 0.5
Norway oa oa
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
Subtotal
Others
Egypt
Graeae
Turkey
US
Other
Subtotal
0.6
0.9
1,0
2.0
1.6
2.8
2161
0.9
04
0.8
0.4
2.1
1.4.
1.3
11
/al
1242
42.5
11.9
45.0
10.9
1.6
8.5
6.0
2.4
2.0
4.0
6.0
1.0
224
ILA
0.1
003
16.6
11147.
24
3.4
4.5
0.2
0.3
04
0.1
1.3
004
0.2
3.0
24
3.2
0.3
04
0.2
0.1
105
0.9
1.2
0.4
0.6
0.6
11,22 1222
1.9
1.2
1.3
0.4
2.6
1.9
2.6
14 fiala
Total itiaal MA 23A2
10,4
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MOM
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SECRET
Five Tear Plan Percentage Anocations
in Bulgarian Foreign Trade
1.111MOMM.110?11????????.........jagaILMOMMI....0.0101?011MINMI......
Industrial Crops
75.3
Grains and Legumes
3.6
Fruits and Vegetables
Fresh
2.8
Canned
3.2
Wine and Spirit Products
1.4
Animal Products
4.7
Minerals .
6.2
Products of Wood.precesaing Industry
1.6
Other Goods .
1.2
Immorts
Maehimery and Equipment
24.9
Metals and Semiproeessed Metal Goods
25.5
Textile Rem Materials
12.1,
Bides and Leather Goods
0.3
Rubber and Rubber Products
1.9
Petroleans Products
5.3
Cho:deals
7.5
Medicinal Articles
2.3
Cellulose and Paper
6.4
Food Products
10.7
Other Goods
2.8
28
OMIT
1221
34.6
9.11
8.9
11.5
9.0
1/.0
3.2
2.7
3.3
121.41
48.9
23.1
6.7
1.0
1.3
5.0
9.7
1.7
0.6
0.4
1.6
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At the close of World Var II, Bulgaria was a country uith a primitive,
self-sufficient type of agriculture characterized by small peasant holdings
divided into uidely scattered stripe, by primitive tools, and by customs and
habits handed doun from generation to generation. Since then, the government
has inaugurated its collectivization program, and by the end of 1950 approximately
50 percent of all arable land was in collective, or state, farms, Peasant re-
sistance to the collectivization program has retarded production and may tend
to decrease it further
Because grain is the most important food crop, a separate analysis is
presented. Exports of other agricultural products form an important part of
Bulgarian foreign trade, and tobacco is the most important single item exported.
The 1950 grain production is estimated at 3,247,000 metric tons, or 9
percent below the prewar average9 In the postwar perio4population increased
10 percent. Therefore, the per capita availability of grain in 1950 was
appreciably below the prover level. Grain stocks as of 31 July 1951 (the end
nf the 1950-51 consumption year) are expected to be 385,000 metric tons, or
almost a 3-month supply. The size of these stocks is not large enough to in-
dicate war intentions.
1. Production.
a. Bulgarian agriculture at the close of World War II was of the
traditional, primitive, small-peasant type, based on motorise and habits handed
down from father to son for generations. Since the mar the government has made
attempts to consolidate the small individual holdings into larger units suit-
able for mechanized farming. EV the end of 1950 about 50 percent of arable
land had thus been consolidated. Lechanization, however, does not necessarily
increase production per hectare, although it does increase production per man
and thus releases man power for other activities. In some districts the
p,asante are resisting collectivization, and there is the possibility that,
because of sabotage, production may decrease throughout thm currant Plan periodo
The important crops are grain/land tobacco. Tobacco is the most
important single commodity in value exported by Bulgaria, whereas grain is the
chief item in the nutrition of the population. In addition small quantities
of sugar beans tomato paste, and other agricultural products are exported,
the combined total forming an important part of Bulgarian exports. Because of
its importance as the basic food and feed item, grain is the only agricultural
oommodity analyzed in detail.
* drain unless otherwise specified includes corn (maim), wheat, rya, cats,
barley, rice, and such minor grains as spelt, mmslin, and bnekUheat.
29 CID
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b. About 50 percent of all grain is produced in the Danubian plain north
of the Balkan mountains. Some 30 percent is grown south of the mountains in
the Uaritea Valley. The remaining, 20 percent is scattered over plateaus and
upland valleys. Before Toad War II, Bulgaria seeded,to grain an average of
2,862,000 hectares, which produced 3,578,000 metric tons, of which 269,000
metric tons, or 7.6 percent, were exported. During the war, acreage dropped
slightly to 2,714,000 hectares, but since the war this has increased, reaching
3,039,000 hectares in 1950. Grain production in 1950 is estimated at
3,247,000 metric tons, or 9 percent below the prewar average.
Latest Annual Estimates of Grain Production -
1948..50
Thousand rietric Tons
Pro. Range o
Year
Estimate
Variation of Estimate
1948
3,575
3,387 to 3,763
1949
3,411
3,231 to 3,590
1950
3,247
3,076 to 3,418
2, Probable Production,
Grain acreage in Bulgaria is, within a narrow margin, statiepand it is
unlikely that there mill be a significant increase in the sown area in 1951.
Because of unrest among the peasantkthere will probably be no significant
increase in 1952, and there may possibly be a slight decrease,
,Estimated Grain Production
1951-52
s
Thousand netric Tons
Probable Range of
Year Estimate Variation of Estimate
1951 3,634
1952 3,658
3,443 to 3,82E
3,466 to 3,851
The 1949 and 1950 crops were both below average because of unfavorable
weather conditions and peasant resistance, the principal factors which gill
also determine production in 1951 and 1952. Estimated production for 1951
and 1952, therefore, assuming average weather conditions, should be equal to
or slightly above the 1948 level.
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Domestic Requirerents.
Domestic civilian requirements of grain in 1950 are estimated at 3,328,0u0
metric tons but may range from 3,269,000 to 3,388,000 metric tons. Estimate*
of total roquirements are based largely on annual increases in population.
The drop in requirements between the 1949-50 and tho 1950-51 consumption years
is, however, accounted for by thesught amp in 1950, since less grain was
used for livestock feed. The reduction in feed for livestock was not
sufficient to decrease livestock numbers materia14. This is reflected in the
estimated grain requirements for 1951-52 consumption year, which are based
on normal practices.
Estimated Emestic Bewirements of Grain
1948.43
Thousand . Uetric Tons
Year
Estimate
Pro.. Range o
Variation of Estimate
1948-49
3,407
3,341 to 3,472
1949-50
3,370
3,308 to 3,431
1950-51
3,328
3,269 to 3,388
1951-52
3,497
3,430 to 3,565
1952-53
3,528
3,461 to 3,596
4. Stockpiles.
Because of the poor harvest in 1950 and the discontinuance of imports, the
Bulgarians may have been forced to dram on their total stocks. The decrease
probably amounted to about 81,000 metric tons.
1/110.10.1.111111?111?111111100?01MMISM.1?131.
Stockpiles of Grain
Thousand Metric Tona
As of
31 July 1950
31 Za13r 1951
Estimate
466 (3 months' supply)
385,a/ (2.7 months'
supply)
Probable Range of
Variation of Estimate
344 to 466
151 to 669
a/ Statistical cumulation.,
431ca
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3. Surplus or Deficit.
The probable surplus or deficit as of 31 July 1951 and 1952 is given
below without taking into account carry-over stocks or net trade. If carry-
over stocks are considered and the 1951 harvest estimate is correct, then
there should be a total surplus of 515,000 metric tons on 31 July 1952,
Stocks or a surplus of this size, if not exported, might indicate that the
Bulgarians were expecting an cmercencY.
Estimated Surplus or Defleit of Grain (Domestic Production
rear
31 July 1951
31 July 1952
Estimate
(-) 81
(.013o
Variation of Estimate
(-) 193 to (4) 30
(4.) 5 to (4) 255-
6, -Collectivization.,
Collectivization of agriculture it Bulgaria began in 1944 with the
formation of 147 so-called Labor Cooperative Farms. Consolidation of small
peasant holdings into large fields seeded to a single crop use facilitated
by the lone-established custom coma= to many villages in Bulgaria of
village crop rotation, Although each peasant seeded his own individual plot*
himself, only uheat vas seeded in one parte the village, corn in another,
the barley in still another, etc, Bulgarian peasants uere accustomed ,to a
system of large areas, comprising hundreds of indtvisbiAlly,owned plots,
seeded to single crop, It uas, therefore, not too difficult for the
peasant to cooperate. in the cultivation of the Labor Cooperative Farms as
an outgrowth of their village crop rotation system. Pressure brought by the
government on individual peasants hastened the process of collectivization,
so that by December 1950 fully 50 percent of the tillable land of Bulgaria.uas
cultivated by 2,568 Labor Cooperative Farms.
7. Trends -- Including Indications of Babilization for War.
There is no indication that there mill be an increase in the area seeded
to cereals in the mar future. Because of the relatively static position of
the Bulgarian grain acreage, it is unlikely that intentions to mobilise for
uar would be reflected in a change in the grain acreage, Such quantities as
might be required to conduct a campaign against Yugoslavia, forcumuwaxi, could
readily be shipped from Odessa.
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11 Industrial Capacity and Levels of Production.
A. Ferrous liotals.
Bulgaria has no iron and steel industry, its small fabricating
plants being entirely dependent for semifinished iron and stool upon
irports from the USSR, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
Bulgaria has, houever, a good grade- of iron ore and several of the more
important forroalloying metals, zhioh are no shipped to the other
Soviet Bloc countries. Righ-quil14ty coal suitable for making metallurgical
coke is not mined in Bulgaria, and the small mount of metallurgical coke
used in industry is imported from Czechoslovakia and Poland. Deposits of
iron ore, chrome ore, manganese, nickel., titanium, and tungsten exist, but
none has been thoroughly developed. Bulgaria needs equipment, mining
experts, capitaiand improved transportation facilities in order to expand
production of ferrous metals. Plans for a small domestic iron and steel
industry appear to have been abandoned.
1. Production,
Bulgaria has most of the mu materiale needed to support a email steel
industry a gpod grade of iron ore and several Of the more important
ferroalloying metals -- but all production is now shipped to the other Soviet
Bloc countries.
Production of ftrrous Ebtals
194840
Year Iron Ore (?0ti: Fe) Chrome Ore
Metnic Tons
Manganese' Ore
1948
38,000
33,000
3,000
1949
38,000
34,000
3,000
1950
40,000
34,000
4,000
20 Estimsted Possible Production and Gapecity.
Deposits ot ironer*, obrom ore, nengenese* niekel* titanium* and inngsten
exist in &aorta* but none has been thoroughly developed* and reserves of these
metals are net large* Production in 1962 is estimated as follows: Irma ores
40,000 **trio tons, chrome oras 45,000# and imulgonoso ores 60000 Because there
is no iron and steel industry* there are no domestic requirements for ferrous
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motels and no etookpileso An iron ore produced is exported to Bingen., Polani
Cseohoslovekla. and Rumania, and.all chrome ore is sent to Bast Geraanyo IL is
believed that all mengenese ore is shipped to the USSR? Ms Five Tear Plan.oalls
for the production of 20,000netrio tons of pig iron end 10,0001mM:rig tone of
raw steel kr 1953, In order to ***owlish the production goals for 105 of the
Five Year Plane a coke plant, too blest ferneees, and a small integrated steel
mill wore to Imre bean built, but there is no evidences that audh courtmmrtim
is under Iwo
3.ik_a3_,...._4_t_errLimiatiens.
Bulgarlaneeds equipment, mining experts, capital, and improved trans-
portation facilities in order to expand production of iron ore, chrome
ore, and manganese and to exploit resources of other ferroalloying metals.
4. Trends s.=_lngkidsL2fLggnfL2LaLuk...Astn_wabt.,b za
Since Bulgarian plans for a small iron and steel industry appear to
have been abandoned, it is not anticipated that great strides mill be nade
in the mining of ferrous metals.
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D. Nonferrous l'etals.
Summary
The production of nonferrous retals in Bulgaria except for copper
and lead and zinc conce:trates is unimportant, and any requirements would
have to be supplied through, imports. for is Bulgaria a particularly
important producer of cop:er, estimated production being from 1,250 to
2,000 votric tons of contained copper ineopper ;.ntte, which is shipped to the
USSR for further Drocessing. Recent information on the calacity of tho smelter
at Elisonja is lacking, but production of from 6,000 to 7,000 metric tons
of matte a year may be possible by the end of 1952. Production of
electrolytic copper will begin as soon as the :bzdra-Kurilo high-tension
power line is completed. Ore reserves are not extensive. Any increased
production of corper mill probably be shipped to the USSR, with limited
quantities going to Czechosloval:ia.
Lead and zinc concentrates are exported. The metal content of
lead concentrates produced in 1949 was 11,250 metric tons, which in terms
of recoverable natal after smelting and refining is estimated at 10,000
aetric tons, In 1949 the zinc concentrates mined contained 4,640 metric
tons of zinc, which in terms of recoverable metal is estimated at 3,700 tons
of zinc. The production of recoverable Lietal in 1952 is estimated at 13,100
met:ic tons of lead and about 5,000 tons of zinc. According to the Five Year
Plan, the capacity of existing concentrating plants is to be enlarged, and
lead and zinc smelters are to be constructed. Details are lacking, however,
on construction deadlines. Present domestic requirements are estimated at
1,000 metric tons of lead and 1,800 to 2,000 tons of zinc per year.
The USSR has sent a number of technical personnel to Bulgaria to
aid in the development and exploitation of mineral deposits and will
supply equipment for nem metallurgical plants in Bulgaria.
???????????????? 411111.??????????????????
1. ....o.RELC.
a. Production.
Bulgaria is not a particularly important producer of copper, and
the entire output is exported to the USSR. A small copper smelter 1./
located at Elisenja near Sofia produces a copper matte containing
approximately 69 percent copper. Production in 1950 is estimated to be
from 1,250 to 2,000 metric tons of contained copier in the copper matte.
exa 35
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b. Estimated Possible Production and Capacity.
No recent informtion on the ca;acity of the Elisenja smelter
is mailable, but previous estimates indicate a production of about 20
tons of matte a day. This uould amount to betueen 6,000 and 7,000
netric tons of matte a year, aUoin for interruptions and shutdouns
for repairs.
The smelter and concentrating plants at Elisenja, uhich uere
built by a Franco-Lelgian csany and nationalized about S :rears ago,
process ores from the. Burgas area on the Meek Sea coast and from the
Plakalnitza rains, Information indicates the possible production of
electrolytic copper ae soon as a high-tension pouer line is-comaeted
fr^m Nesdra. to
C. Durestic Revirements.
Informatirn is lacking on present requirements. Houever, according
to the US Bureau of lanes V, Bulgaria imported an average of about 1,600
metric tons of ,Jopper a year for the period 1935-39. All copper minerals .
and matte are shipped out of Bulgaria for further processing and refinini-band
it is beliowd that very little, if any, copper is stockpiled. Therefore,
the ocuntry depends upon outside-13moms, probably the USSR, for its
domestic rcquirements.
d. Internal Limitations
(1). Availability of Ran Uaterials.
The reserves of copper are in Bulgaria in 1935 rere estimated
as fcllous Ah
Proved Ore
I-robable Ore
Metric Tons
Cooper Percent
190,000
500,000
150,000
4.5
4.5
2 to..3
These reserves are not very extensive, but they could be
exploited by the USSR for about 8 years at the rate of 4,000 tons of copper
a year,
(2) Shortage of Rau Uaterials, Technical Personnel, and Equipment.
The USSR has taken over the Bulgarian mining industry and has
sent technical personnel in considerable numbers to Bulgaria to exploit the
mines. According to the Five Year Plan, copper production in 1953 should
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be 317 percent over 1948 5,./, Which would nean the mining and processing of
about 100,000 metric tons of oro a year. The Plan also includes the
installation of a converter in the Elisenja smelter, which will maim
possible the production of blister copper for the proposed electrolytic
plant. The equilment will probably be imported from the SR 5f or other
Satellite countries such as East Germany or possibly Czechoslovakia,
e, Trends.
All information points to the increasing production and processing
of Bulgarian copper, which will probably be shipped to tho UM and imitated
quantities to Czechoslovakia.
2. Lead and ?inc.
a. Production.
The latest information on production of lead and zinc concentrates
is for 1949. 2/ It is reported that all of these concentrates were shipped
to the USSR,
Lead and Zinc Production
1949
Production Detal Content
UStric Tons Metal Percent
Lead Concentrates 15,000 11,250 75il
Zinc Concentrates 8,000 4,640 58
il Other accrues indicate 73% lead. W
Estimated Possible Production and Capaci0
According to the Five Year Plan, the production of lead and zinc
ores is to be increased 68 percent over 1948 levels. To this end, the
capacity of existing concentrating plants is to be enlargedmand it is
planned to construct lead and zinc smelters. 2/ Thus far all concentrate
have been shipped out of the country for processinc,
Dazed on the scanty information available on production in 1949
an:' using the increase proposed in the Five Year Plan, the estimated pro-
duction of lead and zinc concentrates in 1951 and 1952 would be approximately
as follows:
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Estimated Lead and Zinc Production
1951-52
iletric Tons
1951
122
Lead Concentrates
18,600
20,200
Natal Content at 735? Pb.
13,600
14,700
Recoverable Lead at 89%
12,100
13,100
Zinc Concentrates
9,900
10,900
/Mal Content
5,750
6,320
Recoverable Zinc at Sait
4,600
5,056
Planned production of lead metal in 1953 is 13,300 metric tone. This
requires the construction of one or more lead smelters. No figures mere given
for zinc metal production planned for 1953. There is, therefore, no basis for
comparison.
c. Domestic Requirements.
Information on domestic requirements is lacking. However, the Bureau
of Dines4/ reports that Bulgarian imports in the period 1935-39 averaged
739 tons o lead and 1,216 tons of zinc annually. Present requirements have
probably increased to some extent, poseibly up to 1,000 tons of lead and 1,800
to 2,000 tons of zinc, an increase of approximately 50 percent. The requirements
are for semitabricated naterial such as sheets, lead and zinc tubes, and lead
shot. Information on quantities is lacking.
The metal content of the lead and zinc concentrates produced in 1949
indicates a surplus over domestic needs. This will prevail through 1952.
Information on stockpiling is lacking.
d. Internal Limitations.
(1) Availability of Raw Laterials.
No authentic data on ore reserves are available, but according
to a Bureau of Lanes report there is an important mineralized region in the
Rhodope mountains in southern Bulgaria, occupying parte of Plovdiv and Stars-
Zagora Oblast. Natal content of ores from the Rhodope district varies widely--
1 to 47 percent lead, 2 to 20 percent zinc, up to 2 percent copper, and up to
500 grams of silver and 50 grame of ;sold per ton. Ore reserves of the district
have been estimated as high as 200r4l1ion metric tons. Production from these
deposits began in 1925,
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(2) Shortages of Ram Materials, Technical Personnel.,
?pmnnt. and Other Limiting Factors.
Known deposits are a considerable source of rau materials.
It takes tims, however, to prepare ore deposits for extensive mining oper-
ations* The USSR has sent a number of technical personnel to aid in the
development and exploitation of Bulgarian mineral deposits,
aquipment nill be obtained through trade agreements, as an-
nounced in a speech by tho BalgarianNixdster of Foreign Trade in Jay
1950. Under a long-term trade agreement with the USSR the Soviets nill
supply equipment for non metallurgical norks.
Transportation problems zw cause some delay in the
exploitation of the Rhodope area.
e. Trends.
All information indicates an extensive though probably un-
realistiesprogram for increased production of lead and zinc.
3. Other Nonferrous Mtala.-
Tho production of other nonferrous metals in Bulgaria is unimportant,
and any requirements would have to be supplied through imports.
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Coal?
Sumnary
Bulgaria produced 5,250,000 metric tons of coal in 1950 as compared
eith an estimated 4,800,000 tons in 1949 and 4,015,000 tons in 1948. Nearly
95 percent of the output consists of lignite, and nearly 80 percent of the
total comes from the nines at Dimitrovo (formaflyllaird1). The quality of
coal, in general, has been poor, principally because of its high ash content
and inadequate preparation.
The revised plan for 1951 calls for production to increase 24.8
percent, or 4300,000 metric tons over the 1950 output, which is equivalent
to the original goal (6,550,000 tons) for the last year of the Five Year Plan
(1953). A gain of 1 million tons in 1951 appears to be a more realistic
projection of what is likely to be accomplished. It is estimated that out-
put in 1952 will be 6,875,000 tons, or 10 percent higher than 1951.
It is believed that production was more nearly in balance with re-
quirements in .1950 than in several preceding years, The shortages that have
existed have been felt mainy by household consumers. Allocations are
approximately a, follows: railroads, 35 percent; electric power plants* 15.5
to 17 percent; Atter industries (inducting briquettine), 30 to 33 percent;
and domestic heating, 18 to 20 percent.
There is no evidence of any Imports of coal in 1950, but Czechoslovakia
probably has been furnishing about 2,500 tons of mice annually, probably of
metallurgical grade. Bulgaria has a coke plant at Plachkovtsi and another
at Kazanlik, but production as well as requirements is very small. There may
have been smAll exportsof coal to Egypt and Austria. -
A few mines in Bulgaria have received raodern equipment in the last
few years, apparently frun the USSR, but mining methods in general are primitive.
Most of the equipment is of German make and is now old and in poor condition.
Bad working conditions and low pay make the industry unattractive to
labor. Production depends to a considerable degree on forced labor, and in
the fail of 1950 about 200 women were hired to work in the Dimitrovo mines.
Increased production of coal is not itself indicative of preparations
for war. In order to meet the rising civilian and industrial requirements
implicit in the Five Year Plan, production of coal must be accelerated.
a. 40 am
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I. Production.
Bulgaria produced approximately 5,250,000 metric tons of coal in 1950
as compared with a target figure of 5,580,000 tons. The output represents
an increase of 9.4 percent over the estimated production of 1949 of
4,800,000tons. In 1948, productionpwas only slightly more than 4 million tons
and far short of the goal of 4,920,000 tons. 1/
About 95 percent of the coal produced is lignite, the major source being
the 8 to 10 mines operating at Dimitrovo (formerly Pernik), 20 miles south-
west of Sofia. This area furnished 3,120,550 metric tons 3/ of coal in 19479
or more than 75 percent of total production. It is probable that the
Dimitrovo mines produced close to 4 million tons in 1950, or about 93 prcent
of the total output of coal. The balance of the lignite production is scattered
throughout at least a dozen areas, none of which accounts for any significant
tonnage, It is possible that none of these areas produced more than 350,000
tons in 1950. According to 1947 data, the Bobov Dol and Pirin mines in south-
western Bulgaria were producing approximately 100,000 metric tons each, and
five principal mines in the Maritsa coal basin in the vicinity of Rakovsky
accounted for a total of between 190000 and 240,000 tons. The only other
important source of coal was the Cherno More (Black Sea) mine, located about
9 miles northwest of Stalin (Burnes). which produced about 100,000 metric tons. 1/
All of these mining areas have increased their production, in particular the
Marital& mine, which is now probably the most highly rechanized in the country.
Estimated Coal Production 4/
1948-50
Thousand Metric Tons
31pe and Aree 1948 2.249, 322
Anthracite
Svoge 25 30
Bituminous
Balkan Basin 125 155
Lignite
Dimitrovo
Other Areas
Total
SEC=
3,050
3,650
815
965
_
L122
.4,015,
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35
190
4,000
1,025
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2. Estimated Possible Production and Capacity.
According to the Five Year Plan, the coal production goal for 1953 was
6,550,000 metric tons but this figure, is now the revised objective. for
1951. Although an increase of 24.8 percent 16,/ over 1950appears to be an
ambitious undertaking, it is likely to be accomplished, eince production in
the first quarter of 1951 was reported to be 20.1 percent greater than in
the same period of 1950.
It is doubtful that output will teach the nen target for 1951 unless the
peasants, who generally return to their farms in the summer, are compelled
to continue working in the mines. Increased opal prodUction depends mainly
on better organization, greater labor efficiency, and more manpouer. Output
in 1952 is estimated at 6,875,000 metric tone, or an increase of ablaut 6 percent
over the revised 1961 pale
3. Domestic Requirements.
Coal supplies in 1949 improved considerably in comparison with 1948,
when there was an acute shortage of fuel for beating. The situation was some-
what better in 1950, and it is probable that in the winter of 1950-51 supplios
were more closely in balance with requircuents. However, the quality of all
types of coal is generally vary poor because of high rock content and inadequate
processing, which reduce fuel efficiency and increase consumption.
Although there are little data available ooncerning coal requirements,
it is known that railroads are the largest consumers, using an estimated 35
percent of production in 1949. This proportion, however, may decline to 32
percent by 1952 as output increases and quality improves. Allocations to other
consumers are estimated as follows: electric power, 15.5 to 17 percent; other
industries (including briquetting), 30 to 35 percent; domestic heating, 18 to
20 percent. A more detailed breakdown is given in the table below.
Estimated Availability and Requirements of Coal
1949-52
4110110MMOMINIMOOMft
Thousand !Istria Tons
2242 1950, 122
Availability
Production
4,900
5,250
6,250
6,875
Stocks
(As of 1 Jan)
501,
125
250
300
Imports
4a.122
5375
-?AM
t.175
Exports .
.50 2/
_5O(
-.502/
Stocks
(As of 31 Dec) -125
-250
-300
-300
Taal
Availabilit4 .4A725
5,075
6,150
6,825
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Requirements
1,650
Railroads
Electric Planta
755
Industrial 12/
1,370
Driquetting
100
Domestic Use
C50
Total Requirements
h43.1
1,725 2,025 2,200
C85 970 1,065
1,425 1,850 2,250
100 105 110
940 1,200 1,250
5.07 6A122 ALea
Re9uirements
Percentage
Railroads
35.0
34.0
33.0
32.0
Electric Plants
15.9
17.4
15.8
15.5
Industrial
29.0
28.1
30.0
32.7
Briquetting
2.1
2.0
1.7
1.6
Domestic Use
18.0
18.5
19.5
18.2
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
4. sto.ltaLe.s.
Coal stocks have always been relatively 6=31, although they were larger
in 1950 than they had been for many years. No figures areavrrilable but it
is doubtful that stocks would meet requirements for more than 15 dalt; during
the winter months. Since most of the coal is lignite, it is unsuited to pro-
longed storage, Total inventories of coal on hand probably did not exceed
250,000 metric tons at the end of 1950.
5. SurDlus or Deficit.
There have been shortages of coal in Bulgaria during and since World War
but the hardships caused by these deficiencies have been confined principaAr
to private consumers uho use coal for heating. Railroads and industries probably
have not been seriously affected. Coal production in 1950 probably balanced
essential miuirements and permitted a mo6est increase in stocks, as well as
small shipments to Egypt and Austria. Supplies of coal are expected to be
adequate for all requirements in 1952,
6. Internal Limitations.
a. Labor.
Difficult working conditions and poor pay make coal mining unattractive
to laborers. Bulgaria therefore relies heavily on forced labor and "Trudovalosn
in the mines; in the fall of 1950 200 uomon were hired to work at Dimitrovo,
Other handicap!' to the smooth functioning of the industry include chronic
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absenteeism, the exodus of peasants to the farm in the summer months, the
high proportion of unskilled morkero, and a general lack of initiative.
b. Equipment
Only a feu mines ;lave modern equipment, uhich consists mostly of
conveyors and probably some.rnchinery:for cutting coal. Little if any coal
is mechanically loaded. In general, all equipment is in poor condition.
Since mo.t of it is old, considerable repair is necessary, and spare parts
are difficult to obtain. The small quantities of available soviet machinery
are of poor quality. Bulgaria apparently is dependent upon foreign sources
for all equipment, including such indispensable items as pipe, pumps, and
possibly rails for mine trackage and feeder linos,
7. Trends Including Indications of Lobilization for
Coal production increased about 20 percent in 1949 and 9.4 percent in 1950?
and a jump of 24.8 percent is planned for 1951, advancing the date for fulfillment
of the Five Year Plan goal by 2 years, This accelerated production schedule
is considered to reflect the country's industrial grouth rather than to in-
dicate mobilization for mar. Some thermal pomer plants and a feu industrial
plants, notably the chemical plant at Dimitrovgrad, are under construction, and
these mill require more coal. EXpanding output of industrial products is re-
sulting in increased freight traffic and fuel requirements of the railroads.
Increased production probably mill make more coal available for civilian needs.
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Do IldinsUallo
Una
There is no erode-oil protection in Bulgaria. The only possible domestic
*aurae of oil is shale* There are a nuiber of shale deposits, the two largest
being near Breanik and Urbino's* Together these have some 150 million metric
tons of shalatcontaining from 30 minion to 35 million tons &oil. A plant has
reportedly been built for the experimental recovery of oil from shale, but
no details are available. Although three small topping plants with an annual
capacity of 60,000 tone were in operation before World War II, there is no
record of their operation since the end of the var.
All of Bulgaria's domestic requirements are met Iv imports from Rumania
and the USSR. Of the 200,000 metric tons of petroleum products imported in
1950, an estimated 165,000 tone were consumed* Efforts are being made to
build up stocks, but the actual size of stockpiles is not known.
Bulgaria is not and will not be an important sontributor to the petroleum
economy of the Soviet- Orbit, lack of indigenous petroletu, technical skill,
and equipment make the country& drain rather than an asset.
1.?
.?1
Although the only indigenous source &petroleum in Bulgaria is oil shale,
there are quite large Shale deposits whither* 4*U-suited to development* The
shales are high in oil content and would lend themselves readily to open-pit
mining. The two most important deposits are located immediately north of
Breanik, where an estimated 30 million metric tons of shale have a recoverable
crude-oil 'content of about 3.9 million tons, and at Serbinemo, 9 miles south
of Gorna-Dzhwaya, where some 120 million tons of dole are estimated to
contain neatly 30 million tons of crude oil. Mere are ether deposits near
Eyustendil, Poportsi, and Keesbnliti A number of other geological structures
are considered promising. Periodically, plans for the development or these
sources of oil are reported. Although it is probable that some experimentation
is being conducted, there is no information 'on the extent of development or
on probabilities for the near future* However, production will probably be
inadequate to satisfy domestic requirements. A. plant for the experimental
recovery of oil from Shale is in operation in eastern Bulgaria, but its exact
location and size are not known.
Before World War II there were three wan topping plants' at Ruse an
the Danube River, with a combined annual capacity or only 60,000 metric tons*
Some 25,000 tons or crude oil were imported annually from Rumania for ?
proceosinglit? and the output was approximately 25 peroent gasoline. 12.5
percent kerosene, 12.5 percent gas oil, and 50 percent residue, the last
being used atalew-grade fuel 011.3/ These refineries have not operated
Blade World War II.3/
oo o-
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2. 4gailabga4gantio
Bulgaria!s domestic requirements are met entirely by Imports from Rumania
and the USSR, In 1949 the following petroleum products were imported and
consumed:
Imports of Petroleua Pr:Kb:eta
Gasoline
19,000
Ierosene ,
28,000
Diesel 011
35,000
Lubricants Is Creases
12,200
Others
?
1,800
Total 2fiagS2
In addition, about 8,000metrie tons of aviation gasoline were imported,
most of which was stockpiled. ki As the result of the build-up of the armed
forces in 1950, requirements Increased. Military requirements were mot ki
an Increase in imports and by a decrease in allotments to the civilian economy. Si
Actual consumption in 1950 was about 165,000 metric tons of the total Imports
of 200,000 tans. Civilian consumption was probably no more than 50,000 tons
,-
3, Spic1ce4lev
Before the end of World Ver II, permanent storage capacity vas estimated
at 125,000 metric tons. ?,/ Since then. a nneter of depots have been expended,
and even drums are used for storage. Stockpiles at the end of 1950 amounted to
approximately 35,000 tons, plus any stocks carried over from 1949, which may
have been considerable.
2licauagrjiltua,
BUlgaria has always been entirely dependent on imports to supply domestic
requirements for petroleum; and there lam indication that the situation will
change in the near future Even If the experimental recovery of shale oil ii
successful, it is extremely doubtful that dependence upon imports will be
relieved by 1952.
5. Interpaljipitatione.
The lack of known erode...oil deposits, plus the inadequate facilities for oil
refinement, are basic limitations to Bulgaria's petroleum industry. Dependence
on outside sources for technical assistance and equipment is great.
eta 46 el*
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IssizineumingsdaskiLseasalliatatigamilsto
The =Rhea recently extended aid for the development of the petroleum
industry. This trend is considered to be Julius with the over-ell plan for
greater -Bulgarian industrialisation and (*anomie self-suffieleusy and does
not necessarily indicate a step toward mobilisation for war* The efforts
directed toward stockpiling of petroleum products, however, may prove the
moat significant single indicator that war mobilization plans are being
Implemented within the &mem* of the industrialisation program.
- 47c
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L 211Plitte Pont.
Men
Since the esonopy of Bulgaria is prinarily agricultural, elestric pewee-
is leen important than in other more developed economies. Failures in
electric power would have dislocating effects in local industries and in
transportation, tut the effect an the total economic potential of the Soviet
Orbit would be elmost unnoticeable.
. Fleetric generating capacity at the end of 1950 amounted to 1929000
kilowatts, end the ratio of thermal to hydrodlectrio capacity was About 55
to 45. The greitest concentration of power plants is in the area within
a 40-mile radius of Sofia, where about 60 percent of the total installed
capacity is situated. By the end 01'1952 the total installed capacity in
Bulgaria Is expected to be between 230,000 and 270,000 kilowatts.
There is incomplete infornation on the amounts of electric power being
used todNy by various classes of consumers, but 56 percent of the power
generated in 1947 was consumed by indastry? the balance being accounted
for by transportation, street lighting, home uses, and transmission losses..
Bulgaria has sufficient fool and water resources to supply an aspanding
power industry Vat Is almost entirely dependent upon imports for increasing
production capacity and replacing capital equipment. This handicap also
applies to transmisaion and generating equipment, which cones Chiefly from
the USSR and Gzecboslovekia.
The increases in power production accompliehed since the end of World
9kr II not ally have been insufficient to contribute to the economic strength
of the Bloc bet also have made only a email contribution toward the develops.
meat of the Bulgarian econogy.
alr.111111ftlelenall9011.0.
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10 kesedeageaddawitaajatuar.
The electric power industry elan a minor role in the Bulgarian economy
and offers no significant contribution to the economic potential of the
Soviet Orbit? The agrarian nature of the econmgr and theilack of largeescale
industrial users of electricity have been largely responsible for retarding
electric power development0 Despite the emphasis given to elestric power
development in the 194748 and 1949-53 Plans, production falls far short of
requirements, and electricity remains less Important than coal and fuel wood as
a source of energy,.
2- &SELOL3M.D373Pate2E2IIkail4adaniilddi*
The prevent electricity supply system follows the primer pattern of
concentration of the generating capacity around major population centers
and fuel deposits 0 The greatest concentration of power plants is in an area
within a 40.mile radius of Sofia. Rydro and thermal electric plants in this
area constitute about 60 percent of the total installed capacity in the country*
The Ploediv-Dimitrovgrad and the Black Sea *oast areas each contain about 15
percent of the total capacity, and there are minor concentrations in the
center of the country, in the Area of RUSS on the Rumanian border, and in
the extreme northwest0
Power production has been increased since the wer by repairing misting
plants, operating plants for longer hours, and installing new capacity at
erste of about 10 percent' per year. The development of new capacity, however,
tele far short of the goals outlined in the Two Tear Flan (1947648) and the
Five Yearn= (1949-53)0 The present trend is to attain wider distribution
rather than to increase generating capacity. Greeter sephasis is now being
placed on power4rrigation projects through the construction of small and
dispersed hydroelectric stations. Since the construction of the large hydro.
electric plants envisaged in the Five Utar, Plan appears to have been post-
poned, the prier ratio of thermal to hydroelectric generating capacity
(55 to 45) remains basically the same.
Probable additions of capacity by the end of 1952 will be two 50,000
kilowatt thermal installations, one in the Pernik area near Sofia (for
the lignite industry) and the other in the Maritza River basin (as part
of the plan to manufacture fertiliser at Dimitrovgrad). Information indicates,
however, that not more than 20,000 kilowatts of the 100,000 kilowatt capacity
planned for these areas will to installed by the end of 195201/
30 eietkaallagiagalSOL.
a0 XISEMASIEUSISW
Bulgaria has sufficient lignite fuel and water power resources to
permit further increases in the production of electricity0
4,9
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b. ..141eIdaitr_AL.10ra,Alag,,
SECREr
There are no large electric power plants in Bulgaria. About 75
percent of the capacity, estimated at 192,000 kilowatts in 1950, IA
installed in planta of the 5,000 to 15,000 kilowatt size. The equipment
presently installed, ehich is 15 to 20 years old, needs extensive repair
or replacement, because it was abused by untrained personnel and operated
excessively during the war period.
o. Tranamiasio Svatemg.
The construction of a 110.4ilovolt network running from Sofia
northeast tonmera and Pleven, thence to the centraleeastern section at
Goma Orehmitsal and back to Sofia through Dimitrovgrad and Plovdiv was
begun after the war. The Sofia4lovdtr link of this network was completed
in June 19490 but it is unlikely that this link will be of value unless
capacity is increased in the areas of Pernik and Dimitrovgrad. Because the
rest of this network extends through areas where fuel for thermal installs"
tions is lacking, the hydroelectric plants proposed for the power irrigation
projects must be built in order to make an extensive 110411avolt network
feasible,
The other transmission project of importance inlet:Ayes an agreement,
signed on 16 July 1947, by which Bulgaria and Rumania undertook to create
eammon power supply area for southern Rumania and northern Bulgaria.
Rumania was to provide power in increasing amounts up to 1956, at which
time 10,000 kilowatts were to be annually available to Bulgaria. The latter
country, in tarn, was to instal in 1951 sufficient generating capacity an
its side of the border to allow for some surplus, which would be available to
Rumania. Zwf A tranaDanuho odbleof 604i1ov1t apacity.was completed and
put into operation in Ally 194901 Intensive effort presently is being
exerted toward the construction the Roeitsa dam and hydroelectric
project in the north-oentral part or Bulgaria!, and attempts have been made
no rob ace a large-capacity transformer for Goma Orekbovitsa in the same
region. The trans-Danube cable has been completed, but it is not known hoar
much power is now beiar transmitted to Bulgaria from Rumania? nor hoe great
an area is being supplied*
The building of rural supply cysts= and additional transmission
facilities in population centers is another part of the proposed trans-
mission network, and large amounts of foreign currency have been allocated
for the purchase of necessary equipment. Failure to expand the transmission
network will mean that other parts of the Five Year Plan will be delayed and
will continue to retard the Bulgarian econoey.
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he lX0M2112B*
Increases in electric power production in Bulgaria compare favorably
ulth percentage insreases reported in other Satellites. The per capita
availability, howver, is leas than that of any other European country
accept Albania, Production rose from 266 million kilowatt...hours in 1949 4/
to 548 million kilewatUhours in 1948, 5/ primarily through more intensive
use of existing capacity, end secondarily through new installations*
Production estimates of 730 million kilowatt-hours for 1950 and 890
million kilowatt-hours for 1952 are based on an estimated average increase
in capacity of 20,000 kilowatts per year and an output of 4,000 kilowatt.
hours by every newly installed kilowatt of capacity* Dependence on foreign
sources for design of installations, trained personnel, equipment, and spare
parts mill continue to hamper production thraugh 1952, since assistance fraa
Soviet Bloc countries will be limited*
5* gengessalsea.
The Sofia area ranks far ahead of other ?enters in the consumption of
electric pewer* The Plovdiv-Maritsa area the cities owthe Bleak Sea, and
the Dandbe port of Ruse consume most of Zs remainder* There is insufficient
information on the amounts of power being used by various classes of consumers?
Industry consumed 56 percent. of the power generated in 1947; commeroial and
home use, power plants, transmission losses and slaese;lighting aecounted for
the rest* ft/ The building of mall hydroel:etric plants in remote regions
and the construction of the Dimitrovgrad fertiliser plant indicate that the
agricultural sector of the eeonomy will benefit most from the expansion of
the eieetticity supply.
Since World uar /I, electricity requirements have increased, and produc..
tion is not equal to demand. Civilian consumption is rationed, and industrial
shortages have been reported* The Sofia area appears: to have the strictest
regulations; therefore it is possible that the requirements of certain
industries in this region have increased, A decree of October 1950 which
placed heavy restrictions on all but the most essential consumers and
permitted most industries to operate only 4 days a week exempted the following
industries: canning, textiles, chemicals, locomotive week,
misdng,
water pumping stations, refrigerating, milk processing, baking, and the
tobacco monopoly* It can be assumed that priority is given to those installa-
tions producing military goods*
64, out BecuIremenle*
Input requirements for the electric power industry fail into tee categories.
The first includes requirements for the daily operation of the plants, such
as fuel, lubricants, expendable operating supplies, and manpower; the second,
those things rewired for the replacement of capital items and the expansion
of transmission and generating facilities. Belgaria is in a much more favorable
st,
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pesitian in the first category than in the second, since it has adequate
supplies of feel and sufficient manpower to handle daily operations ef the
industry. However, it mast Import almost all items included in the second
category, as is shown in the following quotation from a broadcast of the
BulgarianDadies sm. capital investment far the entire tre tor Plan is
126,4 =Sae lavas of which 19.4 =lea lava er 1504 patelat? em
allocated for the electrification of the count:ye As to the cost of the
equipment to be imported, from the total a= of 43.7 billion lea for
imports, 13.3 billion are allocated for electrical equipmeet.a Althouda it
is impossible to make exact estimates of the investments actually made, it
is likely that the actual pattern is similar to that of the Plan,
The capital equipment lofted:led einem the .war was acquired *elit foreign
firms, both Orbit and noo-Orbit. Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Itagarn
and the USSR have been the principal sources for new generating capacity, .
transmission -equipment, and the Allied manpower which is nacessagy for
installing this equipment. The purchase of spare parts, the need for Which
has been great because at the varied origin and antiquated nature of the
installed eleetrieal equipment, has ale* cionammed large amounts of foreign
exchange.
Tulnerfhdlity.
The vulnerability of the electric politer industry is very high, Cutting
off all imports of equipment and technical skills would have the following
effects: (a) a, deterioration of equipment at an increasing rate as &result
or lack of spare parts and (b) inabilthy to 'metal additional eapacity.
Xlimination of imports from non-Orbit ccontries would farce some diversion
of the manufacturing facilities of Saviet Bloc countries to supply Balgarien
needs for eleetrieal equipment, at least In quantities sufficient to prevent
deterioration of the Bulgarian electric power industry. The actual =mint
diverted would depend on a decision as to the importance of the electric
supply In Bulgaria in relation to other areas within the Bloc. It is prebable
that an effort would be made only to :maintain the present status of the industry,
and then only if it could be done without severe strain an the resources at
the Blocs,
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V itgaugt
Esg;RTV
4w=
The ehsmical indos-twy of Bolgaria is un?npootant srod endow:a/ape,
Undor the Five !tar Plan the indualeor is to be expanded to produce most of
the basic chemicals needed in the oconoNy ana in gnfficient quentitios to
covor increasing retlaimosnts.
Bulger/ethos a mr_all tevor,able =plus of onod Chemicale (methene4
aeotic acidv aeetonep ete) Glycerine production '.1a greater than =owl
deatad And Is emported to Gsochogavvakla and Eurganyc Of tho lognie ha'
choice:Lep only *slam earbids is produoed in tooMationt amount to met
reqoirements. Xlenents1 sulphur if Mt prOftillIep god tho only irdieatioo. or
pyrites production is the boom amport of 10,010 metric tons in 1949 one the
plargei empart of ovono tore 5n-1951a all to Oseehoolovals. litric uzid
is produced only fnr the moll eipcsiveo 14.06UrItiou of osmotic
gods and suLfurio aold io inamfrioient to most eonnsdee and oaustio geglat,
mostly for leap nanufectorees, in inverted from 3rifedfartio Rrmelnlap last Goatomo
the USSR? e3d Poland. Some sulfuric acid vas tormatly supplied by Tugoolatria0
but ourrent sourceg are ItalT0 Bast Germary and the USSR. The le no known
prodaction of other baeie heavy ohomioals. Soda a ?vapplied by East
Gerriny anI coke ;Tlemicole are importediuLtnly frnm Czechoslovakia. Dyes
are Peoeivel from Ozeohoolovalla aud Bungarf.
Bulgarian agrimittmie requires soma nitrogeoeus Naldlioersp Vac*
ars 'uroiahod by 36ot Garamy and tho USSR, Ori a totnage bacis Bulgaria
oonsAmeg more cc9par ouL'ato than any other ebtelealp moat of whieh iv uved
as a fueigLaae in the grape vineyards.. East Geromp. and protoaiy the BSSR
are Tlet ehlof suppliers.
B13opm1a has a
of notural oubbee, tut
Although prvluction of
insitTleion to 1:12-3o9
balk of Bolt:arian tire
smell =labor Itbrioative, 1n6o3try atoppliod by importo.
tqolabed rater prollets aloe mrat beimoartodc
arterobile 14708 has Increased ainceirlorld War IX it iv
olulrementsp despite aomv Imports of tiresp bemuse tho
production ig emported to tho USSR.
Belaria cannot forniall arT Chomionla in sigeaficant quantitievo to
ti a obit, erd Ito Import requirements rram the Soviet Bloo ere small.
Bulgorio nla7 teeomo uolf-eufficient in baa lo hay chemicals if planned
Inetollations like the Stalin fertiliser plant Dimitrovgrad and othoro
are ,:lompi.otod ale :In operation by 1952.
1.44...iskeeemsarkawieumarw,a-,....caerabawasar-aftersaiSiarpearagt,urvalagasearritert?adeato
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10 gagiaLged142.
au lbamallgo.
The production of calcium carbide in Bulgaria is insignificant.
Only one plant, the State Carbide Factory (formerly NolarovWorts) locateC
at Ilienci near Sofia, is known to be in production. Production was 1,500
metric tons in 1948, and estimated. output was 2,000 metric tons in 3.949
and 2,500 metric tons in 1950.
baliNitid2SUILMILLIZZOSEUMMILSAMM0
Production is unlikely to increase much over the 1950 level. .No
expansion is known to be planned, for the Menai plant, the capacity of 'which
is about 30000 metric tons per year.,/ It is therefore estimated that produss.
tion will be 2,600 metric tons in 3.951 and. 2,700 tans in 1952.
Calcium carbide will be made at the new Stalin State Factory of
Nitrogen Fertilizers at Dimitrovgrad. 2/ This plant has been Underconstruc-
tion since early 1948' and is not scheduled for completion until November 1952. If
No calcium =tido capacity is reported for the plant, but it may produce about
27,000 metric tons annually,
Cc
Domestic Rtoutirqaants.
Bulgaries calcium carbide demands are slightly less than annual production.
There have been no imports since World War II, but small amounts have been .
exported to Albania. One plant (the Stefain Zaneff) at Ibrilowo vas producing
calcium ayanamide fertilizer on an experimental basis at a rate of about
60 metria tons annually, which would require less than 50 metric tons of
carbide. 4/ Other chemicals derived from carbide and acetylene are not
in production. All of the carbide production is consumed primarily by
industry and mining. A stockpile of calcium carbide has not been established,
although Bulgaria had a slight surplus in 1950. The surplus in 1952 may be
less than tnat of 1950 becauseof rising domestic requirements.
d. latermaigstatassa,
Sufficient coke or charcoal and lime are available for the small
annual production.
Sc
The Plan goal in 1953 is 8)000 metric tons of calcium carbide. It
is not known whether the increase in production is to woe from the new plant
at Dimitrovgrad or same other new plant or from expansion at thp Menai plant.
?
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2- cnala2d6-
a. Prcductio4.
There is no conclusive information that caustic soda is produced in
Bulgaria0
b. balatiratmassap.U.
Caustic soda is required tor Bawl& principally for the production
of soap, the most important single chemical plant in the country being the
Nikola Chilov soap factory at Instinbrod near Sofia. Although this plant
employs about 900 workers a large proportion of the total number of workers
avenged in the chemical industry, production in 1949 was only. 4,000 metric
tone, about half of the prewar output. 1/ Bulgaria processes very little
pulp and paper products, and its email textile production demands little
caustic eoda. Before the mar, requirements averaged nearly 2,500 metric
tons a year and in 1946 reached 3,600,23/ Estimated demands for 1952 are
WOO metric tone. It is not likely that a stockpile has been established,
and Bulgaria will continue to be deficient in caustic soda until the completion
of Plan installations.
e. 1anIerka,1 Ldmitations.
Salt, the essential raw material for the production of caustic soda,
is produced at the Solopoden Salt Works near Provadia.
Even if construction of those chemical plants projected ender the
Five Year Plan is actually completed, production will be hampered by a
shortare of skilled labor and technicians. Equipment for this new industrial
capacity must be supplied froa the Soviet Bloc.
d.ZustiL=InsigalaiLatillmittgaltamoktillatitaam_ailW.
A caustic soda factory is scheduled for completion in 1953, with
production estimated at 3,700 metric tons a year. In succeeding years the
output is to be increased sufficiently to meet domestic needs. This plant
also is to produce 8,500 metric tons of soda ash in 1953. 3/ The conetruction
of this plant is no indication of mobilisation for were an the establishment
of facilities to produce caustic soda is a step toward self-sufficiency.
30 AndliEttranitagE0
Synthetic ammonia is not now in production, and it is doubtful that it
will be by 1952. Requirements for this product are negligible. A smell
amount of liquid anmonia (possibly anhydrous) is imported from tbe USSR.
There is a alight demand for fixed nitrogen in the form of nitrogenous
55
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fertilisers. However, no nitrogenous fertilisers, except a small.emount of
calcium cyanamide are produced. The USSR. supplied siMMUDiUM nitrate in 1950,
but it is doubtful. that the total equaled 10,000 metric tons.
The Five Year Plan calls for the production of the follotrilmicrmeducts?
vith annual output as noted:
.4NEMM4smowwwww?ammeosmorars.4....noM44?44rMillaglig
Ammonia, Synthetic
40,000
(33,000 T-N)
Ammonium Nitrate
30,000 ji
(110500 T.N)
Calcium Nitrate
35,000 ati
(5,400T...10
Calcium Cyanamide
35,000 gt
(7,350 T-N)
Nitric Acids/
60,000 v
st Acid concentration not reported. If the
concentration is 100% acid, the nitrogen
equivalent required is 14,800 T-N, but if 40%
(the usual concentration to produce mamonium
nitrate), then the acid is 24,000 T (100% basis)
and requires 5,900 T-5 to be made.
Since ammonium nitrate is a constituent of Amato' (an explosive), as well
a3 of TNT, Some or all of the production coed be diverted in event of war to
he manufacture of explosives.
4. atalsAsia.
The small domestic production of nitric acid is confined to plants
making explosives. Total nitric production at present probably does not
exceed. 00 metric tone (100 percent acid basis) a year. The canpletion of
the Stalin fertiliser plant in Dimitrovgrad will provide Bulgaria with
nitric acid for the production of nitrate fertilizers (ammonium and calcium
nitrates). ,Annual capacity of the plant is to be 60,000 metric tons, 1,/
but there will be no facilities for concentrating the acid to high strength.
If the output of 60,000 metric tons is 40 percent acid, then the capacity
represents only about 24,000 metric tons on a 100.aercent acid basis. In
time of war the nitric acid and ammonium nitrate will unquestionably be used
111 the production of explosives rather than fertilizer,
5. Csakitaustisk.
Bulgaria does not produce coke Chemicals, nor is it likely to by the end
of 1952. All of the metallurgical coke used by the iron and steel industry must
be imported, because Bagarials coal is of inferior quality. The demand for
cdke chemicals is negligible.
M 56 44
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NO elemental sulphur is produced in Bulgaria, 1,/ and data on the
production of pyrites are not available. In the absence of any substantial
domestic eonsumption of pyrites the known exports are indicators of tits
minimum production because the bulk of production is exported. These exports
amounted to 10,000 metric tons in the last 9 months of 1949 a/ and 40,000
tons planned in 19510 all under trade agreements with Czechoslovakia.
It is possible that additional exports vent to the USSR via the Black Sea.
b. Issiallizatranut&
Io sulfuric acid is now produced in Bulgaria, and ardent provided
for in the Five Tear Plan will probably not be completed WI the end of 1952.
Thus there are no requirements for this industry. Consumption of pyrites
tor eller industries is small. Insignificant quantitie? of elementel sulphur
are required by agriculture. Bulgaria has no stockpiles of pyrites.
c. .W.pzug jeliatatitagt.
The lunation and extent of the depoeits of pyrites in Bulgaria are
not well known. Further development of, pyrites resources depends on the
amount of Soviet assistance given.
do Tronda?-analudinkIndicationa of liabilisation for Ware
Production of pyrites will be accelerated to meet rising requinenente
in the Soviet Blom)
70 Rubber.
a. Pradua41or.
There is no production of synthetic rubber in Bulgaria, and the amount
of natural rubber obtained from latex-bearing plants is Inaignifloant. Produc-
tion of automobile tires ,1/ has increased, since World War II, as follow ats
19399 4,000 tires; 1948, 12,500; 1949, 2618753h and 1950, 42,731.
b. liejaegslandat.ergastilaufasLawirja.
Postwar plans provided for the construction of a synthetic rubber
plant, which may be the one located in Sofia that was to start operation in
1949. 3/ However, it appears doubtful that any commercial installation for
synthetic rubber production is yet in operation.
The Five Tear Plan calls for the construction of a nem tire plant
and expansion of existing facilities and production of 100,000 automobile
tires by 1953. Equipment for one tire plant was to come from the USSR and
Czechoslovakia in 1950. .6,/ Expansion of tire production will depend on
procurement of such equipment and upon the availability of :libber, carbon
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black, and robber dhemicals. Carbon bladk and rubber chemicals have been
ID &Abort supply in the Soviet Bloc in postwar years.
e baigithilLaggjagemSeto
Natural rubber trust be imported to =PAY requirements of the rubber
indnstry. Postwar imports are as follows lis 190, 650 metric tons; 1949,
929 tons; and 19509 775 tons. Additional quantities ma y have been supplied in
1949 and 1950 by the Soviet Bloc. Requirements for rubber will probably
increase in 1951 and 1952, possibly to a total of 2,000 metric tons. With
an estimated motor park of approximately 12,000 vehicles in 1950, tire rce
quirements would probably be about 50,000 units per year.
de tumlaturjaisiao
Both raw materials and finished rubber products mast be imported and
stockpllleg of either rubber or rubber goods does not exist. Despite some
Imports of tires from the Bloc and the West and the expansion of the
Bavarian tire industry, domestic requirements remain unfulfilled because the
USSR takes the bulk of the Bulgarian outputs
e. jatereilemblatettlegge
Bulgaria is completely dependent upon imports for rev rubber. Natural
rubber is procured mainly by reexports fees the ME and the Netherlands, and
the USSR bee provided AOMO rubber (Whether natural or synthetic is not known).
Another ma4or factor limiting production is the inadequate supply of carbon
black, tire cord, and rubber chemicals reeesaary for the manufacture of
rubber goods. Some carbon black and rubber chemicals are obtained from
Western European counteles, and the Satellite countries also may furnish
ams)1 quantities of these products. Tire cord is supplied by Cseehoelovakias
some imports also being obtained from Italy and the Netherlands. Lack of
nanufacturing equipment, especially for tires, likewise is a limiting factor
in the expaasion of prodection. The USSR and Czeohosiovakia were to supply
sOMO of this equipment in 1950,
f. Les
Expended and newly constructed plants for the manufacture of tires
will increase production of a potentially military item. If the tJ1 and
the Netherlands ceased to reexport natural rubber Xran Southeastern Anie,6.
Bag/trial's ?libber fabricating industry would be entirely dependent upon
the USSR and East Germany for synthetic rubber.
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0, Agineerine InfItuasze
NC=
Um=
BuIgarials engineering Industry is mall, and almost allmachinery
and vehicles must be imported. The country therefore represents a drain
on the engineering resources of the Setiet Bloo.
Bulgaria does, however, have ambitious plans for development of its
engineering industry. The Five Tear Plan (19494.53) placed heavy emphasis on
the development of machine manufacture, which br 1953 was to be 65 times
greats: than in 1939. Production goals established for 1953 include 6,250
metalaworking machines 21,200 electric motors, 4,600 units of construction
eqUipment? and 90,000 units of agricultural mar..hinery. In order to implement
these goals, the Plan called for the construction of two machine tool plants,
a plant for automobile and tractor parts, two automotive repair plants, and
three agricultural machinery plants.
This program, representing only the beginnings of imiustrialisation -
is nevertheless an ambitious one thieh will probably be difficult to fulfill,
for Bulgaria lacks the raw materials, electric power, trained minpower,
technelogical Skill, and industrial facilities neeeseary for a viable
engineering industry.
Despite these limiting factors, the Bulgarian (government, during the
2 yearn that *Islam has been In operation, has.contbmemay *3-a4med great
production sueoesses. Machinery production in 1949 increaeed 340. percent.
over the 1947 total. The production plan for the first quarter of 1950 was
fulfilled 100 percent; for the second quarterp101 percent* On the other hand,
the government has admitted certain deficiencies indicated in the statement
of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Cheiivenkav that 'defective ?
production is still tolerated; waste and woes, cantina: to hamper and 'reduce
the output of production tools and cow:moral goods."
The USSR is the principal supplier, of industrial equipMeat, followed
by Cseehoslevakia and East Germany. .Western European countries also are making
a substantial contribution, with Austria in the lead, followed by Italy,
andsto a mudh lesser extent,Beeden, Finland, and Belgium.
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1, neggalleas.
Until /9490 Bulgaria produced no machine tools or other metalworking
machinery. The Five Year Plan, however, scheduled an output of 6,250
metal-eanidmgmachines for 1953, In order to implement this Plan* two
machine tool plants were to be constructed and In operation by 1953. There
is no evidence that either of these plants has been ecapleted, although
fulfillment of Plan goals for machine tool production is claimed with
monotonous consistency by the State Planning Commission, Compared with
19470 machine tool production increased 304 percent in 1948 and 340 percent
in 1949, With little previous production experience, technieal
equipment, and few ectsponent-parts plants, it is Likely that the 1953
production target will only be apinimimated. Sven the optimum goal of
fulfillment would result in no significant contribution to the economy
of the Soviet Bloc, inasmuch as the machine tools produced would be of
the simplest types.
Bulgaries limited requirements for machine teas will continue to be
for generalrpose types such as drill presses, lathes, milling machines,
and planers. These are presently obtained from Cseohoelovaklavthe USSR,
and Austria. The =Tent trade agreement with the latter provides for tho
annual export to Bulgaria or$250,000 north of metalworking maenlizem
2, Alectricalleuinment,
The Five Tear Plan calls for the production of electric motors, generators,
transformers, and other electrical equipment required in connection 'with the
industrialization of the country. The Bulgarian electrical industry before
World War II consisted of a few smell breath plants of Atfreign firms, ehleh
mannfaotured light bulbs, batteries, and other small electrical items. These
plants have new been merged into one enterprise, the "apron? plant in Sofia,
which concentrates on electric motor manufacture, In 1947, before consolidsr.
tient electrical enterprises produced onl:Y107.motors. In 1948, after ,
nationalisation and consolidation, the Bulgarian press claimed a production
of 950 motors. The production goal for 1953 is.21,200 motors, whiekwhile
email when compared. with Czechoslovakia's output of 290,000 motors in 19490
is an ambitious goal for Bulgaria. There is no evidence that Bulgaria baa
produced any quantity of heavier electrical equipment, and the country
continue to be dependent upon outside sources for its a. Trade
agreements in effect in 1949 provided for the import of 3,400,000 of
electrical equipment annually from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Best Germany,
Austria, and the Netherlands.
30 AggsatusiXecklasz,
Production of agricultural machinery in Bulgaria was negligible before
World War II, The Five Tear Plan, however, has scheduled a 1953 output of
90,000 units of agricultural machinery, including cultivators, plows, seeders,
Val 60 sla
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UMW
binders and harvesters. In order to implement this program, three new
agricultural.machieery plants are to be nompleted by 19539 At present
-there are two plants in Bulgaria engaged primarily in production of agricultural
machinery the GeorgLIdadtrov Agricultural Mealneig Melts at Poe,
which manufactured the first Bulgarian fertilizer spreader in 2949, and the
former aircraft assembly plant at Levee+.
An iiterpolation of official Bulgarian statistics indicates that
approximatAtly 44,000 unite or agricultipmamadhimrymere produced in 29499
(Poland during that year was producing about 30,000 units a month) Production
will thus have babe doubled during the 5..year period in order to achieve the
1953 goal of 90,000 =its, Since the bulk of Bulgarian production consists
of simple plows and cultivatore, it is possible that the planned figure
will be reaphed,
Bulgarian production of agricultural machinery will Swore domestic
self-sufficiency for only a few items of equiPment, probably horse-drawn
types, and the country will continue to depend upon outside sources for
most of its requirements, Between September 1944 and December 1949, according
to the Bulgarian press, the USSR shipped 1,200 tractors, 1,087 tractor plows,
and "hundreds* of seeders cultivators and harrow to Bulgaria. Although
the USSR has been the most important supplier Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Austria also have trade agreements which provide for the export of agricultural
machinery to Bulgaria.
4. Construction Bhuinment.
The rive Year Plan has scheduled the establishment of a construction
equipment industrY. An annual production of 4,600 units is to be attained
by 1953, including such items as concrete mixers, graveling machines,
compressors, and pneumatic hammers, Three plants for the manufacture of
conetruetion equipment are to be built and in production by 1953, bat there
is little evidence of any production as yet. The Gant Dimitrov Lodomotive
and Car T4orks in, Sofia is reported to have produced three 14-ton steam rollers
in the spring of 1949, the first units of such equipment ever manufactured
in Bulgaria.
Even with a production of 41,600 unite in 1953? Bulgaria will continue
to import most of its requirements for construction equipment. Present sources
of supply are the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Belgium, ind Italy,
5. Panspertation lopincept.
Production of transportation equipment is negligible. The Five Year
Plan calls for the construction of a plant for the nalufacture of automobile
and tractor parts, as well as two automotiverepair plants. There is one
railroad equipment repair plant, the Georgi Dimitrov Locomotive and Corr
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Works in Sofia. This pleat Claims to have built two lonnotivesturkfi,
but there is no evidence ofauy new produation since that date,
are currently being imported from the USSR, Conchae:lova:kis, Austria, and
/tan and leassotives from Cseahoalerakia and Italy.
eq. MAIM&
There are two falr.sised munitions plants in Bulgaria. At Sofia the
State Arsenal (Zavod 12) has 2,000 markers engaged in the production of
artillery shells, smalI.arms ammunition, and ground mines. AtEasenduk
the Rdlitary Factory employe 2,700 workers in the production ?ranching
gene, mines, grenades, ammunition, explosives optical devices, and anti.
gam equipment. The production of these two pleats filis only a. portion
of Bulgarian militaryrequirements, The USSR is the principal supplier
of equipment for the Bulgarian Army,
7.
ME6Eatt.-
Buigaria does not manufacture aircraft or engines for the Air Forgo
or the civil airline but depends upon imports fres the USSR. A, smal
domestic industry, chiefly for overhaul and maint?enance, exists within
some novae factories which manufacture or assemble other age:1point. Same
Czechoslovakian parts have been assembled Into sport or training types, but
the rate was only 4 or 5 per year in 1946 and probably does not now mooed
150 per year, ineloding Some gliders.
It is unlikely that the USSR will help Bulgaria develop an aircraft
production or final asesWely industry, because of the basis lack of aluminum
and steel capacity., teohnical eampetenee, and aviation gas supplies.
Bulgaria's aircraft Shop facilities however, are important to the USSR
for the repair and maintenances a 4viettectical and transport aircraft
stationed in, or Operating in and (Put of, the country in rapport of BUlgarian
Army or Soviet Air Force operations in time of war,
8. 21011,1410g.
Th? Bulgarian thipbuiIding industry is a stato.owned organisation eperatiag
under Soviet contra and supervision. Before and during World War II the
dammed on shipyards was'primarilyTor small modes sailing craft. After
the- war thereinto greater prodtiati.on of diversified typea and tonnage.
The sconio potential of the industry, however, is still negligible.
There are three shipbuilding centers: Stalin (Varna) and Burgas on the
Plea Sea and Ruse on the Danube, with an estimated coehined total of 64500
workers. The espaolty of these yards is limited to the building of ships
up to 1,000 tons, although one drydock in Stalin may haveaoapaeity of
3,000 tons. Flahing schooners 8DU vooden.helled tugs and bargee were the
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Tajor output until 1950t In 1950, &Never, two steel hulls were Launched
in the Stalin yard at Varna and in the aoIovak yard five small biro.
end one cargo vessel of reinforced concrete were laid down. The Varna yards
are potentially able to build sUbmarines and small destroyers.
In the period 194649 the average annual production ease shipping use
4,700 tons. Complete data for 1950 are unavailable, but production will
probably be about 4,700 tans. Jour launchings and five deliveries were
reported. A new yard for building fishing boats is believed to have been
completed in the latter part of 1950.
In view of this additional yard and the present practice of training *hip-
building apprentices, a ',stem instituted by the Soviets, the annual output
for 1951.52 can be expected to rise. Since existing capacity has never.
been fully utilised, any expansion will be in response to Soviet requirements.
These would probably be for small cargo vessels or motor torpedo boats, as
the building of larger ships would necessitate the impart of mashinery and
installations that Bulgaria cannot manufacture.
The. country's rich forest reserves, whits!' coed provide an extensive
source of rev material for vooden.hulled ship.,remain undeveloped. The
lack of iron, steel, and most raw materials neded to produce steel Ships
limits Bulgariats capacity in this regard. All propulsion units for ships
most be imported. These were previously obtained that:many, Cseehoslovakia,
and Hungary, but present reporting indicates that the DSSR is now the major
source of supply for engines.
?
There is no sign of the conversion of other industry to shipbuilding.
The construction of steel hulls and Soviet-designed MTBIs began in 19500.
It can be assumed that steel plating and engines will be provided by the
USSR to maintain production for the Soviet account.
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Mum
Prodnotion ofuranium in Bulgaria began in 1946 under Soviet control.
By the end of 19500 Bulgarian output of uranium ore and concentrates
accounted for 4.percent of the total uranium available to the USSR. All
production is shipped o the USSR.
1.
baSVatala..
Production of uranium in Bulgaria began in 1946 under Soviet controls,
and output increased steadily in the 1946..50 period. By the and of 19500
Bulgarian production of uranium ore and concentrates acconnted for .4. percent
of the total uranium available to the USSR. The 1946.40 rate of output is
expected to continue through 192. There are no atomic energy plants in
Bulgaria and, therefore, no domestin requirements for fiesionable materials
all ;rogation being shipped to the USSR. No stockpiles are maintained within
the country.
2.
Although the deposits of uranium in Bulgaria are not large, Soviet
requirements for this material are such thst all available sources are being
.exploitoi. Sufficient manpower is available, but mechanical equipment,
safety precautions, and replacement parts for mechanical equipment are in
short supply. The ever-increasing domande for expanded output by the Soviet
directors of the Bulgarian uranium mines are evidence of the continued trend
toward a program geared to a war economy.
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Summary
Because of the undeveloped state of the Bulgarian economy,
requirements for transportation are sharply limited. Consequently,
Bulgaria does not have extensive transport facilities, nor does it
possess large inventories of transport equipment. The contribution
to the Soviet economic potential for war uhich can be made by the
Bulgarian transport system is, therefore, of minor importance. sub-
stantial improvement can be accomplished only by extensive assistance
from the USSR and elsewhere uithin the Bloc, as in the case of the
current airfield improvement program.
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...kku.:tro
guba
1!,
a, 1ecrjntion
The 4?050.kilometer Bulgarian railroad network is a grid of
three east-west lines and three north-south lines which connect the portent Stalin
(Varna), Burgas, ard Buschuk with the agricultural hinterland and the
chief population centers. These lines also provide the Soviet Union with
direct connections to the frontiers of Tarkwy, Greece, and Yugoslavia.
The &Mau mountains, which separate the Danube and Earitsa, valleys, are
a barrier penetrated only by the Sofia.Mesdra line and the Stara Zegara-
Trnovo line, A third line, to run through the Balkan chain from Wretch
to Karlovo, has been completed as far as Troyan. The density of the network
is among thelowestin Europe, 5.7 miles per 100 square miles, but the die-
tribution is quite even throaucut the country. About 90 percent of the
network, or 3,600 kilometers, is standard-gauge, and all but 10 kilometers are
single.tracki, y
1:10 IkattLgA
Bail traffic is not heavy in Dalgaria, 1950 traffic being
estimated at 210700 million tom-kilometers, some 32 perzentslove 190 lavas. V
Coal is the largest single item transported, amounting to 17,6 percent of all
freight traffic; grain is 11.1 percent; lumber, 6.5 percent; and flour, 5 per-
cent. This traffic supporta the rekthezlyundevelowl economy of Balgeria
and, except for some possible shipments of chrome aid uranium ore, makes only
a smell contribution to the ecommic potential fbr war of the DSSEL
et. ataintia?
The fixed equipment used in the Begarian rail network is
old, worn, and of light design. Bails are long overdue for replacement and
can support axle loadings of only 14 tone, veil below the Beropean standard.
Bails and ballast are of insufficient veight..less than 20 percent of the net-
work in 1945 had 82-pound rails. A program of rail replacement was begun in
1949-50 on some sections of the Sofia.Plovdiv line. There are =modems
classification yards in aggaria. /act of adequate switching facilities presents
difficulties forlargmo.scal4_Jecomomic and military movements. A program of in.
stalling modern safety and signal equipment has been started but remains a long
wer from completion.
de
The capacity of the rail system is 1 Jut-6410r the obsolescent
condition of fixed facilities aid rolling stock. Only ism lines, the Caribrod.
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Flovdi and the Pernik-Zona-Goma Orekhovitsa, have a olimurity of 16 trains a
day in each direction at 420 tons each, Most of the lines will support only
32 trains a day at from 250 to 300 tons a train. Furthermore, if all lines are
to be operated at capacity, locomotive inventories must be doubled and freight
car inventories tripled.
50 Vulnerability.
. The =Jetsam of numerous bridges and tunnels and the absence of
excess workshop mpmAtyneke the railroads highly vulnerable to both sabotage
and air attack,
f, Conclusions.
The facilities of the Bulgarian railroads will contribute only
slightly to the economic potential for war of the USSR.
2, Direct Contributions of Railroad Equipmnat to the Economic
mosrran. War or
a. Inventories.
Equipment inventories are apparently adequate for traffic
requirements, but equipment inmost categories is Obsolescent, Rolling stock
is estimated to include 612 locomotives and 119790 freight cars. Equipment
is relatively lijA by Eastern European standards, and doable-heading of
locomotives is frequently necessary.- Most of the freight cars have only two
axles, and only a very small percentage baa air brakes.
b. Production Capabilities.
Although the Oeorgi Dimitrov plant in Sofia claims to have built
two locomotives in 1949, the railroad equipment industry nevertheless continues
to be United to the four chief repair shops of the State Railroads, a plant
at Drenovo, and one at Stalin (Varna) which produce some rolling stock, Pro-
duction at these plants consists largely of assembling components, many of which
are imported. Bulgaria cannot yet produce necessary replacement equipment,
c, Transfers to
Uost railway equipment is of standard European guage and is not
suitable, without extensive modification, for service lathe USSR. Bulgarian
equipmgab is in poorer condition than are the rolling stock and locomotives of
any other Satellite and therefore will be the last to be confiscated for service
in central Europe. Should it be removed, the effects would not be severe
because Bulgaria's economy is not heavily dependent upon transportation. For
example, the largest single item transported by rail is coal, 90 percent of
which is consumed by the railroads themselves. The loss of railroad service,
therefore, wou.ln not be a great blow to the internal economy or to the war
potential of the USSR.
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d. Conclusions.
Direct contributions of Bulgarian railroad equipment to the
economic potontial for war of the USSR will be negligible.
3. Indirect Contributions.
a. Role of Roilroads in Soviet Trade.
The role of Bulgarian railroads in Soviet trade is of small
importance. Little direct railwey traffic exists between Bulgaria and
the USSR, although there is considerable movement between the Bulgarian
Interior and the ports of Burgas, Stalin (Varna), and Ruse. This traffic is
largely military, but there is same traffic in lead and sine concentrates,
tobacco, wheat, and unaniwa ore. Such traffic, however, is inconsequential
to the Soviet economy. Even the shipments of uranium ore are only avian
part of total Soviet procurements of this commodity.
b, Role of Railroads in Trade with the West.
The role of Bulgarian transport commerce with the West also is
minor. Trade with the West is only about 15 percent of total Bulgarian
foreign trade, and little more than half of this moves by rail.
h. Inverse Contributions.
Bulgarian railroad requirements fram the USSR are not great. The
volume of railroad components and materials imported into Bulgaria from the
Soviet Union in any given year is an insignificant fraction of total Soviet
production, although it is vital to the Bulgarian transport system. Locomotives
and freight cars are procured largely from the Satellites.
Bulgaria depends upon the USSR for skilled manpower at several
levels in railroad operations, but the mothers are few, and the term of
service is short, Soviet control of Bulgarian railroads is absolute, and is
assured by reliable native Communists who are placed at every level of opera-
tiona. Thus very few Soviet personnel are required for this function*
5. P.?,j,._11.)1_eleobDeve.......k.
There will be few changes in the Bulgarian railroad system by the
end of 1952, and the net in to the Soviet economic potential pill be slight.
Inventories of locomotives and freight cars will be slightly increased; can
siderable worn rails will be replaced with heavier rails on some of the main
lines, particularly the Sofia-Plovdi-aurgas line; and the percentage of cars
equipped with air brakes will increase. Work will go forward on the new
Troyan-Karlovo line, and the Samnelpailistra lime maybe pushed to conpletion.
It is unlikely that the Sub-Balkan line between Sofia and Karlavo or the
connection between Gigen and Pleven will, be completed.
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B. Livr.m.
1, Direct Contributions of H;dmovs to the Economic Potential
773FWa-F-a-TM7Inrt. ?
a. General Description of the Network.
Sofia is the focal point of the Bulgarian highway system.
Although the network is mem (average density being about 0.2 kilometer per
square kilometer), improved roads connect Sofia with all major cities, as
well as with Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. Most of the major roads
are waterboand macadam with stone foundations and rolled gravel or sand sur-
faces (asphalt or concrete surfaces are largely confined to urban areas),
and most of them, with the exception of certain mountain sections, are wide
enough for two-way traffic. Local areas, on the other hand, are usually served
only by narrow, unimproved dirt roads. Sharp curves and grades of from 10 to
20 percent are common on the mountain roads of central and western Bulgaria.1
The total network of surfaced roads is estimated it 26,750 kilometers.
b. Traffic.
In 1939, trucks transported 170 million ton-kilometers of
freight, and buses, operating over 10,000 kilometers reportedly carried 6.7
million passengers. .3/ Accurate figures for the postwar period have not been
reported. A known increase, however, in the number of motor vehicles and the
progressive improvement of the road system suggest that the current volume of
traffic probably exceeds the prewar level. The major portion of road traffic
is carried by various forms of animal transport,
0. Road Construction and mailAssam_Naletn.
The number and type of roadbuilding machines employed sinoe
World War II are not known. Road construction and maintenance are generally
performed by manual labor, using local materials.
d. Capacity.
The traffic capacity of the entire Bulgarian road system has
never been accurately determined. It is vita certain, however, that the
system has not teen used to capacity and that highway capacity has not been
a limiting factor in the development of motor transport. Seasonal variations
in capacity are not great, although climate and terrain do limit potential
traffic throughout much of the year. With few exceptions, average speeds in
excess of 30 to 35 kilometers an hour are impossible, and 15 to 20 kilometers
an hour is a more usual speed. let The traffic potential is also United by
the lack of uoiformity in bridii construction.
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ao Vulnorabilite.
The vain weaknesses of the road system are the absence of
good alternative routes between major towns and the limited capaci,ies of
bridges.
f. Conclusions.
Road construction and repair work have been reported con-
stantly since World War Ii and the highway network has probably been expanded
and improved to some extent. However, its potential value to the USSR In wartime
in not believed to have increased significantly. Although much roadwork has
been reported in the border areas, work on the highways baa been evenly die.
tributed throughout the country in accordance with plans for overeall economic
development. In additions it might be noted that Bulgarian road construction
is, for the most part, of a type that requires almost constant maintenance and
repair, and this fact tends to minimize the importance which may be attached
to reported road work. It le believed that the Bulgarian road system would be
of great value to the ussa in a short, limited campaign but that its condition
and seasonality would sharply limit its usefulness in any extended military
operation.
2. Direct Contributions of H hwa Trans.ort
a. Inventories.
Since 1947 the total inventory of highway transport equipment
has Juan likelihood been increased somewhat through imports from Czechoslovakia
and the USSR, but it is doubtful that the present total exceeds 12,000 vehicles*
Before the war serviceability of the motor park was about 70 percent, and since
the war it probably has not greatly exceeded 60 percentot In addition, there
is a substantial number of animal-drawn wagons and carts ich account for a
significant portion of road traffic movements.
be Production Capabilities.
There is no production of motor vehicles in Bulgaria. Wooden
bodies are built for imported Chassis, and possibly some *ported components
are assembled, but a motor vehicle industry as such does not exist. Some
spare parts are produced at Sofia and Plovdiv, and two vehicle repair plants
are reported to be under construction, y
c. Effect of Transfers to. the USSR.
No highway transport equipment has been shipped to the USSR from
Bulgaria, and it is extremely unlikely that any will be shipped through 19520
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d, Conclusions.
The Bulgarian motor vehicle park makes no significant
contribution to the Soviet economic potential for war, There is a heavy
dependence upon imports of transport equipment from the USSR. There is
no reason to believe that Bulgaria through 1952 mill make any direct
contribution of highway transport equipment to the USSR.
3, Indirect Contributions,
There is virturt11y no highway traffic betmeen Bulgaria and the
USSR, nor mith the West.
4. Inverse Contributions,
a,
In February 1950, 65 Soviet-built trucks mere imported
through Burgas as part of a consignment of 375 trucks promised by USSR. 21
The Bulgarian press reported in 1949 that 2,020 "automobiles and tractors"
had been received from the USSR in the period 194547. 13/ Bulgaria has
perhaps received up to 1,000 motor vehicles per year from the USSR since the
end of World War II. This amount is barely enough to maintain an inventory
of 10,000 vehicles, The Emil atonal increases in the size of the motor
vehicle park are believed to have been the result of additional imports from
Czechoslovakia, Bast Germany, and the West.
b. hhterials and Danposer.
With the exoeption of asphalt, which must be imported, Bulgaria
has ample quantities of road-building materials. There is likewise no shortage
of unskilled labor. The country is, homever, mainly dependent upon outside
aid for supervisory personnel, designers, and trained technicians,
0. Soviet Control.
Soviet control is exercised through Soviet personnel who hold
positions of authority in the Hiniqtry of Transportation. 2/ Although no
definite information is avAilpble on the extent of this control, it is believed
to be virtually complete.
5. Probable Developments.
It appears unlikely that any significant changes in the status of
Bulgarian highway transport mill occur through 1952. Continued moderate increases
in traffic and in the size of ,the motor vehicle park may be expected, as may the
further improvement of major roads and bridges. However._ even if the current
rate of development is radically accelerated, the contribution which Bulgarian
highway transport mill be able to make to the Soviet economic potential for
mar mill remain Small.
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1. Direct Contributions of Water Trans ort to the Economic
o n la or'ax' of
a. General D_itcr..ILV_4ri of the Network.
The Danube River is the primary water transport route in
Bulgaria. There are several other rivers in the country, but they are of
little importance. The value of the Danube to Bulgarian water transport
is lessened somewhat by the fact that, although the river forms much of the
northern border of the country, its mouth is in Rumania. (Under the present
Soviet domination of the Bloc countries, this disadvantage is probably more
theoretical than actual.) Furthermore, the Danube does not penetrate the
interior of the country, where much of the population and economic activity
is centered. Along the Danube there are a few ports, such as Ruse, Lam,
and Vidin, which might be of some use to the USSR in case of war, but their
value is greatly reduced by the present poor state of all facilities for
handling ships and cargoes.
Bulgaria has several ports on the Black Sea, but only two,
Burgas and Stalin (Varna), are of importance. The economic significance of
these Black Sea ports would be increased considerably, however, if there
were water-route connections to the interior. 'Burgas is the main port for
Western trade, and Stalin (Varna) is the principal port for traffic from the
USSR, which comprises the major portion of Nigerian foreign trade.
b. Traffic,
Bulgarian-water transport is of little importance in purely
domestic traffic. Both maritime and river traffic in Bulgaria consist
principally of raw material exports, such as lumber and mineral products, and
Imports, largely machinery and finished goods, from the Soviet Bloc, About
25 percent of Bulgarian trade is with the West.
co Eqgipment.
Bulgarian waterways are in poor condition, needing much
technical assistance which the USSR is either unable or unwilling to furnish
in adequate amounts.
d. Capacity.
The combined capacity of the two main ports of Bulgaria,
Burgas and Stalin (Varna), is of some importance in meeting present require-
manta. It is believed that present port capacity is insufficient to provide
for greatly expanded operations, although the capacity could be expanded through
allocation of sufficient resources.
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e. VuleerabilitE.
Bulgarian eaternays and port facilities would be extremely
vulnerable to attack by Western aircraft based in the Near East or along
the Adriatic. Land- and possibly carrier-based aircraft, for example, could
hit the ports on the Black Sea, as well as lay mines in the Danube and dis-
rupt traffic on that route.
f. Conclusions.
The contribution of Bulgarian waterways and ports to the Soviet
economic potential for war is at present slight, being confined to limited .
traffic movements on the Danube and relatively small and unimportant cargo
movements through the maritime ports. However, the potential contribution
could be increased by intensive build-up of facilities.
2, Direct Contributions of Shipping to the Economic Potential
7-7-77-1EorazirtZST,
a, Inventories.
The ocean and river fleets of Delgaria now total about 35
ships of 2,000 tons. There are in addition about 100 barges ranging from
50 to 1,000 tons. Ocean.going ships number 16 vessels totaling 13,841 gross
registered tons, the river fleet comprising the remainder.
b. Production Capabilities.
Bulgarian shipyards for production of merchant ships are
being expanded. The most important domestic shipbuilding activities are in
the port of Stalin (Varna). Despite the provisions of the Five Year Plan to
increase domestic construction of largereships, actual output is still limited
to small 'ships, probably under 1,000 gross registered tons. Consequently,
contributions to the economic potential former of the USSR are very slight.
c. Effect of Transfers to the USSR.
Transfer of the small inventory of Bulgarian ships to the
USSR would have virtually no effect upon the Soviet economic potential for
ear and would probably work some hardship upon Bulgaria. Transfer of the
entire ocean fleet and river fleet to the USSR would add less than 1 percent
to the Soviet water transport potential.
d. Conclusions.
Bulgarian needs make it likely that there would be no major
change in the status of the Bulgarian merchant fleet in the event of war. The
most important change would probably be a further tightening, if possible, of
present Soviet controls or, under certain military conditions, actual operation
of the Bulgarian fleet within Bulgaria by the USSR,
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- 3. Indirect Contibutions.
Bulgarian water transport is of little importance in trade mith
the USSR and the West. Ebst of this traffic utilizes the port of Stalin
(Varna) ? Suth trade as exists with the West is carried principally in Soviet,
Polish, and Rumanian ships.
4. Inverse Contributions?
Bulgaria mould require much in the may of equipment, materials,
and technical manpomer in order to contribute materially to the Soviet economic
potential. The size of the river fleet mould have to be increased well above
its present level in order to utilize fully the Danube route. Bajor im-
provements in port facilities continue to depend on Soviet assistance.
Continued complete Soviet control of Bulgarian shipping appears to be a fore-
gone conclusion.
5. Pro 1...ae___ba Develo nts.
It is estimated that little or no change mill take place that will
substantirTly alter the present water transport situation in Bulgaria before
1952. The most significant development probably willbe a slight increase in
the size of the fleet through domestic construction and some few needed
improvements in cargo handling in the ports. These Changes, however, are likely
to be of small consequence.
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gt-TMuart2n.
1. arststagatatbutitape of Air Transvort to the Economia.
7442Pt4al for
LtriUofl
Of appratimately 38 2./ listed Bulgarian airfields and landing
osounde, only 5 are atill..,ed by the civil airline TABS?, and 4 of these fields
are shared jointly tith !nits of the Bulgarian or Soviet Air Threes. The
network of airfields sewing civil air transportation are located at Burgas,
Gorne, Orehvitsa, Plovd-v, Sofia, and Stalin (Varna).
ScheduMad operations are conducted on an infrequent basis
with several LI-2 airemft obtained from the USSR. The entire TABSO
crganization contributos nothing to the Soviet economic potential for war.
Foreign airlines engagel in limited commercial operations into Bulgaria are
the Czechoslovak .airline CSA and the Soviet AE2DFLOT.J1(
Co
At least six airfields are believed to be equipped with radio
navigational aids, .1nd recent uncomfirmed reports indicate that such installations
are being made at additional airfields. Other reports of this nature point to
a Soviet-sponsored z:id supervised program for improvement of Bulgarian.airfields
which includes construction of repair and maintenance shape, the laying of
concrete runways, and construction of underground storage facilities0
d.. ae4tYt ,
A rnjority of the 38 Bulgarian airfields are reserved for use
by the Bulgariananl Soviet Air Forces. Runways are of sufficient length
to permit use by D(:.3 or LI-2 transport aircraft if necessary. The fact that
most of these afrfillds have a natural, unpaved surface would not act as a
deterrent to their rso by the types of transports currently employed by the
USSR and the Satellites. Therefore, the potential capacity of Bulgarian air
facilities for the large-scale movement of transport aircraft is an important
direct contribution to the Soviet air transport potential in southeastern
Europe in the event of a rapid build-up for war.
0.NI-XeallitZ.
Air transport equipment is vulnerable to sabotage, but Bulgarian
eqaipment it of sc little consequence that its destruction would be a matter of no
serious importance The vulnerability of the airfields is not a major
consideration in Elgariais economic potential but is important to the strategic
potential of the U43R.
Comlusieas.
The extersive Bulgarian airfield network constitute e,okirect
and.signifialesttoseneftstaGNIONiFtcasRAMMARtonotfldugSSR:
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Direct Contributions of Air Trapaport ntto the
---.74GEocnmT-'oEen--tr1M-Ffr-ar?ofiheUSS
An inventory of Bulgarian aircraft indicates that Bulgaria is
unable to make agy appreciable contribution of air transport equipment to
the. USSR. the Bulgarian civil airline TABSO has the follouing transport
aircraft Vt 2 DC-3s,7 LI-2s, and 3 JU-52s. The Bulgarian Air Form in-
cludes a total of 10 JUa52 transports, Bulgaria has no aviation productLon
capabilities. The econopy of Bulgaria mould not be affected by transfers
If air transport equipranet to the USSR.
3, Indirect Contributions.
Bulgarian air transport aircraft do not enter the USSR, and traffic
by Soviet air transports; tattmeen the USSR and Btagarlamakes DO contribution
tc the Soviet economy. Thera is no air transport trade uith the West, and
clandestine air traffic between Bulgaria and the valet is negligible.
4. .Inverse Contributions,
Bulgaria is almost entirely dependent upon the USSR for its
air transport equianent. Seven of the nine DC-3 type of aircraft of the civil
airline TAO mere obtained from the USSR under a Soviadeftlapalanagamement
establishing the TAM organization.
b. bittliataanda----E.
Bulgaria is dependent upon the USSR for spare parts for its
civil aircraft and for aviation gasoline. Bulgarian manpower requirements
sre principally for technical and supervisory engineering persomnel* The
Bulgarian airfield rehabilitation and construction program has been to a great
extent directed by the USSR,
0. 2ealk_tcalp
Bulgaria's dependence upon the USSR for equipment, materials,
and technical assistance has enabled the USKR to control air transportation
rithin the country. The USSR also has a favored position through the air
agreement resulting in the establishment of TABSO. This airline is a joint
stock company, nominally under the Bulgarian Ministry of Transport, whose policies
and operations are largely directed and controlled by the USSR.
5.
The Soviet-sponsored airfield improvement program will probably
be continued through 1932. It in un3ikaly, houever, that air transport
operations rill increase significantly in this period.
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Tra--SiBEECALALUMUNILAUSESIMISILIURSITIEW
1, lemmaggLeaLbajdoltassatadestn.
'ander the Five Tear Plan (1949.43) the pregtortion between asprinatural
and nonagricultural production is to be changed fras 70 to 30 to 45 to 55.
In order to abeam:110h this aftelerated industrialisation heavy Industry
ie scheduled to receive 83 percent *fall intestment fund:. Indleations
Are that the Bulgarians are failing to meet the goals of the Plan and will
? not attain them by 1953 unless Soviet Bloc assistance i.e increased. An
important obstacle to industrial development is the inadequagy of the
electrical pcmer output :which, excepting Mania* is the smallest in
Eastern Europe, Bulgaria lacks developed facilities and capital goods
for major induitrial progress and development is contingent an Imports
of coal, eoke? oil* iron, stalk, equipment* neehinery, and chemicals.
20. higteultur4 i?er.1-0~t0
The allocations or resonrces to agricultural development are considerably
smeller than those to industry* as agriculture has only second priority under
the Five Year Plan. The government is atteepting to consolidate the small
individual land holdings Into larger units suitable for mechanised farming.
By the end of 1950 about 50 percent of the arable land had been conseidated.
Mechanisation however, does not necessarily increase production per heaters*
althougb it does increase production per man and time releases marpower.for
activities other than agriculture. The tempo of further celectivisaticaL win
be largely governed by the availability of heavy agricultural equipment*
most of Which will have to be imported.
Production of agricultural machinery in prewar Bulgaria was negligible.
The Five Tiernan, however, has scheduled a 1953 output of 90,000 mite of
agricultural maChinery, incleding cultivators* plows seeders, bindere*.and
harvesters. In order to implement this program, three new agricultural
machinery plants are to be coepleted by 1953. Since the bulk of Bulgarian
production consists of simple plows and cultivators, it is possible that the
planned figure will be reached.
3. 211111mAgegagglige.
Civilian requirements receive the lowest priority in allocation of
eoonomic vesources. Food availability In Bolgeria? although almond to that in
Hungary, whiah leads the Satellite ecuntries* is quite low as compared with
Vestern Europe. The most.striking.development, as in other Satellites* has
been the shift of mlonomic advantage fraa the former small middle class to
the new classes of Communist officials and managers and the filer labor leaders.
'or purposes of food rationing the nonfarm population is divided into a
number of categories, of atieh the most favored are heavy laborers as
f/ high goverment officials, and the least favored the workers in light industry*
salc.
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miner civil servants, and professional people. increases in food wan..
abilities projected under the Five Tear Plan would place 2953 oonsumption
well above prewar, tat the continued existence of rationing on most food
items makes it doubtful that the degree of progress is as great am planned.
A severe housing shortage exists in Bulgaria, and unsatisfactory progress
has been made on postwar housing construction pro ns General health
and welfare conditions, however, are not appreciably worse at present than
in recent rears
40
*J1
Bulgaria will impose a alidht net drain on the ear potential of the USSR,
at leant through 1952, because of its dependence upon the other countries of
the Soviet Bloc for fahricatedmaterials9 The developwart of the clammy
toward greater solfseufficieecy? la impeded by the fact that major industrial
raw materials? equipment, and fele moths imported and that these items
cannot be obtained in quantity' either from the Soviet Bloc or free! Vette=
aources. Despite attempts to overcome beets economicweakness** the
Bulgarian contribution to the war potential of the USSR will be itegligible
within the next 5 or 10 years0
lableitagriTANSILSUMLENSIES2a,
lhdas.
Production *Sunni= in Bulgaria began in 1946 under the control
of the Soviet Union. The output has increased steadily wad by the end of
1950 Bulgaria accounted for 4. percent of the total uranium available to the
USSR. The 1946.60 rate of output is expected to continue through 1952.
beneldigiatslinau
Deposits of iron ore, Chrome ore, manganese, soeka3? titanium, and
tungsten exist, but they have not been thoroughly developed, aed reserves
ere not large. All iroe-ere production is exported to Header', Poland,
Czeehoslovakia, and Bumomsland all Chrome ore is exported to Fast Germaqr.
Bulgaria requires equipeaut and technological assistance from other Satellite
countries in order to expand production of iron ore, chrome ore, and manganese0
So gsgasulandji_andatia.
Lead and sine makeamore significant contribution than sapper. Ail
information indicates an extensive program for increased production of lewl
and zinc for shipeent to the USSR. Copper production atd reserves in Bulgaria
are email, but if necessary facilities are provided, exports to the Moo ean
be stepped up to make a small but significant contribution to the Bloc'
military-econeado potential.
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kaglialLAINUCKUMV
Blemeetal sulphur is not produced in Bulgaria, The only indicator
of pyrites prednetion is the known export of 10,000 metric tons in 1949 and
planned exports of 400000 tons in 19510 all to Czechoslovakia. The extent
of reserves is not known.
0 Co Elitaajla?
Bulgaria exports some wood chemicals (sethanCl, acetic acid,
as-stones ate.), as veil as glycerine, mostly to the Bloe. Basic heavy
chemicals, with the exception of calcium carbide, must be imported from
the Bloc, and some quantities of these also are Obtained from the West.
Despite its limited. production, Bulgaria does not depend heavily upon the
Bloc with respect to Chemicalpotecause its requiremente are very moderate.
f. Azdtganaza2ezhasta,,
Since World War II, grain crops, except in 1948, have been below
prewar yields, This has resulted from 3 years of unfavorable weather
and same peasant resistance to the governmentils agricultural policy of
crop quotas and collectivization. Because of unrest along the peasants,,
production probably will not increase in 1952, and there may possibly be a
slight decrease. Moreover, increased acreages of industrial crops are being
stressed in the Five Tear an, and these increases will have to be made at
The expense of food crop acreages. Belgarla exports tobacco end IMMO food
stuffs to the USSR and in exchange reclaim cotton, metals, ell products,
and industrial and agricultural machinery. The Soviet Union bandits fPas
such trade by selling the tobacco and rose oil on world markets for hard
currency.
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14
Since the Bulgarian gooney is primarily agricultural? it is net highly
vulnerable to Western economic warfare measures* The relatively eininportant
industrial seater, however, is vulnerable. Although the volume of Bulgarian
trade with Western Europe Is mall, imports Include strategic indnatrial
Item not readily available from within the Soviet Bloc, such as precision
instruments, abrasives, railroad replacements, textile machinery, automotive
equipment, and ball bearings. Such imports are beginning to be curtailed
as a result of Western export controls, and the ability of Bulgaria to take
effective steps to eompensate for such measures Is very ltnited. The extent
to which the Soviet Bloc would assist Bulgaria by supplying the ramematerialse
machinery, and equipment needed Is questionable* Moreover, econemic warfare
meaeures directed by the West against the USSn and the other Satellites also
vould retard the Bulgarian Industrialisation program, since that coustrys
in View of its negligible contribution to the eeenomy of the Bloc, would
erobehly reteIve a relatively low priority in any reellocation of resources
taithie the Blue. Postwar Bulgarian foreign trade is*Intimated as being
e5 percent with the Soviet Bloc, principally with the USSR. lhports outside
the Bloc are eminpertant and consist largely of fecadetuffe. Thawing.
overseas tradeee-partners include Argentina, which supplies raw materials
such as ueol, bides, and quebracho? and Egypt, uhioh provides some cotton.
Western economic Werfart measures could cutoff these overeaten imports, but
at most this would retard only a small segment of Bulgarian industry. In
any ease, there are now some indications that economic plans for Bulgaria
have changed, and industrialisation maze be sacrificeerin favor of the
expansion of agricultural produetion.
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ZatalltilinLILZUSUSUALISMAIL0
A ounsiderahle acceleration in the military mobilisation of manpower
in Bulgaria in recent months in an indication of preparation for war.
There are no indications reported In the Bulgarian econoey* however*
which can be construed as immediate preparation for hostilities. The
tempo of development of the industrialmmilitary potential* the production
of war material* efforts toward the accumulation of steekpdles* the
reduction of dependence on the Vest, and the development of heavy industry*
au conform to the pattern of Soviet Bloc program over the past few years.
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