THE EUROPEAN SATELLITE POWER COMPLEX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000900030002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 169
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 8, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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O VICE OF RT. t" H A-'rID REPO
GCS / ?. Pro j t 6-51.s C stributioa to IE-33
EUROPEMT $ATKt ITE P JF t CO
PART I
INDIVIDUAL SATELLITE C?M.HIESs
TOOMM f t` THS A WEAK SE5
8 August 1951
I
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. i
Cl DECLASSIFIED
CI ACC CHANGED Tn. rS
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _ / y9
AUTH: ++??HR 7-0-_2
DATES ~I REVIEWER;
ig has been pregarred at the request of the Of ce of IM onal
E timates its a contribution to NIE-33. The material for Section III
oontributec. '' OIRs, Depart of Stet; for Sectim VI G7$ by G-29 Dgq=t--
ment of the Amy. The over-M classi l oatiou of the report is Tap Searet o
C a seotio a however, are of love' classification and are so : .ca .
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(Cants butio n ;o x>33)
PART I
IW IVIEXJAL SATELLITE COUNTRIES:
I~CO,IQi IG STRENGTh S AIrji TTAMM,,"X5M
Cz3 Ch't LcWAKII-
gxl Conclusions.
The oonoinic organization of Czechoslovakia, partilm iarly in industry, is
far_advanaed to'&-erd tho Soviet type, and economic policy i directed from
Moscow, She USSR pl to transform Czechoslovakia' s essentially light induct-:,T
into a heavy indste,:rial cemaolex, which will be integrated with Polish industry
and coal resources to forma "sencond Ruhr," the nucleus for the industrializati4:-i
of the Bloc. In view of the inability of the Soviet Bloc to supply the neeee r..
capital equipment, as well as such rev meteria s as wool, cotton, rubber, and
tin, it is doubtful that suoh a conversion ca-r- be carried out at the rate
scheduled wader the Five Year Plan (1949?53).
The shortage of nonagricultural labor i c another important factor
limiting the ability of the Soviets to carry out their plans for converting
Czechoslovak into the "machine shop" of the Bloc. Although the level o:
technica"s. skill of Czechosloval labor is generally high by Eastern !Duopean
standards ,q the expulsion of 3 raillion Germans, most of them skilled vioirker &
from the u.c; tern part of the country after Tlorld Tar II was a serious loss.
Furthc.-Tu)re, there is little reserve, manpaver available in agriculture except
in the relatively backward region of Slovai ia? there industrial develops sent
is being particularly emphasized.
The standee : of livin in Czechoslnitakia is still the highest awng the
Soviet Bloc countries,, but shortages of consumer goods have resulted in
rationing and high prices vthich9 because the people have in the past been
accustomed to standards comparable to those of Western Europe, have resulted
in low public morale,, Levels of living are not expected to rise appreciably
by 1953.
The v-ital importance to the Soviet Bloc of Czechoslovakia as a source of
industrial equipment is reflected in the rising value of trade between
Czechoslovakia And the Bloc countries, Information on foreign trade shows
that Czechoslovak processing facilities9 the best in the Bloc9 are being used
extensively for the account of the USSR and constitute the. greatest exploit-
able asses, next to the facilities of East Germany, gained by the USSR in the
postwar eyrtti-nsion of Soviet hegemony. Czechoslovak foreign trade policy, as
foivuulated by the Kreml.in, is to strengthen economic ties with the Bloc and
to reduce trade with the Vest, but the composition of Czechoslovak foreign
trade reflects a continued,, though declining., reliance on the Lest. The -most
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important commodities secured from nor,-Bloc countries are iron ore, cotton,
wool, other textile fibers, specialized industrial items, and nonferrous
metals and productsm In l950approximately one-quarter of the value of
Czechoslovak trade was with the USSR, one-quarter with the European
Satellites, one-quarter ri.th Western Europe, and one-quarter slith the rest
of the -;orlde
C zechoslovakia has a ',highly developed iron and steel industry with the
largest output of any of the Satelllites? Although the country has large
reserves of metallurgical coking coal of adequate quality and of low-grade
iron ore., the industry is largely dependent on imports for high-grade iron
ere, iron and steel scrap, and most of the ferroalloys. Procurement of ferro-
alloys is one of the most serious problems confronting the industry, and
failure to obtain a regular and adequate supply has been a principal factor
in the marked deterioration in the quality of Czechoslovak steel products.
Insufficient, amounts of manganese and tungsten -:re mined domestically, All
other ferroalloying metals are obtained entirely from abroado
The Five Year Plan calls for an increase in raw steel production of from
2,7 million ,metric tons in 1949 to 305 million in 1953. To accomplish these
goals,, existing plant facilities will have to be modernized and expanded, new
mills built, modern installations and equipment p r ocured,, and production
methods and plant management improved, These problems would be greatly aggra-
vated by the necessity of extensive conversion of facilities were the availability
of high-grade Swedish ores to be sharply reduced, In any event, the industry is
faced with a critical scrap shortage, and it is unlikely under existing con-
ditions that annual production targets will be met in any year of the Plan,
Czechoslovakia is almost cos3letely dependent on imports for nonmetallic
minerals, as well as nonferrous metals, With the exception of antimony, mercury,
and graphite,, of uahich there are exportable surpluses, the domestic supply is
meager. There is no bauxite or tin ore and only small quantities of copper,
lead,, and zinc ore, all of which are of low grade and too limited in quantity
to permit self-sufficiency,
The supply of coal., i:hich provides from 90 to 95 percent of the energy pro-
duced in Czechoslovakia, is adequate, and reserves are ample for an indefinite
period Some bituminous coal is imported, but an almost equal quantity of of icr
types of coal and coke is exported. Proved reserves are estimated to be over
5 billion metric tons of bitumirors and about 4 billion tons of brown coal and
lignite. The bituminous coal is generally of high grade and compares very
favorably with Oezman and Polish Silesian coal., The brown coal is superior to
German brown coal.
Domestic production of crude oil is unimportant, probably not greatly in
excees of 50,9000 metric tons a year,, and known reserves amount to less than
+00,000 tons, Approximately 200,,000 metric tons of synthetic oil are produced
annually from coal,, leaving approximately 400,000 tons of petroleum requirements
to be met by imports,, mainly from Rumania and Austria and to some extent from
the USSR and Hungary?
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Nearly 85 percent of the electric porter distributed over the extensive
Czechoslovak grid is prodheed by thermal generating units. Coal is the
principal source of energy. Coal reserves., most of which are broom coal
with a relatively low heat content, are ample,, but it is planned to increase
greatly the exploitation of hydroelectric resources. Czechoslovakia is pro-
viding the generating naoUrcry and equipment for a new electric power plant
in Poland which will utilize kvliuh coal and gill supply a large amount of
electric power to Czechoslovakian
The chemical industry is substantially self-6upnorting but must import
sulphur and pyritesy as well as salt for alkali and chlorine production and
phosphate rock and potash for fertilizers. In tonnage output and variety of
production the industry ranks third after East GermarW and Poland among the
Satellites. It acts as a processing agent for rasr materials shipped from the
USSR or from the other Satellites. A large proportion of Czechoslovak pro-
duction of finished chemical products, synthetic fuels$ and consumer goods
depending on chemical compounds for their rraxuzfact-ure are exported to the USSR
to the detriment of the Czechoslovak economy. Nitrogen production is inade ,fate,
and additional quantities must be imported, principally from Austria. Three-
fourth: of the domestic output of nitrogen is used in the production of nitro-
genous fertilizers. The rubber fabricating industry is hilly developed and is
capable of rtceting domestic requirements and providing a considerable quantity
of a large variety of rubber products for export. /1though production of carbon
black and rubber chemicals has been started., the country is mainly dependent on
imports for these products, These imports have been obtained, some clandestinely,
fron Western European countries and from the Soviet Bloc*
The engineering industry is the most important sector in the Czechoslovak
cconoW, and it is the key element in Soviet plane for the industrialization of
the Satellites. The main divisions of the industry include heavy machinery,
aircraft., vehicles, and general machinery, In generalq the luc~sstr es producing
capital goods are vulnerable with respect to raw materials, cents, and
specialized machinery., vhich in the past have come mainly from the West, V.estern
export restrictions." even though loosely enforced, have impeded Czechoslovak pro-
duction., inasmuch as the Czechs have been able to obtain from the Soviet Bloc
only inferior metals, defective components? and almost no specialized machinery.
Despite these obstacles, the trend is toward expansion of the industry and in-
creasing conversion to war production.
Approximately ]3 percent of total Soviet uranium availabilities is obtained
from Czechoslovakia., ichhich has deposits of low-grade uranium ores
Czechoslovak transportation is not a factor seriously limiting the war
potential of the Soviet Bloc. The rail network,, vthich carries over 90 percent
of all ton-kilometer traffic, is the most dense in Eastern Europe. It is more
efficient than any other network in the Orbit area. Rolling stock availabilities
are somewhat below present requirements., hoviever, since a large part of domestic
production of this equiprent goes to the USSP. and the Satellites. Furthermore,
a strain is irryosod on the main emst-west lane by the shift of traffic from
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To Trends in the Structure of the Economy,
Summa
A high degree of governmental economic control has been achieved in Caeoho-
slovskia. The nationalization of industry and services is nearly complete, and
over 22 percent of the arable land in the country is under collective or coop-
erative management. About 80 percent of all retail firms are state-owned.
Control is exercised primarily by the Czechoslovak government and secondarily
.by the Soviet Union, operating either indirectly through the national govern-
rent or directly through Soviet representatives placed in selected governmental
agencies,
The Central Planning Board is the highest planning authority in Czechoslo-
vakiae and all decisions on planning are implemented through its operating agency,
the State Planning Off'ioe? In addition, the State Planning Office supervises
they Price Control Office, the State Statistical Office, and the Slovak Planning
Office and checks on plan performance through the statistics collection services.
Labor unions have been converted into instruments of governmental control
over labor. Taxes and financial mechanisms are available for directing the
flow of ooonomia activity and for checking up on possible diversions from the
plan.
Several trends,, however, indicate certain limitations or weaknesses in
Soviet control over the Czechoslovak economy. Shortages of raw materials which
cannot be filled by the Soviet Bloc greatly hinder the efforts of the USSR to
reduce imports from the West and achieve maximum use of manpower and facilities
within the Bloc. Efforts to expand the industrial labor force indicate that
increased employment in heavy industry can be attained largely only by the trans'
for of labor from other industries. Reduced emphasis on collectivization in
agriculture reflects the inability of the Communists to proceed at their original
pane without disrupting and reducing agricultural produationp Communist controls
are in general consolidated and well-established, however, and are considered
adequato for achieving Soviet objectives.
1. Control of the Economy by the Goverrmaent (inaludin& Direct Control by th
a. Economic Planning.
Economic planning in Czechoslovakia has both political and economic
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objectives. The aoonomio plan is formulated, not merely to direct and control
production and distribution but also to maintain and consolidate the power of
the Covrauufist Parbyt, Economic plans not only give guidance and direction to
economic activity but also embody control measures deemed necessary to aooom-
plish various Communist political goals?
(1) Predation of
Czechoslovak economic planning; started with-the Two Year Plan
(1947-46)9 a aeries of production targets designed to raise ar.viut an average
of 10 percent above 193? levels, In these 2 years the government gained ex-
perier:oa in planning and tranaformed the Czechoslovak soon* from a generally
free to a largely planned system,
The first Five Year Plan (1949-53) established far-reaching goals
and set the stage for than introduction of control devices and mechaniaaaa to
assure fulfillment of the Plans 1 The bane of the Five Year Plan was a sta.
t1stical projection of operations, at maximum capacity and full employments
of all productive facilities, After the original statistical plan was developed.,
alterations were made in accordance with the demands of various policies and
problemr, For example, investment targets, which are the most easily changed#
were revised to emphasize heavy industry at the expense of light industry,
which formerly produced for export to the West. Industries to be reduced were
either converted to other production or allowed to perish by cutting the main-
tenance allowance below the attrition rate. .d Agricultural production plans
were ohauged to meet the planned requirements of other sectors of the economy,
Examples of such revisions are the increases projected for industrial crops
and for those crops which permit greater mechanization and integration of
farms, f Foreign trade plans were codified considerably for purely political
reasons, as. for example, the stoppage of trade with Yugoslavia after Tito's
defection and the changes made to counter Western export controls, 4Y
The Five Your Plan took the form of laws which established targets
for over-all production, investments and other aggregate measures which then
became the basis for the allocation of materials, labor, finance, and supplies.
In addition to this general plan, an annual plan was made for 1949, for 1960,
and for 1951, These annual plans are based on the Five Year Plan goals but
include alterations of those goals to meet changing situations, Such revisions
have been made to include increased Soviet demands for military equipment and
heavy steel products, increased exports to the Satellites, and decreased exports
to the West. 6 In addition to the annual plans, there are quarterly plans or
estimates whit , in effect, constitute "bench marks" for checking progress or
for making short-term adjustnents0
The planning process begins with the transmission of Communist
economic policy to the Central Planning Board, the highest planning policy board
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of Czechoslovakia. All 15 members of tho Board are Conmunist Party members,
and they frequently travel to Moscow to discuss the economic problems of Czeoho-
slovm-kia. ? This Board is composed of the Prime Minister, top officials of
the State Flaming Office, and a few others, 8/ The State Planning Office
acts as the operating agency of the Central Planning Board and also supervises
the Price Control Office, the State Statistical Office, and the Slovak Planning
OCfioe,, The State Planning Office draft. plans for the Cabinet, checks on
performance of approved plans through its statistics collection services, and
conducts research on specific economic problems. In the performance of these
duties it is given wide powers. All state and private economic agencies are
obliged to cooperate with it and are subject to its instructions concerting
planning techniques and methodsyand all persons are required by lam to supply
promptly any information that 't requests,
The State Planning Office has the following divisions%
Group I -- Cadre, Plan Control, Legal and Legislation, Material
Balanoes, Investaeents, Labor Force and Social Services, and Coeeearerce and Travel,
Accounting,
4 II - 'Coordination, Financial Plan, Regional Plan, and
Group III -- Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Construction,
and Tresisportation,
Group IV - Agriculture, Forestry, Food, Economic Cooperation,
and Long-term Ply
The Economic Cooperation Division in Group IV is probably the
key to Soviet control of the planning organization at the working level, It
is made up of the following nine sections, Coordination and Control, USSR,
Poland,, Southeast, Production, Foreign Trade Finance, Transportation, Scientific-
Technical Cooperation, and Research and Politioo-Economic Cooperation.
(2) Plan Control,
Plan fulfillment is controll3d through a system of checks and
counterohecks on the progress and direction of production. Financial control,
for example, is exercised through banking, currency, and credit regulations,.
Production control is maintained through the allocation of resources, including
raw materials, power, fuel, and labor, Further control is exercised through
civilian rationing and other devices which limit the demand for goods. In
addition, the government utilizes propaganda or psychological campaigns, various
pressure tactics including "union" pressure, work brigades for special overtime
work, uStakhanovites, "higher work norms, and police intimidation,
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The Communist Party ultimately controls all phases of planned .
production and acts as the supreme economic authority, overseeing both govern.
rental organization and various production units, Party committees are set
up to assure control of governmental agencies. Party representatives are
on all regional and district units of National Committees, The functions
of local governments are performed by the regional and district units of the
National Committees, and Party representatives are in all such units, Through
these Tarty committees the Covnunists maintain control of factories or groups
of factories,.. Production committees, trades union commmittees, social directors,
and security officers erfeot control at they plant or shop levels, The Party
organization appears adequate to oversee and control the complete economic
process,.
(1) Indust .
Administrative control of industry has undesgons a number of
drastic changes since the Communists cane to power in Czechoslovakia, Party-
oontrolied Shop Committees or Action Committees were the first units to assume
control over industrial plants and shops, Experienced managers were turned
out and replaced by persons whose qualifications consisted of their loyalty
to the Party, The resulting production difficulties made the return of ex-
perienoed technical personnel a common occurrence. The functions of Shop
Committees were then out back considerably, and control over technical manage
meat was given to cadres of social or security officers, who perform certain
personnel functions and check on management.
In the process of socialization, various plants and nationalized
factories were merged into enormous combines, 10 (Whole industries were brought
under horizontal control through industrial. bureaus of the three production
Ministries - Industry, Food, and Trade. More recently these Ministries were
broken up into 677 separate directorates, which usually have corporate exist-
once and operate like a corporation except that they are ultimately responsible
to the appropriate Minister, In December 1950, in an attempt to eliminate
the administrative confusion which had developed, these three Ministries were
inorensed to four: Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Building Industry, and
Food Prooesaing industry.
(2) Agriculture,
The Ministry of Agriculture is divided into 10 depart.nents:
Education and Advisory (Agricultural Schools), Vegetation, Animal Husbandry,
Cooperatives, Mechanization, Farm Material and Labor, Pasture Lands, Research
and Experimentation, National Land laud, . and Political. The farm population
is most directly affected by the activities of the Cooperatives, Mechanization,
and Political Departments, 11 The Ministry of Agriculture, in addition to
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,.most completely nationalired0 In the appointment of plant managers, loyalty
to the Party has been the primary consideration, and technical competence has
been of secondary importance0 18 The last sectors of industry to come under
uontrol have been the skilled artisans, espeoially those of the building in-
dietryo
Goverment control of economic services is also exercised through
ownership. About 80 peroent of all retail firms are state-owned, Remnants
of private enterprise can still be found in such small service establishments
as tailor and shoe repair shops and among certain professional people such
as doctors, but even these relatively unimportant reannants are indirectly
controlled by the government through the all-pervasive checks and pressures-
of the Communist Party, 19
(2) Extent of Collectivization of Agriculture,
Collectivization of agriculture is progressing at a slow pace, 20
At the beginning of 1951, cooperatives and state farms comprised about 22,3
percent of all arable land, and the number of cooperatives had increased to
3,279, representing a gain of about 10 percent in the year 1950, J The
Communists apparently with to avoid a disruption in agricultural production
at this time and for this reason have not attempted rapid collectivisation,
b, Plc over rental Organizations as Instruments of Economic Control,
Czechoslovak trade unions have been converted into semiofficial organs
of the gc.veraament and the Co :arsonist Party and are used as instruments for
control of labor, The unions generally are organized on an industrial basis,
and the shop committee usually is the key instrument of control0 Shop com-
mittees administer social benefits, make assignments to vacation resorts,
register vacancies in housing and recommend tenants, impose pema1ties on workers
as disciplinary measures, and support efforts to inoruase production*. They are
able to manipulate the workers' jobs, pay, conditions of work, housing, and
social benefits In order to force or otherwise "persuade" the workers to fol-
low directives, 22
'aces are used in Czechoslovakia as another instrument of economic
control, In order to prevent the accumulation of real estate, taxes on real
estate are graduated from 5 percent of the first $4,500 valuation to 30 percent
on a valuation over $400,000. The so-called turnover tax (a kind of sales
tax) in used to help balance consumer purchasing power with the volume of
consumer goods available and thereby to control inflation, Heavy taxes are
levied on private farmers and private retailers as a means of "squeezing them
out," 23
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3, Economic Strengths and Weaknesses Indicated by the Trends,
~ ra.+ rww~~wrr~.w+~wv+r. m.~...~.r- w w?a~rw~
The changes which have occurred in Czechoslovakia since the beginning
of the Five Year Plan have included (a) an emphasis on heavy industry, (b)
the development of local sources of supply of raw materials, and (c) an in-
tegration of the economy with that of the USSR and the Soviet Bloc, 24 These
changes have brought more women into industry, shifted labor from rura areas
to urban centers, and increased the number of children and young people in
the labor force,, 25
Increased emphasis on the use of local raw materials reflects the diffi-
culties the Czechs are having in obtaining imports of raw materials, even Eruct
the Satellites, 26 The fact that trade with the East cannot supply certain
requirements is a serious limitation upon the ability of thb USSR to reduce
Czechoslovakia's trade with the West, The uncertainty of supply of raw material?
is a weakness of the Czechoslovak economy.
Planning techniques in Czechoslovakia have undergone oonsiderable develop-
ment since 1947,, and planning now is much more thorough than it was in the
early days of Communist domination, The planning procedure is integrated
with the statistics collection offices, and the planning office, staffed with
competent personnel, has been given powers broad enough to accomplish its
mission. 27
.MW
Economic weaknesses are displayed by the changing emphasis placed upon
various aspects of control, The shortages of raw materials and the efforts
to increase the labor force are indicative of the probable failure to achieve
maximum production, Peasant resistance, with its threat of a reduction in
food deliveries, has caused a deceleration, probably only temporary, of the
collectivization drive. Soviet controls over the economy, however, are largely
consolidated and sell-established and should be considered adequate ultimately
to achieve Soviet objectives, Soviet pressures,, thereforeyaro likely to in..
crease rather thsn diminish through 1952,
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110 Capacity of Human Resouro xs for F? onc DereIo231pt,
Weir and postwar upheavals reduced Czechoslovakia's manpower and left it
poorly distributed. Total employment in 1949 was 5.1 million persons, or 600s00C
below the level of 1946.
Aooording to the Five Year Plan, industrial employment is to increase
by 900,000 in the period 1949-53, rising from 30 percent of total employment
in 1949 to 45 percent in 1953. This increase will come from a 250,000 natursl
increase in the population of working age; transfers of workers from agrioulm
ture, handicrafts, and commerce; and recruitment of women and youth. The
planned additions represent almost the maximum, although further mechanization
of agrioulture is expected to create a surplus of labor which would be avail-.
able to industryo The only other increase possible in labor output is that
which an be achieved through overtime work. The Czechoslovak labor force
is well-educated and highly skilled, and training programs to adapt these
skills to key industries have been started.
1. Size and Distribution of the Labor Force.
War losses and the deportations of 1944-47 reduced the population of
Czechoslovakia by 2.4 million, causing not only an over-all labor short-
age but also a severe maldistri ution of workers by area and by industry.
Some 3.4 million Germans, expelled from border provinces, were replaced by
1,9 million Czech citizens from other provinces. ,2r/ The first Two Year plan
(1947-48) was not successful in overcoming the latror shortage, because the
state did not have complete control over the supply of labor. !/ Even though
the Czech labor force has been supplemented on ocoasion by workers i`roia Ru-
mania, Hungary, and the USSR, some 800,000 fewer.workors were employed in
1949 than in 1946. There is, therefore, virtually no unemployment.
In 1949, total employment was about 5.1 million persons, composed of 2
million agricultural and 3,1 million nonagricultural workers. Czechoslovakia
plans to add 600,000 workers to the nonagricultural sector between 1949 and
1953. Such an increase will necessitate a not reduction of 100,000 in the
agricultural labor force, full utilization of the 250,000 natural increase
in the population of working age, and an intensive recruitment of women.
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Estimated Occupational Distribution of Labor Force
1949-53
Thousands
1949
1950
1951 1952
1953
Agriculture
2,043
1
2,127 1
29050 y 20000 el
10930 y
Nonagricultural. Workers
and Employees
Industry and
Construction
19636
7/
1,740
8
2,053 9 2,236 10
2,419 10/
Randiorafta
631
,
520 12
406 / 402 NF
398
Transport and
Comenuuications 13
322
326
330 334
338
Conic eroe, Public
Employment
600
583 a1
1 330 1
530 1
Total, 1onagrir
cultural
3,089
15
30169 .J
!
5,519 /3
it
,
5,132
5,296
5
6169 5,502
52618
.
Rstimated on the basis of reduction planned to and of 1963, accelerated
1 year., Y
Estimated on the basis of 1950 and decreases likely to result from ab-
sorption of artisans by industry and construction.
Residual within nongricul aural workers and employees.
Estimated on the basis of increase to and of 1951, less increase in 1950,
Interpolation between end of 1951 and and of 1953,
The state plans? within the nonagricultural labor force, to transfer sane
3009000 workers frown handicrafts anc co erce to induatryo
The n tuber of woven employed in industry increased from about 26 percent
of total industrial employment in 1947 to 32 percent in 1951, 17 Further
increases are being promoted by a large expansion of facilities for day care
of working mothers' ohildrans Youths are forced into industry by limitations
placed upon entrance to college, and others enter industry after completing
advanced technical courses,
20 Level of Technical Training9 Skill,, and Efficiency.
Czechoslovakia, which has one of the highest literacy rates in Europe
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and a long tradition of vocational training, is attempting to increase tech..
!ioa1 education. Enrollment in various educational institutions in 194849
was as follows: ?nursery, primary, and intermediate schools, 1,728,706; gym.
nasia, 70,446; colleges, 59,000; advanced specialized schools, 7,110; teachers'
:raining schools, 5,445; agricultural schools, 11,000; technical schools,
218,545; industrial schools, 28.440; men's vocational schools, 21,815; and cam-
:,ercial schools, 26,1570 18
In the immediate postwar period, efficiency was lowered by the loss of
skilled German labor and the replacement of nob.Commnists in key industrial
positions. This loss has been largely overcome by apprentice training, by
the regimentation of workers, and by inoreaaes'of work norms, and productivity
In 1950 approximately equaled prewar levels. 18
80 Expansibility and Adaptabilit of the Labor Foroe.
Czechoslovakia will encounter difficulty in attaining the increases in
industrial manpower called for in the Five Year Plan. Without the rapid col-
lectivization of agriculture, further expansion of the industrial labor force
is not likely. The official work week is 48 hours? and although data, are not
available to indicate the amount of overtime now worked, the cancellation
of holidays and the lengthening of the work week would add from 8 to 10 per-
cent to the man-days of labor per year0
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III" ~a ving and Workings Conditions
SUMMaq
The general living conditions of the Czechoslovak worker have improved
over prewar levels, although periodic food and clothing shortages necessitate
general rationing, and housing shortages have not been overcame, because in-
dustrial construction has been given priority. The status of the middle
class, including professionals; traders, and independent farmers, has deteri-
orated under the Co iunist regime, Such social benefits as medical care,,
old age pions, and paid vacations; which formerly were enjoyed only by the
niddle and higher income groups,, have been extended to all workers and to
peasants who have joined farm cooperatives y Full employment and the special
privileges granted to workers have improved the economic position and the
asocial status of Labor,
Although the population is not subject to labor conscription, the
obligation to work is generally accepted and enforced, T,ages, hours of work,
and general working conditions are determined by the government. The
functions of trade unions have been limited chiefly to increasing output and
productivity norms and conducting a variety of educational, propaganda,, and
social activities, The speed-cup methods modeled on Soviet techniqueb are
causing discontent among the industrial workers and frequently result in low
productivity and failure to reach the plan-nod goals of output. Recent
efforts of high officials to restore morale among workers signify the govern-
mentps awareness of the siituation, Discriminatory measures intended to spur
the collectivization drive have improved the living standards of workers on
state and collective farms whereas the position of the independent peasant
has deteriorated.
1. glIaL Conditions,,
n w.r~..,~.wn.rw
Improvement in Czechoslovakians standard of living since 19147 has
been slow because of reconstruction needs, a bad harvest in 1917-48, and
social upheavals following the Communist coup in 1948, A large part of the
country's economic effort in 1949 and 19x0 was concentrated on increasing
the production of capital goods and military equipment at the expense of con-
.=W goods. Shortages of con^umer goods have led to tightened controls and
higb prices for the general public and to allowances or prioritico for shock-
Rorkers ( tst&khanovites") and collective farmers..
. 15
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The food supply in Czechoslovakia h;;s been rapidly improving be-
cause of the successful harvests of 1948-49 and 1919-50, but deficiencies
in bread grains have had to be covered by imports frou the USSR. Flour.,
bread, milk, sugar,, butter, eggs, and neat are rationed, but supplementary
quantities of these products are available at high prices in the free markets.
In 1939 and 1950.9 some staples were derationeds and their prices were re-
duced, in some cases from 10 to 35 percent, and in the case of breads 25 per-
cent. In December 1950, prices of bread and flour rose again, and on
1 March 1951 rationing of these items was reinstituted. Lqualitarian ration-
ing was abandoned in January 1;19 in favor of a system rhich gave preference
to workers aver nonworkers and to high-producing over lavaproducing workers
Despite the rationing restrictions., the population receives sufficient
food. Lost urban workers obtain food at reasonable prices at least once a
bay from special canteens and lunchrooms at their places of erploymento
Children in urban areas whose parents are employed also are provided with
lunches at nominal cost. Such luxury foods as poultry, pastry, sweets, and
candied. fruits., enjoyed in the prewar days not only by the propertied classes
but also by raarq of the wor scrs., are again available but at such exorbitant
prices that only the higher-income classes of officials and ' Stalch,.anovites"
can afford then. Although the standard of living of these groups has risen
above prewar levels, such Capitalist elements as professional men, trades-
men, white collar corkers, independent farmers, and priests are able to buy
only bare necessities; for which they must pay high prices. Goverment claims.,
however, state that average food consumption per capita is higher than in pre-
war years. According to one such report, "In 1950 consumption of food and
the other :industrial products considerably exceeded prewar consumption. V.hereas
before the war working class families could not afford butter, its consumption
has today become a matter of course and in 1950 rose from 3 kilograms to 4 *85
kilograms per person*" 2/ The sane source compared free.. uarket data and found
meat sales 400 percent Higher., butter sales 68 percent higher, sugar sales
76 percent higher, and egg sales almost 500 percent higher In December 1950
than in December 19149.,
co Clothinga
.L limited quantity of essential clothing and shoes is obtainable at
low prices in the rationed market and at high prices in the free markets
established in January 19149, Even the purchases in the free market are re-
stract.ed., however, and cover only the minimum needs of the populations
a 16 1;M
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d0 Other Consumer Goods.
Availability of consumer goods h s increased since 1950. Basic
items are moderately priced, but the prices of less essential goods are ex-
orbitant.* All luxury items are of domestic origin, but most of the output
has been designated for export. The tiorkers, who have never used such
articles, are now being promised thmi in the near future, provided they raise
their production norr-s, but so far only a fer: "Stakhanovites" have been able
to afford them.
e. flour .
Although an extensive construction progran has been inaugurates: in
Czechoslovakia, housing construction has been slog because of shortages in
building materials cnd because of priorities given to industrial construction.
The present difficulty of the housing industry, rich has been under criticism
whenever its output failed to meet planned targets, is a result of the short-
ages of manpower and lack of mechanization. lJ Deliveries of construction
machinery, expected from the USSR since 3:2407s, have not materialized- The
housing shortage is especially acute in industrial centers There priorities
in housing accommodations are given to essential and influential persons.
Rents have remains under effective control, and recent rumors of general
rent increases apparently were not substantiated. / Since industrial con-
struction and cooperative housing have priority over private housing,
shortages probably will continue through 1952*
f o Health.
.Health services have been nationalisou and are freely provided to
the general population. Because of the wide coverage and the shortage of
medical personnel.. however, the quality of the service is low,
go Social V-elfare.
Such social services as recreation, child care, and old age pensions
are being extended to the Czechoslovak population on a much wider scale then
they were under the previous regime. Over 19 percent of total state expendi-
tures in 1951 are allocated to social welfare and health services.
zee in 1950 pure sed 12,700 refriger_torc, 17,200 kitchen robots (an
electric machine with maw attachments which does various household jobs),
2112,000 bicycles, -15,000 washing machines, 33,000 sewing machines, 29..300
vacuum cleaners, 15,000 electric ranges, and 2111 radios. 2/
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U
2a Working Conditions.
Wages, hours, social benefits, and general working conditions are
reguulated by the state,, Industry has been standardized on an 8-hour c;ay
and a 48-hour week, but longer hours occasionally are worked to increase
production. In many industries a three-shirt system keeps the plants in
continuous operation. Unions have no bargaining power over wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment but have advisory power over vurking
conditions in individual inoustries. Trade unions and their committees and
Communist Party trustees are authorized to carry out certain im-rrovemonts
in sanitation and work loads in local plants and work shops and oversee the
enforcement of regulations.
A speed-up system emulating the Soviet "Stakhanovite" method and Soviet
techniques for maintenance of discipline have been widely introduced. Wage
payments in east instances are based on piece work.* Production norms are
currently being revised to increase productivity and efficiency, but detailed
information on these revisions is not yet available, Wage incentives currently
used in Czechoslovakia include loyalty bonuses for higher output, and special
Sunday shifts and overtime work. These are now to be supplemented, according
to the Czechoslovak press, by better utilization of normal working hours,
better organization of work, better utilization of machinery, proper use of
two and three shifts, better coordination in the supply of rase materials pre-
vention of~ hoarding, and alleviation of the manpower shortage.
Accident rates are high, and safety provisions, particularly in the mining
and transport industries, are inadequate.
Not only industrial v+orkers, farmers, and government employees but also
professional men such as lawyers and doctors are subject to strict control
measures in the practice of their occupations. Their activities must be in
line with the Communist ideology and code of law, and those wtho do not comply
are purged or placed in compulsory labor camps for "reeducation n The state
determines the fees of professional men and assigns clients to them..
Independent artisans and traders have been almost eliminates or absorbed
by state enterprises,?/ and their economic position hcc been reduced to that
of industrial wage earners or lower.2/ Farm workers on state and collective
farr.o enjoy a more favorable position than they enjoyed before the war, because
of social, health, and pension benefits arts shorter fours of work. Working
conditions of the independent fanner, however, have deteriorated. Under govern-
ment pressure fbr farm collectivization, he suffers from tax discrimination,
heavy demands for deliveries, and w lack of essential social benefits.
Data for various ca egories of workers are unavilable, but the average
monthly wage of Czechoslovak workers in 1950, accordin;. to the government,
was 4 .*340 crowns (386.00), havin. increased from 3.600 crowns (w72.00) in
1945. 1/
sEca r
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1V0 'orsi Trade and Finance,,
Sums r
Czechoslovakia in of key eoonomio importance to the Soviet Bloc, largely
because of its advanced development and extensive oapaoittiy in engineering and
heavy industry. The Soviet Union itself accounts for approximately one-quarter
of all Czechoslovak trade, approximately $200 million a year of both imports
and exports.. From 40 to 50 percent of Czechoslovak exports to the Soviet
Union in 1949 and 1950 were finished industrial machine and metal products.
On the other hand, Soviet exports to Czechoslovakia have been composed largely
of raw materials, principally iron ore, cotton, and foodstuffs.
Czechoslovakia also contributes to the economic war potential of the Soviet
Bloc by shipping heavy industrial equipment and supplies to the other European
Satellites. The ability of Czechoslovakia to contribute transportation equip.
ment and other industrial products has been a major factor in current efforts
to make the European Satellites a self-sufficient industrial area. Again,
Czechoslovakia imports from the other Satellites largely rav materials, the p4'
duotion of which does not require technical and industrial skills.
Trade with Western Europe decreased in 1950 from its postwar high in 1949
and undoubtedly will continue to decrease in 1951 and 1952, Trade with the
other European Satellites is expected to increaser and trade with the Soviet
Union probably will increase slightly, Imports from other arena of the world
probably will remain at approximately present levels because certain banjo
raw materials which Czechoslovakia needs, such as jute, ootti, wools and
same nonferrous metals, are not available within the Bloc.
10 a0oducti on.
Cneo't1oslovakiaas prewar foreign trade was the most diversified of that
of any Eastern European country, In 1937, Germany, the leading trading partner,
accounted for only 15,6 percent of imports and 13.7 percent of exports. Next
in importance was the LTS, supplying 10.2 percent of imports and receiving
9x3 percent of exports. Major Western European countries accounted for most
of the balance, but non-European cameras, principally with India, Turkey,
South Africa, Egypt, and Australia, was considerable. Moveover, trade with
other Eastern European countries was important, particularly that with Rumania.
,which aocounted for 502 percent of total Czechoslovak foreign trade. Czechoa
Slovak-Soviet trade was negligible, being only 1.4 percent of total imports
and 0,8 percent of exports.
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The aonnpoaition of Czechoslovakia's foreign commerce in 1947 reflected
prosperous economy based on the processing of raw materials into light
manfactures for export, Principal imports were agricultural products, fibers
and yarns, and minerals, followed by machinery and fuels. Finished to stiles,
iron and steel ii nufacturoa, glassware, foodstuffs, machinery, and war mae.
terialis were the major ex aorta, Effort surpluses were customary$ and the
absence of foreign eoonamio domination allowed the Czechs much leeway in the
conduct :)f foreign trade
Relatively light war damage to Czechoslovakia's economic complex par?
witted a comparatively rapid comeback of foreign trade, and, before the Co??
munist coup of February 1948, the Czechs were fairly successful in trading
simultaneously with both the Fast and the West* The biggest handicaps, aside
Prom supply and other difficulties common to all countries, were the loss
off' skilled workers in the glass, jcwelxy, and other trades and the traditional
?.iependen^e on foreign transit facilities because of Czechoslovakia's inland
geograph'.' o position. Business was carried on through nuunerous private traders
and followed prewar patterns, except that agricultural imports were greater
and exports scaaller tsar formerly as a result of deficient harvests,
Sinoo 1948, Camnaunist polioiee have effected a complete reorientation
of Czeuhoalov kia'S international trade. Trade with the Bloc now receives
priority;, and exports to the West are tolerated only insofar as they are
necessary to pay for essential purchases. The manufacture of light constmoer
goods is being deemphasized as Czechoslovakia becomes the main supplies of
industrial equipment among the European Satellites, In addition, trade has
been initiated with Communist Chins,
Czechoslovakia's foreign trade reached a postwar high in 1949. Total
imports rose from. $754.3 Trillion in 1948 to $788 million in 1949, and exports
from $753 million to $806.5 million, producing the first export surplus since
19466 The 1949 export target of $1,865 million, however, was missed by a
considerable margin, mainly because of political difficulties with the West,
implementation of Western export controls, and the doolining quality of Cseoho-
slo$ak exports, Total trade with Western Europe declined in 1950, combined
imports turd exports being $380 million as compared with $507 million in 1949,
but the composition of trade continued to reflect some reliance on trade with
non.Soviot Bloc countries. The most important commodities procured from not
Bloc sou. ass are iron ore, cotton., wool, other textile fibers and yarns,
speciaii:era industrial items, and nonferrous metals and products.
The increasing importance of Czechoslovakia to the Bloc and its lessened
reliance on the West are indicated by the trend of 1950 trade, approximately
one.quaa er of which was with the USSR, one-quarter with the other European
Satellites,, oneegtxarter with Western Europe, and one-quarter with the rest
of the world.
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Isn of 822uir .ente.
a. Overt Traded
Czechoslovakia's principal import requirements are coal, iron ore,
textile raw materials, pyrites, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, certain
specialized industrial items,, nonferrous metals, petroleum products,, rubber,
and foodstuffs. Some of these are available within the Soviet Bloc,, such as
Polish coal, Soviet iron ore, East German chemicals and pharmaceuticals, East.
German and Soviet specialized industrial items, Polish and Bulgarian zinc and
lead.. Rttxan3an petroleum products, and Soviet and Balkan foodstuffs,
Certain cainoditiee, however, must be procured outside the Bloc,.
Ugh-grade iron ore is obtained from Sweden. Liariy of the textile raw mate.
rial.s, hemp, flax, jute, ramie, and wool are acquired of necessity from non-
Bl.oc sources. Pyrites is imported from Yugoslavia, and some chemicals and
pharmaceuticals are procured from Western Europe,* Certain types of bearings,
industrial diamonds, abrasives, and specialized machinery are available in
neceess&r quantities only in the industrial sectors of Western Europe, whereas
tin is available only from Western-controlled sources, Electrolytic copper
oontinuall.y commands a high priority among Czechoslovak trading agents, and
rubber must be'procured from Malaya or Indonesia,
b, Clandestine Trade,**
Czechoslovakia is the most active of all Soviet Bloc countries in the
field of clandestine trade. As a result of its traditional7,y active inter-
national commercial relations, Czechoslovakia has a wide network of trading
agencies and a large group of trained personnel available for such activities.
In spite of defections and the necessity of installing political arel.i,ables,"
the Czech traders are still the most active and most successful of all Soviet
Bloc agents in the procurement of critical materials,
many commodities and channels are,-used, Copper is transshipped through
Belgium, and bearings Caine from Italy through Switzerland and Mustriao High-
quality industrial goods from (lest Germany arrive through third countries or
are smuggled across the border,
Czechoslovakia engages in another type of clandestine activity of
direct benefit to the war potential of the Soviet Union, In addition to a
continuation, on a reduced scale, of its traditional arms export trade, Czecho-
slovakia supplies arms to dissident groups (preferably Communist) throughout
the world, thus furthering the aids of international Co=iniam as well as pro-
viding hard currencies,
Zile term :: extern Europe includes all. the oEEC countries and SpLin.
Clandestine operations are defined here as procurement of etrate is natoria)i
in violation or circumvention of ~;eatern export controls,
~21-90
SEMMT
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3, Trade with Non-Soviet Bloc Countries.
Slightly leas than half of Czechoslovakia's trade is with non-Soviet Bloc
countries, and this trade is divided almost equally between Western Europe
and the rest of the world.
AD &orts to Non-Soviet Bloc Co~triea.
(1) ti?leatera Europe,
Czechoslovak exports to Western Europe in 1949 were a65 million
but decreased 22 percent in 1950 to approximately ,#206 million. Allowances
for the price increases which took place in the latter half of 1930 accentuate
this decline in terms of volume. In spite of this drop, Czechoslovakia accrued
an export surplus of approximately 430 million,, about ]0 million more than its
export surplus in 1949, The largest export quantities in 1950 went to vilest
Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, Italy, Turkey,
France, and the Belgium-Luxembourg customs union.
(2) Other Area.
Czechoslovak exports to other areas of the world are similar to
those sent to Western Europe and include textiles, steel products, transporta-
tion equip, industrial equipment and supplies, sugars hops, and malt. In
addition, arms are exported to these areas. In spite of the official Soviet
Orbit blockade, Czechoslovakia still trades with Yugoslavia through Austrian
and Swiss intermediaries. It appears that metallurgical coke is the principal,
if not the sole, export from Czechoslovakia to Yugoslavia*
b. apaarta ft M Non-Soviet Bloc Countries.
(1) Western AMM.
The largest single category of imports, by value, from Western
Europe is machinery, particularly machine tools and their components, The
second largest category is wool and other animal hairs, followed by iron and
steel manufactures and chemicals and pharmaceuticals. In 1949 these four
categories accounted for about 30 percent of total Czechoslovak imports fray
Western Europe. The importance of imports from Western Europe, however, is
nct apparent solely from general cav odity groupings or total valves, In-
dustrial diamonds, electrolytic copper, tin, bearings, and certain specialised
types of industrial machinery have a strategic importance beyond that reflected
in the trade statistics.
The relative importance of Czechoslovakia's trading partners is
the same in both Imports and exports, but trade is not bilaterally balanced
in all cases. For instance, although Czechoslovakia exported 246 million
worth of goods to the UK in 1950, it imported only 47,3.9 million worth. In
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trade with the Netherlands, an export surplus of i million was realized,
and a similar situation existed in the case of ;;eat Germany.
Imports from -lestern Europe in 1950 declined more than 30 per
cerxt. from 1949 levels: The importance of this reduction is not in the de-
creased total figures but in the eategorles In which the decline took place.
imports of chemical and pharmaceuticals dropped noticeably, as did shipments
of mineral fuels, minerals, and ores, These particular items are not generally
available from other non-Bloc sources,, It is noteworthy that sirrei:ar dope
did not take place in imports of metals or of wool and other ,animal. hairs.
(2) Other Areas,
Czechoslovak imports from non-European countries consist almost
exclusively of raw materials, such as cotton from Egypts rubber and tin
from Malaya and Indonesia, jute from Pakistan and India, and hides, leather,
and quebracho from Argentina and Brazil. The particular raw materials which
Czechoslovakia needs from these countries apparently cannot readily be supplied
from Soviet Bloc sources in the near future, This trade will therefore prob-
ably continue at approximately its present level through 1952,
4, Trada with Soviet Bloc Countries.
Trade with Soviet Bloc countries constitutes a little more than half of
total Czechoslovak trade, Approximately half of this is with the Soviet union
and the other half with the Boropean Satellites. Trade with China is a srua32
percentage of the total,
a, 'Trade with the USSR. I
(1) Exports to the -W-Z4
The most important exports from Czechoslovakia to the USSR are
locomotives, light and heavy dump can, and other railway equipment; electric
motors; heavy machinery; other metal products; textiles; shoes; suigar; and
malt'.
Ueta corking. industries provided in 1949 about 25 percent of
total Czechoslovak exports to the USSFL, and textiles, shoes, sugar, and malt
accounted for most of the balance. In 1950, however, as a result of changing
emphasis on trade within the Bloc, it is probable that more than half of the
total was composed of metal products, Textiles, shoes, sugar, and malt con,-
t_inued to provide moat of the reat of Czechoslovak exports,, The armament in'.
duatry is producing weapons and components for the USSR, ac* of which are now
being manufactured in conformance with standardized Soviet specifications
.. 23 -
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(2) I acme from the UM.
Czechoslovak imports from the USSR are composed primarily of
-oodatuffg, raw materials, and semifinished products, Capital equipment and
finished industrial products account for probably less than 5 percent of the
total. J The primary commodities received from the USSR by CsechoslovakiA
are iron ore, manganese, copper, nickel, lead, idlest, rye, corn, and cotton.
The lore grade of the iron ore and the cotton, however., have occasioned soma
.difficulties in Czechoslovak industry, reducing efficiency and, in the case
of cotton, lowering the quality of products, The reintroduction of ratios
ing of bread and bread flours in 1951 indicates that the wheat imported from
the USSR probably was stockpiled.
Satellits.
bo Trade with Othx
r.. .. r ..
~r~-.rr~
Trade with other Soviet Bloc countries, except with East Germargr,
follows the general pattern of all Czechoslovak trade -- the exchange of
finished industrial prodnats for semifinished goods, raw materials, and
foodstuffs.
(1) Eporta to Other ?jtenites.
Czechoslovak exports to Albania, excluding war materiel, are
approximately $3 million, a year, a little higher than provided in the trade
agreements. ./ The most important exports to Albania are textiles and trucks,
which together account for about one-third of the total. These and other
goods are seat primarily as direct support for the weak Albanian econocW.
Similtaneously with the signing of the 1949 trade agreement, Czechoslovakia
extended a 82.7 million credit to Albania to be repaid in goods, starting in
1951. Czechoslovak exports to Bulgaria jJ are between $10 and $15 m4 11on a
year. Road materials, machinery (pririai,81 y agricultural), instrueaents,
chemicals, and hope repareseat about 7; percent of the total.
Czechoslovak exports to China 5/ appear to be designed primarily
to support the Chinese war potential rather than to aid the industt'3al develop,.
memo of the country. Skoda machine guns, antitank gang, artillery, and aminwd
tion were shipped to China in 1950 in exchange for soybeans, soybean products,
and wool. In 1951, Czechoslovakia is c omitted to deliver 800 trucks, 720
buses, and 3,000 motorcycles to China, and it has been reported that the USSR
is ordering from Czechoslovakia large quantities of railroad equipment for
China.
Czechoslovak exports to East GexmatW J were approximately $15
million in 1949 and 327 million in 1950. Because of the Berlin blockade and
counterb:Locksdeend the problems of economic rehabilitation which followed the
postwar plunder by the USSR, East Germany in 1948 and 1949 incurred a $2.9
million import surplus with Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak exports to East
Germargr conaist of foundry coke, tires, rolled metal products, textiles and
24 to
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leather goods, and production equipment. In early 1951, East Germany ordered
from Czechoslovakia two three-high rolling mills and one seamless tube rolling
mill, valued at a total of $2,8 million.
Czechoslovak exports to Hungary 7/ are composed of timber and
timber products, metallurgical coke, metal products, and chemicals, Exports
to Poland 8 f include mining equipment, metal products, metallurgical coke.,
agricultuxQ machinery, tires and tubes., technical equipments radio receivers,
footwear, and textiles, These exports in 1949 totaled approximately $45
million, and the Communists claim an increase of 25 percent in 1950,
Exports to Ruaania,21 according to the 1950 trade agreement,, were
to consist of general industrial equipment, metal products, chemicals, and
vehicles,,
(2) Ia orta from Other Satellites,
The decrease in imports of certain commodities from Western
Europe is being offset by production in or by procurement through other Bloc
countries, Imports from East Germany,W are therefore of great and increaa
ing importance to the successful reorientation of Czechoslovak trade, Machin-
cry, s~ufacturee, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, fine instruments, and
optical equipment, all of high quality, are available from East Germany. As
the industrial expansion of East Germany progresses, Czechoslovakia will be
able to acquire many more of the goods which it now can obtain only from
Western Europe, It is apparent that a large measure of success has already
been achieved in this program.
Czechoslovak imports from Poland / are of considerable impor-
tance to the economy. In 1950 the Poles agreed to deliver 3.9 million metric
tons of coal, and this goal probably was met. Czechoslovakia has indigenous
coal resources which are suited to the production of metallurgical coke but
does not have sufficient coal for general industrial use. These imports,
therefore, are of great importance to Czechoslovak industry, In addition,
Poland exports to Czechoslovakia zinc, chemicals, agricultural products, and
machinery. Czechoslovak imports from Poland in 1949 totaled ;AO million,, and
the Co n rsi$ts claim that there was an increase of approximately 25 percent in
1950.
5, Trends - InAlud-IM dications of Mobilization for Vdaro
A continued increase in Czechoslovak trade with Soviet Bloc countries, a
continued decrease in trade with Western, European countries, and trade with
other areas of the world at approximately present levels can be expected in
1951 and 1952. Increased exports of heavy industrial equipment and supplies
wif result from the Czechoslovak Five Year Plan (1949-53), but increased im-
ports of industrial rate materi.ls and supplies and specialized equipment will.
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SDCR1T
be necessary to carry out this program, Czechoslovakia and Fast Germany wilt
.supply nruch of the industrial equipnent needed in the effort to mdse the
Soviet Bloc a self-eufficient industrial caaplex q nsion of the at nt
and heavy machine building industries, which represent a direct Czeohoalovak
contribution to the economic potential for spar of the Soviet Union, will
continue.
26
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Agriculture.
MEM
Agriculture in Czechoslovakia is conducted largely by peasant farmers
engaged in the production of grain, livestock, and sugar'. in the postwar
period, grain production has fallen off, meat production has increased
enough to provide a slight surplus in 1950, and sugar production has in-
creased substantially, resulting in a sizable export surplus.
The cotton textile industry is heavily dependent on imports of rar
materials from the USSR, which closely allocates the supply and distribution
of textiles within the Bloc. The woolen textile industry depends on non-Um
sources for 95 percent of its requirements. Czechoslovak industry has the
capacity and skills to add materially to the-textile production of the Soviet
Bloc.
Collectivization of agriculture has made relatively little progress in
Czechoslovakia and thus has had little effect on production.
1. (bra 3.
a. Production.
Grain and grain products constitute the most important agricultural
commodities of Czechoslovakia,* 60 percent of the arable lend being planed
to grain. l heat and rye are used chiefly for h an consumption, while coarse
grains - corn (Mize),, barley, and oats -- are used for livestock feeding.
The prewar consumption of cereal products in Czechoslovakia constituted 41,9
percent of the caloric value of all foods consumed. This ratio was less than
those in other Eastern European countries, however, but there was greater con-
sumption of high protein foods in Czechoslovakia. Postwar trends indicate a
lowering of the standard of living in respect to food, with less high protein
food now available-and more cereal grains consumed than in prewar years.
Production of grain in Czechoslovakia maintained a relatively stable
average in prewar years, and the country was approximately 95 percent self-
sufficient in food and feed requirements. Postwar planning has altered this
position by decreasing cereal production and increasing coarse grain produces
,ion, a policy which has increased the need for isaports of food grains and
grain products, chiefly from the USSR.
$ Grain unless otherwise specified includes wheat, rye, barley, Dais,
corn (tee), and mealln, a minor grain.
SIORET
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A ricultural, methods are much further advanced in Czechoslovakia
than in the other Satellites,, Planning, crop rotations, increased use of
fertilizers, and other modern agricultural techniques enable the Czechs to
obtain crop yields higher than in any other Bloc country. The most inten-
sive cultivation and crops of the highest yields are found in :3oravia and
Bohemia. :ilovakia is less important as a gain-producing area because of
its geographical position and lower level of agricultural developnbent,
Grain production In 1950 is esticaatod at 4.7 million metric tons as
compared with a prewar (1935-39) average production of 5,7 million metric
tons'. The decrease results from planned reductions in the sown area of
grains and smaller yields per hoctare.
Latest Annual Estimates of Grain Production
1948-50
Thousand Metric Tons
Year
Estimate
Probable Range
Variation of Estimate
1948
4,554
4,437 to 4,671
1949
5,122
4,990 to 5,253
:.950
4,684
4,564 to 4,804
b. Probable Production.
Pressure has been brought to bear on the Czechoslovak Government by
the USSR to increase wheat production at the expense of feed grains and forage
crops, and slight increases in total grain production may result, as indicated
below,
Estimated Grain Production
1951-52
oueand Metric Tons
Year
to
Probable Range of
Variation ofte
1951
4,763
4,641 to 4,9885
1952
4,812
4,688 to 4,935
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a'OR T
c. Doraastic Rbauirements
Because of population increases, domestic requirements of grain have
been gradually rising in the past few years rid will continue to rise through
19530
Estimated Domestic Recjuirementa of Grain
x.948-53
Thousand
Metric Tons
Year
Estimate
_
Probable Rangef''
Variation of Estimate
1948-49
408o
4,828 to 4,933
1949-50
5,179
5,118 to 5,241)
1950--51
5,315
5,260 to 5,368
1,51?52
5,384
5,319 to 5,449
1952-53
5,437
5,372 to 5,502
d. Suratus or Deficit.
Czechoslovakia has always had a grain deficit. Although before the
war some grain was exported (wheat, barley, and oats), rye, corn (maize), and
rice had to be imported. Not imports averaged 134,000 metric tons a year.
Under the Communist regime, grain deficits have fluctuated from year to year
with variations in production but, with the exception of the good crop year of
1949, have exceeded the prewar level as indicated bel.
Estimated Deficit of Grain (Domestic Production)
1948.53
Thousand Metric Tons
Y
Estimate
Probable Range of
Variation of Estimate
1948-49
.326
262 to 391
1949-50
57
13 to 128
1950-51
631
564 to 696
1951-52
621.
564 to 678
1952-53
625
567 to 684
SEGHW
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0, .CtoC j.et3 ,
Followin ; the poor crop year of 1947, Czechoslovakia imported 940,000
metric tons of grain, which, together with domestic productio4 more than
covered requir nta, so that 105,000 metric tons were carried over on 31
July 194into the consumption year 194&.49, The total of this earry6over
plus imports in 1948.49 is computed to have been 625,000 metric tons, of
which 50,000 tons were reexported. The deficit in domestic production in
1948.9 was 326,000 tons, 3nddiiccat:uig a stockpile of 249,000 tons on 31 July
1949. Although 1949 was a good crop year, Czechoslovakia imported 550,000
metric tons, of which about 75,000 tons were reexported, The deficit in
production in 1949-50 was only 57,000 tons, indicating an addition to stores
of 418,000 tons and a stockpile on 31 July 1950 of 667,000 torso The harvest
of 1950 was poor, the deficit being 631,000 metric tone, and imports, chiefly
from the USSR, were expected to reach 605,000 toned Assuming reexports of not
more than 60,000 metric tones the stockpile on 31 July 1951 may be about
581,000 toned
Estimated Stockpiles of Grain
1950-51
Thousand Metric Tons
LOU
Estimate
Prob4ble Range of
Variation of ,mate
31 July 1950
667A/
531 to 601
31 July 1951
581
580 to 782
J Six weeks supp ys
Five weeks' supply.
This stockpile of 581,000 metric tons will not cover the estimated
deficit for the year 1951..52, and, unless there are substantial shipments of
grain fran the USSR or the other Satallitea. Cueehoelovakia will enter the pup
195253 with only the usual turnover eupp,a until the new crop enters dis-
tribution channels, In this case, some 625,000 metric tone will have to be
imported, or grain consumption will have to be substantially reduced,
fo Trendn Includina Indications of Mobilization for'llar,
The USSR is reported to have brought pressure on the Czechoslovak
government to increaoe wheat acreage at the expense of feed grains and forage
crops in order to relieve the need for bread-grain imports, There is no indi-
cation of mobilization for mar in grain production,
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2,. Meat
a, Froduetiions
By 1948, meat production had dropped to 69 percent of the prewar
level in Czechoslovakia, Importation of 30,000 metric tarns in 1943-49
brought meat availability up to 73 percent of the prewar average, and these
supplies.. together with a postwar reduction of 14 percent in population,
brought per capita availability in 1948-49 to 30 kilograms, or approximately
equal to prewar levels.
Meat production in 1949.-50 increased 7.3 percent over the output in
194.49. If, as is assumed, the increase in production was accompanied by a
2,5 percent increase in per capita consumption, import requirements for this
period were 19,000 metric tons.
In 1950..51, meat production is estimated to have increased to 411,000
metric tons,, or 83 percent of the prewar level. It is assumed that per capita
consumption increased 2 percent and the population increased 1.1 percent, in.
dicatinu total requirements of 400,000 metric tons and a small surplus of
11,0(0 tons.*
Latest Annual 1+lstimmatee of Meat Production
1.948-30
Thousand Metric Tons
Year
Estimate
Probably Range of
Variation of Estimate
1948
343
322 to 353
1949
368
346 to 379
1950
411
386 to 423
b. Probable Productions.
Available information indicates that the USSR will not supplyl Czecho.
Slovakia with feed grains to maintain its high potential for meat production.
The USSR has, in fact, urged a reduction in acreages that are seeded to feed
grins and forage crops, It is therefore anticipated that ,neat production will
be sauced both in 195152 and 1952-53 by not lass than 2 percent each year,
* Czechoalovak: a in 1950-51 produced a surplus of meat for the r rat tine .in
decades. Czechoslovak guverrvuent reports on livestock numbers, howo',or, in-
dicate a meat surplus for 1950-51 that is unrealistic.
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Estimated Lisat Production
1951-52
Tone
Thous n4 1et?
Year
Estimate
?_
Probable Range of
Variation of Estimate
1951
403
379 to 43.5
1952
395
371 to 107
c. Danest3c Rec~uiraiuents.
in 1.948-49, meat requirements, estimated on domestic production of
343,0 metric tons plus net imports of 30,000 tons, were 373,000 tons., or
.30 kilograms per capita. In succeeding years the per capita availability of
meat for consumption has been assumed to fluctuate slight3y, in accordance
with corresponding increases or decreases in production. It is estimated
that reductions in per capita supply will offset population increases and
leave total, requirements in 195253 unchanged from the 1931-52 amount.
Estimated Domestic Requirements of Meat
1948-53
Thousand Metric Tons
Year
Estimate
Probable Range of
variation of F..atimate
194849
373
352 to 383
1950-51
387
369 to 398
1951.52
400
381 to 411
1952-53
400
381 to 411
do Stockpiles.
Czechoslovakia is norma3ly a meat deficit country. There was a ==U
ssirplus of from 6,000 to 12,000 metric tons in 19511, which is only a carry.
over stock. Projected estimates for 1953.52 and 1952-53 indicate that Cz,echo.
Slovakia'a meat supply will be even less.
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e~ surplus or Deficit,
Czechoslovakia had a alight meat surplus in 1950-51 and may be margin-
ally self-sufficient in 1951--52. It is probable, however, that in 1952-53 the
meat supply position will again. became a deficits It should be noted that,
although Czechoslovakia consistently exports processed livestock producte, the
country has, with the exception of 1950-.51: been a net importer of meat.
Estimated Surplus or Deficit of Meat (Domestic Production)
1 -53
S'ar'
1u
Probable Range of
Variation of Estimate
,
.
:.948.49
30
0
1549-50
19
19 to 23
1950'-51
11
6to32
1951.52
2to4
1952-53
4to10
~-ctuml. imports?
. Trends -- Including Indications of Mobilization for ;ar,
!r I-. r- ^ P
From 1948 to the beginning of 1950 there was an upward trend each year
in nnnbera of livestock and in the meat production potential, In 1951 and 1952
the trend will be downward, There are no indications of mobilization for war
iu meat production and distribution,
3. s aro
a. Pao
Domestic sugar production in the prewar years provided Czechoslovakia
with an export surplus and permitted a consumption level equal to that of the
Western European countries. Production fluctuated in the period 194-+.+47 as a
result of economic dislocations caused by the war and by a severe drought in
11147, It was not until 1950 that prewar production levels were regained, but
in the interim period rationing apparently became permanent,
.33--
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Latest Annual Estimates of Sugar Production (Raw Value)
19150
Thousand MetrU Toffs
to
Ed LM
Probable Range of
Variation of E ti mate
H
1948
634
570 to 640
1949
626
560 to 635
1950
700
630 to 750
Probable Production.
Considering projected aims and assuming normal agricultural conditions,,
future sugar production is estimated as foU vat
Estimated Sugar Production (Raw Value)
1951-52
Thousand Metric Tons
Year
Est t
Probable Range o
Variation of F?atimate
1951
754
670 to 800
1952
784
705 to 820
Production estimates for these years indicate an output above the prewar level.
c.Dome t I e uireMente.
Rationing of sugar has been in effect since the end of the war,, and there
are no indications of its impending removal in 1951. Estimates of requirements
are based on a per capita norm ranging from 17 to 19 kilogratms. (rant value) and
an additional 80,000 to 95,000 metric tons which are used industrially by the
food,, confectionery,, and distilling industries.
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Estimated Doaestic Requirements of Sugar (Raw Value)
1948-53
Tho Metric ona
Year
Tstima a
Probable Range of
Variation of Est1aate
1948-49
342
307 to 376
1949-50
348
313 to 382
1950-51
351
315 to 386
1951-52
355
319 to 390
1952-53
358
322 to 393
These estimates are based on the asaugption that rationing will continue
through 1952, thus preventing consumption at higher, prewar levels.
d, Stoolcpiles.
Stocks of sugar will probably increase, and it is estimated that a
stockpile of 90,000 metric tons will be available by the end of the 1950-A
consumption year. This estimate assumes that 1 mcnthos supply has been set
aside each year since 1948. A similar proportional increase is expected in
19520
Estimated Stockpiles of Sugar (Rae Value)
1950-51 and 1952-53
Thousand Metric Torus
Estimate
Probable Range
Variation of Estimate
1950-51
90
1952-53
150
3,35 to 165
e0 .:s+:1 . or 2a wit,
Czechoslovakia's present sugar surplus is a result of reduced consumypm
tion, If rationing continues at the present rate and production is increased,
the available surplus by the and of 1952 will add measurably to the sugar
stocks of the Soviet Bloc,
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Estimated Surplus of Sugar (Domestic Production - Ran Value)
1951.52
XM
Est at_e
.Probable Range of
Variation of Mimate
1951
399
357 to 438
1952
426
383 to 468
In the consumption years 1948-49 and 1949-50, Czechoslovakia exported
appraximatelq 460,000 metric tons of sugars, of which 40 percent went to the
Soviet Union. There is every indication that even larger supplies will be
shipped to the USSR and the Satellites in 1951 and 1952,
f. Trends -- jMlugAag Ind
atio of iniiation for War.
Trends of production and planning reveal the importance placed on self-
sufficiency in sugar production by the Satellites and the USSR. Long-grange
planning may. include a higher level of consumption, but for the present the
primary aim is the accumulation of stocks that might be required in the event
of war,
4. Cotton.
aQ P} dize._.
Czechoslovakia is a major producer of cotton textiles but does not grow
cotton. All raw cotton needed for processing must be imported. From 1934 to
1938, Czechoslovakia annually imported an average of 83,000 metric tons of
ginned cotton, 60 percent of it from the US, and exported 22,390 metric tona of
yarn and finished cotton textile products. In the postwar period, t1S imports hav.
steadily declined, and greater reliance has been placed on the USSR, Bar 1949,
US imports represented only 20 percent of the total volume, dropping to lose
than 2 percent in 1950, whereas the USSR supplied 45 percent in 1949 and 55
percent in 1950Q The effect of decreased US supplies in the postwar years has
been apparent in the failure of the Czechoslovak cotton textile industry to
attain prewar production levels and in the corresponding decline in the volume
of textile exports.
b, Domestic Reguiryjento.
For capita consumption of cotton textiles is catch higher in Czecho-
slovakia than in other Soviet Bloc countries because of the advanced productive
capacities of the country and the greater availability of imported raw materials.
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Estimated Dt r:eatic Requi'e ments in Tema of Ginned Cotton
191+5-53
Metric Tons
X,
Fate
Probable age
L n g to
1949
35,412
31,000 to 39,E
194950
47,774
41,000 to 52,000
1950-51 J
498705
44,000 to 54,000
1951-52 W
500003
45,000 to 55,000
1.952-53
50,560
43,500 to 55,5OO
Based on reported per capita corsumption?
Projections adjusted for population changes only.
Stock ].ee.
Under present arrangements Czechoslovakia has little opportunity to
accr .ate stockpiles of ginned cotton or textile fabrics. Domestic consump-
tion uses 75 percent of the present volume of import., and the surplus of
pro essed material is either exported under existing trade commit me or
shipped to the U& under established processing agreements.
in view of the present world shortage of cotton and the expected
heavy demand by other nations in the next 12 months, the possibility of buil&
ing Up stook. is remote,
dG Trends - kc_IgALng Indications of Mobilization for "Jar,
The Five Year Plan limite Czechoslovak textile production in favor of
heavy Industrial production, although the textile industry currently is pro-
ducing at much less than capacity. Domestic requirements can be met by working
a single 1C hour shun. If raw materials were available, Czechoeloraki a l s out-
put at full-capacsty operations could contrUbutc materially to the textile re
r.4irement4 of the US3l for mobilization.
r.
*lool prod uuction in Czechoslovakia is walla and present. erti=tee indir.
cat* that the total. annual wool clip does not supply more than 5 percent of
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do stir requirecentso Postwar efforts have been made to increase the numbers
of the dosneatic herds., and a moderate measure of improvement has been noted in
1950 estimates, The results!, however, do not acid significant],y to total
domestic supplies,.
Latest Ann al Estimates of Wool Production (Clown Banjo)
3-950
---lietric Tans
year
Esc
Probable Range of
Variation of Estimate
1948
581
520 to 630
194.9
611
540 to 660
1950
633
560 to 680
b.,, Probable Production
The 1950 estimate probably represents the postwar peak in production.
Soviet pressure on the Czechoslovak government to decrease acreages of food
and forage crops in favor of expansion of wheat acreage probably will reduce
.,iveatock numbers. If the marginal lands in the Sudeten area' nor used for
sheep grazing are returned to crop production, the tu=ber of sheep will be
turther reduced The reduction in wool production probably will not be less
than 2 percent in each of the years 1951 and 1952;
Estimated Wool Production
1951-52
etr.~* 2onn
Estimate
Probable F.anga of
Variation of Estimate
195.
620
550 to 670
1?52
608
540 to 660
0, Domestic $ ts,
Domestic requirements of wool from 1948 to 1950 averaged 10,157 anet? ao
tuna a year. Computed or. a per capita basis, this figure is much higher that
-2verage3 of other Soviet Bloc countries,, It is assumed for the projection of
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Aiture requ3 reneflt,3 that no t.*rther increases will be possible, Estimates
are adjusted for population changes only,
Itimated Domestic 1 equiremenbs of Wool
191,&52
Metric Toss
Year
Wtinate
Probable Range of
yari ati~on of i&et1mates
1948
10,290
9,200 to 11,300
1949
109364
9,300 to U,400
1951
30,418
9,400 to 11:500
195-1
10,516
9,500 to 11,600
1952
30,633
9,600 to 119700
Present facilities are capable of processing dowestic requirements of
woolen yarn by working a single 10-hour shift o A deficiency of combing equip-
ment for waste yarns, however, necessitates Imports of wool tops in addition
to grease and scoured wool.
d. a2ftil",
There is no evidence of stockpiling of wool. Although a credit agreo-
ment for the purchase of wool was made with the UK in 1949, the quantity of
wool supplied by the UK and the British Dominions since that time has not
zlaen appreciably over 1948 balsa
ea $u, rD1u jr Deficit.
With requirements rising and domestic production falling, Czechoslovakia
is e< ailed to have increasing deficits of .wool. The estimated deficits for
1951 and 1952 are about 109000 metric tons each. Since 95 percent of require-
ments mast be net with imported supplies.. Czechoslovakia is highly vulnerable
to the effects of a strict3j enforced embargo on wool.
f o Trends - bvbdin
Indications of obi lization for War,
According to the Five Year Plan, production of textiles in Czeecho-
elovakla Is to be reduced in favor of heavy Industry. This action has been
parts ally motivated by the world shortage of textile raw materials,, which has
aggravated the difficulties of obtaining supplies from outside the Soviet Bloc.
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There are indications of a close connection with the Soviet Union in
processixag agreements through which the Czechoslovak textile mi31 are being
utilized to the adv& stage of the USSR. It is impossible to judge the went
to which this arrange&.errt has conU?ibuted to Soviet military stocks, but if
raw materials wore supplied in volume and the textile industry were to
operate on a 24-hour ba is, a sizable contribution could quickly be made to
the Soviet war potential,
6. Cala.+"ti.^~i taation6
The Czechoslovak government has sbcceederi, as of 1 March 1951, in orrganirag
tbo it 3,300 so-called 1t nai fled f'axmera a cooperatives," in which tilacge is
carried on cooperatively while the tittle to the land remain* in the bands of
individual households. About 4,000 other farmer organizations purchase and
use farm machinery cooperatively, Faxmer resistance indicates that the goverrv-
man , probably will not attempt to establish collective fare of the Soviet
. o,,; ho type for some years., although plans ode for the eventual social t.>
r ,t ion of agriculture.
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Rio Industrial Cgpacit and Levels of Production.
Aa Ferrous Ustalsc
The Czechoslovak iron and steel industry is highly developed, and
production is larger than in any other Satellite country. Although the country
has large reserves of metallurgical coking coal of satisfactory quality and
,of a law-grade iron ore, the iron and steel industry is dependent largely upon
imports for high-grade iron ore, iron and steel scrap, and most of the ferro~-
alloys, The new economic plan announced in 1918 emphasized the development of
heavy industry in Czechoslovakia,
Ferrous Metals Production Targets
19119-53
Thousand Metric Tons
COQUOdiu
949
L9P.
1
1952
1953
Metallurgical Coke a
'J
2,08?
2,W
2,248
2,520
.
2
860
Iron ore (30-35% Fe
Manganese Ore
1.,355
176
4370
83
1,360
201
1:370
245
,
1,265
Pig iron
1., 865
1,890
1*905
2 8 360
2,725
Raw Steel
2,650
2,680
2,750
3,160
3,550
Rolled Products
1,900
1, 920
1,960
2,270
2.,550
For domestic industry only; exports excluded,
To accomplish these goals, large sues of money have been budgeted for
investment in the iron and steel industry. New coke ovens to be constructed
at Kunciae are to have an annual capacity of 570 000 metric tons, and others
at an unnamed foundry are to have a capacity of 20,000 tons. Exploration
for new and richer deposits of iron are has begun, further exploitation of
existing mines is under way, attempts are being made to procure modern mining
equipment, and modern methods of mining are being introduced,
1. Production,
Production is estimated as follows:
41
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`M;-,,: :al
btealwgio?a woke a
L= Orr? (x)5% Fe),
Pig xrov
Raw .a' ea
Pro&wts
e o~ ~ .fit
) UU, ", . , Of ;z J1 q L%tty w?. 1s in wag
i?~;75O
2
1,475
1 *940
tuattou hau fail c to writ p W, targets,, and I ~ks
b n I the Plan g 1
2 e t
Thea e2.~c-y "Ad h Oz ~: tom i xi and ~? ].. ~stry in 195
be est :+:tedt. but r rz action affbi t n; m
Pt ,ated P b tio 0.t s may Meta .r
1:952
3.99 an
Ne uurgic Coke
.1roit ore Cw~-n% To),
) less ore
Pig
Raw b3te1
R031t4 Prodacta
.12AICL. AM
.at Nn Ae
k000
3e16O
to O am"16 metal om 9tq
X ;t{ requi emex to for he Ima ai i at ;t. j~tduatiT are esi.m taat. as : .: o rz3
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 'Approved For Release I 999/09/ZL t A-RDP79R01012A000900030002-6
Estimated Dwwatic Requirements of Ferrous Metals
1949-5o
Coke
ustallurgical
Iron and St I1
?errroaaloy Met
Manganese
Chromium
Molybdenum
Tungsten
Vanadium
Nickel
Pig Iron
Raw Steel
Rolled Products
Metri.a Tons
1,850,000
29050,000
308008000
4,000,000
1,400,000
1,600,000
100,000
2O?,500
N0A0
N0Ao
995
1'
60
. 66
75
1,400
19500
N.Ao
NeAo
N.Ao
!/ in terms of metal content,
NOA.
N0Ae
In negotiating the 1949 Sredish-Czechoslovak trade agreement, Sweden
refused to accede to Czechoslovak demands for l03 million metric tons of are
but finally agreed to ship 885,000 tons of ore during the period of the
agreement. To compensate for the reduction in imports from Sweden and for
lose of 80,000 tons of ore ,rhi.ch Yugoslavia, before the Tito-Coma nform break,
had agreed to deliver, the USSR agreed to send Czechoslovakia le2 million
metric tons of iron ore, a considerable increase over the 400,000 tons
shipped in 19480 The USSR thus, for the first time in history, has becoyme
Czechoelovakiaas chief source of iron ore imports, In 1950# Czechoslovakia
received lea million tons of Soviet ore and 920,000 tons of high-grade
Swedish ore, Swedish shipments for 1951 have been set at 750,000 tons,
4, St so
There are no stockpiles of raw materiala or of iron and steel products in
Czechoslovakia,
5o Sub 11u8 or Deficit,
Although the iron and steel industry of Czechoslovakia is heavily dependent
upon imports of raw materials, the production of semifinished and finished
steel mill products represents an important contribution to the industrial
potential of the Soviet Bloco A portion of this output is exported, chiefly
to other Satellite countries.
6o Internal Limitations,
Throughout the Czechoslovak iron and steel industry there is a chronic
ahortage of labor and of managerial and technical personnel. Absenteeism runs
43
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high,, equipment is worn and obsolescent,, and modern production methods are
urgently me dedo
Over a long period of years until 1949, Sweden was Czechoslovakia's
principal source of high-gaude iron oreo Czechoslovak blast furnaces orig -
nall,r were designed and constructed to use the high-grads Swedish ores in
raixttrre .th the low -Wade area available domestically and procured from'
other foreign sources, and !.he use of a high proportion of Soviet ore now
pressnt8 a serious problem to the.Caechoslovak Winistry of Heavy Industryo
This ore Faust be sintered,, or agglomerated, before it can be used in the
bias: f'urnaceef rand, to accomplish this, more sintering equipment must be can-
strur tda Furthermore, the blast furnaces will have to be rebuilt in order
to a ke the necessary changes in furnace linings and to permit the introduc-
tion of the larger amounts of omen required in processing the larger prop-
portion of Soviet iron ore* The Czechoslovak iron and steel industry is
uiiabL!.e to make the increased investmsnts required for reconstruction and
expansion or to disrupt production long enough to make such oonversionso As
a result, pig iron production has not met planned targetso
The procurement of iron and steel scrap also is a serious problem, since
scrap is in short supply not only in the r"iioc but throughout the world- If
the TTSSR desires to maintain a flow of steel products from Czechoslovakian
some provision will have to be made to supply sufficient quantities of scrap
for the Czechoslovak open-hearth furnaeese '
Sony of the equipment needed to modernize and expand facilities and to
increase production,, such as blast furnaces and sintering equipment, can be
constructed in Czechoslovakia# but most of the needed installations must be
procured abroado Western export controls make it unlikely that much equip-
ment can be procured in the Westo The USSR is the only possible source of
such aid among the Bloc countries, and it is doubtful that sufficient aid
will be forthcoming from this quarter to help materially in rehabilitating
and expanding the Czechoslovak iron and steel industryo
74 'ends-Inca Indications of Mobilization for Waro
&ctuatl production will continue to fall short of targets for the remain-
ing *yoara of the Five Tear Plano
SECRET
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With the r ception of antimony, Czechoslovak production of nonferrous
metals from indigenous ores is relatively unimportant, and domestic require-
ments are fiUed largely by imports and by domestic secondary metal and Scrap,
timated Requirementel, Production, and D ficita of Nonferrous Metals
195.52
Copper
Requirements
530500
59,700.
65,300
Production
3,000
9,600
10,100
Deficit
ALM
loom
2
lead
Regtzi2'"ementa
229000
22,000
220000
Production
6500
6,500
7,000
Deficit
Zdne
Aequiremente
21,300
23,700
26,300
Production
2,500
3,000
49000
Deficit
lam=
MOM
220 IM
Alter
Baquirements
20,000
22,000
25,000
Production
4,000
4,000
4,500
Deficit O , - 11 I'm a2psw
Domestic copper production is ubiefly from scraps and imports are
obtained from Wearbezn L=uropeo Lead is produced frcm both ores and scrape
and foreign supply sources include Bulgaria and Rumania, Scrap metal is the
sole domestic source of rains, and the bulk of Czechoslovak requiremeenta are
obtained from Poland, which supplies 23,9000 metric tons a year; from the
USSR; and from Western sources, Aluminum is obtained through scrap recovery
and through imports from the Soviet .'.3 c0
Czechoslovakia will. continue to rely heavily on the Bloc for coppere
lead, zinc, and aluminum, It depends largely on overseas sources for its tin
requirementsp Czechoslovakians production of antimony is well in excess of
domestic requirements and is a significant contribution to the Soviet Bloao
-45-
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/E;,lA-RDP79R01012A000900030002-6
ar Productiono
Production of capper ft on domestic ores in Czechos1ovajda is from 55
to '15 metric a years f Other sources of copper are scrap and possibly
p rr.-tea imported from Spain, *ich is used principally for its sulphur and
iron content but may contain fzzi 005 to I percent coppers Total production
is a timated an folds
Estimated Copper Productim
194T.50
Metric Tom
Electrolytic
500
600
600
600
Smelter
(From Scrap) NQAI
7,4o0
78400
7,400
Total
N.A.
8
$4000
880DO
Planned
bo Estimated Possible Production and Capacity,,
rseap+rri rmr.. a ~rarw.o+.~m.sri.ianrn
The annual production of electrolytic copper is expected to rein at,
600 uric tons in 1951. and 19520 The output of smelter copper from scrap,
however, is estimated at 93000 tons in 1951 and 9, 500 tons in 1952, raising
total output to 98600 tuna in 1951 and 10,140 tone in 19520 2 The 1952
cap;city of eleatrolyti: copper facilities is estimated at metric tons,
of bael:bare at from 1,CJO to 1,500 tons, and of second smelters (scrap)
at possibly 10,000 tons,
c':. Domestic LOILIrementso
copper production from domestic mines provides only about Ool percent
of C ec' oslovak requirersents, which are estimated as follows W;
Estimated Copper Requirements
1988 2
)fstric Tons
49?O35 5DO422 53,478 590680 65,310
it is reported that Eastern Europe can supply about 17,000 tenet leaving tho
fo"Llo .ig amounts to be imported from nowt .Bloc sources s
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 'Approved For Release 1999/09/C IA-RDP79RO1012A000900030002-6
Estimated Copper Import Requiiwants from Non-&oc Sources
1948$2
Metric tons
32,035 33,422
do StockpUeso
36,478 42,680
48,310
Stocks of copper for industrial use are esti. ed at 19,830 metric
tons as of 31 December 1948 and 26,260 tons as of 31 December 1949.
42o Surplus or Deficito
Caschhoalov aes copper deficit is estimated in term of requirements
leas domestic production from-area and scrap:
Estimated Copper Deficit
195052
metric Toes
Requirements 53,x378
Production 8,060
Deficit 45
fe Internal Limitationso
.59,680 65,320
9,60o 10,100
5OS48? 5.,123?
Since Czechoslovakia has almost no copper ores and very limited
31t and refining facilities for processing imported ores and blister
oc,oper,, it must rely heavily on imports for its copper supplyo
g, Trends-Including Itxtioations of Mobilization for Waro
Czechoslovakia is attempting to expand munitions production and to
ctYatribute to the industrialization program of the Bloc,, j/ xhich x411 in.
crease requirements of copper. In particular, the engineering industry is
ea.poo.t ed to supply equipment for Soviet electrification projects* Moreov srp
domes{ria production goals have been raised in a recent revision of the Five
Tar Plan, To fill these growing demands, the copper industry will have
tc~ intenaily its efforts to maintain and increase copper importso
a,. Production.
Czechoslovakia obtains small amounts of lead from scrap and from
do. st{c ores. Zinc production in confined to scrap recovery, and all of the
zinc concentrates are exported for smelting* 1/ Production is estimated as
follm s
47
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 Approved For Release 1999/09x"` IA-RDP79R01012A000900030002-6
Est wited Lead and Zino Production
1.99-1?50
metric Tons
L*ad
i Scrap
Frm Ores
21925 33*500 385OO
6A 6,40
2,505 20500
Ca 0
Low, mat Pva i b1e Production and
Action of load and zinc in 1951 and 19x52 are eatiamated as folios a
Estiited Lead and Zinc Froductton
1951.52
ldstric Tone
Lead
:x a
Scrap 3,000
3,000
Frcam
Ores 30500
l,000
To
tal 6A 2E-, *
74000
Zinc
3,cO
4,O-W-
,rho annuai capacity of primary lead smelters is estimated at from
6,003 to ?ffi('00 metric tons of rc fined lead. No intormatiaa is available an
the r apacity of sacorc ary lads lterso Czeohoalovakiate ~7' zinc eifiera,
with an & mia1 capacity of 23,000 ntrio woos, Sze reported shut down in
190, No- infoz* tion is available on the capacity of secondary smelters,,
D atia2 tSo
T
Regr ?i,r tss for lead &-A zinc are estimated as foUowa s
Estimated Li &d and Zinc Requirements
i9i18--52
metric Tons
u tad 4 18.9040 229000 22,000 22,,000 22$000
Zinc 18,800 20,100 2183OO 239 700 26,300
o ~itOt11 0
g :-aad atcc a reporti at 2O,s518 r- trio
ass of 31 Dee r 1949
for as~r zinc stocks at 8,: tons. 6/
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Sur~or Def.
stimated deficits indicated below do not take into consideration
st eke an of 1 January 1950 but represent only the difference between estt..
r ted r quirements and domestic production.
Estimated Lead and Zinc Deficits
1950-52
Lead
15,500
15500
15,000
Zinc
18,800
20s700
22,300
in the case of zinc, Poland in to supply 13,000 tons a year.
;aria a n d R u m a n i a s h i p l e a d c o n c e n t r a t e s to C z e c h o s l o v a k i a b u t not-in
quantities sufficient to make-up the deticito J
fo Internal Li mitationeo
Czechoslovakia has only limited reserves of to-grade lead and zinc
ore:=s and mining operations are handicapped by the mss of the veins,
hik;h prohibits Loge-scale operations, The Pribram mine and the Danslca
Stiki ica mine are the only known domestic sources. Reserves of the Pribrem
!nines which produces out three-quarters of the total output of primary lead,
are estimated at &pproximate1y 3. million motric tons of ore containing about
202 percent lead and 101 percent zinc. mining operations are from 1#200 to
1,5OO meters deep, and production is about 500 tons of ore a day. Ore resew,
of he Banska Stiavnica mine are unknoirn, and the ore yield is about 103 per-
' 'Lead and less than 0.6 percent zinc*
g. Trends-,-Inclndir,g Indications of Mobilization for War.
Expansion of the lead-zinc mines is unlike3yo
3. Aluminum.
a, Production.
Production of aluminum in Czechoslovakia in 1950 is estimated at 4,000
meV??ic tone, mil/ all of which is secondary production from aluminum scrap.
bo Estimated Possible Production and Cap3oitiro
Domestic. production is not expected to increase greatly in 1951 and
1952, being estimated at about 4,000 and 4,500 metric tone, respectively.
Capacity production is estimated at 5,000 tons in 1951 and 6,000 tons in 19529
co Domestic Requirement-s,
Domestic requirements ware estimated at 20?000trio tons in 1950,
22s00O tons in 1951, and 25,000 tons in 1952-
49
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do 3ta-c9ileso
tons* V
so .... lus or Deficita
The total aluminum supply available in 1950 vas 344013 metric tons,
comprising 10,000 tons of stocks, 4,000 tons of production, and 17,000 tons of
imparts. Consumption is estimated at 20,000 toots, indicating a surplus of
].1., C:0 tons. The surplus in 1953. in estimated at 12, 500 tons and in 1952 at
1.4,o tons,
f. Internal Limitations0
~~ 3Q
Since there are no deposits of bauxite in Czeohoslovakia,(p~rimary
alur Chum production pends entirely on imports of raw material. Iocandaiy
production is li Wed by the quantity of aluminum scrap available within the
cour:try and through imports. An adequate supply of technical personnel and
meal aniaal. equipment is believed to be available*
g. Trends-Ina Indications of Mobilization for War.
The increasing demands for imports of aluminum by Czechoslovakia are
presumptive evidence of expanding requirements for aluminum, 'which, it is
be33.eved, are primarily for military production*
s~.o 0
Csechoalavak production of antimony narmally is sufficient to meet
domestic regaimenta. The Cucna mine in southern Slovakia was the largest
prewar producer* accounting for two-ftixds of the country's production, vhiah
totaled about 800 metric tons in 1938- The balance of the 1938 output was
obt43n1 as a by%product from the lead-zinc mina at Pribram In response to
Gexr:~mn wartime de mantis, production vas isaxeas.d and in 1942 was estimated at
over 3,OOO metric toxs. Postwar production is estimated as fol].awss
Estimated Antirmoi r Production
1947-50
8V M.
1,434 1,6 1,800 2,000
Aluminum, stocks as of 1 January 1950 are estimated at 10,000 metric
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900030002-6
MGM
aaitva
bo etin-ated Peaaible Produ21120 MA-222
A new antimony mine was reported in Deomaber 1949 at Lorinobana, ,
located between the to of Zuconec and Zrolen in Slovakia. In viw of
the upva-.d trend in production since 1947, possible production from nev
mines, mid the wartime increases achieved under the Germans, production
is e?atizaated at 2,300 metric tons in 1951 and 2,,600 tans In 1952.
~a. t R o
Czechoslovak production of antimony meets dousestie regnir nts and
prooides a surplus for .xport or stocks. Them is little doubt that require-
ments are greater today than before the war because of inorassed Industrial
activity and possible preparations for war. Estimated domestic requirements
are 1,200 metric tons In 1950, 1,300 tons In 1951, and 1,400 talc In 1952.
d0 21oake3lea.
Antimony stocks cannot be estimated fran available information, but
it is 1xillevved that a part of the annual surplus is reserved for stockpiling
,td the balance Is shipped to other members of the Soviet Blow
e fl am - 2= _-
Fieased on the estimates of production and domestic requirements,
surpluses in 1950-52 are projected as toilaas:
Estimated Antimozy Surplus
195"2
r~e
N+~-+n+r+~MrM
~
Production
2,000
2,300 2,600
Requirements
1,200
1,300 1,400
Surplus M
The available euppiy of antimony is believed to be sufficient for
current needs,, although definite figures an we reserves are lacking. Sine,
Czechoslovakia is a progressive,, industrialized country, the availability
of technical pera;anneal and facilities for the manufacture of mining and
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900030002-6
processing equipment should be adwquate. The possible disaffoatiamof
labor is a potential limiting factor.
go a~-?1 ladinu lndicat Ma !49bili ts 99?ii At.
The production of anthxn ny is Increasing. Although th re - are no
data avadlable on increases in plant capacities, the de lopment and
exploitation of m' new mine would require additional aancntrating
facilities.
50 Zi0
The production of tin in Czeaboslcvakia is negligible. A tin mine
is reported to bave been opened in Cinabanaa Slovakia, but nfcr tion
regarding its development and exploitation is lacking.
Imports and con tLon for 19M.50 are estimated as follows
Zastimated Tin Imports and Canmimption
1948-50
I= TM
I arts W
Netherlands
X05
10030
796
gigs
93
0
265
Malays
0
0
25
Total
20
Co ! t1on
10630
1,03D
10000
52 -
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G? 9A1.
Coal In the sr .e of aver 90 percent of tba orgy acbotmsfd in
Csechos l avak ad Coal production in 1950. s reported +0 have been 18.5
million metric tons of bituminous coal and 27.5 million toga of broom
coal and lignite. The bi' inous mines failed to most theft r output quota
by 2.1 percent,, althoag i brawn coal mines exceeded their goal t r 1.4
pereent0
Objectives for 1951 call for the output of bite sous coal to , increase
6.5 percent and brown coal 7.5 percent ever 1950 levels. It is believed that
bitmirons mines will ba able to produce only about 19?2 m4114 metric tans.,
but that barons coal output probably viii be approximately 29.5 minion togs,
or close to the nor Plan goal. It is doubtful if production in 1952 will
ex9ed 20 million tons of bious and 31 million toms of gown seal
The coal. Industry has had to contend with serious postwar labotr
problems. Shortages of manpouier have resulted in the widespread use of
fasraed labor and apprentices, vbo are unsk313.ed- and inefficient. Dim.
sat'sfactiou of the 'minere with .gees, working conditions, and ineTeaaed
pra action quotas has been manifested in sporadic sit=down satrikea, alp-
dotAa, and high rates of absent?oismn.
Gee ioslovekia is a net importer of solid Thou o In.1950, imports
probably mounted to about 3.9 million %*trio tons of bituminous coal.. Poland
had agrsed to furnish this quantity, vhioh is 350,000 tons lose than
Czechoslovakia had requested. Imports may rise in 1951 and 1952, unless
output abed iscreaie more than it believed likely or unless exports should
deeiease3 Experts in 1950 are estimated to have been appro ' tely 707,000
metric tons of bituminous zml, 1.4 mill ion Bone of terra coal., and over
:L2 jdlUcn tons of coke. Possibly as much as tsa-tbirda of the export
ton na a vent to non-Soviet Bloc countries,
It is estimated that coal requirooments in 1950 weKre near3,y49.B
rail.I.ion 7'L Otric tons and probably will rise to about 56 mill ton tone in 1952.
According to the 1949 Place, bituminous supplies were to be distributed as
i oUss u m3 , .13-1 pe ent; metallurgy (probably all for metallurgical
er1w); 17C 4 per ent; other coke, 247 percent; tra rtation, 12.3 pareent;
t.eetric power plants, 5.8 percent; briquette plants, 1.7 percent; other
Inds r s, 17.9 percent; and dunes9ti.c heating, 781 percent. Bro%m coal
and brown coal coke were t+, be allocated as folaases , 7 percent;
I53_
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e1e3tt'1t pc?wer plante8 11.8 percent; synthetic fuel products (Stalin
Weeks) r, 117,0 percent; transportation, U,1 percent; briquette plants,
2.5 peresn`:; other Industry, 317 percent and domestic heating, 18.9
percent,
1c ~~
CzechoOnvekia produces bitsm inaus ooal, mash of Which is of the
onking type, but the major part of total. coal output is to ovn coal sod
1(wrwgrade l ignites m Produatiesh 9,s o atimalted as follam s
latest Annual Estimates of Coal. Produotlon
194850
Dram coal
ISK Moue gal t,1,,,,
194
1?v746
23,589
41,?335
1945
17,043
26,52'7`
43,5M
1950
18,456
27,506
45,962
The s r1g+i . goal. for 1950 vas exceeded by 4 percent for bites pz duo.-
tio : and by 4,,4 percent for bra= coal and lignite, but the bituminous miroa
failed b,,, 2.1 pest to meet their revised goal, althaugt the broM coal
des a +feedeit their higher goal by 1.4 percento
i'tiuninou coal is produced in five districts in Czechoslovakia. Of
greatest importance is the t trava era vino field, vhiah is the aoutbeastern
extremity of the Upper Silesian coaal basin. This field contains the best
coal fotud in Csertnoa1oy kin and yields coke of outatandfrg qualltyy and,
as a ra.t,, an extensive coke industry has developed in that area. The
1950 target for the t .atrava-garvinaa district was 15 million tone, which,
if attained, would have represented about 81.3 percent of the total bituminous
output (the actual figure was vloaer to 80 porccnt). The Mad mo (Central
Soha=nian) district produ a Pram 10 to U. percent of the bituminous tonnage,
the balame comes f Pisen, Tratnov, and Eosics-,
The 1948 quotas for each district are given in the following table.
Sines the total coincides exactly with the production reported for the year,
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it f sst probable that the output f rcm each district did not wry mach foram
the targets.
Planned Bituminous Coal Production by Districts
1948
irrrro-i..~.a ^ r-ri76ilrr^^^rirYll~r~U =MMOA BIWA Tom
PeReent
wrywsar~~~rir~i~
oatt~esvas ar dn0a 13,710
77,26
8tad
o (C
ntral
n
e
Bohamd an)
2$000
11.27
Plzen (West
+~
Bohn i s )
920
5.28
Trutxs (Furst
Bohemian)
610
3.04
Roeiene (South
24sviaul)
506
2695
Total.
Thu priaafpal bran coal deposits are fond on the Ore Hou telna fault
stretching along their nortbvest.rn be*da=y of flab sis. In this district,
two brown coal bao3.ns have been famed, the Most and the Sokolov* The
Most basin is in also and output the largest coal basin in C$achoslavsl~3 a0
It extends for 60 kileaaeteras 4raa Labem almost to Kadan, and is about 12
td c tst rs vide at its $eaaator, which is in the vicinity of Most. One seam is
up to 40 meters thick and is exploited both by deep mines and strip mining.
The Most district accounts for more than 70 percent of Czechoslovakia's
total ' owsa coal and lignite pre&ucrti on, and 53 mines In this area veiusre
worked in 194,, Three large open-cast mines were being developed in the
o year with a ccmmbined capacity expected to mach 8 mm.ion tons.
Seised in Importance in the Sokolov br+aass coal basin, located sexsftaeet
of the Most district. The Soke1ov basin extends for 30 kilometers, from
?? 1ovy vary to rheb, and has a m5anmm width of 8 kil c rs. There were
26 miser operatic in the area in 1948, of which 7 were open-cast operations,
and the quota for this district represented 20.7 percent of the 194 pled
Out lt*
The remaii Ier of the production is scattered and. ce 1ats of 1w -grade
lignite, with the notable oweption of a few fairly large brown owl mines
in Slovakia in the vicinities of Handl czaa and Noya /b
- 55
SBORET
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SECMW
The 1948 Plan called for the following production by districts:
.san=d Brown Coal and Lignite Prodsaatf o a by Districts
1942
Perch.
Mlk=
an
Most
17,145
71.
7
4
.%koiov (Formerly TnThiov)
4,950
/
y
~
20.70
SIovakla Districts
924
3.87
Lignite in Boheia
344
104
4
Lignite in Moravia
537
'`
2.25
Total
2, WA=JW Pepsi le Pr_nductin and Canaeit .
M&W
The original Five Year Plan establ(ahed-the following ob3ectives for
the production of coal and cakes
Planned Coal Production
194953
1953
E1tamizon Coal
17,750
170900
18,050
18,650
20,800
117.2
Brown Coal
25,800
27,250
29,000
30,600
32,200
134.7
mining coke
3,350
3,550
3,550
3,550
30550
246.6
Metallurgical.
Coke
1,480
1,490
1,600
2,015
2,470
172.2
Gas Coke
' 423
396
42
446
4W
150.3
Brown Coal Coke
1,298
1,410
1,457
1,504
1,551
192.2
. The targets for coal and coke production were revised in 1949 and 1950.
The goals for 1951 have been raised 6.5 percent for bituminous coal and 7.5
percent for brown coal. These increases are probably based on actual
production in 1950, making the indicated targets about 19.7 million metric
tons of bituminous coal and 29.6 million tons of brown coal,, a total
incase of around 3,3 million tons in 1951. Considering the recalcitrant
attitude of a large segment of the labor force and the pressure exerted on
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8WRIM
the workers in 1950 to reach the pl ersnad levels of output, it is ereaay
doubtful that the eettmate d goal for bitaminc a mining will be aehievedo
althaug the prospects for brawn coal mUdM are better.
CoLt produc?an in 1951 and 1952 is estimated as follows s
Estimated Goal ProductIon
195152
ago
81.UMMMOUe
19,200
20,000
Brown
290500
31?004
Total
On the basis of coke production data for the aecomd quarter of 1949,
it is bell ev d that the Plan goals of 7 asill ica metric Una in 1951 erd 7.5
rillion tons in 1952 represent r onablg close approximations of the tonnages
-f coke that will be produced in those year e,, Total coke pro&atiaa ' in 1949
vai reported, to have been 6.59 million tones, as *OMpared With a Plan target
of 6.55 rail Ucn tons.
:30
It is estimated that coal requirements In 1950 were about 49*8 mdl1icn
netria tone and will probably be about 56 udlllon tone In 1952. Lppr xtmate]y
47.8 million metric tons of coal- and brown coal coke were alloeatead to the
domestic eeconuW in the 1949 Plan, but actual distribution is estimated +00
have been about 365,,000 tons less than this figure The planned disstributim
of 20,8 million metric tons of bitty einaua cool was as fellaerss mitrin,
13.1. percent; metallnra (probably all for me+tallnrgica L cure), 17.4 percent;
other coke? 24.7 percent; transportation, 1.2.3 percent; electric power plants,
5.8 percent; briquette plaxite, 1.7 percent; otfler 1nduatr7, 17.9 percent; and
d atia hustings, 7.1 percent. The distribution of 27.1 million metric tons
of t'or't coal and berms coal coke was to be as fellows s mia(ng, 7.0 percent;
e1e etrte power plants,, 11.8 percent; Muthetie fuel produetes (Stalin Works) ,
1.7.0 pe cent; travoportatiofl, 21.1 p=v:s et; brie tte plunte, 2.5 percent;
other industry,, 31.7 percent; and domestic beating# 18,9 percents
J
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The fc alev3ng tables show the planned a11ooatiom of. bid and
1 own cost for 1949 and estimates of regaftements for the period 1949-5o
l tinted C oe1 v k ..vailabilf ty and
1949-52
i9re rents of Bites Coal
&M me
.
.. ..
9
Itz
Proctuc#,f
17,750x0 _
17,00
18,456
190200
200000
Stocks (as of I Jan)
P-.t1co (Briquettes
29100
291
268
400
450
and for M71mg)
37200
372
4?0
400
400
8avifts ffte C ptioa
5M.5
500
0
0
0
ports
20800.0
3/41.
39850
4,000
4250
Subtotal
$
8 Oka (as of 31 Doe)
39 .5
268
400
500
Total Jimllabillt7
AIM &A
mniw
2,729
2,620
2,850
2,920
3,000
t?ic Power Plants
10202
1,202
1,300
1,400
1,9300
Gasworks
570
570
567
5W
600
Xrm1metals
435
435
460
500
550
14etal.urgr
3,608
3,
3,700
4,000
4,400
Coka
5,135
5,135
5,550
5,600
50650
$ li heal wry
245
245
260
270
270
Other uses
29450
264550
20600
2,800
3,000
Ra.roads
dater Transport, Urban
20532
2,532
2,650
29850
3,000
Railroads
29
29
30
30
30
B,igmttes
352
352
40D
400
400
Dcaewtic Rating
1,480
3-0450
19500
11,550
1,600
?aster. Re ents
MA
The udes hard coal briquettes.
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ZZat"Ited Cx004oa1ovak Availability and 3 quir~e~tr~ 9f
Vmm Coal and Bps Coal Coko
2949-52
Prodwtion
Stooks (as of 1 Jan)
26,450Q4~ 26,E
270
400
2gi450~0 U,~
Production (Brl
usttos
q
and for Drying)
4130
425
A"
Brown Coal Cole
1,32
640 1,~
1,
1,440
1,00
Zalu . Col
2600 26
25
_
25
25
Imports
2000 20
0
0
0
Sbtotaj
Xqwrtm
1,220.0 1,52?
10476
1,000
800
Stocks (as of 31 Des)
480.5 400
415
700
925
Tote]. Avail abdlit r
.' ems.. ~
. -
..a
.
.
mining
1,8885 10890
1,925
2,100
20225
Rtaeatic Porn Pleats
3,.209.0 3,210.
3,350
3,700
4,000
Ga"arks
19.0 19
20
25
30
Irons Metals
975.0 975
1,025
10200
1,350
asst 1uV
485.0 485
525
boo
650
tafsoacel Izrlastr-
(St*3a Works)
4,622.0", 4,,621
4800
5,200
5,450
Other chamias1 Industries
1*350.0 2,350
1,400
1$550
1,700
Other Indiustrass
5,717.2 '5,711
5,850
60230
6,6Q0
Pa1lrods
2090.0 2,955
3,100
3,350
3,600
Water Tramports Urban
.moods
55.0 55
55
60
65
Briquett6s
673.0 670
700
750
800
I aotie Skating
5,126.0 40900
51,125
5,365
5,530
Total Req 1 its
a
x+olta s 5543 aaitria too of Y ?n owl coke
59 we
SEDRIT
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M t.axe el vas of 1948, stocks aonaietcd of about 29.L,0C0 mebrie t
Of h` Cuss ewl and 4928OO0 toms of brown cowa and brown c0a1 coka`
or Lisa than mw as roquirmmto. A might decline In ctooko of
:max o and brown coal coke was anticipated by the and of 1949. It
-.sss planed to iacreaais reserves of Utusalnous coal ' Igd`OOO two.. but
tl3a goal prbab]y was not r zedo Cool. stocks are be1teveed to be
1 and thero is little 'Ak 1 hood that t1i.y will Increase
Vxoogb 1952,
99 RIMA.
Avaij Lb1 txaft data shov that Creoboaiovskla vas a not 1np rter of
solid fuels 1 1949 19504 In 7.949, P 1a d euppliid 3.5 xailllon mrtrie
tone f bit wi c4mU. a . agrssed to A dsb 3 R9 million tons in 1950 in
responas to ae o ;a+al.avaklaes request for 4.2 million t=w.
$Zmate in 1950 an estimated at appraxtzete1y 707,000 netrLe tone of
bftmd. ioua cca7.k 1.4 tit= n tome of brown cola 1.2 r ta? tars of bard
raal weep and 61.9,OOC= tons of bnm cad cokes Of the total estivted
ports of 3.4 mi.in metric tons, about 67 per at *nt to no Woe
co mtx iae
Vhe fo7.l.uing tables lu deh statist4es an iiaportss eM exporta of coal
and aolm In 19"b C hoslevak a stopped reporting its tarado in these
i mI s after Augut i949a and it therefore bas been neceaa to x' ?' ea
!Mort data supplied by variot*a European coantrl es and an trade agree ae nts
with wxtrie v In the Soviet B1oe in me nj; these c+omputaUone. yg en
e'er 1914.9 and 1950 abou d therefore be regarded only as approadmatiaM o
Eutimted Coal bVerts (C aIwmkcs)
19.4&p5O
-j --.>
Bitumium Pew 2 Lp a $/ 3,,460e9O0 . 3s85fls000 1V
Drown HUU8017 20,4150
9
Coke Poland 3, TV . W
Ttade Reported. .t.
Si. .a if .
'bab7;j none,
- 60,w
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tee : its of Bite CM a (Csehoela C1a)
194& 5O
S t1
floe CcIAntrier.
HM%PV7
Poland
9iabtot.-i
Total
m _
~- m Im
337,215
383,8
250VOW
20 20
0
0
0
26#312
1.879731
409W
220,348
223;000
29,732
880900
120,000
150
0
0
2
l7 gQ
.
44,200
608,000
1.09
0
0
63
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!t3.ted parts of Brom oe3. (Czechoslovak a)
Ito Cries
AwtxI&
Vert t cmw
9vitzerland
ugoa u
Subtotal
Bice Countries
G
Total
A &MI19 If a
3WO204 43.9.300 375,OOo
8658147 11006#100 1p000?000
16291 3Q- 30 0
.23/ 1 IgA&IM irk' rM2
404% 6,000 A/
QLAW
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 ,Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900030002-6
Eit mat d Exports of Herd Goal Coke (Czeoboa3,avr kia)
191,6-50
Dmmti8aticrt
Hoa3lac Gies
139j,356
6?,OOO
105,000
Finland
0
0
100
Vzan a
46,917
71#,000
700
W?at Oert
74:100
0
0
Itev land
116,OOOO
450,700
600000
Trieste
1,315
0
0
Tugoelavia
Subtotal
Moo Countries
272#292
0
0
aamxia
2,000
205t)
3,000
NSA GenwW
25,000
400,000
4 4,000 Al
257,673
325,000
2111000
PolAnd
1050934
208,700
150,000
Immu
451,82
100,000
150,000
subtotal
Other
Palestiu
Total.
3.o:taon
700
Lgr= IMAM 1
W P coke demo Plan ftgmre4
,. 63
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SSO1i,L+T
Estimated &ports of Drown Coal Colas (CseohosLavo d.a)
1948-30
I . No= TOM
3~3
Auxtria
West GMMTT
Total
4,828 28,300 11,000
34,100 72,300
52,203 40,400 50,000
6o i'~ats~*na1 Li1n to Hass
The Cseehoslovak coal i try bas bad a serious x9opmw problem. The.
postwar deportation of thmaands of Sudeten Germans created a scarcity of
ors and re&ul.ted in heavy dependence upon fwced labourers and yOUng
apprentices, mho are unskilled and iaefticient0 Worker dineatistaction vit
tams, working cooaditicu, and In=-wood pi,c6nctL= a tan has been %=I -
fested in sporadic sit-dove atarikesa, elau?der.m, aid high rates of
absenteeiemo Miners are largely opposed to me+cbanittatie n beoeuse the feel
that they derive little benefit f xi it,
Sam of the coal minea are veld nipped vith modern macbinerry, mash of
vhi bas been imported fray the US and the UX. The used for more maebinery
and equipment and particularly for spare parts, however, In considemblee
Open-cast operations require all sizes of smaavatIng shovels and a large
rnmmber of bulldozers its vhieh are in short supply in Gzeahoslovaldae
The majority of the abaft mines in the important Ostrava district have
`been usi ezapresaed air equipment, and conversion to electri action In
the larger rlnes has been great 3,y delayed by look of electric babies and
.thew ne sssaiy vgaip nt. Vaderground operations in other districts are
generally less mechanised than an the Ostrava m1nec, part3yr because of natural
coalition . The rlying rock strata are very veal in the E3ndnn and Most
die vriatz, and the cos are exbNemely su copt5ble of spontaneous eambtwtic b
These ccvdition , b oh also *caw in some other districts, render mining
,xbn a'C .y hazardous and reduce the possibt1ities of vd2laing move efficient
types of elect rietatl maohineoryo
7o
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 -Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900030002-6
;'? -??Inselud3~? Inc3ie f3a~ of HA M tu.%&*
Co*. is the source of fmm 90 pare ut to 95 per*snt of all wa rgy -:sad
is dseehoal a4 Higher aneas'L production goals ref'. a t the rising
industrial requirements four fa.L Peetwer output gains baw'bsen duets
to a lsxTe extent, to the installation of modern mach1n 7 obtained from
the West,, Cessation of these d+el .vwles would force C ahosl.a~va]cia to rely
on the Soviet Bloc for machinery and equip at and v 1d rednos the
possibility that coal pivduetion voiald attain planned goals,
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900030002-6
ITIOPSEs fi
Fstroleum?
The production of crude oil in dssoboslovakia in 1950 was about 50,,000
mste:ie tons t year, vaich covorod less *ban 10 poroent of annum doi st; a re?
quit nts of 700,000 'once The 'remainder of the rsquiromieats 'Mere not by
aeyrat: do fuels produosd in the Stalin Works at Zdost, the refining of imported
,ado oil and masut (residual fuel oi1), and the importation of petroleum
products.
Output of the Ave operating crude oil refineries in 1980, 1951,0 and
3062 it estimated at about 215,000, ' 230,000, and 255,000 metric tons, _*.
rapsayivo7yo To this nhauld be added about 350,000, 5800000 and 400,000 tons
at a, thetic fuels in the a. years, respectively, from the Lbst refinery,
In addition to the cvuds oil and residual fuel oil imported from Austria amd
pia for reaming, estimieatsd at 200,000 netrio tons in 1960 and 250,000 tons
in 1952,0 Csochoslnvseakia receives ebout'300#000 tons of motor gasoline, and gas
un diesel 'oil f om Hunanla, Austx i~ amgary$ sad East GermazW, :
There is considerable rvidumv that astocks have been and era being
built, upo L]ilitary and reserve depots are kept ;till. at an timsa In 1950
alo , Czechoslovak petroleum produ tion ishsd a possible surplus of
150,000 metric tons for etoakpiling0
Czechoslovak crude oil reserv are small er of inferior qualitya
Laren deposits of brown coal, h r,, provide adequate roar material, for &
synthetic fuels industry. The meant iaaport nt establishment of the. Czreialovak
petrol, industry is the Stn7.in Workag the synthetio fuels plant at Lbst,
Piftrr ? percent of annual petzvleuta req it-vwnts are not by the output of this
punt, which is the, sole Cseohoslovek producer of aviation gasoline. P1
1950 to 1952, output of 95/130?ootana gasoline is expected to rise from.50,000
b 500000 metric tons,
Froddact1on, and Estimated Possible Production and C aoi d
CzeobezslovWda$s production of crude oil has never been laurgi The 05.1
.
produced is a heavy nonparaf`finoua tam containing little gasoline and
lmrosaesa. if By far the mast important producing area is ate. the Lk racvi an.?-
Siovaki.an rdcr no&r Alzatria, in the vicinity of Gbe]yy and lbdonin6 In this
area there are four fields in operation, at Broolav, Maly, Stepbeareov, emd Lab,
Tatar, arid, oil output in 1950 was about 5O ,OOO metrio tons,, Eaefi sine arr
plospwtion is being carried on, but results base been discouraging, 1 and
output probably will r vaain at the some le "I in 1963. and 1952
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TOP SE
In 19360 Gso*boslo tia had 13 rsfin.riss with a "4' axemsal ospaoitp
of about 900000 mstria tons0 J Only five Of thalao With a. total aanuai sa,.
pao .ty of 440,000 taxes, eears in operation is 1948, In ividusl oapaeitiss rare
sstimsted as follaxn a
Estimated Refinery Capacity
D3stillsizion
Tbarmal
SM!LdM
Total
Appollo
Darstia1ava
800000
500000
130
,000
Psnta- 5
Paxdubieo
800000
0
,
808000
States fiasry .J
Dabove+
80,000
0
800000
Vaou-un Z
Rolla
90,000
0
90,0000
Privoi
bravska Ostrav%
600000
0
600000
390 000
so.J0 0
460
The refinery at Bratislava is bsthg expindsd to a ospaoityr of 200a?0? netria
tons a yasre Omd it bas also b.et raparted that the Pardubfes refinery is in
tbm provers of expo i,ou,b,
The refinery outp,at from both dox stio and imported crude oil and masut is
estirted as follows b's
Estimated Refinery Production.
Lbtrio Tout A Year
1950-62
1952
Gasoline
a
9
Seroxem
10
12
DUM1 ani
Other Distilaatai
39
89_
4S
Y asl Oil
26
so
3ti
I ioanta
86 "
91
99
Aapbalt
30
32
35
Paraffin
4
4
4
Others
is
16
18
lbzv than bait of the toted output of refined pzodusts ooarsis f?om the Statin
Uorka, at Lbw-.v built by the Germans in World Wsr II to produce agnthetio fuel
-67-
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TOP SECUT
from b n *Na by the Dergius pmoesso " This plant is dssigtwd to bon a
+oVwity of 1 million metrio sons of liguid fuels a yrasa but the
output obtained vsas only 6820,000 glace 10 The Stalin Tor3ca von badly
damaged in the xvar but hsr a been partiZ!Qr reared, and with firthsr recto-.
ration output probably will aontinus to rise as estimated belaaer ll c
Esti tefd Produatian of Synthetio Fuels
Thousand ti trio
1950
.1961
1982
AV"-Lion Gasoluo
30
40
2btar aaolira
161
176
ITS
Se"sama3
33
35
36
Diesel, and
Othiw Distillates
120
130
1#0
Total
The aVSat ojinu Pro
probably grads 95130e
2. Domwutio Eaciuir&a utr.
sc3~~w.w ~n.rw wr.e.wr.>'.dnMwrawiuw~
.D Btia petroleum rsquiramwntas fttaled 700,000 metric tons In 1960. About
65 perow* of this was not by refining domestic *rude And by the output of the
Lost ey t ictic retifirwrrya satth imports of arcade oil and refined prod=ft
supplying the r+esA ,er. App dmately 580,000 tons ware used for civilian
purposes as fb11Dws ah
Estimattaed GivilLta F'e fro ,+ieam -8egoit'eroszxbs
1980
?m. land A tx1 c Zb
gViation
Gas Oil
Ubtoar and Diuel
La____ r Gasoline Gasoline and Pusl Oil Xerrosens lubricants T al
Air import 13 0
Latex' import 0 222
nail Transport 0 24
Tnduatt7 0 31
Construction 0 5
Agriculture 0 10
otber 0 1
Total 118 291
o 0
99 0
26
0
3,1 2
6 1
66 18
0 15
0 13
15 336
1 80
8 52
2 12
5 98
1 17
68
36
TOP SECRET
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Top SI!.T
Total require a ts, civilian and milit a rya in 1960 for the perm ipal
petiole= products we as .ib11ow x
Bstirratad Total Petroleum 8equiromeats
1950
Thousand Lbtrie Tom
Product
Civilise
.................
am "t%
Aviation Gsaolix*
16
6
18
Lbtor Giaeolins
291
70
361
Gas Oil and Diesel
and F MI O31
206
35
261
seros.ne
30
0
36
Lubricate
82
1S
44
Tetra
578
323
701
It is probable that little ohange in tavtal oo2isi ipt3on mil be registered
in 1951 and 1952, nine sivilimn. a 1oeatioas could be out to aupp2;. ric
acid, conataned in various fields of the chemical industry., while the balance
is 1ar, .y used for the bleaching of sulphite pulp, The country has excess
capacity, and there is little like3dlcxod of additional facilities being installed
in 1951 and 3,952,
4. Coke C=`healcalsa
The Stalin Works at lost, cci feted by the Germans in 19113, is one of the
it icportant chexni.cal plants in the Soviet Bloc: and the bulk of its products
are of military value. It was designed to produce synthetic gasoline frc
the brcqm coals ford in large quantities in the area, By- idu&,3 of thia
proce. a include large quantities of benzol., toluol* naphthalenes, wood preaer,a..
tives? and a special product called py:ocate which has potential use as
an i rt t ingredient in rocket 11ue3z. The Stalin Rorke is by gar the
largest producer of catechol in the world. All catechol output is exported
to the SSISR, and p'oduction at the rate of 3,000 metric tons a year is suffici
to provide fuel for a large number of rockets.
The dyestuffs industry in Czechoslovakia is expanding, and by,-ju'oducts
f the Staff Works Will, be osaential.. for this industry, At the present
t Lee, n'n benzol has been offered for sale through Polish ports to the TiS 0
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50 .phaU Acid,
ss.n r .rim~s+s.+++4
Sulphuric acid,, one of the most important cheadca1e In any industrial
fates, is produced in substantial quantities in Czec a3ovak a. The estimated
- oduw;t4on in 1950 of 2588000 metric tons 3s approximstely, oneebalf of capacity.
The s` ortage of pyrites supplies.. nearly half of which are obtained from nano
orbit countries, is the reason for the comparatively low roduction.
About cne-half of the production is used in the manufacture of fertili ere,
About 30,000, metric tons is used in processing steel, and aprro3dmateljr the
gene amount is used in the production of rayon. Recent reports show that
United quantities of sulphuric acid have been imported from Italy and East
QerMwTa
/ 4 Y h and !~xlMNI 0
a', Production,
No native eulpliar is produced in Czeeboslovakias and the output of
b,7-product sulphur is believed, to be negligible.
SrU quantitios of pyrites are produced- from deposits in the Chveletice
area. Production in 1950 was 40,000 metric tons, and planned production in
7951 is 3.00,000 tons. lam/ Some forced labor has been reported in the mines
b? Estimated Possible Production and Cspadty.
Production of pyrites in 1952 may reach 3,508000 metric tons*
c;, Domestic Requirementse
(1) Su1ir,
Rents of sulphur for industries which cannot use pyrites
are estimated to have been about 28,000 metric tons in 1950, principally for
rayon production but also for ag.*ionlture and the manufacture of, paper and
r b"z . Sulphur requiremwts for 1951 and 1952. will depend largely on the level
at which the rayon industry operates. The industry operated at 65 percent of
capacity in 1949. 3/ Assuming reasonably fun operation of the consuming
: 4ustriea, the 19572. sulphur requirements ii l be from 30,000 to 35,000 metric
(2) .., rites.
Total requirements for pyrites in 1950 have been reported to be
from 300?000 to 310,9000 metric tons' ? and in 39518 from 380,9000 to 100,Gino
tons. Of the 1953. requirements, between 290,000 and 300,000 tons are for the
?heaic .. industry and from 90,000 to 100,000 tow are for the pulps cellulose,.
ud rryou industries. V Requirements for 1952 are estimated to be from 330,,000
to 150,00 metric tons. Y
- 84.
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Shy
Stockpiles.
h cane of V -,e diffirmlties encountered in importing sulpbmr and
pyrites,, it is unlik 4y that sto cpilee of either of these materials have beau
accumrvlated or will be by 1952, In Februaxq 1951, stocks of pyrites awe
reportedly sufficient for 3 mouths' requirements, a normal supply for
industries cousumLag mineral raw materials,
e o Su 3= or Deficit.
(1)Sa
It is estimated that the sulphur deficit of about 31,000 metric
Ums in 1949 trill iaarease to from 35,000 to 40,000 tone in 1952. Etoaspt for a
aU c? tput of ley- u uct sulphur Czechoslovakia is eut$rely dept upon
imports. Import of su:phui'. in ]9 were as f'ol'd 1/:
Estimated Su1phur In-or is
19
Metric Tot:.
Source
ItO7
Portal
USSR
East Garmang
3.20873
12,4301
5,35t;
1,000
Total
657
31
rr+
ports of mnph= from East Carmn1 to Czechoslovakia in 1950
were 19334 metric torsa,. f In addition to the sulphur to be provided by the
USSR miler the 1949 trade agreement,, the Soviets also were to provide 5,000
metric tens of sulphuric acid,, ,500 tow of carbon bisulphide, 100 tons of
sodium sulphates and 300 tons of sod11fl 1 drosulphites 9 all of which would
require about 1,865 tons of el tat culphur or 4.,T$0 of pyrites (I
percent a p1i u' content).
Reports persist that Czechoslovakia is attewting to proms
sulpbnr from the US and Italy in c .rc tion of export controls. Spain
and Cyrus, former ourcec of pyrites, have ddscoittittcad abin-writ
to
zec1toslovaki but have been approached to z esume thmmu. 3
~M85
SEC~tE'.
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(2) EELtMo
Cxec1i e1ovaki.a enact 285,000 ic tons of 6 95 pmmt percent
of its x OMMU in 5iu~ des based on planned imports of
Of requi.?emeut$ is 195, aa of 100 000 tcazs3, but it
i "'S 235,000 to M OOO tom and planned production :
is= iii that, eman with in 'eased domestic product 70 percent of requirO
?amts 'sf1 have to be fined ty ii ports in 1952, Imports of p3ritM In 1950
end piano imports for 1951 are as fo lsws:
Pyrites ~5a0adi pied Iazorta
sources 150 W 1951 (piaa~med} Vf
Soviet Bloc
Subtotal _6 1 DA 0.0 0.
No Soviet Bloc
Iugoala' is 7,50i000
Greece and Cyprus 50,
Norte 13$000
Sweden 7,,000
' V % W t G 0
Italy 5, 0OO
Subtotal 2C?
Rumania
Bu3 aria 60,000
Total.
28
4 MOD
1;09000
80 000
60,000 to 70,000
400000
109000
10,000
15,000 to 20,000
20,000
255to 170.000
.000 to 250,000
The i nports plat ned for 1951 porobab3 hill not be obtained,
aeeca his giv+m notice that abipsaeeata i.U be diecoutfmisd, S edeu bas already
o1 d. its output else there., and expected shipments rxu Na r, G'~, and
ms g receive
.taffy are not like)yr to be cOWjfft93.y .fil3.ed. Thus ^sechosU
aku
bat 75,OOO togs less than An expected supply of pyrites in 2951. No
ti ate of the deficit for 1952 can be m- de$ because of the s ce tai uty of
crfo:rmauee of foreign sources of sugp1ro
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SST
The possibility of importing pyrit, a fro the Gi esche mina in
Polish U V3= Silesia, as was done under' the Gem occupations is . being
considered, .
f, Internal limdtations
7
(1) Availability of Raw 2:iateriais.
no in or>natian is available regarding the extent of the neer]y
discovered pyrites deposits in C.aechoalo da.. The mining operation will.
-eported%y yie3d 200,000 metric tans a year then in frill operation, / or
about half of future pyrites requirements*
Additional equipmnt required for further exploitation of the
pyrites deposits can probab3y be mam*factured in Czechoslovakia. but the
industrial competition for steel may be a limf t ng factor.
(2) Shortages of Rain katerial s.
Since 191.8, serious shortages of pyrites have hampered Czechoslovak
industry, affecting the production of sulpirnric acid, rubber, textiles, paper,
mad fertiliser, The shortages in sulphur and pyrites bare been caused by
Western export controiB and by increasing vrorld demand. Czechoslovakia will
fiord it increasingly difficult, if, not impossible, to procure these raw materials
. non-Orbit areas in the future, and the econoW will be seriously R.*ampared
unlew additional pyrites can be obtained frtwa. m1 n., Bulgaria, acrd Rumania.
Tads-YIncleL.4ng medications of 2?nbilization for War.
Ixploitation of the pyrites deposits in the Chvaletice aria bas been
Given high priority, M/ alad a substantial increase in production may be
t ected. Because the sulphur sbortage is more acute, it can be expected that
'
-,lose industries which now consume sulphur but which could use pyrites by
changing qui ont wi11 do so. The transition, howover,. YjU be c" .
ecauve of the expense involved pnd the large quantities of steel fired,
U3rq of the strategic east-jn%xkcts which use sulphur or pyrites as
jwimsry' rya w materials are exported to the USSR. Failure of Czechoslovakia
to rectos sufficient raw materials will result in the reduction of these
ports$, since there is no substitute for sulphur in its several. foxwas,
Rubberr.
a, Production.
Small quentitiec of neoprene-type synthetic rubber are now reporteMV
produced in Czecbosioeatda, but lack of teohnical equi t keeps production at
low 1e"1, The Bata plant in Ostrokoviee near Gotteraldav reportecl]y
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SEGR
started praduoti4n at the beginnfng of lor3d liar II and prodnoed about 3,000
metric tans in 1942. goat of the plant was destroyed in the war, and
production-has report y declined to about 1 ton a day because of a lack of
equipment, Reclaimed rubber production is estimated at 6,0000 wetift toads
in 1949 and ,900 tons in 1950.
Production of rubber goods has eteaAi3y increased sinus the and of the
drat w d fie output c:!' major types of goods is reported as follow z
Product 1918 Rubber Qoed3
k I/ Y 1W
s
kilts
4,467,800
30,370,000
12,000,000
AntoimablU. Track
and Tractor
tkaits
703,000
900,000
1
20
000
Bicyc3e and Motorcycle Baits
3,7965,000
9,330,000
,
,
10,75o,0o0
Bnbber I+botwear
Pdra
25,5x7,700
27,400,000
29,200,000
Coaveyor.Belts
Squa"
?.36,800
130,000
360,000
Nbtws
a, E9stiateda
Eatinated Possible Production and Ce sad ter.
No data are available on increase . r3aamed in synthetic rabbet production.
The Cseahoalovak goVeZMMWt reported3y has ordered the tIorad an distilleries
and the rrluegar factories in Brno to plan for the pr+odu of synthetic
rubber from alcohol. For this purpose, a large factory, to be latorm as
"Detano7.ka," reported3y was under ns const:ruction in Ra3ecs now Blansko, and vck 1d
be placed urder military control.
Great increases in the production of rubber , 1factu red goods, particu3ar4
of tires and tubes, are planned in 19 Czechoa2ova2da bads the SateUitee
in the production of major categories of rubber goods. The eoptusion of existing
facilities and the addition of new plants have enabled the industry to surpass
year'y p2anned production, and production in 1951 may approach the totals
originally planned for 1952 as fol3.oaas /r
SBMMT
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8stimated Production of Rubber Goode
19b1
t
Uait
P roduotion
Automobile, Tuck, and Tractor
Tires
Units
1,300,000
Rubber Footwear
Pairs
29,700,000
Conveyor Belts _
dquare
180,000
If additional equipsent and an adequate supply of roar materials are
available, a considerable increase in production of rubber goods* particularly
tires and tubes, can be expected.
'00 Doene guirsmeats
Requirements planned for the first 4 years of the current FITS Year
Plan (1949.53) are reported as follows 7/:
Planned Rubber Requiraaaents
1949-52
DQstrio zM
1949
1950
1951
1962
Natural Rubber
30,180
32,248
33,750
37,800
Synthetic Rubber
7,200
7,722
8,060
9,400
Reclaimed Rubber
9,000
9,500
10,100
100700
48, 80
490470
51900
67
900
Carbon Black
81026
810618
8,947
.
10,481
Other Chemicals
53,166
67,494
61,920
73,812
From this expected supply of raw materials, production of rubber goods was plsrnmsd
as follows P/:
SECRST
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SECRET
Planned Production of Rubber (kw."-
Product
Unit
1948
1950
1951
1952
Automobile
Units
428,000
800,000
8500000
850,000
Truck and Tractor
Units
4000000
450,000
6009,000
680,000
Bicycle
Units
4,750,000
4,860,000
5,280,000
5,250,000
Motorcycle
Units
290,000
290,000
360,000
8?0,000
Total, Tires
units
5,868000
8,190,000
8,8?0,000
6 910,000
Rubber Footwear
Pairs 25,600,000
27,460,000
29,280,000
298760,000
Conveyor Belts Square M
eters
120,000
120,000
180,000
180,000
Other Metric
Tons
67,997
71,509
721800
85,265
Later Plana for individual years indicate that changes ~r+ere made is
both planned quantities of raw materials and output of rubber goods, with major
emphasis given to production of tires and tuber. 1 Requirements for rubber
imports may be expected to increase in the next few yearn to meet eupanaion pl*ia
of the industry.
Csechoalovakia'e motor park, estimated at about 180,000 vehicles in
1950, would require from 720,000 to 800,000 tires a year. Although production
of tires is believed adequate to supply these requirements, the diversion of
tires to the USSR and to other Satellite countries may leave inautfioienb
quantities for domestic consunptione
d. Stockpilese.
There is no indication of any stockpiling of rubber or rubber goods,
The small reserve stooks maintained before the war were ocsapletely exhausted
by the Germans during the occupation, and the rubber industry has since operated
on a hand-to-mouth basiso 10 Stooks of raw materials for the rubber industry
are usually maintained at a ut a 3-months' supply. At the end or 1948,
Cffisohoelovekia reportedly had 3,810 metric tons of natural rubber (including
latex) and 1,099 tons of synthetic rubber, 11 f which would constitute only a
normal carry-over of material.
MW 90 -
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e, 9urplxls or Deficit..
Natural and synthetic rubber asplied 81. percent of to
requir~ea>raentaz of
the n in 3949p .'These imports. estimated at 1,3 000 metric tons of nature].
rubber e and 4,000 tons of reclaimed rubber in 1937, 22 7 have reparted3y i acrsoued
since the end of World War II as follmt
RubbW Imports
3&48-50 .
Eetric Two
.29
Natuirallubber 3 3S
Synthetic Rubber Reclaimed Rubber 2,621 I
Total b
I& RLO
27,500 28;000
8,000 8,000 V/
3,av0 3,000 ~
38,500 393000
ecL
M am
Czechoslovakia exports ooatiaiderabls gear Lties of an types of rubber
products to the lei eastern .c ountries and to ' the Soviet Bloc.* it is the major
producer among the Satellites of a wide variety of rubber goods and reportedly
must supply the USSR, with finished rubber pods in exchange for the raw naterials
required by the rubber industry, being a]lcnred to sell oal3r a portion of the
finished goods in Czechoslovakia to cover IDBntlfaatu1'ZA. g costs, RBCett reports
have indicated that Czechoslovakia, is "dumping",~ titres of rubber goods in
Western.. countries to obtain foreign currency. '+'!
The production of tires is considered more than adequate to meet domestic
requirements, except possibly for oertada types and sizes for heavy vehicles. A
oonsiderab7,e portion of the tire production is reported to go to the USSR and other
Satellite countries. Some types and sizes of rubber tires have been imported.
from countries outside the Soviet Orbit,-
Dom, ]tic supplies of carbon black and rubber chmo3,cale are inadequate,
and requirements of these materials are filled mainly by imports.
zec rubber goods include Benelux, Sweden, the UK, the
USSR, Switzerlapd, Austria, Yugoslavakia, Venezuela, and Iraq. 17
91..*
SEr
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be designed for the pa odnction of automobile tires, 30 Special efforts
probabIy win be denoted to provide suffidieait equi a exi for tire production.
A new tire plant IqW to be opened in JWvar7 1950 in S]rovalcia With equipment
ordered from the t1S, but the denial of export licenses for the machinery .made
it necessary to piece out facil3.tien fat' the plant from other plants in
country. So= equipwmt ma3 have been obtained in - other coimtrl es.
g. Tr ??. Tmdicatima of rabilization for liar.
Major emphasis in the rubber industry in Czechoslovakia, 4s in Poland,
bas been placed upon tire production. Soviet -instructions reportedly have
been issued that, since. Czechoslovakia bas the most advancmd. rubber industry
in the Soviet Mae. countries,. the manufacture of all rubber n'cducts in the
Satellite countries is to be. conceutmted there. 32 The coca diaated effort
of the soviet Moe to increase tire production , recent em aria on
obtaining tire cord facilities - also point to the major role tat Ctecbdslovaksa
3s expected to play in the rubber fabricating field. 33
After similar action in the USSR, Czechosloovakia in the ear3y postwar
period tuxt rtook to move frontier. industries toward the interior of the aovntsy.
Several. rubber fabricating plants were moved into Slovakia, now the ant' of
the industry. Factories were placed on a vartine basin, and increased SUM
and special security measuree'Were added. Production ban been initiated
of certain items of possible military use, claming rubber gas,. tanks for
airpianesp gas' magi life jacketa, rubber dinghies,. and equipment four M*nl
8tilxllSlYieas , . 35
w 93
Sa'r4aliii
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SECRET
Go. ....._, T 7ia
The Czechoslovak. ergineexriiag 213dnstzy is the largest amo'g t8e 9si.23i*ee
It produces a aubstantiai v&me of a vide rungs of mddmaq and equI;mft,
which Mots domestic requir e, accept for Certain steam, and
See a aurplva, equal to about 50 percent of total onbpat, a large propor-
f# of fah is d to-other members of the Swat MOO* The industry in
39117 ample d t.080 and it 38 pleas d that t 3953-em020me1t Will be
6311 bio, or about 26 percent of a total labor fom In indasta y and ocoostruotl t
of 2,1i19,000 wo sreo
The main, sectors of the Czechoslovak enginset g iudustiry ino]xate her
machinezy, pracisicu mac inert', aircraft and vehielee, and gametal mRChinory,
Appro~(mate 80 percent - of _ the capao?ir of 8koda, the major producing =ft of
the enginearii ig industry, Is centered in the Insts11atioans at Pilsou The fao..
tarp of ttis Skoda combine produce Complete eleattria poesr stations, camp1ats
eTAPxmt for Sin str3a1 p]ents {including chamibal factor as, pap i. lle;
refiner .ss, pumplr:g s tatiacs, rdWng mills di ftl33srlee, agar thatozrles,
etoa), vehicles, steel stsuatuz+es, ccuatraction machinery, ind3v d1 units at
machine totaa, - att r*tic machines, presser, and mmte-rms other types of equip.
merit, It is reported that fro 60 to 70 pez'oent of p~roduatiaet of thaw items is
eucpaa ede Lbrecm+er, Skoda is one of the chief an ad produce= In Bmapeo
. Produotton of the_ Bering industry in the sar]y postwar
years
increased greatisr over prewar linls, and, vender the Five Year Plan, ou%m to
scheduled to rise at an even acre rapid rate, Production surpasses domestic
ragn3re~nts, ci eating a large surplus which amounts to about 5o peroe* of t ho
production
total outputs All of the surplus is exported. Mm followft table at
of selected o nod3,tIes ahdws actual and plarnnd production.
Production of 3e3sated- Frnginsering
]937, 3948, 195143
m
MGtne Tools
5>
meatrio Lbtorii
Tractors
Agricultural
OLdhInN7
84 o20 i
N, A.
Automobiles
32,634
Trucks
3,
locomotives
75
FraLapt cam
NoAo
BSUOUP
L A,
W.
16,000
N. A.
19,0W
A'
N. A,
N.A.
8,000
5,500,000
Uod
17,504 ,
_
39,900
Na A.
890,,000
20,000
20,000
ICAO
LA0
No Am
1tO'04D
ICA
I5vOOO
O
4
4W
t - 8000
6,500,000
N.A.
N. A.
94
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SRS'
1? k' 41' a T+DOse.
Prodlot3,ao.
its prodoobi of =am a $oc s In 4a oslosakia is !fr gsaime- -
that of mw O mw Soviet Mad ems* 'the W M6 and Oi romks to Oils
ss#n sawn of nappy tar 8its31its -111 ;d', IS-1108 at 0041 as IAoo a. Proiestf m is
eetimsttsd as f*22= a i
tad Produaltcn of ? ddas gaols
j93?, 'I9L643
'site
2471
Proatzoad 5,496 6,770. 9,?l3. 31,814 34;300 3,5,000 16,000 17,900
Mamad 12,500 24,769 24,000 22,400 19,900
iattms milting machines, brosabee g B mao4fase, gssz' aaad
Paltaebb g ms , obape 'e, ax a Being zast1iti t an own -0ts aLd ' "pas
of macb1n too to raaratth d. The rid labor fwm In this 1.W7 1$
118,1$_ DDrb" but' aim* raeporte differ for now faotoarlste and figures s Wst
available for others, We total is oaeaidemd teeabftve.
steed Posaibla nM notion and ta-.
The Cseat aelovok msahirn toot- 3zaetrg Is proditoirig at amp eft, Omtpi
ana aspaoity an both vet1 ted at 26,000 Mite in 3$1 and 1?,540 ud& ft 290.
Despite PZVO M0 ee eonat erduc be at+e~vod , ft Is 1ib*3 wirb *e 3 peodtio~
tim 6I of
DamaestiC H, i .
Data on daasatie rsgaire?soobs ara nat avaiyab]a. Orsahoeit 1e paroialKau
its eufficeirent to fi31 daaeetio needs In mespr 01ctegorl1*oef mntlae taeo3s, bat
outer types mast be 1 orbede For ezuWLs Ossahaalovaicsa bas ordid aft Weebeft
ntrOps wag =d grit . ttttng umbi eery, mechisrerl far prodaradsos t bead s,
amd other epsofal mohiae toolso
Then is no stoo1tp33.tng of msahiae tools as sertoh, bob eani a vblrr gtit3,ss
of vaea$d ltgir0 w MI* boats an stored in tlaeotswlroaak seer beoa*re of a
aak net .
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abroad. There are
baresk and that there Is
at Wawa* at P"ft
but
ad63tioas 1 ebW radstenes
?ab
a variety of aarsr itug b
Gemm .vea bme expe0lsd ftm ' n.baaa not been T] WIfte
]~ ~?~ma T7~ T,eetbf: wi' '1~ ~n ~'~`_ i
There am ue 3ncUoratidats . of largo-sod ataen-sreicm !Tans msthi
tool p"fteman to the pyre uotioa of mar matea'ie le' Mary' -tyre of amine
tools produceid! In C oB1o sk a ere adspt01. to both ai Bent awd s3litar7
uses howeusr, and their p although not a clear ii ieatiam 9C
prep ttiCOlb, doe. stmgmm &a wir potential at the B3 s. WWbI"
teal Plants tifabs atl z atpparsrstiy tong entirely to ailittN7
prc~dnctss ID!!ke both tads and 'military aslts i282ode Rafts
Skoda Adeatovs I Skodat W0116 a, 8koda. Vovy! Bars Skoda PilaaMs Sts~attfl0eti0e,
Qeetixa, &V asd Ceelos' Zbo ejadlcs. At
83gaiflearit and socoesst3. W is have been mad* to ptnzase fart
the tlaet sn+oh items as bidh-speed tbnaftg msddAms (from Pi'anes) r~3~t
ma be ttaad fcr almemeaat pradaat o and aa*a-idea1 for pred tcn ear
mart, 22f and gear-anttttnrg ii hinges tz Stserlata, cb itts Was besisvr
are to be used In the map
Since there are no atomic energy pleats in Cssohos]arlda, there
=xe a ttompstic requirements for fissionable materials, and now is aatpsoted
1952.
4. 3t~sl, s.
All t material recovered is shipped to the V=v and no stack.
101.3 am maistaiaed within the country.
5. Ietarfaall4nitations_
The wailablle. manpower .apply is snff'ieiasit fpr the ezpWtatiap
of the uraa;~i ea d po~.ts. IAning practicer are ineff"l mega , ho~arrv~st, and- aosi w
~~eatileticn sad mseihanised equipotant are iwdequ&U, vb5I proper ? toed sari
lothtig for the vor' s are lsuekiisg. $nwportatioem r+ gUiramests and they
a ly of teetueial personnel are bs ievod to to ad.quate.
6. ssi m I oatiwa oLMa U,wtidq t ?
the outpat of mranLt oorntaratee free 1946 to 1950 has beset
:steadily up rd, with a sharp Jiug in 1949. Yaaraaase sins 1949, however,
bslieved to have been at a low but steady rate.
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Me Traneportaticm.
The transportation systems of Czechoslovakia do not contribute sub-
stantially to the Soviet eeonamLc potential for tar. The rail network,
which is probably in the best condition of axW Satellite system, in
important to the USSR chiefly It T;+ -~i ninC the prof activity of C tyoslovak
industry and in delivering industrial equipment and munitions. Mob, of
Czechoalovalcia* a output of locomotives and other ro33.ing stock is deliveoced
to the USSR and elsewhere in the Bloo, but the industry is operating W U
be3 z its potential capacity. Althougjt Czechoslovaks highvWs are insfgniA-
cant in the Soviet economic potential for war, the country's motor vehicle
industry is a major source of Soviet Bloc supply. A large portion of
Czechoslovakia's relatively limited vehicle production is allocated to Ill
Bloc requireaots, to the serious detriment of Czechoslovakia's ors' motor
transport .inctistry.
Czechoslovak civil aviation is developed more extensively than that of
any other Satellite and is of some importance to the USSR, since it provides
a rapid means of movement to and from the West for high-priority personnel
and strategic eormoditiese The watery rs of Czechoelovakia, ixwover,. make
virt iUyr no contribution to the Soviet ec of mic potential.
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-A. Tailroads.
1. Direct Contributions of Railroads to the Econ=ic Pots} ib>?
Tar 0
a. tieneral DescrfptiAn Of, the Netwero
The net=* of the Croe ablovsk State Ra31vge (CSD) 3s
adequate to meet the recgiireee s placed on it by the cauntryi s eoo doogr and
co affc 'd 8=e surplus carrying capacity.. The netaork. is terry sparse in the
east and quite dense in the west, and there are few lines on the eastrveet
axis. Despite these Befit i?naf es, the railroad system meets the requireseazte
of one of Central Bwope& s most industrialized areas.
no Cseohvelo~ak railroads are staacrd-gouges and tranaanad-
ing of goods or change of car axles is necessary at Junction points with the
broad-age Soviet railroads. The tnansloading station at is
one of the largest on the'Soviet western perimeter and appears to be capable
of handling the Ctechos1ovak.6ovsst tZa,Yfice
b. Traffic.
Railroad traffic in 19b9 amounted to 24.h b5314an mstria ton-
Id].ameters,.an increase of 3.3.7 percent over the previous year. y It is
estimated that the IZO level of traffic vas 75 billion ton *i2ogetera, a
level- hi percent bi&w than 1938, the last corms]. prewar year. Platmed traffic
for 1953 is 17 billion ere.
CsechoelaPak3.a does not coact the Soviet Union with iaporUnt
strategic or economic areas. Thez etire, the oauntrya a railroads n s iRpartant
to the ASSR chiefly for maiataind the pro&zctivity of C$echossovak indtmtry,
and 82 percent of total rail traffic is internal. The largest single ca=K)dity
carried is coal, vbich accotiate fbr40 percent of total traffic by s
followed '+ay stone, porcelains -1 9: p t) . apd
sod (in; The chief commodities wbicb move by rail between CsecboslovaIaa and the Soviet
Union are machinery, weapons, munitions, orbs, and metals..
C.
r1ment0-
The The faoilitiee of the CSD suffered less in the vw than moet
continental rail system, and its egnipment is in better condition than that
of most of the Satellites. The condition of lines in wastes CsochoaLo~d a
Is quite goods but in Slovakia the equipment is vcrn and of older design.
Ballast and rails are too light for the efficient handling of current traffic
requirdme nto. S19ia1 equipment is as advanced in Caechoa3 oyalda as e .
In. Eastern Europe, but a Soviet conLdasion has recently surveyed the 6D n&b-
the Soviet e ork with "viewt~convo ing from the International "Qa 8igi'ial system to
v
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d. City.
The Czechoslovak railroads, it is believed, do not operate
as close to maxim capacity as do other Satellite system. Since Czechoslovakia,
before the war, possessed a rail system adequate for an advanced industrialized
nation, the sudden postwar increases in transportation regairewente experienced
in other Bloc countries have not occurred: It is likely that CSD can sustain
temporary and local traffic increases equal to 20 percent of current traffic.
The system as a whole should be able to support an ova-all increase in traffic
of 10 percent, or a 5-percent increase over arty given route, with a few except-
ions. The chief weakness in the capacity of the Czechoslovak network is on
the main east-went line between Cornmad-Tiean and Win- the lino which
carries almost all of the Czechoslovak-Soviet traffic.
YW,nerabd\lity.
The Czecboa%oval: railroad system is vulnerable to sabotage
and air attack because of its many bridges and tunnels. This vulncrabillty
could be critical in Slovakia, where only one east.-west through route a dste,
but is not serious in Bohemia-3Soravia, where the network is dense enough to
provide alternative routes for most of the lines. Tlorkshops are not 1tl li y
vulnerable in Czechoalovald.a, since the well-developed and
railroad equipment industry can provide considerable emergency m~rLnte
capacity.
2. Dissect Contributions of Railroad Equipment to the. Eco is
I~\~\i~ ^ Ir_I\/^YiY~\~
a o Me" MM
a,* Imrentories.
CSD has an inventory of locomotives and freight cars adequate
to meet all foreseeable traffic requirem,eats. Eat .mated CSD equipment in-
ventories in 19149. included 40.90 locomotives and 82,5841 ? ei ght cars, repre-
of 4' locomotives and .85,3214 freight can are planned for 1953. 7. The
3.3-percent increase In the freight -car inventory planned for 1953 iLU require
685 new cars a year fbr 14 years, and total requirements, including r laceme3ntI
Of a possible 2,4.00 care yearly,. are more than 3,000 care yearly, a figure far
below Czechoslovakia's production capabilities.
b. Production Capabilities.
Czechoslovakia has the best developed transportation equipment
industry in the Soviet orbit, vith a capacity to matmtacture at ],iaet 18,000
freight cars yearly. Present production is estimated to be only about 8,000
.freight care because of reduced requirements and the conversion of much plant
capacity to roar production, Locomotive production is estimated at 220 units
in 1950, 2140 in 1951, and' 260 in 1952.
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SET .
c. Tffects of Transfbrs to the USSR.
Substantial emergency v+ithdrawals of railroad equipment
could be made rtdthout serious disruption of the Czechoslovak eoonomW Be-
movals of up to 10,000 can of all types (12 percent of total inch)
could be made for a short period of time without seorioualy affecting traffic,
but protracted removals might imposo restrictions on pertain aspects of the
traffic pattern. Then removal of 5,OOO cars would not seriously affect traffic .
or reduce the total transport capabilities of the country.
A eubetanti.al part of Czechoslovakia's current production will.
continue to be devoted to meeting Soviet and Orbit requirements. The extent
to which Czechoslovakia is now supplyin 1Oeamotives -and other rolling stock +Q-'1' .
USSR.is not accurately known, but it is~apparent that Czechoslovak production
is currently at a level far below the in&istYy'a capacity, suggesting that
requirements and inventories are not far out of balance throughout the Soviet
Bloc.
3. Indirect Contrioutions.
a. Role of Rai]roacas in Sovet Trade.
(1) Extent and Nature of Traffic with the USSR ' and the Sate
tee.
Czechoslovak- railroads do not play a vital part in Soviet
trade. The CSD handles virtually no transit.traffic between the USSR and
other countries, nor does it handle all Czechoslovak-6oviot traffic, some of
which is carried by Polish and Ilu garian railroads. Czechooloval.^-6oviet tsatfio
is generally restricted to the oast-west line between Zilina and C ,
which i i delivers approximately 7,500 metric tons daily to the USSR and Smaller
volumes f the USSR to Czechoslovakia. The chief corxaditics in this traffic
are machinery, heavy industrial products, munitions, weapons, ores, and metals.
The W SR delivers certain ores and metals to Czechoslovakda for manufacture,
largely for Soviet account.
(2) ar ZM6 is to the USSR.
The volume of traffic between. the USSR and Czechoslovakia
is not large enough to be of serious consequence to the war potential of the
Soviet.economy. Tranaloadings at Cerna,.for example, total an estimsted?5
million .metric tons yearly, eastbound and westbound, or only 0.6 percent of
the total tonnage c rigiz atiog a .ly within the USSR. The a$cial nature of
moray of the materials hauled, including macbIne tools and subassemblies for
arcmments,mak+ea the traffic of catch greater importance to the USSR than its
vo]nme alone would indicate. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union's economic potential
for war would be reduced very little if CSD traffic were cowletel,y halted.
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b. Role of Railroads in Trade with the lest.
(1) E,ct it and Nature of Traffic.
Cseahoalvvaddat s rail-borne trade with the .eet declined
sharply in 19149 and 1950? Rail traffic to Trieste is geatay reducede and
the vol=e of traffic with Se3.tacar3' and- lustrla= is also - believed to be reduoed.
Trade with But and Vest Geruar y, 'Aa Loin Countrioe, and oversew areas eaves
largely by the .be waterway system and highwa.
(2) Clandestine Traffic.
The volume of clandestine rail traffic is not kw=A,
but Western export controls we -e believed to have redaced cuich traMc.
(3) Impgrt!nce of Traffic to the Orbit Econoear.
Host items hotted from the Jest are in short
within the Bloc and are of an economic or military importance which
their dollar value. The Czechoslovak railroads, however, handle only a mall
volume of trade with the test and east be considered of major importance in
terms of the Soviet war Potential.
4. Inverse Contributions.
a. S mm[,t and Uateriats.
The 00 is not dcpender on the Soviet Union ibr either rail-
road equipment or materials. Caeahoslo~vak inatry produces surplus quantities
of locomotives, freight cars, passenger care, rails, and signal equL nt.
b, owel`.
Czochoe1ovalda nas an adequate member of skilled and vn&31"ed
workers to maintain all aspects of railroad service and equipment prodnation,
c. Soviet Control.
Direct Soviet control Wwrtod from within the Czeahoac3,,ovati
Lin istry of Transportation Would T ire an unwieldy or_anizatimatted,
the USSR uses the Fourth Bureen of the Czodhoelovak General Staff, the militaz
ap?aratus though which the Czeehoslova c Armor controls the C3D. The Foourth
Bureau, '3iieh has army representatives in the L'inistsg of Transportation and in
all, eight of the divisional directorates, controls all railroad planning, in-
ibrmtivn, and operations, and the i lnf stry of Transportation In s1mp17 a
vehicle for - the operation and a a1 nistration of traffic. In ad tion to con-
trolling the Fourth Bureau through Soviet Arm officers or the Czechoslovak
General Staff, the USSR is also believed to have Soviet Angr officers at various
levels vithin the Fourth Bureau in order to maintain control and to proaum in-
formation. These Soviet officers are called a ',hiiitary Transportation Lriseiom. J
SECM
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elmom"
The (D will tmderCalcs certain 1wz m amente in 1951 and 3957
which will stramgt7m the iv11 eystem and yield some iacresaes in tasfric
capacity but v311. not materia33y affect the Sovlat eoonomde potoeMal for
tsar. The eastt+gast line betmeen Prague and Cerra- *d-Tisan, via 74"-'=,, my
be doable- tx cked, ui th the possible eocooption of a abort stz et ab east of
Poprad. iktectrificaticn probably win be wteuded eaateard tram Z313na to
Spin des by the and a ]959 and my also be Initiated on the Pz*g -
Ces'sa- Trsbo a line before 7953. It is unlikely that increases of moa than
3 peroent will be made in freight oar inventories bl- December 2909 alt u h
a L-peroont decrease in the total lomotiwa inwentoiy may occur. Ibe- ooo-
st ot3on may include mother Um,, to In -opened between Danorm and IIsharad,
ooineotiag Slovakia and the W SR.
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B. Fii,,,rhwaa.
1. Direct Cgntributions ofrs to the Economic Potential for
r ~rr~r~wrrri~, ?rr.
Bar ~
? .
The Czechoslovak road system, -0:i1e useful in the national
ecoryot r, is in genorally poor condition and makes little direct contribution
to the Soviet economic potentiaL for veer. It is doubtful that the USSR in
t h e .f twe v 1 1 1 e i t h e r m e k s i i b nee of or benefit eppreaa,ehty !'leas
Czechoslovak; highways.
a. General Description of the Network.
in 19148 the hi ghwar network nos 71,000 kilometers, slightly
more than the 69,,810 kilometers in use in 1936. Of the 19148 total, only 12,000
kilometers, or less than 17 percent, were reported to be hard-surfaced highways,
and the remainder was considered unsuitable for heavy traffic. 2/ Several re-
ports indicate that little highway construction and repair worklbas been under-
taken since the end of World War II and that the. road system generally is in
dire need.of repair, only 20 percent of the roads being classified as in "good
conditions" Several of the sane sources agree, however, that all of the more
important bridges have been restored. A total of 930-permanent bridges were
built between 1945 and 1950. 3?/ Road construction plans for 1950 indicated
that no major effort was intendeds 1115 kilometers were to be reconditioned,
l 860 kilometers rolled, and 790 kilometers resurfaced. 2/ Perhaps the most
significant project in'the 1950 program was the reconstruction and widening of
one of the few highways linking eastern Slovakia with the USSR. h/
Since highways now radiate from all the important Czeokwoslavak
cities, and the density of the cystert (0.56 kilometer per kilometer) is
alread~r comparativo2,y high by Eastern European standards, little a on
effort is required. Uoroover, bridges are now in generally good repair, and it
is believed that the entire network could be put in first-class condition within
a few months, should either economic or military circumstances be considered
compel ing.
b. Traffic.
Motor vehicles operating under the Ministry of Transportation
account for between 2,5 and 20 percent of total passenger traffic and a little
over 20 percent of total freight tonnage hauled by all types of transport. In
terns of ton-kilometers, however, this tonnage equals not more than 3 percent
of the freight carried by all forms of Czechoslovak inland tromport, 6J ,btor,
transport is concentrated around the large urban areas and consists
of short-haul cartage and conmmter service.
Under the Five Tear Plan (19l9-'53, development of highway
transport is being directed toward. "the greatest possible cooperation ... with
the railroads in the form of radial transportation." 3/ The naryiretem is
do
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designed to achieve a more eoonomi.e two of both rail and bigbwsW transport.
A sharp curtailment of lee n-oaoc1oad rail ahipmentte is irked. edienb
operating dialricts" have been established, and shipmc nta of packaged. ods
within these districts must be made entirez]y by highiiy. The dixtricto
probably are so defined that the longest possible shipment is' net nwh in
e =em of 1,5 kil eeneterss the distance recently estiwited as the ate
average length of hti1. It r4dpmmU are to crows c strict boundariees they
mast be rrved by bigh Toy to the nearest rail co 11ection center and tram-
chipped it carload lots by rail. 1
Passenger traffic figures are shown in the following table 2/s
Passenger Traffic
c o Travel" Aveaof B"a
( ) tea) ( ~ilaet ,
1937
75.0
N.A,
15.0
~.1.
948
172.7
1,654.1
67.1
9.6 J
1, 8
245.3
N.A:
8662
NAG
19148
July an
225.6
2,229.9
87.1
9.9
rsd - aft
226.6
2,722.4
914.9
12.0
Ju3* Plan
249.5
2,5O7.3
99.0
10.1
2404
2,877.0
109.14
12.0
1953 July P2=
307.14
3,21i6.6
127.4
10.6
Revised Plan
241.5
.
2,91403
118.0
12.2
a/ ina d nationalized concerns reporting to the Mniataq of
J Eetimatod.
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v
Freight traffic is as fbIlove jQfs
393?F ,j' 1i9bt 9j~9,1a
Toss Ton- SUoeraters Av+mcage I+sagl2t
Carried Kilometers Traveled at.8~
year (ninia
1937
12.5
l.A.
74.9
B.A.
1947
17.3
343.0
111..7
17.5
191y8
23.:7
R.A.
136.2
N:A..
3948
July Plan
318.0
161.7
14.9
3.9Revie d rim
49
24.6
Am
167.7
3.4.2
July Plan
22.0
356.
200.1
16.2
19RRevised Plan
53
25.1
371 3
188.8
3149
July Plan
263
4b3..l
24 65
16.8
Revised Plan
29.8
41x..0
224.0
314.8
Inalndes only traff c of nationalized concerns reporting to the 113nistty of
1 Estimated.
Although actual -#igures for. L91t9 and 3950 have not been
released: press sports suggest that motor transport, operations have e0panded
considerably since 39118. In 1949, total freight carried reportedly reaohsd
20 million netrln tons, an increase of 21 percent over 1948 and well in s=eas
of the Flan goal. It appears that ed goals are subject to ohmage as the
oiroumitances earrant. In late 191~cs the Czechs evidently considered to re-
vised goals for 3,949 and 1953 attainable, but Whether changing condition have
praq*ed #srther-Plan revisions since that tune is not koo m..
- 1
Restrictions on the use ofnotorr f WI,, Isposed an I August
1948, bad some effect on motor vehiclo tsafflie. Private vahicte operation was
sharply roduc , and, although gacoline was removed fm?the list of rationed
oom Mies in Janwry 1950, its price -remained at v"1,75 per gallon, ttms eo 1ng
any v despcead resumption of use of private cars or trucks vnllkely.
All wholesale trucking companies and an private but lines
were nationalized in. 3.940j, shortly after gas ration ng vas instituted. CSdD,
the state enterprise for motor transport, has effectively marnpolizcd highwar
passenger traffic and endeavored to expand its trucking operations. The 3argest
part of total motor freight, however, his been moved in foreign (mostly Dartch
and Belgian) trucks and in vehicles belonging to the various large nationalized
industrial organization, and traffic statistics for these vehicles are not avail-
able. Military traffic data are also wdanomu
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3SGRhT
Although information permitting a coc?odity breakdown of
higbnvay traffic is not available, it is believed that most motor iredrht com-
prises industrial raw materials and products. Total highway traffic also
embraces horse-drwm transport, atsich is of less magnitude and sic icance
in Czechoslovakia than in the other Satellites but provides a 31~ndac~ntal
service to the agricultural, eoonotr and is, thereforep of eci national Sm-
poxtanco. Altogether, total. Czechoa] ovuk highway traffic Bust be considerably
larger than is indicated by the figures of the 1.inistry of Transportation:
Itemertholese, since cost of it is carried only short distances, total highway
traffic in ton-ki].aaaeters remains ma11.
c. Road Construction and :Iaintenance T.quipmR .
Details as to the quantity and empl cy sent of road-build
machinery in Czechoslovakia are not knoru. There in some evidence that high
priority has been given to the purchase of eastb-moving equipment friom the
'test. There also is some indication that road maintenance and repair are
to be andled in the future by road-building machinery stations, which are
being established in Czechoslovakia on the Soviet pattern..:! It is believed
that to dates however., the small amount*of maintenance and repair work actually
'undertaken has been performed mainly by manual labor.
d. Cam.
Despite limitations of capacity imposed by the poor con-
dition of the roads throughout much of Czechoslovakia ands in certain seasons,
by the weathers highway use is restricted principally by the availability of
serviceable vehicles and of traffic and probably does not clown' approach the
capacity of the road network, except possibly in the large urban areas, The
highway networks although in need of repair, apparently is meeting the require-
ments of the national economy.
e. Vulnerability.
Since motor transport accounts for less than 3 percent of
total f5reiCht traffic in terms of ton-kilometeres its over-all economic vainer-
ability is judged to be relatively slight. There are long-distance road
connections between the major cities, but alternative routes are generally
available, particularly in the western part of the oounttye 1 cover, the roads
also are supolcmiented by rail lines, thus reducing the economic effectiveness of
attacks on highway targets unless rail connections were disrupted at the same
timo.
The pby ical vulncrrability of the Czechoslovak road system
to air attack and ground demolition is considerable booause of the large number
of bridges and culverts on all main routes. Vulnerability is heightened by the
many obstacles to cross-country movement and dispersals both in the mountaimun
areas and in the highly cultivated river valleys. Good demolition targets also
exist on hilly sections of mare' routes, where the roads are frequently out into
rock above steep-sided valleys. These conditions prevail particularly on the
.. i
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frontier crossings around -the Caachosloevak paar3meftr+. Because of the terrain,
howeverp frontier crossings would be readily defensible against groms? forces.
The vullerabdlit*r of the voter vehicle park is higL, and as
intensive attack directed against the-park probab]y would be the scat ailect-
ive means of dissvpt4ng highway. transport. The deetructi,~ of urban tsort
facilities, would have a high mace value,, and barse-&m tr iaportat on peroba r
would be inadequate to -oovensate for aslyr tholesale deatraction of motor vehicles.
Direct Caatsiburtiane_ of Hiifta4r Rranecport Bquip to the
10, A kw=al lAr arc .
a. Inventories.
Offl ai a1 f gores on the motor vehicle inventory have not
been released since 19168. At that time the sitwation, as compared with 393x,
van as fallow ]1 s
Motor Vab iclis alie
1938,I98~
ns
1 Augst 1938
29 Febraary 20
Motorcycles
80,676
6CO
1119
Autamob
es
99,119
,
Trucks
8,537
66ii,ioO
Tractors
17,000
Buses
3,
8oD
I
Others
h,o1o
,
3,880
Total
338 380
The 19168 figures do not include 2,870 trucks and 2,0i1 buses
oened by the State Railways or the various vehicles operated by the police, the
post offices and, presumabtily, the army. It is not believed that the total
vehicle inventory has changed significantly since 19118. Incroasee from donestie
production cannot have been large, because oanedderabie numbws of new vehicles
have been ecported.
Although complete eacport figures have not been repot ted,
substantial motor r-ehiole dbipmaita are know to have been made to Pblaed,
Romania, and the Nether].a s, the first two receiving mainly trucks and the
third passenger oars. Czechoslovakia also exports vehicles to all of the other
Orbit countries, as well as to several Latin American countries, India! Pakistan,
and most of the Western Dnropean countries. Total estimated exports in 1910 are
shown below ] _' fs
SBGTMT
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Passenger Care
Trucks and Buses
Lotorcycies
10,1400
2,100
21,600
50
33,.
33
Taking into consideration the ].invited UVa is of 3,5b
Passenger cars and 50 trucks in 19119, vehicles allotted for do eatia oonsuaptiori
kmi d.tted a retirement rate of only about 5 p"cent for trucks and 8 present
nor passenger cares aseindng no ohv 1-s rial egystem which turned out these products was teclmologica13,y . advanced
by Ustern European standards and did not sustain Important war deism. To a
considerable extent,. the problem of integrating the Caaechoalecntak ecaragp Into
that of the Soviet Bloc is one of modifying wing procbnct l oa facilitla s
required by the USS& and other Bloc members. Thins involves a tar+a *tax on
from a predeominatat,].y light indartry oaagp1 ar to a heavy one. Tons wh(1 the
pfd average annual rate of Industrial construction at 7.7 psacoant dorbog
the Five rear Plan is small when compared with the planned rate for other
Satellites, neverthe3eaa over 40 percent of Caechoslo~rak icaanaaetmealt Is to be
in industry, aiming at as increase in industrial productiax by 1953 to about
50 percent above the 1949 level.
2.R.t-
A& teulture In Cneohoalrnrakia accounts fear 17.6 perce Of the noticlurarl
Income and xmplaya appa"oac3atate],y acne-third at the papnlation. It pa o ss Over
90 patent. ,f domestic food requir meats and a small export eurp2uss ib7deac the
Five rear I JAns, will receive 8 patent of the noti,onau] Inrestmat
budget. Tae primary purpose of this e p sion Is to sappLy ner] a tad
aachins tractor stations end producer oooparatiiea with equd
puMA ,. fwwiasars,
fuel, and other basic materials. Crop police 'under the Five leer Plat Is de-
signed to increase livestock and sugar best production at the eocpsoss of gain.
In 1S B, crop production was 65 percent of the total value of agrift3twa1
output, livestock being only 35 punt. $g 1953 the ratio is pranced to be
52 percent for amp j oduction and 18 percent for livestock. 'This agriaoaltvrai.
program wUl call for Ingports of grain from less highly 4 ndmitri a3 Is now of
the Soviet Blot, but it should halos better use of available land in O
al arakla, yielding more livestock paroduots for home oeo~ and moss sugar
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for export. The chronic labor shortage in Cseahoalovak agtioulturs has been
only partially relieved by Carat mandatory work programs.
3, C 2MME 4.O.
With a high degree of economic devolopment and near self-andfi dcnay
~ food, ~ the highest In Eastern eyed little .. damage, C$sahc~slo~rakiuaes atsndat+d of
Lrops, despite the addition In early
1951 of bread and flour to the list of rationed foodstuffs, on the othas
hood, high prices, the relative scarcity of goods as aoa4ared with praaer
a wa?~ty, and government pressure to work longer and hordes have sa'Louslj
impaired public morale. Because of the lack of new co nsisvation and of repair
of existing units since 1947., housing remains inadequate. Factors caotributing
to the housing shortage inC1ud9 rM material, ahortagos, high pei+ces, an In-
suffici labor supply, and the priority given to industrial dsviloiauent. A
planned increase in the total. Investment of the National Health Service aqy
contribute to an improved standard of living,
4.
oxdributi on of the Boonomz_to the Dour
Czechoslovakia and Poi.and, under Soviet guidance, are to bsaor the
main canters of heavy industry in the Soviet orbit. Coal and heavy un4.try,
particularly the engineering Industry,, in Czechoslovakia will provide the
nucleus for the of the Satellites. The aggineer1i uad~st:y
produces mainly heavy machinery, including electrical equipment precialon
machinery, aircraft and vehicles, and general machineay. Over 60 pseroant of
pro 2ucti can in these categories and from 40 to 50 percent of tractor parodncti, an
are exported to the Bloc. The export of, half of Czechoslovalciaea output of
machine tools to the Bloc constitutes a basic contribution to the Soviet poten-
tial for war,, The Czechoslovak machine tool industry is. second only to that of
the USSR, .which is incapable alone of supplying Moo rsquireeen s for this type
Of equipment
Cz?choal vak uranium mines accounted for 15 per a" of the total w VA*
of urani'a obtained by the USSR in 1930. Thus proportion is expected to be
ained through 1952. The Satellites depend an Cssohoslarakla for rabber
per, and coal and metallurgical oaks are wworted to the Mm, Despite
the fact that the production of consumer goods is being subordinated to heavy
industry, Czschos;7.ovak exports of goods ankh as shoe , t=U:Lets sir, and
glassware matte a eignifiaant eanctribution in Tier of ahortages of such products
in other W-00
coeu~tri ea.
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U. EJUMIld RUM gt 92&.E ME-WAR W arc
1. ,Ma ion;, kwatrt$.
Czechoslovakia, the most highly 3nduatriaM ned couaptry in the Soviet
Orbit, is dependent upon the West for certain 3 strial products and rw
materials, the lack of which would seriously prejudice the at
the Five Year Plan goals and reduce Csechoalovak a's coar-tributioace to the
Soviet war potential. Mazy of these items either cannot be obtained within
the Bloc or can be procured there only at considerable cost. For eocanele,
Czechoslovakia's ferrous metal industry is dependent qpm Swedish high ,rails
iron ore, and the denial of these imparts would substantially reduce ozeah
steel. production until a reconversion could be made in order to use lower..
quality Soviet ores. In various other instances, production increases are
predicated upon increased imports from, the West.
Specialised machinery (particularly ccgxI x machine tools), beads gi,
industrial diamonds, s and sulphur., tin, die copper,
other items are needed tram the West and a" ppaarttiicular impart~sno , red
attaining the planned production of Cseah industry,
The es'fects of Western, European restrictions an exports at msspr
critical items are evident in Czechoslovak efforts to acquire such items,
especially bearings, industrial diamonds, some types at machine tools, recd
electrciytia copper, through covert channels, Althat* it is a major carport r
of maautaotured goods,, largely light industrial ca.,modities, Czechoslovakia
has not enjoyed a favorable bargaining position with the West because its
plants must often compete with similar industries in Western B cope.
Czechoslovakia depends an overseas counbries for many raw n t wia7s,
principally cotton, rubber, hides,, wool, and jute, name of which can be
supplied in quantity by the Soviet Bloc,
2. Y Seia of me 105MR.
The steel industry in Czechoslovakia is dependent ' upon Swedw for about
one-half of its iron ogre. If the Importation of this high-grade an should
stop, a mininim at 1 year would be necessary to eanvert the industry to the
uti'l.ization of lower-grade are, and production schedules all slang the line
in heavy industry and in other sectors dependent npoa it would not be est.
C manmifactures only slightly more than one-third of its
antitx~icticn bearing requireaments. An effective adbargo on bearings would
severely limit Csechosl ovaki,a to contribution to the Soviet war potential,
-I40
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_ iET
I. Xudigat ir 3WA w .
As the rearmament program within the Soviet BLoc was aoosle~at , Ce.01~a-
s]roralda, MAW Saviet direction, and partricu]arlyy after.191,4, o41 sf I i I Isa
raised p r o d u c t i o n ]avels I n f r i e s o a a fi r r i b a U z g to the - -- - - W
potential, of the MAG and cuirtalled the pro&cti an of oonsuerer, goodo. in
inareaeilag degree cKf Qoiversion to military produotiasu took plans in the
' +6 drys Pwiaular],y in a .tura3. equipaent taetariss.
Bvidenoe of actua], dispersal of imduetry is ].Lofted, but sass 41## 2&9*.
asst of manufacturing plants eastward to 31mides. has noon's par 1arIr
in the rubber ice, and the Fives Year Plan "120 tar the rapid is&strla].
V Vs in vb! of Slamakla. Despite the natural ado ages at Sl+avalda's relative
abw deace of ]Tabor and its greater paraoc dty to r+aw material souroes, sash a
reoeiantation In induct ry a1, d.velopwent my be 3ridiaati a of perepsa'sti on tar
There is no ostensible coamwsicc to war production as a i h, but tabs ssaitr-
nrant of priorities for pr ftot&ou and allocation of raer :flaterlala is as taUsms
(1) war fndustry, atiuittg and, heavy industry, pa ticular]y steel aad rcU3sg
ed11s (2) p`eciaiosn on, tooa. industry, vehicle iaductery, and tracto ind+ stzj and
{3) 1 yDt Industry and optical . The tc d rec ri *Am of td?
Cseohaslvveic so< r to eupply induatri,sl roquireaaesxts for th .-MU nsosi ,.
tatee cc iderrab1e subat3.taxtl cn And eocamW in the use of ran materials, r.-
SWICU of military acuaideraticna. Expedients auseb as utZlsistiroa ai' 'asb-
stitute materials, rodmUm in the use of aitary etas]., and axb nsimn of the
use of hard metals are being emplWed. The acono~nlat3Aa of. food stoaka, 13ke
the effort to find substitute raw materials, ire not in itself an isudircetlcm
of war pr+eparaticnso
The rail fetvork, which is of po sdxdvanb !sas so. in the Oseoho~vrak
transportation cyst m, oonti butee to the Moo ecatioetis?elilitery po .nUal
chiefly in mainntaiaing the produett of as;e~otio lo~rak iadwstry. Tlrrs is
little .or no evideaaoe In railroad amati;ans of par.parati for bostviliti s,
but the continued 'fimplit of higtyaa ys may be indicative of war pespamm
Zion.
UO M
a
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APP# 4DIZ A
fl &PITUXATION (` LItiITATIOAB, 'D8FICIEMCIE;3,
AND MUM S OF D 1 LTD CE
Section a Is, III, VLt2, M and a do not ban aaterial
to be indluded !n this Appeand1z,
U. aaci! of BbIDa nl6atsoaa+aeer for Eocnaaaaio Dev 1c soma
The results of the 1*7 ceoaaws of popu]atian, particu]ar]y for taw
tltualal sector, are avai]ub]a, but ]9 amens results are not. Int r-I
wirl estimates of population, births, :mod deaths . appear in the official
s Lsticw].. pnblicatioa~. Further information is needed an dumps in man.
per plater as theq ooasw. Additional inforbstion concerning hours of work,
prodiotivity, and the content of training cam" also is deeirebls.
IT. Fever Trade and Fines *.
a~~? Iwri.arr+rrll r~r+i~~r.rar+rr
. Wonation an cv deed ai[. tmdb with all c0imtr!.ss Is adegoat1 ttLrough
17148 and the first half of 1949,0 but since the m3dd3~a at 291i9, hasaafv r, It bas'
become progressively moire difficult to obtain. epeaifio and dspas aible .1 t 11i
pones
Informstio an trade with Wastern fnsope is still good. Oeort tssds
etatistice pz v ds inf'ariaation of sufficient accuraay In. prs1 cooaalodi*
grimVI ge. In new l nstaacea detailed breakdowns are avaf.Zabl., whersa* in
*there only broad categories are given. Reporting an free port transacklow
and tran3chiirrents also In fr agmen and insufficient,
I> tozw~abian an trade with the Soviet Bloc ie iasuftioieat. Data an needed
not. a0 y on oditj- zovemmft but also an prlo1 g policies and setbods of
p.-.
Information oa, trade with other arose of the world to available in same
inataaoes, but winch tame aoe ld be reoeaasary to acs plait such and
In many instances it'ia inadOq ate.
dso of specific oonaaption raaquix~ements, impart z+egnire?ente, and
aspbrt. availabi2ttloa of the Soviet Union., Caechoslavakia, and the other Soviet
Blau oountrles Is necessary to anever the prob]Isaa posed in this paper. Such
ir~foa~aati;on in not available to the Trade and Finance Branch except in v:"l
1?nited Instancee.
? 151
SBGW
is
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Information an balance of papments Items other than 11ty, =1 anti
is ?incdeguate. For lastance, the prob]ma of using the faoilit ss of ether
countries is particularly imgortaat in the am of Csechosl~akis, tiedt to
]and -3i deed, but little is bmm about t19 ttsnaportaticn and 1nsuxanof charges
paid for tpe use of such facilities.
Bs tatltui~.
Adequate ?prenr inforsation is available on Oibchoolovsk igrioolt ire, but
cm rsi4erable vo* remalas to be do* to establish a firs base for mootpar3.l~oin.
94M I reoent3ys reports tram the US RdmuM In Pragos have been, fairy adequate,
At. the present tine, however, mere is no agricultural attache In Qeecttoel o~o+ak3s,
and reports are inadequate in naaber. sad quallty. SO reports have besa. helpful,
and the service e1touhd?. be hoc *nded. Greater dependence aoist now be psaoed an
mrospapera, radio broadcasts, and other inuid+entnl bits e!f 1nfca~atiest an
p ous]y, and tberefere mater. d~epen3anoe mast be placed ca mathsr infsrsa-
tim, if and uben obts3nabla, in making eetieaateao.
VI. ''t atrial Capacitor and XaV is of Prodoation:
A. Ferrous Matale.
After the Comet coop in Creohhoslo1vakia and until appraecimatsly
January 1954, defectors, several of Khan held high posttioNIt in the iron aad
steel industry, vsre- source of inforastion and of basic dooments of great
value to this offieee. SinM January 1950, little iafor ticu has been xsdeived.
As3jable iafonaatian is needed on the following.:
1.. Location and desariptton ' of iron ore and mangsneas deposits, mines,
and concentrating p3ants; estimates of reserm..
2, Descriptions of instaltiticas and egnipmert of axiatiag iraa and
steel plants, to be used-ss a basis fbr a detailed plant vW&O,
3, Actual pradnctlcn of all mw materials and saeiifinlebsd paroduefir
of the iron and steel industry from 19218 to date; eatiaatee for ]5343?
40. Cation of, raw materials by the Iran and steel industry tram
19218 to date; oco tion of iron and steel products idt rt E3nsoboelovstds ~-
induetaq.
5. Import aM export trade In Iron and steel raw materials and
products fxaai 39146 to date; trade agreements, with detailed ci nd tr sac o
3iete.
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3BCIR
B, Nonferrous Metals.
3.. C ro.
Iataraaatiaa is 1acklag an iaaaports for 3949 and 1950, pLamned
imports for 2M and 19520 sad stockpiles.
I"d. and Zino?
Inlasm4tiaa Ira JACK M wan production in 2950, sequireasnts, stooia-
pi3es, and expsnaarion of 3sad and lino ulnas. Infor~tian is needed an the
amisltere at the Weisaaasan Wext5a at 9veta3a.-Chote3ovios and the Gebr. Dudek,
Ssttenal. near Teplitz Sahcmu, zsportadly closed down in.3914 9
34 A1mdnum.
Taco ttion is required an the use pattern for Imported alv>a!i m
and the location of. Oxacboslovak fabricating punts.
4.
Data aze. meded on production, Location of misses, planned soVan'-
aims, re~uir ante, nee pattern, and location of fabricatiM plants,
5? M.
Information is required as the new dev+elc>paeent Its Cinebsr* $]ovak s.
.Caai.
The foil using info tdJoa it requested:
2e Produotian In 2950 by diati'icte and by iaadividual mimes and Plan
flgurrs for 1951 and IM,
2. Data an actual imports of bitnm1naus coal fro Pc3,ad,. In ,1950 and
exports by types of coal and Doke to various oonatrles in ]950.
3. Site at coal stocks In the coantsy ip 2M.
Is. Amiysis at the supply a aritmaatioaa and evidence of aw dwr*m at
coal and coke.
Data was aatval producrtim of me Mnargical cake, other lard coal
oche, and brawn coal cake in 1450 and plena for 2951 and 19524 Out figures
by indivi4i pints are desimd.
0.153.0
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TOP S
6. Data on the prcductioss and amp. ty of briquette plants.
7. 3b fora tfon oor~oeraing the -eat of nm adnea, eacpamedon
of- old miuw# and clasiag of argr mines in 1950.
8, Data an mining madsinerry and equip ut, including qusattit3.es sod
types being produced; queutitiea required by the coal indvrrtaty; and q*ntitses,
tppea, and sources of imports.
9. Analysis of production diffimltiea and poasibilttirea for emp d-
ing coal production.
10: Data on the co ion of ooa3. ancI coke in 1950 and planed
consumption in 19a and 39 2.
D. Petroleum.
Xnfarmarticu is needed on the f I&Afte
1. Stockpile size, location, and product campositian,
2. Imports and exports by quantitys products and or].giu or destination.
3. Expansion of old refineries and oonstruat&on of nm onee, frith par-
ticul.ar emphasis on eyntbatice e
11. Production of bigb?grade aviation gasp] inw.
5. Caaasrsmption t y consuiaeor group, product; and quantity',.
6. Infosiaationz art e>cp3orati on and explaitat.ton -of now fields.
Be Electric Po ,
3, Inteorna3. T.fmitatic m,
a. Raaources.
no critical gaps exist in intelltgwrsoe material covering eo U
resources for electric pow 61nora'tialtw raati,oet an pot ttial nad?sr pow
resouroes is sattys bat such 1'esourcea play a minotr part in elacti'ioit p roductian.
be Eleotr4irW G rating Pants.
~~r ^ wrr,ar wrrr~~ rr.rr.wr
There is auttf.aieut, inforaati~a? to detersdne the total installed
oapacitr vitbin from 1D to 35 percent accuragV, but net addition since 3,947
TOP SEMM
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cannot be learned from acvalUble ma-teria1. Further emaadnatii~on of III records
may reduce this detic3.eatcy. Intora en non the p!Wsical ooaiditicu of ecpdpeent
is .inadequate. Such informe~tdau is of iswrtanoe in estab34Wdng the real
rapabilit~ of the plants to deliver pow, as wall as in deta dining replaotsment
lieeda. Current Informuce an the pr'ogveee of new project ooastruckUn also
ya inadequate. 9pecif3.oal3yr fatbxvast3+ou is desired on the progress of
c;onstruation at the joint Cseob Poiiah plant at Dwory, which is 3ar?s mum&
to main significant Qosctribntiona to the electric pdrrr supply of the Silesian
region.
a. Trat'isvion Sydte 0
Available material pro vi a rasoneh3y goody know3afte of
Gaecbo~a1ai dais exiting and proposed trazlsmissic anstema~ but anal a~dd'itirona7
nformatIm is needed to der &a1 * their carrying capacty .and the degree of
t;oordinati n into a natiaml nrnr !o*.
L Prcdnctiau.
Statistical data on electrical pa~oduc:t-i ou fr pVencar yawns to
,,be present are more plaotifWl and more reliable then for most of the oars!
Satelttte nations. It is beocmdng more di Moult each ymr, hdvaverm to obtain
such information.
Considerable inteI13 Bence material is available as to the ~ pattern
of use of el ectacicily bar the main sectors of the Czedaelovak eoonowa and the
:3a we is true of the pro tiaatate use bar the principal oo mxwe itt iadaartary.
?brther inf i~oa and research, bowovw, will be necessary to establish
?eliable parer figures for essential inudustriee.
6. Input" Regnireeaencts.
E pt for the need for more iafonnatiaoat on regnirmanta of new
=d elsatrieal ec~i m there are no critical gyps in inta714genoe
j:*aterial on input requir?enta.
7. Vn]ne~aMtar.
Information is needed an time w i3'M of certain sear s4aeis3a for
t lectrio equipment,nhidt appears to bo tuts paint of ailaeorabilily.
Further reeeaarah i ith D/I and D/M should reduce this Wi ei sn
F. Chawdca3a.
1. aka.
Because of the great importance of the Caeohosla ak nitrogen industry
An time of war as well as in peacettate,, the need to know more about its capacity
155
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S IMM
and rate of production is a math of bigbest pa icrity. Unforttmately, the
volume of infoiwatio n avatlaMs to this office ban dropped man y `since
ear3y 1950, and the Wentity received in 1951 has been negligible.
More infOX Lion is pan tcular3y required on the two new nitrogen
p3daats at Uaost and at Uartrinove Co~afii a,.wxtion of their planned capac3t&es sod
details cat the
data of befr c 8bmatia are needed.
{/~
Other data on the exLeting plants wau3d be he # to
acid faci1it1e of the t%om81a Ostrava plant hay* been Increaseds but there
is little information abdtt new cepaci'r and average dai3y rate of production.
More recent coufbmation of the syathetie e?aaia or nitrogen capacities of
the ~~Seattin ("Synthessi~a~"~)L~p~lant. at IbmveJaa Ontra,a and the plants at Ustirinad-
fabom would prow valiiaV3e.
6. Su3)ha r and Pyrites.
rr r r~.+.rr r i
Lfcre information is needed on quantity and sources of Cuech imports
of both sulphur and pyrites. Sloe dependence on the Meat for a substaarti7.
part of its pyrites supplies renders Czecbos3,orrakia vulnerable to eoancdc
warfare measures Which would ser 37 cripple many of its strategic Industries,
efforts to obtain supplies through clendeeti ne moans particaler]y should be
watched,
information is also needed on progress in the. we Of
C~eebaslooakiato resources of domestic pyrites-and traproduct salphar.
7e Rubber.
Recant 3ufornst cn on the Caeca a1ovak rubber indnatry is inadequate.
Production data, information on a pansicn of fabricating faciliittres end
ii formation on any action twit to increase syutbetie rubber pa~odn are
perticular],y desi.red* In addition, information on carbon black and rubber
chesdea3s is extrama3y scanty, it is believed that a good deal of snub Informa-
tion could be gleaned from open sources, such as trade. journals, nw spaperrs, and
technical articles, were they made available to this office.
t eating ?r!dustSrr.
In the preparation of this paper, considerable use was matte of the
Situation Report for Production Tqui- matt (Working Pape4 30 June 195C-for
informatian which it was not possible to obtain from library sources because of
the time 13 mi tati ons? ' This paper represente appro ri ately 90 percent coverage
of 1950-551 material and ap roxlmately 50 to 60 percent coverage of material
previous to that periods
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SECRET
For the engineering industry as a irlwle, the foU wing are the chief
information deficienciess
1. Production figures for 1950 and the first 6 months of 1951
by product.
2e Degree of achievement of the Five Year Plan quotas for 1950
arid the first 6 months of 1951.
3. Specific of the cc?odities exported to the USSR,
their quantities, ori,g1n, and, 'enever possible, their destinatiaai.
'4- Types of coaranodi tie s being exported to the Sate=tee and
factory of origin.
5, Trade agreements (1950..51) with the' countries of western
Eueope and the Soviet Bloc, particularly secret agreements.
6. Shortages in raw materials, highly specialized machinery, etc,
7. Names and quantities of those item currently received from the
USSR which are important to the Czechoslovak industrial econoap-.
8. Morale of personnel, the factors which affect it, and the
effect of morale on production.
9. Organization of factories, with names and biographical infox-a,-
t:Oon on top personnel.
10. Condition of factory machinery, degree of obsolescence, etc.
11. Factories recent3r constructed and plans for new construction.
12, Instances of factory conversion to materia of direct veur utility.
13. Soviet supervision of Czechoslovak planta, the sectors super
Wised, purpose of supeorvision, and names, addresses, and technical background
of supervisors wherever possible.
ALreraft
In the time allowed, it was impossible to do a thorough research job and
make an evaluation of quantities of item being produced at the various aircraft
factories, Nearly all information is of a hearsay nature. The system whereby
the CIA Library files some documents and SO controls the distribution of
especially valuable ones, thereby making their contents to av41ab3s for research,
increases the time required and reduces the reliability of estimates.
.. 15'7 r
SEUM
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9. s r
In the preparation of this paper; research was restricted to the material
on bawd covering the production of finished craft in sblpyards. Data an marine
equipment comprises; 60 peroant of the inf'ormution avmi1 b1e in the Iiddustri,al
Register and the CIA Library on the a12rinatvsive 5ub3ect of shipbuilding,
which has not been exploited. The time allowed for a review of the subject
was totally mdesquate0
Ho Uranixan.
There is a large voltmae of informartiaan on the uaranl resources of
Czechoslcvslda in OSI, but very little of this mterial In now available in
this branch. _ An accurate knowledge of the real shortages In this field
'v rill. be possible only *hen a complete survey of the material in the Special.
Comcdity files and in OSI has been made.
Vii. Transportation..
Ra.i3roa so
Re3iab3e figures for traffic or inventories have not been available
since 19158. Railroad trackage developments and changes in the signal. systeer
have been r moored, but no authoritative information is avai.Iable.
B. .
The major deficiency is - int.elligenoe iatoasaticn on Czechoslovak hi gb-
wa y transport is the lack of detailed data concerning all aspects of highrm
traffic.. Highway transport is, important tom ous sepwate of the national
econo W, including agri=lture, industry~- the armed forces, commerce, and
gov~er~eut. The total. vehicle park, lnc.ludiaeg both motor vehicles and anim 1.
drawn equipment, in distributed according to the requirements of those segments.
In order to estimate accurate 3 r the over-all capability and the eeoncm3.c vulner-
ability of Caechoslovak highway transport, the allocation of vehicles to those
interests and the nature and qumitity of all types of hi - traffic movements
must be knomn,.
C. water Transport,
The capacity of the inland water transport system is not Imm with
accuracy. Available information is incomplete, often misleading, and mabdgws.
Port capacities are not sufficiently detailed. Fleet invent ol7 Information
is inadequate, since available statistics do net differentiate clearly between
Czechoslovak craft on national waterways and those operating in Poland. ?,bore
details are also needed on the nature and voluaae of traffic.
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S
De Air Tra part,
To assess better the fmportunce - of Cuodws1orak air transportatian to
the USSR eoonomdo potential for war, infoot tm abaold be obtained on the natum
and To]=s of Czecbos]:otiatc air tso orts and esporta V oam y of origin or
destimtiion andL on the percentage of air i orte farm the Weet that an trans-
abipped ty air to the USSR.
To assist in evaluating Csecboalotalda!.a dependeonos cc the tRSSR for air
transport egaip mt add ap 'e par te, reparta are dosired ca the mat um and
tolme of such freight - de3ivered ter air or of mamas of transport to Csecbas3 o-
vWda from the IISSR,
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81 R
APP U B
FOO= W AND SOUR=
Sections I, To vIII, IS, and I do not have
material to be iao3 uded in this Appendix.
II. Ga?jrae, i#aof &own fogAUL90c ,De~velat~me
10
2. State Aespatch No. as Prague,-15 Doc 3914.
34 The N i1 a of
4. CIA : au 990
B. Gloso
as the Five ear Plan).
6. CIA 406430, og* get. 25X1 A2g
7. Did. 25X1 A2
8. a .i.etiok7 Zpravodaa, xif, No. 4., p. 150, 19503
9. From 1950 figure plus increase anmommed in FBIS, 1 Feb 19514
10. Bstimated on the basis of increase planned from .1951. to end of Plea
in FBZS, 11 Apr 1951.
11. CIA 406410, .
120 Statisti+a~r , p. 16.
23. CIA 406410, sham to and of Plate
over the Plan pe iod.
14. 1 Reports of State Statistical Office of C , VOL 7RZ,
oe0 55-5e, 1.949.
15. CIA 406410, 22.
16, Estimated from tat Umwment announced for Five Year Plan, F=s
6 Apr 1951, lees then bar to be added from 1 Jan 1951 to and of
1953, IBIS9 U spar 1951.
17. F&8, 30 Jan 1951.
18. Reports of the Central Statistical. Office, Yos. m, No. 59, ].%9.
19. FBIS9 6 Dee 1950 (awed increases aonvertsd to prewar bass).
ILL- Scam Sm i=TiiwGiiri Ii 0
1.
20
30
5
6.
7.
s4
Vim. Vol. V, No. 236, p. 5, 27 Jan 1949 (Ming Prague z*dla
broadcast of 36 Jan 1949)0
FBI$, 1 May 1951 (citing ZimadelsloQ l rimy, 27 Apr 1931)-
5 Apr 1951.
~g-s Vol. No. 266, P? 7, 26 Jan 1990.
$
31 Migr
s
FBZS, 11 May 1951.
Feat the Curt Vol.. in, Bo. as
23 Fab 1951.
Bo tg,_,Ir f en Czeaho.._....M +5$ Vienna, 17 May 1.951.
Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900030002-6
 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900030002-6
Sa"T
37. E2010 2at F3nanae
1. State Dssp. 2910 Prague, 7 Nov 1930; State Dssp.1950 Praam, 4 MW 193Dj
Prs
3
,
.... 170?s
25X1A2g - -" -~ ?
Jo3nt a 37'0 Pragwip
2. State Dssp. 134, Prag st, F$.
3. State Deep. 291, Prague, on., g-R j 80 4.7679?
4. State Deep. 39L,_ 8w, 1-9493 State Deep. 333, Sws 1990.
5.
6,
70
8.
25X1A2g
/9? State,Desp., Hbf 34 Jan .1950; State A- 5, Prsgw, 7 Fob 1949?
31.
via
Emm MAW
Saaroes=
25X1A2g
I 7707Busm BT 666?49s 24 May 1949.
WA -%WUI A~Pwr Ns? 20, Oct 28 1949.
Be
ND+
I.- FM 1/90, 10 Jan 1950 (deta3l+ed Five rear Plan t w the
Cseobosl,v~raic lie~tallurgf,aa3. ?,~,
30 ~Caeohos]:~onrakia, 1tgy 1948.
-
4. FDD 3/50, . Bit'
50 FDD, Speaf No. ] O, 6 Feb 1951.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900030002-6
6,
7. =S reply to Colloation Aequiest No. 9597.1.
9, Emu% .?.?.? ... ~alal.~ U Delay 1951.
20 bead and Zinc,
1. BID Csec?wslovakia Ua 1948 - CIA No. 129510 p. 80.
20 FDA) Special 10, 6 Feb 1931.
6. FDD sp oUT o Ti Feb 193]..
25X1A2g 8.- Fw 10 Jan 1937.*
a
96 BMW Of i tetyZ AM W ZUMI! 9u y, Jan 1948.
3. A~e
3... Csdechos rak3,a, 1949 Operational Plan, FDB 10, 6 Pb h3.951.
4. A.,B1~, i M?
1. Bureau of l~tinea, MIMCII r M i ,Preprint, 19490
2. T 24 Today. Boyal institute at lrtt. rnati val Altair.,
30 1948.
47* 9 ,,,,, 1949-,Fs NUMPM 25X1 A2g
a.
2. OIR Report 53-64;--20 Sap 1950.
195].
Tin Committee as actual or estimated ooosumption; 1950 figure
estimated) 0
D.
25X1 AOn 1. T, Jan 1938.
25X1 A2g ko lb' E'? J-98 ID EWCtd 18 1949,
50 Info~matfon Paper 88, CIA 518438, 17 Oct 1950.
600 ~-'. i AZ. J+9a, o
7. In Intozinatian I8pet , O. ACA.
as. s
? 162
:11ir Mir
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79RO.1012A000900030002-6
TOP =MW
25X1A2g
2. World Power Conference, Report No. 4, Tablas 17 and 1&.
3? FM translation of oN}{. ;a :l sari" U, No. 4 state
Statiatiaol Office, Pragng, 17 Sep 3.948.
4. 4th World Power Conference,. Sac. A., Pa'p.z' No. 15.
31 6. Wieport I R-249-49, .CIA 344410 {with mph us Federal pawn
Commission Report, "ELectric Power Supp]yr in Cseohoelovakja,a
Apr 1944?
25X1 A2g go nu - 12, 1949?
90 BmUgbink Feb 19503 AmLeg 232, 30 Y 1950; UN
11 tit Swat ati Qa Vj; i-a_+n through Aug 1944z
13e FM mss. . s ? f 25X1A2g
Pragusi Z 50, CIA 464"9o
31 N4 195p ? s ? o Air Attache-
15. c 5X'~A~ F 28 Am 1950.
ear.
E. Ei49tria Dm-
45^ 1
25X1 A2g 12.
7.I.. FDD Thane. Sp. as M. A& g state
9. FDD Trans. Sp. 6, 01949 Operatiaoal Plus for Protctiea and
Allocation of Fuel and Power in C hoelovakla," 21 Doe 1950
10. in Istformatioa Paper as* oR. g As
3. un 950
2. 14 Sep 1930.
6~. 9alahur aad v 'ittea.
25X1A2g.o 25X1A2g
25X1 A2g. 3tntistittto-. ~, Iwo 5-6,. 194'
25X1 A2g 3D. FBIS 37o-7 Feb 1953. (State Platmlzig Office release),
31. Ito FIB taranalation (net publie ihed) )ma paper..
13dHoak "s Jul 19491 5X1 A2g
3.4.. C Repo Q?. s oa.git
25X1A2g
5.
6.
7.
,-163.
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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s
20 a t. ..awm"o
25X1A2g.
3?
30 t. l Maq'p oea'?
1. 3"te, Prague 18, 14 Jan 1990.
2.
30
4. State, Prague 18, o?~. a L?
5
6. ft., Prate 18, op. cat.
25X1 A2 7f Ceeob082 ora1 Five Yeecr p~aa fear Agriculture, 5 Apr 1951.
g se
9
'~(. ?
25X1A2g ~o
13?
4. tractors.
1?
25X1A2g 2.
30
40
Into date 30 Apr 1949; IBIu?C M-V6992, Apa~ 19493 X113-i9,
25X1X750
6. M
25X1 A27g
0
e0
~t9. Cseahoalvv&c Five Year Plan for Agrrioulture, 5 Apr 1951.
31.. HT .723-49.#9
22o a ?
25X1A2g ,?
.
25X1 A2g 3.4. Y'a 04"t15FA, 25 fir' 1951
50 _l a, ,,, anon Eaui~ment.
25X1 X7
2. state, Prague 490, 25 Mar 1950.
25X1 A2
g C, ,
50 Cam State Pluit Office, 22 Feb 1951
sir
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 f' 'Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900030002-6
25X1A2g
6. &j&td &tian k2MME.
1.
2,
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
S.
9.
1a
U.
12.
33a?
340
1r5.
16.
Sources: So reports, 00 reports, Air end Ara W Attache repents,
ft way Prague.despatohee, USFA, FDD,, Internaticnel
Atlas (Italisn-), and Jane's A ?{ ]4!a Aircraft.
` II. 2 ansnartatf oaa.
A. Ra., ~..oade.
1.
2;, Czechoslovak qi e
19 Oct 1950,
25X1 A2g 3.
B. U3 w s.
25X1X7 1.
2.
3.
40
5.
Czechoslovak document issued by State.Plsw g Office Prague,
8 Jul 191;$).
P] anriina Commission RE the Five ink
CIS 4,
'ayy Transport, PI 289,
Air Attache Paris, IR.-382-49.
FDB Tranaiation 49/49, 7 Sep 1949
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 ,,,Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900030002-6
7.
$.
9?
25X1A2g
11.
32.
25X1 X7 33.
S~ ate: Deep. 35s Pragues, 23 ~ 3.9491 NOV 99 ~(~ 1949 c9f~ M? cit.=
FDD Trans3ati?n Special 3:
Plan for Hwy TrweporQ,
14. State Rpt 5830 Prague, 19 Aug 3.948 (official a
15. State Deep. 4902 Pragues 21. Apr 1950 (eatimte
t G officia L).
16 a Ibid.
25X1A2g 17.
18 FDD Trsnalation, Speoial Number 3, M. g&.
3.9. FDB 3.ati~oan 49f49, ottt.
20. Czech kk mooxfra Bulletin %4M Nov Nov 1948.
21. , e , 20 Mar 1950.
22o State Cable 80, Prague, 10 Aug 1950,
atsacya:j.
of Czech Indust tisl
`firaz aport,.
0. !tar.
25X1X7 1.
25X1 A2g 3. (report, of a to r Groh Oder barge crewwa).
4C? d fit
. $?.3. , Prague, 6 Nov 1946.
5
6. State Deep. 153, Viennas 3. Feb 3.953. (eatenent of Czech traffic
expert in Austrian trade journal.).
D. AL- Tr nporte
2. HIS C-& VIII, Sm. 37
3 a CIA- 345 (ReptPit, to the Gzeohoalavak. Central P]anoing Ccmisii,on
on the Five Year P3= for Transportation).
.4. ABC. M&.y i.JW 1951.
Stations . of tha N 1d, Volume 34.
and,gMW
5 o
25X1 A2 7. Air Qrder og $ett~e, no. 172120, 15 liar 1951.
g 8;
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