THE EUROPEAN SATELLITE POWER COMPLEX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000900040001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 105
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 7, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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CEVIRAL =ELME= MIMI
OFFICE Or RESEARCH AND REPORTS
CIA/PR Project 6.51s Contribition to NIE.33
THE EUROPEAN SATELLITE KUHR COMPLEX
PART I
INDIVIDUAL SATELLITE COV1TRIES8
ECONOMIC STRENGTHS AND WEADESSES
7 July 1951
33016
NIXOIMANGE IN CLAS. t
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS CHANGED TO: TSOO
NEXT REVIEW DATE: f7W
AUTH:iotl
DATEIMFROW REVIEWER:
ENTNO. _
This report has been prepared at the request of the Office of National
........ ?
Estimates as a contribution to NIE.430 The material for Section III vas
contributed by ?IR Department of State* The crierwaIl elassifioation et
the report is Top Loreto Certain seetionay howevers are of lower classi-
fication and are so indieatede
eft
7eirmseamerm
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Summary and Cone1usions0.0.0.00.. 0 0000000000
I, Trends in the Structure of the Economy 0 000000 o . 0 * 5
110 Capacity *film Resources far Economic Development 0 9 0 0
Living ath Working Conditions . OOOOOOOOO 0 ? 0 0 * 14
IVO Foreign Trade arkdrinancel000?ow?000 e ao *via 27
V. Agriculture 0000.00.9... ? 000000000000
21
Vlo Industrial Capacity and Levels of Production ? ? 0 9 0 0 24
1
A. Ferrous Motels 0 ...??? 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 ? ? 0 0 0 24
E6 Nonfermus lietals???????????????????? 2E;
C. Coal Q 0 0 0 ? 0 ? 0 0 ? ? 0 ? 0 0 ? ? 0 ? 0 ? 00 0 0 0
D. Petroleum 0 . . 0 0 ? ? 0 ? 0 0 ? SO ?O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
210 Electric Power 0 ? 0 ? 0 0 0 ? ? 0 0 ? ? ? O 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pu Cherdeale 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 9 ? 0 0 0 0 ? 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gr. Engineering Industry 0 ...0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ira. TranoPortation 0 ? ? ? 0 o a o 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0
A. Bailroads094.000w aoe?O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bo Highway* 00000000 a ??? ?oo coo oa
C, Water Transport . 0 ? ? 0 . ? ? ? ? ? 0 0 ? 0 0 O 0 0 0 0
D. Air Transport 000 ?O 0 ??? 0 ??6??000000
E0 Pipelines 0 . .. 0 .. 0 0 0 0 ?? 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
VIII? Current Allocations of Economic Reseurces000000?00n
IL Estimated Degree of Vulnerability. to Western Economie
Warfare o?on?ac000000eoc0000?00000
1:0 Indications of Preparations for War 0
Appendix A. Recapitulation ofIiimitations, Deficiencies, and
Esculrements of Intelligence ? ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 94
Appendix 130 Footnotes and Sources ? ? 0 0000000.0 ??? 103
32
36
45
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65
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Project 6-51
adr.sztarr
TEE EUROPEAN SATELLITE POWER comma ?
(Contribution to NIE-33)
,PI
INDIVIDUAL SATELLITE COUNTRIES1
ECONOMIC SIRENCITES AND 14EAKNESSES
Ma&
iNaivitz.ind.ganslaitga?
The Rumanian women characterised by a large degree of Soviat control
and 4, great dependence cel imports of machinery ami equipment for industrial
deeelopient, currently emphasises production of strategic materia1i3 fqr the
Soviet Bloc. Toongt.cange pluming oOntemplates oonsiderable industrialization
of the pz.edotninantly agricultural OCOnnitro Operation of the econcer utter
emprehenaive plan, however, was not initiated until 1949, and. the USSR, up *
to that time at least, had followed a policy of exacting whatever benefits it
"mot vital little or no regard far the needs of the economy. In
industrial sectors production, has not met planned goals, peasant
to oellectivisation has been substantial, and the extent of
planned for 1955 is not liltely to be attained.
Three.foarths of the S Wilton vcrkers In the Rumanian labor force are
caplgred in agriculture. Since 1949 the nonagricultural labor force has
fathomed Shoat 25 percent, largely as a result of eati)haais on construction,
rate of growth ill not expected to continue. Teolmical training is
and labor productivity, although low, increased in 1950. Serious
-1.01stages, deficiemies in housing, ley wpm, and adverse working
time, all of idtich are producing discontent, are not expected to
materially in the *ext 2 years.
Despite the large proportion of the population engiged in fuming, =4
la little more then one-third of the national income is derived from agriculture0
n.4. but agrioul?anaLisobaisafae
=ports of food to the MM, a draught in 1950,
pejjt.nee to collectivisation have cianaajogjagajadabartiagn.
eith fihrOrabia Imather and no increase in peasant resistance,
avallaile for stocks and exports izt 1952 MeV 'reach 745,000 metric tons.
Itenonsase amen iron wel etee3. capacity la adequate to meet &nestle
21111414enin1til? 13nt high percentages of the gat, er113jLand f
tbsintlustly mut.wilamtagatid. Ore reserves Oev?p.ci, equiromt
is obsolescent,*71111Up2aticed modernisation and IntiOniligin will depart on
assIetenee thin tb. UM and the industriaLteed Satellites.,
anerhelf of an estiriated 'production of 250,000 Iraetric tone of
asatifinished stool was Shipped to the USSR and to Czechoslovakian onmments
plants in 1950,
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Copper concentrates leado and mine are produced in limited quantities
in Rumania aig by-products of gold and silver mining0 Although the tonnages
Involved are small, vigorous measures are being taken to increase production
gad and zinc for export to the USSR because of ahortages within the Bloc
'1).eeause oriheir importance to the militory..esonosto potential*
Rumania is sigatuffiagolLin-cault except tlimmusultable_tozAVg.
Plana to increase production from 3 million tone in 1950 to 8a5 to
in 1955 are not expected to be realized,
The q,. .?labluanior-La-seeenvt-enagr-la_Zat of the USSR
.177111 rc: It is important both as a source of to
R and as a m 4nRtey1 the Total p and probable
reserves are approximately 617 pollion metric tons0 But refinery capacity.,
98 percent of whiCh is concentrated in the Ploesti area, dropped from over
10 million metric tons before the war to approximately 6 million tons as a
result of ha* damage, overinteneive exploitation Soviet dismantling of
equipment? Obsolescence, and. retami exploratory and development drilling*
It is probable that, despite these handicaps crude-oil output will rise
from 406 million metric tons in 1950 to 408 Million tons in 19510 Attainment
of the goal of 10 million metric tons in 1955 is unlikely, particularly in
?iriev of the fact that urgently needed drilling eqpipment probably will not
be available in sufficient vantitiesa The USSR allocates approximately
80 percent of Rumanian petroleum output within the Soviet Bloc, the remaining
20 percent being consumed domestically. '
The electric power industry produces sufficient power to meet Rumanian
requirements and provides small exports to 8algaria0 Postwar Industrial
development has brought into use most of the capacity Which was idle immediately
after the war. New generating capacity is now required if production is to
maintain the postwar rate of increase* Electrical equipment requirements
mat be met through imports, with the USSR being the chief supplier. It la
unlikely that the planned increases of 1 million kilowatts hy 1950 and another
Million kilowatts by 1960 il1 be attaineda
PiTsduetion_st-the isiszgalroonfined,_to the_cutput of
heavy ied11e,ta3._che3nioa34 metallurgy, end InalPiz'
paperintries, Caustic soda, soda ash, and particularly earban black,
all exported to the USSR, are important for their contribution to the military
economic potential of the Orbit*
Although the small
requirements for most types o
ificant
u ry ppe o e USSR,
goods are imported; principally from
Industry does not meet domestic
pment, it does Rtle,a onall
Bloc, partiouly In 2 Citekle
re thanhaLfie the output of the
e su ? stantial quantities of capital
the USSR, Hungary, and Czeahoslovakia0
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A. =Mbar of items of critical equipment are received from Switzerland*
Austria, Italy, and West Germany. The plan to double the aggregate output
of machine-building installations probably will not be achieved, although
production goals for certain item appear realistic. Munitions output is
steadily increasing in a naMber of plants here production of civilian goods
continues sinalltaneaualy,
Rumania's transportation system makes an important contribution to the
Soviet economic potential for war througb the distribution of petreleum to'
the USSR aud the Satellites, mainly by pipeline and by Soviet and Rumanian
me:tient Shipping. Rumanian railroads and inland water transport also make
-
a small but significant contribution in the delivery of petroleum products,
particularly to the USSR. Rumanian transport facilities, now operating
below capacity, impose only minor requirements on Soviet resources, but ani
substantial increase in traffic would neceasitate additional transport eqaPp
ment from the USSR,
Rumanian foreign trade is substantially below prewar levels, primarily'
because the USSR, utich exercises wide control over the Rumaniat econony?
Is maintaining and developing only those brandies of industry which are of
direct benefit to the USSR, In the postwar period the USSR has accounted
anticipated that 1952 Rumania will deliver about half of its an
for as mach as 8 ere of the total fOreign trade of Rumania. It is-
production to the Soviet Bloc ulthont compensation, OurrentUlhai.71aiLimacia
sod Poland are beaming Rumania's principal. trading partners and hence the
chief supporters of the economy, From the Bloc, Rumania 'obtains steel and
4 cotton, coal and coke, machinery* transport equipeorav &emir-els, and
atharmacquticals. Imports from the West inolude limited quantities of all
types of machinery? apre parts, iron and steel products* transport equip,.
ment, cotton leather goods, chemicals, medicines* and pharmaceuticals.
Rumanian needs for exploration and drilling equipment are acute; in maw
instances this eqaipment is not available froth the Bloc.
Although the long-range economic plan for Rumania contemplatee the
industrialization of -the econounthe current pattern of the 'allocation of
resourdes stresses the development of extradtiveindustries and, of agriculture?
Rumania Is the largest source of petroleum and petroleum products available
in Eaatera Europe ger the Soviet war potential and also is expeoted to provide
significant quantities of grain, carbon bleak, some basic chemicals, and Small
quantities of lead and mind.
Western eponomic warfare measures againat the Soviet Bloc would have a'
seriousimpact on RumayrtAo industry, would retard the development prom%
-ind-uould lower living standarda. Is outstanding direct vulnerability
------toJieatern measures of economic Warfare lies in its dependence upon the West
for 011 exploration and drilling equipment to maintain current levels of
petroleum production, The vulnerability of the total economy is limited by
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Its predominantly agricultural character.
There is little or no evidence in the Rumanian economy of direct prepare"
tion for early hostilities. The carrying out of the industrial development
program; however; would significantly increase its contribution to the war
potential of the Soviet Bloc.*
;
AllitaNOMIND I; For a recapitulation of ltations, deficiencies; and requirements of
economies intelligence with respect to Rumania, see Appemitm A4 po 944 litgotc.
note references in the text that follows are numbered consecutively In arabic
numerals for eaCh major subdivision. The footnotes themselves, together vith
references to other sour:senatorial, are given in Appeal.% B9 po 1030
Explanatory footnotes; indicated by asterisks (or, in tables; Ir lower.case
letters), are given on the page in the text where the reference occurso
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I. llsrain-tilaltinadimat?thaissigno
km=
The basic reorganization dribs monads structure along Soviet lines
and constantly increasing government domination of industry and agriculture
have resulted in a highly effective state control of most phase of produc-
tion and distribution of Rumanian resources. These ocmtrols will probtibly
be fUrther extended through 1952. Rumaaa is subject, in addition* to
economic control by the USSR, which exorcises supreme authority in economic
matters.
iSoviet economic exploitation of Rumania* although a source of strength
to the USSR, has already weakened the Rumanian economy and is likely to muse
difficulties in the implementation of Rumanian eoonomic plans. Moreover, -
Soviet control over the Rumanian econcay 'win be further consolidated through
1952. The future developnent of Rumaniats economy will depend largely upon
Soviet and Satellite assistance in capital goods and technical Guidance? 3,/
10.
ti
the USSR
Ito lefalgigaliti=go
(1) b311162111211.0.224M.
?
Rumazda had One Year Flans in 2949 and 1950, but the plan now
in effect is a Five Year Plan (1951.45). In general, the two earlier plans
emphasized the extractive, electric power, and heavy industries. The /IVO
Year Plan Fartioularly emphasizes the establishment of economic foundations
for the industrialization of a primarily agricultural economy.,a/ The
attainment of an industrial clammy by 1955 is mI1ke3 because of Rumania es
lack of machinery, equipment, and structural steel
The Council of Ministers is the top polisswimaking and control
organ. In addition to fannulating economic policy., it approves the over-
all economic plan, which is drawn up by the State Planning Commiesion,d
and supervises its fulfillment. The State Planning Commission receives
from the various Ministries draft plans for the economic units under their
luriedictiono the Elnistries having coordinated the production plans submitted
to them by the industrial centers. The VInistries are responsible far
supervision of planning for the entire sector of the soot:saw which la =der
their control, with the exception of those enterprises which serve only local
needs. Here, administration is in the hands of local authorities. 5,/ The
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industrial centers are the management and planning bodies far individxtal
enterprise* in their respective fields* The centers plan prodnotion (Bubo
bat to higher approval), acquire and distribute raw materia1s. mai control
sales*
(2) 12110.20atiago
After the planp broken down by enterprises and including target
datee for oompletion, has been approved by the Council ON:Winters. it 10
forwarded to the Winterise bythe State Planning Commission* The Ministries
forward to the State Pluming Comission periodic reports on the progress of
plan execution which the State Planning COmmission midst verify*V The State
Comtrol Commission the Central StatiStical institute, the CatattoMion for
Organisation of Co:perativee, and the State Comnission fOr Collection of
Agrioatural Produce also help to IMplementplan-controls
Contra by %mow over the Rumanian 11100b0Mie plane is effective*
This -contra is exerted directly through Soviet pesonnd hOldimgkay? positions
in Rumamian industry and governtent and through &Owlet politica
control of Rumanian government officials*
klatithlattigStraititge
(1) &Mina
(a) battglaLthOlaniaill.
The goversmient nov controls, within the framework of the
estannic plen, all of the most izaportant Segmente of. Rumanian industry* In
addition to the basic pattern of control developed for the nationalised
industries, the Damian government hai adopted other measures to expand and
tietten economic controls over industry* First, goverment ministries have
been reorganised in order to improve topiegvel control. Over gogernment
agenciee and, ematiating the Soviet struOttria, a larger number of ministries
with 'tzar:v.40d functioni have been created* 2/ Second. variouil Other crone
of governmental contra, such law the. standardisation Commission and the
Inatitute for Industrial P3mxaing, have been established as agencies mder
the Couneil of Ministers* Si Third, the credit and texation systems have
been reerganitied, to favor nationalised or cooperative industry over private
enterprise*
In the cooperative segment of inddstry the trend has. been
toward Int:greased control by the government and an increase in the =ober of
state cooperatives, at the expense .of both private cooperatives and Individual
enterprises* Although they/hole cooperative structure since Its inception
has been mtbject to varying degree of government control, an administrative
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consolidation inivell 2949 Imoreasel state comtrolo The various coopera-
tives are now organized Into national videos, uhidh are associated in national
federations, coat:tuned in turn by tbe Central Federation of Consumers
Cooperatives (Ciatreeoop)*
(b) kilitegaZAISMate
Feebler Soviet control *fitment= industry Lticesdisi bt4ont3umaL1;
expanded, incremeUmgRunendes economic value to the 'USSR and making the USSR
virtually the supreme economic authority in Rumania* Tor example, Soviet
control of Rtuanian industry bas been furthered by the eetablisihment and
development of joint Soviet-Romanian (Ugric') companies, managed by Soviet
Directors-General having nearly absolute powers, and staffed by numerous
Soviet officials* These joint companies control enterprises which have the
majority interest in all key sectors of the sconce:* 2/ Because of soonomic
privileges granted to the Sovrom companies by the state, most large private
competitors have been driven out of business* 11)/ Despite the feet that
Savrom companies (with the exception of Sovrombank) were placed ander the
control of the Rumanian government in February 1949, Soviet control is still
exercised over them, 21/
Through domination of Romanian political leaders tr the USSR
controls formulation andimplementation of Rumanian economie poll es* The
presenoe of Soviet personnel in dominant sectors of Rumanian Indust:mi.)/
increases the effectiveness of Soviet control* Furthermore, representatim
of the Couneil of Mutual Econanic Assistant* (CEMA) are located in Satellite
countries, and these countries must accept the recommendations of eneh adviserzo
as well as furnish the USSR with all economic information that it requires*
Reciprocal trade treaties, reparations payments, investments,
allocations of raw materials and some manufactured products, and loans
supplement the USSR peacetime control over the Rumanian economy* Should
Rumania be threatened by invasion or air attack, an Important economic protood
to the treaty signed by the USSR and Rnmania on 4. February 1948 provides that
all Rtmetthul industries important to the war effort would be removed to the
USSR. 222/
(2) Agtiabtalo
Collectivisation of agriculture in Rumania is advancing at a elm
pece, partly because private land tenure is a. deeply rooted tradition and '
Partly bemuse gweat :Antra over agriculture is being oseamplished by
other meane Indepeu1ent landholdings stili comprise the greatest amount of
/and area in Rumania, Collectivization was recently accelerated, however,
at Soviet instigation,
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There are three types of statesoontrelled farms in Ruman4 a. gati
contain land owned entirekr by the state and operated ty hired workers. '.
anvi also are state-owned, but in theory eaoh farm holds the title
to its in perpetuity. The %and Can topsitber field nor leased by the'
callective. The szturela Lam is the first step toward complete colleetii.
vization, and it pax:ma through various stages whieh are aharsoterized tar the
differences in land and inventory ownership and in the methods by which par.
meat for work is melet before coming under complete state control. 12/
(3) Donate pepless (Transnertatian. Cemqpnioations. ete.).
(a) andgel in the Governmed.
. Control of most or the mama? services in %amnia haw been
effected through nationalization. In euckservioes as *compress for examples,
wbere nationalization is not yet complete, the trend 'toward increased state
and cooperative control is evident. The Rhtionalication Lav of 11 Awe 1948
nationalized insurance transportation, and telecommunications enterprises.
tanking already had been nationalised. The techniques of control in these
fields are similar to those employed in the industrial seotor. All major
ezport and import establishments have been nationalized, and thelenistry
of Trade controls virtually every aspect of Rumania's domestio and foreign
commerce. 'Since 1 October 1950, prIvate traders have teen required to obtain
licenses.
(11) 2.9gtagia7ithalS.
The principal means employed by- the USSR to central economic
services in Rumania is the erten:sive use of Sorrom oompaniest including joint
banking, transport9 airline, and insurance companies.
2, betentlalatingatLagiffiteljaisliqi stagsajaml.
t iin4,1010 ?
(1) Sitisd.se2Wsnantlalualawizz
The Nationalization Law of 19A8 nationalized almost all manu-
facturing or processing enterprises of any importance in Humanist all mining
enterprises, and most economic servicetat In this sphere government
control is rigid. Since the original c decree, some ahltional industries,
such as motion, pictures and private health institutions', also have been
nationalized. One of the aims of the current Elva rear Plan in Rumania is
to liquidate all capitalist elements in industry and to curb privets cameras
by 29550
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(2) adleatkaraellgenggiasurastaaltatte
Official figures for 1950 indicate that 2.5 percent of the arable
land vas collectivised, 205 peroent vas under joint tillage or cooperative
Cultivation, and 8.1 percent was bad by *tat. farms. These per:tentage, ars
based on the total arable land according to the agricultural census of,19480
The figure for c011ective fans area is based on data for December 1950, for
Joint tillage and cooperative fern area on data for July 1950, and for state
farm area on data for October 1950.
? Al etymological survey of the major developments in control of
agriculture demonstrates both the methods used by the government to obtain
such control and the increased scope of sudh action after m14-1910. In
December 1948, even before agricultural cooperatives had been introduced in
Rumania,*a speech by Oheorghe Gheorghlu4e1, PirstVice President of the
Council of Ministers and President of the State Planning Commission, made it
clear that their status was provisional and set collectivisation as the ultimate
goal at the government. His statement that colleetivisation would not be
*forced* wanted. solely to allay the fears of the peasants, and ever-Increas-
ing government control of agricultural supply, distribution, and credit,plus
the vse of dimmehnincOmy measures to force the peasants into.collectivsation,
have become effective instruments of government domination*
A. drastic Iend Expropriation Act published inftedh 1949 provided
for tote' expropriation of all land belonging to rich peaaants. Under the 1945
Expropriation Dews cely the larger landholdings had been expropriated* The
formation of Machine Tractor Stations and 'voluntary* peasant associatious for
the use of agricultural madhinery and equipment from these stations was
encouraged as a move toward collectivisation* A new agrioultural tax:law
passed on 11 July 2949 exempted peasahts with a production of less than
22,000 lei from all taspayeents and further weakened the position of the
remaining private landowners. On 24 July 2949, rhanania inaugurated its first
collective farms, modeled on the Sovietjakba, and granted them special eon,*
cessions to establish their favored position and assure effective operation.
In 1950, both the collectivization drive and the administrative
control of agriculture by the government mre imoreased0 Collective farms,
Iiihieh numbered 55 in 2949 and tilled only Oa percent of the total arable -
land, increased to 1,029, tming 205 percent, in 1950. The State Comission
for the Collection of Agricultural Produce also was establithed in 2950 to
earry out the collection, purchase, and distribution of agricultural products
within the purview of the economic plan. 39/ Forced sales of agricultural
produce at discriminatory prices to this commissim have further curtailed
the economic power of the independent landholder. A heavier tax: lee imposed
in 1950 provided that 47 percent of the total governmental revenue derived
from agriculture would be contributed ter only? percent of the land holdings?
In June 2950 e Land Pooling Act outlined procedures for the pooling of
private land into collectives. The plots involved generally ie sections of
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pod land not already taken .by the agricultural empropriations of 1945
and 1949 or otherwise forced Into collective farma. The need to expedite
the collectivisation program also vas an impelling faster in the revision
of the administrative divisions of Rumania In September 1950. si A
further increase In colleetivissation seivity has been yildent In 1951 and
probably viii continue through 1952. The Five Tear Plan specifically provide*
for a great rednetion of capitalist elements in agriculture by 1955.
Soviet control Over Rumanian agriculture is arereisel through
political control of Rumanian leaders Ccessanist Party organs, and Soviet
persormel placed in official position: In Relneilifto
b. AIRMSEIVEiadajkaggitileaLeAlaitragatduitjessaargantrigho
The Rmnanian Worker's* Party (the Cammunist Party) and its organisa?
tions are important instruments of monad? control. Reonarie policy is
dictated tgr the Party and Implemented Usr its membarst, and such Party units
as the &maim Workers" Party Plant Cerasitteeis form peverful groups In
factoriess urging both workers ard managemeat to greater produetion.
Rumanian labor unions, which all workers are required to Jain1 have
no independence, being merely devices to control workers. The Amionization
of farm labor is proceeding under the direction of workers free? industry. &V
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Canacitv of Rumen Resonrces for' Reo?nomic Dovelament.
aBIREC
Three.quarters of the Rumanian labor force of 8 million workers are
employed in agriculture. .Nonagricultural labor, however, has Increased by
25 percent since 1949 through the absorption of the unempleved and the
induction of new workere. The planned rate of growth of the nonagricultural
labor foree.will be slower in the next 2 years, But evenso recruitment of
labor from agriculture and Increased employient of in '411 be required,
in addition to the Yearkv increment in population of working age, if Rumania
-
is to achieve it. 1953 goal of 8.0 million market*. Although the training-
of native technical personnel is Increasing, foreign teohnicians are still
necessary in the operation of Rumanian industry. Labor productivity has
increased lathe last year but remains low,
1. amend Distribution of the Labor Pomo
Seventy.five percent of the Rumanian labor force of 8m41 lion workers
is employed in agriculture, but the government Is endeavoring to increase
the nonagricultural labor force through the divers:Wade agricultural labor
to meet the demands of industry. As late as September 1949 there were 247,000
unemployed,ofwhom 160,000 were urban workers. vg Many of these were absorbed
in 1950 into the nonagricultural labor force, ch increasedlqr 25 peroent
over 1949. The rate of growth will not have to be as high lathe next 3 years,
however, in order to achieve the Five Year Plan goal of an int:reds? of 38 ?
percent by 1953.2/ One of the more significant developmente in 1950 has been
the emphasis on construction in whidh troops, as will as political prieoners,
youth brigades, and free labOr? haie been utilized. iv In addition, males
between the ages of 18 and 56 and females between 18.and 45 ars required_te
oontribute a specified amount of labor to the maintenance of highway-so 4/
Plan goals for the Rumanian labor force and its Components for 1950?53
are set forth in the table below.
SBIRNZ
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Agriculture ,5/
Industry and Services
Industry, Mining, and
Construction
Transport and Coarsanica?
tions
Commerce, Public Emplor.
ment, etc?
Total, Industry and
3019,10011
Student Pool
Total if
Civilian Leber Force
1950.43
125a. 122.
192. 1951
6,000 5,900 5,850 5,800
900 1,3)02/ 1,600W 1 Boo
20021.230 29/ 230 a/ 24O Q/
613 at 613/ 57o/ 560 32/
Uhl 241421 lil WM all
400 2,7/ 420 32/ 440
aaLcx/NAN liags
Totale are minded because of =certainty of final digitee
'revel gt Tecimical T'?nR p411,Gni Einoienor.
Many prewar technicians and managerial personnel were replaced by political
appointees when Rmanian induetriee were nationalized. There are Soviet
technicians at present in ma gr Rumanian ixdustries, but their number, skill,
and location are not known. XV
Semiski.Uad personnel are likewise in aihort? euppreand instruction
programs have been started to remedy this defioleatcy.49/ Under the Five
Year'Plan, 500,000 viorkers are to receive profesaional on-Qs?job training,
and 5850= is:tre are to be given training courses. In addition, students
are sent. to the Soviet Union and to tho other Sa tee for various kinds
of training. gy
Detailed information 031 the prodnotivity and efficiency of the Rumanian
labor force is not available. Prose cmments in March 1950 32,/ on the
extbsesive amounts of overtime worked the lack of adequate training, the
poor working discipline, and the need for no= changes indicated dissatisfaction
with laming labor productivity. Industrial labor output reportedly increased
by 11 percent. from the first quarter of 1950 to the first quarter er-195:6
According to the 1951 Plan them should be another increase of 14 percent. ?
BERET
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MGT
30 impansibilitv sad A410414.15-tv ist the LINT -Fere*,
Oditiaaal labor Input from Present leben ?orate
It Is estimated that Increases In labor productivity, additional
overtime and reductions in abeenteeiam wad increase the maa.41our Input
of the present labor force by about 5 to 10 percent?
%to agagna.PLAWAtansUbuRam.
The annual increase of approximately 325000 In population of varking
age is insufficient for the aehlevement of planned increaacs in the labor. .
force. &V Although goals n individual sectors may be reached through a
redietritution of workers attainment of the goal for the totallebor forse,
depends upon significant increases in the am:pigment of Wean or MeMbers of
other groups not now included in the work force?
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MORE -
1110 pivine and Working Conditioms.
big=
?rRumanials 1017 living standards are not expected to improve In 1951 and
1952. The housing shortage is acute, deficiencies inroad supply have foreed
holders of ration cards into the tree and bleak markets, and health conditions
are unsatisfaotory. Labor morale is poor because of by wageo, heavy work
loads, and bad working conditions.
2. IdA1siceaud4tiona.
*0 IMPAIR&
? There is an acute Shortage of housing in Rumania. The adoption of
the decree of 4. February 2949 on "Reorganisation of living Spacesol/whidh
provided that all space in residential premises "superfluous to requirements
of inhabitants" could be allocated by official renting agenciea to *homeless
workers?" has resulted in evictions an 24?bour notice. In general, a family
of two is not permitted to occupy more than one room. PerMermiddlem and war.?
class families have been either evicted from their homes or assigned single
rooms one rdon for each family. The moat desirable houses and flata are
allocated to Party or state officials. A flat of two rocas, kitchen, and
bath no, costs appradmately S,000 lei (about $53)* a, month, a prohibitive
price except for a ftwhigh.cald Party members. In urban areas, workers
pay about 1,000 lei a month, or about 20 to 25 percent of the gross income
of an =skilled worker, for one room. Mohan and bath, wherever available,
are shared with the other families in the same house, In granting lodgings,
priority is given to Party members and workers who *surpass production norma.
th) bd.
Although It la an agricultural country, Rumania is faced with food(
Shortages because of heavy shipments of meat, fruits, and cereals to the
Soviet Union, Food is purchased in three ways: with food ration tickets,
in governnent shops at "free, or higborices, and at even higher prices in
the black market. Only workers and government employees are entitled to
ration cards, The following groups and their families are denied rattan
cards: those engaged in commercial transactions, those working for wages
an privately owned land, pension holders who live in villages or who once
owned land which has been expropriated, seasonal and dailylorkers lathe
countryside, professionals who are not Party members or state employees,
* One VS dollar equals 250 lei at the official rate.
, 0
MUT
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and domestics employed by any of the groups listed above.
Food rationing is applied to bread, sugar, edible oils, meat, rice,
macaroni, and potatoes. Kerosene, the most important cooking fuel in
Rumania, also is rationed. There are now six categories of ratiau cardss
Card A (750 grams of bread a day), for miners and steel furnace workers; _
B4 (500 grams), for manual workers doing menial tasks; B (500 grame)for
all other laborers; C (350 grams), for all types of office employees;
D (250 grams), for families; and D-2 (250 grams), fa r ohildren. The Miming
are the monthly allowances an atypical cards 2 kilograms of Wheat flour, -
4 kilograms-of-corn (maise) flour, 2 kilograms of meat, 0.5 kilogram of fat,
a .31dlogram of sugar, and 0.25 kilogram of soap. Several times a year butter
and rice are distributed. Rations are insufficient for minimum subsistence,
the rationed items are nt. Alum.0-1 amildble, and quality is generally poor.
co Health.and. ITOMare?
,
&manse of malnutrition, poervorldng conditions, and leek of medical
care and medical supplies, there has been a. marked increase of ttiberculoeis
and.syphilis, particularly among workers. It has been estimated that fran
10 tO 15 percent of urban workers are tubercular and about laperoant are
-Although all workers 'are insured, the Communist-controlled General
Confederation of Labor Whidh orgenisee and controla the Social Security budget,
has not pressed for prompt insurance payments for pensions by theitinistry of
Labor. Hospitals and genital& are seriously overcrowded, and medical treat..
ment is not promptly given by the Hinietry of Health.
d* Mali&
?
Only' a small part of the population is entitled to clothing and shoe
rations. Cloth sells at 800 lei (about $5030) ameter in contrelled markets
and 1,600 lei ameter at free prices. Asuit of poor quality =ler rationing
costs from 5,000 to 6,000 lel,whereas in the free market it costs 22,000 lei.
The one pair of shoes distributed each year an coupons caste about 1,450
lei, and a better pair of'sbcioa bought in the free market costs 5,000 lei.
VorkinteConditIrona.
a* Agfes.
Eight basic wage rates, correlated With Skills, are set for the
Rpm/Lilian industrial worker. An vvialalled worker receives about 4,000 to
5,000 lei amouth, and a &killed worker is paid about 6,000 to 8,000 lei
a month, Take-home pay, however, is frequently reduced by penalties for
failure to moot production norms, for inferior quality of production, or
for damage to state-owned property, and by deductions for union fees,
*donations," and sdbacriptions to Party and laborpuhlications.
' SO 15 6.
SEMIS
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Production Norms,
Each adniatry, in agreement with the trade =dew eatabliehes the
work norm to be accompli r
shed for each bandh of activity :nd determinee the
quantity and quality of production or operation Uhich the employee must
carry out inagiven period of time* Failure to fa= norms results in
wage deductions, and the noneweyetaa has caused Uldespread dissatisfaction*
co Safe tr Conditions.
Employees in the foundries coal and salt mines and oilfields work
under adverse conditions. Smoke- :nd gas-filled factories are a safety hazard?
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IvotateiaLlahamstzumese
UMW
Una
Rucania does not -depend upon imports for subsistenoe, but foreign trade
is vital to the emcees of its industrialization pmgram and provides strategic
I taterials to the other Bloc nembers. Rbcports ?insist obiefly of the products
or tho extractive Industries -.4., petrdleum agriculture, and lzmdlering. lit
exehange, Romania imports minerals, dhemi:als, and capital equipment.
I The great bulk of Rumanian fbreign trade is with the Soviet Bloc countries*
-- For apart of the postwar period the USSR accounted for85.perceat of total
foreign trade,
tot Czechoslovakia and Poland have recently increased their
Share. Trade with nonealoc I countriee although limited,?enables Rumania to acquire. koy items needed for industrial development.
Soviet control ailment= foreign trade is as thorough as Is its
=I
** Rumanian domestic economy.. The influence of the USSR is exercised
Soviet...41==Jan joint stock companies and reparations agreements.
Zalirgsimassz.
Although Rumania sells some industrial products and buys such items ao
cotton and coal In foreign markets, the cOuntry is dbiefly an exporter of
raw materials and semiprocessed goods and an importer of flniabed goods.
Foreign trade is at a low level, partly bemuse of the agricultural character.
of the Romanian econcayezdpartly- tycoons the Soviet Union which exercises
thorough control in this field, la maintaining and expanding may those sectors
of the Rumanian economy which directJ,T benefit the USSR and the Blocs.
2..,,Tragev4th ROnpftlovitet Bloc count/sips.
44 SODO121,
Rumania acquires key industrial items for the petroleom, tetallurgical,
and transportation industriesV through trade with the nonpaloc countries.
In return., Rtnania exports to these countries food, petroleum, and tither
products. Total trade with the nonialoc countries roadbed a postwar peak of
673.5 million in 1949? with exports valued at $3809 million and imports at
$34.6 million, but declined in 1950 to $45.1 million Uhl& included $16.7
million worth of exports and $2807 mill-toe-worth or imports. Postwar trade
and payments agreements have been concluded with almost all of the Important
countries of Western Enrope and with Argentina. 2/ West Germs:eye Italy,
Austria, and Switzerland have supplied game goods cut off by export controls,
Impossibly other Western nations.
? 17
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b. &ports to Non-Soviet Bloc Gountrieg.
Rumanian exports to its non-Bloc trading partners consist primarily
of food products and also include petroleum products and a small quantity of
timber products. These shipments were valued at $3809 million in 1949 and
$16.7 million in 1950.
c. peorts from Non-Soviet Bloc Gounlriep.
/n 1949, Rumania received textile and machinery products fran Italy.
and Belgium; machinery and apparatus from Denmark; chemicals, medicines, and
pharmaceuticals from France; all types of spare parts and machinery, including
equipment, from West Germany; textile and nonferrous metals
Products fran the Netherlands; textiles, machine tools, and electrical equip.
ment from Sweden; textiles, manufactures of base metals, scientific instru.
mints, and dyes fran Switzerland; cotton and tanning materials from Turkey;
and cotton, textiles and rubber goods fran the US. 3/ Other imports have
included bell bearin;s from Switzerland and Italy, war material from Italy,
Industrial goods fran Austria., medicines and pharmaceuticals from the
Near East (primarily Israel), cotton fran Egypt and India, fi and hides
and tanning materials from Argentina. 2/ The total value of' imports from
non.Bloc countries was $34.6 million in 190 and $28.7 million in 1950.
d.. ammati.
Rumanian trade with the non-Bloc countries probably will continue
the decline which began in 1950 despite the importance of Western industrial
products to the country's industrialization program. Foreign credits?are
shrinking, and Soviet reparations requiremente and other techniques are
accelerating the integration of the. Rumanian seaway Into that of the Bloc.
In addition, Rumania's unwillingness or inability to make reasonable eettle-
ments.on nationalized properties and outetanding prewar debts has exacerbated.
trade relations, particularly with Seitzerland, Italy, France, and the UK.
3, Tradevith Sevjet Bloc Countries.,
a. Sigastau
The great bulk of Rumanian foreign trade is with the Soviet Bloc,
ami Rumania is a net debtor, primarily because of the uncompensated deliveries
made.to-the USSR under the reparations agaeements and joint stook company
enterprises.. Rumania aoxprts petroleum, food, and tidber products to the
Bloc countries and receivel in exchange capital equipment and industrial raw
materials. Trade and payments agreements have been signed with the USSR and,
under Soviet direction, with all the other Satellites.
SEC=
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b. limorts to Soviet Blo9 Coyet4eq.
The 1950 trade pact with the Soviet Union l/ provided for Rumanian
000Orts orios million metric tons of petrdleum, 130,000 metric tons of grain,
25 000 mOtric tons Of meat large quantities of other foodstuffs, $20
worth or ludber and ludber products, 120,000 Metric tons of cement,
14111ed worth of processed cotton, and other goods. &ports to the other
followed asimilar pattern. Mash of the small trade with Bulgaria
10,411.14eintery in nature, Ritmania importing rem materials and returning
*mem* pods to Bulgaria, 2/ Electric power oleo la exported to Bulgaria
IX- Mounte.
apports fram Soviet Bloc Countrtm
or the 3950 trade agreement with the USSR, Rumania was to receive?
worth of petroleum equipment, $30 million worth of other industrial
$40 million worth of cotton, 220 million worth of-medicines .$5
width of rubber, 250,000 Metrics tons of coal, 180,000 metric tons of
? metal products, railroad and othattransport equipment, office
land abrasives. ut Poland supplies Rumania with iron and eteel
the metallurgical industry, coal and coke, and carbon electrodes
supplies machine tools oil pipe, trucks and autAXmohatmsjah
les oilfield equit, tools, electrical equipment, and
In 1950, Rumanian imports from Czechoelovekla exceeded exports
siontry by more than $10 million, while the coMbined import deficit
and Poland was about 0 ;zillion. ut
InOludina 44teagons of Mohilizetion for War.
f. expected that the present pattern of Romanian trade with the
Countries will Continue through 1952 and that the USSR will continue
2mmanian.foreign trade for Soviet benefit. In 1951 and 1952,
Will probably deliver about half of its patroleum production to the
Blec-medbers without compensation. ?
44 Neve of Catrvina_on 7ra42.
Ebst of Rumania's trade with non-Bloc countries is oipped by rail to
Central Europe? and the volume is -so small that fabilities are not strained.
Danube River transport Which carries a large part of the trade with the
.Bloc countries, is controlled by the USSR through 'e joint stock compam.
5. Ingginstegagglaajzfelea29.2.2.M.
a. 'Taint Stock Campania'.
Eleven Soviettaumanian joint stock companies have been establithed
In the postwar period to direct the operation of properties formerly owned
19.'
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SE=
by Germans anl enterprises Vhich, although included under reparations, are
Judged more profitable if left in Rumania. These joint stock companies,
known as Sovroms, enable the USSR to exact fixed profits, to obtain a share
of the production of strategic industries and services, and to insure Soviet
Control of the RUmanian economy vhile avoiding the necessity of large Soviet
investments.
The economic agreement of 1946 eatablished Sovroms in the tields
of transport (Sevromtransport), aviation (TARS), timber (Sovromlemn), Soviet."
Rumanian banking (Sovrombank)? and petroleum (Sovrompetrol). f Sovrom.
tractor and Sovramehemicale were added in 1948, Sovromgas (natural gas) in
early 1949, and Sovrammetal, Sovromcoal, and Sovranconstruction in July 1949.1A/
The most important joint stock 'company le Sovrompetrol? which is reported to
control from 40 to 80 percent of almania's oil production*
b. Aemegsw.
The reparations climes of the Soviet-aumanian arnistice of September 1944
set the keynote for poatwar economic relations between the tvo countries. 17/
The Rumanian reparations bill was fixed at $300 million to be paid off by
1 July 1952 through delivery of petroleum products, gratn, timber, river and
ocean vessels, machinery, and other commodities, all valued at 1938 priceso
with $110 million still outstanding, Rumanian financial difficulties
?i ached such proportions that the USSR cut the debt balance in half? w
Nevertheless, the remaining indebtedness of $55 million in 1938 dollars imposes
an annual burden of $41 m4114on in current dollars on the Rumanian balance
of payments and further tightens the Soviet hold on the Rumanian economy.*
6, Mens env:141w Trade*
Rumanian foreign trade la financed by exports, Ohort-term credits from
the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CMA), and gold and foreign exchange
reserves accumulated before the end of 19450 In the postwar period, Rumania
has received the following known credits as
Rumanian Postwar Foreign Borrowing
Country*,
USSR
USSR
Argentina
Switzerland
US (Chase National Bank)
&wad Ralcbssing
10.0 1947..61
22.6 From June 1948
te Marsh 1950
25.0 2947
6.9 1947
1200 /947
Wii1122.2112.
Probably None
N.A.
$106
Probably None
None
* Other =productive outlays Vhidh weaken the Rumanian economy are occupation
costs, estimated by Gene Nicola? Redeems, former Prime Minister, to total $108
million from Septeabstr1944to February 1948,19/and m41 .4tax7 appropriations',
which In 1950 amounted to $400 minion at the official rate of exChange0
200.
MIR=
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Amon
gillnio the mainstay of anmanian agriculture and the stwle of the
national dist. Production in 1949 and 1950 was less than in. 1948, the peek
postwar year, but probably win surpass the 2948 total In 1951 and 1952 If
average weather conditions prevail and peasant resistance to 'collectivisation
_leas-Dot increase. Deficits were experienced in 1949 and 1950, but tightened
---rationing restrictions will probably permit surpluses In 1951 and 1952. Acreage
----is stable and no reserves exist. Stockpiling is expected in 1952. The numbar
clanegilso_thtms, increaSing gladly in the face of strong peasant opposition0
*vresented only 2.5 percent of the total arable land in 1950.
1. ',reduction.
Grain is the meet important agricultural crop in Rumania.* Livestock and
livestock products beans* and other vegetables ale* are produced. Grainprodution, after iseadhing a postwar peak Of 7.3'mi1lion metric tons in 19489
deolined edbstantially in 1949 and 1950. The short 1950 crop vas primarily
a result of unfavorable weather conditions and peasant opposition to collectiviza-
tion.
Latest Anndal Estimates of Grain Production
194840
?
121Z =Mg&
1948 70362
3.949 60314
1950 5,732
Probable Range of
Variation of Estivate
611974 to 17,749
5,981 to 6,646
5,431 to 6,034
Grain acreage, serloaely out in the World War II period, had readhed only
90 percent of the prewar total by 194S and 92 perdent by 1950. Acreages in 1951
and 1952 probably will not increase and may even decrease slightly because of
peasant discontent. '
* Grain unless otherwise specified includes corn (maize),wheat, rye, oats 0 barley,
and such minor grains as spelt0 meslin, and buckwheat.
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the Riaseniene relied upon grain for *boa 75 perm*
Of intake" with oorn Noise) accounting Am approsimetely
Alet4. Sims the war the percentage of grain in the diet
hes prekty inoreeeed. The fact ibat the population lives near the eubsistence
level therefore liudts the extent to which grain requirements can. be reduced.
*et of the shortages resulting from the poor 1950 crop were probably met by
decreasing grain for livestock !Wed.
lietimated Domestic Requirements of lirain
1948,-53
' ? 541 Tam
for
Jet listlatta bridaticatilidkuts
39049 6,763 6,6'70 to 6,869
1949-50 6,991 6,410 to 6,571
1950.41 6,394 6,321 to 6,467
19530.52 6,80 6,796 to 6,992
1952-53 6,886 6,813 to 7,009
4. gigilltgan.
It is believed that, because of poor harvests in 1949 and 1950, there
are no reserve stooks of grain in Rumeuda. No pain was imported in 1949
auol 1950, but small quantities may have been exported to the USSR, Albania,
? and.poseibly wee of the other Satellites. If the expected 1951 crop
.materialises, about 0.7 Winos to will be available for stockpiles suxt
=ports.
22
.uIl..
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Estimated Stockpiles of Grain
1950.52
e Range of
Ia ofBOW& Veriatian of Estimate
31 ally 1950 None Nome to 291
31 ALIF 1951 None None
31 July 1952 746 514 to 4130
50 Surclus or Deficit,
Tightening of rationing restrictions in early 2951 has averted the threat
of a grain deficit in late 1951 of 662,000 metric tons. There will probably
be a surplue in the summer of 19520
Estimated Surplus or Deficit of Grain
(Nxnestic Production)
Tear Erdine
33. July 1950
31 4tly 1951
31 JUly 1952
60 P.SZ11S29.0t1413511111111220
Probable of
=MEW Variatickof Estimate
417
Now
0.746
..429 to 675
Now
6514 to 44130
.The first steps toward collectivization were taken in October 190 with
the establishment of Machine Tractor Stations, followed in early 1949 V' the
organization of smaller farms into farming groups or tillage associations
In late 1949 there were 55 collective femme in operation, cultivating about
0.1 percent of the total arable land of the country, The number of collectives
increased in 1950 to 1,029 small farm uhleh cultivated 205 percent of the
arable land. The percentage of collectivized land in Rumania is too '"-
to have an appreciable effect on 1951 grain production. Peasant resistance
to collectivization is strong and persistent,
70 440 .? * ?f
Sid
for IFIDr.
Government efforts toward land reform achieved on:17 a small increase in
acreage in 1949 and 2950, The strong peasant hostilitYto both collectivism..
tion and the introduction of modern methods of farming makes it unlikely that
the aoreage in 2951 and 1952 will exceed that of 1950, and a decrease is
possible. Imports of train for stockpiles have not been reported,
23
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VX Iz4i Ce.poity and Levels of Produotiono
Ferrous Uetalso
Summary
The iron and steel industry of Rumania under normal ?auditions is ade=
quate for the needs of the country. It is dependent upon importe tar all
requirement" of ferroalloys? except manganese and some ohromite* as wan as
war a len' proportion of its requirements *Metallurgical soks and iron.
oreo Large reserves of ooal ere 1ooatei in the country but only a small
part of domestics output is suitable for the produotion of metallurgical poke.
Tron Ore roserves0 widely distributed throughout the country ere estimated
at over 26 million tri tons but exploitation has been slow? and'Rummia
imports a large proportion of it iron ore requirementez
Uethods of extracting ores are primitive? installations and equipment -of
the snail foundriee and steel mills are obsolesoent end worn*, mad competent
mensiferial and teohnicel personnel ere lacking, To inorease produotion*
Rummnia must make large investMents in all phases of its tatastryo
----Soviet 'managers oontrol Rumenia's four Urgent steel mills? and in 1.960
proximately 60 percent of the total produotion of eemifinished steel prod.
ts vas delivered to the Soviet Control Commieston.for shipment to the
SSP and Czechoslovakia*
Produationo
?
Frem1946 through 1960 there boon 11 increases in iron and eteel
produntion Those inarcasass detailed lathe table below? -ogre aehieved through
inoreasedwork hours mad more stringent labor disotpline*
Estimated Produation of Ferrous Uetals
01101.01.0.11100.10.111.
Uotellurgioal Coke
-Iran Ore (30.60 Fe)
Iron and Steel Sorap
Ferroalloye
Ilangenese
amanita (30.50A Cr)
Pig Iron
Rem Steel
Rolled Produfte
1948-50
law6nto Tons
...~.~....ronwetwaserso
as+04..z :-.?,?? -.,
600000
600000
70?000
'1750000 .
3260000
350,000
-LA:.
4590T
700)00
709000
N.A.,,
59000.70000
89000
1859000
' 1750000 .
2009000
2209000
2359000
2509000'
2009000
2259000
2309000
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Soviet managers0slo have arrived in increasing =Where rime 19480 now
eontrol Rumania's four largest steel mdllso In 1950 the Soviet Control
Commissionreoeived about 60 percent of the total output of seraifinished
steel produote for shipment to the USSR and to the armament plants of
Czeohosiovakia?
2? EatimatetaelatZEI-.1:21M4-212E212r0
The goals *Tithe Five Year Plan were based uponAttioipated-imports of
_equipment from the USSR. Theip_shumals_husjaile4.4.-werberioliss.-1
Awl the Plan targets will not be reached, Production in 1962 win be sub.
stantially the same as in 1951?
Estimated Produotten of Farrow lista).*
1951-68
Thousand Uotria Tons
listallurgical Coke
. 'Iron Ore (30.60g Fe)
joatIlerrO 39;13.0y6
050
Chromite (30.60% Cr)
Pig Iron'
Raw Steel
Rolled kroducts
1961 and 1952
70
400
Ta.Zra.
623
76 NA?
9 IloAo
250 10000
276 10260
260 800
TA, "
700
Although large coal depoaits exists muoh of their output is unsuited to
the production of metallurgioal cokes and they prarvide only a small base fbr
expansion of the iron and steel industry? Irma ore reserves are estimated ,et
26 milliou metric tons and range in iron oontent from. 30 to 60 permeate but
exploitation has been go slag that Rumamia is not yet freed of dependence upon
import80 The chief iron ore deposits are located in the Banat0 Eastern
Transy1vania0 and ia the vioinities of Dente Apuseni0 Ehnedoara0 and Uhramureso
30 Domestic Resuirements0
Although little information ia.available on requirements, differences be.
lemon 1949 and 1950 are believed to be s1ight0 Estimates are based on tho
usual requirements of ran materials to produce pig iron and rag steel?
=25.
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Estimated Domestic. Requirements or Ferrous Details
1949.60
Uetrio Toni
1942. ant_
,
Uetallurgioal Coke 2004000 225,000
ron Ore 5604000 4004000
rap 1250000 1604000
erroalloys
Uangenese 11,A, 11440
Miscalls 11,4A II.A,
ne1ybdenum0 Nickel
Tungsten, and
Vanadiluabf
Pig Iron 1764000 2001000
Raw Steely
Rolled Pto =tell(
EtrriiriarraThil111 IUD=
.d( Dommstio produotion is supplemented by imports,
4.0 a22.q11213
Rumanian produotion of iron and steel products is too IVIT to permit
stookpiling, Domestio output o alloomm3ditie5 except manganese it be
supplemented by imports,
Surylus or Defictit3
'Rumania must import all of the ferrous metals needed tO maintain its iron
and steeltadustryi, sith the emption of manganese, Domestic produotion
ot
this or prebe'oly satisfies requirements and permits some surplus,' but no
taftormation is available as to the amount, Estimated deficits of metallurgical
col= or 1560000 metrio tons in 1950 and 1754000 tons in both 1951 and 19520
Defioits of iron ore are estimated at from 2600000 to 3004000 tons and 5004000
tonsorespective174 for the same periods, There are also deficiencies bf wrap
and raw steel* as well as of ohromite4 mo1ybdermm0 nickel? tungstens an4
vanadium* of vthiah only insignificant amounts are required,
60 Internal Limitations,
Ulning methods are primitives .and there is a need for modern techniques
and mechanised equipment, Installationi-and equipment of foundries and mills
are obsolescent and vrorn4 -Furthermore, competent managerial. and teohnical
personnel are lacking? Until large.soale improvements aremades there i11
be little advanee in production.,
cr,26a
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70 Tag1e=4222241.s.Ipazitions of llobilisation for Tiara
Fleeing the four largest 10441 mills under the nenagement of Soviet
speoialists nay result in a small increase in production, A change also nay
be expected is. the type of semifinished products produoeds with emphasis on
their usability in the *moment programer +be Soviet Blooa rom4 stool pro-
duct swill be *mailable for oonsuner ussa
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83 Nonferrous Wald?
Summary
The prinnipal nonfarm* motels produced =Rumania ere lead and sine,
copper production boingn?gitgibl Coppers. lead# and AI= aro produoed only
ao by-produott of the coneentration of gold and silver onto? (Gold and silver
will not be oonsidered in a paper oontined to industrial metalso) Copper
minerals are smelted into oopper mattes which is used to make copper eu1p1ate0
The possible mine produotion of recoverable copper in 1951.52 is from 800 to
800 metrio tons a yea.re atereas requirements are ootimeted et iron 69000 to
8,000 tons, Thus therevrill bo a defioit of from 5,400 te /0200 tons a Year?
Assuming that tbo tina smelter at Copse-Uloa hut been built and is
operating, zinc and lead produotion in 1951 and 1962 is ostimated at from
49000 to 70000 metrio tons of load and 11=139000 to 43600 tons of sine a
year, Botimatel requiromonts for lead.aad sino are from. 40000 to 89000 to
eacih annua11y0 and Rumania io expoqted to be self-sufficient in lead by 1952,
But requirements tar sin* foreshadow a deficit of from 19000 to 1a500 tonal
Ream reserves of copper, lead, and tioo ores aro not 16402 This is
probably tho.most important factor limiting produotion of these motils, 4
nonfarm* metalo (wahine formed =January 1950 apparently is oonsolidsting
operations of all the principal mites produoing copper, lead* and stimbe
InsteXlations and workers evidently ambelog transferred to these mines from
other mines in a, vigorous effort to lacrosse produotion of coppers lead, and
AMOz Under.tho Five Year Plan, flotation plants are to be built for treatment
of those complos ors**
The quaiity and quantity of nontormas minerals aveilable in Rumania
are not of aufftoient importance to add significantly to the etrongth. of the
Soviet B1oo0 and Rumanian induetrial require:m*6ft tor suohndnerale arm ?
nsg1igib1e0
1, Copper?
ea Production?
Produobion of copper is negligible, being estimated qt about 520 metric)
on in 1947# the latost year for which figures are available, 11 Output csow-
mists only of coppor minerals recovered as a by.produot fromtbo conaaubmdlon
of gold and silver ores ? These are smoltsd into copper mattes wbieh is uged
to make copper sulfato, Copper metal im not produoed =Rumania,
0. 28
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?
b, Estimated Possible Produotkan and C aap joa. t?
The Five Year Plan oontemplates that through "the development of exist.
ing mines and the opening of new Zama* the produetion of Goppar, lead, and
eine ores in 1966 will be 263 pervent of 1950 ouliput411
Possible mune production of reacraerable oopper in the 1951.62 period
is estimated at from 600 to 800 =stria torus a year. Capitol* of all processing
plant* does not emceed 2.700 tone of copper a year, y
Op poreetio Its.Wrementil?
Current inibreation on requirements a oopper is leaking, but in 1947
it vas reported that annual eoneumption wee between 6,000 to 7,000 metric) tons
tons The requirements for the 1951.52 period are estimated at from 6,000
to 8l , tens a year, Information on stoukpilea i laoking, and the annual.
defiolt for 1950.62 is eatimated at from 5,440 to 7,200 tons,
inter_nal Limitations,
The major Limitation to the produotion of copper In Rumuria is the
shortage a ave.ilable oopper ore, Nearly- an of the oopper presently pro-
du.oed is a by-product of gold end silver caning, There is one known oopper
deposit, "Alton Top." looted in the northern part of Tuloes near the Bleak
Se8,0 but it is not known whiet.her this deposit is being worked, liew mine*
oontaining SO= 4000000 metrics tone of from 3 to 6 percent oopper Ore wore
uncovered in 1939,
so Trends.-Inoludin.g Indications of Ibbilization for Wars.
The transfer of workera end equipment from other metal mines to oopper,
lead, and sine Mines indioatee vigorous efibrbs to Inert:ASO the production of
nonferrous metals, A nen nonferrous metale oombize.. formed in January 1960,
reportedly has spent 400 million lei for now mine equipmenta prinoipa14 poor.
quality machinerr from tbo Soviet %AMU Under the Five Year Plan, nine
flotation plants are to be built to prooess ores containing copper, lead, and
sins,
23 Lead and Zino,
ao Produotion.
The procketion of lead and eine in Rumania is a ter.produot .of certain
gold and silver mining enterprises in the Gauntry, Production in 1947 VOX
3,316 metric tone of lead end 2,247 Metric, tons of sine.* y In the ease of sino
it is not Icnown whether 'this figure represent? eine me metal content of ?
sine coneentrates, A sin* palter with a ?opacity of from 6,000 to 9,000 tone
of concentrates annue.1.1$3/ was to have boon vonstruoted at Copeampioa before
World Tier II, but it Is not knows whether it was completed., The principal mines
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which produce lead and sine are the Bells, ndne of the Phoenlipor Bata.Uhref,
Company and the Baia SprieD Capnics and baiut =thee.
b4 Estimated Possible Produotion and Capacity.
(1) Production.
Estimates based on the output and eapecity before Tlorld Tier II
indicate that annual production of lead and sine in 1951.52 ray be from 4s000
to T,OCOmetrio tons of lead and 3,000 to 4,500 tons of zinc (provided the
sine molter at Copse-Moe has been, built and put into operation). Rumania
is expeoted ta be nelf.suffiolent in lead in, 19520
(2)ii2...1Aae*
(a) Icad.
There are three lead smelters in Rummies all oonnected
with important olvemioal =tikes but intonation regarding their capacity differs*
Capanily muy vary from 8,000 to 8,000 =trio tons of lead a year for the 1951.
52 period*
(b) gine.
Information is leaking on the zino smelter Phichwas reported
to te under oonstruation in 1939 at Gopsa.Uica. If this snelter were coMpletea.
and put into operation at the proposed eapacity of from 80000 to 9000 metric
tots or concentrates ayeari) Rumania's zinc netaly output could be Pons'
3000 to 4,500 tone a. year during 1951 and 1952.
? Dcweirbie Requirements.
Before World War IIs RumanWapparentlywasiself.sufficient
In load but had no surplus for export. In threat-me peried, Rumania exported
all of itm production of zinc concentrates and imported =average of about
4,300 metric tons or slab zinc a yearelif
Eetimated domestio requirements of lead and zinc for the.
.1948.52 period are front44000 to 80000 metric) tons a year each* Although
Rum:lion lead pioduotion sill probably satisfy requirenents by 1952, requir*.
ments tor sine indicate a defioit of Prim 10000 to 19500 tons* Information
on stookpiling is leaking*
d* Intercal Limitations*
Lting faatore in the produotion of lead and sine are a shortage of
rasnaterials, teohnical personnels -and equipment* The 'Shortage of tier ma.
rials -arra probably be t] nost important limiting faster* A recent report
indicates that the eonferroun motels oombine has enemmabered difficulties
emus? the development of less pronising deposits has been =gloated, and the
rioh ?realms exhausted in September 19500
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Zrands...-IncludIns Indications of MeMbkal for War.
Information g indicates that the principal gold mines producing
copper* lead* and zinc as ty--Trodacts have been consolidated under a non-
ferrous metals combine and that all gold Imes not producing these nen.
ferrous minerals have been closed down. Installations and workers from
the latter are being transferred to those mines and mills shit& produee
nonferrous by-products. This auggeste future increases in the production
of lead and sine*
3. 9thes Nonferrous Metae.
The production of other nonferrous metals in Rumania is =important*
and requirements for tin, aluminum or antimony either are supplied by
the USSR or other seteutte countries or are imported frac outside the
Soviet Bloc. According to the International Tin Study Group* RTENIMit
in 1949 imported 355 long tons of tin from Malaya and 25 low tons fran
the Netherlands* it in 1950 only 100 law tons were imported tree Malaya*
31
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Co Coalo
SEX2tET ?
Surinam
Rumania is self-sufTicient tufa typea of opal exoept those suitable for
coking. Produation in 1948 vas 2.61millionmetrio tongs in 19490 208 million
tons; and in 1950, approximately 3 million tons. The planned inorease for
1951 over 1960 is 26.9 peroents and the 1955 target is 805 million tons but
neither of these targets is expeeted to be attainedo It Is estimated that
produotion 1.n 1962 will not exesed 4 million tout. Produetion in 1949 on
misted of 7103 pecoent brawn ooal, 2109 percent lignite, 505 pereent bituminoua
eoals and 14 peroent anthracite. About 85 percent of the brawn coal is produced
in the Petrossai area. It is estimated that 150,000 nutria toes of metal..
lurgioal ooke and at least 50.,000 tons of coking wait/ere imported in 1950
to meet Rumanian deficienoiee. Approximately 200,000 tans of coke and 50,000
tons a ooking Goal will have to be imported in 1952. Domestic production of
metallurgioal ooks is about 70,000 tans annually*
Railroads oonsume 60 peroent or more of the total output (mostly brwan
coal -and lignite), and pomer plants take approximately 18 percent) rlearly all
of the bituminous *coal and =oh of the anthracite are used by the iron and
steel plant at Recite.. Allocations for heating probably amount to around
200,000 metric tans, or 7 percent ot total output, and the remainder 30 used
:by 'various industries)
Produotiono.
Coal is not nearly so important infix+ produation of awry/ in Rumania as
in other oonntriee of the Soviet Orbit, beoause of the availability of large
deposits a petroleum and natural gas. Coal production in 1948 was 2.6 million
metric tOnsils or about 15,000 tone less than in 1940* The 1940 output of
2.8 milliontona consisted of brawn coal, 7103 peroent; 1igatte0 21.9 percents
bituminous coals 66 percent; and anthraoite, 1.4perdent. .2./ Total production
for1950is estimated at 3 millionmetrio tonso 1 All of the mime, with the
exception of those in southern Ehnedoara produeing brown coals are small.,
ao Brown Coalo
Rumania's mal reserves consist mostly of brawn opal, *doh is of
better quality than ,ordinary lignite and osa be tUrther improvellwiwashingo
The principal produotion id in the vioinities of Pertrila, Petrosani, Aninoasa,
and Lupeni in the au's:Talley field in the mouthern part of BUnedoara Province.
This area in 1947 produced 104:million matrix: tons& or 87 percent of the gu/t?
put of brawn ooal and 6307 percent of the total Rumanian output of coal* N?
The sesond most important area is in the vicinity of Asau and Camanesti in
num Provinces her the combined output of several mines was 1430150 metric
tons in 19470 or about 806 percent of the produotion of brawn coa10 Third in.
fili) 32 se
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Importanoe is the coal field lying west andnorthweet of 014 in Cluj Provinee,
where there are mines in the vicinity of Agbiresult, Titu, Deno, and Begun..
These mines in 1947 produced 48,811 tons. Met at t1 telexes of produotion
oomee fromithe eastern part of Salaj Province, nbereas;Tihau (ollocated) and
Lbbolia in Cams Provinoe make insignifioant additione.
b. ,Ligni,e!,
Licnite prodaettom is soettered in t dozen different provinces but':
the fmar provinpes of Lbseol, Bambara** Bnnedoara, and Prahovo accounted in
1947 for nearly 80 pereont of total Rumanian lignite produstion'ot 448,729
metrio tons, The main producing area is the basin south of Oampulung in Liumel
Prdvinoe, nhiob.prodused about 126,000 tons in 1947. None of the other pro-
vinces. produoed as much as 100,000 tone..
0. Bituminous Coal.
The entire produotion of bituminous ooal comets from Carla Provincse in.
eouthaestern. Rumania and Brasov Provinee in *antral Rumania. Production in
1947 vas 139,374 metrio tons. The Anima Doman, and Seoul mines in Cares
Province g000unted for 76 pereent of the total tonnage, the ludas mine alone
farnisbing sliglatkirxrare thaa 50 peraento It The Mines at Codlea and Vuloan
In. Brasov ProVince furnished only 20,8/3 tans, or about 18 peroent Of
total production, the balanne omming from& fee -very $mall manse.
117 Anthraoite.
Before World 17ar II the produetion of anthraoits vas lose then 4000
metric tone amdally, all frmn the Sobel% (Schott) mine in Oorj Province. It
is reported .6.1 that in 1947 production was 4,117 tons from the?Soheia mine
and 19,882 tons from tbe Baia Ndua Mine (at Eibenthal near the Dandbe Rivek
in Cares Provinee).
2. Estinisted Possible Proauotion and CaPaoitra
Plan goals for coal output have not been. met in rpoent years* The goal
for 1960 nes approximately 3.1 million metrio tons 1.6 and output fell short
by an estimated 126,000 tons, In 1960, new lignite mines were opened in the
vioinities of Allfer.Biosad sand Paiete de Sus in Baia Uare Provinoe. Pro.
ductionvas.carried,onby primitive methods, but installation of mein= equip..
ment vas plannad.,2/ other lignite mime Isere being opened in stuttered lo,.
The oaal target for 1961 .ie an increase ot 25 peroent over 1960, I/ or. ?
a total'oftabout 3.8 million metrics tona, but this figure is unlikely to be
attained. In the ftrut quarter of 19516 output -was 98,1 peroent of Planned
output. 10/ 1h is estimated that Rumania /81U produce 3.6 million tons of.
Goa/ in T51 and 4 million tons tn 1962. Anoording to the plan for 19549
prodhation is to read* 865 million tons, 11, and lignite output in partied-
leirmriLl be oonsiderably expanded.
33 0.
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$6 Domti ..........._3.iterame
a.6 Railroads4
Coal oonsturiptionby.the rallroade is 60 peroent of total production,
In 1946 the USSR supplied the railroods with000 metric' tone of 40810
probably bituminma, and 30000 tons of coke* 12 Requirements are estimated
at 146 million tons in both 1948 an 1949# 10 million,tone in 19500 and 2e2 .
million tons in 19526
b6 .Electric Power*
Power plants ars the sectondmajor consamer of c)a16 About 19e8 per-
oent of the output of eleOtrio energy was produoed from ooal. in 19500X and
oonsumption is estimated at 5350000 metric tonne Only 150,000 tone o ggite
were used, but new thermal stetio3s9 in ths plennieg stage or titular corstruetion9
wall erectly loaresas the uce ur lignite for power prodeotion4 Aocording to
the plim tor 19560 power plants ate to) =Sumo 342 vilIionmetrio tons of
1igaite0 afbut this will depend upon the template= of the planned powe.c.
ftoi1itie80 It is probable that mot of the increases in power output estimated
for 1951 and 1962 will be obtained ftais lignite, Coal reqairements by power .
stations are estimated at 1 millimtone i. 19520about? 25 ,percent of total cool
prodution ai oomposed with about 18 peroent ,41 total proluotion in 1950-
c* Iron, apd Steel Industrz*
Trobsibly at least 80 peroant of the bituminmts coal produetion sad 00126
of the anthracite is going to the iron end stool works at Recite* Nevertheles89
domostio euppltee have been inadequate, and it ha a been neaeasary to import
ooking coal, local produotionrerrtedly being confined to only on Mines lo-
cated et Seou10 In addition* metallurgical wke must be imported* eine
Rumanian produotion apparently motet* only about one-third of the elountty'are
quiremente* Poland sup lied 300000 metrio tone of coal and 359000 tons of coke
to Romania in 1949, )f Czechoslovakia screed to supply 250000 tons of ooke
for foundry u? and N9000 tons for blast lUsneoes in the game year, 2.1/
?
It it estimeled that in. 1900 the iron And steel industgy required
.185*000 metrio tons of ?Cal, mainly. for ooking purposes, and 2200000 tons of
metallurgioel oaks for blast fUrnace00 At least 509000 tone of coal and
150,000 tone of ooke had to be imported By 19529 Rumania will probably have
to import 200,000 tons of coke but may need pa sore coal imports than it does
at presente Produotion of metallurgical coke in 1952 ie expected to be 700000
mstrio tone, tbe same as in 19609 which would require approximately 1000000 tons
of male The balance of the oottl used by the iron and stool plants is consumed
mainly in the produotim of gas and *teamo
do Other Induetries*
The bulk of the oval used by "ariotte other industries is in the form of
briquettes produoed from brown ooal edned in the Jiu Valley., Requirements are
ec, 34 0.
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estimated at 2750000 metrio tons in 1.948 and 1949,0 3000000 tons in 19500 and
380,000 tons in 19526
So Domestic Destine
Allocations of ooal for heating in homes and buildings are probably
About 2000000 metric tons annually at present* Ten percent of the 1947 pro.
duotionfrcethe Jiu Valleyor about 145,000 tons reportedly went for house.
hold heating. 40. Additional quantities of lignite probably increased total
oonsumptLon in t year to 1760000 tone or more?
40 Stookpi1ew0
Coal stooks cannot be largel,because brown coal and lignite are unsuited to
prolonged storage, and the better types of ooal are in short &apply. Some
dioation of the miss of stooks is found in &report of July 1948 which stated
that the railroads were able to aommulate about 1200000 metric' tons because
the mild winter of 1947.48 reduoed oonsumptionoaa( It is probable that in
a normal winter muoh lase than a manth's requirements are on hand? Stookpiles
at the end of 1950 are estimated at only 150,000 tons and represent for the
most part 'working inventories?
50 Surplue or Deficit*
Aamhough the quantities involved are relatively small, Rumania must impori
about two-tbirds of its requirements of metallurgical ooke and most of its
coking ooa10 It is estimated that 150,000 metric to of metallurgical ooke
and at leaat 500000 tons of edam coal WekrO imported in 1950 and that by 1952 im
porta will, be 200,000 tons and 500000 tons, respectively?
? 55
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SWIM
NetImated Rumanian Availability and Requirements of Coal
1948-50 and 1952
tym41*Mi4t __
Production
Anthracite
Bituminous
Brown
Lignite
Total
.
453 12/
tidals 112/
Moment listrie Topa
1242. 1222. 222
35
hO
50
151
165
200
1,972
2,115
2,650
605
675
1,100
Lala
L221
ital&Q
Stocks
(as of 1 Zan)
100
200
biPor
204
30
Subtotal
2a221
314=
Exports
0
0
Stocks
(as of 31 Dee)
200
175
Total Availability
Requiramenta
Railroads
1,700
1,700
Electric Paver
410
480
Iron and Steel IndUstry
150
260
Other Industries
(including Briquetting)
275
275
Domestic Beating
200
203
Total Requirements
Zan
Zeal
275
50
Jam
150
50
Zia=
0
?0
250
150
AsS122
1,850
2,200
535
1,050
185
210
300
200
1422
350
240
/an
6. Warne]. Litktatitaa.
Lack of domestic eupplies compels Rumania to import coke and coking coalo
Coking coal reportedly is produced in only one nine, located at Seoul. The
mansfaeture of equipment far the coal industry is apparently confined to one
plant in Petrosanl? mhidh doubtless can provide only a limited number of the
items required and probably serves principally as a neehine repair basso It
is necessary to import most machinery and tools* The mines in the important
Petrosani-Petri1a4upien area are reported to be modern by Romani= standards,
and considerable new, equipment has been installed since the ear. Little
electrical machinery is used underground, but pneumatic picks are employed to
a large extent for digging coal, and the main haulage is done by compressed
MC=
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air l000motives. In 1948 the Petrosant minas were reported&to be working
two 12.hmer5hitts, and the labor forgo included samevmmen, which say indioate
a shortage of ltbor.
70 Trearlizto Indioatiora t Ibbilisatton l'or Ware
Coal produetion has inoreased cradually sines World Tier II, and it is planned
that by 1965 production will ree.oh 8.5 million =trio tons, or about 285 percent
of the estimated 1960 output. A tenfold inoree.sa in the produotion of metal.
lurgioal coke, now about 70,000 tons a year, is planned ibr 1966. Power plants
in 1956 are to Gomm 5,2 adllion tons of lignite, as oompared with only
160,000 t0121 in 1960. A number of not lignite =Ines were opened in MO, and
plans ibr moo3hanising these operations etre under way. Some diffioulties vill
bii encountered, prilioipally in obtaining sufficient equipaent, so that production
probably will not be as high as intended. On the other hand, it is equally un-
likely that coal requirements will mach the level oontemplated in the plan,
and to this eztent failure to attain objeotives for coal production will not
handicap the Rumanian eacnorgy.
The ambitious program to increase ooal and coke production cannot be judged
an indioation of war prepare.tiona, tut when considered in the total, context of
Vs. Five Year Plan, it does portend an acoelerated rItt. of industrialisation.
which Mulct add materially to the Soviet war potential if obJeetivess were
aocolplished. These objectives, however, seen to be beyond Rumanian capabilities,
37 Ca
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D, Petroleum,
Summax7
Rumania is the largest Satellite Mine of petroleum and petroleum
produats available to the Soviet Unions In 1950 an estimated 408 million
metric tons of orude oil were produeeds and it is probable that despite
continued use of uneoonemic methods crude.oil output will rise to 4,8 million
in 1951 and 5.0 million in 1952. Teohnioal deficiencies are a barrier
more rapid gains*
Rumanian refinery oapatlityiunder the impact a war damage deterioration
of equipments and oannlbalizations dropped from la, prewar figure in excess ef
10 million metric tans a, year to approximately() million tone? Rumania, recently
has had difficulty in obtaining repair and replaoement eqeipment from the tra-
ditional souxees it. theUest0 and the Soviet Union.hae partially supplied these
requirements, The output of the refineries is generally of poor qeality, For
exanples aviation gasoline is 72-ootanee and the lubrioants are of only medium
grade It is reported that all thermal ?racking faoilities have abut damn,
The output of refined products ia estimated at 4 million metric tans in 19500
40175 million tons in 19510 and 4035 million tons in 19520 Of these amounts0
72-octane aviation gasoline will at:count for about 110,0000 1150000 and
.1200000 tons. respectively,
Domeatio consumption in 1950 was about 8900000 metrics tons* approximately.
50 percent of prewar consumption. A slight increase in domestic) consumption in
1951 and 1952 may be registered in the military category* Civilian consumption
will remain restrioted to a minimum,
The Urge surplus of Rumanianpetroleumproducts brings little benefit
to the oountry. nest of the output is exported to the USSR* mith smaller
quantities going to the other Satellites, and only about 20 peroent of total
production is oonsemed internally, The loss of this @aurae of petreleumpro.
ducts mould be a serious blow to the B1oo0
10 Production,
Not only is petroleum Bumanials basic) indestry, but Rum m
Rumania is the oat
fi'mportant oil produoer in Europe with the exception of the Soviet Unioe. Over
95 percent of Rumanian oil production its concentrated around Ploesti0 Despite
strenuoui efforts* however, the petroleum industry has not met Plan goals.
Annual increases in produotion since the war are beooming progressively smaller,
Crude-oil production in 1950 was estimated at 406 million tons. V ot1y.53
percent of the 1936 peak:production of 8,7 million tons*
40 3/1
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Refining aapaeity& conoentrated aeound P1oaeti0 has elways been :etch larger
than the amount of orude oil available, Prooeasing twilit-tea were estimated to
here ar. original capacity in emcees of 10 million tonsannually;1231 Present
ospaeity& reduoed by bomb damage& dismantling& eannibalisationl deterioration
of equipment& probably does not exeeed 6 million tons& a total still in sxceas
of orude production. Only five of the refineries have thermal tweaking re-
alities, and these facilities were shut down in.JUne 19601 Since the olose
of World Vier II & at least 7 of the 16 most important refine es ham* been ?lewd&
AI reportedly beeause of insufficient supplies of *rude oil end the poor con.
L
_ tion of equipment, In 1950 the estimated output of the operating refineries
was as follows Ys
Estimated Produation of Petroleum Products
1950
Thousand Lbtrio Tons
Produnt
Production.
Aviation Gaeoline
110
Ibtor Gasoline
878
Xprosene
508
Diesel Oil
628
Llaaut
1
108
Fuel Oil and Distillates
438
laricante
12
Resideals
92
Othees
230
Totel
Avietton
produefid are of madiumquality,
,
4090_
gaeolinn le atraight runetth an ootane number of 72, The lubricant's
2, la_stAiLte.P...dolailatEry_tun_and_Cg....SEaei,
The 1951 crude-oil produotien goal ia 116,7 peraent of 1950 output& or about
5.3 millionmertree tens 0V Under the Five Year Plan the seal for 1955 is
10 millron tons," Both appear unrealistic beeauee of the premature exhaustion
og existing fiel and the Allure to unoover new deposits? It la likely that
by forcing the existing field output can bo immreased to an estimated 4.8 millior
million metric: tons in 1951 and 5 million tons in 1952,
Despite recent efforts to obtain replaoement and repair equipment and re.
ported pleas to oonstruot new refineries&-notably two installations in UOldavia
(one a creaking plant)p .?0 is doubtful that the actual pattern of refiner
output will vary =oh in 51 and 1952, The following table is based an this
aasumption..
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Estimated Produotion of Petroleum Produots
1951.52
Preduet
....If"
Prodwotion
198]. --
40.0.......summloilalloft,
.......
Aviation Gasoline
115
120
Ubtor Gasoline
915
953
Kerosene
530
550
Diesel Oil
655
663
Ulm.*
.
14456
14205
Axel Oil end Distillates
455
474
LUbrioants
13
13
Residual,
95
100
Others
242
252
? Total
4 350
33 12a2tiga.:.........teE111.*
07.1 .is the principal source of fuel for industrial and civilian .1441. The
stringent -restrictions on domostio requiroments nocessitated by Soviet eaa
ploitation of the oil industry are impeding the development of tha Rumailan.
econow4r, Shortages of gasoline9 keromes and fuel oil have been reporteds
and estimated domestics oonsumption in 1950 was only about 50 percent-of.prewar
Consumptim in 1950 is shown in the following table by produot and class
or oonstuner;
Consumption of Petroleum Products
1950
Thousand Metrics Tons
Produot
Civilian.
Illitary
Total
Aviation Gasoline
2
11
L3
Motor Gasoline
52
136
188
Kerosene
111
111
Diesel Oil
161
76
237
F4e1 Oil
274
16
290
LUbricante
11
21
32
Others
19
Total
030.-
260
800
Ths principal oonsumers in the oivilian categdry were industry* 35 peroent;
transports 27 percont; shipping? 19 percent; and nett.: tranzports
agricoultures households end air transports 9 peroent* Civilian allooations
are not likely to increase in the next few yearesbut Jai:vases in military
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requiroments are expeotedo By the end of 1952w dorestic uonsumption mar reaah
about 1 million metrie tonso
40 8tILV1221*
Permanent storage facilities in Rumania are extensive* Capacity of the
principal depots is estimated as fellyso
Storage Capacity
Thousmi 'Istria Tons
Location *
..21MAG
Crude Oil at Oilfields
660
Refined Products at Refineries
18639 -
Unitary
106
Total AAA
In, addition.'tbere are a nuMber of depots at airfields8 old depots are being'
expanded8 and new faellities are under construction. Nevert1e1ess0 barrels
were reportedly collected in the spring of 1960 by the Uiniatry of Defense to:
oil sterageea() There is no information permitting an estimate af the
quantities stoo iled. Shortages of gasolines kerosene, and fuel oil ova be
explained in part by efforts to increase stookao
50 S112...M....... 02 t;fieit0
Rumaniao the largest oil produoer among the Satellites, has a large sur.
plus of petroleum products,' All of the crude oil produced is donestioally re'a
? tined, and the exoess produots are exported 8 chiefly to the ussn, Rumania's
only deficiencies ars high.octane gasoline and aviation 1ubricants8 Which are
imported trot the Soviet Union in unknown amounts()
The Nstimated surplus in 1960 is them in the table belowg
Petroleum Produot Surplusee and Defioits
1960
Thousand Ustric Tons
Product
Outpu
Consumption
Surplus
Defioit
011106.3101?1111101111111V
Aviation Gasoline
110
13
97
Deter Gasoline
876
191
686
Kerosene
608
111
397
Diesel Oil
628
234
394
Fuel Oil and Distillates
436
290
146
Wbrioants
12
32
20
Lasut
18108
18104
Other
322
19
303
Total
-1946Q9
890
41200
20
=111?11
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SOMA of the surplus for the past tew years has been, used to build stooks
Possibly 5000000 metrio tone were shipped in 1950 to other Satellites and to
Finlandp vd.th small quantities going to Western Europe and Israel. These shipu
nents were mostly motor gasoline and lUbrioants. All of the surplus of marat1V
and fuel oil is shipped to the USSR. Considerable quantities of aviation gaso-
line. motor gasoline, kerosene and diesel oil also are taken by the Soviet Union0
60 Internal Limitations.
The ohief limitation on the Rumanian petroleum industry is the wasteful
method of exploitation by the Soviete. who show little oonsideration for the
future of the Rumanian econenve ftrthermore, shipments of drilling equipment
lase been out aft by the West ani only lted suppliet have been obtained from
Czeohoslovakia and the USSR, Some of the refineries damaged in World Tlar II
have not been reactivated. Equipment iz wearing outs and repair and replacement
supplies are soaroe. It is possible that the condition, of the refineries would
preclude inereased operation even if more crude oil were available? A large
number of experts and technical personnel have left the oountry, and same of .
those Who remained havw been imprisoned or replseed. None of the refineries
haa been modernized.
as 42 as
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70 Trends.Ino1ild4rg Indications of Lbbiligation for Taro
Although Soviet efforts appear to be shifting from the intensive exploitation
of old eilfialds to the disoovery of new ones and to oonstivuotion of additional
refinery ao.paeitra the extent and progress of this trend are unknowns
Rumanian Crude Oil Produetion
1960
,Thousand Lletric Tons
Drilling District
amtilt
Ploesti Area
UUntenia
Ur
33104
Boidasti
33907
Campine
13008
Buiaoi
76407
Lbreni
44606
Targoviste
45106
0ohluri
41300
Sovrompetrol il
4547.0
Tots10 Ploesti Area
424 7
9602
Berea (Buss.u)
11203
24
Bacau 2:1/
6300
14
Total
110.24
42( No breakdown by drilling distriat is
100.0
?xessasani:".
available*
Sovrompetrol produced an estimated 170000 metric tons' 1.173.dav3a
about 460000 meal? tone
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Estimated Annual Capacity of Printlipal numanian
Operating nefineries.s(
Thousand Detrio Tons
Refiner'
Location
Crude
Distillation
Thermal
Crooking b/
Total
ConsordisArega
Ploesti
19000
193
19193
BomanagAmerioana
Teleajen
750
279
1$029
Stesna.nommia
Campine
800
.
800
Oreditual Lanier
Brasi
275
106
363
Astxa Pomona
Ploesti
1s650
495
4145
Golobbia
Ploesti
500
216
718
Total
4014
w wwww
141,29),
80o68,
?????????...".?
XIDA an on oapao II WS a Sep 0? a I on ?
refineries listed there may be a few small ones operating, but they are
unimportant,
l Thermal creaking faoilities have been reported *closed? There are no
catalytio.oraoking units,
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E. Electrio Power.
SummarY
Rumania's eleotrictity requiremwnte are smalls and the produ,tion of
electrio power is now and will remain sUffioient to meet those demon& and
provide a limited amount for export to Bulgaria. Industrial plants and mine
consume nearly two.thirds of the total output*
Although production doubled from 1942 te 1060, the inorease was aohieved
through fuller utilisation of existing eapaoity rather than by adding new fa.
oilities. The current expansion prograr stresses greater UBO of lignites whioh
now ranks behind gas aud petroleum among the energy sources of .the industry.
The expansion procram is dependent upon imports of teohnicians and equipments
and it is not expected that the high capacity and production targets set for
1955 and 1960 Will be reaohed.
Econoric Importanoe of the Industiz.
Most of the elctrie power produoed in Rumania is consumed by industry*
Sinoe the economy is relatively undeveloped' lxvwevers industrial requirements
for electric' power are small. The growing proportion of marufaotured goods Or
total Rumanian output :lakes electric power inOreasingly important to the
scone:gr. Nonindustrial use is negAigible, only 25 percent of the population
being served by elootrie power0.1(
2. PreardPrwanEmtTrendsandDcrrelots.
Eleotrio power +capacity is still about the same as in 19420 but output has.
-
more than doubled sines World War II. Over half of the thermal *opacity uti-
lises; methane gas and coal for fuel. Power plants in the Buoharest and Ploesti
area depend upon petroleums and supplies are not equal to demand. Available
fuel supplies are limited, and neither rationing of fUel nor partial con.
version of power plants to the use of gas his waved the problem of fueling the
eleotric power industry.
The principal goal of the Ten Year Eleotrifieation Plan (1950.60) is an
inorease in oapaoity of about 1 million kilowatt* by 1956 and a further in-
areal. of 1 million kilowatts by 1961C:102.ot Produotion is to be rore than doubled
in the same period. Although it is ly that capacity and production will
inerease as fast as soheduleds the industry oan expand sufficiently to meet
reqt.draments through 1952. Pixel supply may remain& problems particularly if
other domande for oil and gas increase, immune the industry cannot quiokly
convert to other fUels.
Thm greatest concentration of generating capaclity is in the Bucharest.
Targoviste.Ploesti areas where possibly is maoh as 40 percent of total Rumanian
capaeityls coneentrated. The Stalin (Drascov)0 Turbo., Tarnavenis Petrosanis
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Reoitas and GalateaBrailt areas are the other principal power centers to?
gather oomprising an additional 40 peroent of the total' Some of these areas
naw have a surplus oapactity and ean expand productiaawithout additionn. It
appears that the installation of new eapaoity is following the same locational
pattern as in the pasts with the exception of hydroeleatrio faoilitiess whiah
pre being built in the northwest.
30 Internal Limitations,
!n. ozriog
Petroleums gas* and lignite are the principal souroes of energy for
the produotion of eleotrio power in Rumania, The three regions of P1oagti0
Transylvanik and the JitiValley0 Titer, large quantities of oil* gassand lignite
are found* are also the areas of greatest oonaentration of electric power in.
stallatione0 &mime of postwar diffioulties ir petroleumproduotions there
is a etrong tendenay to limit tin of oil in power plants* and gas and lignite
are being utilised at a higher rate, For examples twice as muoh gas was used
in 1980 as in 1948031/the increase ooming through greater utilisation of gas-
isonsuning generating oapacity already in existence rather than through the
addition of new unite, Potential fuel resources for power plants are exo
tensiVes and present supply shortages are only temporaz70 Rumania is well
endowed with water resource's for power generation.' Thebrdroelootrie power
potential has been estimated at 5.1 million kilowatts* f but only 1 percent
of the total le developed* 'Rumanians streams are widely dispersed* permitting
bydroeleatric development in lament every area of .the oountry and radiating the
need for transmitting power and fuel over long distances.,
b0 Electrioitz Generating Plants.
About 600,000 kilowatts of capacity are now available for meeting power
requirements. IV This capaoity in principally thermals hydroelectric, units.
'oompriming about B percent of the total.. The proportion of thermal capaoity
using various types of fUels is not accurately ]mown s but production in 1950
trri all energy sources? is .estimated as follows
Use of Energy Sources in Eleutria Power Production
1950
Ener Souroe
Peroent
,????????????????110?0
Natural Gas
4063
Oil Products
2908
Iligharade Coal
6,1
low.grade Goal and Ilaste
1307
Other Fuels' .
201
Water Power
860
Total 10000
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NO further inorease in the USIP of gas in power plants is planned and lignite.
burning and hydroelectric plants probably will produce an increasing proportion
of the total power output?
The Ten Vier ElootrifiOatien Plan eevisages the installation by 1955
of au additional 960,000 kilowatts of oapaoity0 as well as the operation of
100,000 kilowatts of equipment now idle. (Over half of Rumeniate generating
equipment is more than 20 years old but is still servioeableo) Bydroeleotric
capacity in to be expanded to & point where it would constitute 1705 peroent of
total capacity? The eleetrification telegram, is to reoeive 1140 percent of all
investment funds allocated between 1950 and 19550Y The present rate of eon..
struetien0 however, will add only 50,000 kilowatts of oapaeity by the end of
19520 At aey rats* the Ten, Year Plan palsy even if aohieved, will be justified
only if Rumania builds up industries that are large users of eleotrio power0
;niche& prooessing of nonfetreas metals0 eleetrie metallurgy, chemicals& and
eleotrio railroads?
CD 112vallgeLEWEsto
lemmata lacks national or regional transmission networks, little effort
being made to link ooneuming *enters and power generation arose to obtain
greaterutilizati.on of existing oapaoltyo The pattern has been to provide
each oonsuming center with its own power plant, Power plants between Buoharest
and Stalin (Brasov) are loosely linked, Although work is being oarried on to
improve and extend the transmission lines particularly in the area of
Tarcoviste and Stalin (Brasov), little ha: bean aocomplished since the ware
A 60.kilovolt lino fr.= the Bucharest area to Giurgiu for the transmission, of
power to Bulgari& was completed in 19494
Produotiono
The following table gives figures fer pasta present& and planned produottea
of power .2/1:
Produotion of Electric Power
19384 19500 19550 1960
Milieu Kilmatt Beurs
lam
Thermalelootrio
2dugsk_eootri
JNIAA
3.938
10003
145
1,148
1950
14940
160
2,100
1955
50690
760
4,350
1960
44660
2,340
78000
The oondition of the generating and transpiasion equipment is =oh that the
average rate of utilisation of aapaoity probably will not be more thee 48000
hours a years or about 46 percent of full utilization, Production in 1952 may
oo 4,7 oo
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reach 2,7 billion kilowatt-hours, if?eresont evocity is incroasod by putting_
info operation some of the equipmont nao idle, by adding 50,000 kilowatts of
neo generating equipmenti and by operating the total at a rate of 4,000 hours,
Looting the 1955 production goal mould require tha installation of large
amounts of now capacity, which is not likely to be done
b* ammakia:
The following is the consumption pattern according to the Tao Year
Electrification flanyt
Electric cower Consumption
1950 and .96O
10 ono op 01.01...11m.????????????
?
1950
of Total
rilliop..Kilornktt Hours
Constueer Consumption'
1960
Consumptica7-7g of Total
Industrial Plantt
and uinea
10310
62,2
4,330
61,6
Electric Traotion
2
0.1
330
43%
Urban vublic Servtoes
Street Lighting
70
ZOO
Streetoars and OU0Sed
80
200
14ater Supply) eta,
40
320
Total Urban
Publio Services
190
940
520
704
Urban Uousoholds and Firms
220
10.4
750
10,7
Rural. Communities
20
1,0
230
333
Losaes and iTivate Use
or fower "Jaants
358
1743
870
12,3
Total
2,100
:awn=
100.0
7,030
10000
1.1???????
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60 Int Requirements.
Rumania has sufficient manpower, fuel, oporating supplies, and repair
facilities to enable the countrY to maintain both existing electrical generating
and transmission equipment and any small additional amounts that may be In.
stalled. Largeftecale expansion. of electric) power capacity, however, would
require imports of teohnioians and almost all types of electrioal equipment.
Soviet Blocengineets are nmrt supervising the construotion of hydroelectric)
plants, but the Rumanians themselves can construct thermal stations, except
for the installation of foreign equipment.
7. tulnerabilitr.
Rumania is self.sufficient in equipmentIsupplios, and teohnological skill
Leoded to maintain or slightly increase output of electricity9 and theraore
the eleotrio power industry oannot be considered vulnerable to measures of
warfare unless a large expansion is attempted.
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Chemicals.
The Rumen-tem dhemical industry has developed rapidly in the postwar
period. The country poem:twee ample supplies of the raw materials essential
to production of Chemicals...Salts cokes limestone pyrite ss and natural gaa
(methane)for fuel? Production haat been limited largely to the heavy
industrial Chemicals used by the petroleum, metallurgy's and pulp-paper
triea.
Rumania is 8e1f6sufficient in suVamle acids soda aths canstio
soda chlorines hydrochloric acid calcium carbide, pyrite ,methanols and
dlyc:rise. The country also produces synthetic ammonia nitric acids
nitrogenous fertilizers (ammonium nitrate and sulphateeand superposphate
fertilizer. Output of nitric acids bowevers is inadequate for domestic
needs and both nitrogenous ani superphosphate fertilizer must be imported.
The plvduction of synthetic organic chemicals is undevelopeds and eudh
as coal tar and aniline dyes oxalic acids and coke Chemicals
benzols naphthalenes etc.) =est also be imported. Rumania also is deficient
In sulPhar,
The principal Chemicals exported have been caustic soda and aoda
lash, both of which are in short supply within the Blocs ands to a lesser
extents hydrochloric acids calcium carbides and wood chemicals? Rpmanian
Writes is an Important addition to the Ortdtes tete sugar. Imports of I
Chemicals have not been sufficiently large to cause a serious drain on the
Bloc. Fertilizers have been received froz the USSR, and Czechoslovakia Ima
been the main supplier of organic and special chemicals?
The bulk of the output of chemicals originates from five principal
plants, A sixth plants the Deft State Works at Uceas may be completed near
the end of 1952, Soviet technicians are direoting the works and Soviet
equipment will be installed far the production of synthetic ammonia* nitric
acids and =moans nitrate.
With the addition of the new. Dees plants Rumania should become
nearly self-aufficient in basic industrial chemicals but will remain dependent
on imports for the small volume of organic and special chemicals not now
produced.
The Rumanian rubber industry is smalls and finished rubber products
are imported to meet domestic demand. Synthetic rubber is now being produced
in Rumania tut output is small.) Four tire plants two of Which produce only
bicycle tiiiess are in production. Carbon.black production has greatly increased
in postwar years, and most of the output is exported to the Soviet Bloc.
50 ?
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Calcium Carbide.
a. Productim.
Rumanian production of calcium carbide is estimated am follows
animated Caloium Carbide Production
1948..50
2948 NCO ai
2949 5, 56 a/
1950 5,800
The "Nitrogen ? plant at Tarnaveni (Diclosanmartin), formerly part of the
Solvay Cadbine is the only known calcium carbide plant Rumania. Its
reported annual capacity is 30,000 metric tons, y but the peak production,
attained in 1943, was only 6,227 tonsilbecause only one of the three
furnaces installed is used to produce carbide, the other two having been
converted to manufacture ferramangeneae. The actual prodUction capacity
for the plant, therefore, is probably about 10,000 metric tone a, year,
b. Estimated PossOle Proftuctpon and Canacitv.
Carbide production by the Tarnaveni.plant is expected to reach
6,000 metric tons in 1951 and 6,200 tons in 1952. One 1949 report stated
that the two furnaces now used for ferrananganese alert be reconverted to
produce carbide/ but there is no additional information indicating that
this conversion has been or viii be accamelithed.
Asnestielteauiragents.
The output of calcium carbide-ls sufficient to cover total require...
manta:, estimated at about 4,500 metric tons a year, and leave a surplus for
export. Carbide is used .in Rumania principally for the production of acetylene
gas. There is no known production of chemicals synthesised and derived from
acetylene. Before 1940 the "Nitrogen" plant at Tarnaveni produced calcium
cyanamide from carbide and nitrogen but the cyanamide furnaces have been
replaced with other installations. it/ There are no available reports in?
dipating actual or intended atockpiling of calcium carbide in Rumania. The
exportable surplus in 1952 may amount to About 1,000 to 2,000 metric tone.
d, IgteraalLimitationa..
Rumanian production of both coke and limestone is adequate to supply
the calcium carbide industrY.
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e. Irends..-Inalmdtla Indications of Mbbilisation for War.
No information received to date indicates that any significant
increase in the production of carbide or the construction of new facilities
is planned.
2. gmullasJadlo
a. DAV&lige.
Rumanian production of caustic soda is estimated as follows*
Estimated Caustic Soda Production
1945..50
Metric To
Du
ExamLim
1948
13,791 1/
2949
23,8102,/
1950
26,000
Caustic soda is produced in three Rumanian plants, located in Turda, Ocna
Nhresului, and Ternaveni? which have a combined capacity of 36,000 metric
tons a year. The Turda Chemical Works, heavily damaged in World War II it
restored in 1949, produces caustic soda by the electrolysis of brine method.
The type of abler...alkali cells installed la not known, but annual capacity
is reportedly 20,000 metric tons. 2/ The Bioara plant (formerly part of the
Solvay combine) at Ocna-Muresului produces soda ash by the Solvay process
(lime-eods) and caustic soda by causticising soda ash, The capacity for
caustic soda has been reported at 13,000 metric tons a year but actual
production is undertaken only when the production of the Tat.da plant is
insufficient to meet demands. Output could be increased above this figure,
tut only at the expanse of soda ash production. The nitrogen" works at
Tarnaveni has a caustic aoda capacity of about 3,000 metric tons a year. I/
The process is electrolytic, and Billiter-type cells are installed. The
equipment apparently is old and constantly in need of repair, for only one-
third of the cells are available at a time. Conversion to modern mercinpr.
type cellslias considered in 1949. il
b. rituladed-Pogsj,b12 Itodpction wd,Cancysity.
The estimatel 2951 production figure of 33,000 metric tons is based
on a planned increase of 127.8 perefert over 1950, ,?/ and 2952 output is cal-
culated at 36,000 metric tons, or an estimated inorease of 108 percent over
2951. Under the Five Year Plan, two new caustic soda paamts? using the
electrolytic process are planned. 11/ It is =likely that these plants will
be in operation by the end of 1952.
Ms 52 OD
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c, agestioRecuirementa.
Rumania is selfueufficient in caustic soda and produces a surplus
for export. Domestic needs are estimated at 18,000 metric tons in 2950
and 241000 tons in, 1952. The soap, petroleum refining, and pulp and paper
industries consumed 11,000 tons, nearly half of the total output in 1949.
Lesser consumers are the rayon, vegetable oils, lye ankolegneers, textile,
and other miscellaneous industries. In 1941, nearly 3,--4-artons were
exported, and large amounta will be shipped to the Soviet Bloc countries
in 1951. The heavy demand by other Satellite countries, especia117 East
Germany, for caustic soda makesit estmanely doubtful that this commdity Slut
been stockpiled ix:Rumania. Surpluses are estimated at 8,000 metric toms
in 1950 and 12,000 tons in 1952.
d.
Limestone and salt, the raw materials required in the manufacture
of caustic soda, are found in ample quantities in Rumania. Production
difficulties have been reported at the Mitrogen" plant at Tarnaveni. The
equipment is old and constsnt17 in need of repair. The Billitera.type cella
'la& filter cloths, aibestos (for cell diapbrapik: and experienced specialists
to operate them also are needed. A postwar report stated that the Solvay-
process equipment at the llioara plant in Ocna4quresalui Was badly worn but
that situation may now be improved. It is believed that replacement parts
to maintain ipatallations at all three plants currently are scarce. If
this condition ahould continde maximum production may be limited to 27,000
metric tons a year, or less than 75 percent of capacity.
e. Trende--Includinz Indications of Motdlizetion for liar.
Despite Rumania's self.sufficiency in caustic soda, great efforts
are being exerted to increase production. The construction of two caustic
soda plants with a cobbined capacity of 15,000 metric tons a year is projected
In the Five Year Plan. Nothing is known about their locations or the
progress made in actual construction. These plans are probably not an indidap.
tion of mobilization for var? because Rumania requires expanded production of
caustic soda to meet increased domestic and foreign demands.
3. 2191101.
a. rroduatin
Rumanian production of chlorine is estimated as follows:*
* Calculated from electrolyticallr.derived caustic soda production.. ,
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Eetimated Chlorine Production
1947-.50
Metric Toep
Zrgsbiatota
1947
11,000
2949
11,000
2949
12,000
1950
13,000
Mhdh of the chlorine produced is allowed to escape into the atmospherei and
cray a small amount, about 500 metric tons in 2949 -and about 900 tons in
3.95q4/ is liquified. The remainder is used to make hydrochloric acid
(estimated at 3,200 tons in 1954 Calcium chloride (about 4,500 tans in 1950),
and a limited number of miscellaneons Chlorinated Chemicals. The following
table estimates the amenable Chlorine (purified for use):
Estimated Available Chlorine
2947-50
mittikasial
Ine Italadlisa
1947
29000
290
39000
1949
4,000
2950
5,000
Chlorine is produced by the Turda Chemical Perks at Turda and the
"Nitrogen" plant at Tarnameni (Diciosanmartin)9 Both produce chlorine and
caustic soda by the electrolysis of brine method. The combined annual
capacity for the two plants calculated on the basis of their cauatic soda
capacity, is about 20,100. metric tons. The estimated chlorine capacity of
the Turda CheMical Works is about 179500 metric tons enter, and current
production is probably about 12,000 metric tons a year. The plant also produces
same synthetic hydrochloric acid and calcium Chloride. The "Nitrogen" plant
at Tarnaveni haa an estimated chlorine capacity of 2,600 metric tons a year.
Current production is probdbly 19700 metric tons a year. The "Nitrogen'
plant supposedly also produces synthetic hydroChloric acid.
bo IdattsataLetaitat2raidisiMallgaitaio
Chlorine production and capacity for 1951,42 are estimated as follows:
0.54.
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Estimated Chlorine Production and Capacity
2951?62
Utz IlsdgailsoL
ista 24,000 20.100
1952 15,000 20,100
Tans
These estimates are projected figures from the 2950 estimate and are based
upon probable electrolytic production of caustic aoda in the same years.
Under the rive Year Plan, two flew plants fdr the production of caustic
soda and chlorine by the electrolytic process are to be built. 3/ If
these plants are constructed, it is unlikely that either of them will
begin operation by the end of 3952.
o agleej..ZAERSESSEdg,o
The production of chlorine in Rumania? estimated at 5,000 metric .
tons in 19500.6,000 tons In 1951, and 7,000 tons In 1952, is more than
enough to meet all domestic demands. There are no known imports of chlorine,
nor are aqy exports reported, an indication that liquefying facilities are
inadequate. Most of the available Chlorine i? used in the production of
hydrochloric said by the synthetic process (Combustion of chlorine in a
slight excess of hydrogen). The other major consumers In Rumania are the
petrolema-metallurgicalr.glue? and textile industries.* Production of
calcium chloride also satisfiep all demand.. The synthetic organics chemical
industry is not. develoPed in Rumania; so chloride is not required for gyt.
thesizing purposes. Requiremente of chlorinated organic chemicals are
imported, There are no Indications. that stotkplles of liquid Chlorine are
being establiehed. Rumania produces slightly more chlorine.than.it consumes,
but it is believed that apy excess production is lost In permitting the gas
to escape.
Internal Idmitatione.
Salt, the basic raw material for the production of chlorine, is
plentiftl? but Rumanian production is limited by shortages of replacement
parts for wern-out equipment, facilities to liquefy and recover surplus
production, and pressure cylinders for shipping and storage.
e.
1
41.? ?
Production or chlorine is indreating? not because of greater direct
demand but rather because chlorine la a bywproduct in the electrolytic -method
of manuf4cturing caustic soda, for which Soviet Bloc requirements are increasing.
* The Turda plant furnishes mt.& of ito liquid chlorine to the Zarnesti
cellulose factory. 2/
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Two new plants are projected in the Five Tear Plan, and their coMbined
chlorine capacity would be about 13,000 metric tons a year, based on an esti..
mated caustic soda capacity of 15,000 metric tons.il Total capacity would
be approximately 3301C0 metric ton6 in 1955. There le no information, how?
ever, that the construction of these plants has started, or even that the
plans for their erection still exist.
Anal14.9 Amtkoni4.
a. Productioa.
Rumaniala estimated production of synthetic ammonia is as follows:
Estimated Synthetic Ammonia Production
1946...50
Metric Tons (Nitrogen Content)
Tear
3946
1947
1948
' 1949
1950
&sisbatkiss
1961O,/
852 V
1,000 if
1,400
10800
Synthetic ammonia is produced by two inatallations, the "Nitramonia"
plant in Fagaras and the "Nitrogen" plant in Tarnaveni (Diciosanmartin)0
both constructed in the late. 19309s. The iNitramonia" is believed to be the
'argent Rumanian producer of synthetic ammonia, present capacity being. about
20300 metric tons (nitrogen content) a year f whereas the "Nitrogen" plant
has an annual capacity of only about 1,400 tons. 5/
Production of nitrogenous fertilizers is small, and some imports are
necessary. Production estimates for ammonium sulfate and ammonium nitrate
are as follows:
Estimated Production of Eamumlion Sulfate and Ammonium Nitrate
Metric: Tons
294752
1947 ,
214W
1948
3502/
1949
450
1950
600
1951
750
1952
900
56
N.A:.
1s050 2/
1,002
1,150
1,250
1,600
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b.
*etC.? ; t
The estimated production and capacity of synthetic ammonia in
1951 and 1952 ia as follows:
Estimated Synthetic Ammonia Production and Capacity
1951-52
11214.2..122a..1111k9gsskSaitscata.
Rsza,iim
1951 2,300 3,700
1952 3,500 9,400
Another synthetic ammonia plants the Um State Works located about 25
kilameters from Fagaras in the Ucee de Jos-Ucea de Sus areas is presently
under construction. Soviet technicians are directing the constructions and
reported/ye machinery from the USSR is to be installed. The enterprise is
a Sovromehims or joint Soviet-Rumanian chemical company, project. The Ucea
pinnt is not expected to be completed until after mid-1952. The reported
paned rapacity is 20 metric tone a day of ammonia 'with a nitrogen content
equivalent of *beat 5,700 metric tons a year. 4/ The total mamba= capacity
of all three p/ents by the end of /952 ay approadh 9,400 metric tons a year.
c. R4madlakeuirementa.
Domestic requirements are not known. Most of Rumanian output of
syrthetic ammonia ie used in the production of nitric acids nitrogenous
fertilizers, and other ammonium salts and for refrigeration? Some seMonia
liquor is supplied to planta which produce soda aah by the Solvay process.
Production of nitrogenous fertilizers since the-war has been insufficient
for agricultural needs. The only known imports of fertilizer are Of Soviet
origin. It is believed that the USSR it supplying fertilizers, perhaps
ammonium nitrates but the amaunt probably is less than 101,000 metric tons a
year.
It has been reported that the ammonia production of the *Nitrogen'
plant in Tarraveni is shipped to Mitratoniau at Fagaras to be made into
nitric acid and that the "Nitramonia" plant supplies the nitric acid to the
*First Rumanian Explosive Corporation" in Fagaras.
There is no stockpiling of synthetic ammonia, since Rumania has none
of the pressure-type containers required for stockpiling this commodity.
In 1950 there was no known deficit of synthetic ammonia. Homemen.s
nitrogen fertilizer r in limited quantities had to be importedo In 19520
uhen the demand for fertilizer will be greater, domestic production will
not be adequate, even though the nevi fertilise:. plant at Ueea may begin
operations in the latter half of that year.
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C10
There are no raw materials shortages in the synthetic ammonia industry.
Production is limited by shortagee of spare parts, general disrepair and obsolete-
ness of equipment and unskilled labor It is known that the 'Nitrogen"
plant as late aa 1949 was operating with inferior ammonia catalysts. 3/
10,
The completion of the Ikea nitrogen plant ahould assiet Rumania
in becoming self-sufficient in nitrogen fertilizers by the ead of 19530
The Ucea plant will produce ammonium nitrate, which in event aver can
be used by the explosives plants in the manufacture of Amato', a TNTs
mammal= nitrate mixture wed as an explosive filler in shells and bombs,
5. at49.41,1,
a. h2513=0.
Rumanian production of nitric acid is eaLtnated as followss
Eatimated Nitric Aoid Production
2938 and 1945-50
Die iteS211211
1938443.
1945582f
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1943,/
191 jj
200
200 2/
1,000
The only plant known to produce nitric acid is the nlitramoniai instail&.
tion at Fagaras. Production of nitric acid by the ammonia oaidation method
was planned ,at the ?Nitrogen" synthetic ammonia plant in 1940, 3,/ but there
is no definite Indication that nitric acid is being made there. The '
"Nitramonia" plant is reported to have a nitric acid capacity of 8,400 metric
tons (100 percent acid basis) &year. ki There are four or five combustion
furnaces for acid production, but only one furnace was in operation in 19499
because of a shortage of platinum meshes (catayet)0,5/ Another plant that
might be producing nitric acid is the "glossa BOW (formerIy *Phoenix") at
Baia Mare? but even if it makes nitric acid, production is probably small.
b.
cti Ca ac
Rumaniaes possible nitric acid production and capacity for 1951-52
are as fellows
58
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Nstimated Nitric Acid Production and Capacity
1951.52
naglia1211 *ORM
1951 3,000 8,400
3.952 5,000 8,400
'tCaine* increased to 23,400 metric tons if
ea State Worki starts production,
These produetion eatimates are considerably larger than previous annual
output. It is believed that greater emphasis is nem being placed on the
production of nitric acid, and that the condition of the equipment at
"Nitramonia* is now much improved. Completion of the &tea plant, the
,planned capacity of which is 20 metric tans a da y of ammonia, or 5,700
tons of nitrogen a year, 4/ will permit a considerable expansion of production,
Possible nitric acid capacity, therefore, may be about 15,000 tons (100
percent nitric acid) a year.
c. Domestio Reoulirements.
Rumanialle estimated requIrements of nitric acid are as fellows:
Estimated Nitric Acid Requirements
1950-52
Negri9 7201
Xs= Erzbuttim
1950 5s000
1951 9,000
1952 101000
Domestic production Of nitric acid is believed to be sufficient for Rumanian
industries whose requirements for this basic chemical are limited, Nitric
acid is not imported, Artificial fertilizers of the fixed nitrogen type are
in short supply, hoverer, presumabl7 because of larger agricultural requirements.
Rumania will require abodt 10,000 metric tons of ammonium nitrate of fertilizer
grade in 1954 and imports may therefore total about 7,500 metric tone,
Estimated deficits of 4,000 metric tons in 1950 and 5,000 tons in 1932 will
result Prom increased requirements for amMonium nitrate fertilizer, There
is no information indicating that a stockpile of nitric acid has been or
will be established in Rumania.
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doili&mis eLjAgjacatimi.
The raw materials essential far the manufacture of nitric acid
'are anhydrous ammonia, which ie in Magnate supply in Rumania air # and
water. Stainlees-eteel alloys and fine platinum cause,* also required
by the industry, are in short supply in the Soviet Bloc. It is expected
that production at the "Nitramonia plant 'will be only 60 percent of
capacity in 1952 because of shortages of replacenent parts for special
equipment.
e.
bi
The completion of the Ikea plant, not likely to be finiiihed
nntil the last half of 1952, should assist Rumania in becoming self-
sufficient in nitrogenous fertilizers by the end of 1953. The ammonium
nitrate produced by the ticea plant could be available for immediate use
by explosive plants in manufacturing a TNT-emmimmilmn nitrate mixture for
high-explosive filler in shells and bombs.
psigalislegio
Very little information is available on the production of coke chemicals
in Rumania. Only one plant is reported producing metallurgical coke* Thin
installation has a battery of about 24 coke ovens, but it is not known whether
all of the ovena are equipped to recover by-products. Plant capacity is
about 80,000 metric tons of metallurgical coke a year, and estimated produca.
tion was approximately 709000 metric tons in 19500 Assuming that all coke
byproducts are recovered, the production of the various coke chemicals
would be as follows
Estimated Production of Coke Chemicals
1950
Coal Tar
MOO
Bensols Refined
570
Toluca
140
/Awe
70
Ammonium Sulfate
920
Naphthalene
190
Anthracene
40
Phenol
25
Cresols
Xylenols
Z
Creosote 011
10
U&ect as a cata4st0
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Production of coke chemicals is not sufficient for Rumanian require?
ments, and Czechoslovakia supplies the small additional amounts needed.
In 19480 about 100 metric tons of benzol and 50 metric tons of naphthalene
were imported from Czechoslovakia. The synthetic organic chemical
industry in Rmnania is not developed, and, therefore, there is no sizable
&.
demand for chemicals from coal. Some benzol is sired to the "First
Rumanian plosive Corporation* plant at Fagaras
SuUhur and Pvrttes.
au 15.143811241.
The only available figure for sulphur output is an =confirmed i
report of the production of 5,000 metric tons in 1949. Sulphur deposits of
unknown extent have been discovered in the course of petroleum explorations
in Prahava near Ploesti. jdf Output of pyrites in 1939 was 31,600 metric tons. 10/
Production of pyrite concentrates in January and February 1949 Was 6,296
metric tons ,..j/ or an annual rate of 37,776 tons. Production haft probably
been Increased in 1950 and 1951 to meet the requirements of the expanding
sulphuric acid industry and to supply exports to Czechoslovakia. Part of
the production is obtained from deposits of iron pyrites in Transy1vania0
part fron popper pyrites at Altan Tep and Balanul, and part from differential
flotation of gold ores, II Much of the output is said to be of poor quality
and high arsenic content. ,5/
idlanUsl.baniUst2EsegetasaugenSmanaz.
NO info:matt= is available on possible production of aulphur in
19520 If the Five Year Flan Is to be three-fifths completed by tbn end of
19520 production of pyrites for sulphuric acid alone must reach 830500 metric
tons0 ther this amount can be provided entirely by domestic' production
is open fo question0
Co banntdabagransta.
No information is available on requirements for sulphur, of which
agriculture is probably the chief consumer. The production of sulphuric
-
acid acoounts for the bulk of the pyrites requirements. In 1950 the estimated
amount Used was 42,000 metric tons' and in 1952 an estimated 83,500 tons
will be required.* Requirements of other industries are probably small,
so that the total demand for all industries vould be apiniaximately 60,000
and 1100000 metric tons in 1950 and 1952, reapectively.
d. Stockpiles.
Since Ruraania has large domestic supplies of pyrites stockpiling
is not required. It vas reported in 19490 however, that pyrites from the
Urals were being stored at Galati and that 10 Shipments of iron pyrites
* Calculated from sulphuric acid production in 1950 and the 1952 goal.
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were scheduled for delivery that summer. Furthermore, Soviet pyrites
is reportedly shipped to Orsova for forwarding to the Viitorul steel plant,
where the ore is roasted to extract the sulphur content. The finished iron
is exported to the USSR. 2/
0e arply, sc Deficit*
As Rumania produces no sulphur, all requirements must be imported. )
incomplete import data show that 6,348 metric tons were received in 1949.
Rumania is both an importer. and an exporter of pyrites and appermtly has a
net surplus. Pyrites vas included in.the1947 Rumanian,Soviet trade agree...
ment? SI/ and substantial quantities were to have ben received from the USSR
in 19490 Rumanian imports of 2,900 metric tons from Cyprus in 19492atmg7
have been destined for transshiment to Czechoslovakia. On the other hand,
Rumania exported 15,000 metric tons to Czechoslovakia in 1950 22,/ and In 1951
planned to export 400:00 tons to Hungary and possibly 40,000 tone to Czecho-
slovekla0 jai
f. IpternalLinitationg.
No data are available "on the extent of either the sulphur or the pyritmt
reserves in Rumania, nor it; there any definite information on Rumanian
shortages of technicalmwmpouer and equipment.
?
go +Pv,)?.! 4-1 .! ? _7
Rumania ia emerging as a fairly important source &pyrites for
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, both of which have in the past depended largely
on imports from non?Bloc countries. The Bloc will be less vulnerable, there-
fore, to the world shortage of pyrites predicted for 1952. Rumania's ?vial'
increasing production of oulphuric acid, howevers may restrict the volume of
pyritea available for exports unless production can be materially increased.
Although the bulk of the increased catgut of sulphuric acid win be used for
the manufacture of fertilizers, Rumania's capacity to produce war materials,
especially explosives, also will be increased.
8. Bulak__.
a. production,.
Rvicanian production of synthetic rubber is believed to be small. 2,/
The importation of 20 kilogram of rubber plant seed under the 1947 trade
agreement with the USSR 2/ indicates that experimentation, with latexibearing
shrubs suCh as kg:lc-aura, was planned*
Tire production is reported at 316.4 metric tons in 1947. 2/
Capacity of the two automobile tiresproducing plants is 220 tires a days
or 661,000 a year. 4/ Two other plants are believed to be producing bicycle
tires. 2/ Postwar production of tires and tubes by the principal tire plant,
the Banloc Rubber Factory is estimated at 1,140 metric tons in 1948,
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2,364 tons in 1949,* and 2,647 tons in 1950. 11/
Production of carbon black in Rumania was 22,086 retries tons in
1949. 2/ With the addition of another plant early in 1950, production
probably increased. Planned production in 1955 is to be 4.5 times larger
than 1950 output. 2/ Natural gas and the Waproducts from the refineries
are of such quality that large quantities of carbon black can be turned
out to agy specification required.
letimatedPossible Production pnd Capacity'.
Some expansion of plants for the manufacture of rubber products
is prObably planned, and the 1949 trade agreement between Rumania and East
Germany provided that East Gamey would supply various machines and spare
parts for the rubber industry. 2/ The current Five Year Plan provides for
the production of 4,000 metric tons of tires by 1955. 12/
C. pomeepticReauirementa.
Rxmenials motor park, estimated at about 10,000 vehicles in 1950,
requires from 40,000 to 50,000 tires annually. Carbon bleak requirements;
are small, probably about 500 metric tons a year. There is no information
available on stockpiling of rubber in Rumania.
d. Surplus or Deficit.
WO information is available on types and sizes of tire manufacturing
capacity in Rumania, but Imports from the USSR indicate that Rumanian produoe!
tion may be deficient in acme categories. The USSR has sepplied tires to
Rumania since 1947. 11/ Other types of rubber goods also are 'imported from
the Soviet Bloc. Imports of natural rubber have been leas than before the ?
war and totaled 19000 metric tons in 1948, 1,250 tone in 2949, and 575 tons
in 1950. 13/ However, additional imports of natural and synthetic rubber from
the USSR and Satellite countries which are not included in these totals have
considerably increased the total Romanian rubber supply, The USSR supplied
400 metric tons of rubber in March 1949, and additional quantities were
probably shipped in 1950. 12/ Large surpluses of carbon black are available
for export.
'!"alaiditahtatalao
Supplies of raw rubber must be imported. Rumania apparently received
only 7 metric tons directly from Malaya in 1950. isti More was Obtained
through reexports and transshipments through the and West Germery., and
the USSR and the other Satellites probably furnished some. Rubber chemicals
also were supplied by the USSR in 1950. Synthetic rubber production will require
other raw materials imports. Soviet specialists are believed to be in the
country to assist in developing synthetic rubber production, 15/ and other
'Includes 204 metric tons of bicycle tires and tubes.
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technical aid by Soviet personnel viiiprobably continue. Rumania may also
be :short of equipment for the manufacture of certain types and sizes of tires.
7rende.?Inc1ud2naind1cations of Itkokilisition for 11140
A great expansion of capacity for the production of carbon black
in Rumania provides the Soviet Bloc with a highly strategic commodity.
The Bloc countries have been critically abort of this product in postwar
years, and great efforts have been made to procure it from the West. Tho
ability to obtain large amounts of Rumanian earbon black will help to oont
serve the Bloc's foreign exchange supplies. In addition, expansion of carbon
Meek production and Increased tire production in Rumania will aid the domestic
economy by taking the country less dependent on the Soviet Bloc and br
strengthening its foreign trade position.
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Go k&ineerinx Industry.
Summary
The egausszingjaaatry of Rumania is goal and unimportant in
comparison with that -of Czechoslovakia or Hungary, but RumaniagAlitga,
in the fields of ra t and shipbuiI. neverthe-
ess makes but
is estimated that over 50 percent of the tot ? Put
o the r industry is shipped to the USSR, and for important in-
dividual plants the export figure is much higher, sometimes exceeding 90
rcent.
Output of the more important products of the engineering industry is
estimated in the following table.
Estimated Production of Ships, Locomotives,
Railroad Care, and Tractors
1950, 1952, and 1955
Item
Unit 1950 1952 ' 1955 Plan
Shipbuilding Metric Tons 28,000 21 40,000 N.A.
Locomotives Units 150 200 N.A.
Railroad Cars Units 3,000 3,600 '5,200
Tractors Units 3,000 4,000 5,000
ITXn 1949,
The Rumanian engineering industry does not meet total domestic re-
iquirements except for railroad equipment, and the fact that the bulk of the
output is exported to the USSR further Increases this deficit. Imports of
, capital goods are substantial, the major portion coming from the USSR* Hungary,
and Czechoslovakia? Some critical equipment is obtained from Switzerland,
Austria, Italy, and West Germany.
The technological level of the industry is not high. Its products
are of simple design, usually copies of foreign models, and little attention
is devoted to improvement of technique e and products. Industrial laboratories
and experimental shops have been completely neglected, although an attempt is
being made to correct these shortcomings through adoption of the latest Soviet
industrial techniques. The industry also is handicapped by a lack of engineers
and skilled labor, and shortages of raw materials, machine tools and other
production equipment, machinery components, and spare parts have constantly
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hampered production. Defective organiiation and planning have resulted in
a number of production bottleneeks. These liwitations have often prevented
fulfillment of production plans for specific items but have not prevented a
eteady increase in over-all outputs
The 1949 and 1950 Plans called for a considerable increase in machinery
output. This wee to be acconplished by expansion of production at existing
plants. Under the Five Year Plan (1951.-65)0 output of madhinery is to be
doubled, and 10 or 12 nevi:lents are to be constructed and put into operation*
though individual production goals for various categories of machinery and
pment could be attained (1) if the plant construction progrwa is completed
on time, (2) if sufficient raw materials and production equipment can be '
imported, and (3) if munitions production does not expand and monopolise
scarce resources, the aver-all target of doubled aggregate output seems
likely to be achieved.
Expantion of the Rumanian engineering industry means an expansion of
potential for the manufacture of war materiel. Nhnitions production in the
World War II period vas Liignificaut but declined precipitously in the postwar
period. In the latter part of 194 and in 1949, production of munitions vas
reeumed in a number of plants and has stendily_increased. More than twowthirds
of the munitions manufacturing plants of World War II are, to varying degrees,
again engaged in the production of light weapons, ?opponents, and ammunition*
There are isolated instances of total conversion, but, in general, production
of civilian goods has continued parallel with that of mations* If the
current trend toward increased munitions output continues, however production
of machinery and equipment will decrease, and the Rumanian engineering industry
? te unable to meet the production goals established in the Five Year Plan*
10 NJohine Tools.
The production of machine tools is mall when compared with the require-
ment!, of Rumanian industry. A few machine tools were manufactured in Rumania
before Weld War II and during the German occupation. Par plane for the
development of heavy industry have placed increasing emphasis on the uenufacture
of machine tools. The rive rear Plan schedules a production of 645 lathes in
1955. Although this is asmall number, it is maw times more than present
production. 2/ More Important is the projected production of a number of new
types of machine tools, many of them complex WhiCh Rumania thus far has shown
no ability to nenufacture.* The principal m:nufacturing plants for machine tools
are Steagul Rosu and Strungul in Stalin (Brasov), Victoria in Arad, Cugir in
Ougir, lemrtirea in Oradea, Unio in Saba Mares, and Dinamo in Dacharest02/
* At the Rumanian Industrial EXhibition in 2950 a few machine tools of Rumanian
manufaeture were on display.engine lathes single-spindle drills, banal
grinders, two boring machines, a Shaper etc. With the exception of two of
the drills the machines bore the inecription "Made for the First Time
in This Country' They mere All simple models and appeared to be fairly
good (topics of US or British typee. 3/
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Almost all requirements e machine toola must be imported. According
to the Rumanian press, the
ikRumania with a multi ? e Never*. $,
eon v. tools from Pit $ particularly frau
Switzerland and Italy. Official exports of machine tools firm Switzerland
to Rumania totaled 44metric tons in 1948, 191 tons in 1949, and a4. tons in
the first 6months of 1950. kj France supplied Rumania with eight hieh..
apeed threading machines, useful in nnnitions production, in the fourth
of 1950.y Italy shipped 35 tons of boring machines in Novedber 2950
and,-under the current trade -agreement, is to vumAy $300,000 worth of
machine tools during'195102/
2. Ariculteralikehigery.
Production of tractors was started in Rumania in 3941 when the former
IAR aircraft plant NN-Converted to tractor production iusler the eontrol
of the Saint Soviet-Rumanian company Sovramtractor.V Current tractor
production is 31,000 units a yearelf Annual output is scheduled to reach
4,000 units in 1952 and 5,000 units in 19550y Production was begun with
an .adaption of the German Hanamag? wheeled model, to which several modifica-
tions have eince been made. Current production Should be aufficieat to net
the minimum requirements of agriculture for the type of tractor produced.
However, the entire output may not be allocated to domestic users. Despite
the increased domestic output, Rumania has continued to import tractors.
Seventy! Zeter4nantoZn?Vr?.c..gec. a tpre were imported in a 4m41outh
period in 1950, and Rumania .:s so received sem Se?'.= n aq Ai
Caterpillar tractors are no ?? ? a presen ough the actor
plant is acheduled to make the Soviet 0.35 caterpillar tractor in the near
future. The Rumanians possess a number of Caterpillar D.17 and D-8 tractors
of US manufacture, for Which it is difficult to obtain replacement parts. for
In addition to tractors, the Sovromtractor plant has far name time produced
aircraft and possibly tanks. Tractor production may possibly have been suspended
in early 1950 in order to expand tank production and to produce accessories
261' armored ears. Such total conversion would conflict with the urgent needs
lof Rumanian agriculture for tractors and would therefore constitute an
Important step toward mobilization for var.
3. Irensnortation,Eduiument.
The greatest contribUtion of the Thalami= engineering industry to the
economy of the Soviet Bloc haa. been in the field of railroad equipment.
than SO percent of the production of locomotives, freight cars, braking
equipment, and wheel sets is Shipped to the USSR.
Production of steam locamotivea is concentrated at the Sovrommetal
plant in Recita and at the "23rd of August" plant in Bucharest, which
produce an estimated 100 and 50 units a. year, respectively. Over SO percent
of the locomotives are of the Soviet vide.gauge type and are shipped to the
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USSR, whereas the remainder are standard-gauge for the Rumanian State
Railways, Total production in 3.952 will probably approximate 200 units.
Production of rolling stock in 1950 is eatimated at 3,000 units and
dhould increase to 3,600 in 19520 The Five Yearn= calla for an oats.
put of 5,200 freight and tank cars in 1955. Almost the entire output
is sent to the USSR. 21 The most Important producers of railing stock
are the "23rd of August" pleat and the Steagul Rosa plant in Stalin
(Brasov), Other producers are located at Arad, Bran% Orastie, Seta
Mere, and TurratSeverin.
Some railroad equipment is imported, and several 1949*mode1 Swim diesel
locomotives have been seen in operation on the Rumanian railroadso The
current trade .agreement vith Italy calls for the supply of $200,000 worth
of Italian railroad equipment in. 19510 Narrow-gauge cars were imported
from the USSR in 1950, 3/
Sh6tages of raw materials and components...welled steel, stamped partsg
timber for freight cars, antifrictLan bearings, and injector and pumps
for locomotives--and of production equipment serioualy hampered output in
190. These shortages still edit, and although they are not sufficiently
serious to cause a drop in preduttion, they have slowed the rate of increase?
40 b4osafaigUagisitid*
Rumania produces a small amount of oilfield equipment. The "First of
May" Sovrompetrel plant in Ploesti and the Sovrommetal plant in Reoita have
for some years produced steam drilling rigs on a small scale. 1/ In 1949
the Steagul Rosa plant at Stalin (Brasov) began production of tricone
dr411411g bites vindhes crude pmia. and drilling rigs? 3/ The 1949 and
1950 Flans placed considerable emphaais on the production of oilfield
equipment. Production target? for 1955 were given in the Five Year Plan
only for rotary tables and drilling trollaya and the goals, 90 units in
each case, are modest, 2/ Quarterly fulfilliaent reports have stressed
substantial increases in production of other drilling equipment such as
crown blocks, traveling blodka, drilling rigs pumping =its, and re:lacing
gears.
The low production of the Rumanian oil industry in 1950 has been attributed,
among other things, to a shortage of new equipment and a deterioration in
existing facilities. hi Even if Rumania's total output of oil equipment 'were
allocated for domestic use the requirements of the oil industry could not
------bakmet. A substantial part, however, including such items as crude-oil
- pumps, rock bits, drilling tongs, traveling and crown blocks, rotary tables,
rotary awivels? blowout preventera and tubing, has been going to the USSR
as reparations, 3/ Items ouch an diesel drilling rigs and all control
apparatus raist be imported. ?/
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Before World War II and immediately thereafter, Rumania imported con-
siderable quantitlea of US equipment, After the imposition of US export
controls the Rumanian government made strenuous Warta to obtain this
equipment elsewhere. Substantial quantities of drilling pipe and vial casing
have been procured through circuitous channels from Italy and Weft Germany, The
USIA (Soviet enterprises in Austria) firm of NannesmannoiTrausl supplied
Rumania with drilling equipment in 195002/ ItAT is sdheduled to supply
drilling equipment valued at $120,000 in 1951, y Rumania placed definite
orders in September 1950 with the West German firm TTAG for delivery of
$150,000 worth of drilling rigs, 2/ The USSR has also anpplied equipment,
inc1104/1g, it is reported, drilling machinery for four new wells in the
latter part of 1950, 12/
The Steaua Rosie Works (formai3y14 Waft Corporationl in Bucharest,
the only significant producer of refinery equipment, 22/ manufactures
large structural parts Each as fractionating columns, tanks, and beat
exchangers, 31,j Pumps, valves, motors, and control equipment for
refineries are imported.
The trend in Rumania is toward an increased output of petroleum equip-
ment. T%ere are no plans for construction of new plants, however, nor far
any. substantial *pension of existing plants, Recently announced percentage
increases of considerable magnitude for the production of oil equipment
reflect the manufacture of new items rather than any great expansion in
volume of output, Rumania will continue to depend, although to a lesser
extent than before the war, upon imports of petroleum equipment*
50 41=2M0
During World Wer II?Rumania had a anbstantial cepacity, distributed
among 29 plants, ji for the production of light 'weapons and ammunition*
Monthly capacity has been eertimated, presumably on the basis of wartime
output, at 75 pieces of light artillery, 345 mortars 4540 small arms,
403,750 shells, 14,500 aerial bombs 234,000 mortar :hells, 330,000 infantry
grenades, and 12,290,000 rounds of Lalluierms ammunition, At the end of the
war, most of these plants were converted to peacetime production, although
a few government arsenals may have continued to produce munitions on a email
scale. By order of the Ministry of War, however, 40 percent of the facilities
for munitions production was not to be used for nonmilitary purposes bawl
to be maintained in condition to resume operations on 48 Mures notice,
Furthermore, Industrial mobilization plana were prepared to enable the Industry
quickly to regain the level of production reached during World Wer II. a/
Since jun. 1948 the entiremedtions imiustry, like all heavy industrY,
has been nationalized, Military directorates known as Production Directorates,
whirl receive orders directly from the Minietry of National Defense, Yhave
been establidhed in the lanistries of Industry, Oil, National Econazy? and
Food. In late 1948 and.1949 a number of Rumanian industrial paants resumed
production of munitions, although continn4ng to marafecture industrial
products. This trend was accelerated in 1950 and early 1951, Approximately 20
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of the 29 plants villa. produced =mitions during the war are again producing
light weapone, ammunition and components, a Theee 20 plants include
almost all of the important engineering establiOhmentse
The Nina IllePintilie (formerly ifergineanca) plant near Ploesti, for
example, made shell made, fuzes,and mortar shells during the ware Capacity
was 282,000 dhalle a year. I/ Liter the war the plant %me coaverted to the
production of agricultural equipment, but in mid-1949 obeli production was
resumed. In the first 91 months of 1950, 200,000 antitank gun &ells for the
USSR were turned out, and the 1951 production goal is 14 million shells,
over 5 timee the plants estimated World War II capacitre2/
It is un.likaly that the munitions industry as a whole is currently
producing at a level near its wartime capacity. Most of the engineering
plants conttnue to manufacture peacetime industrial products, but civilian
production appears to have been cut back. There have been =emus instances
of diveraion of materials and manufacturing facilities to munitions production,
whiCh vill inevitably reduce the output of machinery and equipment. gy
Although Rumanian, munitions production represents a subetantial Contri-
bution to Soviet strength, the industry must depend upon Bloc assistance*
It say be able to supgy the requirements of the Rumanian Army far light
weapons, small arms, and ammunition, but heavy weapons would have to be
furnished by other Soviet Bloc countries. In addition, the munitions
Industry is dependent upon outside sources for much of its raw materials
and almost all of Its production equipment and replacement parts.
6. Aircraft.
Rumania has neither an extensive aircraft iniustry nor the resources to
support one. The country is dependent upon imports frxn the USSR to fill
civil transport and military aircraft requirements. Domestic uae and export
to the USSR of the aircraft instruments and light training and sport airm
craft currently manufactured mill probably continue, but no important contribu.
tion to till power of either Rumania or the USSR is made by the industry. The
chief advantages to the Soviet Union are the facilities for extensive maintenance
of Soviet transport aircraft operating in and through Rulania and for potential
repairef tactical aircraft in event of war. The contribution to the Rumanian
econagy ie not significant? The industry is completely nationalized, and
total emOloyment probably does not exceed 1,500. Aircraft and components
are produced In conjunaticei with other product.; in plants under the direction
of the Ministry of Metallurgical and Chemical lnduetrye The most important
plant with respect to aircraft production is Sevromtractor, a Joint Soviet-
Rumanian company under the supervision and contra of the USSR.
After World Var II, same machinery in aircraft factories was.traneperted
to the USSR, and most of the remainder ma used for the production of consumer
goods. In 190, it as reported that the Soviets had authorized the retooling
for aircraft production of the SET plant in Budharest and the Astra and
Sovromtraetor plants in Stalin (Brazov). A, group of 22 engineers and tedhnicians
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from the 'USSR visited the Sovrantractor plantirith. the samoluseed purpose of
developing It for the production of jet aircraft, although the real reason
probably was to determine Ito usability for aervicing jets*
No large expansion of production is expected, and reoent augmentation
of repair facilities and personnel has been Insufficient to indicate =anise..
tion for ware
70 iltaXt1laglag0
iRizaszdals 24 known shipyards have an annual capacit7 of 80,000 metric
tons. The planned production for 2949 was 42,000 tons, though =3728,000
tons were built, but in 1950 production increased by an undetermined amount?
Although. larger Ohips can be built in the major yarde the great bulk of the
present and planned output consists of tugs tanker b:rges fishing craft,
small river CO Ships, and, in the Sovrameyerdss, motor tOrpedo boats, -
patrol boats, minelayers, and minesweepers? All of the naval craft.are
etandardited- on Soviet specifications, and a new motcas torpedo boat, the
prototype of which is believed to have been fininhed in the lzbanda plant
at Braila, wilI go into construction in 1951..520
The industry employs approximately 22,000 workers, and the most Important
Shipyards are located in Brallal Tun= Severin Galati., and Constansa0
Technical trade schools were inaugurated in all yards in 2949, and the result.
ing intrease in labor skills, together with larger imports of engines and raw
materials fron the USSR and the standardization of construation, is .credited
with the 1950 production gainp.
The entire output of the. Rumanian phipbuilding industry from the teraim
tion of !tal.d War II until the end of 1951 was delivered to the USSR am
reparations. In that period Rumania purchased some ships abroad, tut its
merchant marine is still deficient, The industry is expected in 1951 not
only to fill the reparations aueta but to have a nurplue for national
requirements, with an increase of output to more than 40,000 metric tons0
ltemiumlen nhipbuilding ie bee 41
Tungsten, copper, aluminun? and are obtain ? the USSR, manganese
franliusgarrand Bulgaria, and steel from Poland and Czedhoslovakia0 The
Is the principal source of finished marine engines, although plants In
0 Galata, and Turnu Severin produce that in limited quantities.
There is no indication of convioraion of ether industry to Shipbuilding,
but expansion of all shipyards ham been marked in the past 2 years? Nev
machinery has been snppliedbythe USSR for constructing two new but $mell
yards. Although increased activitgr in this industry cannot be &moldered
an immediate step in mobilization for war, the war potential in definitely
being ipproved. The need for imports makes the industry vulnerable in
peacetime, and the -concentration of the shipyards in awry few locations,
woad make them vulnerable to boMbing.
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VII. Transportation,
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SusinarT
The distribution of petroleum products to the Soviet Union and to the
Satellites is the chiet;vontribution of the Ruminian transport system to the
Bloc's economic potentialfwvar, This distribution is carried out principally
i/// the pipeline network, in conjunction with the Soviet and Rumanian merchant
rites and, to a lesser extent, the Rumanian railroads and inland water
de /transport,
/ Rumania is not capable of making large contributions of transport equip.-
ment to the USSR. The diversion to the USSR of moderate quantities of rolling
stock and motor vehicles, however, would not seriously affect the Rumanian
economy, Rumania probab37 will 4ntinue to deliver rol34ng stock and small
vessels to the USSR out of current production,
Present Rumanian transport activity imposes only minor requirements an
Soviet economic resources, since most Rumanian transport facilitim are
operating below capacity. A substantial increase in traffic, however, would
require Soviet assistance in the form of additional transport equipment.
Because of Rumania's strategic location, its transport system is of considerable
military as well as economic importance,
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Railroads.
1., Direct Contributions of Railroads to the Economic Potential for
mararmirtm
RuMania's railroad facilities make (*Ilya limited contribution to
the Soviet economic potential for war. The principal economic importance of
the railroad stem is in the distribution of petroleum products to the USSR
and the other Satellites and in the event of war the system would provide
logistic support for military operations in the Balkans and the Adriatic area.
1-*\
The difference ingmege between SaViet and Pcimanimil railroads*
does not prevent the USSR from- utilizing the Romanian network, because trans-
loading points at Galatz-Reni, IasirUngheni, and possibly at Dornesti, permit
through traffic between all points In both systems.- Transfrontier traffic is
accomplished by transloading shipments and by substituting axles of the
desired gauge at the transfer points,
a. ....22Geteanagaistion of the Network.
The major portion af,Rumaniats railroad network is roughly
parallel to the southern and eastern frontiers of thqcountry, cut off fran
Transylvania by the East Carpathian range and the Transylvanian Alps. From
Craiova? two parallel lines sweep eastward to Bucharest and northward to the
Soviet frontier south of Chernovitgy. Five gaps in the mountains lead into
Transylvania, but only the routes through Orsova and Brasov are major lines.
Branch lines to Galata and Constanza carry Rumania's heaviest traffic..
.00 Traffic.
Rail freight traffic comprises 85 percent of all imbarnal
traffic in Rumania. The level of traffic has surpassed the prewar volume
and apparently continues to increase. RMMUIPUI rail freight traffic for
1951 is planned at 7.8 billion ton-kilometers, 28 percent above the 1939
traffic figure, Domestic rail traffic consists chiefly of petroleua products?**
timbers grain, and some iron and steel. products,
Responsibility for the control of railroad traffic is divided
between 2 of the 14 Central Directorates of the General Directorate of Railways:
the Operations and Traffic Directorates, which have subordinate offices in the
6 regional Railway District Directoratel-Bucharest, Iasi, Craiova? Timisoara?
Brasov, and Cluj. The respective ragional.levei Directorates control sdboffices
* The soviet gauge in 5 feet; the Rananian, 4 feet ai inches.
** The railroads carry only About 22 percent of the oil delivered to the
USSR, the repainder going by pipeline and tanker .a/
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at every junction and station throughout their regions. be
Railroad traffic control is not highly developed, and no
centralized traffic control equipment has been installed, leaving the telephone
as the chief moans of control. On double-track lines the conventional semaphore
type signal wean is used, mhile the "train staff signal system" (Zhezloviya
Sistema)? under 'which trains proceed fraa station to station and receive -
further orders at each stop, is employed on single-track lines. be However,
autanatic block systea signals have been placed in service between Bucharest
and Ploesti? and fUturo improvements in this field are expected?
Co Equipment.
Met of the war damage to the fixed facilities in Rumania has
been repaired, but the postwar program to improve the stibgrade, replace worn rails
and ties, increase the weight of rail on main lines, and install safety and
signal equipment has not been completed. Only the major through routes have
capacities comparable to the average of Central European lines? New rails for
postwar construction and replacement have come Chiefly from. the USSR and.
Czechoslovakia, but Rumania is noor believed to be self-sufficient in rails.
Rumanian production of ties is more than adequate for domestic needs,
d, Cepacity.
The traffic capacity of Rumanian railroads has exceeded require-
ments since June 1947. 5)( Capacity in 1951 is estimated at about 845 billion
ton-kilometers a year, a 40-percent increase -over 1939. Planned requirements
for 1951. are only 768 billion ton412emeters, and the railroad system could
carr7 additional loads of 1.78 mil-1Jan ton-kilometers a day, =amount
sufficient for large-scais economic or military traffic movements? '
Since 1947 the opening of four mew limbs, in conjunction with
certain improvements to a few claisification yards and block signal installa-
tions has nearly doubled the theoretical capacity between Liveseni and
Bumbe:tis Craiova and Bucharest, Viseul and Telciu, and Faurei and Tecucip
The effective capacity, however, as contrasted with the theoretical capacity
depende not only on fixed line facilities but includes rolling stock and loco.
motive inventories, yard facilities and signalling equipient. All of these
items must be increased before the theoretical capacity can be realised,
The capacity of transloading stations between Rumania and the
USSR is adequate for present needs, and if traffic is greatly increased, the
stations can readily be expanded to cope with the additional requirements.
Vulnerability,
Rumania's rail facilities, because of the system's many bridges,
tunnels, and strategic junctions, are vulnerable to a limited degree to both
air attack and sabotage. Alternative routes have been increased since the war,
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but numerous targets are available for the effective redaction of rail
communications. Rail traffic could not be disrupted completely, however,
without heavy and suptained attacks.
2. Direct Contributions of Railroad Equipment to the Economic
'Potential for Tfar of the USSR.
a. Inventories.
Current railroad equipment inventories are estimated at
about 62,000 freight oars and 2,000 locomotives, about 10 percent being unw
serviceable at agv given time, These inventories are approximately equal
to prewar figures, and intensification of utilization has been achieved to
cope with the substantially increased current traffic. Tarn-round time, for
example, has been reduced to a mintmam, and workshop production has achieved
greater efficiency. ,
b. Production Capabilities.
. Only slight increases in traffic can now be met by intensifying
utilization, and ewe increases in rolling stook and locanotive inventories
must be made if future traffic requirements are to be met. A slight reduction
In exports to the USSR would enable Rumania's railroad equipment Industry to
provide the necessary domestic additions.
c. Effect of Transfers to the USSR.
Any of locoMotivee or ether roilliag stook to the USSR sr ,
elseWhere in the Soviet Bloc would result in redaction of domestic transport
availability in proportion to the quantity of equipment removed. Such removals
however, would not sUbetantly augment Rumania's contribution to the USSR's
econanio potential for war.
3, Indirect Contributions.
a. Role of Railroads in Soviet Trade.
ir
(1) Extent and Nature of Traffic with the USSR and the Satellites,
The chief exports to the USSR which are carried by Rumanian
railroads are petroleum products, timber, grain, and cement. Petroleum is the
major export, but only 12 percent of total petroleum shipments to the USSR
move by nail. Grain, timber, cement, and some iron and steel products move
chiefly by sea but depend on the railroads for transportation to the ports.
Machinery imported from the Satellites depends heavily upon rail transport.
(2) Importance of Traffic to the Soviet Econogy,
Transportation of petroleum from Rumania is of primary
importance to the USSR. Imports of grain, timber, and cement from Rumania are
less vital to the Soviet econagv.
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bG Role of Railroads in Trade with the Nest*.
Rumanian railroads are of negligible importance in the low
volume of overt trade with the Vest, A small amount of clandestine. traffic
with non-Bloc countries moves largely over Eastern Edropean.rail lines, but
the motor vehicles, machinery, and replacement parts whiCh Rumania procuree
Ln this may from,the nest probably are not required to maintain econanic
activity at prewar or even 1948 levels.
I. Inverse Contributions*
a* 2quipment9
Rumanimn railroads make almost no equipment demknds on the
Soviet economy, and, in fact, Rumanian industry exports considerable numbers
of locomotives and other rolling stock to the USSR yearly,
be Materials.
The USSR supplies small quantities of materials, steel plates,
and wheel rims to Rumanian railroad equipment factories. Rumania imporbed
some rails from the Orbit in the years immediately following the warp-but
domestic productive capacity is now believed to be slightly in excess of Rumania's
own rail requirements*
Co Manpower*
Rumania is self-sufficient in manpower for railroad operations*
The Soviet Union has supplied technical experts in the past, largely in order
to train Rumanian personnel in Soviet procedures, but the few Soviet railroad
personnel now employed in Rumania hold supervisory positions to insure Soviet
control 'of the aystemu
5.
Probable Developments*
Small and gradual improvements are expected throughout 195142 in
the condition of Rnmsanimn railroad equipment and facilities, chiefly in the
strengthening of the fixed facilities along main lines. These improvements will
maintain present capacities rather than appreciably increase the total carrying
capacity of the rail system. It is possible that in 1952 Ramaniawilidouble-
track: A large portion of the line between Bucharest and Craiova and strengthen
the roadbed and superstructure between Darmanepti and Salve via Vitra Dornei*
Construction on the projected bridge between Corchia and Gigen may be well
advanced in 1952, but no werk is expected to be undertaken on a bridge planned
between Giurein and Ruschuk? Locomotive and freight car inventories may be
increased slightIy011:nd_ the average age of equipnent will be reduced, The
percentage of cars with air brakes and automatic couplings mall*. increased
by the replacement of obsolete equipment*
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26 abaggio
2. Weft Comtrtbutians of Blahvers to the Economic Potential far
Xer qt:the ow.
The condition of Rumanian roads is pearl and highwey traffic is
not considered important to the national economy. In goal weether9 practical4
all of the rowls are negotiable by motor vehicles but lzkwet weather,
eapecially in the spring, most of them can be tra;ersed only with the
greatest difficulty. it Postwar efforts to improve and modernize the road
system have stressed e construction of relatively highicapacity,
weather highways across Rumania from northeast to southwest. While these
highways will contribute aubstantially to the economic capabilities of the
comtry, their routes and struoture, and the great emphasis placed 'on speedy
comp1etion9 indicate that atrategic considerations may:play. a large part in
their construction.
a. Ceara Descrintlop 2f the Network.
Although the Rumanian road gystem is well distributed throughout
the country, its condition is poor, its deceit?' la low (0028 kileacter per
square kilemeter)9 and it is inadequects for economic and military requirements.
The extent and character of the network in 1947 was as fallow's V
Types and Distances of Rumanian Roads
2.947
Class of Roast
Rational
Depar4exata1
Mhnicipal
Total
ballad
29149
42
Lau
Oravel
`er$111?101MMO.
Earth
ingEEL.L11
lizaka
Mod=
=A-
10,245
17,000
11,500
180
3,900
22,000
143.74
209942
33,500
alba
The gravel and broken atone roads cannot inurbain prolonged highs.apeed traffic,
and only 29655 kilometers of the 10,245 kilometers of national roads of this
type were in good condition in 1947. Raverthe1ess9 at preaent there are probably
from 49000 to 59000 kilometers of highweys. strategically located .to facilitate
motor transport across Rumania from the USSR, which are capable of carrying
rapid long.distance traffic. y Postwar projects emphasize the construction
of modern hard.surfaced highways leading north and east from Bucharest, the
prewar highway system having been oriented mainly toward the vest and south0
to77ai
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Large-scalo reconstruction is reported in Trawl:yentas tinand there are plans
for the improvement and widening of roads in the Banat p area bordering
Yugoslavia. L, Road construction projects accounted for 21 percent of the
1949-50 budget,, y
b. Traffic,
The 1951 plan for highway transport calls for the movement of
8? million of freight,* a sizable increase over the 49 million
ton.kilometers
carried in 1950.1( Although reliable data for previous years
are lacking, there are indications that since the establishment in 1946 of RATA, be
.the state monopoly formotor vehicle transport, truck traffic has steadily in-
created. RATA carried 5,100 metric tons of freight in 1946 and 123,000 tons
1949?2/and the 1950 Plan for RATA called for the movement of 371,000 tons of
freight. 10/ Ekcapt fot a small quantity of highway traffic handled by the joint
Soviet-Rumanian transportation agency, Sovrastransport?** RATA does all the camu
martial trucking in Rumania. 16( Hosever, a Much larger proportion of total
higtmay traffic is of a noncommercial nature and is hauled by trucks belonging
to various Industrial enterprises and by horse-drawn vehicles? Agricultural
produce is the Chiercommodity transported by road, but, in addition, industrial
products and =materials are carried in the urban areas.
C. Equipment?
The type and quantity of road-building machinery now in use are
not known,. Imports of heavy construction machinery fron Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and the USSR have been reported in the Rumanian press, and small quantities of
such equipment have, been requisitioned fran private ofters. Manual labor is
si.dely used, and road work is compulsory for much of the population at a maximum
rate of 20 days a year.
41? Capacity..
From 4,000 to 5,000 'dictators of the highway network, inyluding
roads from Bucharest to the Soviet and Hungarian frontiers are probably able to
sustain traffic at a rate of 1,000 metric tons each ally a Say. The capacity
of the rest of the system is unknown, but it is highly unlikely that any of the
highways are Used to capacity. The road system, therefore, is probably capable
of accommodating appreciably increased traffic movements.
e. Vulnerability.
Long-distance motor vehicle traffic in RuMania is confined to
a limited number of highways, but the resulting vulnerability is of little
importances because of the small percentage of total traffic normally carried
by highway transport,
r"'""t7-rpWent of all Rumanian freight traffic,,
** Sovramtransport, a Soviet-Rumanian joint stock company, is believed to
contra the policies and operations of RATA.
78
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Afoot Contributiema pf pialway pmpoark louinms0 to the
bonande Poteartial for War of Vie 17SSEk.
kratotattaae
Before World War 21 there Were frau 32,000 to 35q200,vehiclea
of all types in the Rumanian motor vehicle pasty but by early 1948 the total
had dropped to from 15,000 to 179000, an of which were reported to be in
Pool" condition. 13/ Another report for the year 1948 etatee that the vehicle
inventory at that time totalled 17,200 units, includingll9000 passenger cars,
5,000 trucks, and 1,200 buses. Thirty percent of the trucks and buses, all
of which turned either gasoline or diesel Mel, and 70 percent of the
passenger cars were believed to be of US manufacture. 311/
Receipts of vehicles under the terms of Romanian trails
agreements with the USSR have been widely publicized, but actual figures
have not been reported. Mlimaniats known vehicle imparts are as fellows:
Irmo?Rumanian note VobjeIs Imports
1949..50
ittada
1949 VS. ?
Italy
UR
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
USSR 4,/
Passenger
=MaThmej kotal
130 ji/
200
16
1,600 si/
Total III 1421A
1950 Italy 222 100 42/
Czeahoalovakla 260
USSR 790 V
Total
Orand? Total la
aari
16
50
Ito
25
? 226
25e
16
1,650
947
322
270
790
?a 032
ii/ Through Turkey.
II/ 3.00 rasconfirmed.
,2/ Probable.
W Types unknown.
2/. Unconfirmed.
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Mile theme figures do not represent total deliveries, they are believed to
include a sufficient number of deliveries to indicate that the current vehicle
inventory does not exceed 25,000 units, This figure probably includes military
vehicles and vehicles belonging to industrial establishments and government
ministries, since in 1948 RATA operated a fleet of just over 400 trucks and
buses 'and at that time expected to operate only 1,000 vehicles by the end of
March 1949. The number of available motor vehicles is inadequate, as
indicated by e 1949 government decrees mach ordered all private owners of
draft animals and carts to register with police authorities for the purpose of
carrying materials for various state enterprises as required. Despite the small
size of the vehicle park, gas rationing has been in effect since 1948, probably
because of heavy petroleum exports to the USSR.
It ie likely that the age and divergent origin of much of the
Rumanian vehicle park and the difficulty involved in procuring parts for
obsolete models limit serviceability to a meadrama of 60 percent. The press
in 1949 stated that RATA vehicles, reported to be operating about 100 kilo-
meters each a day, Waveraged 27,000 kilometers between repairs and
traveled from 40,00Z7to 60,000 kilometers an one set of tires. 17/
be Effect of Transfers to the USSR.
No transfers of motor vehicles to the USSR are knaan to have
taken place. The comparatively undeveloped state of Rumanian Motor transport
and the small percentage of total vehicles no used for commercial purposes
suggest that possible future transfers of motor vehicles mould have only a
minor effect on the Rwandan economy, If, however, transfers should include
largo numbers of carts, wagons, and draft animals, the effects on the econagy
mould be more widespread.
30 Indirect Contributions.
Some motor vehicle traffic presumably moves between Rumania and
the USSR, but no data are available on such traffic, There is no known
highway traffic betmeen Rumania and the lest.
4. Inverse Contributions.
an Equipment.
The acceleration of large-scale highway construction and improve-
ment in Rumania mill require imports of additional road-building machinery, and
the continued expansion and modernization of the rotor vehicle park will require
increasing imports of vehiclee. An. April 1951 report states that Rumania is
importing 250 Soviet vehicles, mostly trucks, a month. 18/ Spare parts and
tires represent a further import requirement, CzedhosiNakia probably will
also continue to supply Rumania with vehicles and parts.
b. Materials.
Rumania has ample supplies of road-building materials.
Cements, asphalts and a newly developed surftoing material called iradbit are
all produced in volumes 'which meet Rumanian needs and leave a see-garnr
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export. Structural steel for bridges, however, is a major highway item for
which Rumania is dependent on outeide aid.
o. Manpower.
Ronnie. has a pool a manual labor sufficient for highway
needa but requires external assistance in obtaining engineers, designers,
and trained technicians,
d. Soviet Control,
Road construction, although controlled by the Ministry or
Construotion, is performed by the joint Soviet-Rumanian company Sovros-
construction, staffed mainly with Soviet personnel, and by ite
Derubau, a former German organisation taken over by the USSR after the war,
Derubau has been responsible for tha construction cif the major Rumanian roads
of national importanoe,
Although details of the control of the highway transport
agency RA.TIL are not known, it is likely that its policies ard operations are
directed by Sovrombransport, the joint Saviet-Rumanian,comany largel,y staffed
and exclusively controlled by Soviet personnel?
5.., Probable Developments,
It is probable that 1952 will see the completion of the major
alimweather highways now being built through Rumania to link the USSR with
Central Europe. It appears doubtful, however, that motor transport traffic
will increase significantly or that the number of motor vehicles allotted
to commercial activity will expand appreciably. The development of bath
the vehicle park and the highway network will cc:outlaw to be focused on
military and strategic rather than on economic objectives.
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Co Water TraeeParbe
10 Direct Contributions of Water Transport to the Economic
Potential. Ito liar of the USSR.
1 Rumanian water transport facilities make a direct and important
contri tion to the Soviet economic potential for war. The Danube River
pr 0 a cheap and easy means of transportation for petroleum exports to
the USSR. Rumania's maritime ports, moreover, are essential to trade with
the USSR, since cargoes moved within Rumania by rail and pipeline are trans-
shipped at these ports to the Soviet Union, Despite their vulnerability,
Rumania's ports would be useful in wartime supply operations in the Balkans,
and the Danube would provide a military supply routes
a. General Description of the Network.
Although Rumania has several navigable rivers, only the
Danube, which forms much of the sauthernborder of Rneania? is of economic
importance. Constanza is the only major maritime port, and its importance
will be increased by the eventual completion of the Danube-Black Sea Canals
nmerveder constructions wiliCh will link Constanza with the Danube near Corns-
Voda. Galatz and Braila, inland ports on the Danube, are also served by Ships
trading in the Black Sea. In addition to Galatz and Braila, there are *bout
25 smaller ports on the Rumanian Danube, some of them mere docking points
others, such as Orsova, Turnu-Severin, and Giurgiu? of considerable importance
to river traffic?
b. Traffic.
Rumania's water transport system is important to the country's
foreign trade, as males to the internal ecammer. Rumanian exports to the
USSR consist primarily of petroleyi products Zran the Ploesti fields, grain
and other foodstuffs, and lumber, which move doenstream on the Danube to
Rmsenian Black Sea ports for transshipment to Aoviet ports on the Black Sea.
Thera is also considerable petroleum traffic to the Communist Far Et. Although
the Rumanian merchant fleet has become increasingly active in foreign trade, such
as the grain traffic to Albania, the bulk of the petroleum traffic ia carried
in Soviet vessels. Danube traffic also includes petroleum and grain for
Czechoslovakia and lumber for Hungary and Western Europe0 ammniam imports
carried by water are Chiefly industrial raw materials and products shipped down
the Danube from the other Satellites and by sea from Poland, the USSR, and the
West.
Equipment.
The ports and waterways of Rumania are fairly well-equipped
with traffic and cargo-handling facilities. War damage has not been canpletely
repaired in all ports, although Constanza? Braila, and Ciliate are 'believed
to be in better than average condition, and in many harbors the lack of storage
facilities is a severe handicap. The Danube route is still replete with such
traffic hazards as sunken bargee and rapids.
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d. Capacity,
The total capacity of Rumanian ports for ocean traffic is
estimated at about 13,500 metric: tons a day, a significant portion of the
total port capacity of the Satellites on the Black Sea. Of this total,
8,500 tons can be handled at Constanza, and 5,000 tons at Galata and Braila.
Recent reports indicate considerable activity in the Rumanian seaports, and
It is poseible that there is no significant excess capacitr available at the
present time. The combined capacity of the Danube ports of RUmania might be
as much as 15,000 metric tons a day.
a. Vulnerability.
Disruption of water transport would affect both Rumania's
domestic and foreign trade and would be particularly damaging to the transport
of petroleum and grain.
2. Direct Contributions of Shiing to the Economic Potential
or TTar of tbe R0
aAi ? Inventories.
The Rumanian fleet includes seven ocean-going ships of
29,000 gross registered tons. NO reliable census of the river fleet is
available,, but it is known to consist of small passenger boats freighters
of from 500 to 600 tons, cargo barges and tank barges up to 1,600 tons, and
tugs of various sizes,
be Effect of Transfers to the USSR.
The USSR has already taken over portions of both the Thalami=
ocean and aland fleets and receives tonnage as Well frau current Romanian
production, As a result, the Than fleets have little or not surplus ton-
nage, and any further transfers to the USSR would be correspondingly damaging
to their capacity.
30 indirect Contributions.
Role of Water Transport in Soviet Trade*
Although much of Soviet-Rumanian trade across the Black Sea
moves in Soviet ships Rumanian water transport makes a direct contribution to
this traffic and play: an important role in the inland movement of export
traffic destined for the USSR, The principal export cargoes are petroleum,
'wheat, and timber, 'stile Runmian imports consist mainly of cotton. This
traffic, as previously indicated, is of considerable importance to the Soviet
economic potential. The transport of petroleum products would be of critical
significance in the event of war,,
Rumania ss maritime and Danube traffic with various other
Satellites is not believed to be of major economic Importance, but the
Rumanian Danube is also used for transit traffic between the USSR and other
Satellites,
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be Role of Water Transport in Track with the West,
Rirromistn ships trade with Turkey and nearby Black Sea areas
but in recent months have teen increasingly active outside the Black Sea*
Traffic with the West, hammer, is of little econamio importance,
40 Inverse Contributions*
Any major expansion ce.Rnmanials water transport potential
momidnecessarily depend largely on Soviet assistance or direct participation*
Soviet contra over _Rumanian maritime transport Is complete at present, and
there 1/1 little prOapect for any ohange in the near future*
5. Probable Dev....its.e.
Several ships maybe added to the RUMantan fleet in 1951, and
port futilities and river navigation conditions maybe improved, but sub?
stantial Changes in the Romanian umter transport potential by 1952 are not
likely?
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D. Air Transport.
4), - ?
sautir.91:flt 4?..m:
)111,`It: .111
? .?
The only factor in lbriffnirm air trarutport of strategic, signfi.
canoe to the USSR is the oonizribution made by tho Rusuniez airfield network
to the Sovict-spemacrod couplax of suoh facilities cactezading fromtbe Baltic
Sea to the southern frontier of Bulgaria.
giSMI-attalad121-$43111110271?
The Rumanian airfield network consists of 49 airfielde and
1 seaplane base.X.1 There are 15 airfields designated exclusively for civil
aviationp and 6 tional airfields are shared jointly by civil and milit
aircraft. Cf the 49 land installations oar 3# BuobareatAenesas Btebeatf
Otopenip and Zilietea, have paved runways. Zilietaa is the only airfield known
to have a runway extending from 6O00 to 7,000 feet, It is possible, however,
that runways at the two Bucharest airfields may be in process of extensien9
b. 213062.
Civil air traffic in Rtzsania is light, and operations are
carried out by the leintly awned Soviet-Rumanian airline TARS. With one
exception all domestic routes radiate from Bucharest. Two external routes
are flown by TARS.
Rutunian Air Route
1951
Internal
Duebareat-Constansa
Duchareat-Sitd:caCargu Maras-Cluj
Buabarest-Tininoara-Arad
Danhereat-Cluj-Satu Mare
BuebereaWibiu-Oradea Mare
Dunhareat-Targn Awes-Cluj
Daehareat-Galats-Daeau-laeay
Timiaeara-Arad-Oredea Mare-Cluj
External
Duellareat-Ekblapeet
Bunhareat-Pregue
Unknown
Daily exempt Sunday
Daily except Sunday
Daily exempt Sncds7
Daily except SundA7
Daily expect Sunda,'
Daily except Sunday
Unknown
Diveekly
Weekly
Foreign air traffic into Rumania is limited to certain Satellite airlines
and the Soviet Aeroflot.
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Pereiga Airlines Serving Throats
ICT (Poland)
Maszovlet Obuigurh
CSA (Czechoslovakia)
Aeroflot (USSR)
Warsaw4Imuleanume.
Budharest
Bucharest-Budapest
Prague.Bucharest
Moscow.Kiev6.0dessa-
Bucharest-Sofia
Weekly
Biweekly
Weekly
Pour Times a Week
0. limammod.
Rumanian airfield equipment is prtive by Western standards
bat could support an increased air transport program if =Oh operations were
conducted with aircraft no larger than the 11-2. A limited airfield equip-
ment and runway extension program was Initiated in 194d under a Soviet..
Rumanian agreement. ?aphasia has been plead an the fielda used for civil
transportation such as Arad/dealal Cauj/Sameseni, Satul/Mare, and Sibin/
Turmisor. Ballo aids to navigation consist only of to/P equipment, tower
facilities, and beacons. Airfield lighting for night landings is not adequate,
amd ground lumilleg equipment is amerces 3/
Cavacitv.
The capacity of the Rumanian airfield network would permit
relatively lergemecale transport.operaimmviiith the type of aircraft utilized
by the USSR.
o.
Rumanian air transport equipment is vulnerable to sabotage,
bat its deetruation would have no affect upon the Soviet economic potential*
a?
With the sasteption of three 31042 aireraft obtained !reel the
USSR and used by?the civil airline, all Thailld132 civil. sal military air
transports are obsolete, and a large percentage are nonoperational because
of lack of spare parte.* Rumanian air transport equipment, therefore, does
not add to the econcmic notential for lair of the USSR,.
Ir'TfiTIGZM aircraft inventory iiaaluded 3 IL4125, 13 Mass
4 J6.52s, 4. Lodestars, 5 P0.42e, 2:Mal1s, and 11 JU-34s, 4/ Military a1r4raft
are limited to 5 JU-52s1 5 S4.49s, awl 5 C-6060,5/
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bo itthritartMeara to the USSR.
Transfers of operational aircraft to the USSR wOuld result
In the virtual cessation of air traneportation within RUM:1U bat would have
no appreolable street on the economy.
3. bilarectCqutlittettioee.
. Rumanian air transport is not a factor in Soviet.ftmanian trade,
nor in Rumanian trade, overt and Clandestine, with thelWeste
4. Imagusiamdalbalgos*
416 Radom&
Ruleentee Principal requirement in the field of air transport
La for aircraft of the LI-2 or 1642 types, which can be obtained only from
the USSR. Soviet assistance to Ramanian air transport has teen limited,
however, to one I10.12, delivered to the civil air line in 1949, and two ethers
recently made available.
b.
Nettaga.
Some spare parte for the miscellaneous group of Rumanian
aireraft have been obtained, presumably tram Czedhoslovakia or Hungary, bat
the large percentage of nonoperational aircraft indicates that Romanian
requirements for spare parts and engine rep1ace6ents are not satisfied.
00 MOM.
Rumania has sufficient personnel to conduct the present
limited air transport operationi without assiatance from the USSR.
50 Zabalaaratigarada6
A recent report ,it discloses a plan to improve the efficiency of
Satellite air transport operations through a consortium of airlines. Undor
Ws. plan, designed to replace the present system of individual single.irtop
round trips, the airlines of Naomi, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Cacho.
slorakia would operate over an International Satellite network touching the
principel cities. Such a development, requiring a pooling of equipment and
repair facilities, is feasible and would probably adhieve same economies of
operations. It Would also tend to simplify Soviet control of Satellite air
transport operations.
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122.411ANNI.
1. axeatContr4,DurtipampfP4N,Ineranitlitiesi,o_tbekazds
rotantial fir War or thf U.
a. riENCESUNENARAINLQUilaillb2d.
The total length of the IbveinnieTt pipeline network is about
1,420 kilometers. Oil pipelines connect the Ploesti fields with Constanza,
Giurgiu, and Rani. Three 10-inch lines lead to Constanza. Branobing from
---thess.linee are a 5...inch and a, 104nch line extending to Dunham% Pratt
-which two 5-inoh lines continue to Ginrgiu. A 104noh line Also branches
fron Paurei to Braila and Reni. Extension of this latter line to Odessa
is believed completed. The branch line to Rani was built an Soviet orders
with pipe taken from two additional lines which the Germans bad laid to
Giorgiu. Two gas lines also lead to Bucharest*
b. UM&
It .is probable that over 50 percent of all POL supplied by
Rumania to the USSR is at some stage carried by pipeline*
e. Radius&
No data are available on maethinery in use for pipeline
construction in Rumanis.
d. agalatk.
Capaeity of the Rumanian oil pipeline system bee been estimated
at 17,000 metric tons a day. The reliabilitr of thie estimate, which indicates;
the existence of substantial unused capacity, has not been established.
Parthermares it is not the practioe of the petroleuat industry to operate oil
pipelines at capacity for extol:lied periods of time. The capacity of the
gas lines is unknown,
e. julnerabilttz.
The econcedo vulnerability involved in the ell pipeline
system is illustayted by the fact that apparently about 60 percent of all
Rumanian oil is tranaported at sane time by 3.mmg.distanee pipelines. The
Constansa lines cross the Danube on a rail bridge between ?Oast& and Ouidiu,
and the line to Rani crosses the Pruth in a similar mummer at Galatia.
Successful attacks at these points would seriously diarept Rumania's oil
transport system.
2. Eqgjosterk to tip lioommeip
So far as is known, no Rumanian-ballt pipeline equipment has been
transfeaved to the USSR. Ruannian production of such equipment is probably
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limited to pumps and le so slight in volume as to preclude future exports
of any egaifioance.
3* liallagatadatallakina?
Although Thmuurtan on exports to the tISSR do noten_gaircreuth.,
petroleum s thin
a
Sinai over 50 percent of
all exports to the USSR is carried at acme time ay pipeline,
and eines other fcame of transport could not absorb this; traffic in its
entir4ity, the role of Rumanian pipelines in trade with the USSR la a vital
one. The Rumanian pipeline network plays no part in trade with the West.
4121201?tatiabitisia?
Whatever pipes and mope may be required for expansion of the
Rumanian pipeline network must be largely imported.
5? haikailipiaragasuake.
Little change in the extent or enployment of the Rumanian pipeline
system is anticipated. Since petroleum production is not sufficient to
ten the present capacity of the network, further expansion in ifticedtlyo
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VIII, gigaigtaUgadaseLAUS2SasitiliMitigo
1.Inulatajaattatagailaidian.
While the Rumanian soonomic plan aims et eventual brood industrializes.
tion, postwar efforts have been concentrated on the development of key
vs industries to capacities beyond domestic requirements and on the
tion of egrieulture. Thus, while the general pattern of allocation
of resources ie directed toward greater induetrialisation of the country,
current and immediately prospective devolopnent is predominantly in fields
iihich provide strategic materials to the Bloc. Strom is placed on the
petroleum industry, on expanded production of carbon black, and on devaLop
meat of copper, lead, and sincleining. Some attempt is also being mole to
develop the production of industrial machinery and equipment sudh as oil
drilling equipment and ball bearings. Tractor production is being promoted
on a considerable scale as a step toward expanded output of grain.
2. tialgeLtagjatagenfat.
Although agriculture employs about three?fourths of the Rumanian labor
force it produces only a little more than onewthird of the national inoome.
The e:onomic plan, while assigning higher priority to industrial developm
meaty will devote enbstantial resouroee to the mechanization of agriculturev -
and tractor production is scheduled to increase tree 3,000 units in 1951 U.
MOO units in 1955.
3? raltaifilatalandiall?
In the allocation or Rumanian resources ender the plan for economic
development, requirements for civilian oonsumption reeeive the lowest
priority. Zaed and ahelter apparently will be allocated only in amounts
sufficient to maintain industrial and agricultural production as sdheduled.
Coteibptilme of the Boomer to the War Capabilities gr the U$SK.
pr fax' the most important economic contribution made by Rtsnania to
the Soviet war potential is petroleum. Rumania is the largest source of
petroleia and petroleum pWancts available to the Soviet Union in Eastern
BUrope. Only about 20 percent of Rumania's output is consumed domestically,
and the rimmnining 80 percent is allocated by the USSR within the Bloc0
aglimolso is expected to make a contribution to the Soviet war potential.
An export surplus of 745,000 metric tone, anticipated for 1952v will be
a significant Soviet gain in VieV of rising food requirements in the USSR.
Other strategic commodities contributed bp- Rumania to the war potential
of the USSR are carbon black for rubber tire production, pyrites for the
produotion of sulphuric acid and caustic soda and soda ash for the chemical
industry. Though small in tLnage, Rumanian exports of copper, lead, and
sine are important, since these minerals are in short supply in the Bloc0
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Various new industries, which did not exist In prewar Rumania, have
been started as part of the country's lonvrange industrialisation program.
Attempts are being mad.e to produce oil drilling equipment. The dittionlitt
of obtaining bell bearinge bas led to the beginning of a domestic bearing
industry. Tractors are being produced in increasing numbers. All these
industries are still in their WWI', tut thftrreProaaat a significant
dhiige in the structure of the eeonomy. This development of Smasnia's
--AamWtry will contribute in the long run to the economic potential for war
of the Soviet Bloo. *WO immediate contritntions are apparent in the
shipments to the USSR of strategic materials, notably petroleum, grain9
chemical products, some nonferrous creep and pyrites.
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Bemuse of the relatively :Low level of industrialization inftmenial
its present import requirements, with same exceptioms, can be Impaled by
the other Bloc members. The most Important emption is speolallsed
machinery, particularly for the petroleum industry, which in order to
maintain current production, requires exploration and drilling equipnent
that in many instances neither the USE. nom. Csedhoslovakia can supply.
Rumania's vigorem attempts to obtain this equipment from the Vest are
evidence of ite serious need.
Modern equipment wdll be needed to fulfill plans far a large increase
in coal produaGion in the next 5 years. Neely establighed manufacturing
industrials will also require:m:61nm and equipnent. If Imports from the
1.4est were completely cut off, the projected industrialization program would
be retarded, whereas if Western exports were denied to the entire Soviet
Bloc the effect an Rumania would be more severe. A large part of
RumaLl's maohine tools, steel, transportation equipment, and agricultural
maohinery are imported from within the Elm, and the reallocation of these
materials and equipment within the Bloc, which would be necessitated by
Western economicimerfare, would force Rumania to modify its economic plans.
Purthermore the allocation of resources by the Soviets would probably be
severely 11Mited because of Rumania's relatively small economic contribu-
tion to the Bloc.
Intrapaloc trade could only partially offset the effects of Western
measures of economic warfare against Rumania, because the Soviet Bloc is
already allocating the maxlmanaleilable supply of machine tools and other
industrial equipment. Since the Rumanian emmany has only a few specialised
industrial lines opportunities for adjust:met to measuree of economic
warfare through :substitutions and changes in production achedules and
consumptUnipotterns would he Limited.
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balgiagaitjUnnuattgaLsuaTim.
There is no evidence in Rumania of such mar preparations as the mobiliza?
tion of manpower or the dispersal of in&ustry. There is no evIdence of
stockpile accumulation that mould constitute immediate preparation for mar
although there Is some stockpiling of petroleum. Efforts to reduce economic
dependence on The West and developmeat of transport facilities are for the
most pert an integral part of the Rumanian industrialization program, but
the development of some transport facilities coincides with war requirements.
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APPENDIX A
RECAPITULATION OF IMITATIONS, DEFICIENCIES,
AND REQUIREMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE
Sections III, VIII, IL, and X do not have material
to be indluded in this Appendix.
I.itljpj.SrendsirizrutureofthaE.
Unfortunately, the limited time available for the preparation of this
paper made It impossible to exploit all the sources of information that
were available and to evaluate completely all of the information that was
used. Consequently, the following list of requirements should be regarded
as tentative And preliminary rather than complete.
I,at12110fPPrarlans.
a. Methods and agencies uned in formulating economic plans in Rumania.
b. Soviet control of Rumanian plan preparation, including informa?
tion on the extent to which these plans are drafted by the MM.
c. The role in plan control of the State Control Commission, the
Commission for Organization of Cooperatives, the Central Statistical
Institute, and the State Commission for Collection of Agricultural Produce.
d. The extent of Soviet control of plan fulfillment and methods
by which this control is effected.
2, Plan Control.
a. Libre recent quantitative estimates of industries and economic
services nationalized.
b. More complete lists of industries and services nationalized
sine the original decree of 11 June 1940 and the percentages of total out?
put produced by nationalized enterprises.
0. Effectiveness of government control over both nationalized and
nonnAtionalized enterprises.
cl4 Lore recent quantitative estimates of land collectivized in
Rumania.
e. The effect of collectivization on agricultural production and
distribution.
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f. Other nongovernmental instrumsnts of economic contl-ol.
g. Ilethods tgrwhich these other organizational struotures are
utilized by the state an instruments of economic control.
3, Administrative Control of Industry.
a. Administrative control of cooperatives and private industry by
the Rmenian government.
b. Key positions currently held by Soviet citizens in Rumanian
industry.
0. Extent to which the Soviet control of Rumanian industry has
effectively achieved USSR plans regarding those industries*
d. The administratore nwonaux.i.om and the chain of command used by
the government to control industry.
e. The internal structure of Rumanian ministries, particularly those
which implement state planning,
f. Soviet-Satellite assistance given Rumania in its capital goods
requirements/ investment needes and technical guidance*
Administrative Control of Agriculture,
a. Degree to which collectivization difficulties have been en-
countered thus far.
b. The organizational structure and functions of the Llnistry of
Agriculture.
5g Administrative Control of Services.
a. The extent to which control of commerce has been increased
recently by the state and by cooperative organizations.
b. Soviet means of control over finances particularly over banking.
0. The organizational structure of nationalized economio services.
II, Cepacitir of Human Resources for Economic Development.
The estimate of the total agricultural labor force is subject to a zargin
of error of about 5 percent. Additional data on the progress of collectivize,
-
tion and the drafting of labor from farms are necessary for the refinement of
estimates. The estimates of the occupational distribution of the labor force
are believed to be subject to varying but small margins of error and additional
&Ile are necessary for further refine:mart. Further collection of data concerning
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military personnel used in construction and employment of political prisoners
is necessary.
The numbers of advanced students is believed to be subject to a margin
of error of less than 5 percent. Additional data on the training of various
types of technical personnel and on the number of Soviet technicians in
Rnmanin are needed to determine the number of technical personnel available
to theatimanimeconoary. Additional information concerning the level of labor
productivity and factors affecting it is required for better estimates of
futura changes in productivity.
IV. loreign Trade and Finance.
The problem of Asking an evaluation of Rumanian foreign trade and finance
is made difficult by the lack of information on the value of trade for the
period 194047. Another obstacle to trade evaluation and analysis 19 incon-
sistency in the data. Attempts to estimate and to forecast encounter the
same difficulties of noncontinuous and nonoomparable data. General statements,
therefore, are based on different degrees of accuracy in estimating and in
many cases need varying degrees of modification, depending on the assumptions
used.
Trade agreements were used to estimate the planned level of trade, but
the official exchange rates indicate projected levels which seem abnormally
high if compared from period to period. It is unknown whether these planned
exchanges were based on prices in 1938, in 19441 in the previous year, or in
the current year, or on world prices.
V. ...115.1.,tam.
Adequate prewar statistics and statistical bases have been prepared for
Rumania by the office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, US Department of
Agriculture; the International Institute for Agriculture, Roma (now the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Organization); and others'.
In addition, the Rumanian Agricultural Statistical 'Yearbook is available in
the Library of Congrese and the Library of the US Department of Agriculture.
Postwar agricultural information on Rumavia has become increasingly
unreliable. Until the early-part of 1950 the agricultural reporting, within .
the limits imposed by the Rumanian government, '43 fairly good4 but at that
, tine!, the vice consul in charge of agricaltural reporting was transferred, and25X9A1
he has not been replaced. This has farther reduced the standards of the US
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In general, the Food and Agriculture Branch depends primarily on news-
papers, radio broadcasts, and other incidental information as the basis for
its estimates. Mich of the required information, it is believed, could be
obtained by a t1 "ed agriculture] reporter. Production estimates could be
much more wourate if dependable weather infarcationvero available*
VI. Industrial Capacity and ,Levels of Production.
A. Ferrous Uetals.
Very little information on developments in the Rumanian iron and
stevaindustry is being currently received. Reliable data are needed on the
location of ore deposits and mines; estimates of reserves of ferrous metals;
production figures for 1948, 1949, aid 1950; production estimates far 1951
and 1952; trade statistics on raw materials and semifinished iron and steel
products; domestic requirements for iron and steel products; ard progress
reports on the expansion of the industry.
B. Nonferrous Detale.
1. Copper,
Information is lacking =recent production, figures, on the
capacity of minas and processing facilities, on requirements, on stockpiles,
on expansion of mines and facilities, and on new exploitations at the Alton
Tep mine in Tulcea.
2. Lead and Zinc.
reformation Is lacking On recent production figura; on whether
or not a smelter exists at Gopsa-Mica and, it so, its capacitor; on the capacity
of minas and processing facilities; on requirements; on stockpiles; and on
the new nonferrous meta combine(.
C. Coal.
The following information is required:
1, Annual coal production tiguresbrareas and for indivilheal mines
if possible. The last year for which such data are available is 1947.
2. Detailed data on individual mines other than those in the au
Valley in Hunedoara Province, for which some fairly good reports have been
received. Information ahould inclnde-the location, type of mine (shaft,
drift or slope), thickness of tba coal seam mining methods, equipment used,
mining difficulties, labor conditions anal;ses of the coal, cleaning and
briquetting, and destination of the plooduot.
3. Data on thesource production, and types of mining machinery and
equipment manufactured in Rumania. The A.C.P. plant in Petrosani is reported
to be supplying equipment and apparently serves as a machine repair base, but
nothing more is known about this plant,
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4. Deammatima on the source, quantities, and types of coal
;wining machinery and equipment imparted.
5. Data on the consumption of and roquiraments for coal by various
categories of consumers.
6. CUrrent figures on imports of coal and coke from Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and the USSR.
7. Data on production and imports of metallurgical coke.
8. Data on the production of gas coke, including information on
the plants producing it.
9. Information on the size and location of the principal stockpiles
of coal.
Petroleum.
Historical data =Rumanian petroleum are very good, but since 1948
little concrete information has been received, The major gaps are listed
below,
1. Size, location, and type of stockpiles.
2. Exports of petroleum products by quantity, destination, and
product,
3. Location, capacity, and output of individual operating refineries
4. Crude-oil production statistics by fields and total.
5. Consumption by quantity, product, and consumer group.
6. Construction of new refineries, including equipment and units
to be installed,.
7. Exploration, successful and unsuccessful, for new deposits of
crude oil.
8. Construction or expansion of storage facilities, including
capacity.
E. Electric Power,
1. En' Resources.
It is not known what difficulties are being encountered as a
consequence of the Rumanian oil shortage and what steps, in addition the decision
to place a limit on the consumption of gas by power plants, are being taken
to overcome them. There is, therefore, no accurate way to predict consumption
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of the varioue types of fuels in 1951.52 or to determine how the efficiency
of the industry has been affected.
Elsotriciier Ganarating Plants,
There in almost no postwar inforatima on electricity generating
plants in Rumania, A list of generating plants was prepared in 1, with a
figure far the caeacity.for each paant, bet a leak of knowledge of the con-
dition, age, and origin of the equipeent, of fuel supply, and of the adeqnacy
of' trained personnel aims that the margin of error in estimates of the
operating capacity of a powar pleat is as high as 50 percent. Such Me in
information prevent accurate eatimatmeofzegional ocnoontrations of reserves
ar shortages of capacity, and of the balance betneen the capacity-demands
of an industrial Installationen& ths capacity ofanearhy power plant,
Adequate information is lacking for an estimate of the rate of installatima
of new capacity. arr of the projects underlay are known, but completion
dates cannot be estimated. ,
3. Tranmadsaion.
Although there aro eome data an tto abwark of power (maw-
ilea between individual pomar plants and consuming centers,
there is little
detailed information on the condition and carrying capacity of lines and
sebstations,
h, Production.
The 2950 figure for total :predation is probably accurate, but
estimates of productiOh far 1951 and 1952 ocatainveakneeses which are um.
avoidable Wien percentages puhliehmi tithe Rumanian press, the oay
*Venable Boum are wed. Figures farregiontildistribution of predation
are lacking fag Ly year. Information of this type would help in estimating
.reserve capacity, type of load, and condition of equIpmenb.
5. Consumption.
dita on the consumption patternaregoodo but the lack
of consumption information for industrial installations is a weakness account..
ing far the inability to determine trends in industrial coneumption.
66 Input Requirements,
The Rumanians maybe capable of operating existing facilitiee
without large inputs of spareparts materials, and skilled manpower from
foreign count r is
ries* but poof reqti red, There ie no inforration an 'which
to thee quantitative estimates of equipment, materials, and manpower
actually received.
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F, Chemicals*
The volume of current informstion concerning the production of
chemicals in Anneal* has declined markedly' since early 1949. Before that
time, published statistics an cutput of dbemicals were available, but,
beginning in 1949, annual production -was reported only iziterms of per-
ventage increases over the previous year's output. Information is needed
particularly on the production and capacity of the following plants:
wlitrogen, at Ternaveni? mlitramonian at Pagans, Turd & Chemical Wolin: at
Turda, Ulcers at Ocna-Edresului, and the Vasa State Vazte at Ude* (1mder
construction). These plants produce the bulk of Rumania's heavy chemicals.
1. Sulphur and Pyrites.
. Little reliable information is available an the production and
distribution of 80phi:rand pyrites in Rumania. The existing world shortage
of sdlphur and the future shortage anticipated in pyrites make procurement Of
such information increasingly important, since the Satellites are in large
part dependent on:the lest for supplies of these materials.
2. Rdbber.
Extremely little information is available on the rubber industry
in Rumania. 'Data are particularly needed on eynthetic rubber production,
existing or planned. Although press reports state that such production is
underlay, the c] reportsavailable indicate production is at vulva pilot-
.plant or experimental stage. Information an the actual existence of p3ants,
their location, facilities, type and process, and raw material, is needed.
Recent data on carbon black facilities, production and exports and any post-
'arida% on rubber DI:brio:aim facilities and production would be of value.
0, Engineering Industry.
It is estimated that the accompanying paper represents approximately
a 50-percent -research job at the material available in CIA. Beteeen10 and
80 percent of the material available was gowned, and it is believed that
the nature and trends of the ROmanian engineering industry have been fairly
adequately covered in broad outline. About 3 months would be required to
complete a thorough research and development of the material available.
The following table indicates the thoroughness of the research
accomplished on the various 'Alamos of the industry:
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Ihterial Percent a Percent of
Available Material Read Ihterial Dovelazed
Planning Good 90
Production Fair 75
Requirements Poor 75
Trade Fair 70
Internal
Limitations Fair 60
60
50
50
21 o etat4fltiaal analysis of the relative sise of the industry, ex-
pressed in such terms as ambers of workera employed or aggregate terimee
output, has been compiled. An estiante of tin total number of 110111:0113 Mould
rewire tho addition of indisidual estimates on each plant, and no crwr-all
Grammer& statistics aro believed to to available in C/A.
Official production statistics in other than paroentage terms are
not mailable except for tractors, for uhich projections on be Ando from
base figures. Calculations of railroad equipment production Imre made from
estimates of ex-prisoners of gar az defectors. For other types of machinery
ami equipmeht, there are no prOductica statistics although estinertes could
be Ea& tqf totalling ex-priaiaaer-olusa.r and defector estimates of individual
plant output. Since the reliability of thew estimates vreiries vddelor, and
for scam plants are not available, such ovarian estimates rould bo subject
to a Vide rgin of ?tutor?
Data on requiremente are sparse, bub with considerable effort reason-
able estiratee could be made 011 Urn bOldB of produ.otion statistdcs for thee?
sectors of the mower *Loh we users of machinery and equipment, such as
petroleum and agriculturo. Trade data are in fragrentary fora. No detailed
invert or export statistics are avallablavand little 1210re than general con-
elusions could be reached. Present information concerning Rumanian aircraft
production and Soviet intentions for its utilisation is mro2iob1o, inoomp3.ete0
and fivmpontlar contradictory.
VII. Transportatica,
A. Railroads.
Available intelligence on Roennian railroadsie inadequate in every
fiold of railroad aottvitr, Re1tbL traffic statistics for the years after
1945 do not exist. Reliable figures on invontories of loccentives? freight
oars, tank oars, and passenger carp are not available after 11450 nor ts
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there aocarate Information on the percentages of oars which era serviaeable,
unserviceable, or beyond repair. Although there is fairly good information
on network developments and new ltne construction In the southern part of the
country, almost nothing is knoan about developments north of the lath parallel,
despite the fact that this is the area in which strategic develops's,. are to
be expected. Infonnation on line construction, strengthening, and b.roadening
is urgently needed.
B* Men*
Major deficiencies in Information on fluManian highsay transport conoern
the followings the specific number, typee, and condition of vehicles ettrrently
In the civilian motor vehicle park; the procurement and disposition of motor
vehicles, including method, number, type, origin, and destination; amilatenalace
procedures and spare parte requirements; locatice and production of repair
shops and parts plants; motor vehicle operations and traffic; fuel requirements;
vehicle retirement rate; type, quantity, origin, and destination of commodities
carried by motor vehicles; the nature and effect of seasonal factors In operaticiim
and traffic; total tons now carried by motor vehioles, average length of haul,
total ton-kilameters (similar data are also required for animal-draen highway
transport); capacity of the road networks, in total and between specific points;
requireMente, procurement, and use of road construction and maintenance stach.tnery.
C. Water Transport.
Mere information an conditions, faoilities, and capacities of the
Rumardan river porta is required. A more abourate ?ensue of the river fleet
is also, needed, and information identifying the fleet by name type, tonnags,
e
and official serial number, as well as a brief technical desckption of
typical craft, would be vex,/ woeful.
D. Air Transport.
It is believed that two airfield& n Ituevuela are undergoing major
improvements to permit their use by four-engine aircraft, but verification,
as tall as the names of the airfields and the ertent of the rehabilitation
being undertaken, is needed. Prompt reporting is deriired of any improvement
in the system of navigational aide provided at several airfields Which would
permit all-weather operations and night landings.
E. Pipelines.
Major deficiencies in &mailable information on aim:den pipelines
Include accurate data on traffic, procurement and eourcee of pipes and pumps,
operation and maintenance policies and prectioee, type and quantity of fuel
used in pipeline operations, the administrative orruthation of the pipeline
wyetem, and plans regarding future construction and operations.
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